armor magazine, march-april 1990

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, March-April 1990

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Its spring. That means basket-ball and the road to the FinalFour. I feel an analogy coming on.Some basketball teams can killyou with the three-point shot,

while others are devastating un-derneath. The better teams havecapabilities both outside and in-side, so if you take away onethreat, theyll get you with theother. But it is excellence in the transition gamethat can put a team out front. Its the fast break,the steal, the scramble for a loose ball, theblocked shot that not only leads to points onthe board, but demoralizes the opponent.Doesnt all of this sound exactly like what we

do in cavalry and armor? Firepower, mobility,shock effect.MG Foley states in his Commanders Hatchthat we are now in transition. How we play thistransition game over the next five years willdetermine whether we pull ahead or fall hope-lessly behind. We have spent the past decadeor so working on our heavy, long-rangeshooters. Weve built up and trained the finestheavy force in the world, only to be on theverge of losing a substantial portion of the teamto graduation. It now appears that future gameswill be won on the inside. (If you think this anal-ogy is beginning to stretch thin, note in the ar-ticle that begins on page 8 that the Sheridansengagements in Panama were all between 100and 460 meters.)What we need now are good coaches to helprecruit the new batch of organizations, equip-

ment, and weapons systems we will need forthe new style game we are to play, not a bunchof Dick Vitales spewing their opinions in high-pitched voices from the sidelines. The tank isnot dead. The need for firepower, mobility, andshock effect in contingency operations was un-scored in Panama. LTG Stiner has said welearned little new on Operation JUST CAUSE,but we verified a lot of what we already knew.Lets put that to use. A recent seminar at Fort

Knox on armor support to light forces high-lighted a glaring need for more work in thatarena.We must replace the Sheridan. It has done itsduty well, but its time to go to pasture. Weneed a system that can move and shoot well

once it survives its heavy drop. It must be lightenough to traverse bridges in non-industrial na-tions. (See again Sheridans in Panama.) Itmust be able to carry as much of its own supplies and fuel as possible. This will not be aneasy task. If it was, we would have replaced theSheridan years ago.And to cap it off, we cant afford to spend thenext 15 years in R&D, testing, and production.We need something soon. Developing countriesrepresent 82.2 percent of the total world marketfor arms imports. That is likely to worsen as themajor powers rush to unload suddenly availablesurpluses.Despite the recent events in Eastern Europe,the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua. it is un-reasonable to expect a lengthy period of peaceeverywhere. It hasnt happened since the PaxRomana, and wishful thinking wont make it hap

pen now.Armor must not play the part of the red-headed stepchild. We must reach inand grab

our place in the Army of the 1990s. We must en-sure that we are in the championship game ofthe Final Four - and that we win it.- PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E. W O N 0Genera l, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:WILLIAM J. MEEHAN 11Brigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-I 7-90-2Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS C. FOLEYARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is publishednthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401KY 40121.Disclaimer: The information contained inMOR represents the professional opinions ofauthors and does not necessarily reflect the

Official distribution is limited to one copy forheavy brigade headquarters, armored, armored cavalry squadron head-

and motorized brigade headquarters ofUnited States Army. In addition, ArmyHQ DA and

of personnel fortwo copies byletter to the editor-inchief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlyU.S. Army Armor

armored, direct-fire ground combat

y CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;aneous items of equipment which

ning for all SC 12A, 12B, and

level and below, to include Threat units atMaterial may be reprinted, provided credit is

March-April 1990,Vol XCIX No. 2

=eatures8

1618

22

29

32

37

42

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Sheridans in Panamaby Captain Kevin J. Hammond and CPT Frank ShermanMarines Add Reactive Armor To M6OAlsby Greg StewartU.S.Armor Between the Warsby Major Patrick J. CooneyAn Assessment of the Soviet T-64 Premium Tankby Captain James M. WarfordBrilliant Battalionsby Colonel Len HawleyTask Force Smith: A Revised Perspectiveby Captain Robert J. KmiecikThe "Fort Knox"of the G ermany Armyby Lieutenant Colonel Phillip J. LinnDeath and Destruction in the Desertby First Lieutenant Mark E. LaDuCaptain, The Truth Changes!by Lieutenant Colonel Pat Knutson

Departments22467

48495152

LettersContactsCommander's HatchDriver's SeatCrossword PuzzleArmor Conference ScheduleBustle RackCrossword Puzzle SolutionBooks


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Time to Reorganize USAREUROn Air Cav Brigade Model?Dear Sir:The articles by General Wagner and

Major Cooney on cavalry, historic and cur-rent, In the September-October issue coin-cided with the remarkable transformationof power in Eastern Europe.

However misguided the euphoria of thetelevision network news staffs, et al., therecan be no question that Moscow'sdecision to cut its erstwhile comrades of

Eastern Europe adrift marks the end of anera. In essence, as I read it, the Sovietsare admitting that whatever chance theymay have had for a quick victory inEurope has slipped away, and the cost ofcontinuing to support the illegitimateregimes it established during 1945-48 istoo great.

We have our own economic problems.The Bush Administration has made plainthat means taking the loosening of Sovietcontrol in Eastern Europe as a golden op-portunity to begin the phaseout of mostU.S. forces in Europe. Let's face it, once

out of Europe, heavily armored Americanformations will not return, peace or war.What would return, if needed, is th eAmerican cavalry, either the present

cavary brigade (air combat) or some fu-ture derivative.Sad to say, neither ARMOR nor anyother official or quasi-official publication

connected with the Army ever reported, tothe best of my knowledge, the speech byGen. F. M. von Senger und Etterlin, thencommander, Central Army Group, callingfor reorganization of all NATO armies on

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.DIRECTORY - Points Of Contact Commercial prefix is Area Code 5024324-x)


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the Sixth Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)model.

Hopefully, we are not going to see an at-tempt to hang on to and past the point ofirrelevancy the familiar structures of thepast 45 years, as happened in the oldCavalrv Journal.

The Soviets, I hink, are shedding a sub-stantial part of their heavy forces becausethey got Gen. von Senger und Etterlin'smessage. What a pity it would be if, onceagain, having produced an imaginativeand effective solution to a major strategicproblem, we let someone else develop it,to our ultimate sorrow.

WILLIAM V. KENNEDYCOL, Armor, AUS (Ret.)Wiscasset, Maine

Use Obsolete ChassisFor Engineer Vehicles?Dear Sir,A number of recent articles in ARMOR

have either dealt with the use of engineerassets in maneuver warfare or with spe-cial problems found on the battlefieldwhich need the attention and assistanceof engineers.

Although numerous references pertain-ing to the use of American and Germanengineers are listed as supportingmaterial for the articles, it would seemthat the most innovative use of special-ized engineer AWs has been ignored. Per-haps the lessons of the British 79th Ar-moured Division and its use of specializedarmor should be re-examined.

For those who may feel that the multi-tude of vehicles developed during WorldWar II by the 79th (also known as"Hobart's Funnies") should only be con-sidered as relative to specific problemsfaced by the Allies in the invasion ofFrance, a cursory glance at the currentAVLB and CEV vehicles will show theirdirect origin from the ValentineBridgelayer and Churchill AVRE AWsused by the 79th during the war inNorthwest Europe.

It would seem that the same problemsexist now as existed some forty yearsago. How does an attacking force breacha defended obstacle, clear a minefield,cross an antitank ditch, cross a blownbridge, ad infinitum? While the AVLB andCEV are very effective vehicles, there

does seem to be at least one vehicle typemissing.

From my knowledge, there is no currentequivalent to the Churchill AVRE or Sher-man "Crab" mine clearing AW. While Itcould be argued that the CEV is themodern AVRE, the CEV does not appearto have the extensive versatility which theAVRE possessed with its numerous brack-ets for fitting engineer equipment. TheCrab, which used chains attached to adriven rotor drum to beat a path througha minefield, was a highly developedweapon by the war's end. Although I amaware of the new Abrams mine-plow, is itas effective over as a many types ofground as the Flail?

What I would like to propose is anotherengineer-specific vehicle. With the intro-duction of the M1, Iexpect that a numberof M48A5s and early M60 models will beconsidered redundant and ultimately bescrapped. Instead of wasting thisresource, would it be possible to developa vehicle on a modular principle whichcould be fitted with numerous engineer fix-tures? Remove the turret, mount a powertake-off from the engine - or an auxiliaryengine, either one positioned in the pre-vious turret basket space and used topower the detachable equipment. Withthe basic vehicle in place, a drum-typemine flail could be developed using someof the same principles as the wartimeCrab. With the removal of the turret, placea stationary rack over the hull on whichfascines could be delivered to breach an-titank ditches. Other brackets could bedeveloped for removable bulldozer bladesor bridging units,

Although it would be very tempting toadd so many attachments and tasks thatthe result might make Rube Goldbergproud, some common sense could hope-fully prevail through the developmentphase so as to keep the concept relativelysimple.

I would think that the greatest benefitsof using the redundant hulls is a vehiclearmored to MBT standards, the removalof the turret, giving the tank an increasedpower-to-weight ratio, and simply that avery versatile vehicle is available to fulfillthe engineer mission.

My comments are offered not as aprofessional, but as an interested ob-sewer and "armchair" historian. In addi-tion, 1 would like to thank you for provid-ing a very informative ournal.

Kerry J. BrunnerMilwaukee, Wis.

Editor's Note:As we approach the 50th anniversary of

the Armor Force, we note the passing ofHerbert H. Burr, a WWll tanker who was arecipient of the Medal of Honor for hisheroic acts near Dorrmoschel, Germany,on 19 March 1945. Burr died February 8near his home in Urbana, Mo.

In August 1945, Presldent Harry S.Truman presented the Medal of Honor toBurr for driving his flaming tank into a Ger-man 8Emm gun position and destroyingit, then returning through a hail of gunfireto rescue a wounded crewman.

