armor magazine, july-august 1987

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, July-August 1987

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Tank Tracks

For the 35th time in the century-old history of our jour-nal, the guidon has passed to a new editor. Like anyother unit, individuals come and go, but the magazinelives on.

I would be slightly negligent were I not to shatter thestillness of this transition just a little. My predecessor,Maj. G. Patrick Ritter, heads to Europe and leaves be-hind a solid source of professional thought and astrengthened professional association. We who wearthe Armor or Cavalry insignia on our collar owe him oursnappiest salute.A close look at your magazine should reveal a few

changes. The paper stock is different; the subtitle, "TheMagazine of Mobile Warfare," no longer appears on thecover; and there is a PB number on the contents page.These changes are among those that are a result of thetransition to a TRADOC professional bulletin program,which received impetus from the DA effort to reduce thenumber of publications. But the contents will remain thesame - thought-provoking discussions about thearmor and armored cavalry business.

This issue contains the final installment of "The TenLean Years", MG Robert W. Grow's personal account ofthe orlgins of the Armored Force. Thls four-part serieshas received much desewed comment and praise.

In "Some Thoughts on Taking Care of Your Soldiers,"BG John C. Bahnsen (kt.) and CPT Robert W. Conediscuss commanders' responsibilities towards their sol-diers.

Battlefield teamwork, effectively developed, leads tobig payoffs. LTC Alan G. Wtters illustrates today'sAirland Baffle Doctrine through WWll blitzkrieg tacticsin his "Teamwork and Synchronization - The Blitzkriegof the '80s."

"Combat Intelligence at IRON STAR" is CPT Michael T.Pierson's discussion of the steps required in Threatevaluation, terrain and weather analysis, and threat in-tegration that are necessary for intelligence preparationof the bafflefield and for an aggressive counter-raconplan.

Gunners and TCs can take away valuable training tipson UCOFT, TCPC, range time management, and prep-to-fire and preengagement checks from CPT Kris P.Thompson's "The Guts of Tank Gunnery," a follow-up toWinning the Peacetime Battle" (March-April 1987ARMOR).As you read this issue and pick up an understanding

of our past - and perhaps some information that youcan use in your own unit - please keep in mind thatthis is your professional bulletin, dependent upon eachof you for its content and support. It is written by andfor members of the Armored Force and draws its sus-tenance from our association, to which only about 47percentof us belong.This publication is our source for innovative ideas and

doctrinal discussion, and our only link to our chosenbranch. That fact makes this magazine even more im-portant when we serve in assignments away fromtroops and tanks. Join up. Pass your copy around, andhelp keep this association and publication gassed upand rolling.

-PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E.VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:R. L. DILWORTHBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB- 7 7-87-4 (Test)Editor-ln-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS H. TAlTARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is publishedbimonthly by the U S . Army Armor Center,4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY40121.Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinionsof the authors and does not necessarilyreflect the official Army or TRADOC position,nor does it change or supersede any informa-tion presented in other offlcial Army publica-tions.Official distribution is limited to one copyfor each heavy brigade headquarters, ar-mored cavalry regiment headquarters, armorbattalion headquarters, armored cavalrysquadron headquarters, reconnaissance

squadron headquarters, armored cavalrytroop, armor company, and motorizedbrigade headquarters of the United StatesArmy. In addition, Army libraries, Army andDOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staffagencies with responsibility for armored,direct fire, ground combat systems, organira-tions, and the training of personnel for suchorganizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the US. ArmyArmor Center has proponency. Thatproponency includes: all armored, direct-fireground combat systems that do not serveprimarily as infantry carriers; all weaponsused exclusively in these systems or by CMF19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscel-laneous items of equipment which armorand armored cavalry organizations use ex-clusively: training for all SC 12A, 128, and12C officers and for ail CMF-14series en-listed soldiers; and information concerningthe training, logistics, history, and leadershipof armor and armored cavalry units at thebrigadelregiment level and below, to includeThreat units at those levels.Material may be reprinted, provided creditIs given to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.

FEATURES

10 Some Thoughts on Taking Care of Your Soldiersby Brigadier GeneralJohn C. Bahnsen (Ret.)and Captain RobertW. Cone16 Combat Intelligence at Iron Starby Captain MichaelT. Pierson20 The "Name Enough Divisionby Brigadier General Albin F. lrzyk (Ret.)29 The Guts of Tank Gunneryby Captain Kris P. Thompson34 The Ten Lean Years (Part IV)by Major General Robert W. Grow43 Teamwork and Synchronization: The Blitzkrieg of the '86s

by Lieutenant Colonel Alan G. Viers49 Draper EssayAward Winner:The Evolutionof a Battalion Commanderby Major Richard P. GeierDEPARTMENTS2 Letters6 Commander's Hatch8 Driver's Seat9 Recognition Quiz47 Professional Thoughts52 Books53 Recognition Quiz Answers

secondc~aaa mcial mail postsga pald at ~ or twx,w, vld addnlonal melting omcea. pomaster

Mttfibullon Restriction: Approvsd for puMk release:dhtrlbution la unilmtled.Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR. A m TSBMAQ. Fort Know. KY 40121.


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Mol Ull.

The debate continues on the heavy orllght armor approach to tank design. The.light armor advocates say the lowerweight allows greater mobility to avoidhits, and the heavy armor advocates saythicker armor will prevent attacking ammofrom getting through. Both sides fail to un-derstand how technology functions on thebattlefield. Both are right and wrong.Weight is not the controlling factor inmobility: horsepower is. With enoughhorsepower. any vehicle - no matter howheavy - can be manewerable. A 21-ton,lightly armored tank, with its frontal armorincreased to stop the largest currentSoviet kinetic energy and shapedchargerounds, would only lose 5 to 6 horse-power per ton due to the additional

..-.-, _.."" .... ".." ,.,.- ...., ."""., ...thickness of the armor will dramatically af-fect CREW survhrability. The more energya round must expend getting through thearmor, the higher chance the crew has ofstaying alive. Shaped charges are af-fected much more than kinetic energyrounds.A defender can wait or manewer for aflank shot on a heavy tank. This apparent-ly makes heavy front armor useless, butIts elimination means the defender doesnot need to flank shoat. A lightly armoredtank would be shot at more often and ear-lier In an attack than a heavy one. Aheavy tank unit would be able to delivermore firepower than a light tank unit. Itwould be interesting to see if this couldbe documented. Maneuverability is onlyusable when on the attack, and even then

attacker.There are several problems facing llghttank survival. They would be blown apartby a large shaped charge that wouldleave only a small hole in heavy armor. Asimple high explosive round, uselessagainst heavy armor, has an even moredevastating effect than the same sizeshaped charge. Reactive armor is of nohelp against such large ammo attacks. itis questionable how useful internal mm-partmentalization with blast relief portswould be. Interior walls would be thickerthan the armor. Large shaped chargesand high-exploshre rounds will overpowerany automatic fire-suppression system be-cause of the tremendous behindarmor ef-

fects. A hit by one of these large foundswould cause so much damage that the

(NOTE Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.Cammer-DIRECTORY-PointsOfContact prefix Is e ame02424-xxxx)ARMOR EditorialOffices

Editor-in-Chief,Major Patrick Cooney 2249Managing EditorJon T. Clemens 2249Assistant EditorRobert E. Rogge 2610Production AssistantVivian Thompson 2610MAILING ADDREVS ARMOR, ATTN: ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox, KY 40121.ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed andaccuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals orclear copies, either typed or printed out in near-letter-quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on5-1/4" floppy disks in Microsoft WORD, Multimate,

Wordperlect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please in-clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra-tions submitted.PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS Report delivery problemsor changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circula-tion manager, 502-942-8624.MILITARY DISTRIBUTION Report deliveryproblems or changes of address to Ms. VivianThompson, AV464-2610; commercial: 502-624-2610.Requests to be added to the free subscription listshould be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOLPoints of ContactCommandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas H. Tait 2121Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)BG Paul E. Funk 7555Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC)COL Claude L. Clark 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM John M. Stephens 4952Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)COL Carry P. Hixson 8346Command and S taff Dept. (ATSB-C%)COL Robert D. Hurley 5855Weapons Systems Dept. (ATSB-WP)C'OL Dan E. Deter 1055Directorate of Training and Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD)CO L Claude W. Abate 7250Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Donald L. Smart. 5050Directorate of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES)COL Robert A. Korkin 3446Training Group (ATZK-TC-TBF)LTC William R. Brownlee I1 3955NCO Academy - Drill Sergeant School (ATNCG)CSM Lowell E. Dickinson 5150Director, Reserve Component Supp ort (ATZK-DRC)COL James E. Dierickx 1351Oflice of the Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)CO L Cecil L. Shrader 7809

