article on cancer immunotherapy

8/10/2019 Article on Cancer Immunotherapy

1/24


2/24

William

B.

Quandt

^m^ THE MIDDLE EAST CRISES

^JL^

^o

area

of

the world had

a

greater

impact

on

American

politics,

national

security,

and

economic

well-being

than did

the

Middle

East

in

1979.

With the fall of

the

Pahlavi

regime

in

Iran

early

in

the

year,

a

profound

change

in

the

regional

balance of

power

took

place.

In

November,

when

the

deposed

Shah

was

admitted

to

the United States

for

medical

treatment,

militants

seized the U.S.

Embassy

in Tehran and at the end of the

year

were

still

holding

about

50

Americans

hostage?with

the

support

of

Ayatollah

Khomeini,

the head of the

new

Iranian Islamic

Republic.

And

in

late December the

Soviet

Union

used its

own

forces

to

replace

one

communist leader

in

Afghanistan

with

another

more

to

its

liking

and

subsequently

sent over

50,000

troops

to

secure

the

new

regime

and

to

put

down

insurgents

in

the

countryside.

In

the face of these

developments,

U.S.

officials

turned

their

attention

to

issues

of

military

power,

bases

and

arms

transfers

to

help

stabilize

the volatile

region

surrounding

the

Persian Gulf.

The

keystones

of the

Carter Administration's

early

foreign

pol

icy?human

rights,

arms

control,

non-proliferation?receded

in

importance,

and

power

politics

once

again

seemed

on

the

ascen

dant

in

Washington.

Public

and

congressional

sentiment

against

the Soviet

Union

led

to

the

shelving

(at

least

for the

present)

of

the

painstakingly

negotiated

Strategic

Arms

Limitation

Treaty

(SALT)

and

with it

much of

what remained

of the

prospects

for

d?tente with the Soviet Union. President Carter's

handling

of the

crises

over

the

hostages

in

Iran

and

the Soviet

troops

in

Afghani

stan

initially

won

wide

support

and

appeared

to

have

dramatically

improved

his chances

of reelection.

Pakistan

and Iran

loom

as

the

most

likely

early

tests

of

the

President's

policies.

In

any

event,

it

now seems

clear that

in

the

1980s

it will

be the

oil-rich

Persian Gulf and

the

surrounding

area?Iran,

Iraq

and

Saudi

Arabia,

as

well

as

Afghanistan

and

William

B.

Quandt

is

a

senior fellow

at

The

Brookings

Institution.

From

January

1977

to

mid-1979,

he

served

on

the National

Security

Council

staff,

where

he dealt

with Middle

Eastern affairs.

He is

the author of several

books,

most

recently

Decade

of

Decisions: American

Policy

Toward

the Arab-Israeli

Conflict,

1967-1976.

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3/24

THE

MIDDLE EAST

CRISES

541

Pakistan?where

superpower

rivalries

will

be

most

acute,

where

the economic

interests

of the industrialized

world

will

be deter

mined,

and where local rivalries will

increasingly

carry

with them

the threat of

global

confrontation.

The

more

hopeful

and

idealistic

phase

of

President Carter's

foreign

policy,

that

is,

up

to

the

taking

of

the

hostages

in

Iran

and

the

Soviet

intervention

in

Afghanistan,

did

produce

one

genuine

achievement

in

the

Middle East?the

Egyptian-Israeli

peace

treaty

of March

1979.

A

product

of

long

and difficult

negotiations,

the

treaty

promised

to

reduce the

danger

of

Arab-Israeli conflict

just

as

the

risks of

confrontation

were

growing

elsewhere

in

the

region.

The

remaining

issues

involving

the

Palestinians,

Jordan,

Syria

and

Lebanon

seem as

intractable

as

ever.

The

unresolved

Palestinian

issue

in

particular

has

a

direct

bearing

on

stability

in

the Arabian

Peninsula

and the

Gulf,

and

thus

must

remain

near

the

top

of the U.S.

foreign policy agenda,

if

not

in

1980

at

least

in

1981.

Because

of

the divisions the

treaty

produced

in

the

Arab

world,

it

did

little

to

enhance American

prestige

and

credibility

with

countries such

as

Saudi Arabia.

And it

was

the

Saudis,

as

much

as

anyone,

who held the

key

to the

escalating

price

of oil.

During

1979

alone,

oil

sold

by

members of the

Organization

of

Petroleum

Exporting

Countries

(OPEC)

doubled

in

price

from

less than

$13

per

barrel

to

around

$30

per

barrel.

For

the United

States,

this

spelled

slower

economic

growth,

a

weakening

of

the

dollar

and

boosted inflation.

With

luck,

it

might

also

mean

a

commitment

to

an

effective

energy

policy

that

would

reduce

vulnerability

to

the

disruption

of

Middle East oil

supplies.

But

there

was

little

sign

of

this

at

year's

end.

In

all,

the events of 1979 have created awesome

problems

for

the

Middle

East and for

American

policy

in

the

region.

The

revolutionary

situation

in

Iran,

the

challenge

of

Soviet

power,

the

stalemate

in

the search for

a

broad Arab-Israeli

settlement,

the

insecurity

of moderate

regimes

in

the

area?above

all Saudi

Arabia?confront

American

policymakers

with

extraordinarily

difficult choices.