Burr sewed in the Am y from 1942 to1945 and was discharged as a staff ser-geant. He was a PFC bow gunner in the41st Tank Battalion, 11th ArmoredDivision, when his tank was hit by anenemy rocket, severely wounding theplatoon sergeant and forcing theremainder of the crew to abandon thevehicle.

Accordlng to the citation: "Private Burrimmediately climbed into the driver's seatand continued on the mission of enteringthe town to reconnoiter road conditions.As he rounded a turn he encountered an8&mm antitank gun at point-blank range.Realizing that he had no crew, no one toman the tank's guns, he heroically choseto disregard his personal safety in a directcharge on the German weapon. At con-siderable speed, he headed straight forthe loaded gun, which was fully mannedby enemy troops who had only to pull thelanyard to send a shell into his vehicle. Sounexpected and daring was his assaultthat he was able to drive his tank com-pletely over the gun, demolishing It andcausing its crew to flee i n confusion.

"He then skillfully sideswiped a largetruck, overturned it, and wheeling his lum-bering vehicle, returned to his company.When medical personnel who had beensummoned to treat the wounded sergeantcould not locate him, the valiant soldierran through a hail of sniper fire to directthem to his stricken comrade. The bold,fearless determination of Private Burr, hisskill and courageous devotion to duty,resulted in the completion of his missionin the face of seemingly impossible odds."Burr was a member of the Congres-

sional Medal of Honor Society and a lifemember of the Veterans of Foreign Warsand the 11th Armored Division Associa-tion. He was employed as a painter forthe General Services Administration untilhe retired in 1986.Letters continue on Page 51

ARMOR - March-April 1990 3


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A Small, Highly Lethal,Quality Total ArmorForce for the 1990s .

MG Thomas C. FoleyComm anding GeneralU S . Army Armor Center

Still the Centerpiece of Mobile,Combined Arms OperationsAs pointed out in our last issue,

Armor can be very proud of thelarge part we played in the decisiveCold War victory. Armor can alsobe very proud of the role we playedin the stunning, quick victory inPanama. The 3-73 Armor did anoutstanding job, as is described else-where in these pages.

Now the Army is moving into aperiod of transition and significantchange. Many mistakenly believethere is no longer a threat - theyare mesmerized by intentions andnot capabilities, and they fail to ac-knowledge the potential regional ar-mored threats to our national inter-ests. Another major reason forchange is the desire to cut the na-tional deficit. As a result, most ofthe services will decrease in size,beginning this year. This is con-tinued in the Presidents FY91budget, which he submitted to th eCongress. While the budget is sub-ject to Congressional change and ap-proval, it does reflect the Presi-dents position, and also gives clearsignal of what the future holds.What follows is our assessment ofwhat this means for Armor. Our in-tent is to keep you updated.

The Armys plan is to makebalanced reductions in both the Ac-tive and Reserve Components andreshape itself into a smaller, yethighly lethal, quality force that isable to meet the needs of our na-tional strategy. Doctrine and war-fighting requirements are thedrivers. The end result could be aTotal Army with 270,000 fewer sol-diers five years from now.

Armor will be greatly affected bythese reductions, which couldremove 27 battalions and squadronsfrom the Total Armor Force overthe next five years. This would leave41 tank battalions and 18 cavalrysquadrons in the Active Com-ponent. There would also be fiverecon squadrons, two separate caval-ry troops, and one light tank bat-talion. All this equates to a reduc-tion of roughly 19 percent fromwhere we are today.In the Reserve Components -

again this is predicated on Congres-sional approval of the Presidentsbudget proposal - we would have44 tank battalions, 13 cavalrysquadrons, and 21 separate cavalrytroops. This is about a 17 percentreduction from today.

Yet, our branch will play an indis-pensable role in the Army of the1Ws. We will continue to be thecenterpiece of mobile combinedarms operations as part of our na-tions forward-deployed, contingen-cy, and reinforcing forces. Let usnot forget that contingency forcesrequire a combination of heavy,light, and special operating forces.It would be unwise for the nation tosend light forces into a contingencyor reinforcing situation whereheavier forces are required. Non-etheless, one of our aims must be tolighten the Armor Force so thatboth contingency and reinforcingforces can get more quickly towhere they are needed. Indeed,even the forward-deployed forcescan benefit from such an effort be-cause both their tactical and opera-tional mobility stand to improve. Amajor challenge will be to avoid thetemptation to lighten our fightingsystems to the point where they willbe ineffective against those hostilenations that are equipped withmodem main battle tanks.

There are some promising tech-nologies that could result in futureweight reductions without sacrific-ing survivability. We must pursue

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these. Another way to accomplishthe goal of achieving force lightnessis to reshape our armor and cavalryorganizations into smaller, yet high-ly lethal and very agile formationscapable of meeting and defeatingthe likely threats. As part of this, weneed to relook our current mix ofheavy versus light organizations. Forexample, is there a need for morethan one battalion of light armor?Why not three - one at FortBragg, one at Fort Lewis, and oneat Fort Knox with a regimentalheadquarters?

Questions like these are a majorthrust of our ongoing combat andtraining development studies andanalyses that we will report on insubsequent issues.

In the meantime, we will beginreducing this year. Fewer soldierswill enter the Army, and others willleave earlier than originally an-ticipated. Some units will standdown. All of this can be very painfuland must be accomplished withgreat care. We will be guided by thefollowing principles:0 Protect quality.0Shape the force for the future

and preserve our historical ties.0 Sustain readiness.0 Use common sense.We are closely examining the

leader development challenges as-sociated with these reductions. Letme discuss this in some detail. First,some background. As you mayknow, Armor comprises only aboutfour percent of the current TotalArmy force structure. While we areone of the smallest branches, weman almost 30 percent of theArmys weapons systems and 60 per-cent of the heavy maneuver bat-talions. In short, we are an all-

weather, ground-gaining, andground-holding, high-leverage fight-ing arm.

Despite the proposed structurecuts, mentioned above, our officerprofessional development system ofschools will remain, as will the non-commissioned officer education sys-tem. Our preliminary analysis indi-cates that the following leaderdevelopment goals for Armor andCavalry leaderswillbe achievable:

first class to be a tank or scoutplatoon sergeant.0 The first sergeant opportunity

should continue to be great - al-most 92 percent.0 Competition for selection as

CSU will continue to be tough.0 DA will continue to conduct an-

nual promotion and school selectionboards. It is too early to state whatthe opportunities for selection willlook like.

0 We should be able to branch-qualify every Armor lieutenant as aplatoon leader during his first as-signment.

0There should be sufficient o pportunity for all captains to com-mand a company or troop, althoughthe opportunity for a second corn-mand will decline.0 Although the Reserve Com-

ponent portion of the Total ArmorForce will be reduced, the impacton professional development shouldnot be great, but will vary based onstructure cuts from state to state.

0 I t is too early to predict theS3/XO opportunity for ma.jors untilwe get better information on officerinventory adjustments. Our goal willbe to continue to afford 18 monthsof S3 or XO experience to deserv-ing majors. This is a key part ofpreparation for battalion command.0 About one-fourth of qualified

Armor lieutenant colonels shouldcommand battalions. Selection forbrigade-level command will alsocontinue to be very competitive,with about one-fifth being selected.0 Every qualified staff sergeant

should continue to have the oppor-tunity to command a tank or a scoutsection.0 There should be sufficient o p

portunity for qualified sergeants

More will follow in later issues ofARMOR. All this will be part of theinformation that we will provide toyou as the defense program takesfinal shape, and we are able toreline our vision of the future. Tohelp chart our course into that fu -ture, we have established an or-ganization called the Directorate ofTotal Armor Force Readiness(DTAFR). This small office com-bines the present Directorate ofEvaluation and Standardization andthe Office Chief of Armor. It willtake the Iead at Fort Knox in shap-ing the Total Armor Force. Seepage 49 for a more detailed descrip-tion of DTAFFLIn summary, by 1995,we will have

transitioned to a much differentTotal Army than we have today.The shift to a smaller, yet capableforce will require the very best ofour efforts. Teamwork and careful,thorough planning will be a must.One of our most important jobs atthe Home of Armor and Cavalrywill be clearly to define and articu-late the role and structure of theTotal Armor Force. Our challengeis to insure that Armor remains thecenterpiece of the combined armsteam, essential to the successful ex-ecution of the Armys warfightingdoctrine. With your help, Im confi-dent we can do that.

Forge the Thunderbolt!



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CSMJohn M. StephensCommand Sergeant MajorUS.Army Armor Center

Getting Their Attention!Over the years all of us have had

to reach back in time to reconstructa proactive situation that led to acohesive effort to solve a problemor to institute a new program.

Leadership problems can besolved with little or no effort, ormay require detailed planning andpreparation to execute. As withmost problems, you will probablynot find the solution anywhere butin your past experience. Most ex-perienced leaders have a readysupply of solutions gleaned frompast situations.

Fortunately, I have had the oppor-tunity to serve a number of outstand-ing leaders. In each and every case,the most important quality thatstood out to me was that they hadmy attention.

What do 1 mean by leadersresponsibility to get someones atten-tion? One example that alwayscomes to mind involves an interest-ing order General James K. Polk is-sued while commanding the 4th Ar-mored Division. The M60 tankdoes not get stuck!, At least, thatsthe way we received it! We were inthe process of drawing new M60tanks. In those days, the general wasth e division commander, but to asergeant, the division commanderwas a long way off. Sometimes sol-diers, including leaders, can be hardto control, especially when they geta new weapons system, vehicle, etc.

Its like a new toy! Evidently, someof the tank commanders thought theM60 could swim. They wouldmaneuver where no one wouldmaneuver a tank FrankenhohenCreek in Grafenwohr. And they gotstuck.

