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BACKGROUND GUIDE

DISEC

AGENDA: Discussing

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

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Index

1) Letter from the E.B

2)History of NPT

3) Treaty on the NPT

4) Nuclear Weapons

5) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

6) Guidelines for Nuclear- weapon- free zones

7) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

8) Implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

9) India and China on NPT

10) The case of Iran

11) Joint Comprehensive Plan

12) Key points of the Iran Nuclear Deal

13) Action 21

14) Secretary General's five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament

15) Israel and Egypt

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16) Questions the Committee has to answer

17) References

18) Links

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Letter from the Executive Board

Hello Delegates!

It is a pleasure to have you in this Committee. My name is Mahima Pareek and I am going to be your Chair. Public speaking is my passion so I love doing the jaw-jaw. Biprajit RoY Choudhry is your Vice Chair and one the most well-read people I know. He loves MUN as much as he loves food.

In course of the two days you are going to learn important skills like diplomacy, team building, debating and most importantly endow yourself with the most powerful weapon “knowledge”.

Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) also known as First Committee is one of the most popular committee in the MUN circuit. Your participation in this committee will make you aware of intricate matters of global politics which accounts for arms. Non- Proliferation Treaty is the foundation which guides this committee. As a lot of you are first timers, my only advice to you is that don’t get worked up seeing those fancy terms rather extend your research and be in touch with global news. Make google your bible! As this topic contains a lot of technical terms, please go forth and understand them. This study guide contains all the important topics ou need to cover . For any further query you can always contact me or my vice chair. Winston Churchill said “ It’s better to the jaw jaw than war war”. So use your words to make your points and come up with solutions for a better if not an ideal future. Best of luck and can’t wait to see you delegates!

MAHIMA PAREEK – mahimapareek98@gmail.com

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BIPRAJIT ROY CHOUDHRY- biphbk99@gmail.com

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History

“The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials.”

The first proposal for international regulation of nuclear material was made by the United States in 1946. The Baruch Plan, presented to the UN, suggested that the United States turn over its nuclear material, including weapons, to a new UN body, and that no countries would be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. However, the plan failed due to opposition from the Soviet Union. In 1953, United States President Dwight Eisenhower proposed the negotiation of a treaty to control nuclear activities, which resulted in the negotiation of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), establishing an international organization for the purpose of inspecting nuclear facilities and providing technical assistance to countries seeking to use nuclear energy. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United States and Soviet Union began negotiations on nuclear weapons testing, followed by serious negotiations on the draft text of the NPT, ultimately agreeing on the final text in 1968. The NPT opened for signature that year, with the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom acting as depositories. The NPT entered into force in 1970, making its three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy the foundation of international law regarding nuclear weapons and technology. The treaty also stipulated that a conference of States Parties would be held five years after the treaty entered into force, and every five years thereafter. The first Review Conference took place in 1975 in Geneva, Switzerland. Despite disagreements regarding the lack of a timeline for nuclear disarmament, the States Parties adopted a Final Declaration by consensus, setting the stage for diplomacy in future years. The Final Declaration declared a “strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons” and recommended greater attention and support be given to the IAEA’s safeguards regime. This document provided the foundation for recommendations made at future Review Conferences.Article X of the NPT states that 25 years after the treaty’s entry into force, “a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods,” with the decision to be adopted by majority vote. This conference, held in 1995 in New York City, was historic for many reasons. It was the first Review Conference held since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and also the first conference attended by all five nuclear weapon states (NWS) identified in the NPT. Between the 1990 and 1995 conferences, 38 Member States acceded to the treaty, including France, China, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa. Although the conference failed to adopt a Final Declaration on the review of the treaty, it did agree to extend the NPT indefinitely. This marked the beginning of the post-

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Cold War Review Conferences, with the focus shifting from Mutually Assured Destruction to asymmetric nuclear warfare, as well as the near-universality of the NPT.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

“I believe we can look ahead with confidence and optimism to the future of nuclear power in the 21st century. Nuclear power will make a significant and growing contribution to sustainable development in

the coming decades.” The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. 1 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.

The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 27 April to 22 May and presided over by Ambassador Taous Feroukhi (Algeria), ended without the adoption of a consensus substantive outcome. After a successful 2010 Review Conference at which States parties

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agreed to a final document which included conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, including the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 2015 outcome constitutes a setback for the strengthened review process instituted to ensure accountability with respect to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part of the package in support of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

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*On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see Decision 3).

