1

TheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(DISEC)

LetterfromtheExecutiveBoard

AsmembersoftheExecutiveBoardoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(DISEC),itgivesusgreatpleasuretowelcomealldelegatestoTHSMUN’15.

I,ShivishSoni,willbepresidingoverthecommitteeasChairpersonalongwithShubhiVadehraastheVice-Chairperson.

Asthemaindeliberative,policymakingandrepresentativeorganoftheUnitedNations,theGeneralAssemblyactsasaforumwhereall193membernationsoftheUNcanexpresstheirviewsonanInternationalstage.ItisoneofthefiveprincipalorgansoftheUNandtheonlyoneinwhichallmembernationshasequalrepresentation.Thus,itservesasembodimentofoneofthemajorfoundingprinciplesoftheUN-Equalityamongnations,aprinciplethatdelegatesareexpectedtoupholdbyaimingtoresolveagendaspecificgrievancesoftheinternationalcommunityatTHSMUN’15.

Thisyear’sGeneralAssemblyagendas:

1. TheThreatofTransnationalOrganizedCrimetoInternationalSecurity2. ProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,StockpilingofBiologicaland

ToxinWeaponsontheirDestruction

Areheavilyresearchoriented.Conducivedebateontheseagendasisaneventualitythatwillonlycometopassifdelegateshaveresearchedthoroughlyandareawareofthequestionsthattheyneedtoanswerintheirresolutions.Beingawareofthedauntingtaskthatthismightseemtomostdelegates,wehavemadeanattemptatpreparingacomprehensive,yetunintimidatingbackgroundguidethatwehopeshallservetoguideyouthroughyourresearch.

Beforeyougoaheadandstudythisguide,pleasekeepinmindthatthisismerelytofacilitateyourresearchandnottheentireresearchinitself.Thebackgroundguidewillhaveabasicoutlineoftheagendatohelpyourunderstandingandexpressourexpectationsfromyouasadelegate.

2

Wehopetoseeconfidentleaders,skilledoratorsandwell-researcheddelegatescomingtogethertoformanamalgamoffruitfuldiscussions.Remembertospeakup,andpleasedoenjoyyourselveswhilewhatwehopeshallbeanenrichinglearningexperiencelasts.

Dofeelfreetocontacttheexecutiveboardincaseofanydoubtsordiscrepancies.

AlltheBest!

AnujGandhi ShubhiVadehra

Chairperson Vice-Chairperson

LetterfromUSG-ResearchandTraining

AsmembersoftheSecretariatoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(DISEC),itgivesusgreatpleasuretowelcomealldelegatestoTHSMUN’15.

Asadelegate,mostofyourtimewouldpredominantlyconsistofresearch.Thisisthekeyelementofbeingagooddelegate.Comingtotheagendaathand,I’dliketostartoffbysayingthatitisoneofthemosttechnicalagendasonecanfindintheGA.Sincethiscommitteeconsistsofmostlyfirsttimers,Iurgeyoutonotbetoooverwhelmedbysuchabackgroundguide.

Weunderstandthatthisbackgroundguideisverytextheavy,butthisiswhatwecouldmanageforthedelegates.TheEB,alongwiththeSecretariat,putworkedveryhardtomakethisbackgroundguidelittlelesstextheavy,andthisisthebestwecouldmanage.

Allthebest,andhappyMUNing

DakshSaksena

USG–ResearchandTraining

3

IntroductiontoDISEC

TheDisarmamentandInternationalSecurityCommitteewasestablishedin1993.ItistheFirstandoneofthemaincommitteesoftheGeneralAssembly.TheroleofDISECisoutlinedinChapterIV,Article11oftheUnitedNationsCharter,whichstates,“TheGeneralAssemblymayconsiderthegeneralprinciplesofcooperationinthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity,includingtheprinciplesgoverningdisarmamentandtheregulationofarmamentsandmaymakerecommendationswithregardtosuchprinciplestotheMembersortotheSecurityCouncilortoboth”.Asperthisarticle,themandateofDISECishighlightedas,“topromotetheestablishmentandmaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecuritywiththeleastdiversionforarmamentsoftheworld'shumanandeconomicresources”.

HistoryoftheCommitteeIn1945,theGeneralAssemblywascreatedwiththeratificationoftheCharter

of the United Nations. Including all 193 members of the United Nations, theGeneralAssemblyisthemaindeliberative,policymakingandrepresentativeorganof the United Nations. As such, it is a medium formultilateral deliberation onglobalissuesspecifiedbytheUNCharter.IntheGeneralAssembly,eachmemberstatehasa voteanda simplemajoritydecideseach resolution.However, votestakenondesignated important issues,“suchas recommendationsonpeaceand

4

security and the election of Security Council members, require a two-thirdsmajorityofMemberStates.”1Specifically, the first committee in theGeneralAssembly, theDisarmament andInternationalSecurityCommittee(DISEC)wasestablishedtoserveasaforumtodebate issues pertaining to disarmament and themaintenance of global peaceand security in an environment of equality.2This committee takes measuresnecessary for the prevention or the reduction of international hostilities andconflict onmatters that are not already being discussed by theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.While theDisarmamentand International SecurityCommitteehas theauthorityto initiate studies and to pass resolutions to promote international politicalcooperationand“thedevelopmentandcodificationof international law,”unlikethe Security Council,DISECdoesnot have thepower to impose sanctionsor toauthorizearmed interventions.3Asapreliminaryorgan,DISECservesas the firstlevelofdiscussion for issueswithin thescopeofdisarmamentand internationalsecurity.Thisallowsallmemberstatestofullydeveloptheirpositionsandengageinmultilateraldiscussion.Instead of having binding authority, DISEC’s resolutions function asrecommendations to the Secretariat or the Security Council. More specifically,these recommendations are for establishing the “general principles ofcooperation for maintaining international peace and security, includingdisarmament”andforthe“peacefulsettlementofanysituationthatmightimpairfriendlyrelationsamongnations.”4Since its inception in 1945, the Disarmament and International SecurityCommittee has played a critical role in promoting the global effort fordisarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destructionand in facilitating international peace and security. While the various studiesinitiatedbyDISEChavebeen invaluabletotheSecurityCouncil for itscontinuedoperations,DISEC’smaincontributiontopreservingandcreatingglobalsecurityisitsnumerousrecommendationsforpeacekeepingmissionstotheUNSC.Startingin1948,thefirstpeacekeepingeffortinIsraelandtheMiddleEasthasworkedtomonitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, and prevent isolated

1“FunctionsandPowersoftheGeneralAssembly”June2011<http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>2“CharteroftheUnitedNations”June2011<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml>3“FunctionsandPowersoftheGeneralAssembly”June20114“CharteroftheUnitedNations”June2011

5

incidentsfromescalatingwithintheregion.5Sincethen,theSecurityCouncilhasauthorized over sixty peacekeeping missions, the majority of them having firstbeenrecommendedbyDISEC.Moreover,DISEChasconvenednumeroustimestoresolveissueswhentheSecurityCouncilhasfailedtoexerciseitsprimaryresponsibilitytoacttoresolvecrises.

