ballistic missile defense walexs: collaborative ... · ballistic missile defense walexs:...

K. KOHRI AND D. W. AMANN

238 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 21, NUMBER 2 (2000)

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Ballistic Missile Defense WALEXs: CollaborativeExamination of Requirements

Karen Kohri and Donald W. Amann

arfare Analysis Laboratory Exercises (WALEXs) have been successful inaddressing complex problems in a collaborative environment, especially in the areas ofmission analysis, concept exploration, requirements definition, and system acquisition.WALEX participants have gained extensive knowledge at significant cost and timesavings to the sponsor compared with the amount of time and effort that would beexpended in trying to achieve the same outcome through ordinary meetings, seminars,or war games. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has successfully employedWALEXs to improve their understanding of missile defense issues for both the UnitedStates and the international community. (Keywords: Ballistic Missile Defense,WALEX.)

INTRODUCTIONThe Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

(BMDO) has used the Warfare Analysis LaboratoryExercise (WALEX) process successfully since 1993.BMDO has found the process to be useful in severalways by, e.g., increasing the understanding and appre-ciation of critical issues; promoting consensus andexchange of information among participants; allowingfor the examination of concepts, doctrine, systems,architectures, and policy issues; and facilitating theidentification of new issues and ideas. For example,General and Flag Officers from the U.S. Pacific Com-mand (USPACOM) and the U.S. Central Command(USCENTCOM) have participated in WALEXs de-signed to help them better understand the need forBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems and assist in

defining the BMD requirements for their respectiveareas of responsibilities. In other exercises, the processhas been used to help Action Officer–level represen-tatives from the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJF-COM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S.Forces Korea (USFK), USPACOM, and USCENT-COM as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) coalition committees to understand criticalBMD concepts and refine operational doctrine and re-quirements for BMD. BMDO has also used the processwith high-level national and international defensepolicy and acquisition groups comprising the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, National Armament Direc-tors for NATO nations, and retired high-level officialsto discuss the need for BMD, the need for multiple types

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 21, NUMBER 2 (2000) 239

BMD WALEXS: COLLABORATIVE EXAMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

of systems to build a better defense,and the importance of internation-al cooperation to achieve a robustBMD.

To achieve a successful WALEX,BMDO has recognized that appro-priate participation in the exercisesis a critical issue. Thus, BMDO-sponsored BMD WALEXs were thefirst WALEXs to be conducted atmany sites around the world toenable full participation, includingthe Netherlands, Belgium, Germa-ny, Japan, and several cities in theUnited States.

In this article, we present threeWALEXs to demonstrate how theprocess has been successfully usedby BMDO to address complexproblems in a collaborative envi-ronment. These WALEXs will beexplored in the context of meetingsponsor objectives and highlightingtheir impact.

NATO BMC3 WALEX

Background and ObjectivesThe NATO Battle Management Command, Con-

trol, and Communications (BMC3) WALEX wasconducted on 22 and 23 October 1996 at NATOHeadquarters in Ramstein, Germany. As a defense or-ganization, NATO faces a growing air threat, not onlyfrom conventional aircraft but also from ballistic mis-siles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Thisthreat, and ballistic missiles in particular, is increasingin sophistication and range, placing in jeopardy both alarge area of NATO territory (Fig. 1) and NATO forcesdeployed out of area. The problem is aggravated by theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATO’sexisting air defense system mainly focuses on aircraftthreats, but it is now building an Extended Air Defense(EAD) to counter this growing threat.

The objective of this WALEX was to explore BMC3

issues related to the development and deployment ofNATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS)for EAD, focusing on BMC3 requirements for incorpo-rating BMD into ACCS. Figure 2 illustrates the ACCS.

The NATO BMC3 Subworking Group, comprising25 attendees representing 11 NATO nations, partici-pated in this exercise. A portable network of laptopcomputers, using the Electronic Seminar Support(ESS) System, captured pertinent ideas and comments.Since English was a second language for most of theinternational audience, attendees were able to take

full advantage of this system by composing and record-ing their thoughts on the laptops. The working envi-ronment in the Ramstein conference room is shown inFig. 3. A brief synopsis of the key issues discussed duringthe 2-day exercise follows.

Discussions

Information Management

Information management within ACCS, a key ele-ment of effective battle management, permeated thediscussion of all scenarios presented in this WALEX.Participants agreed that for ACCS to adequately sup-port the BMD mission, several information manage-ment issues had to be addressed:

• Early warning of a ballistic missile launch was deemedcritical to EAD. The consensus was that an architec-ture and process for dissemination of ballistic missileearly warning into NATO is required, even before theimplementation of ACCS.