International and Regional Frameworks The primary document ensuring the right of states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is the NonProliferation Treaty (1968).Article IV of the NPT clearly states that, “nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” Given the potential of nuclear energy to support development, the NPT highlights the particular needs of developing states in regards to development of nuclear energy. Article III of the NPT also sets forth clear limitations and restrictions on the acquisition and development of nuclear technology, but the Treaty is clear that these safeguards should not be utilized to prevent States Parties from developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses. The 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) reaffirmed that in order for states to exercise their right to peaceful nuclear development, technical assistance must be prioritized to allow states to advance nuclear energy, while adhering to NPT safeguards.

In addition to the NPT, other international instruments guide states in their pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994) requires the Contracting Parties to implement particular safety standards for all nuclear facilities. As an IAEA convention, the safeguards contained within the Convention are particularly important for Contracting Parties wishing to develop or expand nuclear energy production. As of April 2014, the Convention on Nuclear Safety counts 77 parties and another 65 signatories.107 Another important international instrument is the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) adopted in 2010 and formally known as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. The IFNEC is an international partnership comprising 32 participating states that look to promote the expansion of peaceful nuclear production. The IFNEC also monitors its partners’ adherence to security and safety protocols and safeguards in the pursuit of safe and efficient nuclear development.

There are also a number of regional arrangements governing the use and transfer of nuclear energy and nuclear materials. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), originally established in 1958, is an entity within the OECD that promotes international cooperation

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and exchange to ensure the safe and responsible development of peaceful nuclear technologies. Similarly, the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) was launched in 2002 and is an Asian regional organization, working to strengthen regional cooperation as a means of bolstering nuclear safety and security mechanisms. Within the European Union, the production and peaceful use of atomic energy is governed by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Today, the realization of the aims proclaimed in the Euratom treaty rests with the European Commission and within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Energy is responsible for developing policies on nuclear energy

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence. Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 22,000 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date. Disarmament is the best protection against such dangers, but achieving this goal has been a tremendously difficult challenge.

Regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) have been established to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security.

The United Nations has sought to eliminate such weapons ever since its establishment. The first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946 established a Commission to deal with problems related to the discovery of atomic energy among others. The Commission was to make proposals for, inter alia, the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. The resolution also decided

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that the Commission should make proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

A number of multilateral treaties have since been established with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation and testing, while promoting progress in nuclear disarmament. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed in 1996 but has yet to enter into force.

A number of bilateral and plurilateral treaties and arrangements seek to reduce or eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery vehicles. These range from several treaties between the United States of America and Russian Federation as well as various other initiatives, to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, theMissile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, RESERACH ON THE TOPICS BELOW:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Report of the Secretary General on the Follow-up to the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional

approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Article

VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: “Nothing in this Treaty

affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to

assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories“.

General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) defines a Nuclear-Weapon-Free

Zone as…any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United

Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty,

has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be

subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

(b) An international system of verification and control is established to

guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free

Zones

The UN Disarmament Commission in its report of April 30, 1999,

recommended a set of principles and guidelines for the establishment of a

nuclear-weapon-free zone, which included, inter alia:

Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of

arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The

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initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively

from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that

region.

The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of

each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free

zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant

protocol(s) to the treaty, through which they undertake legally binding

commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use

nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty. A nuclear-weapon-free

zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for

peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties

establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for

the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic,

scientific and technological development of the States parties. Treaties

Involved in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The following treaties form the basis for the existing NWFZs:

Treaty of Tlatelolco — Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America and the Caribbean

Treaty of Rarotonga — South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Treaty of Bangkok — Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Treaty of Pelindaba — African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

Resolution on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region

of the Middle East (67th Session)

Submitting Member States

Israel (3 October 2013)

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Letters addressed to the Secretary-General confirming support for declaring

the Middle East a region free from weapons of mass destruction, including

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

Mongolia’s self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status has been recognized

internationally through the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution

55/33S on “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear weapon free status.”

Other treaties that also deal with the denuclearization of certain areas are:

Antarctic Treaty

Outer Space Treaty — Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other

Celestial Bodies

Moon Agreement — Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Seabed Treaty — Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear

Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the

Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

SOURCE

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(CTBT)

History of the Treaty

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) began its substantive negotiations on a

comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in January 1994 within the framework

of an Ad Hoc Committee established for that purpose. Although the CD had

long been involved with the issue of a test-ban, only in 1982 did it establish a

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subsidiary body on the item. Disagreement over a mandate for that body

blocked tangible progress for years.

Status of the Treaty

In accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty, it will enter into force after all 44

States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have ratified it.

