barok vs ptc.docx

7/25/2019 Barok vs PTC.docx

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS "!RO" C. IR!OGO,Petitioner,vs.T#E P#ILIPPINE TRUT# COMMISSION O$ 2010,Respondent.

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G.R. No. 19303%

REP. EDCEL C. L!GM!N, REP. RODOL$O . !L!NO, &R., REP. SIMEON !.D!TUM!NONG, and REP. ORL!NDO . $U!, SR.,Petitioners,vs.E'ECUTI(E SECRET!R) P!*UITO N. OC#O!, &R. +- DEP!RTMENT O$ UDGET !NDM!N!GEMENT SECRET!R) $LORENCIO . !!D,Respondents.

D E C ! " N

MENDO!, J.:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiorityover the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but onlyasserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting

claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy therights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

--- #ustice #ose P. $aurel%

&he role of the Constitution cannot be overloo'ed. t is throu(h the Constitution that the funda)entalpo*ers of (overn)ent are established, li)ited and defined, and b+ *hich these po*ers aredistributed a)on( the several depart)ents.&he Constitution is the basic and para)ount la* to*hich all other la*s )ust confor) and to *hich all persons, includin( the hi(hest officials of the land,)ust defer.Constitutional doctrines )ust re)ain steadfast no )atter *hat )a+ be the tides of ti)e.t cannot be si)pl+ )ade to s*a+ and acco))odate the call of situations and )uch )ore tailor itselfto the *hi)s and caprices of (overn)ent and the people *ho run it.

/or consideration before the Court are t*o consolidated cases0both of *hich essentiall+ assail thevalidit+ and constitutionalit+ of Executive "rder No. %, dated #ul+ 1, 1%1, entitled 2Creatin( thePhilippine &ruth Co))ission of 1%1.2

&he first case is 3.R. No. %440, a special civil action for prohibition instituted b+ petitioner $ouisBirao(o 5Birao(o6 in his capacit+ as a citi7en and taxpa+er. Birao(o assails Executive "rder No. %for bein( violative of the le(islative po*er of Con(ress under !ection %, Article 8 of the
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Constitution9as it usurps the constitutional authorit+ of the le(islature to create a public office and toappropriate funds therefor.:

&he second case, 3.R. No. %419, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed b+petitioners Edcel C. $a()an, Rodolfo B. Albano #r., !i)eon A. Datu)anon(, and "rlando B. /ua,!r. 5petitioners-le(islators6 as incu)bent )e)bers of the ;ouse of Representatives.

&he (enesis of the fore(oin( cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic Ma+ 1%1elections, *hen then !enator Beni(no !i)eon A


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/#ERE!S, Boo' , Chapter %1, !ection % of Executive "rder No. 4, other*ise 'no*n as theRevised Ad)inistrative Code of the Philippines, (ives the President the continuin( authorit+ toreor(ani7e the "ffice of the President.

NO/, T#ERE$ORE, , ENIGNO SIMEON !*UINO III, President of the Republic of thePhilippines, b+ virtue of the po*ers vested in )e b+ la*, do hereb+ order>

SECTION 1. Cre+o o + Commo. &here is hereb+ created the P#ILIPPINETRUT#COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION,"*hich shall pri)aril+ see' and findthe truth on, and to*ard this end, investi(ate reports of (raft and corruption of such scale and)a(nitude that shoc' and offend the )oral and ethical sensibilities of the people, co))itted b+public officers and e)plo+ees, their co-principals, acco)plices and accessories fro) the privatesector, if an+, durin( the previous ad)inistration and thereafter reco))end the appropriate actionor )easure to be ta'en thereon to ensure that the full )easure of =ustice shall be served *ithout fearor favor.

&he Co))ission shall be co)posed of a Chair)an and four 56 )e)bers *ho *ill act as anindependent colle(ial bod+.

SECTION 2. Po4er +- $co. &he Co))ission, *hich shall have all the po*ers of aninvesti(ative bod+ under !ection :, Chapter 4, Boo' of the Ad)inistrative Code of %4@:, ispri)aril+ tas'ed to conduct a thorou(h fact-findin( investi(ation of reported cases of (raft andcorruption referred to in !ection %, involvin( third level public officers and hi(her, their co-principals,acco)plices and accessories fro) the private sector, if an+, durin( the previous ad)inistration andthereafter sub)it its findin( and reco))endations to the President, Con(ress and the ")buds)an.

n particular, it shall>

a6 dentif+ and deter)ine the reported cases of such (raft and corruption *hich it *illinvesti(ate

b6 Collect, receive, revie* and evaluate evidence related to or re(ardin( the cases oflar(e scale corruption *hich it has chosen to investi(ate, and to this end re


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SECTION 13. $rre>E:me. x x x.

SECTION 18. Term o =e Commo. ? &he Co))ission shall acco)plish its )ission on orbefore Dece)ber %, 1%.