• Track data fusion and correlation were consideredimportant issues; the discussions helped to clearlyidentify critical factors that required further study andexamination (e.g., when and where the data fusionand correlation should take place).

• Although internal ACCS interfaces were specifiedand standardized, other factors were not adequatelydefined, i.e., the means by which the system was ableto accept and provide information to external pro-ducers and users to support the BMD mission.

Figure 1. Screen shot of potential ballistic missile threats to NATO territory.



Figure 2. The NATO Air Command and Control System.

Command and Control

The main thrust of these discussions was to inves-tigate and understand the command and control issuesof a ballistic missile EAD. Several conclusions weredrawn, including the following:

• Because of the short time linesof ballistic missile attack, estab-lishing the command authorityand rules of engagement wouldbe especially critical when thetrajectory of the missile crossedcommand boundaries withinNATO regions.

• A consensus was reached thatsenior commanders and politicalleaders must understand the limi-tations and capabilities of ACCSto allow prioritization of defendedassets.

• Participants recognized thatACCS must be flexible enough tomatch the deployments and mis-sion assignments of defensive dual-capable systems (ballistic missilesversus aircraft, cruise missiles, andunmanned aerial vehicles).

Deployment of ACCS Out of Area

Within the ACCS structure, several elements havebeen designated as deployable. The WALEX presenta-tions on out-of-area situations raised may issues regard-ing the ability to deploy, place, and provide connectivity

Figure 3. NATO BMC3 WALEX at Ramstein, Germany.

Combined AirOperation Center

Air Command andControl Center

SAM OperationCenter

Fixed siteradar

Sensorfusionpoint

Deployableradar

NATO air early warning

SAM launch sites



among these elements. Interoperability and coordi-nation were seen as important issues in the contextof a deployed out-of-area scenario, both withinNATO-deployed forces and with other non-NATOforces.

Counterforce

ACCS will be designed to provide a force manage-ment and intelligence dissemination capability for thecounterforce phase of missile defense operations. Crit-ical issues important to ACCS were identified as therapid and efficient exchange of information; the acqui-sition and dissemination of pertinent intelligence data;and the ability to identify targets, recognize the valueof the information, and provide it to an appropriatecounterforce asset.

ImpactThe co-chair of the group was able to use

the information gathered from this WALEX inhis report to NATO’s Missile Defense Ad HocGroup. The results were also used to further discus-sions and studies by the BMC3 Working Group toclarify the issues uncovered during the exercise. Theco-chair summed up his appraisal of the NATOBMC3 WALEX as follows:

In my view, the WALEX was a huge success. It took us step-by-step through the basics of the missile defense problem andenabled us to address a number of complicated battle manage-ment issues and develop approaches to deal with them. … Iconsider the BMC3 WALEX to be an excellent problemsolving mechanism and educational tool.

U.S.–ISRAEL BMD BATTLEMANAGEMENT WALEX

Background and ObjectivesThe United States has been helping the Israelis

develop their own BMD system, a need that becameevident during the Gulf War. Both countries recognizethat it is to their mutual advantage to determine, beforea conflict, how to best establish Battle ManagementCommand, Control, Communications, Computers,and Intelligence (BMC4I) interoperability betweentheir assets. Establishing this combined interoperabilityis critical should the United States have to deploy inor near Israel. Working groups consisting of represen-tatives from both nations have been examining thisproblem for some time. To facilitate the process,BMDO, in conjunction with the Joint Staff and theUSEUCOM J3 Staff, sponsored a WALEX developedand conducted by APL on 17 through 19 November1997 (Fig. 4).

The goal of the exercise, from an operational per-spective, was to identify relevant procedural and tech-nical requirements associated with U.S.–Israel BMDinteroperability. In addition, it was to be used to pro-vide a forum through which the participants couldachieve a common understanding of critical functionsand relationships required to conduct combined BMDoperations, and as a result, develop working BMC4ICombined System Operating Procedures (CSOPs).The development of CSOPs that would be acceptableto both nations had to be based on an understandingof the inherent differences between their philosophieson such issues as placement of defense assets, rules of

Figure 4. U.S.–Israel BMD WALEX (17–19 Nov 1997).



engagement, control of assets, doctrine, etc. The par-ticipants from each side were able to proceed once thesedifferences were identified and understood.

ImpactThrough full utilization of the WALEX process, the

participants achieved consensus on key issues andproduced a U.S.–Israel BMD BMC4I architectureconcept and a CSOP. The Director of Operations,USEUCOM, made the following comment based onthis WALEX experience:

The WALEX produced a common understanding of thecritical functions crucial to conducting combined BMD op-erations with Israel. The exercise afforded the participants anintense and focused forum that produced a working BMC4Iblueprint for integrated operations of a multi-tiered BMDforce. In less than a week, the WALEX completed what wouldhave required many months of staff work and travel and nodoubt would still not have achieved the level of understand-ing generated by the WALEX.

