fm3_27(global ballistic missile defense)

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For Official Use Only

FM 3-27(FM 3-27.10)

ARMY GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

DEFENSE (GBMD) OPERATIONS

January 2011

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect

information and technical data on current technology in areas of significant or potentiallysignificant military application or that related to specific military deficiencies of potentialadversaries. This determination was made on 21 August 2007. Other requests must bereferred to HQ USASMDC, ATTN: SMDC-FWD-D, Colorado Springs, CO 80910.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents forreconstruction of the document.

Warning Notice: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by theArms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of theseexport laws are subject of severe criminal penalties.

Headquarters Department of the Army


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This publication is available at

Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and

General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine

Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).


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_____________________________________________________________________________________DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect

information and technical data on current technology in areas of significant or potentially significant militaryapplication or that relates to specific military deficiencies of potential adversaries. This determination was madeon 21 August 2007. Other requests must be referred to HQ USASMDC, ATTN: SMDC-FWD-D, ColoradoSprings, CO 80910.WARNING NOTICE: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms ExportControl Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export laws are subject tosevere criminal penalties.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents for reconstruction ofthe document.*This publication supersedes FM 3-27, 20 May 2010, and FM 3-27.10, 24 April 2008.

For Official Use Onlyi

*FM 3-27(FM 3-27.10)

Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD)Operations

Contents

Page

SUMMARY OF CHANGES .................................................................................... v

PREFACE ............................................................................................................. vi

Chapter 1 ARMY GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ........................................... 1-1

GBMD ................................................................................................................. 1-1

Missile Defense Doctrine - Definitions ............................................................... 1-1

The US Army's GBMD Mission .......................................................................... 1-2

Army GBMD Role ............................................................................................... 1-2

Ballistic Missile Defense System ........................................................................ 1-3

Ballistic Missile Defense Phases ........................................................................ 1-4

GMD Mission ...................................................................................................... 1-6

Joint Doctrine for Missile Defense Operations ................................................... 1-6

GBMD Organizations ......................................................................................... 1-7

Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL ............................................................................. 2-1

Command and Control ....................................................................................... 2-1

GBMD C2 Systems ............................................................................................ 2-2

GFC .................................................................................................................... 2-2

C2BMC ............................................................................................................... 2-3

Command Relationships .................................................................................... 2-4

GMD Forces ....................................................................................................... 2-5

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) ................................................................................................ 2-6

Field Manual

No. 3-27

Headquarters

Department of the ArmyWashington, DC, 3 January 2011


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Contents

For Official Use Onlyii FM 3-27 3 January 2011

Chapter 3 OPERATIONS .................................................................................................... 3-1

Operations ........................................................................................................... 3-1

Global Operations ............................................................................................... 3-2

Army GBMD Operations ..................................................................................... 3-3

Missile Defense Warfighting Principles ............................................................... 3-4

Protection ............................................................................................................ 3-9

Security Operations .......................................................................................... 3-10

Operations Security .......................................................................................... 3-14

Information Operations ..................................................................................... 3-14

Chapter 4 ARMY GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE SUSTAINMENT ................................... 4-1

Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1

GBMD Site Characteristics ................................................................................. 4-1

Contractor Logistics Support .............................................................................. 4-4

Army Sustainment for GBMD .............................................................................. 4-7

Missile Defense Agency ...................................................................................... 4-9

Chapter 5 COMMUNICATIONS .......................................................................................... 5-1

Overview ............................................................................................................. 5-1

Communications Requirements .......................................................................... 5-1

GBMD Networks ................................................................................................. 5-2

C2BMC ................................................................................................................ 5-4

Responsibilities ................................................................................................... 5-5

Chapter 6 Army GBMD Components ................................................................................ 6-1

GMD Overview .................................................................................................... 6-1

GMD Program Description .................................................................................. 6-1

Launch Support System ...................................................................................... 6-3

GBI System ......................................................................................................... 6-6

GMD Fire Direction Centers................................................................................ 6-7

GMD Organization ............................................................................................ 6-11

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) System Overview .................................................................. 6-14

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Operations ............................................................................ 6-15

Appendix A THREAT ............................................................................................................. A-1

Potential Rogue Missile Threats ........................................................................ A-1

Global Ballistic Missile Threats .......................................................................... A-1

Global Threat Enviroment .................................................................................. A-2

Summary of Strategic Threats ........................................................................... A-2

Trends ................................................................................................................ A-2

Global Threat Environment ................................................................................ A-3

Missiles .............................................................................................................. A-4

Space ................................................................................................................. A-7

Information Operations ...................................................................................... A-8

Physical Attack (Sabotage, Terrorism) .............................................................. A-8

Appendix B GBMD Support Elements ................................................................................ B-1

Associated BMDS Elements .............................................................................. B-1

BMDS Sensors................................................................................................... B-2

Land Components .............................................................................................. B-4


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Sea Components ................................................................................................ B-7

Appendix C GBMD OPERATIONS ........................................................................................ C-1

GMD Planning .................................................................................................... C-1

GMD Operations Planning ................................................................................. C-2

Engagement Operations .................................................................................... C-2

GMD Employment Guidelines ............................................................................ C-3

Security ............................................................................................................... C-5

GMD Site Characteristics ................................................................................... C-5

Security Operations ............................................................................................ C-8

GMD GBI Site Security Operations .................................................................. C-10

GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... References-1

INDEX ..................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. Ballistic Missile Phases and Ranges ................................................................... 1-4

Figure 1-2. GBMD organizational structure ............................................................................ 1-7

Figure 2-1. COCOM AOR ...................................................................................................... 2-2

Figure 2-2. GBMD Command Relationships .......................................................................... 2-5

Figure 3-1. GBMD Systems ................................................................................................... 3-2

Figure 3-2. GMD System Actions After ICBM Launch Detection ........................................... 3-6

Figure 3-3. Missile Tracking ................................................................................................... 3-8

Figure 4-1. PCSS Infrastructure ............................................................................................. 4-5

Figure 4-2. Operational Reporting Summarized .................................................................... 4-7

Figure 5-1. GMD COMNET Architecture ................................................................................ 5-3

Figure 5-2. C2BMC Tri-Node Architecture ............................................................................. 5-5

Figure 6-1 Strongback with Crane at a Silo & Transport of GBI from Airfield. ....................... 6-5

Figure 6-2 Vandenberg AFB & FGA GSD. ............................................................................. 6-5

Figure 6-3. OBV & Payload .................................................................................................... 6-6

Figure 6-4. EKV ...................................................................................................................... 6-7

Figure 6-5. FGA Missile Field ................................................................................................. 6-7

Figure 6-6. 100th MD BDE (GMD) MDE ............................................................................... 6-10

Figure 6-7. 49th MD BN (GMD) FDC .................................................................................... 6-11

Figure 6-8. GMD Organizational Structure ........................................................................... 6-12

Figure 6-9. Organization of Crew Positions ......................................................................... 6-13

Figure 6-10. MDE Operations Modes and Functions ........................................................... 6-13

Figure 6-11. FDC Operations Modes and Function ............................................................. 6-14

Figure 6-12. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Search Profile ...................................................................... 6-16

Figure 6-13. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar Site Security Operations ............................ 6-17


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Figure 6-14. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar Detachment .............................................................. 6-19

Figure A-1. ICBMs.................................................................................................................. A-6

Figure A-2. SLBMs ................................................................................................................. A-7

