armor magazine, march-april 1987

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, March-April 1987

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mNot long ago, a fr iendand Iwere talking aboutcommanders or whomwe had worked. Look-ing back over the pastsixteen years, w e bothdiscovered two qualitiescommon to the goodcommanders. Not sur-

prisingly, these same tw o qualities wereusually lacking in the commanders wedidn't believe were effective.The first quality was that the goodcommanders didn't take themselves tooseriously. I don't mean that they didn'ttake their responsibilities seriously; infact, the good commanders took thei rposit ions and their professions veryseriously. What I mean is that th e goodones were always willing to laugh atthemselves. They had a sense of humorthat made them human to their subor-dinates and often took the edge off ofstressful times. They never consideredthemselves more important, or better,than their soldiers. Believe me, the ir sol-diers worked harder and better as a re-sult.The second quality that made theseofficers "a cut above" the ir contempo-raries was their ability to work effectivelyin unusual or unordinary situations -situations for which their training or ex-perience had not prepared them. No mat-ter wha t the problem, these commandershad a "mental mobility" from which theydr ew th e wisdom to solve problems effec-tively and efficiently. Additionally, theirpeople learned from the experience; theexperience wasn't just another problemfor them to handle for "the old man."Upon my first reading of LieutenantGeneral Sam Myers' most recent install-ment of "Random Recollections," my irs t

reaction was: "What does th is have to dowith Armor and Armored Cavalry?" A l-most immediately, though, lsaw that thisstory related an incident in which anofficer - cavalry officer -found him -self in a situation and with a problem forwhi ch he had no formal train ing or educa-tion. More importantly, th is officer founda way to solve the problem and workeffectively in that foreign culture withoutlosing his sense of humor. The storyrepresented exactly those qualities thatmy friend and I had identified only acouple of weeks before I received "TheGafsa Girls." Idon't believe hat anythinglike this story has appeared in ARMORbefore, and I doubt if anything like it willappear again. All too often we a l l takeourselves too seriously to perm it the te ll-ing of a story that doesn't relate the"historical glory" of our unit - r ourtime-honored technical and tactical com-petence.

As you read this story, t hink aboutsome of the unusual situations in whichyou havefound yourself. Doyou have thatmental mobility so necessary for a leaderand commander today? Ask yourself ifyou too have a sense of humor that makesyou human to your people. Do you takeyourself so seriously that your peoplework because they don't want you to"chew them out," or do they do the ir bestbecause they know you'll appreciate theirefforts? While I doubtyou will ever find your-self in the same situa-tion as did the com-mander of the 'racetrack gang,' 1 hope thatyou see a littl e of your-self in the story we call"The Gafsa Girl s."- PR


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Magazine StaffEditor-in-ChiefMAJOR G. PATRICK RllTE RManaging EditorJO N T. CLEMENSAssistant EditorROBERT E. ROGGEProduction AssistantVIVIAN THOMPSONContributing ArtistSFC ROBERT TORSR UD

United States Army Armor SchoolCommandantM G THOMAS H. TAlTAssistant CommandantBG PAUL E. FUNKDeputy Assistant CommandantCOL CLAUDE L. CLARKChief of StaffCOL RALPH R. WOLFECommand Sergeant MajorCS M JOHN M. STEPHENSMaintenanceCOL GARRY P. HIXSONCommand and StaffCOL ROBERT D. HURLEYWeaponsCOL DA N E. DETERTraining GroupLTC WILLIAM R. BROWNLEE. IINCO Academy/Drill Sergeant SchoolCSM LOWELL E. DICKI NSONEvaluation and StandardizationCOL ROBERT A. KORKINTraining and DoctrineCOL CLAUDE W. ABATECombat DevelopmentsCOL DONALD SMART

Units194th Armored BrigadeCOL SAMUEL D. WILDER, JR.1st Armor Training BrigadeCOL ROBERT 6. FRANKLIN, JR.2d Armor Training BrigadeCOL DOMINIC W. RUGGERIO4th Training BrigadeCOL JOHN N. SLOAN

Directorate ofReserve Component Support

DirectorCOL JAME S E. DlERlCKXOffice, Chief of Armor

DirectorCOL CECIL L. SHRADERMarch-April 1987Vol XCVl No. 2

FEATURES8 The Mi-24 "Hind": A Potent Adversary

by Captain Carter MyersReducing Track Squeak on Current U.S. MBTsby First Lieutenant Edward Stanley, Mr. David Sass, andMr. Gary Marti nRandom Recollections: The Gafsa Girlsby Lieutenant General Samuel L Mye rs (Ret.)The Ten Lean Years: Part 2by Major General Robert W. Gro w (Ret.)

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20

25

34 The S3/S4 Interfaceby Captain C. S. Barnthouse

DEPARTMENTS2 Letters5 Commander's Hatch6 Driver's Seat7 Recognition Quiz39 ProfessionalThoughts48 Master Gunner's Corner50 Regimental Review

50 Recognition Quiz Answers50 Armor Conference Agenda51 Books

ARMOR magazine ISSN 0004-2420) spublished bi-monthly by the U.S. Army ArmorCenter, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox,Kentucky 40121. Unless otherwise stated,material does not represent policy, thinking, orendorsement by any agency of the U.S. Army.Use of appropriated funds for printing of thispublicat ion was approved by the Department ofthe Army 6 January 1984.ARMOR is not a copyrighted publication bu tmay contain some articles which have beencopyrighted by individual authors. Materialwhich is not under copyright may be reprinted ifcredit is given to ARMOR and the author.Permission to reprint copyrighted materi-al must be obtained from the author.ARMORmay be forwarded to milita ry personnelwhose change of address is caused by offi cialorders (except at APO addresses) withoutpayment of additional postage. The subscribermust notify the postmaster.

CORRESPONDENCE:Address al lcorrespondence to U.S. Army Armor Center,A T N : ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox. Kentucky, 40121.(Telephone: AUTOVON 464-2249/2610 orcommercial (502)624-2249/2610.)SECOND class postage paid at Fort Knox,Kentucky and additional mailing office.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individualsubscriptions oARMOR are available hroughthe U.S. Armor Association, Post Office Box607, Fort Knox. Kentucky 401 21. TelephoneDomestic: $16.00 one year; 527.75 tw o years:$39.50 three years. Foreign: $23.50 one year;$36.75 two years. Single copies, 52.50.

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USPS 467-970


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New Boresight InstrumentDear Sir:

I note with interest an article, "HelpfulHints To A Good Boresight," by CaptainPhilipS. Sperling in he Nov-Dec 86 issueofARMOR Magazine.The article suggestsa method of elim inating parallax in thePye Watson bores ight by using dark coloredadhesive tape with a punched hole on theeyepiece.In August, 1986, after a full competitiveevaluation, Lenzar Optics Corporation'was awarded a large multi-year award forthe M26, 105/1 20-mm muzzle boresightdevice. The Lenzar boresight will be thenew standard for the U.S. Army. Thedevice is inherently self centering, doesnot require rotational readings, has a 10Xmagnification, and has a +/- 4 dioptereyepiece adjustment to compensate forparallax without a fix of dark colored tape.The boresight was designed and will bemanufactured in th e US., and althoughwe admit to being partial, w e believe oursoldiers will now have the finest largecaliber boresight device in the world.

BRAD GANTHERLenzar Optics CorporationRiviera Beach, FL

Clarke Article LaudedDear Sir:

How sweet it was to again read anartic le by General Bruce C. Clarke in yourNov-Dec issue. (See "An Estimate of theArmor Situation.")As usual, General Clarke asks somevery big questions and reminds us armor

types, as well as the whole Army, of somevery important lessons earned, but unfor-tunately forgotten over time.Having served under General Clarke'scommand in 7thA rmyas a young.lieuten-ant, and again as a battalion S3 when hecommanded USAREUR, I've grown overtime t o realize he is truly one of our all-time premier trainers and combat leaders.

CLARK A. BURNETTColonel, Armor (Ret.)Enterprise, AL

Liquid Propellant DevelopmentsDear Sir:

The September-October 198 6 issue ofARMOR contained a well-written articleentitled "Novel Tank Guns?" by RichardOgorkiewicz, which warrants additionalcomment. Mr. Ogorkiewicz may not beaware of the fu ll range of liquid propellantworkongo ing in he U.S. It scritical toth eevolution of the Close Combat (Heavy)Force that we objectively evaluate allemerging technologies associated with

tank gunsystems. We need o ensure thAthe needso f the force drive technology tothe heights necessary to minimize battle-field deficiencies and defeat the threat.AirLand Battle and Army 21 doctrine maybe unnecessarily burdened with potential-ly outdated technology if we wa it throughanother generation of solid propellanttank guns without accurately assessingthe to tal systems benefits of a liquid pro-pellant tank gun.Mr. Ogorkiewicz provides an excellentoverview of the past successes of the GERegenerative Liquid Propellant (LP) Gunprogram. This success has been achievedwith considerable support from the U.S..Army Ballistics Research Lab (BRL) andthe Armament Research, Development,and Engineering Center (ARDEC). How-ever, l must disagree with the author'sstatement that, "...liquid propellant gunsdo not offer tha t many advantages oversolid propellant guns as tank guns." Onthe contrary, the potential gains from aliquid propellant tankgun, as employed inaccordance with AirLand Battle doctrine,are quite significant.

Performanceof the gun itself, measuredin terms of rate of fire, accuracy, andability to penetrate enemy armor, is ob-viously the most critical evaluation. Theability to penetrate enemy armor dependson several factors, including projectilekinetic energy and projectile design. Asth e author discussed, increases in kineticenergy can be achieved by increasingmuzzle velocity or developing larger cal-iber ammunition. Unfortunately, with con-ventional propulsion, both approacheswillnecesitate large increases in gun weightand size, and consequently have an ad-verse impact on the tota l tank system.General Electric and BRL are develop-ing a novel approach to achieve signifi-cantly h igher kinetic energy using a liquidpropellant travelling charge. The travel-ling charge acts as a high pressure, in-bore rocket, and offers greatly increasedprojectile kinetic energy with relativelylittl e increase in gun weight. Designstudies, based on the use of LP travellingcharge, indicated that it should be possi-ble to design a tank gun which wouldlaunch the current 120-mm projectilewit h a velocity in the 2-3 km/sec range,wit h only slight increases to gun weigh tand volume.