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light armored vehicle could not berepaired, but the heavy armored vehiclescould be recovered and returned to action.Since hull defilade Is not always pos-sible (the only protection against heavy

direct-fire rounds for statlonary lightly ar-mored tanks), a hit will be fatal to thevehicle and CREW more often. Infantryare better able to defend against lightarmor since more smaller weapons canbe carried. A single ALPIS weighs 9 kg,which is equal to 16 shaped-charge riflegrenades. Reactive armor would reducetheir effect, but not stop the penetration. Iffacing a force of light tanks, the bestweapon to have is the automatic gun. Theonly defense against it would be to in-crease the armor thickness, which startsthe antiarmor-versus-armor race again.The israeli Army, based on Its experience,has opted for the heavy armor approachto tank design. The events of 1982 provedthe value of this.The NTC is the only other source of lnfor-mation available, but the antiarmor-versus-armor issue IS NOT addressed, except ingeneral terms. The light tank does have aplace in the U.S. Army (82nd, IOlst, 7th.and 29th divisions), but not as our prin-cipal combat vehicle. The heavy armor isnot there so a tank can stay put and slugit out, but to save the crew (and the tank,if possible) from being killed when a hitoccurs. A hit should always be avoidedand the heavy tank has the same chanceof avoiding a hit as a light tank. At thistime, 1 see the future tank main armamentchoice down to two candidates, liquidpropellant guns and high-velocity rockets.Missiles are out of the question, since allguidance systems could be jammed (hitchances can be as low as 1 per cent) andthe passive systems can be blinded, notto mention that the gunner has to trackthe target until impact. The automaticloader presents a problem. What good isit that it can out-load a human being inthe long term if all engagements will bedecided in 10 to 20 seconds? Our tacticsrevolve around firing 2 to 6 rounds as fastand accurately as possible. With thespeed at which a Soviet formation canmove, this is critlcal. The human can loadin three to four seconds and the machineneeds six to eight. The rocket would bemy choice of armament because thelauncher would have no overhang (Hur-ray!) and the automatic loader would beuseful because several rockets can bemade ready to fire at the same time froma launcher. Secondary armament needsconsiderable movement independent ofthe main armament so high speed aircraftcan be engaged. An automatic gun foruse against light armor and aircraft, andan automatic mortar (40-mm Mk 19) fordirect and indirect suppression, wouldmake up the secondary battery. I am notsure a riflecaliber machine gun is stillnecessary, but it can be added to thesecondary battery.

A more Important Item than armamentis the future fire control system. The dis-play is obsolete before going Into use andthe eyepiece should remain the secon-dary fire control system. The helmet-mounted sight (HMS) will be the primarysight for the TC and gunner. By the flickof a switch, the HMS can display engage-ment, navigation, overlay, operationsorder, or vehicle status (fuel, tempera-tures, pressures, ammo, etc). The HMSengagement display would have anaiming reticle, cursor Indicating weaponlocation in relation to the hull, andweaponlammo ready to fire. The sight it-self consists of a body with two heads(one above the other). The upper head isslaved to the TC's HMS and the bottomone is used for engagements and Is fixed.The TC and gunner can switch which isbeing viewed through. The sight wouldhave 3, lo-, and 40-X magnification. TheTC would search with his unaided eyeand the HMSaided eye. When a target isdetected, the TC presses an alignmentswitch, causing the weapons to slew andthe gunner's HMS to switch to the TC'sdisplay. The gunner or TC lases on the tar-get (three stadia lines appear to matchthe range received so the lasing accuracycan be checked) and selects theammo/weapon. When the weapon aligns,the location cursor bllnks when the upperand lower periscope heads have aligned,the gunner switches his HMS to the lowerhead's display, and fires.

With low-level air defense systems sosmall in number now, and not likely togrow In the future, the tank's fire controlmust be able to engage low performanceaircraft as well as it can ground targets.The Wehrmacht learned this by the end ofWWll and all planned armored vehicleshad ADA capability built in.

CHRISTOPHER H. SCHNEIDERSSG, Troop, 11238 CAV, !ANGNoblesville, IN.

Reactingto AmbushDear Sir:I am writing in response to the article,"Ambush!" by Captain DeMario. There aretwo points I wish to address: The dif-ference between a trap and ambush, andactions in ambush. We must understandthe difference between the trap and theambush if we are to react properly. Thetrap leaves the defender with littledefense or manewer. The ambush issomething you can fight through andmaneuver out of. The trap can be avoidedby the use of reconnaissance andOCOKA. The ambush can occur despitegood recon and is almost always laid forvehicles traveling in column. Therefore,avoid the trap and prepare for the am-

bush. Action drills provlde the foundationfor effective automatic reaction to am-bush. At the call, "Ambush, action right!"the reaction must be to move quickly andshoot simultaneously. When an ambushhits, it can be from one side, the front, therear, or a combination - usually bothsides. its vlctlm must choose a responsewith little time for the selection. A platooncan use the herringbone maneuver inresponse to an ambush on both sides ofthe column by ground troops with an-titank weapons. The 71th Armored Caval-ry employed the herringbone effectively inSouth Vietnam. This, however, is a split-ting of forces and can make reconsolida-tlon for counterattack more difficult. Ourcompany SOP states that a com-panyheam caught in a combination am-bush will herringbone by platoons (1Pltright, 2Pit left, 3Pit right...), cut throughthe enemy and consolidate in the direc-tion of travel for counterattack. Actionright, left, or rear, with smoke, puts theplatoon firepower forward in one sectorand gives some nd gives some cover tothe rear. The decision as to which dlrec-tion to move must be made instantaneous-ly. That direction should be toward theenemy. The only defense here is to at-tack. The priority is to leave the kill zonequickly by punchlng a hole In the "wall."Turn in the direction of initial fire, maximiz-ing your frontal armor. Do not take time tolay center of mass: the column must ex-plode upon the enemy violently. I an-ticipate three problems with the actiondrill response. One, the first vehicle turn-ing wiii be flanked to any enemy to hisfront. Two, some vehicles may not haveon-board smoke. Three, after turningtoward the enemy, on-board smoke couldhelp outline vehicles even better forenemy gunners.

Being flanked to the front Is a chanceyou must take. After you turn and shoot,look over your shoulder or have your gun-ner scan quickly to that slde. Smoke maynot be working on all tanks. Use what youhave. Ambush reaction remains the samewith or without smoke. Finally, in any am-bush or attack, tanks never turn their tailto the enemy. If smoke protects your rearor flank for a moment, use it. In the am-bush, the enemy already has you in hissights. Smoke will not Increase your perilconsiderably.

What Is Important Is that you have acoherent response to an ambush that thewhole platoon or company understandsperfectly. Thus, when the platoon leader'sturret gets separated from the hull, theremaining tanks will turn, fight automati-cally - not freeze in their tracks, waitingto die Ina similar manner.

JOEL C. GRAVESLT, ArmorFort Hood. TX

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Handling the HindDear Sir:The article, 'The Mi-24 HIND A PotentAdversary," in the March-April 1987 issue,was quite interesting. The author has ob-viously thought a great deal about thesubject. Iwould like to offer a few sugges-tions that may be of use in countering at-tack helicopter operations..The attack helicopters, such as theHIND, fly fast for helicopters, but slow ascompared to fixed-wing aircraft of eventhe earlyW I1 period. Even so, the useof tracer flre to "aim" the Browning caliber-50 MPHB against air targets is wasteful oftime and ammo. Considering the short ef-

fective range of the gun, this can be aserious problem. Use of the "ring andbead" or "speed ring" AA sight could allowthe gunner to better estimate proper leadon enemy helicopters. Hits on the targetswould be increased greatly once the gun-ners get some experience with this sight.There are existing designs that easily at-tach to the caliber .50 M2HB machine gun.Another way of increasing the chances

of a hit on hosti le helicopters would be toincrease the rate of fire. The 45-inch-bar-relled machine gun fires about 450-550rounds per minute. The aircraft 36-inchbarrel version, the AN-M2, fires 750-850RPM. The *inch barrel is available fromArmy and Navy sources and is easily at-tached to the standard MPHB gunreceiver. The limited capacity of theammo on the caliber .50 MG mount limitsAA fire to fleeting shots, then furiousreloading while hostile aircraft f l i about.The current mounts hold a single box,M a l , of 100 rounds capacity. If theammo box were to be the same type asused to hold 60-mm mortar ammo(similar to the M2A1 box, but 13 inch,rather than 7.5 inches), it could carryabout 200 rounds of caliber .50 ammo.The ammo box tray could be easilymodified to hold either the mortar or theMG ammo box. Being located at themount's center of gravity, the extra weightshould not slow down PA aiming.