Figure B-1. Operations Center Likely to use C2BMC ............................................................ B-2

Figure B-2. DSP Satellite ....................................................................................................... B-3

Figure B-3. SBIRS Satellite .................................................................................................... B-4

Figure B-4. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar ...................................................................................... B-5

Figure B-5. UEWR ................................................................................................................. B-6

Figure B-6. COBRA Dane Radar ........................................................................................... B-7

Figure B-7. SBX Platform and Radar ..................................................................................... B-8

Figure B-8. Aegis Ship with AN/SPY-1 Radar ....................................................................... B-9

Figure C-1. In-flight updates .................................................................................................. C-3

Figure C-2. Operational Reporting – Summarized ................................................................ C-8

Figure C-3. Command Relationships for Security Operations ............................................ C-12

Tables

Table 3-1. Aspects of GBMD ................................................................................................. 3-3

Table 3-2. GMD Engagement Sequence ............................................................................... 3-6

Table 5-1. Tier I Nodes .......................................................................................................... 5-7

Table 5-2. Tier II Nodes ......................................................................................................... 5-8


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For Official Use Only3 January 2011 FM 3-27 v

Summary of Changes

1. Purpose: To summarize the revisions made to this Field Manual, Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense

Operations, published 20 May 2010.

2. The purpose of FM 3-27 is to describe the Army’s mission and roles in Global Ballistic Missile Defense

(GBMD) of the United States homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies from ballistic missile attack. It alsoestablishes the doctrinal framework for Army GBMD operations in the Joint community.

3. TRADOC Commander directed the information found in FM 3-27.10, Army Ground-based Midcourse

Defense Operation to be incorporated into FM 3-27 without duplication of information. All incorporated

information was copied verbatim from FM 3-27.10 to this document. When approved, this document will

supersede FM 3-27.10.

a. Executive Summary

• Current: Document lacks Executive Summary.

• Change: Adds Executive Summary with changes from original document.

b. Preface: Provides overview of Army GBMD operations.

• Current: Lacks identification of Army GFC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems.

• Change: Adds paragraphs to identify the Army GFC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems.

c. Chapter 1: Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense. Chapter defines GBMD doctrine as it relates to the

Army role, mission, responsibilities and relationships.

• Current: The chapter highlights to ballistic missile defense systems in general.

• Change: Adds text to clarify the Army organizations involved in GBMD and the GMD mission.

Adds explanation of BMDS engagement phases for ICBM flight path.

d. Chapter 2: Command and Control. Chapter discusses C2 for GBMD organizations and Army units

involved in countering the global missile threat

• Current: Chapter did not contain information about C2BMC or AN/TPY-2 (FBM).

• Change: Adds a section for each of C2BMC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM).

e. Chapter 3: Operations. Chapter discusses operations and considerations Army GBMD units must

apply for planning and execution of their mission.

•

Current: Lacks a discussion of operational procedures for GMD.• Change: Adds GMD warfighting principals, force protection requirements, and day-today ops.

f. Chapter 5: Communications. Contains GBMD communication requirements for Army systems.

• Current: Lacks information on In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS).

• Change: Adds information on IFICS.

g. Chapter 6: GMD Components. Chapter contains Army GBMD systems components.

• Current: Lacks system component descriptions.

• Change: Adds system component descriptions for GMD ground systems, launch support

equipment, ground safing devices, GBI, EKV, MDE, FDC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM).

h. Appendix C: GMD Operations. Appendix gives an in-depth view of operations and considerations

GMD units must apply to the conduct of their mission planning and execution.

•

Current: Lacks in-depth view of operations and considerations for GMD units.• Change: Adds in-depth view of operations and considerations for GMD units.

i. Glossary and Index have been updated to reflect changes made to this document.


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For Official Use Only vi FM 3-27 3 January 2011

Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-27 Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) Operations is a proponent-level

manual. It is the principle publication for describing the Army’s role and mission in GBMD of the UnitedStates (US) homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile attack. Although the focus is

Army GBMD, all aspects of this FM are consistent with the Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and

Missile Threats and United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Ballistic Missile Defense

Concept of Operations. This FM also establishes the doctrinal framework for Army GBMD Operations in the

Joint community.

GBMD is any defensive measure designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of an adversary

ballistic missile attacks. Threats may or may not cross Combatant Commander’s area of responsibility (AOR)

and may require coordination or integration among the affected combatant commands.

To achieve the Army’s objective of becoming a “…strategically responsive quality force, dominant across the

spectrum of conflict and fully integrated within the unified action environment security framework…,” the US

must be able to fully integrate GBMD. US Army Strategic missile defense forces contribute to this effort by

employing sensor and shooter capabilities as part of the USSTRATCOM GBMD mission.

The Operational Army and strategic planners will use this manual as guiding principles for the successful

execution of this missile defense mission. In addition, other Services and Joint organizations can use this

manual for doctrinal applications of Army GBMD operations. Army trainers will use this manual for the

curriculum in Army institutional training and leader development. This FM provides doctrinal guidance on

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system operations to the Army, the 100 th Missile Defense Brigade

(100th MD BDE (GMD)) and 49th Missile Defense Battalion (49th MD BN (GMD)) as well as how the

AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) radar that supports the Army's GBMD operations.

GMD is the only system for strategic missile defense of the US homeland, which is currently protected against

the threat of limited intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) attack, as a result of investments made over the

past decade. GMD relies on Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) at two sites: Fort Greely, Alaska (FGA) and

Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), California. It is an element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

(BMDS) and functions under the Army’s GBMD concept for defending the US homeland from ballistic missileattack. This fundamental framework guides the Army participation in GBMD and GMD system operations.

The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is a forward-based, phased-array, X-band radar used to support BMDS by providing

combatant command (COCOM) early warning of ballistic missile launches. It is designed to transmit boost and

early midcourse radar track data for both regional and strategic missile defense systems. AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

radars are forward deployed to providing early warning for homeland defense (HLD) as well as regional

defense for COCOMs AOR.

This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the

United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserves (USAR) unless otherwise stated. This

publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and General Dennis J. Reimer’s

Training and Doctrine Digital Library (http://www.train.army.mil).

The proponent of this manual is the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/US Army Strategic

Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT). Send written comments and recommendations on Department of ArmyDA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, HQ

USASMDC/ARSTRAT ATTN: USASMDC-FWT-D, P.O. Box 1500, Huntsville, AL 35807-3801 (e-mail:

[email protected]).


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For Official Use Only 3 January 2011 FM 3-27 1-1

Chapter 1

Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense

As the Army’s keystone manual for GBMD, this chapter defines GBMD doctrine

definitions as they relate to the Army’s role, mission, responsibilities, and

relationships. It highlights the BMDS in general to include missile defense doctrine

and the Joint warfighting principles for missile defense operations. The chapter

concludes with a description of GBMD organizations. This chapter also addresses

BMD concepts, doctrine, and the GMD mission.

GBMD

1-1. USSTRATCOM defines GBMD as defensive measures designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the

effectiveness of adversary ballistic missile attacks that cross COCOM AOR boundaries. These cross boundary threats require coordination or integration among the affected COCOMs.

1-2. GBMD is a USSTRATCOM mission to coordinate the employment of GBMD and strike forces todefeat limited ballistic missile attacks in all phases of flight or prior to their launch, and defend US,

deployed forces, friends, and allies. This document only discusses Army GBMD systems. To accomplish

this mission USSTRATCOM integrates and synchronizes a wide range of sensors, shooters, and command

and control (C2) elements. This includes, GMD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis

(BMD), and sensors - Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR), COBRA Dane radar, Sea-Based X-band

(SBX) radar, and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars and Command and Control, Battle Management, and

Communications (C2BMC) systems.