SPACE-BASED LASER STRATEGICPOLICY ASSESSMENT WALEX

Background and ObjectivesA growing concern exists in the United States re-

garding the increase in sophistication and range ofballistic missiles. As more and more nations build andtest ballistic missiles that have the potential to threat-en not only our allies but the United States itself,efforts have turned toward developing and testing a

new generation of defense systems to counter thisthreat. One such defense concept is the use of a space-based laser (SBL) to shoot down ballistic missiles (Fig.5). Inherent in exploring this technology is examiningthe policy implications of developing and deploying anSBL system.

In the last 5 years, the SBL Program has overcomeseveral technical hurdles and is continuing to advancethe technologies necessary to realize a future operation-al capability. Congressional legislation has called forthe development of a subscale SBL space experiment.

On 24 and 25 February 1999, APL conducted theSBL Strategic Policy Assessment WALEX. It drew oninsights from a WALEX for the SBL Strategic Panelheld on 4 and 5 June 1998. Both WALEXs examinedthe implications that the SBL system would have onU.S. national policy formulation. The panelists for thesecond WALEX were selected from former high-rank-ing policy officials from DoD, Capitol Hill, and selectedgovernment agencies, with a former Space CommandCommander-in-Chief as the panel chair.

The purpose was to identify those issues that mightaffect technology selection and other decisions beingmade regarding the actual development of an SBL sys-tem. The exercise focused on exploring potential policyoptions afforded by an SBL, identifying key issues, anddiscussing the arguments for and against the system. Toassist the panel in focusing their discussions, several keyareas related to the development and deployment of anSBL system were presented (Fig. 6). These issues al-lowed the panelists to discuss each area in depth whilestill recognizing the cross-implications of decisions in

one area on another. The panel’sspecific role was to provide perspec-tive and judgment about these keySBL issues and, in particular, whichissues would weigh more heavilythan others and which would bethe “show stoppers.”

ImpactDuring this WALEX and the

wrap-up session, several insightswere gained. Potential benefitswere identified for developing anSBL system, especially in light ofrecent events (i.e., more countriesare obtaining ballistic missiles thatcan directly threaten the U.S.homeland). Aside from providingnational missile defense, the sys-tem might also play key roles inproviding theater and tacticalBMD, space control, and ballisticmissile deterrence. Balancing theFigure 5. Spaced-based laser (with constellation depicted in background).



be an ongoing challenge. The panelnoted that there will always be bud-getary and emotional argumentsagainst the system, but the needmay eventually outweigh them.

SUMMARYExamples cited in this article

show how BMDO has applied theWALEX process to a diverse set ofproblems, ranging from technical tooperational to political. The processhas allowed BMDO and the partic-ipants at each WALEX to gainknowledge and insight in a shorter

time and with less effort than would have been achievedthrough ordinary meetings, seminars, or war games.

Figure 6. Key issue areas concerning use of an SBL system.

types and number of missions that such a system wouldperform against the cost and support for the system will

Deploymentissues

Developmentissues

Employmentissues

Domestic supportConstellation design

Laser design

Internationalsupport

Weaponsin space

Spacecontrol

Deterrence

Missions

Commandand

control

THE AUTHORS

KAREN KOHRI received a B.S. degree in physics from Drexel University in1982. She is a member of the APL Senior Professional Staff of JWAD and aProgram Manager for Theater Air and Defense Warfare Analysis Programs forBMDO. Ms. Kohri joined APL in 1982. Her technical expertise includes Air andMissile Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Strategic Ballistic MissileWeapon System analysis. She has many years of experience moderating andfacilitating technical meetings, including briefing high-level senior officials fromboth the United States and allied countries, leading technical teams inpreparation for WALEXs, and evaluating future military systems concepts andarchitectures. Ms. Kohri was appointed to the Counterproliferation BusinessCouncil in 1999. Her e-mail address is [email protected].

DONALD W. AMANN received a B.S. degree in mathematics from NorthCarolina State University in 1975 and an M.S. degree in numerical science fromThe Johns Hopkins University in 1979. He is a member of the APL SeniorProfessional Staff. Mr. Amann joined APL in 1982. As a member of the StrategicSystems Department, he focused on the system accuracy evaluation of the Navy’sFleet Ballistic Missile weapon systems and served as a section supervisor in theFlight Accuracy Group. He joined the Joint Warfare Analysis Department in1995. His current work concentrates on the development and execution ofWALEXs with an emphasis on Ballistic Missile Defense. His e-mail address [email protected].

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