Firepower would be further enhancedwith an autoloader system able to storeand handle only the projectile itself- otthe propellant or the casing and primer.The elimination of the casing and solidpropellant wou ld pe rmit.an LP version ofan M l A l ocarryanestimated56stowedrounds. Ready rounds would increasefrom the current 17 (hand-loaded) to ap-proximately 48 (automated). Rate of firewould increase to an estimated 20 rds/mi n (KE) and 13 rds/min (HEAT). Theseestimates are based on a one year LP

Armor study effort performed by GE in1985 for the BRL.As a system, an LP-equipped CloseCombat (Heavy) vehicle offerseven great-er gains. The ability to use a simpler andsmaller autoloader device coupled withthe storage flexibility and much higherpackaging density of liquid propellants,would yield considerable turret designflexibility and-thepotential for decreasing-vehicle p rofile and size. Mr. Ogorkiewiczhigh lights the survivability advantages tobe gained through LP-equippedplatforms.In fact, th e family of monopropellants inuse isactuallyw ater soluble, low in oxici-ty, and highly resistant to initiation byfragments and shaped charge mpact. Thelogistics benefits of a bulk-stored andbulk-loaded propellant are substantial.Additionally, curre nt estimates indicatethat per shot propellant costs for an LPtankg un would be lessthanone-sixth thatof solid p ropellant costs.In summary, a liquid propellant tankg unoffe rs significant system benefits includ-ing higher muzzle velocities, reduced vul-nerability, smaller vehicle size, increasedrate of fire, more stowed ammunition loadand decreased logistics burden. The key isthat we not resign ourselves toa less thanoptimal choice for th e next generation oftank guns based solely on estimated en-gineering timeliness. Mr. Ogorkiewicrcloses his article by stating that, "...it isnecessary to continue th e development ofsolid propellant tank guns and to produceat least one more generation of them." Iagree - we do need to continue thedevelopment of solid propellant tank guns-bu t we must also push the development.of liquid propellant guns. When it comestime to decide on which will be in he nextgeneration of armored vehicles, the.deci-sion should be based on the system thatbest meets th e needs of the armor trooperto fight and win on the next battlefield.Needs of the Army must drive technology,.not vice versa.

CHRISTOPHER J. KltLOYProgram Engineer, GECaptain, Armor, USARPittsfield, MA

"Which SABOT?"Dear Sir:

At present both the APDS and APFSDSrounds are announced in the fire com-mand as "SABOT." The two rounds do,however, have different ballistics and,therefore, different trajectories.The Army has acknowledged hese dif-ferences by installing separate cams foreach i n the M60, M60A1, and M48A5tanks. Also, the M60A3 has two ammuni-tion select buttons, one marked APFSDSand he other APDS. When changing fromone to th e other, the gun does, in fact,

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move to compensate for the different tra-jectories.If we hadto fighttomorrow, both roundsare still in inventory, and wou ld certainlybe issued. Can we afford to ignore thepossibilityof combined loads nourta nks?Imagine the devastating confusion whenthe TC orders, "GUNNER, SABOT, TWOTANKS..,"and both the gunner and loaderreply, "which SABOT?"The bottom line is that we don't trainwith APFSDS, so we don't have a firecommand for it.Please consider this a plea for fire com-mands that te ll the crew what round theTC wants to shoot. I propose a change i nfire commands to announce APDS as"SABOT," and APFSDS as "FIN SABOT."

DAN DENSFORDMajor, Armor, TXARNGHouston, Texas

This SABOTDear Sir:

Curren t stocks of spin stabilized serviceammunition (M392A2) are being retro-graded and fired either in tests or intraining at the NTC. This retrograde isexpected to be complete in 1990. Theprobability of mixed ammunition loads ona tank is currently small, and is decreasingtoth epo intof being impossiblein 1990.IfM392A2 were not being retrograded,MA J Densford would have a valid point. In,view of the situation, a change to firecommands would be of litt le current (andeven less future) use for worldwide appli-cation.Tank fire control systems have separate.baHistic solutions for spin (APDS) sta-bilized M724 training and M392A2 ser-vice ammunition, and for fin (APFSDS)stabilized service ammunition. There is alarge ballistic difference, as MAJ Dens-ford points out, that requires separatesolutions for.spin- and fin-stabilized am-.munition. There are not, however;separatesolutions for each model (M735, M774,M833) of fin-stabilized service ammuni-tion on M60/M48 series tanks. Ballisticcharacteristics of these rounds are suf-ficiently similar to allow their firing wit hone fire control solution and still m aintainsystem accuracy requirements. This alsoreduces production costs and eliminatesthe chance of confusion over "What typeof fin ssbot?" Additionally, there is onlyone spin-stabilized solution (M392A2) inthe fire control computer, with which bothM392 A2 and M7 24 are fired.Unit SOPs should address upload ofammunition to preclude mixed types(spin- and fin-stabilized)on.boardatank. Ifammunition is mixed on a tank, SOPsshould also state that the fin-stabilizedammuniti on should be fired only at tanks.

DANIEL E. DETERColonel, ArmorDirector, Weapons Systems Dept.

Fort Knox, KY

Crewscan CapeDear Sir:Despite the fact that our stocks ofM32 9A2 ammunition wil l beconsumed inthe near future, the CAM/ballistic solu-tion for spin stabilized munitions will re-main in he tank's computerfor some timein order to fire the M7 24 training sabot.Unless the cost of newly developedrounds with fin stabilized type ballisticsimili tude comes down considerably, theM72 4wi l l emain he KE training round inmost locations.In keeping with the "keep it simple"philosophy, the tank commander's deci-sion i n the heat of battle is a choicebetween tw o rounds, KE or CE. His choiceis then announced in a standardized firecommand to his crew. The occasion ofhaving two types of KE ammunition onboard will be the exception (diminishingover time) and can be easily handled on anexceptional basis by the crew. It certain lydoes not warrant making a change togunnery training for the entire Armorforce. We need to credit our tankers wi ththe a bility to cope with a simple problem ofsegregating rounds by type within theammo racks and possessing the team-work necessaryto recognize and announcethe lesser KE round once the "best" KEround is no longer available.

DOUGLAS R. BURGESSColonel, ArmorTSM Tank Systems

Reflections on KoreaDear Sir:"Armor Operations and Training inKorea" by Lieutenant Colonel Koropey.(Nov-Dec issue) I thought excellent andtimely; further, I found his conclusionsvalid and realistic. Following enlisted in-fant ry service i n the Korean .War (Co L.35 th Inf, 25t h Div; Dec 1950 to June1951) I had commissioned service in Ar-mor. In March 1986, with a veteransgroup, I had the privilege of revisitingKorea, includ ing many places memorablefor events of 35 years before. Aga instthisbackground I offer some additional com-ments on th e subject of Lieutenant Colo-nel Koropey's article:Indirect ire wit h the tank main gun was"frequent," but rare and generally con-ducted as a sort of intellectual exercise.For many reasons, especially in mountainterrain, indirect supporting fires are bestleft to the mortars and artillery. Our infan-try is more apt to lack direct supportingfire, which you find wherever you can.Twoclassic examples, both rom weaponsdesigned for air defense, were the Ger-man Army's use of the 88-mm in WW IIand our use in Korea of the halftrack-mounted "quad fifty.""The Defile Problem." Lieutenant Colo-nel Koropey notes that the usual solution

of moving infantry along ridgelines whiletank-infantry teams move along the valleyroads s "thorough but awfuIlyslow."The35th (CACTI) employed this very methodin and along the Uijongbu corridor in theUN Counteroffensive of late May 1951,and found a way to speed up the temposomewhat. Enemydefensive and delayingpositions .were located on successivepeaks of th e very large hi ll masses com-mon to Korea. As shown by the Regimen-tal Command Report forthat month, whileone un it advanced along the high ground,others advanced by road (tank-mounted,often follow ed by additional truck-mount-ed infan try) o attack the flanks and rear ofan extended objective area in simulta-neouscoordinated attacks. The firstday ofthis phase was marked by hard fightingand slow going, but rapid movement, al-most without enemy contact, ensued forthe next several days, carrying up to andpast the 3 8th Parallel.

Thorough clearing of all enemy duringan advance was found essential i n Korea.Bypassed North Korean units, of the samerace and language as the South Koreanpopulation, had the inheren t capability togo temporarily underground, and this ca-'pability was emphasized in their trainingand doctrine. Later, when opportunity of-fered. these units (in a few cases up todivisional size) could retrieve uniformsand weapons and reengage, in conven-'tional or guerrilla-type operations, andagainst either supply installations or therear of our frontline combat units. Pocketsof subversive elements in the South Ko-rean population also aided this enemycapability.

Americans wi th a blitzkrieg backgroundfrom WW II (especially impatient tankers)were always on th e lookout for a chance atthe rapid, deep, and decisive maneuver.Tank-infantry formationsof battalion size,intended for an independent operation ofseveral days duration, were commonlycalled "task forces," and often employed.but generally wi th little result. An exam-ple was Task Force Lee (after LTC JamesH.Lee, an Armor officer then command-ing 3rd Bn, 35 th Inf). on 18-19Apr i l l951.UN forces were across the parallel.-on thewestern front, but the CCF spring offen-sive wasexpected mom enta rily(it actuallycame in full force on 22 April). The TFincluded 30 0 infantry and 38 tanks (89thTank Bn), it s mission apparently beingreconnaissance in orce with some hope tmight develop in to a spoiling attack. Thefirst day's advance was halted, after fivemiles, byen emya rtilleryfire , which isbad-news o infantry riding on tanks. Return-ing to assembly area for the night, the TFmoved out next day at 0630 only to bestopped after three miles by a blownbridge and evidence of a few land mines.The mission was cancelled and the TFdissolved.The preceding is also enlightenin g onLieutenant Colonel Koropey's discussionof "Barrier Obstacles." Complex and ex-tensive obstacles of the kind he describedwould no doubt be encountered i n special'

