CHAPTER - II

EVOLVING STRATEGIC Ca-JCERN AND MARITIME SUPREMACY

The term strategy is derived from the Latin noun strategia

and the Greek word stratega is defined as a branch of military

art regulating and coordinating the war preparations. It is the

art of tactical pre-dispositions and directing the combat to

achieve the aim of waro 1 The French dictionary defines strategy

as an art of combining the action of military forces in view of

attaining an aim in the war determined by the political power,

strength, security, economy of forces constituting the tradi-'

tional principles of strategy, and its domain belonging to the

government and the (military) high command, jointly. 2 .Whether

the term strategy did exist since long in the Orient and was

also used by the Greeks in Herodotus' and Thucydide' s tines or

began to be used in the European languages, somewhere in the

eighteenth century and it tended to retain the lesser corr.bi­

nation of n stratagemtt for the general, were for the leader to

consult and interpret to chalk out and plan to achieve his war

aims in the absence of systematic treatiess on the subject is an

unresolved debate.

What we study today is the development of strategic and

tactical theory in the West from its origins in the eighteenth

century until our day, and the interaction of this theory with

1. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Dizionario EncicloP.edico Italiano (Rome: r..stituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1970), vol. XI, p. 746o

2.

the actual practice of and preparation for war by soldiers and

statesmen. 3 The dialectical views of Buellow and Berenhorst

expressed on the subject of strategy during~the early nineteenth

century were to be soon displaced by two very much abler and more

influential thinkers, namely Antoine Henri J omini and Carl

Clausewitz, in defining the relationship of war to it. They wrote

in almost the same terms, rejecting the eighteenth century belief

shared by Saxe and Lloyd that campaigns could be won without

battles.

Unlike C lausewi tz, J omini perceived battle in a broader

context than that of a straightforward and massive conflict of

forces, a 'bloody and destructive measuring of the strength of

forces physical and mental', with whoever has the greater amount

of both left at the end of being the conqueroro For Jomini it

4 mattered where and how the battle was fought. Clausewitz wrote

that strategy teaches the use of engagement for the object of

the war, 5 while Jomini defined strategy as the art of making war

upon the map, and comprehending the vmole theater, it dec~des

6 where to act. The strategic concept which was a topic of purely

3. Howard, Michael (ed), The Theor and Practice of War: Essa s Presented to C a tain H. B. Liddell-Hart, London: Cassell, 19 5 , p. IX-X foreword. '

4. Ibid, pp. 10-17.

5. Clausewitz, Carl von, On \'lar, edited and translated. by Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter (Princeton: PrincE?ton University Press, 1976), Book 2, chap. 1, p. 128.

6. J omini, Baron de, The Art of War, translated by Wendell, G.H. ~ and Craighill, W.P., (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962;, p., 69 ..

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49 and simply of a body of~££ KUerre (a concept of wartime

tricks) of generals and soldier-statesmen, in fact broadened in ~-

scope during the nineteenth century to an art of controlling and

utilizing the resources of a nation - or a coalition of nations -

including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interestB

shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual,

potential or merely presumed. 7 The famous Napoleonic dictum 11 to

read and reread the campaigns of the great captains" past and

present was perhaps the main reason and basis of the writings on

strategic formulations by its practioners.

The twentieth century writers have defined strategy along­

with its paraphernalia. According to Hajor-General W.D. Bird,

strategy may be defined as the direction or management of war;

and strategy in peace will, therefore, comprise the management of

all national resources so that they may be capable of being

exploited not only to the greatest possible extent, but also at

the time when they will be most useful, should the necessity for

protecting national interests involve the nation in war. 8 In a

brief paper on 11N ew Thoughts on Strategy", Herbert Rosinki said,

that strategy should be considered as the comprehensive direction

of power for the purpose of exercising control of a field of

7.

8.

Earle, Edward Mead, ( ed), Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thou t from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971 , Introduction, p.viii.

Bird Major-General vv. Do , The Direct ion of War: A Study of s-trat§.&Y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19~~0), p. 24 ..

50 action, in order to attain objectives.9 Eccles himself is of the

opinion that strategy may be described as the coinprehensive

direction of power toward the attainment of broad objectives or

aims. This includes the selection and time-phasing of that mini­

mum of specific objectives whose collective attainment w::.ll

accomplish the broad aim. 10

Eccles also quotes Admiral R.B. Carney defining strategy

as a plru""'l of action best to employ resources in pursuit of aims,

and in any case great or small strategy is a matter of reconciling

desires and capabilities. 11 Liddell-Hart who devoted a whole

life time to the study and explanation of strategy and the related

aspects of it opined that it is the art of distributing and

applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy. For

strategy is concerned not merely with the movement of forces as

its role is often defined - but with the effect. When the

application is of merging the military instrument into actual

fighting, the disposition for and control of such direct c.ction

is tactics. The two categories, never be truly divided into

separate compartments because each not only influences but merges

into the other. 12 But this definiti?n, too, according to general

Beaufre' suffers from a C lausewi tzian clout. He defines strategy

as the art of applying force so that it makes the most effr~ctive

contribution towards achieving the ends set by no.tional policy. 13

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Quoted in: Eccles, Henry E., Logistics in the Natior~al Defense (Harrisburg, PA, The Stackpole Company,1959),po10.

Ibid, Po 21.

Ibid, Po 22.

Liddell-Hart, B.H.,, Strategy, the InQ,irect Atproach()l"ew York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), pp. 335-33 •

Beaufre 1 , General Andre' , Introductiop to Strategy

_ T.onrlon • 1965}. . I

51 While explaining strategy Liddell-Hart opined that as

tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so

strategy is an application on a lower plane~· of n grand strategy".

While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the

conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy wLich

should govern its object, the term "grand strategy" serves to

bring out the sense of policy in execution. For the role of

"grand strategy"- higher strategy - is to coordinate and direci:

all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the

political objective of the war - the goal defined by fundamental

policy. 14

The global strategy was described by Air Vice-Marshal E.J.

Kingston-McLonghry as the strategy evolved through the ages from

the aims and means of the most primitive of armed forces, through

the developed strategies of specifically armed services to the

often hastily improvised combi~ned strategies of allied nations. 15

Although the advent of air power altered the formulations of the

combined land and maritime strategies greatly, the end of the

World War II gave rise to the most important and the so-called

ultimate weapon, the nuclear power. As strategy results from

reciprocal interaction of doctrinal preferences with the various

environments affecting it. These environments (the internal and

external environments and technology) operate in different ways

14. Op.cit. 12, p. 336.

15. Kingston-HcLoughry, Air Vice-Marshall E.J. , Global Strate~ (London: Jonathan Cafe, 1957), P• 13o

sz at different times, producing opportunities and constraints for

these charged with the development of and implementation of

strategic doctrine. 16

l\1ARITIME STRATEGY

Traditional writers have been using the term naval stra-

tegy for the study of sea po·wer. Since this term restricts the

scope of the study of sea in its all. aspects, it is unobjection­

able to use the term maritime strategy instead; which is derived

from the Latin noun~ meaning sea. The Germans have a

literal translation of the original Latin version of maritime '

strategy, the Seestrategie. The term maritime describes tqe

strategy of sea, in preference to the 'naval', because 'naval'

so readily introduces a motion of naval vessels or of the Senior

Service, whereas it is desired to focus attention upon the

function rather than on the instruments by which it is per­

formed. 17

Since the writers of the ancient period mainly provided

only the evidence about maritime strategy for modern writers to

derive their own conclusions18 from the axioms of yesterday. 19

Mahan, himself remarked that a study of the military history

17.

18.

19.

Snow, Donald M., Nuclea;r__ Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981), p. 48.

Op. cit., p. 206.

Till, GeoffreY.i Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London: Macml lan, 1982), p. 20o.