After General Polk gave theorder, everyone made a cohesive ef-fort to ensure a tank did not getstuck. The use of reconnaissance,AVLBs. and a lot of common scnsedid the trick. A simple order by ano-nonsense commander hadeveryonesarratfioit!I mentioned the story becausethere are problems occurring at the

tank, platoon, and company levelsdirectly related to the leadershipgetting someones attention.

One tank commander decides notto boresight his tank today, eventhough the rest of the platoon hastaken the time to do so. After thepoint is discussed during t h e AAR,it is passed off with a the hell withit attitude. The platoon sergeanthas not gotten the sergeants atten-tion. More important, the incidentoccurs during a live fire evaluation.This means the tank commanderwas allowed to do the same thingduring practice, the leaders of theorganization did not know the unitSOP, or there was no SOP. Nobodygot the NCOs attention! After theplatoon leader has received his or-ders and informed the platoon

about its role in the operation, hedecides he has time to spot checkthe vehicles. On one particularvehicle, he notices the S O cat is fil-thy, and the turret floor is coveredwith trash. Who does he have aproblem with? The tank com-mander? The platoon sergeant? Hehas a problem with both of them,but he should focus his immediateattention on the platoon sergeant be-cause h e has not done his job. Andthe platoon scrgeant has not gottcnthe TCs attention!

These are two basic problems thatmost leaders say do not exist intheir organization..until they check.

Simple orders should be all that isneeded to execute an operation. Hewho stands in the way or jeopar-dizes mission accomplishmentshould not be allowed to exist as aleader. Using excuses like: he isnew, I am breaking him in, or someother tale only prolongs theproblem. If he can tank in CONUS,he should be able to do so overseas,and vice versa. It takes more thantime in grade and service to be acombat leader. Leaders should iden-tify the weak early, assist, and ifleaders cant get their ATTEN-TION, remove them.

Leaving them in position onlyhinders the success of the organiza-tion and the safety of the menunder them!



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Army Operations and TacticsAll words in this puzzle appear in FM 100-2-1 on the page shown following the clue.le was created bv Thomas Hammett of the Threat Division. USAARMS.

. i s ne of the most important arHllery missions because it

. Mi-2 light observation helicopter. 9-12In the defense, the Soviets emphasize disperslon Into company-.6-9ounted troops travel- anks. 5-11

he combat power of Soviet ground forces resides mainly inand motorized divisions. 1-1Attack frontage of a motorized rifle is 500800 meters.9-6

. The forward- lement engages lead enemy forces. 532and envelopment are basic forms of - 5-13- o be the main ground forceSoviets use the -to deliver strikes at decisive moments in a9-79. The AT battery, engineer company, and a tank or motorizedthe motorized rifle regiment's- eserve. 6-6in Soviet ATGM vehicle. 10-1

s using- itted to the leadBM-21 is a- ocket launcher. 9-11. Most probable Soviet attack formation. 523Defense is a- orm of combat. 6-8o assist movement and enforce march control, each regiment- ontrol platoon. 5 5- ercent of all artillery units of. Soviet infantry fighting vehicle. 5 11s consider the offense to be the only means to

e decisive- 6-1. Collection of information on enemy location, size, activity, com-

2. To achieve depth In the attack, Soviet forces attack in-. 2 53. Ammunition consumption is based on- f fire. 985. A Mobile Detachment provides protection for advancingcolumns by laying minefields. 5-76. An attack from the march is the- ethod of attack. 5-138. The__ s a tailored high-speed exploitation force. 2-79. The primary unit for execution of maneuver. 3-1610. Soviet artillery plans for antitank operations in a- ire mode.10-111. Soviet performance standards, expressed in numerical form.2-1113. Artillery battallon firing positions are generally laid out In thisshape. 9-814. Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (abbr). 5-3215. Prepared and hasty are the two ypes of -. 6-118. Neutralization of antitank weapons in primarily the responsibilityof the - 5-2821. Soviet tanks carry more of these rounds than any other kind ofmunition. 52722. The Chief of Troops and Artillery Is responsible for thedivisional fire plan. 5-1723. Road junctions, bridges, command posts, and communicationssites are typical objectives for a -detachment. 52225. Regimental artillery group (Abbr.). 51727. Tanks on ine generally go- f BMPs. 5-1 130. Antitank guided missile (Abbr.) 10-131. Blinding, camouflaging, and decoys are methods of employing.13-132. Soviet air and artillery prep fire may last up to- inutes. 5-2233. Wheeled Soviet armored personnel carrier. 51138. Precision Guided Munitions (Abbr.) 8-340. The regimental reconnaissance company travels about twenty-- ilometers ahead of the main body of the regiment. 5-31Pu nle solution appears on Page 51



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SheridansIn Panamaby Captain KevinJ. Hammond andCaptain Frank Sherman

In their first combat drop,The aging Sheridans of 3-73Armor addedrirepower to OperationJUST CAUSE

niis article is a clirorioiogicai ac-coiint of the eriipioynierit of aniior ir iOperation JUST CAUSE aridprovides obseniatioris made tliroiigli-oiit tlie Operation.

14 November to 4 DecemberJust after 3-73 Armor's fall gun-

nery period, the battalion received atask to deploy four Sheridans, acommand and control element, anda support element to Panama.There they would be attached to the193d Separate Infantry Brigade,specifically 4-6 Infantry (Mech).The alert went to CM-73 Armor on14 November 1989. On 15 Novem-ber, the platoon (+ ) loaded ontoone C5A Galaxy. The troops ar-rived in Panama during the earlymorning hours of the 16th. Thepresence of Sheridans and the smallarmor support team in Panama wasclassified. The tanks moved fromHoward AFT3 to their "motor pool"under cover of darkness and canvas.The Sheridans remained undercover during daylight with accesslimited to the crews and the com-mand group of 4-6 Infantry. Crewsconducted PT and individual train-ing six days a week. They performedmaintenance seven days a week.Once each week, they took vehiclesout of their concealed locations anddrove them around the motor pool,

normally between 2200 and 0200.Crews checked and rechecked allvehicles, weapons, equipment andammunition to ensure that the unitwould be ready for any alert. Beforethe sun came up, the Sheridanswere back under cover and guard.

For the next few weeks, CPTFrank Sherman and LT AndrewKozar developed a battle plan foremployment of the team. TeamArmor, 4-6 I N F Mech) was to con-sist of four Sheridans and a platoonof Marines equipped with LAV-25s.They conducted reconnaissance ofthe area of operation and gatheredintelligence. They also coordinatedwith LT Brian Colebaugh, theMarine LAV platoon leader, routesand plans for link-up, frequenciesand call signs. Detailed prepara-tions continued.

4 to 16 DecemberOn 8 December, CPT Kevin Ham-

mond took command of TeamArmor from CPT Sherman, whoreturned to Ft. Bra= to prepare theremainder of his company for mis-sion responsibilities. In thiscapacity, C Company was desig-nated as the "armor ready company"in support of the 504th ParachuteInfantry Regiment (PIR). FortBragg personnel rigged four

Sheridans for low-velocity airdelivery (LVAD or heavy drop).The remaining vehicles and allcrews in C Company were onstandby for no-notice rapid deploy-ment and follow-on missions.

In Panama, CPT Hammond final-ized a battle book for the vehiclecommanders. Due to the nature ofthe operation and its many "be-prepared missions," leaders con-ducted tactical exercises withouttroops and refined their battleplans. The officers, in particular,needed to be completely familiarwith the plan because the conceptof the operation, routes, objectives,and be-prepared missions were clas-sified above tank commander level.All crews were briefed in a genericmanner and taken on day and night"tours" to gain familiarity with t h earea of operation. A three-man en-gineer team was also task organizedwith Team Armor during this time.

16 to 19 DecemberOn 16 December 1989, membersof the Panama Defense Force killed

a U.S. Marine lieutenant and as-saulted and abused another officerand his wife. These events initiateda unit recall and increased readi-ness posture for Task Force 4-6. Sol-diers removed the Sheridans from

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ARMOR - March-April 7990


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cover to mount S O caliber machineguns, load Shillelagh missiles, andinstall antennas. The Sheridans thenwent back under cover. Task Force4-6 conducted a show of force bymoving across th e Canal topredetermined assembly areas. Themechanized infantry companiesremained on th e east side of theCanal. This left Team Armor as theonly combat force in 4-6 Infantry onthe west side of the Canal. On Mon-day, 18 December, team com-manders of task force 4-6 learnedthat they were in the executionphase of their contingency opera-tion.

Meanwhile at Ft. Bragg, units ofth e 82d Airborne Divisions readybrigade (DRB) went on alert atO900 to conduct an emergencydeployment readiness exercise. Theexercise included all three infantrybattalions, with CS and CSS ele-ments in the task organization. Theunit activated readiness SOPS,moved vehicles, equipment, sup-plies, and ammunition to the heavydrop rigging site, and prepared forheavy drop by crews and parachuteriggers. All troopers from the DRBtask force moved to the personnelholding area for orders, issue of in-dividual troop items and ammuni-tion, manifests, rehearsals, and pre-jump training.