SECTION 15. Pbc+o o $+ Re:or. ? < <

SGD. P!*UITO N. OC#O!, &R.Executive !ecretar+

Nature of the &ruth Co))ission

As can be (leaned fro) the above-


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established b+ states e)er(in( fro) periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianis) to serveas )echanis)s for transitional =ustice.

&ruth co))issions have been described as bodies that share the follo*in( characteristics> 5%6 the+exa)ine onl+ past events 56 the+ investi(ate patterns of abuse co))itted over a period of ti)e, asopposed to a particular event 56 the+ are te)porar+ bodies that finish their *or' *ith the

sub)ission of a report containin( conclusions and reco))endations and 56 the+ are officiall+sanctioned, authori7ed or e)po*ered b+ the !tate.%12Co))issions )e)bers are usuall+e)po*ered to conduct research, support victi)s, and propose polic+ reco))endations to preventrecurrence of cri)es. &hrou(h their investi(ations, the co))issions )a+ ai) to discover and learn)ore about past abuses, or for)all+ ac'no*led(e the). &he+ )a+ ai) to prepare the *a+ forprosecutions and reco))end institutional refor)s.2%%

&hus, their )ain (oals ran(e fro) retribution to reconciliation. &he Nure)bur( and &o'+o *ar cri)etribunals are exa)ples of a retributor+ or vindicator+ bod+ set up to tr+ and punish those responsiblefor cri)es a(ainst hu)anit+. A for) of a reconciliator+ tribunal is the &ruth and ReconciliationCo))ission of !outh Africa, the principal function of *hich *as to heal the *ounds of past violenceand to prevent future conflict b+ providin( a cathartic experience for victi)s.

&he P&C is a far cr+ fro) !outh Africas )odel. &he latter placed )ore e)phasis on reconciliationthan on =udicial retribution, *hile the )archin( order of the P&C is the identification and punish)entof perpetrators. As one *riter%puts it>

&he order ruled out reconciliation. t translated the Draconian code spelled out b+ A 2&o those *ho tal' about reconciliation, if the+ )ean that the+ *ould li'e us tosi)pl+ for(et about the *ron(s that the+ have co))itted in the past, *e have this to sa+> &here canbe no reconciliation *ithout =ustice. hen *e allo* cri)es to (o unpunished, *e (ive consent totheir occurrin( over and over a(ain.2

&he &hrusts of the Petitions

Barel+ a )onth after the issuance of Executive "rder No. %, the petitioners as'ed the Court todeclare it unconstitutional and to en=oin the P&C fro) perfor)in( its functions. A perusal of thear(u)ents of the petitioners in both cases sho*s that the+ are essentiall+ the sa)e. &he petitioners-le(islators su))ari7ed the) in the follo*in( )anner>

5a6 E.". No. % violates the separation of po*ers as it arro(ates the po*er of the Con(ress tocreate a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

5b6 &he provision of Boo' , Chapter %1, !ection % of the Ad)inistrative Code of %4@:cannot le(iti)i7e E.". No. % because the dele(ated authorit+ of the President to structurall+reor(ani7e the "ffice of the President to achieve econo)+, si)plicit+ and efficienc+ does notinclude the po*er to create an entirel+ ne* public office *hich *as hitherto inexistent li'e the

2&ruth Co))ission.2

5c6 E.". No. % ille(all+ a)ended the Constitution and pertinent statutes *hen it vested the2&ruth Co))ission2 *ith


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5d6 E.". No. % violates the e
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%. hether or not the petitioners have the le(al standin( to file their respective petitions and


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ndeed, le(islators have a le(al standin( to see to it that the prero(ative, po*ers and privile(esvested b+ the Constitution in their office re)ain inviolate. &hus, the+ are allo*ed to


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*as upheld in a litan+ of cases, such as,Custodio v. President of the enate, 0anila 'ace 1orserainers2 %ssociation v. 3e la 4uente, Pascual v. ecretary of Public Wor*sand%nti5Chinese(eague of the Philippines v. 4eli+.KE)phases included. Citations o)ittedG

Not*ithstandin(, the Court leans on the doctrine that 2the rule on standin( is a )atter of procedure,hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs li'e ordinar+ citi7ens, taxpa+ers, and le(islators