An aid to disrupting the aim of enemygunners In hostile helicopters is thesmoke grenade launcher on the tank tur-ret. Using all the grenades at once wouldblind the tank commander as well as thehelicopter. If one were to mount a smokegrenade launcher on the top of the maingun mantlet or on the MG mounting sothat it could be fired in a desired direc-tion, it would be possible to selectivelyobscure the surrounding area while retain-ing enough visibility to begin evasive

maneuvering. The article mentioned useof the main gun as a limited AA weapon.what sort of projectile is intended for thisuse? The great range of the 105-mm tankgun, for example, makes it quitedangerous to friendly forces if it missesthe helicopter.W n g a direct hit on a small targetsuch as a helicopter is extremely difficult.The tank's fire control system is hardlysuited for AA fire. Use of the HE shell isprobably the best for helicopter attack.Try the Army or Navy AA proximity fuzesalready in stock. Put in a seifdestruct fea-ture so that misses don't end up killingyour own or allied troops miles down theroad. One could also adapt the Navymount captain's "rlng and bead" sight forthe tank commander to quickly aim histank's main gun. Navy 5inch gun

mounts, in the old days, used such sightson the roof hatches of the mount shieldsto point the guns against close or fleetingtargets. Even though this old type Navygun mount is no longer in widespread ser-vice, there are no doubt many of thesights In storage.The ideas suggested in this letter are in-tended to be short-term improvementsusing available materlal in a slightly dif-ferent way. Longer-term projects may in-clude increasing the elevation of the maingun on some tanks, such as theupgraded M48A5 and the M60, for better

AA fire as well as for longer range artillerysupport fires.The AA fire mission by tanks should behandled in an "overwatch" format. Notevery vehicle needs to be so equipped,though any specially-modified vehicleswill have to be distributed down toplatoon level for best effect. A commentabout AA protection is in order. UnlikeNavy ships, which have weapons and sen-sors for a variety of purposes in one smallarea, the Army has its capabilit ies well dis-tributed among many formations. This al-lows the individual unit to suffer fromneglect, as with having almost no organic

AA capability. The attack helicopters thatattack you may be out of range of yourown organic weapons, but may be in therange of the weapons of another unit.Similarly. the helicopters attackinganother unit may be in the range of yourown organic weapons. Help each other byusing what weapons you have in the "AAoverwatch" concept as you use the "over-watch" concept in other areas. It is hopedthat the ideas presented in this letterprove to be of use. If not, they mayprovoke better ideas from the readers ofARMOR.1 will leave you wlth one, last, wild Idea:use the 40-mm AA round with proximity

fuze (yes, they are that small now) as the"payload" in a discarding sabot AA round,Fitted with a reduced powder charge, soas to keep the velocity "reasonable" forthe fuze and the round (5,000 fps is toomuch), this AA round might be kept downto a cartridge case size that would be aseasy to load as a fixed round.GORDON J. DOUGLAS, JR.Fullerton, CAMoreThoughts on LightArmorDear Sir:I congratulate CPT Spurgeon and Mr.Crist on producing a very interesting andprovocative article. They make a very com-pelling argument for a light armor force

from a deployability issue, though theCombined Arms Tank, as they present it,would have technical limitations thatwould make i t unacceptable at presentfrom a light force standpoint. However,even wlth their proposal of a very uncon-ventional idea, the authors have raised anIssue that Armor as a branch has done lit-tle about in recent years, that of theviability and need for a light armor forcein today's Army.There can be no doubt of the combatpower represented by the Ml lM2 com-bined arms team, and the need for theseforces in Europe, where the Abrams andBradley battalions represent a credible

deterrent to an ever-increasing Sovietmenace. The drawbacks to these units arethat they are both expensive and notstrategically deployable on any sort oftimely basis. Light armor, developed tofight on the low-to-mid-intensity bat-tlefield, can overcome these drawbackswith little loss in combat power. In fact,such a force exists in a small way in theM551A1 Sheridanequipped 3d Battalion(Airborne) 73d Armor at Fort Bragg.Ught armor battalions can be deployedto hot spots around the globe in a matterof days, rather than the weeks required ofheavier forces. If the vehicle can utilize theLAPES (low-altitude parachute extractionsystem) or airdrop methods of insertion,these battalions gain the forcedentrycapability that M1 battalions were notdesigned to have. That the vehicle beable to kill MBTs of all types outside oftheir effective range is a must for a lighttank. The present M551A1, firing the Shil-lelagh missile in addition to conventionalHEAT ammunition, currently fulfi lls theserequirements, but is beginning to reachthe end of its useful service life. With thedeath of the AGS program and the reluc-tance to product-improve the Sheridan inorder to extend its service life, the death

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of the only light armor force in the Armyis imminent.To expand on the authors' commentsregarding Operation URGENT FURY, theSheridans of the 3-734 Armor were avail-able to be deployed to Grenada, but weregiven the mission of guarding the divisionheadquarters at Ft. Bragg. The Marines, inkeeping with their commitment to theCombined Arms concept, landed M60s tosupport their effort in the operation, andas a consequence, they enjoyed muchgreater success in securing their objec-tives quickly. Their operations in Grenadashow just what a light infantry force iscapable of when given armor support.MG Carl W. Stlner, currently the com-mander of the 82d Airborne Division, hasmade great strldes in institutionalizing he

combined arms concept in the light force,as represented by the airborne division.However, Armor branch also has a role insupporting the light force. Sadly, this roleis not currently being filled, due seeming-iy to a widely held concept in the Armorforce that a tank must be a %ton trackedvehicle, heavily armed and armored inorder to do anything worthwhile on thebattlefield. This is simply not true, as wit-nessed by the ability of just two BTR-GOvehicles to threaten the Rangers on PointSalinas airfield. Light infantry must fightvery smart indeed to defeat a mechanizedforce without armor support. It is up to usin the Armor branch to give the light forcethat support. Even one battalion of lighttanks per light infantry division would givethe light force a much more credible bat-tlefield capibility, at the monetary cost oftwo or three Abrams battalions for an NDIprocurement program.

The authors' concept of infantry actuallyriding in the tank is an excellent one intheory, though from a -technicalstandpoint impractical at present. An ar-mored vehicle in the 15- to 30401-1 angesimply cannot be made impervious toeither CE or KE ammunition. A vehicle inthis weight category must therefore relyon a low probability of hit for its survival.This is generally accomplished by makingthe vehicle as small as possible in orderto reduce the target presented to enemygunners.

Carrying additional infantrymen wouldof necessity increase the size of the tar-get, raising the probability of a hit.Deployability would also be reduced, dueto the greater cubic volume taken up bythe larger vehicle when loaded on AirForce aircraft. At the same time, the prob-ability of kill would be increased, sincethe envelope requiring armor protectionwould be increased, while not allowing for

additional armor to be added in order tostay within the 15-to 304011 weight class.If additional armor were added to thevehicle in order to increase its protection

level, deployability would again bereduced, this time due to the increasedweight of a larger armored envelopehaving the same protection level as thesmaller, non-infantry-carrying ehicle.An expedient method to increase themobility and tactical cooperation of lightinfantry with armored forces is in use inthe 82d Airborne Division, and it is not anew one. The infantry simply rides on theback of the Sheridans. This technique hasbeen used at various times both duringand since World War it, and while the in-fantry does not enjoy the same protectionlevel as the tank crew, it is no less than

the protection they have while advancingalone. Infantry leaders ride with armorleaders, so face-to-face communication ispossible, and the infantry leader can com-municate with his subordinates on othertanks through the Sheridan's externaltelephone. It is also not a problem tohave the infantry dismount when they aresupposed to, since they must do so inorder to avoid needless casualties. At thesame time, the armor leader must havethe infantry dismount in order to use histank's firepower and mobility to the ful-lest. While primitive, this technique issimple and still effective for both arms.If it seems that I have neglected theFieid Artillery's role in the light force, Ihave not. 1 have assumed that the King ofBattle is there, as always, doing its part toput steel on target. However, artillery can-not make up for lack of armor support tolight infantry, since it cannot advanceunder fire with the infantry, as armor isdesigned to.

With the potential for future development in armor protection, CPT Spurgeonand Mr. Crlst's Combined Arms Tank mayvery well be the wave of the future. It is,however, a very unconventional, and quitepossibly impractical, idea in light of cur-rent technology. l believe the greatestvalue of their article lies in the argumentfor a light armor force to fill a role thatM60s and Mls simply cannot, that ofdeploying anywhere in the world In 48 to72 hours, and to fight and win as a com-bined arms team upon arrival. The 3d Bat-talion (Airborne) 73d Armor, along withthe 82d Airborne Division, is currently theonly force in the world with this capability,and unless something is done now, it willbe the last.

DANIEL B. MILLER,1LT, ArmorFort Bragg, NC

Historical FootnotesOn the 112th Cav

Dear Sir:I was particularly grattfied to see theMarch-April 1987 issue of ARMOR andthe ali-too-brief historical sketch of the112th Armor (Cavalry) on the rearcover.It Is unfortunate that the historicalsketch is limited to basic genealogyand does not provide enough detailsto fully inform the reader about thehistory of a unit. In the case of the112th (1st Texas Cavalry), it might havebeen of interest to note that justbefore the regiment went into combat

at Cape Merkus ("Arawe") New Britain,albng the Driniumor River near Aitape,New Guinea, and in the liberation ofthe Philippines, it was the last US.horse cavalry regiment to bedeployed to a combat zone as a TO/Emounted unit. The regiment was final-ly dismounted in May, 1943, on the is-land of New Caledonia.Your predecessor, the old CavalryJournal, carried an article written byMG (then COL) J.W. Cunninghamduring that period, which describedthe care and condition of the regi-ment's horses on that island.An Interesting coincidence occurredwhen the same issue that carried thehistorical lineage of the 112th also in-cluded the article by MG Grow, en-titled "The Ten Lean Years." I notedparticularly the aceaunt of the moveof the 1st Cavalry from Marfa, Texas toFt Knox in January, 1933, as part ofits conversion to a mechanized outfit.Members of the 112th greeted the 1stwhen it came through Dallas, Texas atthat time (a copy of an article from aDallas newspaper on that incident isenclosed).The article suggests that the conver-sion from horses to vehicles was notuniversally a happy one. Incidentally,this event occurred just about thetime that the Army abolished the useof the M1913 "Patton" saber in theCavalry. it was a time of great changeto be sure and the history of the 112threflects this.