1-3. The Unified Command Plan 2008 (UCP 08) tasks each COCOM with "Deterring attacks against theUS, its territories, possessions and bases, and employing appropriate force should deterrence fail." All

combatant commands (and their subordinate commands as applicable) coordinate their GBMD planningand support with CDRUSSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile

Defense (JFCC-IMD) (See JP 3-01).

1-4. The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile technology requires aGBMD capability for defense of the homeland and overseas AOR’s. However, as the range of threat

missiles increases, so does the potential for cross AOR impacts. Thus, the links from sensors to decision

makers to shooters must occur rapidly and reliably, often across traditional geographic and AOR

boundaries.

MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE - DEFINITIONS

1-5. BMDS – An evolving, [Joint] integrated, and interoperable system comprising multiple elements andcomponents that will provide opportunities to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of flight (i.e. boost,

midcourse and terminal) against all ranges of threats” according to Department of Defense Directive

(DODD) 5134.09 dates September 17, 2009. BMDS consists of a layered system of systems comprised of

sensors, weapon systems, planning and battle management software and hardware.

1-6. GBMD – Army GBMD is designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of adversary ballistic missile attacks that may or may not cross COCOM AOR and require coordination. The Army

GBMD systems are limited to countering limited strategic ballistic missile threats. USASMDC/ARSTRAT

provides planning, integration, control and coordination of Army Forces (ARFOR) and capabilities in


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support of assigned USSTRATCOM missions; USASMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the proponent for Space,

GMD and High Altitude missions and is the Army’s integrator for global missile defense (Army

Regulation (AR) 10-87 & General Order 37).

1-7. GMD – An Army System for strategic missile defense of the US homeland. The Army is the leadService for GMD systems and the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar. GMD is an element of the BMDS. It functions

under the USSTRATCOM GBMD concept for defending the US, its forces, and its allies from ballistic

missile attack.

1-8. TBM - Theater BMD encompasses all activities focused on the identification, integration, andemployment of forces supported by theater or operations and national capabilities to detect, identify, locate,

track, discriminate, minimize the effects of, and destroy enemy theater missiles. Theater ballistic missiles

(TBM) constitute the primary threat countered by Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) forces. TBMs are missiles with a range from 80 km to 3,000 km.

THE US ARMY'S GBMD MISSION

1-9. The Army mission is to provide to combatant commanders (CCDR) the forces and capabilitiesnecessary to execute the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies. ARFOR

provide the capability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit

comprehensive control over land, resources, and people. This land power capability compliments the otherServices’ capabilities. Furthermore, the Army is charged to provide logistic and other executive agent

functions to enable the other Services to accomplish their missions (FM 1).

1-10. The Army is organized to accomplish GBMD mission and trains, provides for, and equips groundmissile defense forces to all COCOM. The Army’s GBMD mission is to defend the US homeland, allies

and forward based forces against all range of missiles in all COCOM AORs to include intermediate range

ballistic missiles (IRBM) with a range between 3,000-5,500 km and ICBM with a range greater than 5,500

km. Army specific responsibilities are to detect, deter, defend against, and defeat adversary ballistic missile

threats (see JP 3-27 and JP 3-01). USASMDC is the Army’s proponent for GBMD and ARSTRAT

provides planning, integration, control and coordination of ARFOR and capabilities in support of

USSTRATCOM missions.

1-11. To accomplish the GBMD mission the Army integrates and synchronizes specific Army sensors andshooters. This includes GMD, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars, and BMD battle management

assets.

ARMY GBMD ROLE

1-12. The Army GBMD role is to provide protection for deploying/deployed US forces, allies, andfacilities and assure the freedom to execute operational maneuver throughout the global area of operations.

Joint doctrine presents fundamental missile defense principles that guide the employment of Army GBMD

forces in coordinated and integrated action to fulfill this role.

1-13. The GBMD consists of Army systems integrated and coordinated across multiple COCOM AORs.GBMD fully synchronizes and integrates offensive and defensive actions and supporting systems to

achieve unity of effort. Within HLD, GBMD activities support actions and plans as part of protecting the

US homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile attack.

1-14. As the lead Service the Army operates elements of BMDS by planning, coordinating, and executingGBMD operations and integrating GMD with other elements of the BMDS. US Army GBMD forces

employ a combination of fixed and mobile sensor and shooter capabilities, as integral elements of GBMD

forces providing protection for the homeland, Allies, and power projection capabilities.

1-15. US missile defense warfighting principles form the basis for successful execution of missile defenseoperations and require an integrated strategy that supports the rapid, flexible application of defensive


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 1-3

capabilities synchronized with offensive actions to deter and defeat the increasingly prolific global missile

threat.

1-16. The Army’s approach to missile defense includes four operational elements: active defense, passivedefense, attack operations, command control and intelligence. The Army component also provides an

Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) that integrates the operational elements to

synchronize Army contributions to Joint counter air operations.

Active Defense. The role of active defense operations is to protect the homeland and our

deployed forces, friends, and allies from missile attacks by destroying ballistic missiles in flight.

Active defense must consist of defense in depth against all ranges of ballistic missiles. When

destruction of the missile prior to launch is not possible or unsuccessful, missiles will be

engaged by all available weapon systems throughout their entire flight profile.

Passive Defense. The principal measures used to accomplish passive missile defense includes

early warning, reducing targeting effectiveness, reducing vulnerability, hardening and protecting

assets and individuals, and recovery/reconstitution. An example is chemical biological,

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defense operations with these three

objectives: minimize casualties, preserve operating tempo and restore combat power.

Command Control and Intelligence. Commanders perform decision making functions through

an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed

by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, executing, and controlling forces in theirAOR.

Attack Operations. Offensive operations intended to destroy and disrupt enemy ballistic

missile capabilities before, during and after launch. The objective of these operations is to

prevent the launch of BMs by attacking each element of the overall system, including such

actions as destroying launch platforms, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

(RSTA) platforms, C2 nodes, missile stocks, and infrastructure.

1-17. Commanders use several integrating processes and continuing activities to BMD operations withinthe GBMD plan. Besides the military decision-making process (MDMP), Composite Risk Management

(CRM) should be used during planning. Overall operations must be synchronized with each other as well

as integrated. CRM is the Army’s primary decision-making process for identifying hazards and controlling

risks across the full spectrum of Army missions, functions, operations, and activities. CRM is a decision-

making process used to mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill

personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

1-18. The BMDS is a multi-service, integrated, global system of systems comprised of sensors, weaponsystems, and C2 information systems. BMDS provides planning and battle management software and

hardware, which employs layered defenses to intercept ballistic missiles during their boost, midcourse, and

terminal flight phases. BMD activities do not include defense against cruise or tactical air-to-surface

missiles.

1-19. Deployed BMDS capabilities are for potential operational use globally. Missile Defense Agency(MDA) is developing and deploying missile defenses systems, for the Department of Defense (DOD),

capable of protecting the US, our deployed forces, and friends and allies. As the lead agency for BMDS

development, MDA’s charter is to provide centralized management to develop and integrate programs ofsensors, interceptors, C2, and battle management into the BMDS. Specifically, the MDA is directed per

Executive-level and DOD-level guidance as follows:

To develop and deploy, as directed, a layered BMDS.