*hen the public interest so re %6 does not per)it the President to create a public office, )uch less a truthco))ission 6 is li)ited to the reor(ani7ation of the ad)inistrative structure of the "ffice of thePresident 6 is li)ited to the restructurin( of the internal or(ans of the "ffice of the President Proper,transfer of functions and transfer of a(encies and 6 onl+ to achieve si)plicit+, econo)+ andefficienc+.9!uch continuin( authorit+ of the President to reor(ani7e his office is li)ited, and b+issuin( Executive "rder No. %, the President overstepped the li)its of this dele(ated authorit+.
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&he "!3 counters that there is nothin( exclusivel+ le(islative about the creation b+ the President ofa fact-findin( bod+ such as a truth co))ission. Pointin( to nu)erous offices created b+ pastpresidents, it ar(ues that the authorit+ of the President to create public offices *ithin the "ffice of thePresident Proper has lon( been reco(ni7ed. :Accordin( to the "!3, the Executive, =ust li'e theother t*o branches of (overn)ent, possesses the inherent authorit+ to create fact-findin(co))ittees to assist it in the perfor)ance of its constitutionall+ )andated functions and in the

exercise of its ad)inistrative functions.@

&his po*er, as the "!3 explains it, is but an ad=unct of theplenar+ po*ers *ielded b+ the President under !ection % and his po*er of control under !ection %:,both of Article 8 of the Constitution.4

t contends that the President is necessaril+ vested *ith the po*er to conduct fact-findin(investi(ations, pursuant to his dut+ to ensure that all la*s are enforced b+ public officials ande)plo+ees of his depart)ent and in the exercise of his authorit+ to assu)e directl+ the functions ofthe executive depart)ent, bureau and office, or interfere *ith the discretion of his officials.1&hepo*er of the President to investi(ate is not li)ited to the exercise of his po*er of control over hissubordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other po*ers, suchas his po*er to discipline subordinates,%his po*er for rule )a'in(, ad=udication and licensin(purposesand in order to be infor)ed on )atters *hich he is entitled to 'no*.

&he "!3 also cites the recent case of Banda v. Er)ita,*here it *as held that the President hasthe po*er to reor(ani7e the offices and a(encies in the executive depart)ent in line *ith hisconstitutionall+ (ranted po*er of control and b+ virtue of a valid dele(ation of the le(islative po*er toreor(ani7e executive offices under existin( statutes.

&hus, the "!3 concludes that the po*er of control necessaril+ includes the po*er to create offices./or the "!3, the President )a+ create the P&C in order to, a)on( others, put a closure to thereported lar(e scale (raft and corruption in the (overn)ent.0

&he Does the creation of the P&C fall *ithin the a)bit ofthe po*er to reor(ani7e as expressed in !ection % of the Revised Ad)inistrative CodeL !ection %conte)plates 2reor(ani7ation2 as li)ited b+ the follo*in( functional and structural lines> 5%6

restructurin( the internal or(ani7ation of the "ffice of the President Proper b+ abolishin(,consolidatin( or )er(in( units thereof or transferrin( functions fro) one unit to another 56transferrin( an+ function under the "ffice of the President to an+ other Depart)entFA(enc+ or viceversa or 56 transferrin( an+ a(enc+ under the "ffice of the President to an+ otherDepart)entFA(enc+ or vice versa. Clearl+, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof b+ reason of econo)+ or redundanc+ of functions. &hesepoint to situations *here a bod+ or an office is alread+ existent but a )odification or alterationthereof has to be effected. &he creation of an office is no*here )entioned, )uch less envisioned insaid provision. Accordin(l+, the ans*er to the


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efficienc+, shall have the continuin( authorit+ to reor(ani7e the ad)inistrative structure of the "fficeof the President.2 /or this purpose, he )a+ transfer the functions of other Depart)ents or A(enciesto the "ffice of the President. n Canoni7ado v. A(uirre K !CRA % 51116G, *e ruled thatreor(ani7ation 2involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof b+reason of econo)+ or redundanc+ of functions.2 t ta'es place *hen there is an alteration of theexistin( structure of (overn)ent offices or units therein, includin( the lines of control, authorit+ and

responsibilit+ bet*een the). &he EB is a bureau attached to the Depart)ent of /inance. t fallsunder the "ffice of the President. ;ence, it is sub=ect to the Presidents continuin( authorit+ toreor(ani7e. KE)phasis !uppliedG

n the sa)e vein, the creation of the P&C is not =ustified b+ the Presidents po*er of control. Controlis essentiall+ the po*er to alter or )odif+ or nullif+ or set aside *hat a subordinate officer had donein the perfor)ance of his duties and to substitute the =ud()ent of the for)er *ith that of thelatter.:Clearl+, the po*er of control is entirel+ different fro) the po*er to create public offices. &hefor)er is inherent in the Executive, *hile the latter finds basis fro) either a valid dele(ation fro)Con(ress, or his inherent dut+ to faithfull+ execute the la*s.

&he


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!"$C&"R 3ENERA$ CAD> Not the *hole of P.D. KNo.G %%9, Iour ;onor.

A!!"CA&E #!&CE CARP"> &he po*er of the President to reor(ani7e the entire National3overn)ent is dee)ed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the %4@: Constitution, correct.