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circumstances, b ut day in and-outa blownbridge and even he suspicion of a handfulof mines was generally sufficient, espe-cially if covered by any degree or k ind offire. We had not armored personnel car-riers in those days, but my consideredopinion is that -th oug h very useful forlimited purposes- heir use would stillnot suff ce o permit mobility, in he armorsense, on the Korean battlefield.My conclusion is that the MElT facto rsdictate that that war, and any recurrence,must be accepted as an infantry war.Tanks, invaluable though they are, mustresign themselves to a supporting role.Mobility at the operational level wil l haveto come from amphibious means, as atInchon, or from airborne/air mobility re-sources, and not from armor.Some unusual uses of armor werefound, especially in operations related tothe assault crossing of the Han River on 7March 1951. First, engineer trailers load-ed with the assault boats were towed tothe pre-dawn crossing sites by tanks,rather than engineer vehicles, which keptdown congestion and confusion on theapproach trails and helped preserve sur-prise. Second, tankers of Co A, 89th TankBn displayed great initiative in locatingfording sites and rigging up to ford theriver, when bridge construction was de-layed, so as to give prompt and effectivesupport to infantry i n the bridgehead.These actions are given detailed treat-ment by Russell Gugeler in his book,Combat Actions in Korea. Two other in-stances occurred after the crossing. Onetank was unable to fire its main gun owingto a turret malfunction (I have alwaysharbored a suspicion this co nditio n exist-ed before, but did not deter the tankcommander from making the crossing.).The CO of the supported rifle company,Captain Luther F. Weaver (now Lieuten-ant Colonel, retired), pressed it into ser-vice transporting casualties back to theriver; the se would otherwise have had tobe carried by litter across a thousandyards of open rice paddy under enemy fireto the aid station. A few days later a smallrank-infantry force (of which the regimen-ta l commander, Colonel Gerald C. Kel-leher, had taken personal command) wasadvancing northward along the East bankof th e Pukhan River. The road was markedbysteepgrades, hairpin urns, cliffstooneside and steep drops to the other, suchthat the tanks were unable to provideeffective support. Colonel Kelleher's solu-tio n was to send some of the tanks backsouth to a ford, then across the river, andthen northward again, to a point fromwhic h effective support could be providedfrom the opposite side of the PukhanlIt should be recalled that, in that era,one tank battalion was organic to theinfantry division, sometimes with an ad-ditional tank battalion attached. The nor-mal breakdown of tank supp ortwas there-fore a tank section (sometimes a platoon)in support of each committed rifl e com-pany. Considering the enemy did not em-ploy armor during the period under dis-

cussion, I thought this level of armorsupport provided a good balance.Itshouldalso be recalled that the tankof thosedays(the M4) had a 5-man crew and an addi-tional cal. 30 MG (toggle-mounted in thebow). Notwithstanding this, I saw in-stances where a tank crew h ad affixedyetanother cal. 30 MG to the turret top, byweldin g a home-made mount, for a total ofthree cal. 30s. plus the cal. 50 and themain gun. This is indicative as to whattankers thought necessary in that par-ticular war.

The one area where I hought improve-ment was needed was in tank-infantrycoord ination at the lowest levels (i.e.. asbetween tankcrew and riflesquad, ortan ksection and rifle platoon). In a reportedincident in WW II in which 2nd ArmoredDivision prepared to attack through aninfantry unit, the infantry Commander un-dertook to explain the fires available to th etank commander and asked whic h of th einfan try supporting fires were desired bythe tank unit. The tanker's answer was,"All Iwant from you people is hat you getdown in your holes and stay out of myway."This is understandable. But in a warin which infantry was the dominant arm, Ialways thought it would be nice if thetankers would coordinate something otherthan time and location of the rifle com-pany's chow line. Especially in a Korean-type war, down at the squad level iswherethe action is. All too often, during a criticalhour or two, the r ifle squad is out of directcontact wit h itso wn higher headquarters.Tankers were prone to use their owninitiative in such cases, and sometimesdid good work; but there were instances inwhich tank fire support, at longer rangesand catching the supported rifle squad orplatoon by surprise, was every bit asunsettling as sudden enemyfire from t hefront.Loudspeakers on the tanks (reportedlyused in WW II) might be a partial solution,also greater effo rt to habitually marry-upthe same tank unit to the same infantryunit. Most important, probably, would beadded traini ng and doctrinal emphasis, ineach branch. on the special capabilitiesand problems of the other.

W. B. WOODRUFF, JR .Lieutenant Colonel, AUS (Ret.)Decatur, TX

Vermont, Not ConnecticutDear Sir:I wish to thank you for your notice onpage 49 of the November-December 1986issue about Norwich University's statuehonoring Ma jor General Ernest Harmon.One of the problems of the nation's f irstprivate mil itary college is tha t everybodythinks we are in Connecticut and the firstsentence of your announcement perpetu-ates the myth. Since becoming President,

Ihave added to the t itle of the Universitythe tit le of its two components, the Mi li-tary College of Vermont and VermontCollege, hoping that the addition of Ver-mont twice in a title m ight very well dispelthe idea that we're located n Connecticut.Interestingly enough, the title, the Mili-tary Col ege of Vermont, was given to Nor-wic h University b ythe State of Vermont inthe year 18 98 when Admiral Dewey, oneof our most renown former students, re-turned after defeating the Spanish atManila Bay. From that time until WorldWa r II, Norwich was a cavalry school. Infact, a t one time the Corps of Cadets wasofficia lly th e cavalry squadron of the Ver-mont National Guard. Our cavalry armortraditions run very deep and we wouldinvite you to come to Vermont and visit.

W. RUSSELL TODDPresidentMajor General, USA (Ret.)(Ed. Note: See orrection in Jan-Feb 87Regimental Review)

Comman d List:Additions andCorrections

Editor's Note: In ou r last issue, w epublished a l ist of armor officerssewing in command positions at bat-talion/squadron and brigade/regi-ment levels. The following are cor-rections and additions to th at list:LTC Jam es L. Fry5-12th CavFort KnoxLTC Michael Robinson2-4 CavFort StewartLTC James Larson4/37 ArmorFort RileyLTC Dennis H. Long4-64 ArmorFort StewartLTC Donald Brunner3-77 ArmorFort PolkLTC Jackie W. Colley3d Bn, 1 t BT BdeFort JacksonLTC Peter Becraft5th Bn. 3 BT BdeFort DixLTC Robert A. Duckworth1s t Bn. 3 d BT BdeFor t LeavenworthCOL Jo hn Jorgensen1 Bde. 5th ID, Fo rt PolkCOL Joe N. Frazar1 t Bde, 24 th ID, Fort Stewart

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8 1MG Thomas H. TaitCommanding General

U.S.Army Armor Center

ReconnaissanceOperations at the National Train-ing Center, as well as examinationof recent REFORGER exercises,have indicated reconnaissanceweaknesses. There are some organi-zational problems; however, mostof our difficulties are the result oftraining inadequacies. In manytank battalions, the scout platoonis a stepsister on ammo detail,range guard, or whatever fatiguedetails come along. Their trainingtakes a back seat, and when theymust perform, they dont knowhow. We have simply failed tofollowthe old cavalry maxim of scoutsout.Our reconnaissance elementsmus t operate by stealth. hey needto find the enemy without beingdetected and, equally important,find where the enemy is not. Re-connaissance is a valuable combatmultiplier, an d our current organi-zations do not have enough recon-naissance capability. Our scout pla-toons need t he ten recon vehicles ofth e H series, not the six of th eJand AOE TOE. It is essential,therefore, to train our few scoutsproperly. For example, how oftendo the scouts dismount? Not nearlyenough! They are wedded to theirvehicles. With the introduction ofth e M3, the difficulty in gettingthem to dismount increases geo-metrically. The answer for the scoutis not the blitz technique. You can-not seek the seam using the blitz; infact, for recon units, blitz equalsblunder. In 1940, Major I.D. Whitestated t ha t the best recon is per-formed by stealth. Since we lack

the firepower th at w as a n integralpart of the divisional cavalry pla-toons, they - s well as the scoutplatoons - must ensure they arenot decisively engaged when seek-in g intelligence.Our heavy division cavalrysquadrons do not have sufficientcapability to accomplish the broadrange of reconnaissance missions.Two ground and two air troops justcannot provide the division com-mander with the ability to gatherintelligence throughout the depthof the division area. The air troopshave limited effectiveness a t night,thereby diluting recon capabilitywhen we - with our ground ther-mal systems - have the tacticaladvantage. Furthermore, if the di-vision cavalry squadron has tofigh t for intelligence or is requiredto perform a guard mission, it mustbe supplemented with at least atank company. In order to ensurefamiliarity with reconnaissancemissions, it is probable the divisioncommander will permanently assigna tank company to work with thecavalry squadron. This will helpwith cohesion an d ensure the tank-ers react with lightning speed.Consider the screening mission.When one considers the speed ofcurrent tanks and personnel car-nerdfighting vehicles, it is likelythat screening missions will be-come guard missions in a matter ofminutes. This argues for the as-signment of tank s, organizational-ly or, as previously s tated, by pro-viding a tank company to thesquadron from one of the tan k bat-

talions. The air scouts can assist inthe screening mission; however,their time on station is limited.Whether or no t to have tank s inthe cavalry is a n emotional subject.We do need them. At the end ofWorld W a r 11, studies indicatedthat we had to fight for intelli-gence; thus when the Army wasreorganized, tanks were assignedto recon units. I n 1946, I.D. White,by then a MG, stated th at aggres-sive action requiring combat is th ebest way to obtain info on the en-emy. One thing is certain; guardmissions require tanks. Our firstpriority, however, is to provide thesquadron commander with a thirdground cavalry troop. Without thethird troop, adequate coverage ofthe division sector, especially dur-ing periods of limited visibility, isvirtually impossible. In CentralEurope, where weather conditionsare poor during a arge percentageof th e year, the air troops which canprovide flexibility will spend toomuch time on the ground.Our second priority will be to putthe tanks back in the divisionalcavalry. We attempted to do both inthe past year and were thwarted.We will attempt to do so again. Thevalue of scouts an d cavalry in theaccomplishment of security andguard missions cannot, an d shouldnot, be understated.We need your support.Treat em Rough!