The following Article XIV states have ratified the treaty:

Algeria Argentina Australia

Austria Bangladesh Belgium

Brazil Bulgaria Canada

Chile Colombia Democratic Republic of the Congo

Finland France Germany

Hungary Indonesia Italy

Japan Mexico Netherlands

Norway Peru Poland

Romania Republic of Korea Russian Federation

Slovakia South Africa Spain

Sweden Switzerland Turkey

Ukraine United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Viet Nam

The following Article XIV states have not yet ratified the treaty:

China Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Egypt

India Iran (Islamic Republic of) Israel

Pakistan United States of America

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After more than two years of intensive negotiations, the Chairman of the Ad

Hoc Committee, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, presented a

final draft treaty to the CD in June 1996. An overwhelming majority of Member

States of the CD expressed their readiness to support the draft treaty. India, for

its part, stated that it could not go along with a consensus on the draft text and

its transmittal to the United Nations General Assembly. The main reasons for

such a decision, as India pointed out, were related to its strong misgivings

about the provision for the entry-into-force of the treaty, which it considered

unprecedented in multilateral practice and running contrary to customary

international law, and the failure of the treaty to include a commitment by the

nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time-bound

framework.

As a result, Australia, on 22 August 1996, requested that the General Assembly

resume the consideration of agenda item 65, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear

Test-Ban Treaty” as provided for in resolution 50/65 of 12 December 1995. For

that purpose it also submitted the draft CTBT, identical to that negotiated in

the CD, for adoption by the General Assembly. On 10 September, the General

Assembly by resolution (A/RES/50/245) adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test-Ban Treaty and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in

his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature at the earliest

possible date. The Treaty was opened for signature in September 1996.

Latest Developments

Article XIV of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) states that if

the Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the

anniversary of its opening for signature, a conference may be held upon the

request of a majority of ratifying States. Such a conference is held to examine

to what extent the requirements for entry into force have been met, and to

decide on measures to accelerate the ratification process. Previous

Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty were held in

1999, 2003 and 2007 in Vienna, and 2001, 2005 2009 and 2011 in New York.

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Pursuant to Article XIV, and at the request by a majority of States which have

already deposited their instruments of ratification of the Treaty, the Secretary-

General of the United Nations, in his capacity as the Depositary of the Treaty,

will convene the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the

CTBT on 27 September 2013 in New York.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO) is an international organization established by the States

Signatories to the Treaty on 19 November 1996 and has its headquarters in

Vienna, Austria. The objective of the organization is to achieve the object and

purpose of the Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions,

including those for international verification of compliance with the Treaty,

and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among Member

States. To this end, the Commission prepares for the entry-into-force of the

Treaty and carries out the necessary preparations for the effective

implementation of the Treaty, including the establishment of a global

verification regime. The Preparatory Commission consists of a plenary body

composed of all States signatories to the Treaty and a Provisional Technical

Secretariat.

The relationship agreement between the United Nations and the CTBTO was

adopted in the year 2000 by the General Assembly as A/RES/54/280.

SOURCE:

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/ctbt/

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China

China strictly abides by the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has been making unremitting efforts in promoting the three NPT goals of: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, progress in nuclear disarmament and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In response to the request of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, the Chinese Government hereby submits to this conference the following report on its implementation of the Treaty:

Ⅱ Nuclear Disarmament

China has all along strictly complied with its disarmament obligations under NPT and made an earnest effort to promote international nuclear disarmament process, and for an ultimate complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons and for a world free of nuclear weapons.

China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an international legal instrument for this purpose. To eliminate nuclear weapons eventually, China proposes the following,

First, all the parties should establish a security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation so as to create a favorable regional and international environment for nuclear disarmament.

Second, nuclear disarmament should contribute to the maintenance of international strategic stability and should be based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

Thirdly, nuclear disarmament should be carried our through a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a downward balance. To create conditions for other nuclear-weapon states to participate in the multilateral disarmament process, states possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in reducing their nuclear arsenals drastically and in a legally binding manner. The nuclear weapons thus reduced should be destroyed and should not be diverted from deployment to stockpiling.

As a nuclear-weapon state and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has never shunned away from its own obligations in nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, it has undertaken nuclear disarmament responsibilities that other nuclear-weapon states have not yet undertaken or are not willing to undertake.

1.China advocates a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and strictly observes its nuclear disarmament obligations. China is the only

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nuclear-weapon state to advocate a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China was forced to develop nuclear weapons under special historical circumstances and for the sole purpose of self-defense. On the very first day when it possessed nuclear weapons, China issued a solemn statement and proposed to hold a world summit to discuss the issue of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Over all these years, China has exercised great restraint in the development of its nuclear weapons in terms of both scale and upgrading. From the first nuclear test in 1964 to the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests in 1996, China conducted fewer nuclear tests than all other nuclear-weapon states. It has never taken part in any nuclear arms race or deployed any nuclear weapons outside its territory.