!"$C&"R 3ENERA$ CAD> Ies, Iour ;onor.01

hile the po*er to create a truth co))ission cannot pass )uster on the basis of P.D. No. %%9 asa)ended b+ P.D. No. %::, the creation of the P&C finds =ustification under !ection %:, Article 8 ofthe Constitution, i)posin( upon the President the dut+ to ensure that the la*s are faithfull+executed. !ection %: reads>

!ection %:. &he President shall have control of all the executive depart)ents, bureaus, and offices.;e shall ensure that the la*s be faithfull+ executed. 5E)phasis supplied6.

As correctl+ pointed out b+ the respondents, the allocation of po*er in the three principal branchesof (overn)ent is a (rant of all po*ers inherent in the). &he Presidents po*er to conductinvesti(ations to aid hi) in ensurin( the faithful execution of la*s in this case, funda)ental la*s on

public accountabilit+ and transparenc+ is inherent in the Presidents po*ers as the ChiefExecutive. &hat the authorit+ of the President to conduct investi(ations and to create bodies toexecute this po*er is not explicitl+ )entioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not )ean that heis bereft of such authorit+.0%As explained in the land)ar' case of Marcos v. Man(lapus>0

x x x. &he %4@: Constitution, ho*ever, brou(ht bac' the presidential s+ste) of (overn)ent andrestored the separation of le(islative, executive and =udicial po*ers b+ their actual distributiona)on( three distinct branches of (overn)ent *ith provision for chec's and balances.

t *ould not be accurate, ho*ever, to state that 2executive po*er2 is the po*er to enforce the la*s,for the President is head of state as *ell as head of (overn)ent and *hatever po*ers inhere in suchpositions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself *ithholds it. /urther)ore, the Constitution

itself provides that the execution of the la*s is onl+ one of the po*ers of the President. t also (rantsthe President other po*ers that do not involve the execution of an+ provision of la*, e.(., his po*erover the countr+Os forei(n relations.

"n these pre)ises, *e hold the vie* that althou(h the %4@: Constitution i)poses li)itations on theexercise of:eccpo*ers of the President, it )aintains intact *hat is traditionall+ considered as*ithin the scope of 2executive po*er.2 Corollaril+, the po*ers of the President cannot be said to beli)ited onl+ to the specific po*ers enu)erated in the Constitution. n other *ords, executive po*er is)ore than the su) of specific po*ers so enu)erated.

t has been advanced that *hatever po*er inherent in the (overn)ent that is neither le(islative nor=udicial has to be executive. x x x.

ndeed, the Executive is (iven )uch lee*a+ in ensurin( that our la*s are faithfull+ executed. Asstated above, the po*ers of the President are not li)ited to those specific po*ers under theConstitution.0"ne of the reco(ni7ed po*ers of the President (ranted pursuant to thisconstitutionall+-)andated dut+ is the po*er to create ad hoc co))ittees. &his flo*s fro) theobvious need to ascertain facts and deter)ine if la*s have been faithfull+ executed. &hus,in 3epartment of 1ealth v. Camposano,0the authorit+ of the President to issue Ad)inistrative "rderNo. 4@, creatin( an investi(ative co))ittee to loo' into the ad)inistrative char(es filed a(ainst the
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e)plo+ees of the Depart)ent of ;ealth for the ano)alous purchase of )edicines *as upheld. nsaid case, it *as ruled>

T=e C=e E


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into s+ste)aticall+> 2to search or in x x to sub=ect to an official probe x x> to conduct anofficial in


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to conduct preli)inar+ investi(ation on char(es a(ainst public e)plo+ees and officials is li'e*iseconcurrentl+ shared *ith the Depart)ent of #ustice. Despite the passa(e of the $ocal 3overn)entCode in %44%, the ")buds)an retains concurrent =urisdiction *ith the "ffice of the President andthe local !an((unians to investi(ate co)plaints a(ainst local elective officials. KE)phasis suppliedG.

Also, Executive "rder No. % cannot contravene the po*er of the ")buds)an to investi(ate cri)inal

cases under !ection %0 5%6 of R.A. No. 9::1, *hich states>

5%6 nvesti(ate and prosecute on its o*n or on co)plaint b+ an+ person, an+ act or o)ission of an+public officer or e)plo+ee, office or a(enc+, *hen such act or o)ission appears to be ille(al, un=ust,i)proper or inefficient. t has pri)ar+ =urisdiction over cases co(ni7able b+ the !andi(anba+an and,in the exercise of its pri)ar+ =urisdiction, it )a+ ta'e over, at an+ sta(e, fro) an+ investi(ator+a(enc+ of (overn)ent, the investi(ation of such cases. KE)phases suppliedG

&he act of investi(ation b+ the ")buds)an as enunciated above conte)plates the conduct of apreli)inar+ investi(ation or the deter)ination of the existence of probable cause. &his iscate(oricall+ out of the P&Cs sphere of functions. ts po*er to investi(ate is li)ited to obtainin( factsso that it can advise and (uide the President in the perfor)ance of his duties relative to the

execution and enforce)ent of the la*s of the land. n this re(ard, the P&C co))its no act ofusurpation of the ")buds)ans pri)ordial duties.