Brown, Neville, Nuclear War: The Impending Strategic Deadlock (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 107.

of the past, 20 is enjomed by great military leaders as essential

to correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future, <!-

recognizing how important the sea has been in the past and how

important it would continue to be in the future. According to

Till maritime strategy does not operate in a vacuum but in the

real world, where logistics, political dissension, administrative

inefficiency, health and so forth all have considerable impact

1 t. 21 on nava opera 10ns. But, then without a will, even those

strategically favoured could not and cannot have a strategy, it

(maritime strategy) was not relevant to those states with neither

the need nor the inclination'to use the seas in such ambitious

way as the United States and Britain did. 22

Technological advancement does alter and modifies strate­

gic considerations to the extent of the level and the capacity

to apply those techniqueso The whole complex issue of the

relationship between technology and the national principles of

war is one that constantly appears in the development of naval

theory, 23 and therefore, the pursuit of universal truths about

maritime strategy may be a pointless, even dangerous activity.

Universal and fundamental truths are almost synonymous. Vlhile

Mahan contested that naval strategy was based on fundamental

truths which 'when correctly formulated, are rightly called

20.

21.

22.

23.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1789 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. ,1918), pp. 1-2.

Till, op.cit., p. 8o

Booth, Ken, Ethnocentrism and the Theory and Practice of Stra~, quoted in Till, p. 8.

Till, op.cit., p. 9o

54 principles, these truths when ascertained, are in themselves,

24 unchangeable. Brodie was of the opinion th2.t no valid cone ep-

tion of sea po~er can vary according to th~ psychology or culture

of different nations. A concept of sea power is either correct

and conforms with the realities of war, or it is vJrong. 25

Among the elements or constituents of sea power are geo­

graphical location, physical conf9rmation, extent of territory,

number of population, character of the people, and character of

the government as mentioned by Mahan. Merchant shippine;, over­

seas possessions or bases and the fighting instruments (battle­

ships) were the three 'inter-locking circles' of sea power, an

idea taken up by Richmond and Roskill who identify these three

inter-locking circles as the three material elements of sea

power, adding 'skilled men to wield the instruments. These are

all constituents of 'sea power' -probably the most obscure

concept in the whole lexicon of maritime strategy. 26

Mahan used the term sea power to emphasize the role played

by non-naval factors, in success at sea, and therefore the

observers prefer to encompass all the possibilities in the L3.bel

of 'maritime power', 27 and Till has explained this cmplex debate

very lucidly concluding that sea power consists of influence

exerted by a mixture of military and non-military forces and,

24. Op.cit., p. 90.

25. Brodie, Bernard, A Guide to Naval Strate~ (New York, Praager, 1965), Po 115o

26. Till, op.cit., Po 12o

27. Ibid. , Po 14.

55

therefore a 'maritime strategy' will be taken to refer to the

methods by which countries attempt to maintain or increase t:1eir

sea power and how they try to use it to achieve desired objectives

28 in peace and war.

This broadened view on the concept ancl principles of

maritime strategy is also contested by one of the most prolific

writers on maritime affairs today, Captain M.oore, who opines thRt

sea power is that strength in naval ships, associated aircraft,

weapons and support services which enables a country to promote

the political and economic interests of itself and its allies in

peacetime and supremacy over the enemy in war. 29 Therefore, a

synthesis of these two opinion is rather useful in evaluating the

functions of the diverse tools of strategy to achieve the goal of

serving national interest in context of the role of the maritime

element in it.

EARLY CONTENDERS IN INDIAN OCEAN

Geographical location and the coastal configurations,

alongwi th the technical knowhow and the temperament and the sl~ill

of people continue to exert a tremendous influence on the sea-·

faring activities of nations as much as they did in the past.

No treatise on maritime strategy has ever ignored the geographi­

cal factors and geography has always mattered in shaping maritime

strategy both in terms of its conception and execution. In the

28.

29.

Ibid. , p. 14.

Moore, Captain John, Seapower and Politics: From the Morman Conquest to the Present Day (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,, 1979), p. 2.

56 Medieval Age whatever the contact and trade relations Europe

could claim to have with the Orient was mainly through the Arab

and Turk intermediaries. Indian ventured arid establishE~d them-

selves in the South China Sea and the Chinese ships were sailing

occasionally in the eastern and northern Indian Oce8.J"l and the

Arabs were active in the coastal regions everywhere in tl:'1e Indian

Ocean kno~m before the coming of Europeans in search of direct

contact with the East using an alternate Cape Route in 1498.

Maritime enterprise in the Orient developed erratically

from region to region but never into any grand thalassocracy, nor

did formal navies beginning to appear as other than army trans­

port forces until very late in the Middle Age. 30 Except thalasso-

cracy, they, the Indians, Chinese and Arabs, possessed all the

aspects and attributes of maritime activity in the Indian Ocean

at that time. S_ri vijaya Empire and i'-1ajapahi t possessed subs tan-

tial numbers of naval units to protect the trade, communication

lines and the colonial bases. The Hindus held supremacy ovex·

the Indian Ocean from very early times up to the thirteenth

century due to the favourable geographical conditions of India in

relation to the Indian Ocean, and they took to the sea for

c anmercial rather than political endso 31 Of course, the strong

cultural and trade ties between India and the countries of So~th-

east India were so strong that even after more than a milleniu~

30.

31.

Reynolds, Clark G., Command of the Sea: The Histor' and Strategy of Maritime Empires, New York: William Morrow & Co Inc. 1974), p. 98o

Sridhar an, C omrnander K. , Maritime Hi s_:_t_?_ry __ of India(N ew Delhi: Publications Division, 1965), pp. 1-2o

57

they are sustained today. Indo-China and the Halay Peninsula

continued to be important with their added importance for spices

for the West, even after the Hindu phase, 32 '"~as over. After the

defeat of the Arabs at the hands of the Turks, v1ho played a very

important role in the restructuring of the geopolitical set up

in the Indian Ocean, which indeed belonged to the transition

period, 33 ending after the arrival of the Western armadas for

dominance m the regiono

As the efforts of the Chinese Mmg Dynasty to take to the

Oceanic activity frittered away after the Chinese achievements

in the fields of navigation'and shipbuilding, the powerful

thrusts of the Western maritime povrer were being felt in this

region. Among the European powers of the early fifteenth century,

only the Iberian Peninsula was geographically well-suited for the

voyages undertaken to the unknown places charting new nautical

maps. All voyages and efforts were made in Europe in the

fifteenth century to reach India via a route till then unknown

in the annals of historyo It was Portugal which was much rn8re

• . • . -r d' 34 ~nterested ~n the treasures of .1.n ~a ..

J. Each of these several maritime power (Portugal, Spain,

Holland, Venice, Genoa, etc .. ) centres remained areas of conflict

from the early fifteenth to the early eighteenth centuries (the

32.

33.

34.

Coedes, Ge, Les Etats hindouises d'Indochine et d' Indonesie (Paris : P. U. F. , 1948), PPo 1-2.

Maull, Otto, Politische Geographie, 1956(Berlin: , 1956) ,pp.49-50.