The stakes

include

the

continued

access

of

the

United States

and the

West

to

Middle

Eastern

oil,

as

well

as

whether the

price

of

that

oil

can

be

kept

within

manageable

limits. The

challenge

to American

diplomacy

and to the

ability

of

the

United

States

to

marshall all

its

levers of

influence?diplo

matic,

economic and

military?may

be

the

greatest

since the

onset

of

the cold

war.

The

analysis

of these

problems

and

their

interrelationship

will



4/24

542

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

begin

with

what

happened

in

Iran

and

on

the

Israeli-Egyptian

front

in

1979,

and then

will consider

the

implications

of

these

two

situations for Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states. The events

in

Afghanistan

and the

Soviet

policy

toward

the

region

will

then

be

examined,

and

finally

the

implications

for American

policy.

ii

The dramatic

events

that led

to

the fall of the Shah of Iran and

his

replacement

by

a

militant Islamic

Republic

go

back

to

1978,

but

deserve

brief

review

here.

In

retrospect

it

seems

clear that after

the

massive

riots

of

early

September

1978

there

was no

real

possibility

that the Shah could have maintained his

authority

in

undiluted

form.

Even

the

large-scale

use

of

his

army

had failed

to

quell

the

riots,

and

he

himself

apparently

recognized

that

some

new

political

formula

was

needed.

The

real

question

at

the

peak

of the

crisis?on

which

he

consulted

extensively

with

the

American and

British

Ambassa

dors?was

whether

he

might

have been able

to

preserve

the

institution

of the

monarchy

on a

new

basis

if

he

had been

willing

to

turn

over

some

power

to

a

competent

civilian

government

or

to

the

military.

The Shah did ask the United States for advice on

how

to

deal

with the

growing

unrest

in

the

country.

But

he showed

little enthusiasm

for

either

a

civilian

or

military

government,

and

joked

about

the

incompetence

of

the

people

to

whom

he

would

have

to

entrust

the

leadership

of

the

country.

Perhaps,

he

said,

they

would

help

convince

the

masses

that

the

only

real

alternative

was

the

iron fist.

Hearing

these

confused

plans,

U.S.

officials

were

not

prepared

to

take

responsibility

for

telling

the Shah

how

to

govern

his

own

country.

The Shah

proceeded

to

name,

in

turn,

a weak

military

and

then

a

weak

civilian

government,

but

neither

was

able

to

restore

order,

to

end

the

strikes

that

were

paralyzing

the

country,

or to

defuse

the

growing

alienation

from

his

rule.

The American

hesitancy

to

give

advice

to

the

Shah

reflected,

to

some

degree,

the

post-Vietnam

aversion

to

overinvolvement

in

the

internal

affairs

of

other

countries.

It

may

also

have

reflected

a

misreading

of

the

Shah,

who

reportedly

wanted

to

be

told

what

to

do.

He

subsequently complained

that

he

never

knew

what

the United

States

wanted

of

him

during

the

crisis,

and he

appears

now to

blame

the

United

States

for his downfall.

Those who had

known

the Shah

in

earlier

periods

recognized

a

familiar

pattern

of

psychological

dependency.

In

the

end

he

lost

all control

of the

situation

and

left

the

country

in

January

1979. After

a

brief



5/24


6/24


7/24

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

CRISES

545

from the

United

States

to

Panama

in

December

had

little

effect.

The

one

man

whose voice

seemed

to

carry authority, Ayatollah

Khomeini,

remained adamant

in

calling

for the Shah's

return

to

Iran

as

the

price

for

the

release of

the

hostages,

and

carefully

orchestrated American

pressures

seemed

to

have little

impact

on

his

thinking.

Nor

did

the domestic turmoil

in

his

own

country,

with

separatist

movements

active

in

Azerbaijan,

Kurdistan,

Khu

zestan

and

Baluchistan,

convince the

Ayatollah

to

turn

his

atten

tion

to

internal

problems.

Instead,

in

the

image

of

a

true

revolu

tionary,

Khomeini

remained

obsessed with

the

evils of

the Shah

and

with

the

great Satan,

the

United

States.

One

of the

questions

that surrounded

the

Iranian

Revolution

from

its

onset

was

whether

Khomeini and

his Islamic

Republic

might

signal

a new

resurgence

of Islamic

feeling

and

solidarity

that

would

affect

other Islamic

nations,

especially

those

in

the

Middle East.

Iran

was,

to

be

sure,

a

special

case,

not

only

because

of

the

centralized

personal

rule of

the

Shah,

but also

because

of

the

dominance

there of

the

Shi'ite

version

of

Islam,

which

with

few

exceptions

is

elsewhere

in

the Islamic world

a

small

though

at

times

disturbing minority.

Islamic reaction

to

the

new

regime

in

Iran

reflected

these differences.

Muslim

leaders

expressed

criticism

of

Khomeini,

coupled

with

concern

for Shi'ite activism

in

countries

such

as

Iraq,

Kuwait,

Bahrain,

and

the

eastern

province

of Saudi

Arabia.