Since the beginning of 1990s, China has gradually cut back on its nuclear weapons development program. The nuclear weapon research and development site in Qinghai was closed, transformed into a civilian facility and handed over to the local government in May 1995 after environmental clean-up.

2.China sticks to the policy of not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and is opposed to the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons. China is the only nuclear-weapon State among the five that has adopted the no-first use policy. On 16th October 1964, when it conducted its first nuclear test, China solemnly declared to the world that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. No matter of facing of nuclear threat or nuclear blackmail during the Cold War or in face of the drastic changes in the post-Cold-War international security environment, China has never deviated from its commitment.

China has worked hard with other nuclear-weapon states for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons. In January 1994, China formally presented a draft “Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons” to the other four nuclear-weapon states, and has since sought to reach arrangements with other nuclear-weapon states on a bilateral basis for mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-targeting of such weapons against each other. In September 1994, head of state of China and Russia issued a statement in which to commit to mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-targeting of such weapons against each other. On 27th June 1998, China and the United States announced their decision no to target nuclear weapons at each other. In April 2000, the five nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement announcing that they would not target their nuclear weapons at any countries.

3.China also undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In April 1995, China issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and its commitment to offering them positive security

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assurances. In 2000, China and other four nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement reaffirming the security assurance commitment in the UN Security Council Resolution 984 adopted in 1995.

At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the Chinese Government issued statements on security assurances to the two countries in December 1994 and February 1995 respectively .

China has called upon other nuclear-weapon States to unconditionally provide both negative and positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states and to conclude an international legal instrument to this end as soon as possible. China actively supports the efforts by Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to establish an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances and start substantive work and negotiations in this regard without delay.

4.China supports the efforts of non-nuclear-weapon states to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is conducive to preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting regional and global peace and security. China supports and respects the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and WMD-free zones on the basis of voluntary consultations.

In 1973, China signed Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean. In 1983, China joined the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and has undertaken the obligations thereunder. In 1987, China signed Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. In 1991, China joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and has undertaken the obligations thereunder. In 1996, China signed Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

China supports the efforts made by the ASEAN countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has reached agreement in principle with ASEAN on the relevant issues in the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China stands ready to sign the Protocol when it is open to signature. China supports the efforts made by five Central Asian countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. China has no difficulty with the current text of the relevant treaty and its protocol, and is willing to sign at an early date after an agreement is reached among the parties concerned on the text. China supports the efforts made to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East, and hopes that the goal will be achieved at an early date. China joined the consensus at the various sessions of the United Nations General Assembly on resolutions on establishing nuclear-weapon-free

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zone in the Middle East. China respects and welcomes Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

5. China firmly supports the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and actively participated in the negotiation of the Treaty, making significant contribution to the conclusion of the Treaty. As a nuclear-weapon state and one of the 44 Annex II countries, China is well aware of its special responsibility for promoting the entry into force of the Treaty. In 1999, the Chinese Government completed its review of the CTBT and submitted the Treaty to the National People’s Congress, which is now reviewing the CTBT in accordance with the relevant procedures. China took an active part in all the three Conferences on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Treaty and invited the Special Representative of the States Parties to Promote the Ratification Process of the CTBT and the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Prep.Com. of the CTBTO to visit China, and exchanged views with them on promoting the early entry into force of the Treaty. China will continue to honour its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions.

China is taking an active and constructive part in all the work of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization. China is earnestly preparing for the national implementation of the Treaty, and has set up a specialized agency to prepare for national implementation of the Treaty, including the construction, operation and management of International Monitoring System stations with Chinese territory.

China has undertaken the construction of 12 stations, including 6 seismic stations, 3 radionuclide stations, 2 infrasound stations and 1 radionuclide laboratory. At present, construction of the 2 primary seismic stations and radionuclide stations have been almost completed, the radionuclide laboratory is under construction, the site survey for the infrasound stations has completed, and the National Data Center is also nearing completion. At present, China is discussing with the PTS about the Facility Agreement.

China has taken an active part in the negotiations on the on-site inspection operational manual and other operational manuals. Chinese experts have been studying the on-site inspection techniques provided for in the CTBT, and has developed a prototype mobile Ar-37 monitoring system which can be used to quickly detect underground nuclear explosions.