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CS M John M. StephensCom mand Sergeant MajorU S . Army Armor Center

Generic ANCOCBNCOC. We really never devotedthe time to teach platoon sergeantsbecause our courses, both armorand cavalry, were infested with

Small-Group Instruction, During-Action Review; After-Action Re-views; Skill Level 04 tasks throughSkill Level 03 tas ks; AirLand Bat-tle doctrinejgunnery beginning atadvanced conduct of fire; elimina-tion of Skill Levels 1 hrough 3 a sformal blocks of instruc tion; elimi-nation of vehicle specific training ;dismounted reconnaissance; multi-echelon training; - hard-hittingplatoon sergeant courses for bothtankers an d cavalrymen th at willsoon be introduced as the new Ge-neric Advanced NoncommissionedOfficer CoursesMOS 19D, E, an d KSeries.The new courses ar e being devel-oped the right way - hrough thesystems approach to training.First, we have h ad successful pla-toon sergeants from across theForce come to Fort Knox andanalyze the latest job task analysis.Important? Yes, very important!With the introduction of new equip-ment, the reorganization of our ar-mor and cavalry units, and theincrease in the number of lightunits, there have been considerablechanges to the way we do businessin th e field. Tha t doctrine must beapplied to the NCO courses, as wella s to the officers courses.The Advanced NoncommissionedOfficer Course will be mirroredafter the Advanced Officer Coursego, recently introduced to theSchool after a year of design anddevelopment work. Although allcourses will be resource intensive,it is a price we will have to p ay toproduce competent officers an d non-commissioned officers in order tobe successful on the battlefield.We ca nnot contin ue to tea chlower skill levels in ANCOC. Lowerskill level subjects, basic conduct offire, ammo identification, etc., havebeen a pa rt of the ANCOC programof instruction. Those subjects, andmany more, hav e historically beentaugh t in OSUT an d more recently,

lower skill subjects (not all bad).There is a better way to design an ddevelop a program of instruction soth at we ca n teach the mission-es-sential tasks for ANCOC a nd t rainand evaluate collective and indi-vidual tasks at the sam e time. Weare going to do just t hat.All tasks taught will be SkillLevel 4 and above. This does notmean we will not require proficien-cy in lower skill levels; just theopposite is true. NCOs will no t onlybe required to be proficient, theywill be required to identify collec-tive and individual tas ks th at sup-port the Skill Level4 tasks, ensureall tasks are part of the overalltraining program, evaluate thetrain ing program, an d conduct af-ter actions reviews with their peers.The success of this type of pro-gram is dependent on small-groupinstruction- ixteen-student class-es working together to develop allthe required information to trulyaccelerate our classroom instructionan d field evaluation.Who will attend? Everyone whoexpects to be a sergeant first classor better. The rule is out! SomeNCOs are not listening. The lastANCOC clas s had eight SFC short-falls. They missed the ir chance!What is expected of the atten-dees?First an d foremost is job com-petence. You must be a qualifiedtank commander! You must havemastered Skill Levels 1, 2, and 3before attending! Anything shortof th at will cause problems as younegotia te th e course. However, letssay you ha ve been assigned outsideof yourMOS for the l ast three yearsas a Drill Sergeant or RecruitingNCO. If this is the case, you willattend th e Tank Commander Certi-

fication Course before attending

ANCOC. This course will bring youup to vehicle or system certifica tionlevel before entering ANCOC. Thevehicle or system you will be trainedon will be the one you will be as-signed to after ANCOC.The cavalryman will not only betrained before ANCOC on th e sys-tem he is being assigned to, butANCOC will include some inten-sive dismounted reconnaissance aswell.An attempt is being made to de-velop a program that trains allarmor platoon sergeants to instruc-tor/operator level on the UCOFT.This will be a big leap and puts th eresponsibility of UCOFT and crewgunnery train ing where it shouldbe - n the h and s of th e platoonssenior noncommissioned officer.We have needed these changesfor a long time; however,it is impor-tant that any major changes to aprogram of instruct ion be designedan d developed correctly. We ar estill a year away from actuallyteaching th e new program - ne-cessary sacrifice of time if we are oensure ourselves a solid, hard-hit-ting, course for platoon sergeants.How can you prepare for thecourse? If you are selected forANCOC, you should be competentin Skill Levels1 hrough 3.Not onlyshould your SQT score reflect yourMOS proficiency, you should be aTCCT-1 or SCCT-1 (Tank/ScoutCrew Certification Test 1) expert.You should be physically capableof passing the APFT beyond theminimal requirements.The teaching of this POI willbetter meet the needs of th e Army.The need is, a highly competentplatoon sergean t, highly proficientin skills that surround the MOS,ready to assume leadership posi-tions of higher responsibility.6 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1987


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The Mi-24 'Hind':A Potent Adversary

U.S. Maneuver UnitsMay Have To GoAgainst Soviets'by Captain Carter Myers

Somewhere in West Germany,near the East German border, aU S . tan k company lies in wait inprepared battle positions. Themorning is dreary, overcast, andfoggy. A Soviet motorized rifle reg-iment, augmented with elementsfrom an assault helicopter regi-ment, ha s moved across the borderand is rapidly closing in on th eUS .company. Tank commanders have

It Alone"Flying Tank''carefully selected their alternateand supplemental positions andplaced their vehicles in hides. Wai t -ing for the last two days, the U.S.soldiers have constantly improvedtheir battl e positions. They ar e welltrained; they know their enemywell, an d they hav e performed themyriad of tasks necessary to winthe impending fight.Th e 1stPlatoon leader sights the

lead scout of the Soviet advanceguard at about 0700 and a lerts thecompany comm ander, who directsthe platoon leader to engage theenemy at 1,800 meters. T he pla toonleader moves h is platoon in to hulldefilade and waits.The young lieutenant begins hisplatoon fire command when theenemy closes to 2,000 meters. Hisplatoon en gages the lead scout sec-tion at a range of about 1,825meters, and soon the Second andThird Plato ons begin to fire at theSoviets.When the enemy has closed to1,000 meters, the U.S. companycommander gives the order for aphased withdrawa l. Suddenly, twoMig-21s attac k. Th e company's at-

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tached Stinger team fires at thefirst Mig and gets a hit, but theother Mig sight s down the Stingersmissile plume and kills the Stingerteam with a burst of 23-mm cannonfire. As the tank company teambegins to depart, Soviet artilleryra ins down on th e battle position.The American captain knowsthat he has to get hi s platoons backto their subsequent battle positionsquickly, so that he can cover thewithdrawal of the U.S. companyteam on his flank. As he moves hi scompany down several covereddraws an d ski rts the edge of a smallforest, his lead tanks receive Sag-ger fire from the edge of a nearbyvillage. The tanks wingmen re turnfire quickly and suppress the ene-my AT gunners.The young captain realizes thathe cannot get bogged down whilemoving, so he disengages from theskirmish a nd orders his three pla-toons down parallel fencerows. Hislead tank platoon is only 500meters short of its subsequent bat-tle position when th e leaders tanktakes a direct hit from an AT-6Spiral guidedmissile fired from oneof four Mi-24 Hind Es hovering attree-top level on his left fla nk near-ly 2,800 meters away.As a ta nk commander, a platoonleader, or th e company team eom-mander, what can you do? TheStinger team - our only air de-fense asset - s destroyed. TheHinds can outmaneuver you, out-run you, an d outgun you.Quite simply, you will do as you

have been trained; however, if inyour training, aircraft have beenconspicuously ab sent , or th e sce-nario h as always conveniently in-dicated th at th e air force h as givenyou local air superiority or panty ,you and your unit will probablybegin to die.That American tank crews willhave to fight Soviet Hinds in anyfuture conflict is quite possible. Airdefense asse ts are precious a nd, atpresent, quite vulnerable. Ameri-can tank ers may well have to fightthe Hind by themselves. The firststep in prepar ing yourself for fight-ing Soviet attack helicopters is toknow your enemy.

Versions of the HindWestern defense analysts firstobserved the Hind in 1973, andcontroversy concerning its purposeon the battlefield ha s followed th eaircraft ever since. Analysts orig-inally thought the Hind to be adrastically upgraded Mi-8 Hip, butcloser anal ysis showed th e aircraftha d a completely new fuselage an dslightly modified engines, two Iso-tov TV-2s rated at 1,500 hp each.The Hind A and B (actually, theywere developed in reverse order2)

were the fir st Soviet helicopters de-signed to operate on the fron t lines;the aircraft were highly armoredand carried a large amount of arma-ment. Earlier helicopters, the Hipand Hound, operated near t he frontlines, but were primarily for trans-portation. Some ana lys ts believeth at the Soviet design engineering

group proposed a pure gunship an dreceived the go-ahead as long as th edesign incorporated some troop-car-rying capability so a new troop-carrying helicopter would not hav eto be funded.3The resulting productmore closely resembles a flying Mer-kava t ha n an y Western helicopter.Figure 1 illustrates the differentmodels of th e Hind.The Hind family is quite techno-logically advanced among Soviethelicopters. I ts five fiberglass rotorblades ar e more tha n 55 feet longand produce a considerable groundsignature. The all-metal fuselagehas retractable landing gear andself-sealing fuel tanks.4 There aredistinct differences between theA/B/C models an d the D/E/ Fmodels.The Amodel has alightlyarmoredfuselage and , as a result, h as beenrelegated o convoy escort in Afghan-istan . The A model is a likely can-didate for transporting Spetsnazor air ass ault troops into our rearareas.5 The B Model was probablyan experimental model, an d had noanhe dral (downward slant) on itswings. It also never went into ac-tual production. Analysts believetha t the C Model is a tra ining ver-sion since it has no armament. Thelater models (D , E, F) are redesignsand upgradings for antitank andattack roles.The anhedral wings of th e Hindare one of its distinguishing fea-tures. These wings provide lift andstability at cruising speeds and al-so act as launch s tatio ns for weap-

Model Armament Nose/Turret Additional DifferencesA 4 x AT-2 Swatter ATGMs12 x 57-mm unguided rockets

1 x 12.7-mm MGB Same as A modelC NoneD 4 x AT-2 Swatter ATGMs

128 x 57-mm unguided rockets, 80 x80-mm rockets, 4 x 12.7-mm MGSame as D model except: 4 x AT-6Spiral ATGMs, 2x23-mm cannon pod

EF Improved Weapons Capability

TECHNICAL DATA Height: 14 0 Weight: 60 00 kgFigure 1: Versions of Hind

3-man crew, relatively unprotected Initial production model.Engines: 2 x TV-2 lsotov@1500hpeaNo anhedral on wings. Verylow production.Noarmament. Very low pro-duction. Used for training.Target acquisition enhance-ment: Optical LLTV, Laser, IREngines for D/E /F 2 x lsotovTV-3 @ 22 00 hp each.Triple rail missile racks onwing tips. Possible exportversion w/AT-2.