&he sa)e holds true *ith respect to the D"#. ts authorit+ under !ection 56, Chapter %, &itle ,Boo' 8 in the Revised Ad)inistrative Code is b+ no )eans exclusive and, thus, can be shared *itha bod+ li'e*ise tas'ed to investi(ate the co))ission of cri)es.

/inall+, no*here in Executive "rder No. % can it be inferred that the findin(s of the P&C are to beaccorded conclusiveness. Much li'e its predecessors, the Davide Co))ission, the /elicianoCo))ission and the enarosa Co))ission, its findin(s *ould, at best, be reco))endator+ innature. And bein( so, the ")buds)an and the D"# have a *ider de(ree of latitude to decide*hether or not to re=ect the reco))endation. &hese offices, therefore, are not deprived of their)andated duties but *ill instead be aided b+ the reports of the P&C for possible indict)ents forviolations of (raft la*s.

8iolation of the E


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durin( prior ad)inistrations *here the 2sa)e )a(nitude of controversies and ano)alies29@*erereported to have been co))itted a(ainst the /ilipino people. &he+ assail the classificationfor)ulated b+ the respondents as it does not fall under the reco(ni7ed exceptions because first,2there is no substantial distinction bet*een the (roup of officials tar(eted for investi(ation b+Executive "rder No. % and other (roups or persons *ho abused their public office for personal (ainand second, the selective classification is not (er)ane to the purpose of Executive "rder No. % to

end corruption.294

n order to attain constitutional per)ission, the petitioners advocate that theco))ission should deal *ith 2(raft and (rafters prior and subse


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"ne of the basic principles on *hich this (overn)ent *as founded is that of the e


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constitutional prohibition a(ainst ine


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discri)inatin( differentiation clearl+ reverberates to label the co))ission as a vehicle forvindictiveness and selective retribution.

&hou(h the "!3 enu)erates several differences bet*een the Arro+o ad)inistration and other pastad)inistrations, these distinctions are not substantial enou(h to )erit the restriction of theinvesti(ation to the 2previous ad)inistration2 onl+. &he reports of *idespread corruption in the Arro+o

ad)inistration cannot be ta'en as basis for distin(uishin( said ad)inistration fro) earlierad)inistrations *hich *ere also ble)ished b+ si)ilar *idespread reports of i)propriet+. &he+ arenot inherent in, and do not inure solel+ to, the Arro+o ad)inistration. As #ustice sa(ani Cru7 put it,2!uperficial differences do not )a'e for a valid classification.2@@

&he public needs to be enli(htened *h+ Executive "rder No. % chooses to li)it the scope of theintended investi(ation to the previous ad)inistration onl+. &he "!3 ventures to opine that 2toinclude other past ad)inistrations, at this point, )a+ unnecessaril+ overburden the co))ission andlead it to lose its effectiveness.2@4&he reason (iven is specious. t is *ithout doubt irrelevant to thele(iti)ate and noble ob=ective of the P&C to sta)p out or 2end corruption and the evil it breeds.2 41

&he probabilit+ that there *ould be difficult+ in unearthin( evidence or that the earlier reports

involvin( the earlier ad)inistrations *ere alread+ in


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&o reiterate, in order for a classification to )eet the re

!EC&"N %:. !pecial Provision Concernin( Mandate. f and *hen in the =ud()ent of the Presidentthere is a need to expand the )andate of the Co))ission as defined in !ection % hereof to includethe investi(ation of cases and instances of (raft and corruption durin( the prior ad)inistrations, such)andate )a+ be so extended accordin(l+ b+ *a+ of a supple)ental Executive "rder.

&he Court is not convinced. Althou(h !ection %: allo*s the President the discretion to expand thescope of investi(ations of the P&C so as to include the acts of (raft and corruption co))itted inother past ad)inistrations, it does not (uarantee that the+ *ould be covered in the future. !uchexpanded )andate of the co))ission *ill still depend on the *hi) and caprice of the President. fhe *ould decide not to include the), the section *ould then be )eanin(less. &his *ill onl+ fortif+ thefears of the petitioners that the Executive "rder No. % *as 2crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of

officials and personalities of the Arro+o ad)inistration.2%10

&he Court tried to see' (uidance fro) the pronounce)ent in the case of /irata v.andiganbayan,%19that the 2PC33 Charter 5co)posed of Executive "rders Nos. %, and %6 doesnot violate the e


22/29

&he issue that see)s to ta'e center sta(e at present is - *hether or not the !upre)e Court, in theexercise of its constitutionall+ )andated po*er of #udicial Revie* *ith respect to recent initiatives ofthe le(islature and the executive depart)ent, is exercisin( undue interference. s the ;i(hest&ribunal, *hich is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself (uilt+ of violatin(funda)ental tenets li'e the doctrine of separation of po*ersL &i)e and a(ain, this issue has beenaddressed b+ the Court, but it see)s that the present political situation calls for it to once a(ain

explain the le(al basis of its action lest it continuall+ be accused of bein( a hindrance to the nationsthrust to pro(ress.