To enable the fielding of elements of the BMDS as soon as practicable.

To provide capability in blocks, improving the effectiveness of fielded capability by inserting

new technologies as they become available.


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Chapter 1


1-20. The Army's keystone system of BMDS is GMD. The GMD element of BMDS engages long rangethreats in the midcourse engagement area using data from the suite of BMDS and external sensors. GMD is

contributing to the development of advanced BMDS capabilities with increased data sharing across the

system to more effectively manage BMDS assets and prepare the BMDS to engage missile threats. The

technological capability of the system, the mission, and the area to which forces are committed are guiding

Army GBMD employment plans and operations as BMDS capabilities evolve in an incremental

development process.1-21. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar detachments are usually forward deployed in relatively static locationsoutside the continental US (OCONUS). Particular locations are dependent upon mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) resulting in the

integral sensor management section to be integrated into the C2BMC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PHASES

1-22. A ballistic missile does not rely on aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. Ballistic missiles have a prescribed course that generally

cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel. However, a re-entry vehicle (RV) may maneuver

independently of the missile or have some form of terminal guidance/control. BMD capabilities are to

detect, deter, defend against, and defeat adversary ballistic missile threats. The goal of BMDS is to build an

integrated layered missile defense to defeat threat ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. The intent is to be able to engage a ballistic target with multiple weapons systems throughout its entire trajectory.

1-23. BMDS forces incrementally deploy layered defenses that use complementary interceptors, sensors,and C2 tools to engage all classes of ballistic missile threats. These systems provide multiple engagement

opportunities against ballistic missiles threat targets in all phases of flight. Figure 1-1 depicts the ballistic

missile flight phases and ranges. Ballistic missile flight is commonly divided into three phases: boost,

midcourse and terminal. Each phase plays an important role in the design of a robust system intended to

defend against a ballistic missiles attack.

Figure 1-1. Ballistic Missile Phases and Ranges


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 1-5

BOOST PHASE DEFENSE

1-24. The boost phase of a ballistic missiles flight is that segment of flight lasting from launch through thecompletion of propulsion fuel burn. This is the ideal phase to intercept a missile. Intercepting a missile

carrying a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon in the boost phase, will likely cause the debris to fall on

or near the launch country. While it is ideal to destroy a ballistic missile as it struggles against the Earth’s

gravity, it is also very challenging. The Boost phase defenses can defeat ballistic missiles of all ranges, but

it is the most difficult phase in which to engage a ballistic missile. It is not always essential to destroy the

RV in the boost phase since an impact with the booster should prevent the RVs from reaching its intended

target.

1-25. The infrared (IR) signature created by the combustion of the missile’s fuel provides a highly visibleexhaust plume and increases the likelihood of detection by satellite sensors. Satellites provide early

warning of missile launches and usually provide the first indication of a missile launch. However, an

accelerating missile is difficult to intercept as the boost phase is relatively short, usually lasting less than

300 seconds and at an altitudes of less than 300 kilometers. To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, the

BMDS needs real-time launch detection, accurate threat determination (impact prediction), quick reaction

times, high confidence decision making, and multiple engagement possibilities. Sensors must quickly

detect a launch and relay engagement quality track data about the threat missile. Boost phase defense

requires the ballistic missile to be quickly confirmed as a threat and the ability to destroy the threat before

booster burn-out. Any BMDS weapons platform positioned to intercept in the boost phase may very likely be exposed and vulnerable to enemy strikes and interdiction.

1-26. Current Boost Phase missile defense elements in BMD include Defense Support Program/Space-Bases Infrared System (DSP/SBIRS) satellites, Aegis BMD and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar depending on

their locations.

MIDCOURSE PHASE DEFENSE

1-27. The Midcourse phase begins after the booster shuts down. As the boost phase terminates, themidcourse phase of flight begins as the missile/RVs continues along its ballistic trajectory. This phase can

last as long as 30 minutes for ICBMs, allowing opportunity to destroy the incoming ballistic missile

outside the Earth’s atmosphere. Any debris remaining after the intercept will likely burn up as it re-enters

the atmosphere. The GMD element is designed to defend the US homeland against a limited attack from

rogue countries. GMD system can only defend against IRBMs and ICBMs. A network of advancedsensors, radars, command, control, battle management and communication assets provide target detection,

tracking and discrimination of countermeasures to guide the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) into the

path of the hostile missile, destroying it with hit-to-kill technology.

1-28. The primary elements of BMDS that are operational during the midcourse phase are GMD FireControl (GFC), Aegis BMD, UEWR, SBX, and COBRA Dane Radar.

1-29. Depending on the threat launch locations, launching multiple interceptors may increase the probability of an intercept. Multiple threat launches may prevent repetitive kill evaluations and re-

engagement decisions. The more time a threat missile spends in the midcourse phase, the greater the

possibility it may deploy countermeasures and penetration aides, if equipped. Conversely, the GMD

sensors have more time to discriminate the RV from countermeasures, penetration aides, chaff, and other

objects along the same trajectory.

TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSE

1-30. During the terminal phase of IRBM and ICBM flights, the missile RV reenters the Earth’satmosphere. This phase usually lasts only 60 to 120 seconds. The RV is free-falling at extremely high

speeds (14,000+ miles per hour). Defensive systems designed for use in the Terminal phase have a very

limited battle space and short timeline to provide adequate defense. It is the last opportunity to make an

intercept before the RV reaches its target. Intercepting an RV during this phase is difficult and the least


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desirable of the phases because there is little margin for error and the intercept will occur close to the

intended target. Terminal phase interceptor elements include the Army’s Phased-Array Tracking Radar

Intercept On Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) now deployed worldwide and the

THAAD system. These mobile systems defend against SRBM to MRBM range ballistic missiles. THAAD

provides wide area defense while PATRIOT is most effective in protecting point targets such as troop

concentrations, ports, airfields, and staging areas.

GMD MISSION

1-31. The GMD mission is to defend the US and designated areas against IRBM and ICBM attacks in theMidcourse phase of flight as part of the BMDS and to conduct concurrent operational and test activities. Tasks include:

Place the GMD systems on alert.

Execute concurrent testing and defensive operations.

Continue development to incrementally improve capability.

Provide trained and certified crews, installation support, and personnel protection.

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

1-32. The rapid evolution of GBMD has outdistanced existing Joint missile defense guidance. Currentmissile defense doctrine does not adequately capture the integration of BMD elements to include weapon

systems, sensors, and battle management. Without doctrinal guidance on this integration, potential

adversaries will look to exploit seams in these elements, bringing risk to the homeland and operations in

forward AORs. This integration requires close coordination across the Army branches and functional

components.

1-33. The Army incorporation of missile defense into doctrine was finalized long ago before JP 3-01.5Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense was promulgated in the early 1990s. The JP was based on the

Army's concept for defeating the Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) threat. The four operational

elements of the GBMD concept (active defense; passive defense; attack operations; and battle management

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) are still the basis of all DOD integrated

missile defenses. GMD is an active defense component of the global BMDS.

NOTE: JP 3-01 incorporated JP 3-01.5 during the last revision. This version of JP 3-01 also

established theater missile defense as an important area of concentration under air defense,

needing special emphasis and certain different ways of operation from traditional air defense.

1-34. Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats provides the Joint definition for activedefense in the air domain, to include BMD. Attack Operations are an element of Offensive Counter Air

(OCA) operations.