DAVID0. HALEWoodbridge, VA

July-August 1987 ARMOR 5


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MG Thomas H. TaitCommanding General

U.S.Army Armor Center

Remembering Some Lessons LearnedIii the latter pari ofApril, the Aniio rScliool hosted a two-day seriiirtarwith sir retired Wanior Generals.Tliey interacted with oiir A O A Csmall groiips arid participated iii apanel session with the scliool staffartd faciilty and Pre-Coriiniarid

Coiirsestudents.nie senior general present wasJames H. Polk, class of 1933,USMA. Coriiriiissioned in Cavalnslie rose to coriiniaiid the 3d Cavalry,Pattort's q e s arid ears, iri World WarII; the 4th Aniiored Division; BerlinBrigade; V Corps; arid cirlntiriated

Itis brilliant career in 1970 as CIN-CU SAR EU R. We Itad the rare oppor-hrriity to listen to a soldier who wasinitial& trained on the ltorse artdeverthially coriimarided an h i i yGmirp with four corps (Aiiiericaiiartd Gentian) .General Polk's tliolrglits on trainingwere gathered by Mujor Daniel R.Miirdock, who was his CSCOH diiringthis visit to the Aniior Sc l im . n i ecviiiriterits in pamntlteses are mine.- THT.

Training - n the early years, thetroops would mount up at 0730 andmove out on a tactical exercise.They would return about 1130,clean and stable the animals, then

break until afternoon. In the after-noon, the NCOs would take the sol-diers on detail and th e squadroncommanders would train the juniorofficers in technical skills. The of-ficers made it a point to tr y and dothings better than the best NCO.The officers stuck to the basicsmuch of the time. During tactical orweapons training, the platoon ser-geant kept an eye on the lieutenantsto make sure they were on the righttrack; however, the training ofjunior ofkers wa s the senior of-ficers' responsibility.In World War I1 combat, unitswere normally given an easy or less-critical mission until they were"bloodied once or twice. The unitswere then pulled out to get thingstogether before they were put into amore critical and dangerous situa-

tion. Individual soldiers were nor-mally assigned where they wereneeded most. The experienced crewmembers trained the new guys."We stopped taking 2LTs trainedat the Armor School - they hadonly Armor training, nothing onreconnaissance. We would put theplatoon sergeant in charge for 90days to see how he would work out,and promote him to 2LT." ( n i eA n y today needs a riiechariisrii to

allow battlefield coriiniissiorts. Wedidit 't coiiiritission oiir best NCOleadership ir i Ketrrarii - this was amistake.)"We always tried to develop a win-ning attitude, whether it was tug-of-war, polo or tactical training."General Polk's thoughts concern-ing gunnery training were veryclear. All crews should be trained touse their weapons in a precisionengagement. However, reconnais-sance elements, during actions orcontact, must be trained to place ahigh volume of suppressive area lireinto the target area as quickly aspossible."When one scout crew wasengaged, every weapon within rangelet loose as much ammunition aspossible. You don't need a sep-arate table to teach mass supres-sive fire." (We are ma~iiirtinigsepamte cavalry giiiiiery tables fortlie M3. niere is sonic coiitroveq)regarding this initiative; how ever ,scoirts do not figlit the sam e w q asirtfantry. mierefore, our tac tical tab lesneed to be different.)Combat Operations: General Polkcommented on the fundamentals ofrcconnaissance operations, as con-ducted by the 3d Cavalry in WorldWar 11, and how they tracked with

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"...We all recognize a need to fight for reconnaissance.."current doctrine.characterized by:Start point

0 Termination point0 Lateral boundaries0 Mandatory contact points0 Check points

1. Reconnaissance zones were- o a cavalry squadron and expectit to perform the way thesquadron's organic tankers would.We all recognize a need to fight forreconnaissance - and a divisioncavalry squadron should be able todo it without direct fire attach-ments.

2. Maximum reconnaissance for-ward was applied only as the situa-tion dictated. Often, scouts wereemployed in depth; jeeps followedby scout cars, and finally tanks ortank destroyers.3. The troops always oriented onthe objective during reconnaissanceand on the main body duringsecurity missions.Actions on contact taught at th eArmor School today are similar tothose applied in WWII.0 Deploy, suppress (with ervry-tliirig yoii Iiave), and report. Make

riiaiiiniirii use of artillery. (Todaywe'd ah0 make nia~ir i i i i r t r iise ofCAS arid attack Iielicopters if avail-able.

0 Develop the situation.0Choose and recommend acourse of action. The courses of ac-tion were normally hasty attack andthen bypass if the objective couldnot be taken in an hour or less. "Werarely chose a hasty defense."The tanks followed the scouts andreacted immediately to any engage-ment involving th e scouts. "Thescouts were much more willing toget close when they knew thetankers would get there quickly."

(Atiotlier aqyntetit for keeping tanksin the divisional cavalry squadron.)The bond that developed betweentanker and scout due to close as-sociation should not be discounted.You cannot take any tank company- attach, OPCON, DS, or whatever

Command and control was mis-sion-oriented. G EN Polk usuallyhad his S-3 write a five-paragraphGeld order to issue to squadronsonly when the overall missionchanged. Squadron commanders, inmost cases, issued oral operationsorders off of the map overlay. Com-manders issued orders, not S3s.#The commander's intent was al-ways there; they just didn't invent aname for it in those days. (Zit tlieorder it was known - arid still istoday - as tlic coiicept of tlie opera-tioir.) One excellent example was atasking given to Colonel Polk byGeneral Patton on the 3d Cavalrycommand net. General Patton

stated "I flew over the Danubetoday. There is a bridge intact. Takeit and 1'11 make you a brigadier; ifyou don't, you're relieved." GeneralPolk remembers he had no troubleremembering the commanders in-tent. He also said "Even though thebridge hlew up in my face, I didn'tget relieved. That was just (GEN)Patton's way of motivating people.".Reports to corps weresimplified when General Polk at-

tached an AM commo team tocorps to establish a dedicated recon-naissance net. The 3d Cavalry wasable to stay off the cluttered com-mand and intelligence nets.0Reports sent to higher head-quarters were sent by the S2. TheS3 looked forward, the S2 lookedback. (Good advice.)0 Everyday, General Polk tried toanticipate where the most critical ac-

tion would occur. He then went tothat location and sent the executiveofficer (XU) to the second mostcritical area. The XO kept up withthe battle in detail!

0FRAGOs were issued face-to-'face when possible, then, if news-sary, on the radio. (As we tiiove intohigh tech coiruiiartd arid coritml qr-terns, tliere appears to be a tetideiicyto look at a screen instead of a facewlieri we issiie FRAGOs. If we arecoticenied about siibordiriates iinder-standing coniiiiarider's irtteiit, tlieriwe real& need to look tlietn ir i theeye wliai issiiirig the order.)Leadership: General Polk sat on aboard after World War 11 thatselected officers for integration intothe Regular Army. When applicantswere asked which trait they admiredin their leaders, the almost universalanswer was "fairness."Farce Design: The Bradley is toolarge to perform reconnaissance.(77ris is especial& tnie if the

philosoply of not fighting for ititel-ligetice is Io be the itonti. 77ie Brad-ley, in this role, is too large arid toonoisy - notliirig stealtliy aborit it.However, if we are to figlit for ititel-ligetice, we will rieed to add tanks totlie division cava@ squadron.)General Polk stated that divisionalcavalry must have tanks. "You can'texpect your scouts to do their jobunless they know there is a dedi-cated backup." (See above. niis alsoaqgies against prosidingjiist any tankcoriipany in siipport of tltc divisiotialcavalry sqiadrori. V i e operative wordIiere is dedicated.General Polk's wisdom should notbe lost on us. He is one of the fewremaining World War TI leaderswho fought in high-intensity combat.We need to remember t he lessonsthey learned, and not reinvent thewheel with soldiers' blood. Thinkabout it.