In these instances, theDisarmamentand InternationalSecurityCommittee ischargedwiththedutyto“considerthematterimmediatelywithaviewtomakingappropriate recommendations toMembers for collectivemeasures, including inthe case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed forcewhen necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”6Notable examples of the emergency sessions include, the 1960 session, whichcalledfortheimmediateinterventionintheCongoandthe1980sessionforthesituation in Afghanistan, which called for the peaceful ceasefire between theSovietUnionandtheAfghaniNationalists.7Recently,theGeneralAssemblyhasapprovedthelandmarkMillenniumDeclaration,adoptedin2000,andthe2005WorldSummitOutcomeDocumentwhichreestablishthecommitmentofMemberStatestoreachspecificgoalstoattainpeace,securityanddisarmamentandstrengthentheUnitedNationsastheworld’sprimaryinternationalinstitution.Thesedocumentsarereflectionsoftheinternationalcommunity’scommitmenttothestandardsandobjectivesoftheUNCharter.

5“UnitedNationsTruceSupervisionOrganization”June<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/>.6“CharteroftheUnitedNations”June20117“EmergencySpecialSessions”June2011<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml>

6

TOPIC1:TheThreatofTransnationalOrganizedCrimetoInternationalSecurity

Whatdowemeanby“transnationalorganizedcrime”?Theterm“organizedcrime”appearstohaveemergedinChicagoin1919,andthetermretainsunder-tonesofthebootlegginggangsprevalentduringthatera.Butthephenomenonoforganizedcriminalactivityfarpre-datesthiscoinageanditsmanifestations have developed considerably since that time. Depending on thedefinition, offences that could be classed as organized crime have always beenwithus,butitwasonlyrecentlythatthenationsoftheworldbegantocomparenotesandcollaborateonacollectiveresponse.Although the development of multilateral agreements to control thetransnational drug trade began a century ago, and a number of internationalinstruments to address certain offences have been in existence for some time,therewasnot,untilrecently,anagreementonhowtransnationalorganizedcrimeshouldbeaddressed.Therapidgrowthinthescaleandscopeoftheprobleminthe post-ColdWar world led to the passage of theUnited Nations ConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,whichcameintoeffectinlate2003.Remarkably, the Convention contains no precise definition of “transnationalorganizedcrime,”nordoes itcontaina listofthekindsofcrimesthatmightfallunder this heading. This is not a problemunique to theConvention – as notedabove; there is no consensus definition of organized crime among eitherpractitioners or theoreticians. A very wide range of criminal activities can beconducted trans-nationally in an organized fashion, and new forms of crimeemerge constantly as global and local conditions change over time. In order toaccommodatethiscomplexity,aprecisedefinitionwasomitted.Instead, the Convention defines “organized criminal group.” This is neededbecause the Convention requires parties to criminalize participation in anorganizedcriminalgroup.2butthepurposeoftheConventionisto“preventandcombat transnational organized crime”, not organized crime groups. Attackingthe groups is just one tactic toward this end. Under the Convention, an“organizedcriminalgroup”is:

7

• Agroupofthreeormorepersonsthatwasnotrandomlyformed;

• Existingforaperiodoftime;• Actinginconcertwiththeaimofcommittingatleastonecrimepunishable

byatleastfouryears’incarceration;

• In order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other materialbenefit.

Sincemost“groups”ofanysortcontainthreeormorepeopleworkinginconcertandmostexistforaperiodoftime,thetruedefiningcharacteristicsoforganizedcrime groups under the Convention are their profit-driven nature and theseriousnessoftheoffencestheycommit.TheConventioncoversonlytransnationalcrimes,but“transnational” issimilarlycastbroadly. Itcoversnotonlyoffencescommitted inmorethanonestate,butalsothosethattakeplaceinonestatebutareplannedorcontrolledinanother.Alsoincludedarecrimesinonestatecommittedbygroupsthatoperateinmorethanonestate,andcrimescommittedinonestatethatimpactonotherstates.The implied definition of “transnational organized crime” encompasses virtuallyallprofit-motivatedcriminalactivitieswith international implications.Thisbroaddefinition takes account of the global complexity of the issue and allowscooperation on thewidest possible range of common concerns, but leaves theexact subject matter rather vague. A better idea of the offences intended isprovided intheattachedProtocols,whichrelatetospecificcrimes: trafficking inpersons, smuggling of migrants and firearms trafficking. These issues – whichtypicallyinvolvecountriesoforigin,transitanddestination– are areaswhere international cooperation is essential, since it is beyond thecapacityofanysinglestatetotakecomprehensiveactiontotackletheproblem.