China hosted a Seminar on Regional Cooperation, an On-Site Inspection Workshop and an IMS Training Course in cooperation with the PTS for three consecutive years.

In recent years, China has co-sponsored the CTBT resolutions in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

6. In order to promote the international nuclear disarmament process, China opposes the deployment of weapon systems in outer space, and is of the view that missile

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defense systems that disrupt global strategic balance and stability should not been deployed. It calls on the international community to negotiate an international legally binding instrument to prohibit the deployment of weapon systems in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space.

In June 2002, China and the Russian Federation, together with VietNam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe and the Syria Arab Republic, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) a working paper entitled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects”(CD/1679), which attracted attention from all sides. China and Russia will continue to refine the working paper so as to lay a solid foundation for the negotiations on the international legal instrument within an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space to be established by the CD.

In April 2002, China and the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs jointly sponsored a major international seminar on arms control and disarmament issue in Beijing. Participants engaged in in-depth discussions on the prevention of arms race in outer space. On 21st and 22nd March 2005, China, the Russian Federation, UNIDIR and the Simons Foundation of Canada jointly sponsored an international seminar on "Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" in Geneva. More than 150 officials, experts and scholars from 65 members states of the CD held in-depth discussions on wide-ranging topics, including the legal means, for preventing an arms race in outer space as well as monitoring and verification issues.

China has for years co-sponsored the resolution on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space(PAROS) in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

7. China supports multilateral efforts on nuclear disarmament. China supports the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD to carry out substantive work on nuclear disarmament, security assurance, and PAROS. China is in favor of an early agreement on a program of work for the CD that is accepted for all sides, including commencement of negotiations on a multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon Report. On 7 August 2003, China declared that it would accept the Five Ambassadors’ Proposal on the CD’s program of work, which is supported by a vast majority of countries in the CD.

China supports the intermediate nuclear disarmament measures proposed by non-nuclear-weapon states, and is ready to consider the implementation of these measures at an appropriate time and under appropriate conditions as the nuclear disarmament process progresses.

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Over the years, China has been the only nuclear-weapon state which has cast affirmative votes on the important nuclear disarmament resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, such as those entitled “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda”, “Nuclear Disarmament”, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, “Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons” and “Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-weapon states against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

INDIA AND CHINA ON NPT:

India has a flourishing nuclear power program and plans to have nearly 15,000 MWe

of nuclear capacity on line by 2020.

China has fast-growing electricity demand and a rapidly-expanding nuclear power

program. Nuclear capacity of at least 50,000 MWe is planned by 2020.

India is already self-sufficient in reactor design and construction, and China has

become so for second-generation units, but has imported Generation III technology

and is developing it further.

India's uranium resources are limited, so it is developing the thorium fuel cycle to

utilise its extensive reserves of thorium. It can now import uranium.

China's uranium resources are modest and it relies heavily on imported uranium.

India is the world's largest democracy, with about 1.3 billion citizens. China has some

1.4 billion people. They represent almost half of the world's population, and they are

rapidly increasing their energy, and particularly electricity, use. They both have well-

considered policies to increase dramatically their use of nuclear power to make that

electricity. Both see nuclear power as an important ingredient of sustainable

development.

India

Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India and has been a priority since

independence in 1947. In 1948 the Atomic Energy Act was passed, and the Atomic

energy Commission set up. Under it, the Department of Atomic Energy was created in

1954, when the country's 3-stage plan for establishing nuclear power was first

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outlined. This plan first employs Pressurised Heavy-Water Reactors (PHWR) fuelled by

natural uranium to generate electricity and produce plutonium as a by-product. Stage

2 uses fast breeder reactors burning the plutonium to breed U-233 from thorium.

Stage 3 is to develop this and produce a surplus of fissile material. India’s civil nuclear

strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle,

necessary because it is excluded from the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

due to it acquiring nuclear weapons capability after 1970. (Those five countries doing

so before 1970 were accorded the status of Nuclear Weapons States under the NPT.)In

May 1974 when India exploded its first nuclear device only 94 states had signed the

NPT and fewer (79) had ratified it. This compares with 190 ratifying states now. After

1974 India was denied nuclear technology by the Western world. Post 1974, India has

been considered a nuclear weapons-capable state – though its military nuclear

program proceeded slowly in the ensuing years and only came fully out of the closet

in 1998 when India conducted several nuclear explosive tests. The rationale for this

isolation was largely coercive, to encourage signature of the NPT by India and the other