At 2000, LTC James Reed, com-mander of Task Force 4-6, issuedhis OPORD. H-hour was set for0100 on 20 December. When CPTHammond returned to theSheridans, he found that the LAVplatoon had linked up. CPT Ham-mond briefed the entire team andthen gave his OPORD to theleaders. He issued wartime CEOIsand classified overlays. Rules of

engagement were very precise. Thetask force commander had to ap-prove Sheridan main gun fire be-cause Team Armor would be firingover, and in close proximity tofriendly forces. Crews were to avoidfratricide at all cost and keepdamage to nonmilitary areas to aminimum.20 December

At about 0030, he companies ofTask Force 4-6 reported ready atth e start point. Team Armor re-quested and received permission tomove to and cross the swing bridge,which happened without incident.There had been radio reports ofenemy fire in the vicinity of AlbrookAirfield, which we had to pass, butwe encountered none. Team Armormoved to and occupied Bull 1 andBull 2, its two positions on AnconHill. The Teams three engineers im-mediately began placing demolitioncharges to clear fields of fire for thevehicles in Bull 1.Vehicles in Bull 2had adequate fields of fire.However, visibility at both positionswas obscured by smoke and flamesfrom the burning buildings in thevicinity of La Commandancia. Oc-casionally a crew could identify aparticular target, but because thecrews could not be 100 percent surethat rounds fired would not causefriendly casualties, no fire com-mands were given. Additonally,since the effort to isolate the head-quarters complex was well in hand,Team Armor was advised not toopen fie.0135

The massive airdrop of heavyequipment began as the C-141Bsreleased hundreds of tons of equip-

-

Photos of a Sheridan heayrop at Fort Bragg illustratti e technique used in Panama.

ment and supplies onto the dropzone. Cl3-73 Armor established ahistorical precedent by being thefirst U.S. unit to heavy drop lightarmor into combat. The Sheriddnslanded somewhat east of their in-tended points of impact in a swam-py area overgrown with elephantgrass. Immediately after the heavydrop, 82d Airborne Divisiontroopers began their personneldrop. The concept of the airborneoperation was for 2,200paratroopers, with supplies, to be



12/56

-- --.- --PacificOcean

on the ground in one pass.However, a severe ice storm inNorth Carolina delayed takeoff ofsome aircraft from Pope AFB. As aresult, Sheridan crewmen arrived inthe first two of three waves ofaircraft.

Three separate drops took placeon Torrijos DZ. The plan called forthe eight Sheridans to be task or-ganized, in pairs, to each of thethree infantry battalions. Theremaining two Sheridans, a platoonof infantry, and an engineer sappersquad were to establish a blockingposition at the Highway 1 entranceto the Tocumen-Torrijos Airportunder the control of CPT Sherman.

Sheridanana two L A V - u s , wth other ele-ments of Task Force 4-6, cameunder the operational control of theS3, 4-6 INF (M).We saw the pack-age again a week later as part of thecordon around the airfield. Shortlyafter this, LT Kozars Sheridan andan LAV-25were placed OPCON to

10

D/4-6 INF (M). They were to rein-force a mechanized infantry platoonthat had sustained a number ofcasualties. LT Kozar and the LAV-25 moved to th e southeast corner ofthe Commandancia complex wherethey destroyed a wall and over-watched a possible PDF escapehein-forcing route. They fired two 152-mm rounds at this location. Both of

these linkups were made in dark-ness and under enemy fire.0700

As daylight broke, th e smoke andfire wcst of La Commandanciacleared enough to allow observationof all buildings in the headquarterscomplex. The remaining vehicles in

I

Tank Commander SSG Anthony Woodham, C33, ook this photofrom his overwatch position at BP Bull 2, on Ancon Hill. Th e Corn-rnandancia complex is hidden in the smoke in the distance.



13/56

At left, the Comman-dancia complex be-fore Operation JUSTCAUSE. Photo wastaken from BP 2 onAncon Hill. At right,closeup of damagedone by 152-mmHEAT rounds.Photos by Captain Sherman

Team Armor moved to Bull 2 be-cause it offered adcquate fields offire without blowing down trees. En-gineers removed the demolitioncharges on the trees in Bull 1. Atabout 0700, SSG Kevin Hamiltonand his gunner on C31, SGTGregory Krumme, sighted a PDFsoldier with an RPG-7 in the westend of La Commandancia. LTCReed ordered C31 to engage, andthe crew fired four 152-mm HEATrounds into that end of the building.The crew did not fire machine gunsbecause of the possibility ofricochets hitting friendly forces.

At Tocumen drop zone, two ofCPT Shermans Sheridans wereready for action and received themission to escort a convoy toPanama Viejo. Snipers ambushedthe convoy, under the control of 2-504 PIR, at a roadblock threekilometers west of Tocumen air-field. The roadblock consisted ofcars and propane tanks piled acrossthe road. Two more tanks were dis-patched to assist the convoy. U.S.troops returned fwe with small armsas th e Sheridans fired HEAT andS O caliber. Two Sheridans providedcovering fire as the convoywithdrew to find a more secureroute. Crews towed a Sheridan dis-abled by engine problems back tothe Tocumen airhead, where it wasrepaired the next day.

0955Following assembly on the drop

zone, two Sheridans under theleadership of LT Randy Jennings

received the mission to escort a con-voy of HMMWVs to Ft. Cimmaron(home of Panamas Battalion 2000,Ranger, and Airborne Schools).During the road march, the convoyreceived sniper and small arms fire.The main body of Task Force 4-325conducted an air assault operationto positions south of Ft. Cimarron.That night, elements of TF 4-325held thcir positions while an AirForce AC-130 fired at designatedtargets in the complex.

1400Two Sheridans under the control

of LT John Bunn were ordered toescort a convoy to Panama Viejoand link up with 2-504 Infantry.During movement, PDF soldiers ina POV fired on C21. The Sheridancrew engaged the POV with 50caliber fire. Back in the area of LaCommandancia, clearing of theheadquarters complex was about tobegin. Team Armor would providepreparatory fires on La Comman-dancia from 1445 to 1455, followedby brief fires from Army Aviationelements.A reinforced Ranger com-pany and C/1-508 INF (ABN)would then clear buildings, whileBravo and Delta Companies, 4-6INF (Mech) maintained their kola-tion positions around the complex.At about 1400, Team Armors en-gineers received permission to clearfields of fire for three firing posi-tions in Bull 1. Team Armor oc-cupied Bull 1at 1430.

The Sheridans engaged La Com-mandancia at 1445 and fired ten

rounds of 152-mm HEAT withdevastating results. The HEATrounds penetrated the IO-inch rein-forced concrete walls and caused ex-tensive damage to the interior struc-ture of the building. The com-manders intent, to expend a fewwell placed main gun rounds ratherthan to risk the lives of infantrymento clear the buildings, was ac-complished. When Army Aviationassets were delayed, Team Armorsremaining LAV-25 providcd sup-pressive fires with 25-mm HE-T.The USMC crew fired more than100 rounds into the windows of LaCommandancia. By the time avia-tion assets tinally arrived, theirpreparatory fires were quicklychecked due to the proximity offriendly ground forces. The two in-hntry companies promptly movedin and cleared the Commandanciacomplex. By nightfall, the area wassecure. That night, Team Armormoved into Quarry Heights and as-sisted in providing security to US-SOUTHCOM HQ and t h e adjacentfamily housing area. For the nextfour days, Team Armor remained inthis vicinity. Sheridans and LAV-25s were at the gates of QuarryHeights and at locations around theCommandancia in a counter-sniperrole. Just after dark on the 21st, theLAVs returned to their parent unit.. 21 December, 0300

C11 received the mission to escorta resupply convoy from Tocumenairfield to Cerro Tinajitas. 1-504PIR had conducted an air assault to



14/56

Cerro Tinajitas, home of the 2dPDF infantry company, the daybefore. Enroute, the columnreceived sniper and mortar fire.After arriving at Tinajitas, SSGJohn Troxell, TC for C11, receivedthe mission to pick up 18 soldiersfrom the 1-504 Infantry who werepinned down by sniper fire at theLZ. When the Sheridan arrived,sniping stopped, and all soldiersmounted the Sheridan and returnedto Tinajitas.0800

C20 and C21, the two M551Alsthat had moved to Panama Viejothe day before, escorted a gunHMMWV and troop transportvehicles to th e Marriott Hotel andparticipated in the extraction ofU.S. civilian personnel. Althoughthey received small arms and sniperfire as they approached th e hotel,this soon stopped.2200

SSG Troxell was again pressedinto convoy escort duty. As hisSheridan led the convoy of hardshell and logistics HMMWVs fromTinajitas back to Tocumen airfield,it was ambushed at two differentpoints. SSG Troxell returned firewith his main gun and M2. Othervehicles in the column also returnedfire. C11 received f i e but took nocasualties. Both ambushes wereeliminated or suppressed, and theconvoy continued to Tocumen. Con-voys moved at high speed (ap-proximately 304 mph) and at anextremely close interval. Thisprovided security and preventednon-military vehicles from enteringthe column. Sheridans led thecolumn. If there was a secondSheridan available, it was usuallythe third vehicle in column (behinda gun HMMWV).

On 21 December, 4-325 AIR con-ducted its attack on Ft. Cimarron.

Near the Vatican Embassy, where Panamanian strongman ManuelNoriega sought refuge, C 23 takes up a blocking position.

The two supporting Sheridans firedapproximately 30 152-mm HEATrounds in support of the attack.PSYOPS teams, attached to 4-325,announced on loudspeakers termsof surrender to occupants of thebuildings. In accordance with"measured response" criteria, PDFrefusal was met by Sheridans firingone or two rounds into each struc-ture to neutralize enemy positions.

Dismounted infantry then clearedthe building of any remaining resis-tance. A squad of infantry remainedwith the tanks to furnish localsecurity. Infantry forces operatedtwo or three buildings ahead of theSheridans to prevent ambushes andclose range attacks.22 December, 0900C10 and C12 moved to 4-325's

new sector and assisted in clearingPanama City.23 December, 0800C12 and C20 provided convoy es-

cort to 4-325 AIR. As the columnapproached the 2-504 PIR sector,both the stationary and moving forc-es came under small arms andsniper fie. In the ensuing firefight,the Sheridans received small armsand heavy machine gun fire.

In addition, a rocket-propelledgrenade was fired at a Sheridan.The round missed. Sheridans tookseveral hits from small arms. Thispassage of lines reinforced the needto plan all passage of lines opera-tions in detail. Both the stationaryand the moving force must under-sttand duties, responsibilities, andcontrol measures.24 DecemberCIO, 22, 23, and 34 moved to

secure the area around the VaticanEmbassy, C11 and C12 moved toCerro Tinajitas and provided sup-port to 1-504 Infantry. C20 movedto the Cuban Embassy to assist insecuring that area. During this time,C11 and 12 in the vicinity ofTinajitas took 120-mm mortar fire.