1-35. Joint Publication 3-27, homeland Defense provides doctrine for the defense of the US homelandacross the operational themes from peacetime military engagement to major combat operations. It provides

information on C2, interagency and multinational coordination, and operations required to defeat external

threats to, and aggression against, the homeland.

1-36. Joint Doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces incoordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. In the event that deterrence fails,

CDRUSSTRATCOM, in support of the COCOM, is tasked to coordinate the deployment and employment

of GBMD and strike forces to defeat limited ballistic missile attacks in all phases of flight or prior to their

launch in order to defend the US, our deployed forces, friends, and allies.


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 1-7

1-37. Although the threat has changed, the defense of the US homeland has always been the primaryconcern of the nation, DOD, and the Army. Doctrinally, little has changed despite treaty interpretations,

funding levels, evolving threat evaluations, and the changing focus of research and political debate. While

defense of the US homeland from ballistic missile attacks shifted from “conventional” anti-ballistic missile

(ABM) and nuclear-based deterrence technologies to BMDS, Air and Missile Defense (AMD) efforts, and

limited-strike shields, the essential task and approach are the same. Currently, the Army is fulfilling its

traditional role of defending the US homeland by operating the Army elements of the BMDS.

GBMD ORGANIZATIONS

1-38. Many organizations have a role in GBMD within a COCOM, subordinate COCOM, or JTF. Missiledefense is inherently a Joint operation. GBMD operations are multi-command, multi-regional, and

conducted according to Joint doctrine. See figure 1-2 GBMD organizational structure.

Figure 1-2. GBMD organizational structure

1-39. USASMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) toUSSTRATCOM who is the integrator for GBMD. USASMDC/ARSTRAT also conducts space

operations, provides planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army resources and capabilities in

support of USSTRATCOM missions. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is responsible for:

ARFOR assigned to ASCC and to USSTRATCOM. Providing continuous oversight, control, integration, and coordination of ARFOR assigned to

USSTRATCOM.

Planning and execution of ASCC responsibilities by exercising specified Administrative Control

(ADCON) of organic, assigned, and attached ARFOR.

ARFOR specified for high altitude, GMD, and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD).


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Supporting, as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM, all Army, Joint, multinational, and interagency

elements.

USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the proponent for GMD.

Serves as the Joint user representative, centralized manager, and integrator for the GMD system

and executes horizontal integration across all IAMD systems.

Army integration for GBMD systems and senior mission commander for GMD systems.

Integration of technical and operational requirements with material developers.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

1-40. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for GBMD planning and coordinating GBMDoperations support. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supporting commander to other COCOMs for GBMD

execution and is the COCOM authority for the NG units, 100th MD BDE (GMD), 49th MD BN (GMD) and

forward deployed AN/TPY-2 (FBM) detachments.

1-41. USSTRATCOM is organized to accomplish its mission with Joint Functional ComponentCommands (JFCC) which are assigned specific functional responsibilities. JFCC-IMD is responsible for

the day-to-day planning and execution of IMD and JFCC-SPACE is responsible for supporting JFCC-IMD

for IMD issues.

JFCC - INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

1-42. JFCC-IMD coordinates with COCOMs and services for desired Joint effects and capabilities forGBMD operations and support for missile defense. The command also synchronizes GBMD operations

and support (sea, land, air and space-based). JFCC-IMD monitors and coordinates activities with

associated combatant commands, other USSTRATCOM Joint functional components, and the efforts of the

MDA. The JFCC-IMD commander advises the USSTRATCOM commander on all aspects of GBMD and

serves as the commander of USASMDC and ARSTRAT.

1-43. The JFCC-IMD mission is to support USSTRATCOM's UCP 08 mission by synchronizingoperational-level GBMD planning and GBMD operations support. JFCC-IMD supports development of

global effects for DOD and when directed provides alternate missile defense execution support. JFCC-IMD

will work with other JFCCs to continuously coordinate, plan, integrate, and synchronize, USSTRATCOM

capabilities to provide tailored, responsive effects in support of national objectives and COCOMs.1-44. Additionally, the JFCC-IMD is responsible for maintaining oversight, situational awareness (SA)and management of the system resources/assets supporting readiness of the GBMD equipment. When one

of the GMD or AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems has a readiness change, the JFCC-IMD will conduct an Asset

Management Conference (AMC). The AMC is to ensure all command elements concerned are aware of the

change to the GBMD capability and status.

JFCC - SPACE

1-45. JFCC-SPACE optimizes planning, execution, and force management, as directed by the commanderof USSTRATCOM, of the assigned missions of coordinating, planning, and conducting space operations.

JFCC-SPACE provides BMDS with ballistic missile early warning and communications capability.

1-46. The mission for JFCC-SPACE is to continuously coordinate, plan, integrate, synchronize, andexecute space operations to provide tailored, responsive space effects in support of national objectives and

CCDRs. Commander JFCC-SPACE will ensure Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment

(ITW/AA) and Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) systems generate and report precise, timely and

engagement quality information on ballistic missiles and nuclear detonations.


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 1-9

JFCC - INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND R ECONNAISSANCE

1-47. Commander, JFCC for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) is responsible for providing support to JFCC-IMD for GBMD. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) appoints the Director of

Defense Intelligence Agency as the Commander, JFCC-ISR. JFCC-ISR supports oversight and

management of the ISR Enterprise by developing and synchronizing operational ISR and associated

Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) plans and allocation strategies to integrate national,

theater and multinational ISR capabilities to satisfy CCDRs’ requirements.

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

1-48. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) deters ballistic missile attacks on the US, its territories, possessions, and bases within its AOR and other areas as directed. Should deterrence fail, and as directed

by the SECDEF, Commander USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) will employ available BMD

forces to defeat ballistic missile attacks.

1-49. USNORTHCOM forces are responsible for executing GBMD operations in support of the defense ofthe US homeland. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) are OPCON to USSTRATCOM.

USNORTHCOM has operational control (OPCON) for execution of the GBMD mission. Army Forces

Command (FORSCOM) provides ARNG and active component missile defense forces under command of

USSTRATCOM to execute BMD operations for the defense of North America. These forces are OPCON

to USNORTHCOM during execution of a mission.

1-50. The CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander for HLD. If offensive operations arenecessary to protect the homeland, CDRUSSTRATCOM will support CDRUSNORTHCOM, Commander

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the appropriate overseas Combatant

CCDRs as directed by SECDEF. JFCC-ISR will support USNORTHCOM’s requirement by developing

allocation recommendations of ISR and PED capabilities to satisfy USNORTHCOM’s requirements.

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

1-51. NORAD provides aerospace warning for North America that consists of the detection, validation,and warning of an attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. NORAD

has three missions: aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. Through its aerospace

warning mission, NORAD supports USNORTHCOM and its maritime warning missions as well as itsaerospace control mission. NORAD provides comprehensive aerospace warning, aerospace control, and

maritime warning for the defense of North America. NORAD's core responsibilities include:

Deter, detect, and defend against aerospace threats to North America.

Provide timely and accurate ITW/AA to North America.

US ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND / ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC

COMMAND

1-52. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is an operational level Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army(SECARMY) as the ASCC to USSTRATCOM and exercises ADCON authority and responsibility over

ARFOR as delegated by CDR USSTRATCOM. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army proponent for space,

high altitude, and GMD; and develops and transitions technology; and provides acquisition support to

assigned fields.