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CSM John M. StephensComm and Sergeant MajorU.S. Army Armor Center

LeadershipDevelopmentMore and more emphasis is beingplaced on leadership development.Positive directions have beendeveloped as we grow with theprogram. There are key points thathave been expressed by our leadersover the last couple of months. Iwould like to share with you someof those points.In order to reinforce leaderdevelopment, all of us must know

what leadership instruction is beingtaught and what are the objectivesof that instruction. What betterplace to find out than the Noncom-missioned Officer Academy?The NCO Academy is an outstand-ing place for an NCODP class,where the noncommissioned of-ficers of the organization can seefirst-hand where our noncommis-

sioned officers live while in school,what is expected of them, what sub-jects are taught, and how to rein-force the training received oncethey return to the unit - the latterbeing the most dilficull. Most of us,over the years, have not allowed thenewly trained NCOs to use theirnewly acquired talents when they ar-rive back in the unit.There are many subjects which

need to be taught in the platoonthat can be assigned to other NCOsin the platoon to develop theirskills. Physical Training, Drill andCeremonies, Inspection in Ranksand the Billets, How to Wear theUniform, etc., are a few of the sub-jects for a new Primary LeadershipDevelopment Course graduate.

It is important that the platoon ser-geant always remember that he isresponsible to counsel the NCO onstrong points and shortcomings.Probably the single most importantpoint to remember is that Leader-ship Developmcnt allows for mis-takes to be made. Too often werecklessly criticize someone for amistake instead of using it as ateaching point and sharing theproblem with others.The second area I would like toaddress is the Military OccupationalSpecialty of the NCO. How do youdevelop the Basic Course graduate?How do you combine leadership

with technical skills? How do you in -tegrate technical and tactical train-ing? How do you integrate commontasks and individual task into leadertraining? First, you must know whatthe demands of the basic courseare. Again, for those of you who are

stationed on or near a BNCOC, Istrongly recommend the commandsergeants major, fwst sergeants, andplatoon sergeants visit the schooland learn what courses of instruc-tion are taught, and how to assistyour NCOs during schooling andupon their return to the organiza-tion. Its not easy to combine leader-ship with technical skills, especiallywith the deletion of monetaryresources. However, it is a must ifwe expect the squad leader orvehicle commander to be totallyproficient on the system for whichhe is responsible.

First, you have to integrate techni-cal and tactical training. All thetechnical skills in the world will nothelp you if cannot maneuver thevehicle at the precise moment. TheUnit Conduct of Fire Trainer(UC0F.r) demands the basic fireand movement exercises. The Na-tional Training Center, and (soon)the Combat Maneuver TrainingCenter in Hohenfels, demands tech-nical and tactical proficiency if youare to survive. The Basic Noncom-missioned Officers Course (Armorand Cavalry) demands technicaland tactical proficiency throughSituational Training Exercises(STX).

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Some Thoughtson Taking Careof Your Soldiersby Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen(Ret.) and Captain Robert W. Cone

Have you ever met a fellow officerwho did not claim to "take care ofsoldiers?" Of course not! 'Takingcare of soldier s" has become thesta ndard byline of our professionaldialogue. But what exactly does"taking carc of soldiers" mean?To many officers, it is synonymouswith somehow making the Army sys-tem work for the individ ual soldier,or ensuring that the system meetsthe soldier's needs. Such a notion isfluffy at best and is probably thereason - despite all the rhetoric -

we generally take care of few soldiers very well. Unfortunately,"taking care of soldiers" is a conceptthat is long on good intentions andshort on specifics.

The purpose of this article is toprovide some age-old techniques of"taking care of soldiers" that workweU in peacetime and will returnbig dividends in war. The ideas weoffer are rea lly little more than oldwine in new bottles. There is littlepride of authorship here, as few ofthese techniques are original.Rather, they are simply an accumulation of ideas that work.Tested in both peace and war, theyhave passed from mentor to mentored over many yearsOur profession is one of the veryfew that encourage the free ex-change of such professional "techniques" without acknowledgment. We

know that you have ideas that al-

ready work; but just maybe you willfind something here that will makethings better still.On Healthand Physical Well BeingFew organizations possess theresources to care for the total needs

of their members. In the main, theU.S. Army does. Despite that fact,one does not have to look very farto find soldiers with rotten teethand in poor physical shape. Theresources to ftx these readinessdegrading problems are all available, but few so ldiers - by themselves - possess the skill, knowledge,or persistence to make thebureaucracy deliver. Making thebureaucracy work for your soldiers'benefit is your job as a leader andas a commander, and thal's noteasy. Dealing with problems takestime - both your own and that ofyour soldiers - and often distractsfrom your immediate concerns of"getting Delta 34 up" or gettingready for the ARTEP or qualification gunnery. Moreover, some ofthe "little things" you encounter indealing with the bureaucracy tendto get you in more trouble than mayseem of immediate worth to you.For instance, making a bunch ofdental appointments for soldiersand then not following through onseeing that the soldiers get to themdoes tend to generate some embar-rassing statistics at higher headquarters. The point, though , is thatyou need to worry about the big pic-

ture. Sure, you can "micromanage"your way through a marginally successful 12-18 months of commandby working problems on a day-today basis, but the truly big gainscome from long-term payoffs fromlong-term investments, such astaking care of the health of your soldiers.

Denial CareHow many "snaggletooths" do youhave in your unit? We bet that ifyou have not personally checked

your soldiers' mouths, you have atleast a handful of soldiers wi th obviously decayed, missing, or twistedteeth. You say: "How can this be?They all have their teeth checked bydentists at every prep-for-overseasmovement exercise, every birthdaymonth audit , and every routineexam!" While all that is probablytrue, the pathology of dental diseaseis a devious one. Those soldiers'teeth didn't get that way overnight,and although they probably don'tlike their teeth as they are, those soldiers sure don 't want to go throughthe agony and aggravation of gettingthem fIXed. Although they may beidentified for dental work at thesevarious screening procedures, theyjust never seem to make it over tothe clinic to get the work done.H is not just young soldiers whohave bad teeth, either. Take a hardlook at your first sergeant's andyour platoon sergeant's teeth, Theseindividuals can provide the mostcrea tive and exotic excuses for

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avoiding dental work. Do nothesitate to make them open theirmouths and show you their teeth.Keep a little card file, remindingyou just who needs what. But mostof all, follow up and make sure that,once the dental care is started, it isfinished regardless of how incon-venient it is for your unit and howuncomfortable it is for the soldiers.More than likely, you will not getthanked for making the soldier goto the dentist tomorrow or the nextday, but they will appreciate it even-tually. That is taking care of soldiers.Medical CareThe dental care issue may seemlike a minor point, but the same

principles can be applied to medicalcare. Very fortunately, our soldiersare pretty durable and rarely gethurt or sick. When they do needtreatment, it is just as serious tothem as it is to a four-star general.They will be treated just as well as ageneral, and they need to knowthat.Take the time to personally visityour troops in the hospital andmake sure their friends and squador crew membcrs do also. It can bea frightening experience for a youngsoldier to find himself all alone inthe hospital without contact fromhis family and friends. Let himknow that somebody cares and thatit matters that he gets good treat-ment and gets well quickly.A real secret to good health careis getting to know the people whotake care of your troops. As a unitleader, take the time to let yourunit's physician assistant, medicalplatoon leader, or even doctor fromthe hospital know who you are.Make a personal effort to ensurethat they understand your unit'straining needs and that your sol-diers matter to you personally. Letthem know when you think theyhave done a good job and invitethem to your unit's training events.

Building a good rapport not onlytends to smooth out rough spots incommunication, but provides yoursoldiers with a more friendly andfamiliar face when they need it most.

Ppl -- .D Co., 1-67 Armor pulis together to win division championship inthe 2d AD during 1984 tug-of-war competition. Pick your sportscarefully, the authors suggest. "Find a sport best suited to yourunit's talents and make it an all-out effort."

Physical FitnessOne key to good health is good,hard physical training. Immediately,this statement means many things todifferent audiences. Physical fitnesshas gotten a bum rap in recentyears by the predominant image ofseemingly bionic young officersgrinding many of their senior NCOsand less fi t soldiers into the dirt onIO-kilometer runs. This is a shallowperspective that really misses the

point of physical training. The ul-timate goal is teaching them to takecare of their mind, their body, andtheir spirit - the entire holistic fit-ness program which we are now un -dertaking in the Army. Soldiersneed to understand the basic con-cepts of diet, conditioning, strengthdevelopment, and aerobic fitness.Physical fitness should be a win-ning proposition for all and it is theleader's job to make it that way. PTevents should be tailored to meetthe needs of all soldiers both youngand old. Stretching before and afterexercise is something you owe yourolder soldiers. Do not jump in andout of fitness programs, but buildtoward attainable objectives andthen celebrate their attainment.Find a way to give your weaker per-formers special attention, but avoidembarrassing them publicly. Goodtips for this are the "Run for YourLife" award program, release pointruns, and small group fartrecks.Nothing can give your unit and its

soldiers the same emotional lift aswinning at competitive athletics. Un-fortunately for many units, such en-deavors are a double-edged sword.Many units halfheartedly enter teamcompetitions simply to f i l l a require-ment. They end up forfeiting halftheir games and humiliate themsel-ves in the games that they do play.As a commander, pick your sportscarefully. Consult your trainingschedule to make sure you canfinish what you start. Find a s p r tthat is best suited to your unit'stalents and make it an all-out effort.A division championship in a weirdsport that can be mastered by prac-tice, like "tug-of-war", is far betterthan losing records in football andbasketball. Taking care of soldiers isgiving them the Winning edge.