It became routine for Sheridans tobutton up any time Army helicop-ters approached, because their ar-rival normally drew enemy mortarfire. These vehicles and crewsremained in position until 1 an 90.

25 DecemberTeam Armor was detached from 4-6 INF (M ) and task organized with

1-9 IN F (L), 7th LID (with the ex-ception of LT Kozar'svehicle,0).



15/56

C30 was to provide direct fire su p4-6's attack of

f Fort

INF. A1though.a threat toforces still existed, sniping and

in Panama City were nowof engagementf hostile intent and im-

nt danger were present).The mission of Team Armor was

know that Sheridans were

F. ClementLa

, Sheridan.The Sheridans moved back and

to

or civilianhe arrival of the Sheridans, troopsad dealt with mobs and sniper firen the area.December 26As A/]-9 INF began clearing build-

ings in the vicinity of Luis F. Cle-ment Avenue, the Sheridans wereagain in a show-of-force role. Crewsplaced them in position to supportthe infantry by direct fire and whereanyone in the area could see them.1-9 INF provided a dismountedsquad for local, security of theSheridans. The crews of TeamArmor had a tense but uneventfulday. That night, they conductedthree more mounted patrols, againemploying searchlights.

C30's mission to support the clear-ing of the causeway never came topass. Near sunset, CPT Hammondtold LT Kozar to link hack up withTcam Armor th e next morning.

27 DecemberCPT Hammond learned that the

Sheridans in Team Armor were tolink up with 504th PIR, 82d Air-borne Division. Once C30 returnedto Team Armor's location, the team(consisting of three Sheridans andtwo HMMWVs), moved acrossPanama City to Panama Viejo.After a week of combat, CPT Sher-man finally saw the Sheridans andcrews that had been predeployed on16 November. Team Armor wasreconligured.

CPT Sherman used the CSSHMMWV ror command and con-trol. One Sheridan, C33, wouldremain at Panama Viejo, and CPTHammond would take two tanks toCerro Tinajitas lo augment 1-504PIR. Later that night, LT Kozarand his wingman were placedOPCON to 1-75th Rangers 15kilometers northwest of Tocumenairfield.

27 thru 31 DecemberDuring this period, the disposition

of forces remained t h e same.Sheridans conducted show of forceoperations and augmented infantryand military police road blocks andcheckpoints. There was very little ac-tion. However, the crews and leader-ship remained tense and alert be-cause the vehicles had to sit in ex-posed positions to conduct the showof force mission. To sit in stationaryexposed positions was necessary,but contrary tu training, and crewsfelt somewhat "naked." During NewYear's Eve, all nonessential move-ment was stopped and checkpointswere pulled in. This prevented sol-diers from firing at civilians (who

were celebrating by firing weaponsand fireworks).%


16/56

tion must flow up and down, leftand right, and to the front and rear.0 Explain "why" whenever you

can; but troops must realize thatthere is not always time for an ex-planation.0 Set and follow priorities of work

and effort.0 Focus on the mission, maintain

an offensive spirit, don't losemomentum, and don't give theenemy time to react.0 Encourage troops to become

semi-proficient in other languages.There is a lot of real-time informa-tion available to those who can con-verse with the local populace.0 Use appropriate operational

terms and graphics. A common lan-guage is very important whenoperating with different units,branches of service, or in unfamiliarterrain.

0Have a workable plan forprisoners, detainees, and refugees.Without one, command, control,and communications can be severe-ly hampered.

0Have a plan for workingthrough "hot mikes." They exist incombat, too.

0Make good use of maps. Don'tcut them to tit your current situa-tion. You may not be in the samearea tomorrow.

0Talk with attachments that arenot accustomed to working with you(e.g., Marines), make sure you un-derstand each other. Your terms,jargon, and slang may not conveyyour intent to soldiers who are notfamiliar with your unit.0 Learn he capabilities and limita-

tions of supporting and supportedunits and equipment as well as anyspecial requirements that theymight have (e.g. LAV-25s need 25-mm ammunition).

0Make sure everyone is using theappropriate CEO1 (and that theyare using it the same way). There isnothing like finding out that the unit

you are linking up with "froze" thesigdcounter-sign three days agoand you are using the current ones.

MOUTSheridans were absolutely critical

to fighting in built-up areas byproviding direct tire support to in-fantry, as well as surgical firescapable of penetrating reinforcedconcrete buildings.0 Strip maps, with individually

numbered buildings (all buildings inthe area), are a must for operationsin built-up areas. Maps do notprovide enough detail and may notadequately represent the area..In built-up areas, the M2 S Ocaliber machine gun on a flexiblemount is superior to the weaponsstation found on M60- or M1-seriestanks. Yes, the TC is exposed, but itis easier for him to acquire targetsand bring the S O caliber to bear onthose targets.

0The M3A1 submachine gun isuseless as a weapon for the loader.The loader needs a pintle-mountedmachine gun (or an M16 at a mini-mum).

.Large numbers of refugees willlikely be encountered. Be ready forthem.

.Crews frequently used daysights during night operations be-cause city lights, fires, and back-ground illumination washed out theANffVS-7As and M44 night sights.

They used night sights and nightvision devices when the lack ofother illumination permitted.Low-Intensity Conflict (UC).Soldiers must know the rules of

engagement.0Soldiers must have enough dis-

cipline to apply rules of engagementin the absence of supervision.

0Be prepared to task organizewithin platoons. It is not unusual tooperate in pairs or as single tanks.

0Junior officers and NCOs mustknow an d understand thecapabilities and limitations of theirtroops and vehicles. It is not un-usual for a tank commander to bethe armor expert and advisor for aninfantry battalion. Be assertive; letthe infantry know what you haveand what you can do for them. Donot forget to let them know yourlogistical requirements.0 Dismounted security is extreme-

ly important. Let the supported in-fantry know that you need 360-de-gree dismounted security.

.Be familiar with "show of force"operations. Armor can do a lotwithout firing a round. This goeshand-in-hand with executing rulesof engagement.

Combat Service Support (CSS)0 Have someone dedicated to

CSS. It is nearly a full-time job forkey leaders to sustain an armorforce that has been task organizedacross several sectors.

.Effective medical support andevacuation are key in maintainingmorale. The combat lifesaverprogram is invaluable. Every tankshould have a school-trained com-bat lifesaver and medical kit, be-cause of the likelihood of piecemeal-ing Sheridans throughout the sector.Although no serious injuries oc-curred, medics and lifesaversprovided assistance to the combinedarms team and civilians.

(After medics jumped in to theTocumen airhead, they had to rideon the back decks of Sheridans.These soldiers displayed tremen-dous courage under fue andprovided on-the-spot care forwounded soldiers.)



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Airborne0 A homing device is needed to

find equipment that cannot be seen.0Everyone must know the as-

sembly and evacuation plans.0 Sheridans retained their

boresight and zero after heavy drop.

Other0 To prevent fratricide, dont ac-

quire POVs or enemy weapons un-less they are essential to the mis-sion. Impounded civilian vehiclesand troops with strange weaponsmake target identification difficultfor troops with itchy trigger fingers.0 Pre-positioned Sheridans and

the APCs of 4-6 Infantry addedsand bags to the exterior of vehiclesfor additional protection.

.Train lroops on what they canexpect to see in combat. Actualcombat is a lot different than it isdepicted in the movies. Soldiersfight th e way they train.

0Use PT to build stamina; flakjackets and ammunition-laden webgear are heavy. Rapid deploymenttroops must also have the staminato go from winter to summer condi-tions in a matter of hours.

oStocks, pistol grips, and bipodsshould be available for dismountingthe M240 coax machine gun. Theloader of one Sheridan fired a dis-mounted M240 using asbestos mit-tens (to prevent burns).0 All engagements occurred be-tween 100 and 460 meters.0The 152-mm HEAT-T rounds

penetrated reinforced concretewalls from six to ten inches thick.This round created up to eight-footholes in walls and caused extensivedamage to the interior structure ofbuildings.0 Sheridans did not encounter any

V300 armored cars although theSheridans were equipped with Shil-

lelagh missiles, HEAT-T, and 50caliber APl-T for this eventuality.0 Once derigged, heavy drop

Sheridans had little problem movingoff of the swampy drop zone. In ad-diton, they recovered severalHMMWVs and other equipmentthat was stuck on the DZ. Onceclear of the drop zone, there wasvery little cross-country movement.Vehicles in Team Armor traveled100-150 miles, while those with the82d Airborne moved 280-350miles.0All bridges in the area were

rated at 30 tons, with the exceptionof the Bridge of the Americas,which was rated at 50 tons.

oM55lAls were used to driveover or eliminate enemy roadblocksthat were constructed of cars,trucks, buses, concertina wire, andrubble.0 Wheeled vehicles experienced

flat tires from glass, jagged metal,wire, downed poles, and bullets.0 Sheridans completed 100 per-

cent of assigned missions. However,the vehicle is old and has severalshortcomings. Even though theSheridans performed well in thisoperation, there is an urgent needto develop and field a replacementfor the Sheridan.

*Establish and maintain a posi-tive mental attitude. ENDEX maybe a long time coming.SummaryWhile this article focuses on the

employment of armor in OperationJUST CAUSE, armor supported in-fantry in a combined arms effort.The outstanding efforts and achieve-ments of other units have beenomitted simply because time andspace do not permit a full accountof their actions. Without t h e gallantefforts of the individual in-fantrymen, combat engineers, andother soldiers working as a team,Sheridan crews would not have suc-

cessfully accomplished their mis-sions and would certainly have suf-fered casualties.

Units must continue to train ascombined arms teams. This opera-tion has also reinforced the impor-tance of combined arms training att h e tank crew, section, and platoonlevel. Operation JUST CAUSE wasa success because of the highly-trained soldiers at small-unit level.