Same a A modelSame as A modelRedesigned and armored turret.Pilot/gunner seats in line. Bullet-resistant glass.Same as D modelSame as D model

Length: 559 Empty Rotor Diameter: 559

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ons. But while hovering, the Hindrequires a significant increase inpower because the wings cause anega tive effect on the lift providedby the downward motion of the ai rfrom the rotor.6The Hind D was a major re-designing of the basic aircraft. hedesigner added additional armor,particularly in the cockpit area.The cockpit and forward fuselagewere completely redesigned, withthe gunner and pilot sitting in linera ther t ha n side-by-side. The gun-ner is in the forward position. The

Dmodel could also carry additionalweapon systems, along with im-proved targeting devices, such asra da r, low-light television (LLTV),and a laser rangefir~d er.~wo im-proved engines appeared on the Dmodel; each now developed 2,200hp, and the cargo area was rede-signed, probably to carry extra arma-ment and ammunition rather thantroops. A four-barreled, 12.7-mmgun replaced a n earlier 12.7-mmmachine gun.

CapabilitiesAll models, except the B and Cmodels, can fire th e AT-2 Swatterant ita nk missile from the weaponspoints on t he wings. A greatly im-proved version of the aircraft, theHind E, carries the AT-6 Spiralcommand-guided AT missile, alongwith improved targeting devices,such as a head-up display. TheHind E also carries a two-barreled,23-mm cannon pod.8 The AT-6Spiral is of particular interest to ussince it has a 5-km rang e and fliesat supersonic speeds. The possiblecombination of a laser designatorand the supersonic speed of theSpiral will reduce the unmaskedtime for the Hind E in an engage-ment. A 5,000-meter-range targetcan be hit in approximately 11seconds compared to the 27-secondflight time of the Hind Ds Swatterfired a t a 4,000-meter target.s Bothmissiles fly by line-of-sight com-mand guidance, so your best de-fenses are to place terrain betweenyou an d the Hind or to fire directlyat the Hind to break the gunnersconcentration.The Hind can also carry free-fallbombs, roekets, and mine pods.Since free-fall bombs require thepilot to fly over enemy positions,they will probably only be used inrelatively safe (in terms of air de-

fense) areas.10 The 57-mm rockets

@ (TACAIR) SPETZNAZ ABN/ASLT

FIG2. SOVIET FRONT

ABN/ASLT ABN/ASLT SPERNAZ

F1G 3. SOVIETTANK ARMY

are unguided projectiles, similar tothe 70-mm rockets carried by theU S . Cobra, and a re relatively inac-curate. The flat par t of the trajec-tory of the 57-mm rocket onlyreaches out to 1,200-1,500 meters.Because of the rockets dispersionpattern, gunners normally fire themin salvo against soft targets. How-ever, thei r hollow-charge warheadsare capable of penetrat ing 230-mmof armor. A newer, 80-mm rocketmay appear on the Hind in thefuture, and with the ability to pene-tr at e 350-400-mm of armor, theserockets could present a potentialdanger to US armored units.12Soviet helicopter design philoso-phy is radically different from USthinking. The US Army h as placedits fai th in small, highly maneuver-

able airc raf t capable of hiding and

flying in the tree lines a nd possess-ing precision guidance for nightand adverse weather conditions.The Soviets have developed theHind for a multipurpose role. Itmore resembles a flying tank tha na helicopter. By US standards, theHind is underpowered and its rotorincorporates a relatively old tech-nology; therefore, it isprobably notvery agile.3 Its lack of agility,large rotor blades, a nd difficulty inhovering will preclude flying nap-of-the-earth (NOE) under most ter-rai n conditions. Hinds will proba-bly attack at a 100-200 meter alti -tude and pop up when in the vi-cinity of the target for better ac-quisition and target loc k- ~n . ~heHinds size and lack of agility willallow US air defenders and tankersto train better and plan to defeatthi s flying tank.

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The Hind in AfghanistanUntil the Soviets invaded Af-ghanistan, analysts had neverbeen able to assess he Hinds abil-ity in actual combat. The Muja-

hadeen, th e Afghan freedom fight-ers, have had much experience withthe Hind.The Mujahadeen have broughtdown several Hinds with small,heat-seeking, surface-to-air mis-siles, such as captured Soviet SA-7Grails. The Hinds original designfailed to include much in infraredcountermeasures, and little has beendone to reduce its infrared signa-ture, other than a slight reductionin engine operating temperature.15In response to their losses of Hindsand other types of helicopters, theSoviets have equipped them withflare dispensers, holding up to 120flares, along with a missile warn-ing system.16 Nevertheless, theMujahadeen antiaircraft effort ha sbeen effective: for example, eightMi-8 Hips were lost in 1983 in jus tone operation.To bring down Hinds by machinegun fire, the Afghan freedom fight-ers fire down on the rotor, upperfuselage, and the engine/trans-mission area from higher vantagepoints on mountaintops as theHinds fly down the valleys. AnAfghan pilot of the Communist Af-ghan Army, who defected in 1984,disclosed t ha t the Hind A was ex-tremely vunerable to ground fire,especially in the cockpit and therotor. He said th at pilots are rou-tinely warned to avoid heavy rebelconcentrations. According to thedefector, more Hind As were lost tosmall arm s fire to the cockpit th anany other cause, and a steel platehas been installed that can bemanually raised to protect the pilot.The report in Auiution Week (Octo-ber 1984)continued to state ha t theHind A was indeed under-poweredfor most of its combat tasks andhad a very weak tail boom. Of ex-treme interest is tha t th e Mujaha-deen also reported that about 30percent of all munitions usedaga ins t them failed to detonate.

Employment in EuropeJudg ing from Soviet training ex-ercises, battlefield employment ofthe Hind in Europe will probably bemarkedly different from it s use in

Afghanis tan. The Soviet helicopterforce belongs to th e Soviet frontal

aviation element (tactical air force)and is usually attached to front-line units at high levels, such as thefront or all-arms army. Typically,there is one air assau lt brigade perfront, and one assault helicopterregiment per tankla11 arms army(See Figures 2 and 3).One result ofth is high level of attachment maywell be an inherent inflexibility:Soviet helicopter pilots seldom at-tack targets of opportunity, a s seenin Afghanistan.17Other factors leading to inflexi-bility are the organizational ab-sence of forward air controllers(FACs), the poor quality of battleinformation being transmitted be-tween ground and air units, and a ninflexible pre-planned fire supportrequest system.* However, the So-viets may be learn ing some valua-ble lessons in Afghanistan. Recent-ly, helicopter assets have been de-centralized down to the divisionwith helicopter squadrons underthe tactical control of the divisioncommander.Hinds almost always attack inpairs or in a group of four aircraft (aflight). One reason may be the fearof a defection by a pilot, but tact icsalso influence this organization.Normally, one aircraft will attackwhile the other overwatches. Theoverwatching wingman pinpointsair defense gunner s by backtrack-ing the missile plume to its originand then fires to suppress the airdefense gunners or destroy them.One principle of air defense thatshould minimize thi s th reat is mu-tual support; however, mutualsupport aroundmaneuver elements(e.g. ta nk or mech teams) is difficultif the friendly unit is moving. Asobserved in Soviet propagandafilms and TV programs, a typicalEuropean mission goes like this:A flight of 4 Hinds, commandedby a senior 1ieutenantJifts off froma forward airfield, 18-20 miles be-hind the front. The helicopters flyat approximately 150 meters abovethe ground at about 175 km/hr,using terrain masking wheneverpossible. The flight descends nearthe target area, flies to within en-gagement range, and pops up toabout 60 meters of altitude to ac-quire the target. The helicoptersfire while in a shallow dive.Hinds normally appear in thesefilms to be supporting a n offensiveoperation, rather t ha n a defensive

one as would be expected from So-viet journalism. However, expect-ing t he Hinds to fire froma hover insupport of a defensive operation isnot unreasonable. 9About 83 percent of all engage-ment ranges in European terrainwill be 3,000 meters orless, so shortrange air defense (SHORAD)weap-ons will be able to defend maneuverelements better than in desert ter-rain. The European countryside al-

so provides armored units more op-portunity for camouflage and con-cealment.20General Reznichichenko, a re-spected Soviet author and tactician,writes ...the correlation betweentank and helicopter losses are 12-1or even 19-1 in th e helicopters fa-vor, according to practical experi-ments.Q1 The use of Hinds in amajor armored th rus t could affectUS. attle plans considerably. Con-sider the speed and firepower of theHind i n respect to armored move-ment: an armor battalion couldeasily become decisively engaged ifthe enemy combines a number ofHinds with his armored forces. TheHinds will be able to engage andbreak awa y quickly from a superiorforce, conduct pursuit operationsefficiently, and block avenues ofescape very rapidly without beingencumbered by minefields, obsta-cles, forests, swamps, or urbanterrain.

Hinds in the DesertIn desert operations, the Hindwill prove quite a formidable-foeaslong as it operates below 1,000 feet,the Hawk missiles minimum effec-tive altitude. Since targets can beidentified in the desert at ranges oftens of kilometers, the Hind will beable to engage at 4-5kilometers andstill remain out of the range of ourinfrared air defense weapons (see

Figure 4).The best air defense weapons inthe desert are passive IR and op-tical countermeasures. One of thebest optical/IR countermeasures isthe desert wind. If you have trainedat the National Training Center,you know how that wind can ob-scure and hide the enemy. Thiseffect is even greater from a flyingcraft, an d gives the ground soldiera much greater advantage. If thetank commander happens to see aHind launch a missile a t him, hewill have between11and 30 seconds

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MAX EFFECTIVEWEAPON SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EMPLOYMENT RANGE GUIDANCE MOBlLlTIA42 DUSTER

WLCAN 6-barrel 20-mm cannon:HAPARRAL 4-rail launcher, infrared missileIEDEYE Shoulder- fired, infrared missile,iTlNGER Shoulder-fired, infrared missile,

Twin 40-mm cannon (relativelyobsolete)

man portableman-portable

National Guard 1650m AD

US Army 1200m ADUS Army 5000mNational GuardUS Army 3000mNational GuardUS Army 3000m +National Guard

4500m surf4500111 surf

FIGURE 4. US Army SHORAD Systems

Visual

Visual (rangeonly radar)InfraredhomingInfraredhomingInfraredhoming

Track

Track, towedstationaryTracked,stationaryMan-portableMan-portable

before impact at 4,000-5,000meters.The ta nk driver must immediatelybegin quick s tart-and-stop, side-to-side movements, or make a fastdash to cover, if he w ants to live tofight another day. However, remem-ber tha t the dust cloud sent up by ahovering helicopter ca n often be asunforgiving to him as your owndus t trail a s you move. A good airguard - eeing the bad guy be-fore he sees you- emains the bestdefense.