NutritionAnother way of taking care ofyour soldiers' health is in the diningfacility. Did you ever wonder whytroops swarm to the "gut truck" or

"poagie wagon" each morning whenit rolls into the motorpool or onto arange? More than likely, it is be-cause your soldiers didn't get upearly enough to get breakfast in themess hall. The 70-cent breakfast isthe best deal going in the Armytoday, and yet, if you check theheadcount, you will find that veryfew of your soldiers take advantageof it. Where else can you go into arestaurant, cafeteria-style, and haveall the toast you want, all the milk


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you can drink, cereal, and fruit (twoto three different kinds)? And ifyou rniist eat those things that arenot good for you, you can eat eggs,creamed beef on toast, and all theother wonderful things we serve inour mess halls. The 70-cent break-fast is the way to take care of yoursoldiers, so they do not wait untilthe "maggot wagon" comes throughthe motorpool to spend their pre-cious money on a pastry and coffeefor a buck-and-a-half. That kind offood does not last long.Great idea, you say. But just howdo you get your soldiers to break-fast? It is not an easy situation tofuc, but basically you need to makesure that the troops get up or comein early enough to make it to themess hall. There will he plenty ofresistance from the growing numberof young soldiers who live off-postwith their families, but they are theones who can afford th e "gut truckleast.The other thing you can do ismake sure the mess hall is servingwhat the troops want. Glad-handt h e mess sergeant, eat breakfast inthe mess hall yourself, and set up ac-tivities like company breakfasts tointroduce non-users to the facility.Your mess sergeant will quicklyidentify you as the reason that hisheadcount has gone up and he willvery likely be more responsive to

your suggestions and requests in thefuture.Clothing and SupplyHow important does a soldier

have to be to get an issue wristwatch? How about goggles, cover-alls, a desk in his room, or a newmattress or new pillow for his bed?Making sure your troops get every-thing the supply system has to offeris another way to show them thatyou care about them. The Armysupply system is both complicatcdand hazardous for the unit com-mander. It is complicated because ittakes constant study and effort tofigure both what you are authorizedand how to get it. It is hazardous be-cause once you have figured the sys-tem out, you are ultimately account-able for all the extras that youbothered to get. Unfortunately,many commanders have reducedtheir risk by cutting back on troopamenities under the generalphilosophy of "the less you have, theless you have to worry about." Butimagine a conversation between twoprivates from different units withinthe same battalion, one with all thelittle extras and one without, andfigure out what kind of conclusionsthey will draw about which soldieris more important to his respectiveunit. Taking care of soldiers is going

j,Y

Members of D Co., 1-67 Armor, gather for Thanksgiving DinnerI November, 1983. Captain Cone, one of the authors, commandedthe unit at the time.

the extra mile to show them youcare about them and they they areimportant to you.Another way to take care of yourtroops is to make sure they arewearing the right clothing for theweather. You will not have much

'I.. . Another way to take careof yourtroops is tomake sure they are wearingthe right clothing fort he weather..."~ ~ ~~ ______

trouble with the obvious things likefield jackets, gloves, or wet weathergear; it is the little things that manysoldiers consider to be optional.Such items as long underwear andthe OD muffler apparently do notseem like a fashionable idea to inex-perienced soldiers. Make them wearthem whether (hey like it or not,and then you need to check them tomake sure that they do. A relatedpoint involves the tendency of yourmore senior personnel to have ac-cumulated "special" items of cloth-ing. Such niceties as goose downparkas, insulated coveralls, "MickeyMouse" boots, and electric socksare great cold fighters that yourmore experienced NCOs and of-ficers have collected in theircareers. Unfortunately, they have nobusiness wearing them unless theyhave been issued to the entire unit.Leaders need to wear the identicalitems of clothing that their soldiersdo in order to gauge the effects ofthe elements on their troops.The quartermaster laundry isanother great deal for your troops,but very few take advantage of it un-less they are pushed. The reason isthat quartermaster laundry is bad-mouthed by a lot of soldiers be-cause the service is not timely oritems get lost. Generally speaking,the problem is not with quarter-master laundry, the problem is withyour supply sergeant. The supplysergeant is responsible fo r pick upand delivery, as well as account-ability and paperwork. The fewersoldiers who use it, the easier thejob is. The best way to solve thatproblem and improve your unit's

~~



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service is for you as a commanderto sign up for it yourself. For eightdollars a month you can put in 21pieces of laundry a week and youget your fatigues and shirts back onhangers. Once you and your supplysergeant work out the details of get-ting the service up to your stand-ards, then you can have the rest ofyour unit sign up in good con-science.GetYourself OrganizedA sure-fire way to ensure thatnothing every drops through thecracks and that you are ready tomeet any contingency is to keepyour entire unit waiting around foryou all the time. Make them waitwhile you are in a meeting over atbattalion so they can react to anyproblems that might develop in plan-ning a training event. Keep a realclose hold on them during the littlefree time that you do allow them sothat you can call them in at thedrop of a hat to get a jump on someunanticipated problem.Sound ridiculous? Unfortunately,it is an unstated leadership practicefor many commanders, and sadly

enough - due to the loyalty anddedication to duty of our soldiers -it usually works. Granted, there aremany situations in which units mustbe responsive to rapidly changingand extremely demanding missions;however, it is when such a leader-ship style becomes the standard ingarrison life that serious damage isdone. We submit that the real causeof such "leadershipby micromanage-ment" ultimately is created by a com-mander at some level who is not or-ganized and therefore places an ex-tremely low value on his soldiers'time.In the planning process, manyleaders take their soldiers' time assort of a given. They think that, al-though they worry about range time,bullets, diesel, and repair parts, theone quantity that is truly unlimitedis their soldiers' time. In a sense,this is true. It is the one resource im-mediately available to the small unitcommander which is limited only bythe number of hours in a day. Un-

fortunately, the abuse of thisresource has certain intangible andlong-term costs. The fact is that yourarely waste the time of people whoare very important to you or thatyou care about. When you waste asoldier's time, you are telling themthat you do not value their time andthat you do not care about them.And as a result, they tend to per-form in the mediocre fashion thatyou would expect of someone whosetime was valueless. This begins aseemingly endless cycle of allocatingmore time to accomplish less work.The solution to the problem issimple. Get p m e l f organized andmake plans that place a premiumon your soldiers' time.

DoYour HomeworkYou can never think of everything,but most of us can do a lot betterthan you would think. Workthrough every operation mentallyfrom start to finish. When you areplanning a training event, talk to the

NCOs in your unit who ran theevent the previous year; talk to yourcounterparts from sister units whohave already been through it; talk tothe evaluators and controllers.Gather every bit of data that youcan about how it was done and whatcould make it better.To learn from your own mistakesmeans that your soldiers are learn-ing about you at the same time, andthat makes you look stupid. Learnfrom somebody else's mistakes asmuch as you can beforehand; youwill still make mistakes, but theywill be far more subtle.Use as few soldiers as you can inthe planning and set up phases. Donot be shy about making your seniorNCOs and junior officers put inequally long hours of preparation.Rehearsals, map exercises, TEWTs,and terrain walks are all good waysfor you to get your leadership teamin synchronization without makingtroops wait for you. When you areready to execute - get on with it.Demand 100% effort from your en-tire unit and accept no less.

Train to Standards- Not to FillTime

Today's soldiers are smarter thanthey have ever been. If they arepushed in training, they will ac-complish far more than we expectedin the past. Set high standards, andwhen the soldiers meet the stand-ards early, do not jack them aroundbecause you did not figure that theywould do that well. Either move onto more difficult tasks or let themoff; o not make them repeat thesame tasks over and over or theywill respond by developing a normof taking four hours to do some-thing they can really do in two.After letting the troops off early afew times, you and your NCOs willsmarten up and plan from the startto accomplish far more than youhad expected.Stick to Your PlanIt seems that a lot of commandershave good intentions and prettymuch follow the planning process asdescribed up to this point. But thenwhen the first tank goes downrangeand "bolos" with the brigade com-

mander watching, or one of thetroops you let off early gets caughtby the colonel at the snack bar atthree o'clock in the afternoon, theirknees seem to get a little weak.Many will abort the plan, cut theirlosses, and micromanage their wayto survival by overreacting to everyintonation of their boss's voice.Others will stay the course.The question is, "If they changetheir approach, who will notice?"First of all, their troops will notice,from the 1SG right down to the lastprivate. The privates will just figureit was too good to last anyway, andthe 1% will chalk that officer downin his memory along with dozens ofother commanders he has knownwho "had the right idea hut couldn'tmake it work." Second, the poorcommanders will know.The point is, even the best of plansare going to have setbacks. Makeyour plans the right way and stick tothem. If you lack the guts to dothings the right way in peacetime

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W l l l l u l l l y L l l G 1111ca1 U L I U J l l I t j y u u 1"career," how can you expect sol-diers to follow your plans in war,under the very real threat of losingtheir lives? Stick it out; it is usuallyafter the first few glitches that theplan begins to pay off.