80+ states that were non-signatories in 1974. However, political support within India

for its nuclear weapons program has been strong across the political spectrum, due to

distrust of its neighbours China and Pakistan in particular, and this precluded any move

to sign the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State – the only option open from NPT

perspective. The self-sufficiency engendered by this isolation extends from uranium

exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor

design and construction, to reprocessing used fuel and waste management. It has a

small fast breeder reactor and is commissioning a much larger one. It is also developing

technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel. It has 18 small

and two mid-sized nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, plus one large on

now operating. Five large reactors are under construction, and more are planned. In

2013 nuclear power contributed 30 billion kWh of electricity – 3.4% of total, and

capacity had reached 5.3 GWe. Government policy is to have almost 15 GWe of nuclear

capacity operating by 2020, and 25% nuclear contribution is foreseen by 2050.Led by

the USA, India has set up an international agreement which now allows it to import

nuclear power plants and uranium fuel and to put itself more fully under the

international safeguards regime without having to abandon its nuclear weapons. In

effect, the aim has been to put it on much the same basis as China with safeguards

and access to trade. In 2014 the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with

IAEA came into force.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, GO TO THE FOLLOWING LINK:

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http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/non-

proliferation/india,-china-npt.aspx

The case of Iran :

In the 2000s, the Islamic Republic of Iran started an independent program of

uranium enrichment which did not subject to the supervision of the IAEA (as

discussed in the next section). The international community viewed Iran’s

program as a path leading to the development of any nuclear warheads which

could easily reach most of the Middle East and Europe. For this reason, in

2006/2007 the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1737 and 1747, calling

for selective economic sanctions against Iran under UN Charter Article 41. Such

economic sanctions have been in place for almost a decade. In the meantime,

multilateral talks were held between the five permanent members of the UNSC

with the addition of Germany (“the P5+1”), the European Union, and Iran. The

result of the talks is a set of “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program”, adopted in

April 2, 2015 (US Department of State), and a definitive accord of July 14, 2015.

The government of Iran has agreed on limiting its uranium enrichment

program, turning several nuclear bases into scientific centers, and accepting

IAEA supervision, in exchange for the lifting of much of the economic sanctions

against it. The final accord is yet to be ratified by the legislatures of the US and

Iran. If the deal is approved domestically, Iran will not be able to develop a

nuclear weapon for one year at the very least. The supporters of this Nuclear

Agreement – the governments of the P-5 and the European Union, which

moved to turn a dangerous enemy into a possible ally - believe that it can keep

the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and perhaps start talks for the nuclear

disarmament of Israel. On the contrary, opponents – among which are Iran’s

strategic rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia, whose governments consider Tehran a

threat to their survival and influence – regard the deal as a “historic mistake”:

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Iran, they claim, cannot be trusted because of its recent political history, and

the accord will pave the way for a new nuclear-weapon-equipped state.

Nine states currently possess nuclear weapons: the United States, the Russia,

China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel. If

any of these states were to opt for the use of the atomic bomb against another

state, the threat of M.A.D. would become reality. At the same time, other

states have nuclear programs which might have the task of developing nuclear-

weapon capability in the future. Moreover, non-state actors may be coming

closer to gaining access to nuclear know-how and technology. The necessity of

ensuring nuclear security and non-proliferation is, therefore, timely and

urgent.

JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN:

On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United

Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear

program will be exclusively peaceful. October 18, 2015 marked Adoption Day

of the JCPOA, the date on which the JCPOA came into effect and participants

began taking steps necessary to implement their JCPOA commitments. January

16, 2016, marks Implementation Day of the JCPOA. The International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has implemented its key nuclear-

related measures described in the JCPOA, and the Secretary State has

confirmed the IAEA’s verification. As a result of Iran verifiably meeting its

nuclear commitments, the United States and the EU have lifted nuclear-related

sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA.

For further information on JCPOA, visit the following link:

http://m.state.gov/mc67923.htm

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KEY POINTS OF IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL:

The main points of the Vienna agreement on Iran's nuclear ambitions are:

Iran will sacrifice two-thirds of its ability to enrich uranium, the vital process

that could be used to make the core of a nuclear bomb. All but 6,000 of Iran’s

19,500 centrifuges will be placed in storage, monitored by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran will export all but 300kg of its entire stockpile of eight tonnes of low-

enriched uranium.

The combined effect of these measures will be to place Iran about 12 months

away from having enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb –

compared with its current “breakout” time of three or four months.

The Fordow enrichment plant, which was built in secret inside a hollowed-out

mountain, will be converted into a research centre. Almost two-thirds of the

centrifuges in Fordow will be removed and the remaining 1,000 will not be

used to enrich uranium.