Mendonca, Renata de, Bresil: P8£es d' _h_istoire(Brussels: Elsevier, 1959), Po 15o

58

Portuguese-Spanish domination checked the Venetic:m muri time

power which had become a buffer between the Christian and ~:oslem

powers), but simultaneously the ma~or rnc..'~.ri tfme 1)coples ext,:nded

their rivalries even farther abroad in a flourishinr; ocean Lc

age¢ 35 Therefore, as favoured by '-"eographical location, af~er

the closure of the fifteenth century, it was the countries along

the Atlantic coast of Europe (Portugal, Spain, Holland, Fr:1nce

and England) which were placed in a dominant position in relation

to the new trade routes of the worldo 36

In this pursuit of the European pov:ers the discovery of

alternate route to India and the Indian Ocean was of prime and

sole .i.mportance, as they were lured by the enormous precio"Js

wealth of the Orient. The era of the Portuguese entry into the

Indian Ocean at the close of the fifteen century corresponds to

the Medieval age in Europe when it was dominated by the ma:~ine

forces of Indonesians Indians and the Arabs. 37 Portuguese

historians have recently analysed the Portuguese colonial

exploits in the light of the history of the Iberian Civiliza­

tion and have opined that the Portuguese Oriental Empire W3.S the

ak f . . 38 pe o 1gnom1ny.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Reynolds, op.cit., pp. 107 and 114.

Sokol, Anthony E., Seapower in the Nuc~ear Ar;-e (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p.5o

Dessehamps, Hubert, Histoire de Madagascar (Paris: Berger­Levranlt, 1960), p. 39.

Martino, Oliveira, Historia de Portu~al (Lisbon: Gu.imaraes Editor~s, 1972), p. 11o

59 The loosening of Indian naval control of the waters of

the Indian Ocean in the thirteenth century, obscuring the impor­

tance of the sea to the problem of Indian defence and the conse-.

quent passing of the oceanic navigation into the hands of the

Arab mercantile adventurers for nearly two centuries culminated

in the arrival of the Portuguese claiming an exclusive mastery

of the Indian Ocean waters, 39 and tl:)e negligent or the wL .. ful

ignorance of maritime affairs as ordained by sheer provid1mce

indicates to the fact that with the loss of the command of the

Sea, India lost her Independenceo Supremacy of the invading

foreigners in the East was of course, based on the sea power

they enjoyed in the West. 40 The Portuguese recognized and empha-

sized the significance of sea power and held a monopoly in this

field for a century. Economic motives were paramount in the

Portuguese efforts to find an Atlantic route to Asia due to the

Arab, Turk, Venetian, and Genoese domination of the Mediterranean,

however, later on, Brita~n and Spain also had the economtc

incentives to find alternative routes to break Portuguese control

of the Gape route. 41 The \'!estern countries engaged in the

maritime exploits worldwide were also the areas of confl:Lct from

39 ..

40.

41.

Panikkar, K. M., The Strategic Problems of the Ind.: an Ocean (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1944), p. 4.

Sridharan, op.cit., p .. 2o~

Kemp, Geoffrey, Maritime Access and Maritime Powers: The Past, the Persian Gulf and the Future, in: Cottrell A.J., et. al ( ed) Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean (Beverly-Hills, Sage Publications, 1981), Po 22.

GO the early fifteenth to the early eighteenth century. The ultimate

spoils were not merely local superiority but command of the major

sea lanes of the entire globe watched from the secure choke

points on the strategic strains.

The strategic forces that shaped the Oceanic Age between

roughly 1415 and 1730 combined traditional with genuinely new

factors (of exploration and discovery) to establish unpreceden~

tedly power thalassocracies and maritime - active continental

states.42 This Renaissance Age saw navigation progress rapidly

with the invention of magnetic compass, the sea quadrant, astro­

labe, cross-staff and Mercator's projection. In shipbuilding .it

was the day of all-sail galleo·ns with heavy broadside batteries

with the Portuguese, while the English and Dutch preferred lower,

sleeker and swifter galleons for tactical reasons in the age of

gun-power, before switching over to standard capital ships in

the seventeenth century.

Even after the Treaty of West Phalia (1648) the Western

Powers had a formidable enemy in the Turks, whose eminence in

the Mediterranean and the Red Sea could not be diminished until

they undertook the second seige of Vienna in 1683. The strategic

calculation and the skill of Alfonso de Albuquerque, the

Portuguese triumph over the Arab and Indian rivals in the Indian

Ocean were very swift and decisive of the European techniques of 4~ naval warfare, J and it laid the foundations of the European

42. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 107.

43. Gordon, Donald c., The Moment of Power: Britains' I~1erial Epo£h (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,Inc., 19 0), pp. 1-2.

61 hegemony over the non-European world that lasted for four

centuries.

EUROPEAN STRATEGIC MANOEUVER

After the arrival of the Europeans in the Indian Ocean and

the Portuguese claim of absolute maritime control, the diplo­

matic activities were also on the increse. In 1504 Venice

formed an alliance with the Sultan of Egypt and the King of

Calicut against the Portuguese. But the Portuguese are also not

lacking in this skill and entered into secret parleys and treaty

arrangements with the local coastal kingdoms; and ignored the

diplomatic aspect in preference to the strategic gains, con-·

quering the diplomatic activities were also on the increase~ In

1504 Venice formed an alliance with the Sultan of Egypt and the

king of Calicut against the Portuguese. But the Portuguese are

also not lacking in this skill and entered into secret parleys

and treaty arrangements with the local coastal kingdoms; and

ignored the diplomatic aspect in preference to the strategic

gains, conquering Goa in 1510 and Malacca in 1511, and sent the

first expedition against Mombasa in 1528 before coming to a

compromise on the Moluccas with Spain in 1529. Sidi Ali's fleet

was defeated in 1553. It was only in 1569 that they were

defeated by Kunjali, and Portugal was annexed by Spain in

1580.

The First English expedition to the Indies arrived in

1591, just nine years' before the formation of the British East

India Company in 1600. The Portuguese finally subjugated

Mombasa in 1592, exactly a hundred years since the discovery of

6Z Brasil by Cabral. Finally in 1595 the first Dutch expedition

arrived in the Indies. It is only in the beginning of the .. ~ seventeenth century that the tough competition and rivalry between

the English and Dutch starts with the decline of the paramount

Portuguese sea power in the Indian Ocean.

Hugo Grotius expounds his theory of the freedom of the

seas in 1609 just before the English arrived at Surat in ·1616

and the Dutch found the city of Batavia in 1619. The decJ.ine of

the Portuguese power in this region is completed with the Persian

reconquest of the Hormuz in 1622. Dutch occupy the island of

Mauritius in 1638 just one year before the founding of Madras

in 1639. All these events occur before Portugal is separated

from Spain in 1640. As mentioned earlier a peace treaty between

England and Portugal was signed in 1642 and a treaty of marriage

and alliance in 1661. In 1641 Dutch wrested Malacca from ti2e

Portuguese. The French settled for the first time in Madagascar

in 1643. The Arabs reconquered Muscat in the year of the signing

of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. The Dutch keep consolidating

their footholds in the East India by conquering Java in 1650,

and arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 to start, the First

Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54). In 1668 the British East India

Company gets Bombay.

The French expedition led by Admiral de la Haye reaches

the Indies in 1670 and Pondicherry is founded in 1674o It was

only in the second half of the seventeenth and the first part of

the eighteenth century that the Western Maritime powers found a

tough challenge from the formidable Marathas. This period also

coincided with the· activities of sea pirates of Madagascar.

As the English, French and Dutch were active in the Persian Gulf,

India at this time, so it was an opportune time for the Arabs to

reconquer the coast of Africa.

After the Treaty of Westphalia, Holland emerged as a

genuine nation state with the political and strategic strength

to take economic advantages through their commerce and mercantile

activities supported by a well-maintained navy sustained by its

growing economic strength, while that of Portugal was on the

decline due to the lack of manpower and financial obstacles.

It took the advantage of the weakened position of the Portuguese

in the East Indies dueing the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). It

was made possible by the Dutch adopting a strategy sailing

directly to the East Indies and siding with the enemies of

Portugal and securing the strategic base of Batavia from

Indonesia. The English also took advantage of their trade

relations with Persians securing the defeat of Portuguese, and

aligned with the Dutch against the native rulers of Indonesia,

and took the mrorimum benefit of the Grotian Principle of ~

liberum to drive away the Portuguese from their secured position

in the northern Indian Ocean choke points, and established

firmly instead. The strategy employed by the Dutch against the

Portuguese in the Indian Ocean was that of tactical blockades

which resulted in the downfall of the Portuguese in the East.