8

Whatdoweknowaboutit?Unlikethe“conventional”crimes(murder,rape,robberyetcetera),citizensrarelyapproachthepolicewithcomplaintsaboutorganizedcrime.Manyoftheoffencesare “victimless”, in the sense that none of the parties participating has anyinterestinbringingthemattertotheattentionofthepolice.Evenwhenthereisaclearvictim,thispersonmaybereluctanttoreportforfearofreprisals.Further,tosellcontrabandorillicitservices,criminalmarketshavetobeopenenoughtoattractcustomers,andtooperateinthiswaysuggestssomedegreeoftoleranceon behalf of the authorities. Corruption is often implicit, and members of thepublicmay be left with the impression that complaintswould be useless.Whyinformthepoliceaboutbusinessesoperatinginplainsight?Consequently, most organized criminal activity comes to the attention of thepoliceonlywhen they take thepains toproactively investigate it. Theability todetectorganizedcrimeiscontingentonapoliceforcewiththeresourcestotakeonthisadditionalwork,beyondtheconsiderablecaseloadinvolvedinrespondingtocitizencomplaints.Italsorequiresapoliceforcewiththeskillstoconductlong-term,oftenclandestine,investigations.Anditrequiresapoliceforceabletoresistthe corrupting influence of organized crime groups, whose resources may farexceed those of law enforcement. Inmany parts of theworld, one ormore oftheseelementsismissing,soverylittleorganizedcrimeactivityisregistered.Evenincountrieswithplentyofcapacity,theattentiongiventoanygivenareaoforganized crime differs. The definitions of crime can also vary based on localvalues. As a result, the criminal justice statistics may reflect political prioritiesmorethanthestateoftheunderlyingproblem.Of all the areas under consideration, themost is known about drug trafficking.UNODC and concerned governments have conducted surveys of the majorcultivationareasforcocabushandopiumpoppyformanyyears,andsoestimatescanbemadewithsomeprecisionastohowmuchcocaineandheroinarebeingproduced.ManycountriessubmittheirseizuredatatoUNODC,andmostofthemain destination countries have survey data on the size of the drug-usingpopulation. Supply, demand and seizures can be triangulated to give a morereliablepicturethananysingledatasourcecouldgenerate.Asaresult,sometrendscanbetrackedwithconsiderableconfidence.It isclear,

9

for example, that long-term declining demand for cocaine in the United Statesand rapidly growing demand for it in Europe have reconfigured global drugmarkets. Between 2004 and 2008,West Africa suddenly became an importanttransit area for thedrug in awaynever seenbefore.Alsonovel is the growingtrafficking of cocaine base products from the Plurinational State of Bolivia toneighboringdevelopingcountriesintheSouthernCone.Thesephenomenacanbetrackedthroughsupply,demandandseizurestatistics.But thereremainmanygaps inourknowledgeof thedrugmarkets.Aggregatednationalseizurefiguressayverylittleaboutthenatureofthetrafficking:thewho,what,where andhowof smugglingdrugs. For this,more research anddetailedreports of individual seizures and arrests are needed. Under the drugConventions, States parties are obligated to send to UNODC details of specificseizures,whicharedeemed importantbecause they throw lighton the sourcesfromwhichdrugsareobtained, thequantities involved, themethodsemployedby illicit traffickers or because they illustrate new trends.3 these details areconsolidated in the UNODC Individual Seizures Database. Some countries gobeyond the requirements of the Conventions and send complete details of alldrugseizuresaboveathresholdamount,4buttoofewregularlycomplywiththisobligationforthesedatatoprovideacomprehensiveglobalpicture.Less isknownabout thescaleandnatureofhumantrafficking.UNODCrecentlyspearheadedtheUN.GIFTproject,which,amongotherthings,gathereddatafrom155countriesandterritoriesonhumantraffickingvictimsandperpetrators.5theamount and reliability of this information varied greatly between countries,however,andsomeimportantcountriesdidnotparticipate.Mostimportantly,itisdifficulttosaywhatshareofthevictimsaredetectedandwhetherthesepeopleare representative of the market as a whole. It remains likely that lawenforcement is just skimming the surface in many parts of the world. And,unfortunately, the UN.GIFT report was a one-off assessment; a mechanism forcollectingthesedataonaregularbasisisnotyetavailable.Transnational firearms trafficking presents even greater obstacles, since theConventiondoesnotprovideforinternationalseizuredatapooling.6Evengroupsthat have been involved inmonitoring the small arms situation for years havetrouble quantifying the extent of transnational trafficking.When large seizuresare made, it is difficult to distinguish firearms that have been trafficked from

10

those that have been legally imported and then diverted to the illicit marketdomestically.For the emerging issues, the process of gathering information is at its earlieststages. Most information remains anecdotal. Some of these areas, how-ever,touchonwell-documentedaspectsoftheliciteconomy,suchasthesmugglingofcounterfeit goods and environmental resources. For example, groups like theEuropean Customs Union publish statistics on their seizures of counterfeitproducts each year. Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce keepsdetailedrecordsofpiracyincidents,andtheConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) secretariat maintains alongstandingdatabaseonelephantivoryseizures.GlobalizationandCurrentTrendsinOrganizedCrime

Injustonedecade,organizedcrimehasgonefrombeingconsideredaproblemlimitedtocertaincountriesorregions,theresultofspecifichistoricalcircumstancesandscarcelyaffectingthepoliticaldecisionmaking,tobecomeoneofthebasicfactorswhendefiningthreatstothenationalsecurityingeneralanddemocraticgovernanceinparticular(GodsonandOlson1995).Organizedcrimeisnolongerconsideredadelicateproblemofcriminalitywhichhasbecomespreadandstructuredtoacertainextent,butaphenomenonoperatingonawidescalelikelytoharmthefunctioningofsocietyandpoliticsworldwide,althoughitseffectsvarydependingoncertainconditions.Ifthisistobemeaningful,theconceptoforganizedcrimemustfreeitselffromthenarrowvisionsembeddedinthelegalisticthesesandthoseoftensimilarlypresentedbythesecurityagencies,soastofindoutaboutthedifferencesbetweengroupsofpeoplewhosystematicallycommitcrimesandwhatisspecificallyconsideredtobeorganizedcrime.Althoughitispossibletoobservefunctionalrelationshipsbetweencriminalsgangsandorganizedcrime,andthesebecomemoreacutewhendealingwithlocalperformanceoftransnationalorganizedcrime(Joe1994),therearetwobasicdifferencesbetweenbothnotions.Firstofall,4organizedcrimeexistswhenthetypeofoffensesperpetratedhaveparticularlyserioussocialrepercussions.Thismaybeduetotheviolenceinvolvedintheirexecution,thefinanciallossesproducedorotherfeaturesimplyinganxietyorindignationamongthegeneralpublic.However,asecondcharacteristicmustbeaddedbeforeorganizedcrimecanbeconsideredtoexist:itisabletoprotectitselfagainstthestateandotherexternalagentswhichconstituteapotentialdangertoitscontinuityandthe