1-53. Coordinated Army support to both USSTRATCOM and combatant commands is critical andachieved through the efforts of USASMDC/ARSTRAT and the JFCC-IMD. This coordination is greatly

assisted by the fact the Commanding General USASMDC/ARSTRAT is dual hatted as the Commander of

the JFCC-IMD. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the integrator of Army GBMD and conducts mission-relatedresearch and development in support of Army Title 10 responsibilities.


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1-54. USASMDC Commander also has Army missile defense responsibilities in accordance with (IAW)AR 10-87. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is an operational level Army force, designated by the SECARMY,

serving as the assigned ASCC to provide planning, integration, coordination, and control of ARFOR and

capabilities in support of the USSTRATCOM requirements. These USASMDC/ARSTRAT functions are:

Conducts research and development for and provides acquisition support to USSTRATCOM or

other CCDRs. Serves as the Joint user representative, centralized manager, and integrator for the

GMD System and executes horizontal integration across all IAMD systems. Advocate for AMD funding and requirements; provides input to Army AMD doctrine, policies,

and procedures; identifies AMD capabilities, capability gaps, and concepts; coordinates future

ground–based air defense requirements issues and programs with CCDR and Joint staff; reviews

AMD initial capabilities document and Joint capabilities documentation in support of future

requirements.

The Army's integrator for GBMD systems and the senior mission commander for GMD systems.

The Army’s implementing agent for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Integrates technical and operational requirements with materiel developers.

The Army’s lead organization for coordination and support to the MDA.

Supports operational and developmental testing of theater/strategic ballistic missiles/

interceptors (Major Range Test Facility Base) and directed energy testing and evaluation in

support of laser developmental and operational tests.

ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMANDS

1-55. AAMDCs perform Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) planning, coordination, integration,and execution in support of a CCDR’s priorities. The AAMDC integrates the four operational elements of

Army TAMD (passive air defense, active air defense, attack operations, and C2 Information Systems) to

protect contingency, forward-deployed, and reinforcing forces as well as designated assets from the

CCDR’s critical asset list.

1-56. In a theater an AAMDC will normally not only have a command relationship of OPCON with theARFOR commander or Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), if designated, but also will be

in direct support to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). These command relationships

allow the AAMDC to assist in synchronizing Joint TAMD operations.

1-57. If available in the AOR, the commanding general of the AAMDC performs two critical roles as thesenior Army ADA commander for AMD operations. The commanding general serves as the Theater Army

Air and Missile Defense Coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) to the JFLCC and Deputy Area Air Defense

Commander (DAADC) to the JFACC or Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) to provide

C2 of multi-tiered AMD using air, land, and sea based missile defense assets.

1-58. Currently, there are two AAMDCs that support CCDR priorities in US Central Command(USCENTCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and USNORTHCOM, with an Air and Missile

Defense Detachment (AMDD) supporting US European Command (USEUCOM). The AAMDC that

supports USCENTCOM also has a force provider responsibility and serves as the FORSCOM executive

agent for TAMD operations and Army AMD force management. Although, the AAMDCs are not in the

USSTRATCOM, JFCC-IMD, or USASMDC/ARSTRAT chains of command the AAMDCs do have a

coordination relationship (when approved by their higher headquarters) with JFCC-IMD in its role as a

GBMD integrator for USSTRATCOM. For example, the AAMDC with the Army AMD force managementresponsibility supports JFCC-IMD in the global force management process with FORSCOM approval.

100TH

MD BDE (GMD)

1-59. The mission of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) is to destroy, on orders, ICBMs in the midcourse phase todefend the US and defended areas (DA). The 100 th MD BDE (GMD) is to organize, train, equip, and

operate the GFC system. Also, the 100th MD BDE (GMD) provides planning and coordination functions

for GMD test activities in support of MDA.


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 1-11

1-60. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) Commander is dual hatted and serves in both a Title 10 United StatesCode (USC) and Title 32 USC capacity to effectively C2 multi-component Soldiers. The 100 th MD BDE

(GMD) provides both ARNG and regular Army Soldiers to operate the Missile Defense Element (MDE) at

Schriever AFB, one of the two GFC nodes. The MDE operates continuously, utilizing a five-crew rotation

schedule with 5 unique positions per crew. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) also provides C2 for an 49th MD

BN (GMD) and is comprised of ARNG active Army Soldiers.

1-61. The mission of the 49th MD BN (GMD) is two-fold. First, the 49th MD BN (GMD) secures the FGAMissile Defense Complex (MDC) and second, they provide Soldiers and operate the Fire Direction Center

(FDC), a second GFC node located at FGA to dissuade, deter, and destroy ICBM attacks in the midcourse

phase of flight. The 49th MD BN (GMD) is comprised of only ARNG Soldiers. The FDC operates

continuously, utilizing the same five-crew rotation schedule with 5 unique positions per crew as does the

MDE.

1-62. The mission of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) Detachment 1 is to provide continuous monitoring of theGround Safing Device (GSD) and Command and Launch Equipment (CLE) located at Vandenberg AFB,

California in order to ensure the GBIs at that location are mission ready.


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For Official Use Only 3 January 2011 FM 3-27 2-1

Chapter 2

Command and Control

This chapter describes C2 for GBMD organizations and Army units involved in

countering the global missile threat. The C2 of these Army units is complex and

includes the Command Authority. Also addressed in this chapter are the GBMD C2

systems with a role in GBMD. This chapter also describes command relationships

and interrelated responsibilities between commands.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-1. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform C2 functions through a C2

system (FM 6-0). C2 is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. Each of the warfighting functions

relies upon C2 for integration and synchronization.

2-2. Successful execution of GBMD C2 requires an integrated strategy that supports the rapid, flexibleapplication of defensive capabilities synchronized with offensive actions to deter and defeat the

sophisticated adversary missile threat. This strategy is based on the principles of unity of effort, unity of

command, centralized planning, and decentralized execution.

2-3. GBMD operators will remain under the control of the established Title 10 USC, Title 14 USC, 20 orTitle 32 USC chain of command when conducting missile defense operational duties. The SECDEF, as the

President’s principal assistant on military matters, has overall authority for DOD and executes the HLD

mission (JP 3-27). Colorado, California and Alaska National Guard (NG) Soldiers executing the GMD

mission or guarding the GMD facilities do so only while in a Title 10 status and under the command of the

Title 10 chain of command.

2-4. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the senior Army headquarters responsible for executing the GBMDmission. USASMDC/ARSTRAT forces will maintain a dedicated C2 structure to plan, integrate, and

coordinate Army support to GBMD. These capabilities will be part of a responsive, layered offensive and

defensive system capable of deterring, preventing, or defeating missile threats as part of the greater GBMD

mission.

2-5. Organizations that have a C2 role in GBMD are the Command Authority, USSTRATCOM,COCOMs, and Service components. Army organizations that have a C2 role in GBMD are

USASMDC/ARSTRAT and the AAMDCs in their respective AORs. The UCP 08 identifies regional

boundaries. However, since missile threats can across AOR boundaries, COCOMs must establish cross-

AOR C2 relationships to effectively counter missile threats.

COMBATANT COMMANDS

2-6. Combatant commands are Joint military commands composed of forces from two or more services,

has a broad and continuing mission, and is organized either on a geographical basis or on a functional

basis. All COCOMs are commanded by either a four-star general or admiral and are considered "Joint"

commands with specific badges denoting their affiliation.