The main rival of Dutch maritime power in this region

emerged .f.n England, who enjoyed the control over the Indian

subcontinent, while the Dutch were left undisturbed to control

the East Indies uninterruptedly till the mid-nineteenth century

and the northern choke points (Aden and Hormuz) were utilized

64 /

by the local slave-traders. By the mid-seventeenth century the

Netherlands ruled the major sea lanes of the world and as Dutch

trade grew, the Spanish and Portuguese powers declined The •

threat posed by the rise of England and France after 1650, and

though Dutch civilization continued to flourish and its great

naval wars were yet to be fought, the Dutch seaborne empire

would survive only at the sufferance of these two growing

political giants,44 and in the years roughly 1650 to 1730,

therefore the goals of warfare shifted to economic motives.

Technological development had a grave impact on the ve~pons

system and tactics, and logistics., the fast-moving galleous

armed with the mortars, crude bombs, muskets and grenades and

guns were the order of the day. The Dutch assessed and realised

their political, economic and strategic limitations and checked

their ambitions by taking satisfaction in what they already

possessed and were.vigilant not to lose it. The Anglo-Dutch

Peace Treaty of 1674 and the Franco-Dutch Peace Treaty of 167845

were signed with this intention. While the strenuous efforts by

Richelieu, r1azarin and Colbert resulted in France taking active

interest in maritime matters inspite of her continental nature,

the geographically favoured natu~al insular British Isles were

being obstructed and hampered in by their domestic politics. The

Anglo-Dutch wars beginning in 1652 had prepared England to

imporve its naval armament, logistics and tactics in order to

have absolute supremacy in sea power. The English diplomacy

44. Reynolds, opocit., pp. 171-172.

45. See: Dumont, vol. 7, pt.I, pp. 253 and 350o

65

succeeded during the reign of Charles II in getting Bombay from

the Portuguese and alarming the French and Dutch. The Dutch

bought friendship of the British to defeat the Swedes in 1664

and turned toward France, who in turn deceived the Dutch in 1670

by signing a secret treaty with England. But due to the poor

performance of France at sea against the Dutch in 1672, the

disgruntled English thought it wise to befriend holland agalnst

the French, to check France on land.

This was the most opportune time for the British stra~e­

gists to chalk out a master plan to dominate the world ocean,

Indian Ocean, of course enjoying a pivotal importance in this

pursuit. The diplomatic uses in exploiting the futilities of

her rivals England did succeed in realising its aims. In the

eighth decade of the seventeenth century both England and France

concentrated their efforts on consolidating their gains in the

Indian Subcontinent. The accession of William of Orange on the

English throne and retaining the Stadholderschaft of Holland

greatly improved and favoured English cause at the cost of

Holland. The War of the League of Augsburg fought by Franct:!

against England and Holland in 1687 and 1697 was a clear water-

shed in the history of naval warfare, marking the end of the

great naval battles in which both fleets tried to destroy each

other and obtain absolute supremacy at sea and ultimately the

combined Ango-Dutch fleet emerged a superior victor. The result

was, France took to the ~uerre de course (attacking the enemy

commercial shipping) strategy, 46 and the maritime power, obviously

46. Reynolds, op.cit. 9 p. 195.

66

England. alongwith Holland, adopted the strategy of blockade

of the enemy homeland, destruction of its shipping and capture . of its colonies. A tactics on which the crux of Mahan's whole

naval strategy was to be based.

Inspite of domestic debate on whether to prefer a conti­

nental or maritime strategy, England William of Orange could

adopt a strategy of concentration of her fleet in the English

Channel acting both as guarding its sea frontiers and bloc~ading

its immediate continental rival in the command of the sea,

protecting its sea trade lanes and the colonies, and to keep

the neutral countries safe for future support and use to her.

The 1690 sea battle between England and France did result in the

victory of the French Admiral Tourvilles' strategy, by the lack

of French foresight and to use it (the 1690 victory) to formu-

late a proper maritime strategy, obviously came in handy to the

English to adopt a strategy of "fleet-in-being" res.ul ted in the

English victory over French in the battle of Barfleur (1692).

The order and instruction in the use of the fire-power evolved

as a cardinal rule of English naval tactics for the time being,

and the tactical thought was stagnant naval wars for the

remainder of the age of sail (till 1830s) were decided more by

superior strategic dispositions,47 and hereafter England got

busy in protecting its sea trade and the overseas possessions.

In absence of any significant possible threat to the metropolis,

hereafter the theater of naval confrontation shifted to the

47. Reynolds, op~cit., p. 198o

64

overseas colonies and the necessity for establishing overseas

bases for the protection of colonial possessions and trade.

After the English gains in naval engagements against the

Turks and Indian native rule, in the last decade of the seven­

teenth century and the diplomatic moves in the War of Spanish

Succession, the Peace Treaty, of Utrecht48 of 1713 consolidated

the English position and their command of the sea. The first

half of the eighteenth century was a period marked with a weakened

central authority in India due to the decline of the Mughal

Empire and of diplomatic intrigues in Europe centred around the '

issue of the wars of the Spanish and Austrian successions.

With the virtual withdrawal of the Portuguese (except for

the Estado da India, Mozambique and Timor) power, the main

contenders for maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean in the

eighteenth century were the English, French and Dutch. English

advanced into and concentrated on the northern littoral of the

Indian Ocean considering its comparatively rich resource base

and strategic base for mercantile profits, while the French got

foothold in the islands of the southern Indian Ocean, and the

Dutch were making every effort to safeguard their territorial

gains mainly in the Peninsular Indonesia. The Seven Years' War

(1756-63) in Europe had considerable impact on the politico-

strategic situation in the Indian Ocean region.

By the closure of the Oceanic Age in the third decade of

the eighteenth century England had already become the most power-

ful maritime nation in the world, commanding the major sea lanes

48. State Papers 9 vol. 35, p. 815~

68

of communication and trade which she monopolized. Now the

British policy was to wrest control of the rfimnants of maritime

power- and not to allow any nation hitherto to acquire any signi-

ficant competition with her. In strengthening their thalasso-

cracy, the English were always watching every French move in

this direction. The English statesman were very vehemently

opposing any bilateral of multilateral move which allowed France

footholds abroad and any possibility of reviving her which was

happening since 1762.49 While in England there was a big problem

of financial corruption in the reign of King George III.

As mercantalism regulated and moderated the other aspects

under the dominance of economic priorities, tactics became rigid

in absence of frequent warfare activity and respect for law was

being encouraged and enforced in the eighteenth century. It was

only in the last qqarter of the century that much political

upheaval was caused by economic and social factors culminating

in the success of British maritime activity. Due to big techno­

logical change, the galley was out after 1717, and the fireships

gave way to ship of the line and this age also witnessed the

significant change, in tactics brought about by slight change

in the weapons system used in the new logistics. Cannonade were

introduced against hulls. The_ heavy cannons caused increase in

the size of vessel and the standardized British warship The . . men-of-war proved successful in the eighteenth century for its

range and sea days in blockading and combact activities. Due to

49. Moore, Captain John, Seapower and Politic; From the Norman Conquest to the Present Day (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 23.