While

it

would be

wrong

to

conclude

that

a

wave

of

fundamen

talism

is

sweeping

the entire Islamic

world,

it

is

fair

to

say

that

many

Muslims

have

a

renewed

sense

of

pride

in

their

own

civilization,

a

sense

of

power

derived

from

the

explosion

of

oil

wealth

in

some

countries,

and

a

resistance

to

foreign

interference

in

their

affairs. These

sensitivities manifested themselves when

accusations

were

made that

the United

States had

been involved

in the

attack

on

the

Grand

Mosque

in

Mecca

in

November

1979.

While

false,

these

charges

resulted

in

violent

anti-American

dem

onstrations

in

Pakistan

and

Libya,

the

former

culminating

in

the

destruction

of the

U.S.

Embassy

in

Islamabad.

This

suggested

that

an

overt

military

threat

against

Iran

over

the

hostage

crisis

might

also

serve

to

mobilize Muslim

opinion

against

the

United

States, just

as

many

Muslims reacted

harshly against

the Soviet

invasion of

Afghanistan

in

December.

In

sum,

the Iranian Revolution

was

unquestionably

the

most

disruptive

upheaval

in the

Middle

East

in

the last

generation,

exceeding

in

the breadth and

depth

of

its

implications

even

the

Arab-Israeli

wars

of

1967

and

1973.

The

damage

to

American and



8/24

546

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

Western

political

and economic

interests

in

1979

alone

was

very

great.

These losses

were

not

immediately gains

for the

Soviet

Union,

but the

spreading

chaos

in

Iran,

the

emergence

of

strong

regionalist

tendencies,

and

the

persistence

of

a

small

but

organized

Left

raised

the

possibility

that

in

the future the

Soviet

Union

might

be

well

positioned

to

exploit

Iranian difficulties.

This

could

pose

new

threats

and

new

challenges

to

American

policymakers,

who

showed

few

signs

of

having

devised

a

strategy

for

dealing

with

Iran

either

under Khomeini

or

in

the

event

of

his

departure.

m

In

contrast

to

the

events

in

Iran,

the achievement of

peace

between

Egypt

and

Israel

represented

a

welcome

development

in

the

Middle

East

from

the

perspective

of

the

United States

and

some

of

its

closest

allies.

While

considerably

less

than

the

compre

hensive

peace

the Carter

Administration

had

initially

favored,

the

peace

treaty

signed

in

March

was

nonetheless

a

significant

step

toward

the broader

settlement

which remained

an

objective

of

American

diplomacy.

The

treaty

was

to

be

implemented

in

phases,

resulting

in

full

Israeli

withdrawal from

the

Sinai

by

the

spring

of

1982.

Under

the

schedule,

negotiations

began

in

May

1979 on a

Palestinian

self-governing

authority

to

be elected

for

a

five-year

transitional

period

pending

a

final

settlement.

The

target

date for

concluding

these

talks

was

May

1980.

Independently

of the

Palestinian

negotiations,

Egypt

and

Israel

are

obligated

by

the

terms

of the

treaty

to

carry

out

a

carefully

balanced

set

of

commitments.

With

the

return

of

the Sinai oil

fields

to

Egyptian

control

in

1979,

Egypt

undertook

to

supply

Israel

with

agreed

quantities

of

oil

at

somewhat

advantageous

prices.

Israel

is

now

to

withdraw

its

armed

forces

to a

line

running

from El-Arish

to

Ras

Muhammad

by

January

26,

1980,

and

at

that

time

diplomatic

relations

are

to

be

established

and

shortly

thereafter

ambassadors

will

be

exchanged.

A

series

of

additional

negotiations

are

envisaged

after

the

establishment

of

diplomatic

relations

which

will deal

with

trade,

communications,

cultural

relations

and

civil

aviation.

In

addition,

the leaders

of

the

two

countries

adopted

the

practice

of

periodic

summit

meetings

to

discuss

bilateral

relations

as

well

as

issues

of broader

strategic

concern

such

as Soviet

policy

in the

area.

In

brief,

a

remarkable

new

chapter

in

Egyptian-Israeli

relations

was

being

written.

It

was

less

clear,

however,

that

this

would

lead

to

progress

in

solving

the Palestinian

question.

Whatever

the

potential

of the

Camp

David

accords

in

laying



9/24

THE MIDDLE

EAST

CRISES

547

the

foundations

for

an

overall resolution of

the

Arab-Israeli

con

flict,

the

American role

in

the

second

phase

of

negotiations

dealing

with Palestinian

autonomy

was a

sharp

departure

from

previous

efforts

to

press

the

reluctant

parties

to

make

substantive

conces

sions.

This

stance

reflected

changes

in

the

American

negotiating

team,

as

President Carter

and

Secretary

of

State Vance

in

May

1979 turned

over

much

of

the

responsibility

for the

peace

talks

to

Robert

Strauss.

Wary

of

taking

on

the

sensitive

questions

involving

the

Palestinians

until

he

was

fully

in

command of the

issues and

had

a

feel

for the

personalities

involved,

Strauss

preferred

to

go

slow

at

the

outset.

The burden of

the

negotiations

fell

increasingly

on

the

Egyp

tians and

Israelis,

with the Americans

contenting

themselves with

offering

support

and

providing

encouragement.