Captain Frank Sherman isa 1983 graduate of theCitadel. As a lieutenant, heserved as a cavalry platoonleader and company execu-tive officer in the 3dSquadron, 11th ACR. Fol-lowing AOAC, he was as-signed to the 3d Battalion(Airborne), 73d Armor,where he served as the S1.He is currently the C Com-pany commander, whichparticipated in OperationJUST CAUSE with the 82dAirborne Division.

~~ ~

Captain Kevin Harnmondis a 1981 graduate of theU.S. Military Academy. As alieutenant, he served as atank platoon leader, execu-tive officer, and scoutplatoon leader with 4th Bat-talion, 40th Armor at Ft.Carson. Upon completionof AOAC, he was assignedto the 3d Battalion (Air-borne), 73d Armor wherehe served as the battalionmaintenance officer andcommander of A Company.In Operation JUST CAUSE,he served as the com-mander of Team Armor, 4-6Infantry (Mech).



18/56

At left, Marine M60A1 with reactivearmor array on hull and turret. Close-up, above, shows detail of attachmentpoints for turret side panels.

. - - -

Marines Add Reactive ArmorTo M60AIsby Greg StewartExplosive reactive armor tiles once

destined for U.S. Army tanks inKorea have now been fitted to manyof the Marine Corps M60Als to in-crease their survivability againstshaped-charge (HEAT) warheads.

The tiles were purchased to im-prove the protection of the ArmysM60s in Korea, which do not havethe protection of the newer Mlsspecial armor. Instead, the Armydecided to replace these tanks withMls. The Mls special armor servesmuch the same purpose as the reac-tive armor panels; it disrupts theHEAT rounds slug before it canform to penetrate the tanks armor.

Following the lead of the Israelis,who added reactive armor to oldertanks before the 1982 Lebanon in-vasion, many nations have experi-mented with the reactive armor tileson cast armor turrets and hulls.While the modem armor of newerMBTs, those with depleted uraniumor layered armors like Chobham,offer a great degree of protection

against shaped-charge warheads,MBTs with homogenous, rolledsteel armor are candidates for thereactive armor arrays. This is espe-cially the case as more and more ar-mies field effective Light weaponswith HEAT warheads, such as an-titank guided missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.While the battlefield appearanceof reactive armor on Israeli MBTsin Lebanon caused some excitement

in both civilian and military publica-tions as something new and unique,better-informed individuals were al-ready aware that the United StatesArmy had been working intermit-tently on reactive armor since the1950s.When the Soviet Union Fmtequipped its vast fleet of MBTs in

Central Europe with reactive armorin 1984-85, many assumed that theyhad merely copied reactive armor,from Israeli MBTs captured by theSyrians during the 1982 Lebanonconflict. But this would be selling

Photo on facing page illustrateshow reactive armor tiles arelayered on turret front, above gunmantlet.

the Soviets short; they had beenworking on their own reactivearmor program for many years.

The United States efforts in itsown reactive armor program arenow becoming visible. Since the endof 1988, the U.S. Marine Corps hasadded reactive armor to M60A1MBTs.

The tiles became available when itwas decided to replace the 2nd In-fantry Divisions M60A3 MBTs withMlAls . The reactive armor setsthat had been earmarked for the 2dIDS tanks went to the Marines in-stead.

Fifty-seven M60Als of the 1stTank Battalion/lst Marine Divisionat Camp Pendleton, California,were the first to receive the reactivearmor sets, in September to Decem-ber 1988, followed by 58 M60Als ofthe 2nd Tank Battaliodnd MarineDivision at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, in February to April 1989.The 34 M60Als of the 1st Armored



19/56

Assault Battalion, Okinawa, wereequipped in July-August 1989, andthe tanks of one of the threesquadrons stored on Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS) were to befitted in February.

Teams from Anniston ArmyDepot, Alabama, mounted thehardware and tiles to all MBTs ineach battalion, with the exception oftanks due to be rebuilt. They willreceive their reactive armor atMarine logistic bases when they arerebuilt.

The tiles, which come in only twosizes, do not cover the tank as com-pletely as the Israeli design, whichincludes many different sizes andshapes, but they do have the ad-vantage of being easier to maintain,replace, and resupply. Each M60A1MBT has 42 of the larger M-2 tiles(each weighing about 28 poundsand measuring ll -l/2 by 17-V2 by 2inches thick), and 49 of the smaller

M-1 tiles, each weighing 19.9pounds and measuring 11-112 by 11-1/2 by 2 inches. The tiles are boltedlo rails, which are bolted to 111studs welded to the turret and hull.The system adds about 3,000pounds.

Inert (dummy) tiles will be usedon a11 MBTs currently fielded, untilthey are to be deployed in an en-vironment where enemy antitankweapons would necessitate replace-ment with live tiles. Until needed,these are stored on MPS ships.

The dummy tiles weigh much lessthan the live ones, except thedummy tiles on the main gunmantlet, which must equal the livetile weight to keep the gun inbalance. The gun mantlet tiles alsohave to be removed for installationof any subcaliber device duringtraining. To remove the power packalso requires removal of five turrettiles.

~ - ~ARMOR - March-April 1990

Tanks equipped with dozer bladescant accommodate 12 of the tilesnormally located on the front of thehull.

While the Marines will soon startto receive the new MlAl tank, it islikely that the M60Als will supple-ment the Abrams for some time tocome. With the vast array of shaped-charge warhead antitank weaponsavailable today, reactive armor onthe M60Als should enhance theirsurvivability and increase their use-ful life.

Greg Stewart is afreelance photographerspecializing in U.S. Armyand USMC armor and artil-lery. He contributesphotographs to defense-related domestic andforeign publications.17


20/56

At left, U.S. tankers in French-built anksroll toward the front line in World War I.Their commander was BG Samuel D. Rock-enbach,at right.Urns.Armor Between the Wars

by Major Patrick J. Cooney, Editor-iwChiefThe use of armored vehicles

during WWI was a grand experi-ment to reintroduce mobility to astagnant battlefield. But thegasoline engine was too new, andthe war ended too soon after tankswere employed for the majority tosee their value on future battlefields.

Each main belligerent of the FirstWar could claim a handful of vision-ary thinkers during the interwaryears who put to paper theirthoughts on employment of ar-mored vehicles. But, except for theGermans, who steadily movedtoward formalizing doctrine, organi-zations, and tactics heavily reliantupon the characteristics of armoredvehicles, the remainder tinkeredwith the idea once or twice, andeventually gave it up. For the mostpart, they didn't take up the ideaseriously again until late 1939, whenthe Germans unveiled their"Blitzkrieg."

The story of the United StatesTank Corps was typical. Within sixmonths of signing the Armistice, acertain disdain for the war justfought and for anything connectedwith the military was firmly rootedin America's consciousness. In theface of Congressional purse tighten-ing, military opinion was itselfdivided over the future role of ar-

mored vehicles. "How could one in-clude in cut-and-dried war plans avehicle that had a tendency to breakdown when it was most needed andto outrun the infantry when it was ingood condition?" one historianwrote.

The post-war Tank Corps' homewas at Camp Meade, Md., com-manded by Brig. Gen. Samuel D.Rockenbach. Even before redeploy-ment was complete, cuts began totake their toll. Congress passed alaw on 11 July 1919 that cut TankCorps strength to 154 officers and2,508 enlisted men.

A War Department board, con-vened in 1919 to study tank employ-ment, supported General Pershing'sview that tanks should be under thecontrol of the Infantry Branch, aswas the case in the French Army.The board concluded that 'TankService should be under the generalsupervision of the Chief of Infantryand should not constitute an inde-pendent service."

Rockenbach was in position tofight for the existence of the tanksas a separate arm, but "the methodi-cal, hidebound general was not theright man for the job. He was moreinterested in maintaining the statusquo than in promoting research,

development, and training - three es-sentials for the creation of avigorous, improving force."

It fell to men like Maj. George S.Patton Jr. to argue the case. Writingin the May 1920 Irvarttr>, Journal,Patton said, Th e tank is new and,for the fulfillment of its destiny, itmust remain independent, not desir-ing or attempting to supplant in-fantry, cavalry, or artillery, it has noappetite to be absorbed by any ofthem.... The tank corps grafted oninfantry, cavalry, artillery, or en-gineers, will be like the third leg toa duck - worthless for control, forcombat impotent."

Such voices and arguments aside,Congress passed the NationalDefense Act on June 2, 1920, whichabolished the Tank Corps as an in-dependent arm and assigned allunits to the Infantry. Comensurate-ly, all officers reverted to prewarranks by the end of June.

As one might expect, morale inthe tank units plunged. Rockenbachreverted to the rank of colonel andtook up duties as Camp Meade com-mander and symbolic leader of abranch of service that was no longerindependent. Patton and Mitchell,commanders of the 304th and 305thTank Brigades at Meade, both lost



21/56

LTC George S.Patton, Jr. during WWI.their eagles and pinned on captains'bars at the end of the month.

By late 1920, everyone saw thatthere was no future with tanks andthey al l began to bail out, returningmostly to the cavalry.Left at Meadewas only the 16th Light and 17thHeavy Tank Battalions and a main-tenance company. The rest of theforce was carved up. A tank com-pany was assigned to each infantrydivision across the country, and abattalion went to the InfantrySchool at Fort Benning.

By 1927, the British were ex-perimenting with mechanization, lar-gely through the urging of Gen.J.F.C. Fuller. Dwight Davis, U.S.Secretary of War, returned from ob-serving a demonstration anddirected the chief of staff to or-ganize a mechanized force of ourO W .On 1 July 1928, the ExperimentalMechanized Force was born at Fort

Meade and consisted of the lightand heavy tank battalions at Meadeand various smaller infantry, artil-lery, engineer, and signal units fromForts Eustis and Hoyle. From Ft.Myer came the Cavalry's one andonly armored cavalry troop. Alltold, the force, commanded by Col.