Defeating the HindOur most valuable weapons

against the Hind a re those in thefamily of air defense weapons. IfHinds fly high enough, the Hawkor Patriot systems can target theSoviet aircraft a nd destroy it quick-ly. However, Hinds will usually flyat relatively low altitudes and bemasked by terrain a nd ground clut-ter. Hence, SHORAD systems willprobably play a much greater rolein battles with the Hind. SHORADsystems do have their limitations,and soldiers in maneuver battal-ions should know these limitat ionsin order to make effective decisionson engagements. Figure 4 lists theSHORAD systems available in theheavy division and their capabil-ities. The following is a breakdownof the SHORAD systems limita-tions:Vulcan- he primary limi-tation of the Vulcan is itsmaximum range of 1,200 me-ters. When compared to theHind (with its 3-5km range),the Vulcan appears quite vul-nerable. Unless a Hind movesto within 1,200 meters, theVulcan can do very little to

destroy th e Soviet helicopter.

Chaparral - The Chapar-ral is a heat-seeking missile(IR) with a range of 5 kilom-eters. It travels on a trackedcarrier capable of firing fourmissiles before reloading.Since it is a heat-seeking mis-sile, the C hapar ral can onlyfire at the Hind after the heli-copters gun or missile run,when the C hapa rral ca n lockon to the Hinds heat source,its engines. In a frontal en-gagement with t he Hind, theChapar ra l ha s very l i t t lechance of locking on an d hit-ting the target.Redeye - This missile isalso a heat-seeker employedsimilarly to the Chaparral.The Redeye, though, is should-er-fired and has a shorterrange, 3 kilometers. Obvious-ly all of the problems associ-ated with the Cha parral alsooccur with this weapon andare accentuated by the Red-eyes even shorter ra nge andlack of a multiple firing capa-bility.

Stinger - This is an im-proved shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missile, similar to theRedeye but with much im-proved performance. This mis-sile does possess a limitedhead-on attack capability, butit is man-carried and lacksany sort of protection fromindirect or direct fires.Under current air defense doc-trine the commander will allocatethese systems differently for offen-sive and defensive operations.In an offensive operation, the bri-gade or task force commander will

probably designate his maneuverelements as his priority assets inhi s air defense plan. The Redeye/Stinger or Vulcan teams will proba-bly be attached to th e mechanizedelements since they are more mo-bile. The Chaparral systems willdefend more static targets such asbridges, supply routes, TOCs, etc.In the defense, most a ir defensesystems will probably be distributedto critical logistical and commandcenters. The brigade support area(BSA), TOCs, field trains, supplyand ammunition depots, and indi-rect fire assets may all be priorityassets in the air defense plan.

Our air defense doctrine calls forthe placing of missile systems wellahead of the defended asse t so thatthe missiles can acquire a n IR lock-on when th e aircra ft passes by. Butif your defending company team isthe defended asset, it is not likelythat the missile system will be toyour front because it would be be-tween you and the enemy. Thissituation leaves only the Vulcan toprotect you from the threat ofHinds. Its limited ranges meansthat a flight of Hinds can engageyou anywhere from 1,200 to 5,000meters away without fear of Vul-can retaliation. The Sgt.York Divi-sional Air Defense Gun (DIVAD)was supposed to fill this gap incoverage, but that project ha s beencancelled.Moreover, the Air Force will findit difficult to locate an d acquire th eHind amid battlefield clutter whileits high performance aircraft at-tempt to avoid the man y Soviet airdefense systems on th e ground. Pos-sible exceptions to this situationare the A-10 Thunderbolt I1and the



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Armys Cobra and Apache attackhelicopters.The Aviation bra nch of the Armyhas realized the deadliness of theHind and is experimenting withair-to-air missiles and tactics forthe Cobra an d Apache. The 30-mmtank-busting rotary cannon on theA-10 (theGAU-8/A)is also a n excel-lent weapon for engaging the Hind.If these aircraft are on station inyour area , the Hinds will definitelybe at risk, but A-10s have a limitedtime-on-station, an d have broad sec-tors of responsibility. Hence, youwill not be able to rely upon them orthe Armys attac k helicopters in al linstances.

With our limited air defense as-sets, and the Soviet field artilleryand frontal aviation placing a veryhigh priority on destroying our airdefenses, we in the maneuver bat-talion task forces and companyteams may well find ourselves with-out dedicated air defense weaponssystems to protect us. In essence,the front-line tanker and mech in-fan tryman may eventually face atank/IFV-versus-Hind engage-ment. I n thi s type of engagement,the vehicle commander must decidequickly whether to hide or fight.Even if the Hind formation is by-passing your position, it still maybe carry ing Spetsnaz troops to yourown rear areas. If you decide to fire,quickly engage with the heavy ma-chine gun or cannon (on the M2/3).This will ale rt other friendly forcesof the presence of th e Hind and givethe gunner time to bring th e turret(in the case of a tank) to bear on thetarget so that he may engage withcoax or main gun.Passive Defense MeasuresCover and concealment are cri-

tical in evading the Hind. Use na-tural vegetation as much as possi-ble, and keep your unit well-dis-persed. Try to s tay away from fieldsof high vegetation (corn, smalltrees, etc.) because your vehiclestracks will give away your positionto the Hinds. Natural cover, such ashills a nd depressions, may be use-ful when concealing your vehiclesfrom enemy tanks, but the Hindcan rise to acquire you, so ry to usetreelines as much as is possible andfeasible.In the desert, try to move downdraws and arroyos to maintain

cover. If a Hind spots you a nd fires,use quick changes to speed anderratic direction changes to mis-lead the gunner, and tr y to head forcover.The late-model Hinds could beequipped with thermal vision de-vices th at could easily pick out hottank exhausts from a cool back-ground of a forest or ground. Hence,keep your thermal signature inmind a nd t ake measures to deflecthot exhausts (from M113-type ve-hicles, especially).Active Air Defense Measures

When you encounter the Hind,the tank commander or even theplatoon leader will have to makethe decision on when to engage. I nthe act of firing on the Hind, yourobjective is one of the followingfour, in th is order:Destroy the helicopter.Force the helicopter out of yourarea of operations.Force the helicopter to fly high-er so t ha t long-range air defenseweapons or ai r force attack air craftcan shoot the Hind down.Spoil the Hinds aim and/ordisrupt his attacking run.Try to engage primarily with ma-chine guns, but do not ruleout theuse of your tanks main gun. Ifwithin range, use the 25-mm can-non on your M2/3s.When you engage with machineguns, use the doctrine set down forsmall arms air defense.22The pri-mary principle of th at doctrine is toput a heavy volume of fire into thepa th of th e helicopters. Pick a point50meters in front of th e helicopter,and fire continuously into that

point as the helicopter flies toward

and , hopefully, into it.23f possible,the platoon leader should give aplatoon fire command since oneplatoon, if deployed properly withmutual fields of fire, will probablybe able to engage with a t least twotanks. The platoon leader shouldselect and communicate the firingpoint over the platoon net; pre-planned target reference points canbe useful in this communication.Each firing weapon should fire atthe selected point; do not tr y to leadthe Hind. Instead, put up a wall ofsteel an d let the Hind fly through it;youll have a higher probability ofhitting the target that way.Aim high with your machineguns; use the highest rate of fire,an d fire continuously at your aim-ing point. At longer ranges, thetracers may appear to strike thetarget, but may actually be strikingunder it. The Hinds most vulner-able area s are its rotor, ta il boom,and its engine/transmission area,so the platoon leader should adjustthe platoons fire to hit those vul-nerable areas.For a Hind crossing to your frontwithin 2,000 meters, you should usethe heavy machine guns a nd theautomatic cannons in your unit. Ifpossible, track with the main gun/coax on the tanks. Tracking willallow you to fire quickly with yourmain gun on the helicopter if itcomes within range and remainsclear of terrain. On a crossing tar-get, the chance of hitting a fastmoving helicopter with one roundfrom the m ain gun is so slim, andmain gun ammo is of such criticalimportance, that it could be toohigh a risk to take. However, maingun rounds firedat aircraft tha t ar e

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hovering or in a shallow dive to-ward you will have a good probabil-ity of destroying the aircraft (de-pending, of course, on your gun-ners ability). Even if you dont hitthe helicopter, you will probablyshake him up severely. Addition-ally, an upgrade to our main gunammo isbeing studied which wouldprovide a proximity-fuzed anti-hel-icopter round and , possibly, a mod-ified fire-control system for aerialtargets.24If the r ange to the helicopter is inexcess of 2,500-2,700 meters, yourwisest course of action is not toengage. However, if the Hind isattack ing (from a hover or a shal-low dive), the TC would probablychoose to fire in self-defense. Askilled gunner may hi t th e helicop-ter at 3,000 meters, a nd it takes only2.2 seconds for a sabot round totravel th at far.25If the Hind is relatively near, in ahover facing toward you, or in ashallow dive coming towards yourposition, then you must act quicklyand fire everything you have at th eaircraft - main gun, coax, heavymachine guns, an d automatic can-non. Tha t Hind is probably aboutto fire at you - or it may havealready fired - nd you must dis-rupt th e gunners aim as much aspossible and as quickly as you can.This might mean firing whateveryou have i n the main guns breech,