2-7. As directed, combatant commands are supporting commanders to CDRUSNORTHCOM for missile

defense of the contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and Hawaii. For example, Commander, US Pacific Command


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(CDRUSPACOM) is the supporting commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for execution of the GMD

mission with Aegis BMD ships and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) track data for ICBM threats to the homeland (sea,

land and space-based).

2-8. CCDRs exercise COCOM authority over forces assigned to them. COCOM authority is the

nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 USC section 164, exercised only by

commanders of COCOM or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or

the SECDEF. Figure 2-1 illustrates the COCOM AORs and the possible seams that could add complexityto cross COCOM GBMD C2, and the requirement for the establishment of seamless global C2

relationships.

Figure 2-1. COCOM AOR

GBMD C2 SYSTEMS

2-9. Organizations with a role in GBMD utilize a wide range of BMD battle management systems. Thesesystems enable C2 to mitigate complexities associated with cross COCOM GBMD operations. For GBMD

purposes, these C2 systems are C2BMC and GFC.

2-10. Command authority, USNORTHCOM, and COCOMs primarily use the C2BMC system as a BMD battle management decision aide. However, in executing GBMD, the Army utilizes the C2BMC for C2 of

the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar and GFC for the C2 of GMD. Because of the global threat, execution of this

strategy will require close coordination with THAAD units. THAAD will come under the COCOM C2

structure when it is executing the strategic GBMD mission for defense of the homeland.

GFC

2-11. The GFC system is a suite of hardware, software, consoles, communications equipment, and trained personnel integrating the GMD system and other supporting elements to manage all phases of engagement.

The GFC controls the GMD which is the first operational hit-to-kill and only operationally deployed

missile defense program to defend the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The system

provides early detection and tracking during the boost phase, midcourse target discrimination, precision


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 2-3

intercept and destruction of inbound ICBMs through the use of hit-to-kill technology. GFC uses multiple

sensors, communications systems, and GBIs with EKVs that are capable of detecting, tracking, and

destroying IRBMs and ICBMs during the midcourse phase of flight.

2-12. The GFC is the brains of the GMD system. GFC combines a variety of sensors/radars, which includeDSP/SBIRS, COBRA Dane radar, UEWR, SBX radar, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and Aegis BMDS. The GFC

processes the sensors/radars information on target search, acquisition, track, classification, hit assessment,

and in-flight interceptor data communications support to develop an Integrated Task Plan (ITP) for everyGBI launched. This information provides the GBI with the ability to locate, discriminate, and destroy the

incoming RV.

2-13. GFC nodes receive and pass data from sensors supporting GBMD. They also provide automated C2information and permit human-in-control (HIC) management of the GMD operations. The GFC

Engagement Planner (EP) is the software resource that synthesizes all the sensor data, develops the

Weapons Task Plan (WTP) for the GBI and provides information to the operators. The GFC crews then

analyze the information provided by the GFC to determine if the Commander’s Intent for engagement has

been met.

2-14. The GFC provides instructions and launch direction to GBIs with EKVs that uses kinetic energyfrom a direct hit on the incoming RV to destroy it. The EKV is a sensor-propulsion package that collides

with the target at a closing speed of approximately 15,000 miles per hour.

C2BMC

2-15. C2BMC supports GBMD planning, SA and C2. The C2BMC provides GBMD users withcapabilities to plan and maintain SA to commanders, staff and shooters. It provides missile defense forces

at both the strategic and tactical levels of command the capability to plan the GBMD fight, while

concurrently tracking all potential ballistic missile threats. C2BMC specific capabilities include missile

shooter/sensor planning coverage, overall planning assessment, SA, and sensor management. The C2BMC

system provides data, decision, and communication linkage between BMDS elements. Actual C2BMC

hardware at a given COCOM location will vary by function and data requirements.

2-16. C2BMC serves as the integrator for BMDS elements and components into a global network ofintegrated sensors, weapons, and fire control systems. Currently there are C2BMC Suites located in

USPACOM, USEUCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USNORTHCOM. The USNORTHCOM C2BMC suite

supports the USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD located at the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center

(MDIOC) at Schriever AFB, Colorado.

2-17. C2BMC is part of the BMDS Communications Network (BCN), which is integrated with numeroussensor and shooter communications systems and associated message formats, protocols, and computer

security information assurance measures. The C2BMC controls the sensor management and track

processing for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar via the C2BMC Integrated Battle Management Picture (IBMP)

software segment.

2-18. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar interfaces with the C2BMC network through the C2BMC NetworkInterface Processor (CNIP). C2BMC forwards select track messages to Aegis BMD assets over Ultra-High

Frequency (UHF) Satellite Tactical Automated Data Information Link-Joint (TADIL-J) (STJ) and

Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Multicast TADIL-J (MTJ) networks and Air Defense System Integrator

(ADSI), C2BMC also forwards track messages to the GMD system. This information is used to cue other

systems supporting the missile defense operations and improves the overall SA of commanders at all

levels. The Link-16 TADIL-J network also enables the precision cueing of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar by

directing messages from Aegis BMD through the C2BMC suite that controls the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar.

2-19. C2BMC program facilitates a layered defense by networking and unifying the individual elementsthat make up the BMDS. The C2BMC IBMP provides the foundation for detailed IMD data and graphical

information available in a variety of tables and reports for operational forces SA. The C2BMC IBMP also

allows sensor managers to select radar states, define search parameters, override tracking priorities, control


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track forwarding, define discrimination confidence, and enable wide-band discrimination and coordination

with C2 levels and operators and maintainers.

2-20. The Distributed Multi-Echelon Training System (DMETS) Control Center (DCC) is located atSchriever AFB and supports both GMD and non-GMD training, evaluations and exercises. The DMETS

servers provide the GFC with medium fidelity emulation of ballistic missile threats and GMD subsystem (e.g.

DSP/SBIRS, UEWRs, AEGIS, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), etc.) responses without interference to real world

operations. In addition to GFC, DMETS has a wide variety and large number of GMD and non-GMDcustomers across all echelons of commands. Its use must be scheduled in advance in order to deconflict

competing requirements.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-21. Command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as theoperational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as COCOM

(command authority), OPCON, tactical control, or support.

2-22. Traditionally, command relationships are established through operation plans (OPLANS), concept plans (CONPLAN), crisis planning, or execution orders based on real threats. Increasing range and other

technological advances in ballistic missiles may necessitate missile defense forces in one AOR to provide

direct support to an adjacent CCDR. The supported commander's requirements establish the overarching

framework used by supporting commanders in their respective supporting plans. The supported

Commander’s CONPLAN establishes the overarching framework used by AOR CCDRs to develop

supporting plans and to support regional missile defense plans.

2-23. Together USSTRATCOM and JFCC-IMD provide recommendations to the Joint Staff/SECDEF to balance HLD requirements with the missile defense needs of other COCOMs. Supported by the Services,

USSTRATCOM has the unique position of integrating missile defense requirements and Service

capabilities across multiple AORs and linking GBMD planning with decentralized execution.

2-24. At the strategic level, the collaborative missile defense planning process synchronizes each CCDRmissile defense plans with the GBMD plans of adjacent CCDRs. At the operational level, the Joint

Staff/SECDEF establishes CCDR relationships into supported and supporting roles. Thus, balancing other

AOR priorities for defended assets with global missile allocation IAW priorities set forth for HLD.

2-25. The supported CCDR issues “commander’s guidance” for the missile defense mission. The Armycomponent provides forces to CCDRs to execute the missile defense mission.