This

seemed

to

be

a

satisfactory

arrangement

to

Sadat and

Begin,

who

began

to

develop

for the first time

a

cordial

personal

relationship.

On

two

occasions

the United

States

showed

signs

of renewed

activism

in

the

search

to

broaden the

peace

negotiations.

By

midsummer

1979,

an

Arab

initiative

was

being

floated

at

the

United

Nations

concerning

a

possible Security

Council

resolution

which would reaffirm

U.N.

Resolutions

242

and

338

on

Middle

East

peace,

while

adding language

on

the

right

of the

Palestinians

to

self-determination. Rather

than

turn

such

efforts

aside,

the

Administration

decided

to

explore

the

possibility

of

producing

a

balanced

resolution,

which,

if

successful,

could

bring

the

Palestine

Liberation

Organization

(PLO)

for the

first

time

to

accept

Israel's

right

to

exist. This would

remove

an

obstacle

in

the

way

of

a

U.S.

Palestinian

dialogue.

In

order

to

gain

time

to

develop

the

text

of

a

moderate

U.N.

resolution,

U.S.

diplomats

in

late

July

sought

a

postponement

of

the

debate.

As

part

of

this

initiative,

the

American Ambassador

to

the United

Nations,

Andrew

Young,

held

an

unannounced and

unauthorized

meeting

with

an

official

of

the

PLO.

While

success

ful

in

obtaining

the

postponement,

Young

was

less

than

forthcom

ing

in

his

reports

to

Washington

of the

meeting,

resulting

in

a

political

crisis

which

ended

in

his

resignation

on

August

15.

American black

leaders

resented

what

they

saw

as

Israeli

pressure

to

remove

Young,

and

for

a

period

of

weeks

black

community

leaders

angrily

denounced

Israel and

sought

to

open

contacts

with

Palestinians.

Meanwhile,

the

Administration

doggedly

pursued

the

search

for

a

balanced U.N.

resolution.

Carter

sent

Strauss

to

the

Middle

East

in

mid-August

with firm

instructions

to

inform

Begin

and



10/24


11/24

THE MIDDLE

EAST

CRISES

549

balance

of

power

so

dramatically

in

favor

of Israel

that

any

future

negotiations

will

largely

result

in

Israel

being

able

to

dictate

her

own terms.

Even

if

the

Egyptian-Israeli

treaty

stands alone for

the

moment

as a

separate

peace,

from

an

American

perspective

it

will

serve

several

useful

purposes.

It

virtually precludes

a

resumption

of

a

large-scale

Arab-Israeli

war,

such

as

occurred

in

June

1967

and

October

1973.

Thus the

risk

of

a

U.S.-Soviet confrontation

in

the

Middle East

over

this issue has been

sharply

reduced. Nor

is

the

Soviet

Union

likely

to reenter

Egypt

as a

dominant

power

now

that

Egypt

no

longer

requires large

quantities

of

Soviet

weapons.

Indeed,

a

profound

change

has been

taking place

in

Egypt's

foreign policy.

Sadat has

embarked

on

a

new

strategy

as

a

result

of

the

peace

treaty

with Israel

and

it

will be

extraordinarily

difficult

for

him

to

reverse course

and

return

to

a

state

of

belliger

ency.

To

do

so

would

risk

sacrificing

most

of

the

gains

he has

made

in

recovering Egyptian territory,

and

even more

important

in

terms

of the

new

U.S.-Egyptian

strategic

relationship.

Peace

with Israel

is the

precondition

for

Egypt becoming

a

special

partner

of the United States. Sadat

understands this

relationshipand seems

prepared

to live with its

implications.

But

unlike

the

United

States,

Sadat

has

not

welcomed Saudi

Arabia

as

a

party

to

the

new

relationship.

He

seems

to

prefer

a

direct

U.S.-Egypt

bilateral

tie,

undiluted

by

Saudi

economic

assistance.

American

aid,

in

his

view,

is

more

reliable

and

comes

with fewer

strings

than

Saudi aid.

As

a

result,

Sadat has

often

seemed

to

be

deliberately pushing

the Saudis

away

from

Egypt,

as

in

a

provocative speech

on

May

1,

1979.

He

has likewise

shown

little

concern

with his

growing

isolation

in

the

Arab

world.

The United

States,

from Sadat's

perspective,

is

likely

to make

up

for

the

loss

of aid

from

the

other

Arabs.

And

to

a

substantial

degree,

the

United

States

has

been

forthcoming.

When Saudi

Arabia

withdrew

its

offer

to

pay

for F-5E

jets

for

Egypt,

the

United

States

took

over

the

financing

and

even

offered

a

better

airplane,

the

F-4

Phantom. One billion

dollars

annually

in

Amer

ican

economic

assistance,

coupled

with

$500

million

per

year

of

military

credits,

represents

a

substantial

step

in

the

direction of

meeting

Egypt's

real

needs

in

these

two

areas,

and there

has

been

speculation

that the amount of

military

aid

may

be

significantly

increased

in

fiscal

year

1981.

Some of

Sadat's

colleagues

are

genuinely

concerned

by

the

degree

to

which

he

has

split

Egypt

from the

Arab world and

by

his

somewhat

unrealistic

expectations

of

American

support

in

the



12/24


13/24

THE MIDDLE

EAST CRISES

551

exchange

of ambassadors

in

February

1980.