11

expansionofitsactivities.Suchprotectionisachievedbasicallyintwoways:ontheonehand,intimidationthroughtheactualuseofviolenceorthethreatofusingit;ontheother,corruptionwhichblocksactionbystateinstitutionorcivilsocietyentities(Fijnaut1996).Withinthislaxdefinition,therangeofactivitiesorganizedcriminalsmaycarryoutisextensiveandthesevaryinaccordancewiththeinternalandexternalvariablesfacedbyeachgroup.Theycanincludethecombinationofoneormoremarketsandarelativelylimitedorlargenumberofcountries,althoughrecentlyastrongtendencycouldbedetectedtowardstheconcentrationofbusinessinalessernumberofgroupsdedicatedhowevertoagreaternumberofillegalfields.Theirrepertoireofactivitiescertainlyincludeprofessionalandfinancialcrimes,butorganizedcrimeasawholeisfarmorearticulatedandincorporatesstrongcontrolinstances.However,atcertainpointsbothcriminalmodelstendto5amalgamate(Paoli1995;Naylor1996).Organizedcrimemayevenresorttoterrorismasapartofitsviolentmethodsatcertaintimesorduringparticularstages.Awideranginginventoryoforganizedcriminalactivitiesincludethesupplyofillegalgoodsandservices,suchastheproductionandtraffickingofdrugs,tradinginweapons,children,organs,illegalimmigrantsornuclearmaterial,gambling,usury,forgery,hiredkillingsandprostitution;thesaleofstolenproperty,especiallyluxurycars,animalsandworksofart;helpingoutlegitimatecompaniesinillegalmatterssuchasbreakingenvironmentalorlaborlaws;theuseoflegalnetworksforillicitactivitiesincludingthemanagementoftransportcompaniesfordrugtraffickingorconstructioninvestmenttomoneylaundering;finally,systematicpredatoryactionsuchaspiracy,extortionandkidnapping.AmongthelargegroupstypicallyconsideredtobelongtothecategoryoforganizedcrimeandtobeinvolvedinoneorotheroftheseillicitactivitiesarethosepertainingtoquitealonglistoforganizationsdedicatedalmostexclusivelytodrugtraffickingonawidescaleinEurope,LatinAmerica,SouthAsia;theItalianMafiainaglobalexpansionprogramoriginateddecadesago;theJapaneseYakuza;theChineseTriads;and,finally,themagmaoforganizedcrimecomingfromRussiaandotherEasternEuropeancountries(Picomb1996;Cretin1997).

Theevolutionofinternationalrelationstogetherwiththetransnationalizationoforganizedcrimehasendowedthisphenomenonwithanewroleasagrowingthreattodemocraticregimes.Althoughthereisnounanimitywithrespecttheextentoforganizedcrimeasathreat,itsimportancebeingreducedtoapotentialriskbysomeauthors(Turner1991;Block1996;Naylor1995),recentresearchhasgivenweighttothechallengesitposesfornationalsecurity.Ontheonehand,the

12

collapseoftheSovietUnionandtheacutefinancialandpoliticalcrisisincurrentRussia,haveledtoafundamentalredeploymentoftheideasgoverningtheconceptofnationalsecurity.Thus,theorganizationswhichplayedamajorroleduringtheColdWarandthesetofinstitutionswhichwerecentralactorsintheconfrontationbetweenmilitaryindustrialcomplexessuddenlyfoundthemselvesdeprivedofthetheoreticaljustificationsuppliedbyopposingsuperpowersandnucleardeterrence.Inthisnewscenariowherethesupremethreatdisappeared,theseagencies,whichhavebeenexternallyforcedtoredefinethemselves,thereasonsfortheirexistenceandtheirhighexpendituresinanenvironmentwithstrictfinancialcontrols,requireanewkindofjustification.Thus,followingthewaysetbytheSovietUnion,whichwentfrommonolithicCommunismtobeingbrokenupandbecomingapreytoorganizedcrime,theSovietblockfellbehindasfarassecurityconcernandthe7mafias’,whichgainedcontrolofalargeamountofresourcesintherepublicswhichemergedfromthebreakupoftotalitarianism,becameaclearmenaceaswereitshomonymsinotherpartsoftheworld.Generallyspeaking,thisshiftinfocusispartofaredefinitionoftheconceptofsecurity(Burros1995),whichismoreakinnowtotheoneexistingintheperiodbetweenthetwoworldwarsthantotheprevailingoneduringtheColdWar,whichwasbasedontheconfrontationbetweenantagonisticblocks,geopoliticalcalculationsandtherealisticdimensionofinternationalrelations(Baldwin1996).Nonetheless,apartfromtheargumentsdevelopedwithinthesecurityagenciesandarmedforces,itisevidentthatrecenttrendsinorganizedcrimehaveledtotheeffectiveincreaseofitsharmfulconsequencesonnationalsecurityingeneral,aswellasonthenormalfunctioningofdemocraticinstitutionsandprocessesinparticular.Severalfactorsfacilitatedthisemergingsituationandproducedanewmodeloforganizedcrimepredominantlytransnationalinitscharacter.Thistypeoforganizedcrimehasthreebasicdifferenceswithrespecttopreviousmanifestationsofthephenomenon:ittendstooperateataregionalorgloballevel,mobilizingextensivecross-borderconnectionsand,aboveall,hastheabilitytochallengebothnationalandinternationalauthorities(GodsonandOlson1993).Processesparalleltothosewhichmade8possiblethegrowthineconomicglobalizationenabledalsocriminalorganizations,onceconfinedtorestrictedenvironmentsorcountries,toperformatabroaderscale.Therapidityandthepossibilitiesprovidedtodaybyinnovativetechnologiesappliedtotransportation,togetherwithapoliticalcommitmenttoglobalfreetrade,haveincreasedtheflowoflicitaswellasillicitgoods.Thissituationhasbeenaggravatedasfarasthemostlucrativebusinessoforganizedcrime,thatisdrugtrafficking,isconcerned,since