FootnotesSoviet Military Aircraft, Bill Sweetman,Presid io Press, Novato , CA, p. 134.ZMilitary Helicopters of the World, N.Pamar & F.D. Kennedy, Nava l InstitutePress, Annapolis, MD, p. 135.31bid.The Soviet Mi-28Combat Helicop ter, W.Cherikov, Znternational Defense Review,1011984, p. 1457.51bid, p. 1455.6Soviet Helicopters- Design, Develop-ment, and Tactics, J. Everett-Heath, JanesPubli shing Co., 1983, p. 90.71bid.8The Soviet Armed Helicopter Threat,MAJ Richa rd Armour, Air Defense Artillery,Fall 1983, p. 33.gHelicopter Air Combat, J. Everett-Heath, Interna tiona lDefense Review, 5/1983,p. 605.loSovietArmed Helicopters, MAJ HenryShield s, Military Review, Feb 1984, p. 62.UB-16 or UB-3257mm rocket..., Everett-Hea th, pp. 93-94.12Armour, . 34.13Sweetman, p. 136.Red Armor, R. Simpkin, Brasseys De-fence Publishers, 1984, p. 77, and ...at per-ha ps 150m (500ft)..., Everett-Heath, p. 95.I5BothTV-2 and TV-3 ar e .. ather heavieran d less fuel efficient tha n comparable Wes-tern engines, run at lower temperatures. Ex-

but if youre successful, youll liveto fire again. Aim high on the noseof th e fuselage for the best ballistictrajectory. Again, the rule to followis to put a heavy volume of fire inthe air. Use a platoon fire com-mand, and if you have sufficientsabot, use it. Its a more accurateround and gets there faster.If your company team ha s TOWSwith it, they ca n fireat a HIND too.Of course, th e TOW is relativelyslow, and this lack of velocity is itsmajor limitation when fired aga ins tthe Hind. If the pilot observes thelaunch, hell probably be able tooutrun the missile or outmaneuverit.Pla n artillery fires behind hillsand in treelines where enemy heli-copters are likely to hide. Use artil-lery at night also. If you should beattacked by Hinds a t night, returnthe fire, using your tank thermalsight (TTS).You can also fire airburst artillery rounds int o the areaand mortar flares. Nothing ca n beso devastating to a helicopter pilotflying at night th an a n artilleryillumination round popping besidehim a nd taking away all his nightvision for many minutes.

SummaryThe Hind is a n extremely formid-able foe, and we must take it intoaccount for mission planning. The

Hind is faster, more maneuverable,haust gas temperatures are therefore lowerwith a consequently reduced IR signature.,Soviet Helicopters- Design, Development,an d Tactics, p. 91.IeEverett-Heath, p. 88.Afghanistan 1982, the w ar continues,D. C. Isby , Inter nat ion al Defense Review,11/1982, p. 1526.8The Transform ation of Soviet Fr ontalAviation, CPT Greg Parlier, Air DefenseArtillery, Winter 1984, p. 41.19Everett-Heath, p. 95.20Fiftypercent of all targets (on the Euro-pean Battlefield) are under 1,000 meters, 30percent between 1,000and 2,000m. and 20percentat 3,00Om,8percent a re 3,000-4,000m,4 percent ar e 4,000-5,000m, and5 percent ar eover 5,000m. The Modem Battle Ta nk,Part2 Firepower, F. Schreir, Inter nation al De-fense Review, 1/1972, p. 16.ZIPar lier, . 40.Z2TC 23-44, Sm all Arms Air DefenseAgainst Air Attack, U.S. Army.2 3 F ~ rurther reading on tank engagementsof aircr aft see FM 17-12, Tank Gunnery,Chapter16,an dT C 17-15-5,Handbook for theM48A5, M60A1 Tank Platoon. pp. 144-149.24ArmyDevelops Five-Part Pl an to MeetAir Defense Needs After DIVAD Cancella-tion, Aviation Week & Space Technology,July 7, 1986.25105mm APDS - 1,380 m/second,Schreir, p. 16.26Bradley Gunners Go for the Planes,ARMOR, Sep-Oct 1985, p. 51.

and more agile th an our armoredvehicles. Its armament ha s a great-er range th an our air defense weap-ons. Additionally, the Hind cancarry a squad of air assau lt troopswho can wreak havoc in our rearareas.However, the Hind is a very largeaircraft, a nd you can see and h ear itat considerable distances becauseof its large rotor and loud engines.Our air defense systems have thecapability to destroy the Hind, butas most of us realize, there will betimes when the maneuver unitsmust go it alone. The main rule ofthumb in these cases is to put ahigh volume of fire in th e ai r withevery available weapon brought tobear on the target or an aimingpoint through which the helicopterwill pass.The firststep toward winning th etank/IFV-versus-Hind fight islearning the Hinds capabilitiesand weaknesses; the next step istraining. Perh aps the best trainingavailable is a Small Arms for AirDefense Range. Contact your divi-sional air defense battalion for in-formation on these ranges. The pro-fessional air defenders of your unitwill probably be glad to give youfurther instructions. You ca n readabout one unit that trained on asimilar range a s it was reported i nthe September-October 1985 issue

of ARMOR.26

CAPTAIN CARTER M YER Sis a 1980 graduate of the AirDefense Officer Basic Courseand the Armor Officer BasicCourse. He has served as aplatoon leader to a Vulcanplatoon,XO to a Redeye bat-tery and an armor company,and a company commanderto an armor company in theTexas Army National Guard.He is currently the S1 of2-152 Armor, Alabama Na-tional Guard. He works forSchneider Services Interna-tional as project coordinatorfor the building of a rockettest cell at Arnold Air ForceBase, Tennessee. Previously,he worked for VkDonnellDouglason Spaceshutt le in-tegration and at Texas Instru-ments in Dallas, Texas, build-ing tank thermal sights forthe M60A3 Tank.



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Reducing Track SqueakOn Current U.S. Main BartleTanksby First Lieutenant Edward Stanley, Mr. David Sass, and Mr. Gary Martin

"Tuning" CenterguidesCan Turn Down theSound of SqueakyTank TracksThe Applied Research Branch ofthe Survivability Division, US.Army Tank-Automotive Command(TACOM), RD&E Center has beeninvolved in vehicle signature anal -ysis, including both acoustic andIR, for a number of years. Tracksqueak was identified as a problemin 1983, and work as an in-houselaboratory independent research

project began.

The squeak of American tanksha s been a characteristic since theearly d ay s of th e M26l in WW 11,and still exists on the currentmodels. Besides creating a n identi-fiable signature, this squeak causespain to unprotected human ears inthe immediate area. It is clear tha tthe squeak should be eliminated orreduced.The initial step in the reductionof the squeak was to locate andidentify the source(s). This taskwas accomplished by using an or-dina ry tap e recorder to record a noperating tank. The da ta was thenanalyzed with a Hewlett Packard

US Army Photo by SP4 Jane E RackleyFourier Analyzer to determine theacoustic characteristics of the ve-hicle. The squeak was coming fromthe track centerguides, which areshaped like tuning forks. The road-wheels strike the centerguides asthe vehicle moves, causing the cen-terguides to vibrate, or squeak.Several methods were tried to de-tune the centerguides. A t first, wethought that a mass attached toone side of the centerguide would besufficient. It worked quite well aslong as the m ass was elastically orloosely attached, for example, byattaching a small magnet to oneprong end. Rigid attachments,

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" ..A modification that successfully eliminates the squeak.. .has beendemonstrated at TACOM and was tested a t Fort Knox."

FIGURE 1 - A standard centerguidewith a small mass welded on.where a n identical mass wa s weld-ed on (Fig. 1)were unsatisfactorysince the squeak frequency merelychanged slightly. Forcing a largeblock of track pad rubber betweenthe centerguide prongs was ex-tremely effective, but t hi s solutionprecluded certain necessary periodicmaintenance operations. Joiningth e centerguide prong en ds with ametal ba r was not successful; therewas still some ringing when thenew design was struck with a ham-mer, although the squeak was sub-stan tially reduced.

New centerguidedesigns that didnot squeak were available (Figs. 2and 3). We soon realized tha t th iswas the best solution to t he prob-lem, as they are much strongerth an the current design. The solid,heavier design (Fig.3)was observedat Ft. Knox, and a cursory checksuggested that it was quite satis-factory.There are several thousandsqueaking tanks currently in ser-vice, and it seemed th a t mmediate-ly retrofitting a squeak-less center-guide, before the service lives of th e

FIGURES 2 AND 3- ew centerguide designs. Figure2 is simply a lightened formof the centerguide shown in Figure3.

current centerguides were up, wouldbe uneconomical. A low cost fieldmodification would be needed toeliminate track squeak as soon aspossible.A modification th at successfullyeliminates the squeak on the cur-rent centerguide has been demon-strated at TACOM an d was testedat Ft. Knox. The modification (Fig.4) is a U-shaped piece of steel withdamping pads attached to bothoutside faces. This damper is boltedto the inside of the centerguide,using t he centerguide nut an d bolt.The centerguides have a machinedarea where the nut seats, so aspacer is needed. The spacers (2-SAE 7/8-inch f lat washers) preventth e damper from being crushed intothe machined area on the center-guide, and form a flat surface forthe damper base. The U-shapeddamper is formed with the basecurved down 1/16-inch in the cen-

' ter, an d the prongs parallel to th ecenterguide teeth. This providesclearance for the damping padsduring installation, and initia l pres-sure for the pads against the cen-

terguide prongs, since the base willflatt en when t he centerguide nut istorqued down. The damper will notallow the use of the large BII soc-ket, but a 1-3/16-inch socket, NSN5120-00-239-0022,(Fig. 7) 3/4-inchdrive, will fit. This socket was usedto install (i.e. oosen, th en retorque)two complete sets of dampers (320total) on two tanks.The damping pads are made ofsome elastic material, 1/8-inchthick. Highly durable materials arepreferred. Slices of track pad rub-ber and innertube rubber have beenused successfully. A hybrid designof 1/16-inch each, with the inn er-tube rubber on the inside of thecenterguide, appears to be better.The pads were glued on to thedamper metal usina an ordinarvRTV silicon e glue. Dipping th eends of the dampers in Plastisol3seems to be just as satisfactory as asingle layer of rubber and less sus-ceptible to heat, ozone, ultravioletradiation, etc.The dampers were installed byremoving the tracks from the tank ,removing each centerguide nut,