2-26. The SECDEF will assign or attach forces to respective COCOMs as required for GBMD operations.THAAD, GMD, and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sensors comprise the Army’s role in GBMD. During GBMD

operations, the SECDEF has directed the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) assigned to

USSTRATCOM will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM for operational execution. THAAD and AN/TPY-2

(FBM) radars are under the OPCON of the appropriate COCOM.


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 2-5

2-27. USNORTHCOM is the supported COCOM for HLD and directs engagement operations when thethreat is to the US, its territories and its possessions require an active defense. USNORTHCOM is the

supporting COCOM for GBMD threats to other COCOMs. See figure 2-2 for command relationships.

Figure 2-2. GBMD Command Relationships

GMD FORCES

2-28. The GMD Title 10 USC Operational Elements (OE) for the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN

(GMD) are the subordinate MDE and FDC units. METT-TC is the basis for delegation of OPCON to otherCCDRs.

2-29. The GMD units are assigned to USSTRATCOM. The 49th MD BN (GMD) is subordinate to the100th MD BDE (GMD). The 100th MD BDE (GMD) belongs to the Colorado NG, but has a Detachment in

the California NG. The 49th MD BN (GMD) belongs to the Alaska NG. The 100 th MD BDE (GMD)

Commander is dual-hatted Title 10 USC and Title USC 32 who commands the associated State NG units.

NG Soldiers transition between Title 10 and 32 statuses IAW the approved SECARMY staffing model.


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The OEs are separate and distinct Title 10 USC Federal units with a clear Title 10 USC chain of command.

State Adjutants General retain authority over the NG units and Soldiers only when in a Title 32 status. The

State Adjutant Generals have no command authority over the Title 10 USC GMD Soldiers of the 100th MD

BDE (GMD) or 49th MD BN (GMD).

AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

2-30. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the responsible organization for deploying and managing the AN/TPY-2(FBM) radar detachment as an Army organization. Effective 1 Oct 10, the detachments appears on the

Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for the 100th MD BDE (GMD), which allows for greater

operational flexibility. The detachment has three primary AORs: radar site operations; radar management

operations; and radar site security. As a forward deployed element of the global BMDS, all command,

control, and support relationships are established IAW Joint and Army doctrine.

2-31. In a regional defense situation, it is likely the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar will be OPCON to theCOCOM. As a supporting commander, a COCOM will support the Commander, USNORTHCOM, in the

conduct of the homeland defense mission. There are situations where a COCOM may simultaneously be

the supported commander. The COCOM may use the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar to concurrently support both

strategic and regional missile defense operations. Before deployment of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar into a

theater of operations, the reporting chain will be established to deconflict lines of authority for the sensor

managers during concurrent strategic and regional crisis operations.

2-32. COCOMs will coordinate/synchronize plans and actions with other COCOMs under the direction ofUSSTRATCOM who has worldwide synchronizing responsibility. The local COCOM that has OPCON of

the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar will civil support operations with the radar system as much as possible, based

on mission requirements.


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3 January 2011 FM 3-27 3-1

Chapter 3

Operations

This chapter presents an overview of operations and considerations that Army

GBMD units must apply for the planning and execution of their mission. This chapter

describes the global context within which Army GBMD units perform their mission

incorporating elements of the BMDS, and it describes the security of Army GBMD

sites.

OPERATIONS

“The new strategic challenges of the 21st Century require us to think differently, but they

also require us to act. The deployment of effective missile defenses is an essentialelement of the United States’ broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence

policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we face. Defending the American people

against these new threats is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and the highest

priority of my administration.”

President George W. Bush

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 23

3-1. The Operational Environment for the Global BMD consists of simultaneously defeating missilethreats to all COCOM AORs, in support of COCOM operations. During GBMD operations, the threat may

include SRBMs, Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM), IRBMs, and ICBMs. All of these missiles

have the potential to carry either conventional or WMD RVs and can cross multiple AORs. The number of

threats can range from potentially hundreds of SRBMs to dozens of ICBMs. Major combat operations

adversaries will likely employ these threats in waves, and in combination with other offensive forcesagainst any or all of our defended assets.

3-2. HLD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defenseinfrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. DOD is

responsible for the HLD mission, and therefore, leads the HLD response, with other departments and

agencies in support of DOD efforts. In today’s complex threat environment, our approach to HLD must

address all aspects of the operational environment.

3-3. Externally, the US seeks to shape the international environment through the application ofdiplomatic, economic, military, and informational means. Confronting the homeland is a variety of

interrelated threats that demand coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among US Government

departments and agencies charged with law enforcement and national defense.

3-4. These threats include any transnational activity including international terrorism, the proliferation ofweapons, to include WMD, and the delivery systems for such weapons that threaten the national security ofthe US.


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Chapter 3


3-5. The friendly forces organization will include layered defenses employed in a manner intended togive prioritized defense capabilities to a given list of assets. This layered defense will include the ability for

defense forces to engage and destroy the threat in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phase of flight. The

defensive capability will be a distributed system of systems, including sensors, shooters, C2, and

communications. In the aggregate, these systems form the elements of the BMDS. GBMD involvesmultiple sensors, and shooters at every echelon of command, see figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. GBMD Systems

GLOBAL OPERATIONS

3-6. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for GBMD. CDRUSSTRATCOM isa supporting commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for BMD execution in defense of the homeland.

3-7. In preparation for global deployment of strategic missile defense forces in the homeland or into anAOR for forward based GBMD forces, the Army will participate in Joint collaborative planning. This is

done IAW the COCOM priorities and Defended Asset List (DAL), development of the theater area air

defense plan, finalization of Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and engagement criteria, refinement of existing

HLD plans, determination of cross COCOM engagement coordination, and force allocation. Distribution of

approved plans across the Joint network to all affected missile defense forces is critical so engagementoperations can commence as soon as possible. Multinational missile defense forces are included in all

phases of the MDMP and training of multinational missile defense forces across multiple security levels

must be considered.


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Operations


3 January 2011 FM 3-27 3-3

3-8. Missile defense planning, intelligence support, Intelligence Preparation of the OperationalEnvironment, and airspace management are four areas critical to successful employment of GBMD.

Planning is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects

of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary

potential courses of action. Army FMs and JPs on these subjects provide important guidance towardsuccessfully supporting GBMD planning. However, whether planning for strategic level missile defense or

theater missile defense, the tenets for GBMD apply. See table 3-1 for the aspects of GBMD.

Table 3-1. Aspects of GBMD

1The growing threat defines the mission…the threat from adversaries across allranges of ballistic missiles is increasing for the US and Allies across the globe.

2 GBMD is greatly enabled by persistent and reliable indications and warnings.

3GBMD addresses all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight and can best beoptimized by using networked C2 and integrated sensors; layered defensescomplicates enemy offensive actions.

4

GBMD acquisition provides interoperability on delivery, is an active partnership with

the Services and missile defense forces, and can take years to optimize for missiledefense fight occurring in minutes/seconds.

5 GBMD forces are low-density/high-demand, expensive, unique and global in nature.

6GBMD assets are frequently located in the US homeland or in friendly countriesenvironments.

7GBMD assets are managed remotely and over global distances and are highlyinterdependent for both homeland and regional defenses.

8 GBMD planning is 90% of the fight.

9GBMD is a four dimensional fight that cross multiple region

fm3_27(global ballistic missile defense)

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