On

balance,

it

appears

that

the

Egyptian-Israeli relationship

will

evolve

with

only

mini

mal

movement

on

the

Palestinian

front.

Neither

breakthroughs

nor

breakdowns

in

the

Camp

David

negotiations

can

be

expected

in

the

near

future.

Instead,

the

parties

will

tend

to more

urgent

matters,

and,

it

is

hoped,

recognize

that

in

due

course

the

Pales

tinian

issue

will have

to

be

confronted

forthrightly

and with

the

same

degree

of commitment

and

perseverance

that

was

needed

in

the

successful

Egyptian-Israeli

peace

treaty

negotiations.

But

the

time

for such

renewed

efforts

will

most

likely

be

1981,

not

1980.

While

Egypt

and Israel

can

take

satisfaction

in

their

new

peaceful

relationship,

other

Arabs have been

deeply

opposed

to

what

they

see

as a

separate

peace.

Meeting

in

Baghdad

in

March

1979,

after

the

signing

of the

peace

treaty,

nearly

all

Arab

coun

tries

decided

to

break

diplomatic

relations with

Egypt

and

to

terminate

aid

commitments.

Palestinians,

through

their

self-designated spokesman,

the Pal

estine

Liberation

Organization,

were

vociferous critics

of

Sadat's

policies,

but

were

also active

in

promoting

the

idea

that

the

Palestinians

should be

brought

into

negotiations

at

some

time

in

the

future.

And while their attitude

toward the

Camp

David

process

was

predictably

negative,

they

sought diplomatic

recog

nition

in

Western

Europe

and

dropped

hints that

their future

policies might

be

more

moderate than

those

of

the

past.

By

the

year's

end,

the PLO

had received

unprecedented

recog

nition

in

Europe,

as

well

as

in

virtually

all of

the Third

World.

Even

within

the

United

States,

significant

currents

of

opinion

were

calling

for

some

kind

of

dialogue

between

the

United

States

and

the PLO.

The

mainstream of

the PLO

welcomed these

developments

and

anticipated

that

at

some

point

contacts

with

the

American

government

would

take

place.

But

the

PLO

still

seemed

reluctant

to

enforce

a

uniform

policy

on

its divided

ranks,

and

in

particular

it

continued

to

withhold

the

card,

as

PLO

chairman

Yasir Arafat

called

it,

of

recognizing

Israel.

There

were

some,

however,

who

saw

in

the

Jordanian-PLO

dialogue

a

positive

step

toward Palestinian

acceptance

not

only

of the

reality

of

Israel,

but

also of

the

inevitability

of

a

link

between

any

future

Palestin

ian

entity

and

Jordan.

IV

If

the

PLO

seemed

to

be

relatively

self-confident and assertive

during

much of

1979,

the

same

could

not

be said

of

Saudi Arabia.

There

the

events

of

Iran

and

the

Egyptian-Israeli

peace

treaty



14/24

552

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

caused

a

great

deal

of

anxiety

and

ambivalence,

coupled

with

a

loss of

confidence

in

the

United

States. To

allay

the

fears

caused

by

the events in Iran,

Secretary

of Defense Harold Brown visited

Saudi

Arabia

in

February,

as

well

as

Egypt,

Israel and

Jordan.

He

promised

a

more

active

U.S.

role

in

the

region,

and

specifically

consulted

with the Saudis

on

threats

to

their

security.

The Saudis

felt

particularly

vulnerable

when,

just

after

Secre

tary

Brown's

trip,

South Yemen

attacked North

Yemen.

That

brief

incident alarmed

the

Saudis,

who

appealed

to

the

United

States

for

immediate assistance. The

American

response

was

swift

and

substantial.

Nearly

$500

million

in

arms was

promised

and

rapidly

delivered to the Sanaa

regime,

but this was not immedi

ately

translated

into

U.S. influence.

Instead,

North

Yemen contin

ued

to

hedge

its

bets

by

also

accepting

arms

from the

Soviets,

talking

of

unity

with South

Yemen,

and

keeping

some

distance

from

the Saudi

embrace.

Anxious

to

preserve

a

close

relationship

with

the United

States

despite

differences

over

the

Palestinian

issue

and

Camp

David,

the Saudis

were

generally cooperative

on

oil

pricing

and

pro

duction

during

1979.2

In

January

1979,

the Saudis

were

producing

at their maximum sustainable

capacity,

about 10.5 million barrels

per

day

(mb/d),

in

order

to

make

up

for

the

shortfall in Iranian

production.

But

even

at

that

level,

supply

was

not

able

to meet

demand.

In

these

circumstances,

the

Saudis

were

unable

to

re

strain

OPEC

decisions

in

mid-1979

to

drive the

price

of oil

up

by

60

percent.

Saudi

Arabia

did, however,

sell its

oil

at

$18

per

barrel

during

most

of the last

two

quarters

of

1979,

and

output

was

kept

at

9.5

mb/d.