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and placing two wasners (some-times one) over the centerguidebolt. Each damper was placed in-side its centerguide so that no partcould be hit by a roadwheel, evenafter many miles of wear. Thedampers were held to prevent rota-tion while the centerguide mutswere installed. The procedures tookabout five hours. At TACOM, th etracks were left on the vehicle an dthe installation took about tenhours.Each damper was then tuned formaximum effectiveness. A smallhammer was used to s trike eachcenterguide; correct installationshad no audible ring. All others wereadjusted using a large screwdriver.The screwdriver was used to care-fully bend the damper, in smallsteps, away from the centerguideprongs. The hammer would be usedto hit the centerguide; then thescrewdriver would be used- itheron each side, alternately, or on theside with the most pressure (deter-mined by inspection). After a fewcycles, either the ring would becompletely or almost completely

FIGURE 4 -T he damper placed in acenterguide. ready for installationgone, or it would be as bad as ifthere was no damper a t all. If t hering became louder, an additionallayer of rubber would be glued on tothe side with the least pressure, a ndthe tuning process resumed. Thetuning method was completely suc-cessful.The test at Ft. Knox was partiallysuccessful. Initially th e squeak dis-appeared when the tan k wa s drivenin a s traig ht Iine on a hard surface,but returned during turns. A sug-gestion that the squeak might dis-appear afte r the track ha d brokenin proved to be basically correct;the centerguide sides were roughwith rust, a nd after a few miles, the.centerguide sides were smooth an dshiny, and the squeak was nolonger audible, even in turns .A thrown track ended the testing.The throw occurred on a sideslopewith the lower track running through4 to 6 inches of thick mud. Aninspection revealed tha t the causewas a combination of sideslope,unknown track tension, and mud.Sideslope an d mud, combined withincorrect track tension, has been

known to.cause similar failures.Inspecting the track revealedmany things. First, the washersused as spacers had begun t o de-form. This had caused man y center-guides to become loose, whichmight have caused the loss of thetrack later (a snapas opposed to a noverride a t th e sprocket).Second, while the dampers th athad not been through the mud ap-peared to be undamaged a nd work-ing in a satisfactory manner, thethick mud had bent together mostof th e ends of the dampers on theother side. This might have beendue to hydraulic pressure generatedas the road wheels rolled pas t th ecenterguides, trapping and forcingthe mud to escape,at high pressure,through any exit available. Thecenterguides ap pear to be nea rseveral possible exits. Some ofthese dampers had been struck bythe roadwheels (shiny spots) sothere may be other explanations.Third, and surprisingly, no fail-ures due to heat, sand abrasion,large rocks and other debris, orcreep (pad adhesive failures) were

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MATERIAL Steel.carbon 1010-1015ASTM A57 6 or A 108..12-in thick

Phosphate Coating Tvpe2 Class 2 SPEC DOD P-16232 t

FIG 58

t -I

I

detected. Th is could be because th etest was too short, but given theterrain, it seems unlikely.The conclusions based on thelimited te st results are:The damper does seem to workas required, but a redesign (Fig. 5a)should be better, as welding twodamperson each centerguide wouldbe easier to maintain, and wouldavoid using the centerguide nutan d bolt.Higher quality steel is neces-sary for the damper. This wouldallow the current damper design towork as predicted, but a new socketlike the one in Fig. 7 would beneeded because of size limits be-tween th e centerguide prongs. Thenew design (Fig. 5a), made of high-er qua lity steel, should be satisfac-tory. Currently, it appears that asteel with yield strength of at least150,000 psi should be sufficient,and a 4000-series steel should beused (e.g. 4130). This, of course,increases t he cost.Third, damper pad life doesn'tappear to be a problem, but thismay be settled with further testing.At this Doint. it seems that the

FIGURE5 -The original damper design is shown in 5b.while the improved designisabove, in Figure 5a. new centerguide designs (Figs. 2and 3)are the best solutions to theproblem. They are stronger, do notsqueak, and the one shown in Fig. 2weighs about the same a s the cur-rent design. Best of all, it appearsth at they will cost about the same

as the current design. The extra n utand bolt seems a trivial price topay, i n terms of a greater Iogisticalburden (more parts for each tan k)for increased strength and decreaseddetectability.We would like to express ourthanks to the people whose assis:tance made this project possible.The people in the fabrication divi-sion at TACOM built the prototypedamper and provided advice andaccess to tools for installation. Mr.Sam Letman at the tire lab pro-vided track rubber samples, advice,an d a n oven for production ofPlastisol-coated dampers. Finally,we appreciate the work done by th emaintenance Operations proceduresshoPoftheMaintenanceDirectorateat TACOM, the people at the Armm

FIGURE 6- damper installed on a tank. The dark areas on the centerguide prongsare where the road wheels make contact with the centerguides These areas willbecome shiny after a few miles of movement.

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"...Damper pad life doesn't appear to be a problem but this may be settledwith further testing."

FIGURE 7 -The socket used for theinstallation of the dampers is o n thetrack block. This socket, NS N5120-00-239-0022.s a t ight fi t once thedampers are installed.

and Engineer Board, and the sol-diers from H Company and MCompany of the 2/6th Cavalry a tFt. Knox,who installed the damperson the ta nks a nd ra n t he field tests.Without their help, advice, andwork, thi s project would never havebeen possible.Footnotes

'Earlier tan ks also squeaked, but this arti-cle is concerned only with t ank s fitted withthe centerguide type shown in Fig. 1. A pic-ture, apparently of 1943 vintage, of a T-23fitted with a double-pin track with the two-prong centerguide can be seen in Hunnicutt,R.P., P e r s h i n g : A History of the MediumTank T-20 eries, 1971,Feis t Publications, p.88.*See Graziano, Jame sM., rantR Gerhart,and Th omas R. Noms, "Acoustic SignatureReduction of Track Squeak."3Plastisol is a trade name for P ubber-likecompound tha t is in liquid form and must beheated in order to harden. It is used for manythings, such as coating bare metal tool han -dles to form a cushioned,non-slip grip, and asthe construction materia l for certain typesofoverboots.

FIRST LIEUTENANT ED-WARD STANLEY attendedthe Ordnance Officer BasicCourse in the fall of 1983.He was assigned to theTank-Automotive Command(TACOM) in Warren, Mich i-gan. He has been an R&DCoordinator for the Surviva-bility Division (AMSTA-RS)of theTank-Automotive Tech-nology Directorate in the Re-search, Developmentand En-gineering Center for almosttw o years. He holds a bache-lor's degree in computerscience from the Universityof Texas.

MR . DAVI D SASS holds abachelor'sdegree in mechan-ical engineering from Michi-gan Technologicat University.He has been working withthe Tank-Automotive Com-mand, Survivability Division,Applied Research Branch(AMSTA-RSA) for the pasttwo summers and iscurrent-ly working as a contractor forAMSTA-RSA through Ste-vens Ins titute of Technologyin N.J.MR. GARY MARTIN holdsa bachelor's degree in me-chanical engineering fromLawrence Institute of Tech-nology. He has been workingin th e Applied ResearchBranch (AMSTA-RSA) of theSurvivability Division at theTank-Automotive Commandin Warren for t he past threeand a half years.

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ecollectionsThe Gafsa Girlsby Lieutenant General Samuel L. Myers (Ret.)

All war is not, as General Sher-ma n said, hell. kill war is noddeath,disaster, blood and fire, despitewhat many journalists and his-tor ians are ap t to depict. All war isnot misery, discomfort, dirt, suffer-ing, an d confusion,as a great manyof those who participated a re apt tosay. I have experienced all of this,but I prefer to talk of more pleasantthings. There were many- ven inWW I1- nd such pleasant thingswill be the gist of the tale whichfollows.I landed at Mers el Kebir imNorthAfrica, on the 12th.of November,1942, with a portionof the I1CorpsHeadquarters. As we disembarkedfrom the s hip Monterey - whichha d brought us, almost uneventful-ly, from Grennoch, Scotland -there was firing of sorts going onall around us, but strange o say,wewere left alone, an d alone we wereindeed, without even a single ve-hicle.So our mom than 100 staff of-ficers starte d heir first approach tobattl e by ha ving to walk, from Mersel Kebir to Oran, overloaded withjunk, without full canteens, andwith no guides. Our first war casual-ties were blistered feet an d most ofour superfluous luggage.My position in I1 Corps Head-qua rte rs was Automotive Officer. Idont believe that slot exists today,but in 1942, when I was trained at

Fort Holabird for this duty, thenewly motorized US.Army wastearing vehicles up faster than in-dustry could build them. There wasgreatneed or my expertise, coupledwith strong command backing.On December 21, 1942, ColonelJohn Dabney, Chief of Staff of I1Corps, called me int o his office andtold me the old man , General LloydR. Fredendall, ha d a most unusualjob for me. In the Generals office,Iwas told th at sometime in the verynea r future, I1 Corps would be go-ing into battle in Tunisia, orEas tern Algeria, between Tebessaand Gafsa. At present, the onlyknown combat troops in that areawere French, plus one Americanparatroop battalion and a few un-known British troops. They thentold me to choose 15 officers and 25enlisted men from the headquarters-mostly technical service person-nel - ut also some line officersbecause we might have to defendourselves.

My yet-unnamed task force wasordered to l eave about the 6th ofJanuar y, 1943, go to Tebessa, andthere establish a genera l depot tosupply I1 Corps when it arrived.Natousa, North African Theatre.ofOperations, together with the FirstBritish Army, would be responsiblefor forwarding the supplies to mevia the narrow-gauge railway from

Ouled Rhamoun, or by truck, o r byboth.For the time being, I would op-erate with only verbal orders. Imention this because absence ofwritten orders caused some stickysituations later.Following the .conference withGeneral Fredendal l and Joh n Dab-ney, I went to th e adjuta nt generalwhere, by phone with th e sectionchiefs,I picked 15officers and left itup to them to choose t w o enlistedmen each. The adjutant generalwas then to issue travel orders,while I went about further prepara-tions.On the 23d of December, I flewfrom La Senia, South of Oran, toAlgiers, and headquarters of Na-tousa, where I was further briefedby t he G-4, who I think was Briga-dier General Tom Larkin.

I must say here tha t most of thisarticle will have to be from mymemory. (Several years ago theArmy Historical Office asked me tosend my papers and records tothem for storage. I can no longer goall the way to Carlisle, Pennsyl-vania, to study my own papers.)At Algiers, where I stayed about36 hours, I was given additionalorders, verbal, and a considerablyenlarged mission. Ill not go intothe details, sincedetail will developas we go along, but I will mentionone item of utmost importance: I

20 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-A

armor magazine, march-april 1987

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