13

producingandconsumptioncountriesareindifferentcontinents,althoughdistancestendtobereducedorevendisappearwiththeincreaseduseofsyntheticdrugs.Inasymbiotictypeofrelationship,criminalorganizationshavecombinedtheexploitationofbusinessopportunitiesandroutesopenedupintheinternationalmarketwiththehistoricallyaccumulatedknowledgeofcontraband,whichhadalwaysbeenveryresistanttotheactionofthestate(Resa1999).Thus,averylucrativemixofoldandnewillicitactivitiesweregeneratedwherespecializationandwideningofmarketsdidnotseemtobecontradictorytendencies.Inthisregard,itisnotamerecoincidencethattheactivitiesandeventheabusescarriedoutbylargemultinationalfirms,ratheruncontrolledattheinternationallevelduetothelackofantidumpingagreementsandtheincreasinglymoreintensesearchforcompetitiveness,laydowntheusualprecedentsforthe9introductionoforganizedcrime(SavonaandMezzanotte1996).ResearchcarriedoutintheUnitedStatesandWesternEuropeshowthatthereisalinkupwiththeactivitiesofthelegitimatefirmsandthatimportantsegmentsofthelegaleconomyhavebeenpenetratedbyorganizedcrime(VanDuyne1993a;BlockandVanDuyne1995).Thegrowthinworldtradehasbeenaccompanied,orevenfavored,byarevolutioninthefinancialnetworks.Remarkabletechnologicalprogressincommunications,aswellaseffortsofthebankinginstitutionstodevelopnewoptionstoavoidpayingstatetaxesandtosatisfythegrowingdemandsofthetransnationalcompanies,togetherwiththehugeamountofmoneyincirculationwithinthesystemandtheeasewithwhichitcanbetransferredathighspeed,havegreatlyfavoredabasicstageinanyillegalbusiness:moneylaundering,thatisthecontrolofmoney,obscuringitsillegitimateoriginanditsownership,thenlegalizingprofits.Thegenerallackofsupervisiononinternationalfinancialactivities,albeitrecenteffortstointroduceacertaindegreeofcontrol,inadditiontothecomplexityofsuchoperations,makeitextremelydifficulttoenforceregulations.Shouldanycountryundertaketoreinstatethecontrolontheflowofcapital,thiswouldnothavethedesiredeffectbut,onthecontrary,couldleadtoarapidrelocationofcapital,loss10ofearningsforthepowerfulbankingsectorandgreatercomplexityasregardsthefinancialinstruments.Moreover,formanycountrieswhichreceivetheseillegalfundstheycomposeasubstantialpartoftheireconomies,andaradicalapproachtotheissuewouldeventuallyinflictstrongeconomicandsocialhardship.Actually,theseactivitiesarecarriedoutonalargescaleinmanycountries,whicharechosenaccordingtofactorssuchasbankingsecrecyandfacilitiestooperatewithtaxhavens,corruptionlevels,policetraining,thepoweroffinancialinstitutionsand

14

thecurrencyexchangecontrols(Maingot1995).Inaddition,technologicalprogressmadeincommunicationsystemsandthetransferofinformationhashadothereffectsontheevolutionoforganizedcrime.Ontheonehand,ithasallowedtheflexibilityoforganizationalstructuresandhasenabledthemtofunctioninnetworks,whichtendtomaximizeprofitsandeludethestatesecurityforces.Ontheotherhand,itallowsthereductionofaccumulatedpaperworkandsoeliminatesmuchincriminatingevidencewhichcouldfacilitaterepressivepoliceaction.However,asanunderlyingtrend,therehasbeenachangeinthenatureofthreatstonationalsecurity,whichpreviouslywererelatedwithgreataccumulationofpower,resourcesandterritory,andarenowassociatedwiththegenerationandcontrolofinformation.Regardingthis11point,newvulnerabilitiesappearinthesecuritydefensesofthestatesasthecriminalorganizations,withtheirenormousfinancialpotential,canaccessinformationwhichtheymayeventuallyusetoimproveandexpandtheirbusiness.Theglobalizationofinformationthroughmassmedia,whichallowstheimmediatepresentationtothewholeworldofwell-beingenjoyedindevelopedcountries,theparallelappearanceofamultiplicityofregionalconflicts,andtheprogressmadeintransportation,haveledtoanimportantincreaseinimmigrationflowsandthegradualcreationofethnicnetworksthroughouttheglobe.Despitethevastmajorityofimmigrantsbeingrespectfultothelawsofthehostcountries,criminalorganizationshavetakenadvantageofthisethnicdispersalsoastodeveloptheirowntransnationalnetworkswithinwhichtheyareinpermanentcontactthroughadvancedcommunicationssystems(Myers1995).Althoughthemaincriminalgroupsstillhaveastrongnationalidentityandhavenheadquartersfromwheretheyco-ordinatetheiractivities,theprecariouslivingconditionsofmanyimmigrantsfacilitatestheirexpansionintonewmarkets.Ethniclinks,withtheirsystemsofloyalty,solidarityandsanctionsoftensuperimposedonthelegislationofthecountrieswhereimmigrantslive,indirectlyfacilitatestheimplantationoforganizedcrime.Policeinterventionamongthesegroupsishinderedby12languageandculturaltraits,whicharestrengthenedbykinshiptiesleadingtogroupsolidarityandsuspicionofnationalauthorities(Savona1996).Thissituationisfurtherworsenedbyinappropriateactiontakenbyadministrationagencieswhichdonotmakethedistinctionbetweenmembersofcriminalorganizationsandpeoplelocatedinawidersocialsegment,whogenerallytendtobethosewhosufferthedamageofdiscriminatorypractices.Regardingthispoint,theexistenceoffrontierswhichhavebecomeincreasinglyporoushasproducedapartialshiftinpoliceaction,frombordercontroltothe