Iran’s heavy water plant at Arak will be redesigned and rebuilt to make it

impossible to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Iran will implement the “Additional Protocol” safeguards agreement, giving

IAEA inspectors more powers to monitor its nuclear plants and other facilities.

Once the IAEA has confirmed that Iran has taken these steps, America and its

allies will lift all nuclear-related economic sanctions, including oil embargos

and financial restrictions. This could release over $100 billion (£65 billion) of

frozen Iranian assets.

America and its allies will also recognise Iran’s right to enrich uranium for

peaceful purposes, as guaranteed by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Iran will remain subject to a UN arms embargo for five years. Restrictions will

stay on its ballistic missile programme for another eight.

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Action 21

As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are

encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to

determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily

providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The

Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly

accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the

nuclear-weapon States.

The Secretary-General’s five-point proposal on nuclear

disarmament

“The United Nations and security in a nuclear-

weapon-free world”

First, I urge all NPT parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon-states, to fulfil

their obligation under the treaty to undertake negotiations on effective

measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

They could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework of separate,

mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-

weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long

been proposed at the United Nations. Upon the request of Costa Rica and

Malaysia, I have circulated to all UN member states a draft of such a

convention, which offers a good point of departure.

The nuclear powers should actively engage with other states on this issue at

the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the world’s single multilateral

disarmament negotiating forum. The world would also welcome a resumption

of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russian Federation

aimed at deep and verifiable reductions of their respective arsenals.

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Governments should also invest more in verification research and

development. The United Kingdom’s proposal to host a conference of nuclear-

weapon states on verification is a concrete step in the right direction.

Second, the Security Council’s permanent members should commence

discussions, perhaps within its Military Staff Committee, on security issues in

the nuclear disarmament process. They could unambiguously assure non-

nuclear-weapon states that they will not be the subject of the use or threat of

use of nuclear weapons. The Council could also convene a summit on nuclear

disarmament. Non-NPT states should freeze their own nuclear-weapon

capabilities and make their own disarmament commitments.

My third initiative relates to the “rule of law.” Unilateral moratoria on nuclear

tests and the production of fissile materials can go only so far. We need new

efforts to bring the CTBT into force, and for the Conference on Disarmament to

begin negotiations on a fissile material treaty immediately, without

preconditions. I support the entry into force of the Central Asian and African

nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I encourage the nuclear-weapon states to

ratify all the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I strongly

support efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East. And I urge all NPT

parties to conclude their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to

voluntarily adopt the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol.

We should never forget that the nuclear fuel cycle is more than an issue

involving energy or non-proliferation; its fate will also shape prospects for

disarmament.

My fourth proposal concerns accountability and transparency. The nuclear-

weapon states often circulate descriptions of what they are doing to pursue

these goals, yet these accounts seldom reach the public. I invite the nuclear-

weapon states to send such material to the UN Secretariat, and to encourage

its wider dissemination. The nuclear powers could also expand the amount of

information they publish about the size of their arsenals, stocks of fissile

material and specific disarmament achievements. The lack of an authoritative

estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons testifies to the need for

greater transparency.

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Fifth and finally, a number of complementary measures are needed. These

include the elimination of other types of WMD; new efforts against WMD

terrorism; limits on the production and trade in conventional arms; and new

weapons bans, including of missiles and space weapons. The General Assembly

could also take up the recommendation of the Blix Commission for a “World

Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of

mass destruction”.

Some doubt that the problem of WMD terrorism can ever be solved. But if

there is real, verified progress in disarmament, the ability to eliminate this

threat will grow exponentially. It will be much easier to encourage

governments to tighten relevant controls if a basic, global taboo exists on the

very possession of certain types of weapons. As we progressively eliminate the

world’s deadliest weapons and their components, we will make it harder to

execute WMD terrorist attacks. And if our efforts also manage to address the

social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that aggravate terrorist

threats, so much the better.

SOURCE :

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/sg5point/

Israel and Egypt

As mentioned, the country of Israel has been heavily involved in international

conflict since its establishment in 1948.233 Territorial disputes between native

Palestinians and Israelis have led to decades of instability and violence in the area,

most recently in August 2014. After 2,100 Palestinian casualties and nearly 70 Israeli

deaths, negotiations finally ended the weeks of fighting.234 Additional conflict

between Syria and Israel over the past decade has contributed to tension in the area

as well. While Israel has been hesitant to enter into another war with Syria, violence

between the two countries continues. Furthermore, the continued Arab-Israeli

conflict has instilled insecurities in Israeli political and social life. This has led to Israel

having a highly innovative and capable military. Israel remains a leader in the world’s

military exports, and is widely known to have extensive WMD capabilities.235 As a