69 the stagnation set in tactics, the tactical lesson missed by

the British Admiralty, however, was that victory had been due! ~·

largely to strategic, not tactical superiority.5°

The differing naval tactical doctrine, of France and

England as recommended by Admiral Vicompte de Morogues (Tactique

navale, 1763), Vicompte de grenier (E' Art de laguerre sur mer,

1787), and Audibert Ramatuelle (Cours elementaire de tactique

navale, 1802), and John Clerk of Elden (Essay on Nval Tactics,

1782), were studied by Nelson and were made the best use of,

giving an admirable credit to Elden. The pattern of naval

battles in the Revolutionary and Napoleanic Wars which followed

was certainly much more to the British taste. But complacency

had its inevitable consequence. The Royal Navy afterwards based

such tactical and strategic doctrine as it had on the half­

remembered and half-digested sayings of Nelson and effectively

relapsed once more into the dark ages of naval thought.51

BRITISH MARITIME SUPREMACY

The British maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean was

absolute with the victory in the 1783 naval war against France.

The lack of coordination of tactics and non-adherence by Suffren

to the official French naval tactics and the surprise element '

in the strategy of concentration and the fleet-in~being adopted

by Admiral Rodney in the naval battle of 1783 in the Indian waters

proved catastrophic for the French. Since then it had been a

50. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 220.

51. Till, Geoffrey, et. al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London, Macmillan, 1982), p. 24.

70 purely British controlled Ocean. The 'French emphasis on Navy

being subordinate in assistance to Army was purely a conti-

nental strategic policy, the tacts at Trafalgar, while open to

criticism in detail, were in their main features comfortable to

the principles of war, and their audacity was justified as well

by the urgency of the case as by the results, but the great

lessons of efficiency in preparation, of activity and energy in

execution, and of thought and insight on the part of the English

leaders are strategic lessons and as such they still remain

good. 52

England was engaged in the North Atlantic naval and land

battles to retain its possession of North America against the

French direct and indirect help to the British colonies, but

the British could sense a possible move by the French and Dutch

to merge their East India establishments to promote and consoli­

date economic interests, hence she (England) realized the need

of naval bases53 in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere to protect

her colonies and the sea lanes of communication and trade so

vital for the Imperial Maritime Supremacy.

Now from the northern Indian Ocean region England looked

toward the Dutch possessions, i.e. Sri Lanka, Andaman Sea and

the newly discovered Australian and New Zealand. She acquired

the Andamans and Australia by 1780. After the visit to the

mascarennes by Ocean (in 1803), Britain wrested the Cape from the

Dutch in 1805 and Mascarennes from France and Java from the Dutch

52.

53.

Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co,1918), p. 12.

Moore, op.cit. 1 p. 27.

71 in 1810-1811, after having subdued Turkey by signing a treaty

of Peace in 1809.54 Interestingly, it was at this juncture of

time that Britain was a dominant maritime power engaged over­

seas but had no continental ally to engage France on land, as

Russia, too was not amicably disposed toward England, and had

a maritime power in her own right. 55 The British naval victory

of 1783 gave her a time to reflect and the Kempenfelt- Hove

tactical reforms rejuvinated the naval tactics of the Royal

Navy, replacing the strategic supriority concept by "personal

initiative" (of Nelson model).

For the consolidation of its gains in the Indian.Ocean,

England entered an alliance with Persia in 1801, which proved

to be very useful in securing the surrender of Fench force in

Egypt that year. As usual in the 1803-1804 Anglo-French battles

the French strategy of Guerre de course could not succeed against

the British naval tactics of personal initiative cor.centration

of the fleet, blocade of the enemy ships and the melee tactics

to hire enemy into battle. The naval battle of Trafalgar (1805)

was a superb demonstration of Nelsons genious, "personal initja-

tive" and melee tactics, resulted in a crushing defeat o-: France

and British command of the world seas. England took away Re_

union anQ, Mauritius _!rom France in 1810.. ·Reunion was returned

to the Bourbon France in 1815 by the congress of Vienna which

recognized French control of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.

At the time of the congress of Vienna Britain possessed a fleet

54. See: Hertzlet, Commercial Treaties, vol. 20 , p. 371.

55. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 261 ..

7'l

superior to the combined naval power of the rest of the world,

and the Royal Navy indeed ruled the ways and was set upon tte

path of riches, 56 and the only sprawling e;pires still growing

were continental, those of Russia and the United States; but to

say that neither of them desired command of the seas57 is an

understatement.58

The wealth of England grew on account of her successful

retention and milching of overseas rich colonies of their

natural resources during the industrial revolution made possible

by technological progress. JDuring this phase ( 1815-1914) the

sailing ships gave way to the steel dreadnoughts requiring a

new weapon system and tactics. Industrial capacity, newly

acquired, facilitated the new sort of foreign policy that needed

naval power to project national influence abroad, and fortu:L"tously,

the pace of technical innovation created the means.59

In the nineteenth century the manufacture of large sheets

of steel made possible the construction of steamships, which due

to abundant coal supply, completely replaced the all-sail war­

ships, and evolved into steel-armoured and steel-hulled warships

by the turn of the century. In the nineteenth century the

British Empire expanded greatly and enjoyed the raw materials of

its overseas colonies, which in return became a hand-picked

56. Moore, Capt. J·., op.cit., p. 32.

57. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 319.

58. See: Smith, Dale 0, u.s. Milita£Y Doctrine (New York: Duell Sloan and Pearce, 1955), p. 37.

59. Lord Hill-Norton, and Dekker, John, Sea Power (London: Faber & Faber, 1982), p. 20.

7J

market for the finished goods exported from the British home

market. The non-tropical regions of the Empires were soon

inhabited by the surplus white population, and there was also

a movement of indigenous population known as "indentured

labourers" to the tropical colonies.

Th~ second half of the nineteenth century marked a per­

fect dual colonial policy pursued by Britain with regard to its

white and non-white subjects as it granted dominion states to

Canada in 1867, just after the crushing the popular uprising of

1857 in India, during the era of growing liberalism. Perhaps

it was due to strategic re'asons, as the fleet was geared to its

full strength in the Indian Ocean waters both in the Anglo­

Afghan and Anglo-Chinese Wars of 1838 and 1840 respectivelyp as

the riches of the Indian Ocean colonies were of critical impor­

tance to her. Hence Britain kept the French always on the toes

(Egypt after 1882 and Sudan 1898). In the last quarter of the

nineteenth century the "grab for Africa" by the colonialists was

already under way. The shift was from the already saturated

island and littoral state, to the hinterland areas of the Indian

Ocean.

The technological achievement provided explosive shells

and smokeless powers in the second half of the nineteenth

century to the armoury of the Dreadnoughts in 1905, as the sub-

mersible weapons, such as mines, torpedoes continued to be in.

use till the World War I. Surprisir~ly, technology and naval

tactics did not change significantly over the nineteenth century,

and this lack of tactical innovation combined with the general

74 conservation toward new weapons in resisting change. 60 The

Fashoda incident (between the French and British troops) on

the Nile River in 1898, and the War between the British and the

Boer Republics in 1899 were the two major happenings on the eve

of the twentieth century. These incidents although characteri­

zed the British policy as isolationised but were in fact an

excellent opportunity to evaluate their power in relation to the

naval programmes of potential rival for naval command in the

Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. 61 The revolutionary ideas of

liberalism, the invention of telegraph increased the growing

' power of press and the insatiable need of industrial revolution

for materials and the search for markets for finished goods,

and the advent of dreadnoughts, fitted with the propelled smoke-

less weapons systems, the submersible mines and torpedos and the

skilled manpower were the f~ctors responsible in 1890s to set

the stage for the conf+icts of the twentieth century. 62

The British realization of the dangers of maintaining

futile policy of isolation culminated in resolving their differ-

ences with France through Entente Cordiale, which was next door

to a positive alliance. Russia was joined to this in 1906 and

Europe was then divided into that state of two armed camps -

Triple Alliance balanced by Triple Entente - which was inevitable

to lead to the cataclym of 1914.63 The grovling potential power of

60.