15

surveillanceofspecificsocialgroups(Anderson1996),eventuallycriminalizingcertainethniccommunities.Adeterminingfactorinthischangehasbeentheinconsiderateandalarmisttreatmentofbothimmigrationandorganizedcrimegivenbycertainmassmedia.Paralleltothisprocess,multiculturalurbanareasaregrowingfast,functioningasnucleioftheworldeconomicsystem.Toacertainextent,thesepluralcitiescanberegardedastheheirsofthoseclassicalporttownswhichwerecentraltothefirstglobalnetworksoforganizedcrime.Suchcitiesprovideacombinationofelements,whichincludepowercenters,highlydevelopedfinancialandbankingsystems,significanteconomicinequalities,acosmopolitanpopulationwhichguaranteesanonymity,therelaxationofsocialcontrolandethnicdiversity,allofwhichcanintentionallyor13unintentionallyfacilitatethepenetrationandmaintenanceoftransnationalcriminalnetworks.Organizedcrimeisalsofamiliarwiththerapidspreadoftechnologicalprogressinotherdomainsthanthosealreadymentioned.Infact,owingtoitsenormouseconomicpotential,largecriminalgroupshavefasterandmoreefficientaccesstotechnologicalresourcesthantheaveragepersonexperiencedinthefield.Itiscommonknowledge,forinstance,theirabilitytoacquireanddeployanykindofnewdevice,whichtheyalsocontinuallyexperimentwith.Thisprogressisespeciallyrelevantwithrespecttodrugs,ashasbeenshownbythespreadofnewsyntheticnarcoticsubstances,inthefieldofweaponsandintheforgeryofalltypesofgoods.Moreover,theiraccesstonewcontrolandcommunicationstechnologyisachievedmorequicklythanthesecurityforcesresponsibleforpursuingsuchcriminalorganizations,thebecominglessvulnerabletostaterepression.Butprogressintransportandcommunicationstechnologieshasalsogivenrisetothemultiplicationofsocialcontactsandtheimmediatetransmissionofanykindofnovelty,thispavingthewayforexperimentationwithnewdrugsandveryoftenforuncontrolledabuse.Theexcessofwealthandanenvironmentwheremassiveconsumptiontakesplaceinthecontextofindustrializedcountrieshavecreatednewrecreationalandleisureopportunitiesaccompaniedbyanincreaseinillicit14goodsandservices.Thefactthatapartofthesesoughtaftergoodsandservicesislegallyprohibitedhasaidedthegrowthofsomespecializedbranchesoforganizedcrimeandtheexpansionofoldgroupsintonew,lucrativebusiness.Finally,organizedcrimeisalsoinvolvedinthegreatinternationalpoliticalconflictswhichhavemultipliedduringrecentyears.Infact,globalstrategyofthelargecriminalorganizationshasbeenprofoundlyinfluencedbygeopoliticalevents.Whileundernormalconditionsorganizedcrimeprefersstability,ittendstoprosperwhenthereispoliticalandeconomicunrest.

16

Communicationsandtransportationenablesthemtotransfertozonesinconflictorunstableareas,wherethereisanobviouslooseningofcontrols,largeamountsofcapitalwhichcoverstheflightoflegalfundsattimeswhenhardcashisnecessaryandwherereturnsoninvestmentareusuallyhighduetotherisksassumed.TheendoftheColdWarhasmeantadiminishinginworldtensionand,therefore,inconflictareasarelaxationofanytypeofindirectorevendirectcontrolbyWesternauthoritiesresponsibletolesspolarizedaudiences.Someeventsinrecentyearshavebeenparticularlyrelevantfortransnationalcriminalgroups,suchastheYugoslaviancivilwar(Xhudo1996),Germanreunification,economicreformintheChinesePopular15Republic,theemergenceofbothnewtradingblocksandnewindustrializedcountries.ThedisappearanceoftheSovietBlochasbeenacrucialeventencouragingorganizedcrimeexpansion.Helpedbythelackofinternalcontrolsoncethecommunistregimeshadfallen,thetransnationalcriminalgroupswerequicktomakecontactsinEasternEuropeancountries.Thishashadextraordinaryandveryharmfulconsequencesforthefuturedevelopmentofthesestatesaswellasfortheconsolidationofpluralisticregimes.Thetriumphofcapitalism,aweakornonexistentcivilsociety,andapeculiarpoliticalcultureinmanyofthesecountrieshasledtothetroubledestablishmentoffreemarketmechanismswithouttheaccompanyingcontrolmeasures.Thischangehasinitiallyledtointernaldisorder,thedemiseofpreviousauthoritystructures,reluctanceonthepartofthepopulationtonewofficialcontrol,therevivalofethnicantagonisms,andacollapseinthejudiciaryandsecurityagencies,oftenentailingtheirsubordinationtoorcooperationwithorganizedcrime(Douglass1995).Thevacuumofpowerandaprevioushistoryoforganizedcrime,whichhassuppliedthehumanresourcesandtherequiredsocialnetworks,togetherwiththeprogressivefallinthelivingstandardshaveprovidedexcellentconditionsforrecreating,establishingandexpandinglargecriminalgroups.Atthepresenttime,theoverlappingofillegaland16legalactivitiesinmostoftheserecentlyinauguratedmarketeconomiesisintrinsictothenewsituation.Ofalltheseactivities,thegreatestthreattoregionalandglobalsecurityisperhapstraffickinginradioactivematerials,whichmightfallintothehandsofterroristorganizationsoruncontrollablestates,althoughevidenceofsuchtrafficisstillscarceandinsomecaseshasbeenmanipulatedbytheintelligenceservicesandthemedia(RaineandCillufo1994;UnitedNations1996).Nevertheless,someothergeopoliticaleventswhichwerebelievedtofacilitatetheexpansionoforganizedcrime,forexamplethedisappearanceofbordercontrolsbetweentheWesternEuropeancountrieswhichsignedtheSchengenAgreement,seemto

17

havehadaveryrelativeanddoubtfuleffectinthismatter(Bigo1996;VanDuyne1993b).Infact,bordercontrolswerealreadyverylaxduringpreviousstagesoftheregionalintegrationprocessandthesmugglingorganizationsfoundalternativeroutesthroughouthistorywhichhadbeenusedbythelargegroupsoforganizedcrime.Onthewhole,however,alltheotherfactorsconsideredinabovepagesunintentionallyhelped,duringthelastdecade,toexpandtransnationalorganizedcrimeontheeveofthe21stcentury.Thephenomenonhasevolvedtoomuchfurtherreachingorganizationsthaninprevioustimes.Asaresult,organizedcrimeconstitutesagrowingthreattonationalsecurityandinternational17stability,candisruptsocialinstitutionsandeconomicdevelopment,hastheabilitytounderminedemocraticprocesses,andvictimizesentirepopulations(UnitedNations1995:39).Thus,atraditionalproblemofpublicorderorinternalsecurityhasbecomeachallengewhichcouldnotonlyendangertheviabilityofsocieties,theindependenceofgovernments,theintegrityoffinancialinstitutionsorthefunctioningofdemocracies,butalsothepeacefulrelationsbetweenstates.