Other

OPEC members

were

charging

$6-10

more

per

barrel

than the

Saudis,

and

the

spot

market

price

of

a

barrel

of oil hit $40. When it

appeared

as if Saudi Arabia was

forgoing

current

income

largely

as a

subsidy

to

American oil

companies

(whose

profits

hit record

highs by selling

less

expensive

Saudi oil

in

the

uncontrolled

European

market),

the incentives

for further

Saudi

price

restraint

were

weakened.

Just

before

the Caracas

meeting

of OPEC

in

December,

the Saudis

raised

the

price

of

their

oil

to

$24

per

barrel.

Price

increases

helped

the Saudis

meet

their

growing appetite

for

income.

For

two

years,

in

1977 and

1978,

the

Saudis

had

overspent

their

budget

and had been

obliged

to draw down on

some

of

their

reserve

holdings.

The oil

price

increases

of

1979

returned

Saudi

Arabia

to

a

position

of

accumulating

substantial

2

For

details,

see

the

article

by

Robert

Stobaugh

and Daniel

Yergin

in

this

issue.



15/24


16/24


17/24


18/24


19/24

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

CRISES

557

eliminated

in

favor

of the

Khalq

faction led

by

Noor

Mohammad

Taraki

and

Hafizullah

Amin.

As the Taraki

regime

tried to extend its

sway

into the

country

side,

it

encountered

armed resistance from

fiercely

independent

Afghan

tribesmen.

By

the fall of

1979,

the

Soviets

apparently

concluded

that

President Taraki

needed

to

broaden

his

political

base

and

to

that end

he should

remove

his

controversial Prime

Minister

Hafizullah

Amin.

Not

surprisingly,

Amin

reacted

by

ousting

Taraki,

in

a

coup

in

September

that

caught

Moscow

unprepared.

From that

moment

on,

the Soviets

appear

to

have

developed

a

strategy

for

removing

Amin and

replacing

him with a more

amenable

client. Under

the

guise

of

helping

the

regime

against

the

Muslim

rebels,

Soviet

military

advisers

entered

Afghanistan,

followed

in

late December

by

combat

troops.

In

addition,

several

Soviet

divisions

were

poised

across

the

border.

Soviet forces

first

settled

the

score

with

Amin in

a

quickly

executed

coup

which

brought

Parcham leader Babrak

Karmal

to

power.

Amin

himself

was

executed,

as

Soviet

troops

poured

into

Afghanistan,

their

numbers

exceeding

50,000

within

a

matter

of

days,

clearly

with

the

objective

of

putting

down the

insurgency

and

establishing

firm

and

lasting

Soviet

control.

This

unprecedented

display

of

Soviet

military

power

outside

Eastern

Europe

brought

U.S.-Soviet

relations

to

a

crisis

point

and

raised serious

questions

in

Washington

about

Soviet

aims. Presi

dent Carter

noted

that Soviet

behavior

in

Afghanistan

had

done

more

to

educate

him

about

Soviet

intentions

than

any

other

event

during

his

presidency.

As

a

result,

he

postponed

Senate consider

ation

of

the SALT

II

treaty,

cancelled

17

million

tons

of

grain

sales

to the

Soviet

Union,

and

announced

a

series

of

other

punitive

measures.

If

Iran

were more

stable,

if

oil

were

less

vital

to

the

West,

and

if

U.S.-Soviet relations

were

otherwise

in

good

repair,

the

events

in

Afghanistan

might

have

had

limited

impact

on

American

thinking.

But

in

the

existing

circumstances,

the

Soviet

occupation

of

Afghanistan

served

to

crystallize

a

number of

converging

trends,

the

net

effect

of

which

was

to

reinforce

American

concern

for

Persian Gulf

security.

While Iran was

likely

to

prove

the most

significant

arena

of

confrontation,

it

was

neighboring

Pakistan

and its

Baluchistan

province

that seemed

most

vulnerable

to

pressures

from

the Soviet

military

presence

in

Afghanistan.

Arms

supplies

to

Pakistan

were

one

response;

aid

to

Afghan

rebels

another. The

search

for

naval



20/24

558

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

and

air

facilities

to

support

a

stronger

American

military

posture

in

the

area

was

also

accelerated.

But

the

diplomatic

challenge

loomed

large.

Could the U.S.

capitalize

on

Pakistani,

Iranian and

even

Iraqi

fears

of Soviet

expansion

to

insure

that

Moscow's

influence

could

be contained? Or had U.S.

prestige

sunk

so

low

that

Afghanistan's

neighbors

would

prefer

to

accommodate the

Soviets

rather than

try

to

resist Soviet

pressures?

As

the 1980s

began,

the

question

could

be

raised,

but

not

answered.

VI

As of

mid-January

1980, it is too

early

to assess the full

impli

cations

of

the

Soviet invasion

of

Afghanistan.

Continuing

Soviet

dominance

there could

threaten Pakistan

in

the

immediate future.

By

supporting

Baluchi

dissidents,

the

Soviets could weaken

both

Pakistan

and

Iran,

perhaps

eventually bringing

the

Soviets closer

to

gaining

a

foothold

on

the Arabian Sea.

In

any

event,

there

can

be

no

doubt that

in

Middle

East

terms

what has

happened

in

Afghanistan

has

greatly

accentuated

the

already

serious

problem

of

security

and

stability

in

the vital

region

surrounding

the world's

largest

reserves of oil.