&he Philippine !upre)e Court, accordin( to Article 8, !ection % of the %4@: Constitution, is vested*ith #udicial Po*er that 2includes the dut+ of the courts of =ustice to settle actual controversiesinvolvin( ri(hts *hich are le(all+ de)andable and enforceable, and to deter)ine *hether or notthere has been a (rave of abuse of discretion a)ountin( to lac' or excess of =urisdiction on the partof an+ branch or instru)entalit+ of the (overn)ent.2

/urther)ore, in !ection 56 thereof, it is vested *ith the po*er of =udicial revie* *hich is the po*erto declare a treat+, international or executive a(ree)ent, la*, presidential decree, procla)ation,order, instruction, ordinance, or re(ulation unconstitutional. &his po*er also includes the dut+ to rule

on the constitutionalit+ of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, procla)ations, orders,instructions, ordinances, and other re(ulations. &hese provisions, ho*ever, have been fertile(rounds of conflict bet*een the !upre)e Court, on one hand, and the t*o co-e 2And *hen the =udiciar+ )ediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert an+superiorit+ over the other depart)ents it does not in realit+ nullif+ or invalidate an act of thele(islature, but onl+ asserts the sole)n and sacred obli(ation assi(ned to it b+ the Constitution todeter)ine conflictin( clai)s of authorit+ under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in anactual controvers+ the ri(hts *hich that instru)ent secures and (uarantees to the).2 %1:

&hus, the Court, in exercisin( its po*er of =udicial revie*, is not i)posin( its o*n *ill upon a co-e


23/29

'no*in( the truth and so it *ill not allo* itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attain)ent. t )ust,ho*ever, be e)phasi7ed that the search for the truth )ust be *ithin constitutional bounds for 2oursis still a (overn)ent of la*s and not of )en.2%%1

/#ERE$ORE, the petitions are 3RAN&ED. Executive "rder No. % is hereb+ declaredNC"N!&&&"NA$ insofar as it is violative of the e

REN!TO C. CORON!

Chief #ustice

!NTONIO T. C!RPIOAssociate #ustice

CONC#IT! C!RPIO MOR!LESAssociate #ustice

PRESITERO &. (EL!SCO, &R.Associate #ustice

!NTONIO EDU!RDO . N!C#UR!Associate #ustice

TERESIT! &. LEON!RDOHDE C!STROAssociate #ustice

!RTURO D. RIONAssociate #ustice

DIOSD!DO M. PER!LT!Associate #ustice

LUC!S P. ERS!MINAssociate #ustice

M!RI!NO C. DEL C!STILLOAssociate #ustice

ROERTO !. !!DAssociate #ustice

M!RTIN S. (ILL!R!M!, &R.Associate #ustice

&OSE PORTUG!L PEREAssociate #ustice

M!RI! LOURDES P.!. SERENOAssociate #ustice

C E R & / C A & " N

Pursuant to !ection %, Article 8 of the Constitution, certif+ that the conclusions in the aboveDecision had been reached in consultation before the case *as assi(ned to the *riter of the opinionof the Court.

REN!TO C. CORON!Chief #ustice
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$oooe

%An(ara v. &he Electoral Co))ission, 9 Phil. %4, %0@ 5%496.

Bernas, &he %4@: Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Co))entar+, %449 ed.,p. xxxiv, citin(0iller, $ectures on the Constitution of the nited !tates 9 5%@46 % !ch*art7,&he Po*ers of 3overn)ent % 5%496.

Cru7, Philippine Political la*, 11 ed. p. %.

d.

0Resolution dated Au(ust , 1%1 consolidatin( 3.R. No. %440 *ith 3.R. No.%419, rollo,pp. @:-@@.

9!ection %. &he le(islative po*er shall be vested in the Con(ress of the Philippines *hichshall consist of a !enate and a ;ouse of Representatives, except to the extent reserved tothe people b+ the provision on initiative and referendu).

:Birao(o Petition, p. 0, rollo, p. :.

@!alvador $aurel v. ;on. Desierto, 3.R. No. %09@, April %, 11, citin( /.R. Meche), A&reatise "n &he $a* of Public "ffices and "fficers.

4nternational Center for &ransitional #ustice, http>FF***.ict=.or(FenFt=F%@.ht)lS visitedNove)ber 1, 1%1.

%1/ree)an, &he &ruth Co))ission and Procedural /airness, 119 Ed., p. %, citin( 1ayner,nspea*ableruths7 4acing the Challenge of ruth Commissions.