Whyshouldwebeconcerned?Thethreatposedbytransnationalorganizedcrimeisoftenmisunderstood.Thereisatendencytoover-simplify,and, inparticular,toequatethedamagedonebyorganizedcrimewiththeamountofviolenceassociatedwiththemarket.Butthethreatposedismuchdeeperthanabodycount,tragicthoughthislossoflifemaybe.Manyformsoforganizedcrimedoinvolveviolenceorthethreatofviolence.Forexample,tosubjugatehumantraffickingvictims,violenceorthecrediblethreatofviolenceisalmostalwayspresent.Inothermarkets,violenceisneededtoensurecontractcomplianceand to resolvedisputes.Professional criminalsmayseek tominimizetheextentofviolencetoensurethesmoothflowofprofitsandtoavoidunwanted attention, but fewwould be able to con-duct their businesswithoutrecoursetothegun.Relyingonhomicidefiguresasaproxyforthethreatwouldbeabigmistake,however,becausesomeoftheareasmostafflictedbyorganizedcrimehaveverylowviolencelevels,justassomeauthoritariansocietieshaveverylowcrimerates.

18

Typically,thebetterorganizedthecrime,thelessviolenceassociatedwithit.Thegroupsconcernedhavepaidofftheappropriateofficials,resolvedintra-andinter-grouptensions,andterrifiedthepublictotheextentthatverylittleadditionalviolenceisrequired.Asnotedabove,crimegroupssometimesprovidesocialservicesandsupportthatthestatedoesnot,winningthempopularsupport.Iflawenforcementiseverrousedintoaction,theviolenceassociatedwiththisdisruptionofthecriminalequilibriumcanevenfuelcallsforenforcementtodesist.So, the real threat of organized crime cannot be reduced to the violenceassociatedwithcriminalmarkets.Rather,itisbestdescribedundertwoheadings:

• Direct impacts,which are essentially the reasons each criminal activitywasprohibitedinthefirstplace;

• Indirect impacts, in particular the ways organized crime as a category

underminesthestateandlegitimatecommercialactivity.DirectimpactIt is easy to lose sight of the reasons why organized criminal activities wereprohibited in the first place. For somemarkets, like drug trafficking ormigrantsmuggling,most of the parties arewilling participants.Many die as a result oftheirchoices,butinaworldincreasinglygovernedbytheprincipleofletthebuyerbeware,itispossibletoabsolveourselvesofresponsibilityforthisloss.Unlesswehappentoknowoneofthevictims,thesepersonalcostsarenottalliedassocialcosts,andsotheimpactofcrimebecomesobscured.Inaddition,theimpactoforganizedcrimeisoftenrealizedinadifferentcountrythan that where the profits accrue. Crimes may appear victimless when thevictims are located on the other end of the world, and criminals who bring inmoneybyexportingproblemsmayreceivepopularsupport.Forexample,peopleresidingintheunder-governedareasofcountriesthatproducedrugsmayseenoproblemwithworkingforthetraffickinggroups,whomayprovidemoresecurityandsupportthanthestate.Thedrugaddictsarelocatedoverseas,andsodonotform part of the calculus of local actors. Similarly, those who use drugs indeveloped countries rarely consider the way that their consumption may be

19

affecting violence and stability in producer and transit countries. Only whenviewed globally are the net costs of trafficking apparent, and only nationalgovernments, not their organized crime substitutes, have any incentive to lookglobally.Certain drugs are prohibited because they cause addiction and lead toserious physical and mental health problems. The impact inevitablyextendsbeyondtheusers,affectingtheirfamilies,communitiesandthesociety at large. The costs of drug-related accidents, lost productivity,child neglect and abuse, psychological damage and the like aretremendously difficult to tally. It is a challenge to simply estimate thenumber of drug addicts in the world. Addicts in developing countriesoften go uncounted, while some of those in richer nations handle thematterprivately.Basedontheavailabledata,itispossibletoestimatethatbetween172Million and 250million adults used illicit drugs in 2007. On the upperend,thisismorethanthepopulationofanybutthethreelargestnationsintheworld.Perhaps18to38millioncouldbeclassedas“problemdrugusers”. On the upper end, this is more than the populations ofSwitzerland,Bulgaria,Honduras,Israel,andHongKong,Chinacombined.We also know that some 4.4 million people are currently in drugtreatment worldwide, equivalent to the entire population of Ireland.Studies of people arrested for a range of crimes in the United States,Australia, and else-where have found that most test positive for druguse. Ina2008study intheUnitedStates,87%ofpeoplearrested in10majorcitiestestedpositivefordrugs.31Fewwoulddisputetheseriousnessofthecrimeofhumantrafficking,butfarlessisknownaboutitsextent.Basedondatafrom111countriesandterritories(notincludingChinaorIndia),21,400victimsweredetectedworld-widein2006.Thesearejustthevictimsdetected,anditisestimatedthatonlyonein20oronein30victimsareever recognized. If true, this representsan immensepoolof humansuffering.Inaddition,thereareasmanyasamillionimagesofchildpornographycurrently circulatingon the Internet, eachofwhich representsanactofhumantrafficking and a crime against the most basic moral principles. The impact ofthesecrimesisimpossibletoquantify.

20

Manymistakenlybelieve theprimary impactofproductcounterfeiting is lossofrevenues to rights holders, but the crime has far more serious implications.Manufacturers of counterfeits have little incentive to adhere to safetyregulations, since they have no reputation to protect or liability to fear.Substandardoroutrighthazardousproducts,fromtoystoautobrakepads,poseaseriouspublicsafetythreat.Ofgreatestconcerniscounterfeitmedication,which,inadditiontohasteningthedeathofthemanywhogountreated,cancontributetothegenerationofdrug-resistantstrainsofthemostdeadlypathogens.The profits generated through natural resource smuggling are driving wholeecosystemstothebrinkofextinction.Thetruecostsofthiscrimeareimpossibletoreducetoadollarfigure–aworldlessdiverse,theendofwholelifeforms,ashortsightederrorimpossibletocorrect.IndirectimpactAside fromthedamagesdirectlycausedbyspecific formsofcrime, there isonethatiscommontoall:theinsidiouserosionofstatecontrol.Traditionalorganizedcrimegroupsdisplacestateauthority,byfillingthegovernancenichesneglectedbytheofficialstructuresandbyco-optingwhatevervestigialstateagentsremain.In otherwords, organized crime groups gradually undermine the authority andthehealthoftheofficialgovernment.Why isthisaproblem?Insofarastheofficialstatestructuresprovidevalue,thisvalueisthreatenedbythegrowthofparallelstructures.Organizedcrimegroupsare inherently unaccountable, they are not subject to democratic controls, andtheir chiefaim is theenrichmentof theirmembership,not theadvancementofsociety. Where they are predominant, development can become impossible,becauseanycontractthatisnottotheadvantageofthedominantgroupswillbenullified. In areas where the official state structures are particularly bad,organizedcrimegroupsmayappearrelativelyattractive.Butthesolutioninthesecases is to improve governance, not to cede authority to those who enrichthemselvesthroughantisocialactivities.Sincethenetworkgroupsdonotseektowrestterritoryfromstatecontrol,theirimpact isevenmoreinsidious,butcanbejustas important.Mosttrans-national

21

trafficking requires smuggling, and the surest means of smuggling is throughcorruption. In poorer states, the corruption can go straight to the top, and thehighest authorities can quickly become manipulated by traffickers. If opposed,these groups can engineer the removal of problematic officials, up to andincluding the chief executive. If the state is uncooperative, it can supportoppositiongroupsor insurgents.Under thesecircumstances, the rationalchoicemaybetogiveintothetraffickers.Thisisasituationtheinternationalcommunitycannotaffordtopermit.