Recognidng Your SoldiersSo far, most of the ideas we'vementioned for taking care of sol-diers have either involved makingpeople do things that they did notreally want to do, or that put you,t h e commander or leader, at someform of risk. Recognizing your sol-diers is the one area that is puregravy for both you and your troops.There are a lot of different waysthat we can recognize our soldiers.First of all, you should get used tosimply looking them in the eye, shak-ing their hand and saying "Tltarrks"and W n proud of yoii" when youthink they have done a good job orput forth extra effort. That is theeasiest way and often is the most ef-fective.MedalsWhen your unit successfullyreturns from a major training eventor scores well on a major inspec-tion, you should think about impactawards. Awards can range from bat-talion certificates of achievement, tothe Army Achievement Medal, toth e Army Commendation Medal.Here are some things to remem-ber, however. An impact award isexactly that. You need to give it outalmost immediately after the eventor you miss the point. Make anissue of recognizing those soldiers

who are not highly visible, such as:mechanics, cooks, medics, and truckdrivers. If a soldier is only attachedto you, make a point of recommend-ing him to his commander for anaward and see that he gets it; hewill beg to work with you on thenext field problem.Also, do your homework and findout what other awards the soldierhas received. Many older NCOs donot have the newest medal, theAAM. It is often surprising to find

UUL L I I ~ L ;a nuiiiuci UI JCIIIUI I V L W ~also do not have ARCOMs. Youare not finished giving the medaluntil the soldier has the certificate,the'medal, and the orders.Another "no lose" situation is theGood Conduct Medal. Despite thefact that there is an Army regula-tion that states that soldiers shouldreceive this award and all others in

an appropriate ceremony or in for-mation, very few actually do. Makean issue of tracking down which sol-diers have not received the GoodConduct Medal and give theseawards in your formation. Anothergood tip is to always get a photog-rapher to take pictrues of the awardceremonies. Some public affairs of-fices gladly provide this service.Having each photograph signed bythe officer presenting the award andgiving it to the soldier is a nice per-sonal touch. The rewards your unitgets from a good awards program isworth far more than the cost of theribbon and the piece of metal.Efficiency ReportsGood leaders need to be able towrite well to take care of theirNCOs and junior officers. As a com-

mander or rater, if you cannot ex-press exactly how good the peoplewho do your bidding are, then youmight as well stick knives in theirbacks. Too many oficers worry toomuch about their own efficiencyreports and not enough abouttaking care of their "horses." If youcannot write, now is the time tolearn. Writing comes easily to veryfew people and the only way thatyou get better at is by painful repeti-tion. Worry less about using bigwords and more about being clear,concise, and to the point. You mustbe able to take care of the peoplewho take care of you. Good writingis a key to this.A related point involves the com-mander's role as a reviewer. Youneed to teach the NCOs and of-ficers who work for you how towrite as well. Too many units acceptthe norm that the average EER foran E-5 is a 119, the average EERfor an E-6 is 122, and anything goeson these reports just as long as they

MajorGeneral John W. Wood-mansee presents the 2AD'sDistinguishedUnit Awardto D Co., 1-67 Armor inJuly, 1984..do not get kicked back by battalionor division. That is wrong! Re-viewers need to treat every reportas if it were their own. The NCOmay not be a future CSM, butevery sentence should be completeand every "4" in its proper place.In most cases it takes six or morepainful drafts, but hopefully thewriters will learn something. Thegood news on this subject is that thepersonal computer revolution hasmade it a lot easier to crank outhigh quality paperwork through t h euse of multiple drafts.On the FamilyA few years ago, this subjectwould not be discussed in this ar-

ticle. Either young enlisted soldiersdid not have families or those whodid were well under control of thehighly organized distaff side. TheArmy of Excellence is much dif-ferent today. The advent of th e all-volunteer force raised the numberof young soldiers with families whilethe rise of sexual equality has sig-nificantly weakened t h e respon-sibility of spouses to act as unpaidarticipants in their husbands'careers.14 ARMOR July-August 1987


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We do not wish to argue thebroader implications of this socialtendency, but simply to point outthat the focus on enlisted family lifeis more acute than it ever has been.Also, we acknowledge wide varian-ces in both the need for and currentstate of unit family assistanceprograms in both USAREUR andCONUS units.The point is that you simply can-not escape it; if your soldier hasproblems at home, he brings themto work. You are ultimately asresponsible for the welfare of thesoldier's family as you are for thesoldier. While at the same time, youwalk the fine line between intrudinginto the sovereignty of family life onthe one hand, and doing too little,or being uncaring on the other.

Unit AssistanceEffective family programs arevoluntary. If you have done a goodjob of taking care of your soldiersup to this point, you will have a legup on taking care of t h e family. I t isa good idea to have unit parties tocelebrate major accomplishments.But these parties should be targetedat the family. Do not make anybodydo anything. More than likely, it willbe apparent to you which wives arein th e "old guard and which are"new wave." Let the "old guard or-ganize as they please and just keepperiodic touch with the "new wave."Do not discriminate against wiveswho refuse to participate in unitfunctions. If you have a tight unit,their families will follow de focfo.The key point to remember is thatthe best thing your unit can do forits families is not to waste your sol-diers' time.

Professiona AssistanceDespite your best efforts, yourfamilies are going to require outsideassistance to help with certainproblems. The commander's rolehere is both as a directory of infor-mation to military and communityagencies and often as an inter-mediary. It is important to stay incontact with these agenciesthroughout the period of theproblem. Few soldiers like to admitdifficulties with their families and

therefore, all levels of leadershipmust be sensitive to indications oftrouble. Leaders need to know theconditions of housing in which theirfamilies live and the rough financialstatus of each family. Do not beafraid to seek professional advicewith any problem that you do notthink you can handle.ConclusionNow that we have laid out thislong list of techniques and ideas,the question that must be answeredis, why should you bother to takecare of your soldiers? There are twogood answers to that question. First,as we pointed out very early in thisarticle, taking care of soldiers is along-term investment that pays off.

It pays off in peacetime, when yoursoldiers realize that you really docare about them, when they realizethat it is just as important to youthat the mission gets accomplishedthe "right" way as it is that the mis-sion is accomplished at all. Thepayoff comes in strange ways. Some-times it happens when your unitdoes far better on a gunnery or anARTEP than you felt that theyshould have, or seeing them dosomething really well that you hadnot expected. At other times, itcomes from offhand remarks youhear in the battalion area or just theway your soldiers respond to you.Sometimes it is more formal, likebeing specially asked to reenlist orpromote one of your former seniorNCOs, or receiving a Christmascard from a soldier who was in yourunit several years ago.Second, and most important,caring about your soldiers inpeacetime shows them that you willcare about them in combat. If youare willing to set the example foryour soldiers by leading from thefront and saying, "I care about you,and I'm not going to let you dosomething I won't do," then you willbe successful in combat.

Caring for your soldiers is harderin peacetime than it is in war. If YOUlearn to really care about them inp e a c e t i m e , t h e n c o m b a t w i l lbethatuch easier and they will fol-low you anywhere.

CAPTAIN ROBERT W.CONE Armor, graduatedfrom the USMA in 1979.He served as a platoonleader and troop executiveofficer in the 2-1 Cav andBMO and company com-mander In the 1-67 Armorof the 2d AD. A graduateof AOAC and IOAC, he iscurrently completinggraduate school at theUniversity of Texas inpreparation for duty withthe Leadership Depart-ment of the USMA.

BRIGADIER GENERALJOHN C. "DOCBAHNSEN retired in June1986 after 30 years of ser-vice. He graduated fromUSMA In 1956 and com-manded a platoon, a troopand a squadron in Viet-nam. He also commandeda platoon, company, bat-talion and brigade In Ger-many or the CONUS. H eholds 18 decorations forvalor, including the DSCand five Silver Stars. Hewas the ADC of the 2d Ar-mored Division when CPTCone served as his akled e-camp.

15July-August1987 ARMOR


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Cornbat Intelligenceat Ironstarby Captain Michael T. PiersonIIntelligence Preparation of the Bat-tlefield (lPB), along with an aggres-sive counter-reconnaissance plan, isessential for a task force to defeatthe mass, speed, and firepower of aSoviet-style regiment. An in-depthdefense, in which the enemy is ob-served and attrited throughout thesector, is critical. This was demon-strated during the 1st ArmoredDivision's (MD) recent Iron StarExercise, conducted at Hohenfels,

Germany, against an OpposingForce (OPFOR) similar to that ofthe National Training Center(NTC). In Iron Star, battlefield intel-ligence proved a ma.jor contributingfactor in the success or failure of atask force.The critical first step in battlefieldintelligence is the S2's IntclligencePreparation of the Battlefield (IPB).The information provided in thisstudy, including threat evaluation,battlefield area evaluation, terrainanalysis, weather analysis, andthreat integration, is an importantfactor used by the commander and

S3 in planning the task force mis-sion. This intelligence assists thecommander in preparing his intentand the S3 in developing the con-cept of operation to fight the battle.The IPB is a continuous process ofstudying and analyzing the bat-tlefield hefore and during a battle.It provides for maximum integration

of combat intelligence - theenemy, the terrain, and the weather.Threat evaluation, using a doctrinaltemplate, shows the enemy organiza-tion, equipment, and other impor-tant order-of-battle material (seeFigure 1). This assists the com-mander in "seeing" the battlefield,and determining the enemy'scaapahilities and probable coursesof action.A detailed analysis of the terrainwithin the area of interest identifies

avenues of approach and mobilitycorridors which support theenemy's doctrine and employmentinto the sector. It provides the com-mander with information concern-ing areas of good observation andfields of fire, locations affordinggood cover and concealment (notonly for the task force, but also forthe enemy), any natural obstacles orkey terrain which, if controlled, canhave an impact on the battle.Further study of the terrain allowsthe commander to answer otherquestions, such as: Does the areaallow for appropriate maneuverspace for the enemy to deploy hisforces according to his doctrine?