61.

62.

63.

---------- -- -----------Reynolds, op.cit., p. 326.

' Marder, A.J., The Anatomy of Sea Power: A Histo~; of B~!'itish Naval Policy_in ~he Pre-Dreddp.Q~ht Era_j_?B0-1905 ~~amden, 1964), p. 351.

Moore, Capt. J., op.cit., p. 41.

Jenkins, E.H., A History of the French Navy, p. 30E3 (London: Mar·...,nal<1 & Janes, 19'13).

75

the United States and Russia was gauged by Mr. Godley, the

permanent Under--Secretary at the India Office, as he expressed

that there were only two powers, and two only, whom Britain could

be afraid of, viz. the United States and Russia, for the simple

reason that they have or must soon have better military access

to an important part of our dominions, than we have ourselves

and we must modify our diplomacy accordingly. 64

As earlier, the British strategic uses of treaties and

alliance~ the Anglo-Japanese alliance formed in 1902 was per_

ceived by the English as relief from an increased and strenuous

and suspicious naval presence in the north Pacific. Keeping in

the view the over~ll security and safety of the Indian Ocean

region, the strategic reorientation done under Sir John Fisher

in 1903-4 in view of the growing ambitions of the German naval

menace, in fact strengthened and increased the importance of the

main southern m1d eastern Indian Ocean choke points, due to the

amalgamation of East Indies stations and the switched weight of

Britains, battleship fleets from overseas stations into home

waters. The dominant factor behind the formulation of strategic

thinking and planning for the Indian Ocean region was the region

was the renewalo Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911, which shifted

the focus of interest from the defence of the Indian Ocean to

that of the Pacific empireo 65

64.

65.

India Office Library Curzon Papers~ vol. 114 (Londonv Godley to Curzon, 10'November, 1899J.•

Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Maste~ (London: Allen Lane, 1976), p.221.

'l6

The ever_ increasing naval strength of Germany forced

England to have alliance with France in naval matters more effec-

tively executed~ The 1912 Anglo-French naval agreements did

have impact on the French and British naval presence in the

Indian Ocean region, too. India's defence against any enemy,

most likely from the northern direction, was only second to that

of United Kingdom in order of priority. By 1914, Britain's

foreign, naval and military policies had undergone enormous

changes, all of which formed part of an even greater development

the steady decline of her world-wide predominance and the ending

of the age of Pax Britannica, consequent upon the loss of her

early economic lead and the industrialization of the other

powers. Connected with this, too, was the relative dec:ine of

sea-power vis-a-vis land-power as the 'Columbian era' drew to

a close. 66

MARITIME STRATEGY IN BETWEEN 'rtft~ TWO WOHLD WARS

With the advent of the dreadnought type warships and the

efforts both by Britain and France to perfect their naval arms

and weapons systems, the concept of traditional naval warfare

tactics was undergoing a vast change. The effort of conti­

nental Germany and Japanese to have big naval programmes with

grandsise maritime strategy was a challenge to the British mari­

time supremacy even in the home waters, that is in the North

Sea. The two fold British maritime strategy of giving top

priority to the defence and protection of Britain over the

66. Ibid., p. 237.

74

defence of the Empire had already generated a heated contro­

versy. The success of the Churchill line of thinking and the

astute British diplomatic moves (e.g. alliance with France) had

already out-witted that strategy.

More emphasis was thus laid on the North Atlantic with

undermining the growing maritime strength of Japanese and Hussia

in the context of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean in the first

decade of the twentieth century. The advacacy for a small and

torpedo faster boats equipped with the latest weapons instead

of big battleship was best suited for the guerre de course ' strategy argued by the Jeune Ecole, while the more traditionalist

arguing for the powerful battle fleet that by its victory would

have the command of the sea67 confused the whole situation in

France life 1900 when she finally decided in favour of powerful

large ships. In Great Britain a reorganization of maritime

strength had already been launched in 1904-5. Although France

acquired considerable overseas Empire during the last quarter of

the nineteenth century still the progress made by her in ship-

building was very slow due to inadequate provisions for destro-

yers.

The British diplomatic success secured them the Entente

Cordiale with France involving no specified fleet commitments

on either side. The British naval superiority was being main_

tained, and the responsibility of safeguarding the imperial

interests and the p~otection of homewaters in the vast North

Atlantic was primarily that of Britain, while France would

67. Jenkins, E.Ho, op.cit.P pp. 304-305.

concentrate in the Mediterranean. The grandiose Naval Plan

of 1912 gave a cause of real worry for the British Admiralty.

The War office \vas all the more worried about the impact of a

possible withdrawal of the British naval force from the Medi-

terranean in this context.

The policy of the Entente Cordiale was a virtual depar­

ture from the British attitude of maintefiance of a naval j_so-

lationism and was also responsible for giving obviously larger

role to the Army in a context of a conflict with continental

povTer, e,,g. Germany by undermining the spirit and image of the

Royal Navy, the Senior Service of the Empire. The British

isolationist Policy could well be termed as policy of self­

reliance in defence matters assisted by an astute diplomacy.

But the Entente Cordiale die cause concern in the Admiralty.

The ongoing diplomatic parleys for achieving a symilar Entente

Cordiale with Russia, if obtained might have created other

problems, as General Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, of the Army

had already warned that the British Policy should be to keep

Russia at a distance as long as possible 68 in the context of , India's defence; and a policy of entente with her might have

made it quite unnecessary to dispatch expeditionary army un.its

to India~ Due to the Entente Cordiale with France, the Royal

Navy which only a short time ago had enjoyed a clear edge over

the discredited army, both lost its superior position and had its

isolationist policy increasingly circumscribed after 1906. 69

68. Rober:ts, Gen. F., in his l\Unutes on 13 June, 1887. F,.D. Sec. F. Programme,(London) October 1887, No. 288-91.

69. Kennedy, P.M., op.cit., p. 234.

"When the World· War-.~ began British and French were the

two colonial powers alongwith the little colonial possessions

of Holland and Portugal in the Indian Ocean region. Since the

War was fought ~ainly in the Atlantic Ocean, so like the Pacific

the Indian Ocean did not witness even as much naval activity as

Pacific Ocean had seen, however, only sporadic. But the Indian

Ocean had the impact of the great war felt here. The trad.i- ·

tional British strategy of concentration of the fleet, blockade

and maintenance of her imperial sea-lanes of communications was

adopted in the sea-battles. The German tactics of hit and run

in the g_uerre de course strategy was applied by the fugi tine

German ship Emden in the Indian Ocean area share the Bri ti~;h

thalassocracy wher~ reigned supreme. Even inspite of her-

colonies in East Africa, the German Navy could not think of

chalking out a strategy for Indian Ocean due to the complete

British domination of the Indian Ocean region.

On the littoral of the Indian Ocean, where Britain was

on the offensive in view of the threat posed by Turkish advances

into the Middle East and the possible blockade of the Suez. ~anal,

the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, eventually threatening India.

The safety security and maintenance of the sea lanes of communi-

cations was very critical to the needs of Britain and its

Empire. It was a combined maritime and land strategy adopted

by Britain which kept its Indian Ocean Empire secured and

intact. In the eastern region of the Indian Ocean Britain

herself had requested Japan to operate there as a supplementary

to the British maritime strength, and sell some of its warships

to Britain. Al·though this diplomatic move by Britain could get

80

Japanese patrolling in the Indian Ocean. A suspicion was also

caused in the British defence circles by Japanese refusal to

sell them the warships saying that Japan also needed them to

protect its sizeable interests.