I

A Chiistie tank - It ran on tracks or wheelsI II

Oliver Eskridge, amounted to about3,000men.The project was doomed to fail atthe outset. There was no money tofm up the already decrepit vehiclesand equipment, and the force wa sdisbanded on September 20.The War Department decided fur-

ther study was required and taskedits G3 Training Section to take upthe study. Thus, this small groupsuddenly had the power to set thefuture course of mechanization inAmerica.

Enter one "lean, hawk-eyed, high-goal polo-playing cavalry officer,"named Major Adna R. Chaffee,who was a staff officer in the G3Training Section since 1927.

Though Chaffee was not one ofthe old tankers, he could seemechanization's capabilities and bat-tlefield applicability as an inde-pendent force. His report of Decem-ber 5, 1928, for the first time setdown a definite program leading tothe creation of an Armored Force.He outlined a four-year, Wmillionplan for a completely mechanized,self-contained, highly mobile regi-ment, which would be the test bedfor future similar units that wouldcompose "a great part of the highly

M1 "combat cars," tanks for the Cavalry.mobile combat troops of the nextwar." The backbone of this forcewould be a fleet of new, fast tanks,supplemented by support troops inarmored cars, personnel carriersand trucks. He envisioned a com-bined arms team - each element car-ried to battle on tracked or wheeledarmored vehicles.

Immediately there arose cries of"expensive gadgetry." Because therewas no money in the FY 1928budget, it didn't matter anyway, butthe proposal did give rise to a dog-light between the Chief ofOrdnance and the Chief of Infantryover what kind of tank the Armywas to buy. Ordnance wanted a37mm-gun tank of 7.5 tons (T-1)from Cunningham and Sons, andthe Infantry wanted an 8.6-ton Chris-tie design.

Congress appropriated $250,O00 nthe next budget to buy six to eight T-1s for test by the Infantry. But achange in Infantry Branch chiefsbrought a change in the budgetprovision to buy six to eight Chris-ties instead. The new Chief ofOrdnance, however, disliked Chris-ties, so they only bought one for$62,000, and the rest of the moneywent back to the Treasury. Chaffeemust have taken great delight in



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seeing his plan come together likethis.

Chaffee tirelessly refused to let themechanization idea die, when lessermen would have tossed in the towelin frustration.

Perhaps as a tribute to Chaffee'spersistence, the FY31 budget con-tained $285,000 for mechanization.But, where to start? In 2930, theWar Department was looking toclose Ft. Eustis. Thus, one of Chiefof Staff General Summerall's lastdirectives before leaving office inOctober was, "Assemble thatmechanized force now. Station it atFort Eustis. Make it permanent, nottemporary."

Chaffee had recommended ageneral officer to command themech force, bu t none he ap-proached wanted the inherent riskinvolved. So, Chaffee picked andrecommended Colonel Daniel VanVo orhi of the 12th Cavalry on theborder. His organizational and ad-ministrative abilities were wellknown in cavalry units. Among theother first officers were MajorSereno E. Brett, and Major RobertW. Grow.

From Chaffee's position on thegeneral staff, he continued to arguefor better tanks and equipment and

At left, MG Guy V.Henry, one of theChiefs of Cavalry inthe 1930s

At right, two tanksford a creek in sup-port of infantrymaneuvers at FortBenning,Ga.. in 1939.

spoke at the Infantry,. Cavalry, FieldArtillery, and Engineer Schools; atdivisions and at the War College insupport of a combined arms,mechanized force. His typicalspeech ended with this challenge:"The main point is that we, as sol-diers, must recognize the tremen-dous strides which our automotiveindustry has made since the lastwar. If we neglect to study everypossible usage of this asset in ournext war, we should not only bestupid, we should be incompetent."

In fall of 1930, Chief of StaffGeneral MacArthur ordered yetanother study of all War Depart-ment policies regarding mechaniza-tion. Petty branch jealousies sur-faced again. Infantry wanted controlof mechanization, citing theDefense Act of 1920. Cavalrymenwanted to be a player, but had thejitters about losing their belovedhorses. Writers became prolific insupport of their own parochial views.

But Chaffee began to see amechanized force as a natural exten-sion of the historic cavalry missionsof reconnaissance, screen, guardand hit-and-run tactics. He quietlyworked behind the scenes, gentlybut firmly pushing mechanizationinto the cavalry domain. This drewunexpected opposition even frompeople like Van Voorhis, who

stayed firm in his belief that a mechforce should not be p a t of anybranch.

Chaffee gained the support of theChief of Cavalry, MG Guy V.Henry, who in time convincedMacArthur to assign mechanizationto the cavalry. The results of theWar Department study had a mixedresult. The Mechanized Force atEustis was disbanded, its elementsassigned to the cavalry for reor-ganization. But each branch wasauthorized to pursue its ownmechanization agenda, this leavingthe Army with no clear unifieddirection.

Chaffee knew that some of his fel-low cavalrymen would feelthreatened by mechanization, whichthey perceived as a death knell forthe horse, but h e was unpreparedfor the bitter, deliberate oppositionhe would encounter for the nextdecade. The prominent view wasmechanization taking a parallel rolewith horsed cavalry, assisting, sup-plementing, supporting - but neveroperating independently. But Chaf-fee's goal was clear - only an inde-pendent armored force could getthe job done.

On June 15, 1931, Chaffee leftWashington and reported to FortEustis as XO. He and Van Voor-



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Two of the founders of the US. Ar-mored Force, MG Daniel Van Voorhis,far left, and BG Adna Chaffee, besidehim, with members of the commandgroup at Fort Knox in the 19309.

his agreed that the Virginia postwas too small to test and experi-ment with new equipment and tac-tics, so they began to search foranother post. The Chief of Cavalryand the Cavalry School wanted theforce moved to the border whereth e bulk of the cavalry regimentswere stationed. But Chaffee wantedCamp Knox with its 33,000 acres ofrugged terrain.

The War Department approvedthe choice, and on 1 January 1932,Camp Knox was permanently re-es-tablished as Fort Knox. The TankSchool itself, however, moved toFort Benning as part of the InfantrySchool.

The remnants of the disbandedEustis force arrived at Fort Knox inNovember 1931 and formed thenucleus of a new mechanized caval-ry unit, the Detachment forMechanized Cavalry Regiment.

In December, the War Depart-ment ordered Fort D.A. Russellclosed and its 1st Cavalry Regimentto Fort Knox, another skirmish wonby Chaffee.

Through 1933 and into 1934, Chaf-fee scratched out a civilized exist-ence at Fort Knox, which wasdilapidated and had no paved roadswhen he arrived in late 1931. He

turned down the chief of staff's jobwith the 1st Cavalry Division atBliis to stay with the force. Hefought for money and gave newmeaning to the word improvisation.At t h e same time, he trained hisnew force. Invited to participate inthe spring 1933 maneuvers, Chaffeedeclined, "We have too big a job infront of us to get the regiment or-ganized and trained in a basic wayto be able to afford to go out andshow it off. There is no use makingconcert engagements until you canplay the piano."

In the meantime, the banter aboutmech versus horse increased intempo. The typical view, expressedby Major George S. Patton, Jr. inthe September-October 1933 Caval-r) , Joiinzal called for a mix of horseand mech units. No cavalry officerwanted to go on record as sayingreplace the horse with a machine.The way we have come to associatePatton with sweeping tank actionmakes this view all the more surpris-ing, "It is my opinion, however, thatsuch operations [machines actingalone] will be the aception [em-phasis in original] rather than therule and that in general mechanizedand horse cavalry will operatetogether....Armored fighting vehiclesare...costly machines with no com-mercial use. Hardly a part of themis standard. Also, they become ob-

solescent before they are finished.For this reason, no nation will everstart a war with many machines."

Interestingly, in the same issue,Captain F.T. Bonsteel saw the fu -ture, along t h e same lines as Chaf-fee, in "The Employment of aMechanized Cavalry Brigade." [pp.19-2(,] "Mechanized cavalry willenable a commander to extend hispowers beyond the sphere of ac-tivity of t h e other arms, and tactical-ly to influence the course of eventsby striking a dynamic blow in a vitaldirection. Mechanized cavalry willachieve its greatest results when con-centrated in large masses, underdirect control of higher com-manders, and employed in decisiveaction to exploit fleeting oppor-tunities."

While the discussion heated up,the last Cavalry Joiinzal issue of1933 unceremoniously showed the1st Cavalry (Mechanized) at FortKnox, Ky., having assigned ColonelDaniel Van Voorhis, commanding;Lt. Col. Adna R. Chaffee, XO; andMa,jors Robert W. Grow and Wil-liam G. Simmons. And they were in-volved in something more than dis-cussion. They were strugglingagainst preconceived ideas, branchjealousies, and lack of assets toforge a new thunderbolt for the bat-tlefield.



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T-64s In the Fieldb

1Above, early T-64~ ithout either "gill armor" platesor non-metallic skirts reveal suspension details.Note that the T-64 suspension, unlike that on earlierSoviet tanks, includes rack return rollers. Also noteshorter 125-mm gun tube on this model.

At right, thisT64A has the early opticalrangefinderwith "ear" on right side ofturret. Smoke dischargers are mountedon turret front; they are moved backon later models to make space for reac-tive armor array. Front slope armor onthis tank has been upgraded with appli-que plates: note oval cutouts that per-mit access to mine-plow attachment

a

Gunner's sight "dog house" details help identify the T-64 variants. On the T-MA, at left, the gunner's "doghouse"issmaller and narrower, and there is a second "eat' in front of the commander's station on the op-posite side. Note also the infantry handrail and "gill armor" plates on this model. In photo at right, thelarger, wider gunner's "dog house" identifies he laser-rangefinder-equippedT-64. Nonmetallic skirtsreplace he "gill armor" plates, and the front slope has additional armor plates added. Also note earlysmoke discharger ocation, later moved to rear.