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leading military power in the world, they are capable of developing nuclear

weaponry and maintain policies that would support the idea that nuclear weapons

could positively contribute to their national safety. Continuous instability in the

region is the primary reason for Israel to potentially have developed nuclear

weapons. Whether this claim is true or not, it has certainly created distrust among

other states in the region. On 3 October 2013, Israel officials released a statement

reiterating their consensus on an eventual NWFZ in the Middle East.236 However,

they note that a lack of peace within the region is halting the process. Israel has

avowed continued support for confidence building measures among states in the

region. For this committee, it is important to understand that the continuing Arab-

Israeli conflict is a major factor halting the establishment of a NWFZ. During what is

now known as the Arab Spring, Egypt experienced a political revolution in early 2011,

ending in late 2013. Despite the political turmoil within its territory, Egypt has

remained a leader in the movement for the establishment of a NWFZ. An original

supporter of the 1974 UN resolution, Egypt is also the largest sponsor of a NWFZ in

the Middle East. Egypt recently participated in the 2013 Geneva Convention in hopes

of nuclear talks with other member states. The Geneva Convention was held to

prepare for the 2015 NPT review and the convention yielded some success, such as

the Geneva Agreement with Iran.237 However, the delegation of Egypt was hoping

to further negotiations over the implementation of a NWFZ in the region.238 The

lack of serious discussion on this matter led Egypt to walk out of the global nuclear

talks, as it felt that some member states were “obstructing” the goal.239 After 15

years of inaction, Egypt feels that it is time for member states to take serious

measures in order to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East. All of these countries

mentioned, namely Israel, Iran, and Egypt, are some of the most important countries

in the region concerning the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The recent

actions taken by these countries is important to consider as the establishment of a

NWFZ in the Middle East will have to be a regional decision.

*NWFZ – Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Questions the Committee has to answer

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1. Is your country a signing party to the NPT, CTBT, or other non-proliferation resolutions? If no, why not?

2. Is your country currently producing nuclear technology, or has it historically done so?

3. Is your country in a NWFZ? If so what were the challenges when establishing the NWFZ and how did your country work to overcome them?

4. What is your country’s policy toward non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East?

5. What does your country feel are the primary obstacles impeding the creation of this zone?

6. What measures do you feel need to be taken to peacefully establish a NWFZ in the Middle East?

7. Are there any pre-existing standards or methods that the committee

should utilize to ensure the successful establishment of this NWFZ ?

8. Do you think nuclear weapons should give up by all states for greater

good or few countries should be allowed to possess it ?

REFERENCES

The Charter of the United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

World Nuclear Association. “Outline History of Nuclear Energy.” http://world-

nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Outline-History-of-Nuclear-

Energy/

International Court of Justice, 1996. “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear

Weapons. Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.”

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95

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International Atomic Energy Agency, 1957. “The Statute of the IAEA.”

http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.htlm

NPT Review Conference, 2005. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons.” http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html

Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of

America, to the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 8

December 1953 (“Atoms for Peace”).

https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech

NPT Review Conference, 2015. “Activities of the International Atomic Energy

Agency relevant to Article III of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons. Background

Paper.”http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.20

15/13

United Nations General Assembly, 2012. “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-

Free Zone in the Middle East.” https://gafc-

vote.un.org/UNODA/vote.nsf/958591109a21b54c05256705006e0a5c/e6692ea

f446c41e085257ad2005236d1/$FILE/A%20RES%2067%2028.pdf

Report by the Secretary General, 2013. “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-

Free Zone in the Middle East.” https://disarmament-

library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/a45bed59c24a1b6085257b100050103a/e12

c3fdee123f66e85257bc000516a1c/$FILE/A%2068%20124%20Part%20I.pdf

Page | 34

US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 2015. “Parameters for a

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s

Nuclear Program.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm

Arms Control Association. “UN Security Council Resolution on Iran”.

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran

International Atomic Energy Agency. “UN Security Council Resolutions on

Nuclear Terrorism.” http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/sc_resolutions.asp

6. USEFUL WEBSITES FOR RESEARCH

The CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/

Your country’s official website (e.g. http://www.bundesregierung.de)

Your country’s permanent mission to the United Nations (e.g. http://china-

un.org)

Your country’s ministry of foreign affairs

Your country’s ministry of defense and security

Your national nuclear program website (if any)

UN Official Document System: http://documents.un.org

The IAEA website: http://www.iaea.org

UN wire: http://www.unwire.org

United Nations System: http://www.unsystem.org