1. EstablishAppropriateInternationalLegalandPolicyFrameworks:organizedcrime is classically considered to be a criminal justice issue, and whilejustice initiatives cannot be applied exclusively, it is important to have inplacethenecessaryandsufficientlegalarchitecture.Thisisparticularlytruein the context of an increasingly globalizedworld,where criminal groupsselect the jurisdictions in which they want to operate based upon therelativelaxityoftheirrespectivelegalprotocols.Inthisregard,anumberofframeworkconventionscometothefore:a.TheUNConventionagainstTransnationalorganizedCrime(UNTOC)andits protocols, and the need for proper implementation and effectivemonitoring thereof. An additional protocol on environmental crime hasbeenproposed.b. The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), given the extent towhichcorruptionundermineseffortstoeffectivelyfightcrime.c.ThethreemajorUNdrugconventions.d. Protocols and the capacity to countermoney laundering and to enactasset seizure within the guidelines issued by the FATF. e. Issue specifictreaties, suchas theArmsTradeTreaty,CITESand theUNConventionontheLawoftheSea.

2. Strengthening Prosecution Capacity: In a number of key areas, a lack ofcapacity, political will or corruption has prevented the prosecution oforganized crime. In these instances, structures need to be explored thatwould allow regional or international jurisdiction to be applied totransnational organized crimes. For example, officials could look to themodel used to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia, which could beadaptedandpilotedtoaddressquestionsofillegalfishing,drugtraffickingandothercrimes,aswellastheproblemofclosingdown“criminalhavens”thatdevelopeitherbydefaultordesign.

22

3. Focused Strategies on Kingpins and Controllers: Too often, efforts tocounter organized crime are targeted at the foot soldiers and couriers ofcriminalgoods.Indictmentsofcontrollersofcriminalsyndicates,andthosewho areoften reaping the greatest profits, have gained littlemomentumevenwhentheiridentitiesareapparent.Globalstrategiesandinternationalcooperation to target these controllers would serve as a more potentdisincentive anddisrupter of criminal economy chains than the relentlessefforts to stem the tide of front-line agents. Asset seizure is a powerfuldeterrent tool in combating criminal groups, given their motivationstowards profits. Lessons learned from Mexico and Central America,however,showthatthesekindsofstrategiesneedtobemixedwitheffortsto (re-)build the legitimacyof state institutions invulnerableandaffectedcommunities.

4. Applied development approaches: While organized crime serves as aspoiler to development, it must be recognized that developmentapproacheswillremaincriticaltoasustainableresponsetocrime.Theissuecannot remain exclusively in the domain of security and justice, but alsorequires efforts to undermine the political, social and economic leveragethat organized crime groups have established by providing genuine,sustainable alternatives for communities. It should be acknowledged,however, that many in the development community feel that the basictools to understand and analyze the phenomenon from a developmentperspectivearelacking,andthisneedstobeaddressed.

5. Insulate democratic processes: The level of criminal infiltration into thestate is oneof the greatest challenges andmostpotent threatsposedbyorganizedcrimetothemodernworldnowand inthefuture.Theneedtoapply greater transparency and accountability within the framework ofmulti-partydemocracies inall states, and to reduce the influenceof illicitcampaign funding, including in thedevelopedworld, shouldbeapriority.Corrupt states whose interests do not prioritize maximizing thedevelopment and security of their populations fundamentally underminemulti-lateral processes, and make genuine progress an overwhelmingchallenge.

6. Emphasize non-state actors: Approaches to combating organized crimehave arguably been too state centric, with insufficient recognition of thepotentialvalueofleveragingnon-stateactors,particularlycivilsociety,asameanstocreateresilientcommunities.Non-stateactorscanbeengagedin

23

civilian oversight and transparency initiatives, in advocacy andprioritization, in investigations and community policing, and in servicedelivery.Criminalgroupshaveshown impressivecapacities tounderstandthevalueoflegitimacythrougheconomicandsocialmeans,andthisneedsto bematched by similar efforts by government. Positive examples fromBrazil, the United States, and other jurisdictions can be brought to bear,working through local actors to combine security and developmentapproachesinresponsetocommunitypriorities.

Inlinewiththeprinciplesoutlinedabove,indicatorshavebeenselectedtoshowprogressaccordinginthefollowingthreeareas:1.Politicalwill:establishmentoftheappropriatelegal,policyandstrategicinitiatives to address organized crime within the target. Indicatorsmeasuring political will, also known as structural capacity to combatorganizedcrime,reflectkeyprinciple1.EstablishAppropriateInternationalLegal and Policy Frameworks and key principle 5. Insulate DemocraticProcess. The infiltration of criminal actors into state infrastructure willhamperstatesworkinginthebestinterestsoftheircitizens.2. Prevention / Protection: programs are in place by multiple actors toprevent the crime, protect its victims and mitigate the impact ondevelopment. Especially important within the prevention / protectionarena isthatresponsestoorganizedcrimecannotbe limitedtothestate,butrequirebroaderbuy-infromcivilsociety,theprivatesector,etc.Inthisrespect, key principle 6. Emphasize non-state actors is particularlysignificant.3.Prosecution:effortsarebeingmadetoprosecutetheperpetratorsofthecrime. While development approaches are needed to combat organizedcrime, a strong criminal justice response also remains essential.Consequently,indicatorsincludeafocusareaonprosecution,reflectingkeyprinciples2.StrengtheningProsecutionCapacityand3.FocusedStrategiesonKingpinsandControllers.

24