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The Tank That Could Have Won the Next War:An AssessmentOf the Soviet T-64PremiumTankBy CPT James M. WarfordHistorically, the Soviets have

managed to successfully surprisetheir enemies on the battlefield bykeeping their most advanced armortechnology secret.

In his book, Parrzer Leader, aboutthe early days of the German armorforce, General Heinz Guderian tellsabout a Russian military commis-sion's visit to various German tankfactories and schools in the springof 1941. Germany and Russia werestill allies, bound by the Russo-Ger-man Non-Aggression Treaty of1939, a situation that would con-tinue until the German invasion ofRussia a few months later.

Hitler had ordered that the visit-ing Russians see all of the latestGerman tank production facilitiesand his army's best tanks, insistingthat nothing be concealed. Accord-ing to Guderian, W e could reckonon our tanks being technically bet-ter than all known Russian types;we thought that this would more orless cancel out the Russians' vastnumerical superiority:'

When the Russian officers viewedthe Panzer IV, they did not believeit was Germany's best tank. Theywere convinced that the Germanswere hiding their newest tanks fromthem, and complained that theywere not seeing everything.

When the Russians were so insis-tent that they were not shown thebest the German Army had to offer,t h e German ordnance office cameto an unfortunate realization: "...The

T-WB with reactive armor attachment pointsRussians must already possess bet-ter and heavier tanks than we do."2

This eleventh-hour realization be-came battlefield fact a few monthslater, at the end of July 1941, whenthe Russian T-34/76 medium tankmade it's appearance in battle. Itforced the German Army into thedangerous position of having toreact to a technically superiorenemy tank.

This may have only been the firstexample of the Soviets' ability tobeat their adversaries to the draw intank technology. This Soviet ability -to develop technically superior ar-mored vehicles and then keep thesevehicles secret until they appear onthe battlefield, or until their remain-ing a secret is no longer required -has been an increasingly dangerousthreat to the armies of NATO. Ithas been demonstrated, not once,but twice in recent history.

In addition to the example of theT-34/76 described above, theSoviets started to produce anothervery powerful and innovative tank in1%5. The T-64 was not only supe-rior to Western tanks of the sameperiod, but also forced the Westernarmies into the position of having toscramble to react to Soviet innova-tions. Even in peacetime, the T-64'sappearance caused a massive reac-tion by the armies of the West. Yetthis was only a fraction of the im-pact this tank would have wroughton the battlefield, had a war beengoing on at the time.We must be prepared to identifyand counter whatever develops as

the next tank in the line that startedwith the T-34/76 and continued withthe T-64. We must avoid any future"eleventh-hour" battlefield scenariothat could translate into the samekind of strategic surprise that ul -timately defeated the Germans o nthe Eastern Front.A close examination of the SovietT-64 suggests what could have hap-

pened if war had broken out priorto the appearance of the AmericanM1 and West German Leopard 2as well as what might happen if thenext innovative Soviet tank is al-lowed to surprise the West.Origins of the T-64When the Soviet T-62 main battle

tank entered production in 1960,work had already started on anewer tank, and by the time the T-62 was first seen in public in 1%5,this still-newer tank had gone intoproduction. While Western intel-ligence sources knew of the exist-ence of this new tank, they did notappreciate how radically it differedfrom earlier Soviet designs. Beforeidentification of the tank that wouldbecome the T-64, the Soviets haddeveloped tanks in a series ofprogressive, evolutionary steps,from the T-34 series, through the T-54 and T-55,nd finally to the T-62,essentially an improved and up-gunnedT-55.

The "-64 was a much more daringevolutionary step, incorporatingmajor changes in several areas. Inaddition to improved armor and abigger gun, the T-64's flat, opposed,

ARMOR - March-April7990 23


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5-cylinder diesel was a major depar-ture from the diesels that hadpowered the earlier designs, and itsmuch more sophisticated suspen-sion - incorporating "live" tracksand return rollers - bore littleresemblance to the earlier Christie-type suspensions that had been per-fected in the T-34 design of the1930s.The production models of the first

T-64s were preceded by a numberof prototypes that differed primarilyin turret and hull front shapes.Several sources identified aprototype that was used for testsand was known as the T-67, butwhat they may have actually seen insome very grainy films of a winterexercise in 1970 was the base modelT-64. This new tank was given theprovisional designation of M1970,and has since been referred to asboth the "-70" and the "Dvina" tank(after the March 1970 Dvina exer-cise in the Byelorussian Military Dis-trict). Because these first views ofthe T-64 were of very poor quality,(the tanks were most likely misiden-tified as developments of the T-62),various speculative designationswere attached to the new tank.Once better quality photographs be-came available, it became obviousthat the tank in question was clearlynot a modified T-62, but was in factthe newT-64.

The Soviet Army fielded the T-64for operational trials in 1967 withthe 100th Guards Tank TrainingRegiment? Shortly after the start ofthese trials, the tank was sub-sequently issued to the 41st GuardsTank Division. Since it's initial field-ing, the Soviets have continued todevelop and modify the T-64. Todate, Western intelligence sourceshave identified seven differentvariants of the T-64. he variantsand their major identifying featuresare summarized in the illustration.

Evolution of the T-64d Variation -Several prototypes were apparently tested with dif-rent turret configurations and hull fronts. At first, Western analystsentified them as variants of the T-62, some calling the tank the T-67.grainy movies of a 1970winter exercise, the tank the analysts wereieing may have been the base model of the T-64.

so called the "base model,"'7-70,"nd "Dvina Tank," it was first seenthe March 1970 maneuvers near Dvina in Byelorussia. Actually!Id& for trials in 1967. Identifying features includea shorter versionthe 125-mm main gun, infantry handrails along th e lower part of therret, and tool stowage box on right front fender (replaced by a fuelnk on later models.)

ieT-A, or"standard model," produced in very large numbers, con-wed to use an optical, coincidence rangefinder. Identification fea-ires includea longer, thermal-sleeved 125-mmmain gun, elimination' t h e infantry handrails, and replacement of the tool box on th e rightmt fender with an additional fuel tank. Smoke grenade launchersereadded to the turret sides. Four spring-loaded armor platesrotect each side of the running gear from HEAT warheads.

4th Variation I, Called the T-64A LRF, thecoincidence rangefinderis replaced by a laser ran-gefinder. Gunner'sprimary sight "doghouse"is wider andlarger. Optical ran-gefinder "ear"is coveredand sealed, no longernecessary with the LRF.Nonmetallic, full skirtsalso replace gill armor onchassis.24

~~



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5th VariationCalled the 1981/1, thiswas the early T-646,first seen on parade inRed Square in May1985. There is an L-shaped bracket in frontof the commander'shatch, perhaps to addthe guidance controlbox for the AT-8"Kobra" missile, if re-quired. Like the 4th Variation, this one also has theThe right-hand "eat, or larger gunner's "dog house." Smokethe earlier optical ran- grenade launchers have been moved back togefinder is now deleted. accomodate ater addition of reactive armor.

There are several obvious identifying eatures: The K version does notmount the antiaircraft machine gun at the commander's station andcarries an additional storage tube at the turret rear.The tube contains an addi-tional antenna mast whichcan be mounted on the tur-ret roof. The telescopicmast, 10 meters high whenelevated, has to be guyedin place, so the tank is im-mobile when the mast is seUP.There is an additional ante1na base in front of the cornmander's hatch.

On thisT-646, the guidancebox for the AT-8 missile ismounted in front of the corn,mander's station on the tur-ret roof. The missile, storedin two parts in theautoloader carousel, can beloaded and fired like a con-ventional round.I \ '. I ISO fitted for reactive armoi7th VariationThe T-64K command tank variants are assigned to battalion andregimental commanders and are not seen below battalion level. Thesemodels are converted T-64As, and have the smaller "dog house" andright-side rangefinder "eat" of this earlier model.

-The T-64 was the first tank in the

world to be fielded with multi-layercomposite armor. This innovation,which I will discuss in detail lateron, changed the face of moderntank warfare. The many .teethingproblems that have been associatedwith the T-64 over the years prob-ably became apparent with the basemodel of the tank. There werereports that the T-64 was plaguedby poor automotive performance.There were also reported problemswith the innovative automatic load-ing system, a new development thatpermitted reduction in crew size tothree men. According to thesereports, the automatic loading sys-tem occasionally "ate Soviet tankers"and that "few gunners are excited bythe prospect of having their arm fedinto the breach of the cannon...More recent information indicatesthat these early reports were exag-gerated and that the majority ofthese problems had been solved inlatcr variants.

114

Armament InnovationsThe T-64 is fitted with the 2A46 D-

81TM Rapira-3 125-mmmain gun.It is the largest main gun mountedon any tank in the world, and it'sdestructive power is enormous.There are, however, some reports ofdispersion problems with the gun'sammunition. These problems wereprobably caused by poor qualitycontrol in ammunition manufacturein early generations of 125-mmrounds.

The gun's maximum effectiverange is somewhere between 1,500and 2,OOO meters. For engagementsbeyond this range, the T-64B canfire the AT-8 antitank guided mis-sile interchangeably with the conven-tional HVAPFSDS, HEAT-FS, andFRAG-HE ammunition. The gun isfed by a "korzina" (basket)autoloader that allows the vehiclecrew to be reduced to three, and

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enables the tank to fire six to eightrounds per minute. One drawbackof this main gun was identifiedduring the Iran-Iraq war, in whichthe 125-mm was fitted to Iraqi T-72s. According to the Iraqis, themain gun had a barrel life of only120 rounds.

Later models of the T-64B also in-corporated a major technical innova-tion in the armamenl system: the125-mm gun could fire not only thenormal range conventional ammuni-tion, but could also launch anddirect the AT-8 "Kobra" antitankmissile, which uses radio-frequencyguidance and can be loaded directlyfrom the auto

armor magazine, march-april 1990

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