Nor is

it

now

possible

to

assess

the reaction

in

Iran

to

a

totally

Soviet-dominated

Afghanistan.

One

might

expect

Iranians

to

recognize

that

it is

the

Soviet

Union that threatens

the

indepen

dence and

unity

of

Iran. This

could result

in

a

turn

to

the United

States

after

the

hostage

issue has been

resolved.

But

Khomeini

shows

little

sign

of

drawing

such

conclusions,

and

thus Iran's

future

orientation

remains

clouded.

Many

in

the

Middle

East

expect

that

Iran

will

eventually

slip

into the Soviet

sphere

of influence. This could occur if a pro

Soviet

regime

were

to

come to

power.

Or

it

could

result from

Iran's

fragmentation,

with autonomous

governments

in

Azer

baijan

and

Kurdistan

turning

to

Moscow for

support,

as

happened

after

World

War

II.

The

Soviets

have

several factors

in their favor

in

Iran.

They

could

provide

needed

military equipment

to

the Iranian armed

forces.

They

could

offer

protection

against

Iraqi

military

threats.

They

could

help

Iran circumvent

a

U.S.-sponsored

economic

blockade. And

they

have

supporters

in crucial sectors such as the

Tudeh

party,

among

the oil-field

workers,

and

in

the

provinces

along

the

Soviet

border.

Iran

will

not

inevitably

go

the

way

of

Afghanistan,

and

the

Soviets

will doubtless

have

difficult decisions

to

make

as

they

pursue

their

long-term

objective

of

enhancing

their influence

in



21/24

THE MIDDLE

EAST

CRISES

559

Iran.

But

the Soviet

incentive

for

gaining

a

privileged

position

in

Iran

is

likely

to

grow

in

the

1980s

if

the

U.S.S.R.

does

in

fact

become

an

importer

of

significant

quantities

of

Middle Eastern

oil. Predictions

of Soviet

supply

and demand for

oil

are

uncertain,

but

one

line

of

analysis

leads

to

the

conclusion that the

Soviets

will

need

to

import

oil

by

the

mid-1980s.

For

Moscow,

this raises the

problem

of

how

to

pay

for

the

oil,

since

virtually

all

producers

insist

on

payment

in

hard

currencies.

If

the

Soviets

were

to

import

only

one

mb/d

at

1980

prices,

they

would

need

to

spend

nearly

$10

billion

annually. Any

arrange

ments

whereby

the Soviets

could

supply

arms or

goods

to

offset

this

cost

would

be

highly

advantageous,

and Iran

stands

out

as

one

country

where such

terms

might

be

met

if

a

sufficiently

friendly

or

dependent

regime

were

to

come

to

power.

Thus,

in

assessing

Soviet

attempts

to

take

advantage

of

insta

bility

in

the

Persian Gulf

and

Arabian

Peninsula,

Iran is

likely

to

be

the

most

dangerous

arena

of confrontation.

Having

failed

to

come

to

terms

with

Khomeini,

the

United States

may

begin

to

look

beyond

his

rule

to

the

kind

of

Iran that

may

emerge

at

a

later date.

For

the

moment,

American

influence

over

Iranian

events

is

at

the

lowest

point

since World

War

II.

But

whatever

the

outcome

of the

hostage

crisis,

President Carter's

dilemmas

will

not

be

easily

resolved.

The

question

will

remain of how

to

influence

events

in

Iran

so

that

eventually

U.S.-Iranian

relations

can

be

resumed

on

a

level

commensurate

with

American

interests

in

the

region.

One element

of

an

effective

American

Middle

East

policy

involves

military

power.

During

the

Iran

hostage

crisis,

it

became

common

wisdom

to

declare that the post-Vietnam

era

had

come

to

a

close.

Iran

had

supposedly

convinced

Americans

that

an

anti

interventionist

foreign policy

was

inadequate,

that

military

power

could

not

be

neglected,

and

that U.S.

prestige

must

quickly

be

restored

if

vital interests

were

to

be

protected.

In

this

atmosphere,

it

was

almost inevitable

that

President

Carter

would

seek

a

larger

military budget

and

that

plans

would

be made

to

acquire

U.S.

bases

in

the

Persian Gulf

region.

A

reflection of

this

change

was

an

increase

in

U.S.

military

capabilities

in

the

Indian

Ocean and

Persian Gulf regions by the end of 1979. Two ships were added to

the

Bahrain-based Mideast

Force;

units

of the Pacific

and

Medi

terranean

fleets

were

rotated into the

Indian Ocean

to

create

a

continuous

presence;

defense

spending

for

a

Rapid

Deployment

Force

was on

the

rise;

U.S.

radar

planes

were

operating

from

Egyptian

airfields;

and

at

year's

end

a

U.S.

mission

was

sent to

Saudi

Arabia, Oman,

Somalia

and

Kenya

to

look

at

basing



22/24

560

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

possibilities.

It is entirely appropriate to think of how tomake this dimension

of the U.S.

presence

more

effective

and

credible.

But

there is

a

risk

of

concentrating

on

the

technical

requirements

of the

military

without due attention

to

political

and

diplomatic

contexts.