%%nternational Center for &ransitional #ustice, supra note 4.

%%rmando 3oronila, Philippine 3aily 6n8uirer,Au(ust , 1%1.

http>FFne*sinfo.in


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%@"!3 Consolidated Co))ent, p. , rollo,p. %0, citin( y v. andiganbayan, 3.R. Nos.%10490-:1, March 1, 11%, 0 !CRA 90%, 991-99%.

%4!enate of the Philippines v. Er)ita, 3.R. No. %94:::, April 1, 119, @@ !CRA %, 0and 4rancisco v. 1ouse of 'epresentatives, 91 Phil. @1, @ 5116.

1"!3 Me)orandu), p. 4, rollo, p. @.

%3.R. No. %%%10, Au(ust %4, %44, 0 !CRA 019, 01.

!upra note %4, citin( Pimentel -r., v. &+ecutive ecretary, 3.R. No. %0@1@@, #ul+ 9, 110,9 !CRA 9, 9%-9.

"!3 Me)orandu), p. 1, rollo, p. 4.

3.R. No. %:%49, Ma+ , 119, @4 !CRA %91, %9-%@.

0!ocial #ustice !ociet+ 5!#!6 v. Dan(erous Dru(s Board and Philippine Dru( Enforce)entA(enc+, 3.R. No. %0:@:1, Nove)ber , 11@, 0:1 !CRA %1, % &atad v. !ecretar+ of theDepart)ent of Ener(+, 9 Phil % 5%44:6 De 3uia v. C"ME$EC, 3.R. No. %1:%, Ma+ 9,%44, 1@ !CRA 1, .

93.R. %0:, #ul+ 4, 110, 90 !CRA :, 9.

:@ Phil. 9@, : 5%446.

@25%6 the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case 56 the presence of aclear case of disre(ard of a constitutional or statutor+ prohibition b+ the public respondenta(enc+ or instru)entalit+ of the (overn)ent and, 56 the lac' of an+ other part+ *ith a )oredirect and specific interest in the


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4"!3 Consolidated Co))ent, p. , rollo, p. %.

1"!3 Me)orandu), pp. @-4, rollo, pp. 0:-0@.

%Citin( Depart)ent of ;ealth v. Ca)posano, 3.R. No. %0:9@, April :, 110, 0: !CRA@, 01.

Citin( Evan(elista v. #arencio, No. $-::, Nove)ber :, %4:0, 9@ !CRA 44, %1.

Citin( Rodri(ue7 v. !antos Dia7, No. $-%400, /ebruar+ 4, %49, %1 !CRA %, 0.

3.R. No. %9991, April 1, 1%1.

0Consolidated Co))ent, p. 0, rollo, p. %90.

93.R. Nos. %@1%-@1, #ul+ %1, 11%, 91 !CRA :%@, also cited in Banda, supra.

:&he 8eterans /ederation of the Philippines v. Re+es, 3. R. No. %001:, /ebruar+ @,119, @ !CRA 09, 09 D"&C v. Mabalot, @ Phil. %0, %9-%90 5116 Mondano v.!ilvosa,4: Phil. % 5%4006.

@"!3 Me)orandu), p. 09, rollo, p. :0.

43.R. No. %%:0, "ctober %9, %44:, @1 !CRA :%, :1.

01&!N, !epte)ber @, 1%1, pp. 10-1:.

0%"!3 Me)orandu), p. :, rollo, p.09.

0

3.R. @@%%, !epte)ber %0, %4@4, %:: !CRA 9@@.

0d. at 94%.

049 Phil. @@9, @49-@4: 51106.

00Consolidated Co))ent, p. @ rollo, p. %9@.

09!ection %:. &he President shall have control of all the executive depart)ents, bureaus,and offices. ;e shall ensure that the la*s be faithfull+ executed.

0:"ple v. &orres, 0 Phil. 4@, 49: 5%44@6.

0@!)art Co))unications, nc. et al. v. National &eleco))unications Co))ission, 09 Phil.%0, %09 5116.

043.R. No. 499@%, Dece)ber , %44%, 1 !CRA @.

91d. at 4.

9%&!N, !epte)ber @, 1%1, pp. 4-and "!3 Me)orandu), p. 9:, rollo, p. 4.
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9"!3 Consolidated Co))ent, p. 00, rollo, p. %:0.

9d. at 09, rollo, p. %:9.

9d.

903.R. No. %9::%%, "ctober %1, 11@, 09@ !CRA :, 4.

99$a()an Petition, pp. , 01-0, rollo, pp. 0%, 01-91.

9:$a()an Me)orandu), 3.R. %419, pp. @-4, rollo, pp. :-@.

9@$a()an Petition, p. %, rollo, p. 4.

94d. at @-4, rollo, pp. 9-:.

:1d. at 4, rollo, p. :.

:%"!3 Me)orandu), p. @@; rollo, p. 1:.