As a result of the Entente Cordiale the main task of the

British and French interests in the Indian Ocean during the VMI

remained the Prime responsibility of Britain. The British

supremacy in the region took good care of it and the Royal navy

emerged victorious and stronger while the French navy was dis-

gruntled, and it was apparently realized in the Washington and

London Naval Conferences. The Washington Conferences in

1921-2270 was in a true sense the beginning of a genuine effort

to tackle the problem of disarmament, but after deliberations

by various participants it resulted in treating the United

Kingdom and the United States of America on an equal footir.g in

respect of tonnage ratio with Japan enjoying superiority over

France, which infuriated her. Furthermore, the British anc

American proposals to ban submarine warfare was not acceptable

to the French Jeune Ecole, and she also refused to accept another

proposal to restrict the strength of crusiers and destroye:--s,

as she regarded the role of cru~·ers vital to her maritime

power. Japan also refused to accept these proposals and out­

rightly denunciated the treaty the same day.

At the next Naval Conference under the auspices of the

league of Nations at Geneva in 1927 no agreement could be arrived

70. Great Britain, France & Others: Treat~ on Limitation of Naval Armamenty signed on 6 Feb., 192 at Washington, in: State Papers, vol. 117, p. 453.

at for the rigid stands on the issue of cruisers by the u.s.A.

on one hand and the United Kingdom & Japan on the other. France's "1'.

role was insignificant in this conference. In 1928 France tried

a cowpromise formula between the USA, UK and Japan, but it was

rejected by the United States at the very outset.

The same French intransigence prevailed in the London

Naval Parleys ·of 1930.71 No concrete conclusion could be drawn

of these parleys. Therefore Japan also withdrew and the tready

provided for several escapes and became worthless due to the

lack of accommodation and mutual trust. The years from 1928

to 1933 were years of lessening hope, ending in a strong revival

of fear. 72

After the defeat of Germany73 and Turkey74 in the War

their colonial possessions came under the British control.

According to Dieter Braun, 75 in the period between the two World

Wars, Britain was able, in spite of her imperial drive now

being markedly weaker, to make further gains, above all as a

result of the German and Turkish defeat in 1918. In the :Lnter-

war period Britain consolidated her position by signing treaties

and agreements with a number of countries in the Indian Ocean

region, viz. with Muscat, in 1922, with Iran France (on con­

cessions in territories detached from the Ottoman Empire) in

71.

72.

73. 74. 75.

·---------------- ·-·-· -·- ---State Papers, vol. 132, p.603.

Gibbs, M.H., Grand Strateg~' vol. I: Rearmament Policy (London: HMSO, 1976}, p. •

State Papers, vol. 116, p. 832. State Papers, vole 119, p.472. Braun, Dieter, The Indian Ocean; Region of Conflict or 'Peace Zone' (Delhi: Oxford University Press,1983),p. 6.

82

1923; wj_th France (Notes on Protocol on the boundary of the

Sudan and Equatorial Africa); with Iraq (agreement on military

matters); with Be lgilml (on the boundary between TanganyLca and

Ruanda - Urundi) in 1924; with Portugal (regarding the S\faziland­

Mozambique Boundary commission) with Muscat (treaty of Friend­

ship), with Abyssinia, with Siam, with Nejol, with Italy (on

Eritrea-Italian Somaliland Railway) and with Iraq, in 1925;

with Johore (Territorial Waters Boundary: Singapore and Johore)

with Italy (on Keny3-Somaliland Boundary in 1927; with Yemen

(Treaty of Friendship and cooperation) in 193'-+; and a number

of British Orders in Council from 1920 to 1930 in respect of

its relations vli th the indigenous rulers and cononies.

France also had treaty commitments, both bilateral

multilateral, and orders issued on its overseas possessions in

this part of the globe. France which was sceptical of the

international fora was naval armaments limitations talks,

however continued to participate in them till 193876 while

strengthening her naval arm; a bu~lding programme was launched

from 1932 onwards to give France more ships and cr~isers,

destroyers, and submarines. Moreover,the strained situation at

that time had enabled mobilization measures to be tested., The

French Narine v.ras good when the World War II started in

1939.77

However, the story of Royal Navy was altogether different.

The victory over the Axis would not have been possible without

76.. §tate Papers, vol., 142, pp. 427, 138.

77. Jenkins~1 E. 4, op.cit., p. 317.

8l

the prestigious decisive sea battles in the Atlantic and the

Pacific Oceans, but surely its role was undermined by the promi­

nence of the Army in the continental battles. The Washington

Naval Treaty of 1921 saw the British monopoly in naval matters

being broken with the parity enjoyed by the United States, which

was·destined to wrest the maritime supremacy of Britain in the

coming decades. The Plan in Germany to acquire a power Reichs­

marine really posed a grave danger to the British Isles and

its Allies and the Empire. In the London Imperial circles, the

strategic importance of the choke points in the Indian Ocean

was never declined. The Committee of Imperial Defence78 was

fully aware of the naval situation and the Government fully

recognized the basis of any system of Imperical defence against

attack from overseas, whether upon the U.K., Australia or

elsewhere, must be, as it has been, the maintenance of our sea

power.

Furthennore, the British also considered the possibility

of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance79 in order to economize

the British war efforts in face of the growing naval pov.,er of

Japan, an obviously possible menace to the British Empire in

the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The frustration and the doom

which had set on the signing of the Naval Armaments, Limitation

treaties, was got rid of as a result of the French Minister of

Marine Nousieur Darlan and the French naval strategist Admiral

78• C.I.D., 141st Meeting; p. 3.

79. C.I.D., 122nd Meeting; pp. 6-7.

84 Castex, casting a shadow on the British maritime strategists,

as they also realized the futility of these treaties and began

construction and modernization programmes of smaller vessels

and the perfection of submarine weapon. However, the British

fleet was again to be concentrated in the N0 rth Sea.80

Britain naval position at the outset of the war in the

Indian Ocean totally ~xposed, as the Royal Navy had battleships

concentrated at Alexander instead of Singapore or the Cape,

while the merchant navy was to follow the Cape Route avoiding

the Mediterranean Sea.

When the World War II started, the next day Portugal

declared itself neutra1, 81 , Britain clarified an emergency in the

Persian Gulf States,82 while Persia remained neutral, and

concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Japan on 18 Oct. 1939.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia snapped all ties with Germany and a Treaty

of mutual Assistance between Turkey and Britain and France was

signed the next day. A non-aggression pact was signed between

Great Britain and Thailand on 12 June 1940.83 Thailand also

signed the same day a Treaty of Friendly Relations and Terri-

torial Relations with Japan, also.

Italy was the first power to attack Sudan in this region

on 4 July 1940; although the Allied Warships had already arrived

in Alexandria, and the Japanese Foreign Minister had already

demanded the maintenance of political and economic status quo

------------- -- --80. Dulffer, J. Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, (Dusseldorf

1973)' p. 350.

81. State PaRers, 2-9-1939 9 vol. 143, p. 672o

82. State Papers, (5 Sept 1939), vol. 143, p.177 & p. 531-2.

83. State Paners, vol. 1L~4, pp. 172 & 435o

85 in the Dutch East India on 11 May 1940, just four days before

the capitalation of the Dutch Army. The British Somaliland was

occupied by Italy on 4 August 1940 and entered into the '

Egyptian territory on 15 September 1940; and Thailand attacked

Indo-China on 28 October, the very next day of the signing of

the Axis Pact for Political, Economic and Military Cooperation 84 between Germany~ Italy and Japan.

Japan's lmperial designs on the Asian countries were

very much evident in the declaration of Policy by Japanese

Cabinet known as "New 0rder in Greater East Asia" on 1 August

1940. So far only Italy announced a total blockade of British

possessions in the Mediterranean and Africa, and brushed with

the British troops there, the only significant political acti··

vity in wake of the war in the region was the opening of the

Eastern Group Conference at Delhi on 25 October 194o.85

General \'Javel began his victory campaign in Egypt and the British

offensive in Ethiopia in December 1940 January 19L~1. At this

time Thailand was being possibly used by Japan as a surrogate

against France in Indochina, however France, Japan and Thailc:.nd

had already signed a protoco186 on 9 May 1941 to which Japan

was also a party but was now acting as a mediator in this

Franco-Thai conflict. By 17 February 1941 Egypt, the Sudan and

Kenya. were taken back from the Italians by the British troops.