Bases

or

facilities

may

or

may

not

be

useful

in

a

strictly

military

sense,

but

if

they

serve

to

weaken

a

regime,

or

provide

openings

for

Soviet

influence,

they

may

be

politically

counterproductive.

In

addition

to

strengthening

the

U.S.

military

presence

in

the

Middle

East,

some

analysts

have

recommended

that

the

United

States take the lead in developing a collective security framework

modeled

on

NATO.

Egypt,

Israel

and

Saudi

Arabia

are

usually

mentioned

as

the

prime

candidates;

the

incentive would

presum

ably

be

a

common

fear of

Soviet

power.

The NATO

analogy

serves more

to

highlight

the

difficulties of

security

in

the

Middle

East

than

to

prescribe

a

remedy.

Whereas

the

NATO countries tended

to

perceive

the

Soviet threat

in

similar

terms

and held

many

political

values

in

common,

the

major

powers

of the

Middle East

are

far from

being

a

cohesive

bloc.

Egypt

and Israel

are

groping

their

way

toward

a

new

relation

ship

which

might

in

time include

cooperation

in

the

security

area,

but the

United States

can

do

little

to

force the

pace.

Saudi

Arabia

wants

no

part

of

an

Egyptian-Israeli

alliance,

seeing

in

their

relationship

one

of the

prime

reasons

for

growing

Soviet

influence

in

the Arab

world.

For the

moment,

national

rivalries overshadow

any

recognition

of

common

security

problems.

The

best that

the

United

States

can

hope

for

is

a

network of

bilateral relations?

with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan and Somalia?

which

might

in

time lead

to

broader

cooperation.

VII

While the

events

of 1979

in

the Middle East will

undoubtedly

have

the

effect

on

U.S.

policy

of

pushing

the

Persian

Gulf and

Arabian

Peninsula

region

to

the

top

of

the

foreign

policy agenda,

it

would

be

misleading

to

conclude that

the

more

conventional

American concerns with the Arab-Israeli conflict can be relegated

indefinitely

to

the back burner.

In

the

first

place,

there

is

a

link

between

stability

in

the

Arab

oil-producing

areas

and the

Pales

tinian issue.

Second,

the United States continues

to

occupy

a

unique

diplomatic

position

as

the

only acceptable

and

credible

mediator

in the

Arab-Israeli

dispute.

The successful

Egyptian



23/24

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

CRISES

561

Israeli

negotiations

stand

as

testimony

to

what

can

be

achieved

by persistent and imaginative American diplomacy.

Several

specific

policy

choices

involving

the Palestinian

question

will

be

faced

by

the

Administration

in

1980 and

beyond.

Most

important

will be

how

to

proceed

in

the

negotiations

after the

May

1980

target

date has

passed.

The Israelis

are

likely

to

want

to

continue

the

talks

within the

Camp

David

framework. The

Egyptians

may urge

a

broadening

of the

negotiations.

As

the

architect

of

Camp

David,

President

Carter

will

become

the

likely

arbitrator.

If

the

negotiations

have

produced

few

results

in

the

course of one year, it will be hard to justify continuing with the

same

terms

of

reference.

This

suggests

that the formal

talks

might

be

recessed,

pending

a

redefinition

of the

underlying

principles

of

a

Palestinian

settlement,

or

that the United

States

might begin

to

put

forward

substantive

positions

of

its

own

in

order

to

keep

the

negotiations

alive.

The

U.S.

motivation

for

resuming

an

activist

role

in

the Pales

tinian

negotiations

need

not

be fear that

a

stalemate

could

jeop

ardize

Egyptian-Israeli

relations.

And

activism

for its

own

sake

is

pointless. But the Administration does need to think about the

questions

of

stability,

Soviet

influence,

and American

credibility

in

the Arab

world,

and

to

some

extent

each

of these

issues

will

be

affected

by

the

stance

taken

by

the

United States

in

the

ongoing

peace

negotiations.

It

will do

little

for

U.S.

prestige

as a

superpower

if

Egypt

and

Israel

appear

to

be

dictating

American

policy

in

the Middle

East.

Quite

apart

from

the

perceived

interests of America's

two

partners

in

the

peace

negotiations,

the United

States has

important

rela

tions with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Jordan. Sadat may

treat

the Saudis

and

King

Hussein

with

disdain,

but

that

is

no

reason

for

Washington

to

follow

suit.

By refusing

to

see

King

Hussein

in

the

fall

of

1979,

President

Carter added

unnecessary

strain

to

U.S.-Jordanian

relations and

reduced

even

further

the

chance

that

Jordan

would

adopt

a

helpful

role

in

the

search for

a

Palestinian

settlement.

Indeed,

the

deterioration of

U.S.-Jorda

nian

ties

during

1979

was a

striking

and

worrisome

development.

Thus,

one

step

toward

restoring

the

United States

to

an

influ

ential role in the Arab Middle East will involve a resumption of

serious

initiatives

to

resolve the

Palestinian issue.

No

one

expects

instant

results,

especially

in

an

election

year,

but

many

Arabs

still

look

to

Washington

as

holding

the

key

to

peace

in

the

region.

This

is

both

an

asset

and

a

liability,

depending

on

how

the

Adminis

tration

plays

its

hand.

But

to turn

away

from

the

Arab-Israeli



24/24

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