:"!3 Consolidated Co))ent. p. 9@,rollo, p. %@@.

:"!3 Me)orandu), pp. 41-4, rollo,pp. 14-%.

:he Philippine -udges %ssociation v. 1on. Pardo, 3.R. No. %10:%, Nove)ber %%, %44,: !CRA :1, :%%.

:0d. at :%, citin( chon( v. ;ernande7, %1% Phil. %%00 5%40:6 !ison, #r. v. Ancheta, No. $-04%, #ul+ 0, %4@, %1 !CRA 90 Association of !)all $ando*ners in the Philippines v.

!ecretar+ of A(rarian Refor), 3.R. No. :@, #ul+ %, %4@4, %:0 !CRA , :0.

:9#uino v. en*ows*i,0 / d %101 5d. Cir. %4406 cited in A). #ur, d, 8ol. %9 5b6, p. 1.

::&dward /alves, 6nc. v. Wa*e Country, N.C. 9 cited in A). #ur. d, 8ol. %9 5b6, p. 1.

:@(ehr v. 'obertson, 9 ! @, %1 cited in A). #ur. d, 8ol. %9 5b6, p. 1.

:4!ee Columbus )d. of &d. v. Penic*, ! 4 cited A). #ur. d, 8ol. %9 5b6, pp. %9-%:.

@1!ee (ombard v. tate of (a.,: ! 9: cited in A). #ur. d, 8ol. %9 5b6, p. %9.

@%Beltran v. !ecretar+ of ;ealth, 0% Phil 091, 0@ 51106.

@Cru7, Constitutional $a*, 11 ed., p. %@.

@0c&rlain v. aylor, 1: nd. 1 cited in A). #ur. d, 8ol. %9 5b6, p. 9:.

@Cru7, Constitutional $a*, 11 ed., pp. %0-%9.
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@0No. $-09, 04 !CRA 0, ::-:@ 5!epte)ber %, %4:6.

@9)asa v. 4ederacion !brera de la 6ndustria aba8uera y !tros rabajadores de 4ilipinas4!6%4$,No. $-:%%, Nove)ber %4, %4:, 9% !CRA 4, %%1-%%%%nuncension v. 9ational(abor nion, No. $-914:, Nove)ber 4, %4::, @1 !CRA 01, :-: /illegas v. 1iuChiong sai Pao 1o, No. $-499, Nove)ber %1, %4:@, @9 !CRA :1, :0 3umlao v.

Comelec, No. $-00, #anuar+ , %4@1, 40 !CRA 4, 1Ceni:a v. Comelec, No. $-01, #anuar+ @, %4@1, 40 !CRA :9, ::-:: 1imagan v. People,3.R. No. %%@%%,"ctober :, %44, : !CRA 0@ he Conference of 0aritime 0anning %gencies, 6nc. v.P!&%, 3.R. No. %%:%, April %, %440, !CRA 999, 9:: -00 Promotion and0anagement, 6nc. v. Court of %ppeals, 3.R. No. %1140, Au(ust 0, %449, 91 !CRA %4,% and iu v. Court of %ppeals, 3.R. No. %:%1, #anuar+ 1, %444, 1% !CRA :@,@@-@4. ee also 6chong v. 1ernande:,No. $-:440, %1% Phil. %%00 5%40:6 /era v. Cuevas,Nos. $-94-4, Ma+ %, %4:4, 41 !CRA :4, @@ and olentino v. ecretary of 4inance,3.R. Nos. %%000, %%000, %%00, %%00, %%0:0, %%0:@%, %%0@0, %%0@:, and %%04%,

Au(ust 0, %44, 0 !CRA 91, 9@.

@::th hereas clause, Executive "rder No. %.

@@Cru7, Constitutional $a*, 11 ed., p. %@.

@4"!3, Me)orandu), p. @4,rollo, p. 1@.

419th hereas clause, Executive "rder No. %

4%$ee, ;andboo' of $e(al Maxi)s, 11 Ed., p.

4%%@ ! 0:, http>FFcasela*.lp.findla*.co)FscriptsF(etcase.plLcourtTusUvolT%%@UinvolT0accessed on Dece)ber , 1%1S.

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Macalintal v. C"ME$EC, 3.R. No. %0:1%, #ul+ %1, 11, 10 !CRA 9%, pp. 9%-90anila Prince 1otel vs. #6, 0 Phil. @, %1% 5%44:6.

4d. at 9.

40:09 /. !upp. @@, N.. D. nd., %44%, #an 1, %44%, Cri) No. ;CR 41-alsohttp>FFin.findacase.co)FresearchF*fr)Doc8ie*er.aspxFx


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%1%!ee A). #ur. d, 8ol. %9 5b6, pp. :1-:%, as footnote 5A state le(islature )a+, consistentl+*ith the E

barok vs ptc.docx

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