By 24 March, 1941 the British troops were able to reconquer

Somalia, also.

84. State Papers, vol. 144, p. 415.

85. The Times (London), 26 October 1940.

86. State Papers, Vol. 144, pp. 800-802.

86

In the eastern region, large Australian forces landed

at Singapore on 19 February 1941, as a part of the British

Imperial strategy of maintaining the safety, and security of the

sea lanes of communication visualizing the possible ~enance

posed by the growing war potential of Japenese in the Pacific.

While the British troops were successfully carrying out their

military campaigns in the African continent, a pro-Axis coup

was staged in Iraq in April 1941 positing a serious threat to

the Imperial interests in its vicinity and gradually exposing

the whole Indian Ocean region to the incalculable dangers.

President Roosevelt of the United States on April 11, proclaimed

the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden open to u.s. shipping in view

of the Allied naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the

Indian Ocean. Subsequently, the British forces quelled the

coup in Iraq duly refusing the mediation offer by Turkey, which

signed a treaty87 of territorisl integrity and friendship with

Germany on 18 June 1941.

Larger reinforcements were again sent to Singapore from

Britain which re 8 ched there on 14 Iviay 1941 and by 11 June 1941

the last Italian Port in East Africa was also recaptured by the

British troops, and the Haifa-Baghdad Road88 was also secured

by British in view of forestalling any Axis moves; and Thailand

was also forced to terminate its I'-1ili tary Pact with Japan on

21 December 1941, just before the Declaration by Great Britain

an~ others of an Alliance Against Axis Powers on 1 January, 1942.

This Alliance was formed in view of adopting a Grand

87. State P~p~, vol. 144, p. 816.

88. State Papers, Vol., 147, p. 1096.

89. State.llm_ers, vol. 145, p. 1174, pp. 159, 500.

87 Strategy90 to defeat Germany, and once Germany is defeated,

the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

Some of the essential features of the strategy were the

maintenance of essential cow~unications: e.g. the cape and

other routes in the Indian Ocean, and the main air-routes, e.g.

from Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, Malaya, Augstralasia, the

East Indies etc. The Axis Powers, favoured by a non-belligerent

Posture of Japanp were acting in a situation already favoured

to cut these communications. 91 The Japanese swift and surprise

naval and air attacks and troop landings had already begun in

Thailand and Malasia on 8 December 1941, and Japanese troops

landed in Sumatra on 28 December 1941 before the Japanese

Offensive in Burma on 16 January just one month before they

occupied the British base in Singapore on 15 February 1942. By

8·March 1942 Palembang had already fallen into Japanese hands,

they had landed in Bali, Timor, and Java after securing a naval

victory in the battle of the Java Sea.

JThis victory is attributed to the Japanese strategy of

wave of invasion in absence of British naval concentrations in

view of the latter's emphasis on and priority to the North

Atlantic threatre. The best way of holding Japan was to continue

limited offensive operations on a scale sufficient to contain the

bulk of the Japanese forces in the Pacific. 92

90. Washington War Conference, American and British Strategy, Memorandum by the US and British Chief of Staff (WMI), (London : H.M.s.o.).

91. Fioravanzo, Guiseppe, Panorama strategico dell Oceans Indiano dell'Oceano Pacifico (Rome: Istituto Italiano,1941), p. 15.

92. War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee c.o.s.(u2) 466 (0) Final. 31-12-1942.

88

Due to Siam's continued collaborstion with Japan in

its offensive against the Allied interests, Britain issued a

Notification of the State of War93 with Sia~ on 5 Februo.ry 1942.

By now the Japanese troops were marching ahead in Burma and the

Dutch were obliged to leave Bat(J.Via, and furthernore, due to the

plan of Petains "to continue the fight from the Empire'' st::--ategy,

Britain had to deal with the Vichy Governments' activities in

Madagascar. Hence the British naval operations in f·1adagascar

started on 3 March 1942. By 23 1'1arch the Andaman-Islands were

also occupied by Japan, who had started bombing Tv1andaley in

Burma and Coconada and Vizagapatam in India and Trincomalie in

Sri Lanka by 9 April.

Even after Winston Churchill's statement in the House of

C0 mmons94 on the sea war in the Bay of Bengal, nothing much

happened in terms of strategic moves of the British Policy in

this region. British naval strategy of capturing Diego Suarez

from the north to take Madagascar was successful by occupying

Tamatave and finally Antananarivo which led to the signing of

the Franco-British Accord re-establishinG the French (De Gaulle)

sovereignty on Madagascar95 and its dependencies on 14 December

1942. Japanese had even ventured an attack on Diego Suarez

on 30 May 1942. After it the Japanese did not fight a major

naval battle with the A11ies in the Indian Ocean region until

the Allied attack on the Japanese-Occupied Sabang harbour in

93. State Papers, vol. 144, p. 884.

94. The Times, 14 April, 1942.

95. State Papers, vol. 144, p. 1007.

89 Sumatra on 25 July, 1944, in which all battleships, cruisers

and destroyers of the Allied Eastern Fleet participated. The

major naval action in the Nicobar Island was taken on 21 October

1944 when the British fleet started bombarding them.

Although India was cleared off the Japenese invaders by

1944, the Japanese floating dock of Singapore could be struck

by the u.s. aircraft only on 3'1 January, 19Lt5, and by JViarch

1945 Japan had lost half of her battleships and medium cruisers,

and in the heavy air and naval attacks on the Andamans one·more

cruiser was sunk by the Royal Navy destroyers in the Malacca

straits on 15 May 1945, while on 24 July 1945 the Japanese

positions in Malaya were bombed by the Royal Navy and it was on

19 August 1945 the Jpanese in Java received the cease fire order.

In terms of ships the destroyer was almost on all-purpose

ship to reach and hunt submarines and attack in naval blockades.

Compared to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the Indian did

not witness a major and decisive naval battle. In the sporadic

incidences there was no proper coordination and concentration

of. ships and even of efforts directed against the swift waves

of the enemy invasions.

Seen in the context, Roskil's definition of sea that the

function of maritime Romes is to \'lin and keep control of the sea

for one's own use, and to deny such control to one's adversaries~6

the Grand Strategy adopted by the United Kingdom and the United

States, did not attach high priority to the Indian Ocean region

in their maritime strategy, while in terms <>f political priori ties

96. Roskill, Ce>tJtain S.W.,, The Stre:tegy of Sea Power(Lor,don: Collins, 1';62), p. 15.

90 it was considered to be of very great importance to Britain.

Moreover, the sustenance capacity of the British economy had

already given way after the First World War, and it was \'/ins ton

Churchill's greatest contribution to the British war stratees

to recognize from the beginning that American support was abso-

lutely essential, and to strive with all his charm and all his

wits to secure that assistance in a form best suited to the

interests of the British Empire. 97 It was more true in case of

the Indian Ocean, where the Japanese advances were hampered by

the u.s. Navy in the Pacific, keeping the Royal Navy, the Br5_tish

commerce and colonies intact at least till the end of the war.

The era of protected sea communications ended for Indian and

the question of the control of oceanic areas surrounding her had

. b . t 't98 agaln ecorne lmpor an •

97. Kennedy, Paul H., op.cit., p. 313.

98. Panikkar, K.M., India and the Indian Ocean (Bombay:George Allen & Unwin, 1971), p. 81.