Does the road and trail networkand cross-country trafficability favorthe enemy or friendly forces if rapidreinforcement is needed at anygiven location? A detailed terrainanalysis identifies friendly andenemy capabilities, vulnerabilities,and courses of action. It shows thecommander where combat forcescan and cannot move, shoot, andcommunicateAfter analyzing the enemy and hisdoctrine and performing a detailedterrain analysis, the next step in theIPB process is to study the weather.Temperature, precipitation, winddirection and speed, ceiling heights,and visibility all have to be takeninto account when preparing for an

operation. The commander mustconsider if the forecasted weatheror outlook favors the attackers ordefenders. He must consider howsnow or rain will influence terrainconditions. In developing the con-cept of maneuver, the S3 mustdevelop two plans, one fo r g o dweather and another for a battle inreduced visibility. In Iron Starvisibility was a critical factor, withfog and/or snow at times reducingvisibility to less than 50 meters.

The final step in the IPB processis threat integration. Basically, thisconsists of determining how theenemy would "like" to fight - theIDEAL - and determining, be-cause of actual battle conditions,how the enemy will have to fight inthis battle - the REALITY. Thisproduces a situational template.The situational template is basicallya doctrinal template with terrain,weather restraints, and confirmed in -telligence (such as combat losses)applied. It shows how the enemyhas to deviate from his doctrine toaccount for these factors.

A situational template is the basisfor event templating. Event templat-ing is the study and analysis of bat-tlefield events and enemy activitieswhich provide indicators of theenemy's course of action. By know-ing the enemy's doctrine of rapidmovement along high speed avenuesof approach and also knowing theterrain within sector that supportsthis type of movement, an enemy'scourses of action can be predicted.An enemy force moving into thearea will become visible to friendlyreconnaissance elements when itenters certain areas along a mobilitycorridor. These areas are callednamed areas of interest (NAI) -locations (such as a choke point orcrossroads) where enemy activity orlack of activity can be used to con-firm or deny a particular enemycourse of action. Once an NAI isdesignated and established as such,some type of reconnaissance ele-ment - scouts, recon patrol, obser-vation point (OP), or ground surveil-lance radar (GSR) - must be as-signed to cover it and collect the in-telligence it provides.NAIs can be established alongevery mobility corridor or avenue ofapproach into the sector. An enemyforce can be tracked and followed,identifying its location, direction of



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Figure1Doctrinal template showsenemy organization, equip-ment, and other importantorder-of-battle material whichcan help the commander "see"the battlefield, determineenemy capabilities, and pre-dict his actions.

movement, and intent, giving thecommander the timely intelligencehe needs to fight the battle or toreposition forces.NAIs along each mobility corridor

and avenue of approach can turninto target areas of interest (TAI).Each TAI is an area wherc the com-mander can delay, disrupt, ordcstroy the enemy, eithcr withdirect or indirect fire, or where hecan confront the enemy withobstacles, causing him to abandonor change a course of action andforcing him into the strengths of thetask force.Once TATS are established,

decision points (DP) can be iden-tified. DPs are areas which may re-quire a tactical decision by the com-mander as a result of battlefieldevents. Identifying a DP can assistthe commander in examining andmaking a decision before it is thrustupon him in a critical situation.Likewise, enemy decision points canbe predicted, at which his probablecourses of action can be identified.The completed IPB gives the com-mander and S3 a good estimate of

enemy strengths, composition, andpossible courses of action, to allowthem to develop the concept ofoperations. After the initial plan isdeveloped, intelligence continues toplay an essential role in developingthe situation. Reconnaissance orcounter-reconnaissance plans todetermine the enemy's intention,along with continuous updating ofthe IPB, are essential in answeringthe commander's priority intel-ligence requirements (PIR) -

~

EXAMPLE O F A DOCTRINAL TEMPLATETANK REGIMENT MAIN ATTACK (DIV SLICE)f

1 5@!AA-

Ea

J im

T I S\ a -> "-.*\--\--

REG: BREAKTHROUCH A 2. 1 b w ZONE tREGARDLESSOF OPERATIONAL FRONTAGE

-.

ECHELONIRST

those questions or items of intel-ligence that the commander needsanswered to light the battle.When a task force is defending, acounter-reconnaissance plan is es-sential to deny the enemy the intel-ligence he needs and will attempt togather from his reconnaissance ef-forts. The counter-reconnaissanceplan must provide security for thetask force by killing the enemy'sreconnaissance elements well for-ward in the sector. Long range

reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs) orOPs from a reinforced scout pla-toon must find enemy reconnais-sance elements and maintain con-tact with them, without beingdetected themselves, until theenemy unit can be destroyed. Atank platoon, with its mobility andfirepower, must be identified as areaction force and on call to moveforward or to intercept an enemyreconnaissance unit and kill it.Within tank platoons, some crews

should be designated to be on alertin their tanks, with their night-visionequipment, to search for enemyrecon units. Other crews must getout of their tanks and provide dis-mounted security for the platoon.This allows th e infantry to move for-ward in sector to cover dead spaceand any dismounted infantryavenues of approach between battlepositions. GSR teams must beplaced forward in sector, eitherunder direct control of the scoutplatoon leader or company com-manders to ensure timely intel-ligence.

Different overlapping intelligencesecurity systems are essential toprovide mutual support and depthof effort. The areas which allow foreasy infiltration into the sector bymounted or dismounted reconnais-sance elements must be identified inthe IPB. The S2 must stress to theS3 and commander the importanceof covering these areas with surveil-July-August 1987 ARMOR 17


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lance assets. The counter-reconnais-sance battle must be fought awes-sively hy th e task force, taking thebattle to the enemy and forcing hi mto adjust his plans or mission be-cause of his lack of intelligence.Counter-reconnaissance s a very dif-ficult task, especially as proven inthe German terrain in which 1ADconducted Iron Star. Dismounted in-fantry teams moving through therolling forests during periods ofreduced visibility were almost impos-sible to detect and stop.In one mission conducted duringIron Star, a battalion task force, con-sisting of three armor companiesand one mechanized company, wasassigned the mission to defend insector. The intelligence indicatorsshowed that the task force wasfacing a tank regiment with over 100armored vehicles (tanks and BMPs)and heavy artillery support. Terrainanalysis identified three majormounted avenues of approach into

the task force sector (see Figure 2).All three avenues of approachoriginated at the same point beforebranching out through the taskforce sector. At this point, DP-1,t h e enemy commander was facedwith the decision of which avenue touse in his attack.The S2 broke down the counter-reconnaissance battle into threebelts. The scouts, consisting of theorganic scout platoon, with its three

APCs and three ITVs, were rein-forced with a FIST-V, an additionalfour APCs, a squad of infantry, anda GSR team, and were given respon-sibility for the first belt. The criticaltask for the scouts was to identifywhich avenue the regiment wouldtake (the dcfending commandersfirst PIR). They were assignedcoverage of DP-1, TAI-1, TAL5and TAI-3, and were instructed toattrit the enemy, once spotted, withindirect fire. The scouts had threemajor threats to avoid: the enemys

reconnaissance elements searchingto destroy them, th e enemy dis-mounted infantry that would sweepthrough th e area, and the rolling ar-tillery barrage as the regiment ad-vanced.In the second recon belt, themechanized team forward in battleposition 2 (BP-2), in the central sec-tor, was assigned coverage of DP-2,TAI-5, and TAI-6. The tank team in

BP-1, with an attached GSR team,was responsible for the northern ap-proach route and TAI-4, just at theedge of its engagement area. Final-ly, in the third belt, which containedthe task force main defense area,the tank team at BP-1 was assignedcoverage of TAL8 in the north,while another tank company at BP-3 was assigned coverage of DP-3and TAL7 in the south. OPs wereestablished by the companies andlocal patrols were run throughoutthe night to cover the dead spacebetween battle positions.

18 A R M O R J u l y - A u g u s t 1987


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Figure2In this Iron Star mission, a bat-

probable avenues of approachment.

"...Infiltrationbythe enemy infantryteams that identified BPs and obstacleswas decisive and had a major impacton the battle ..I'

talion task force covered threeas it faced an enemy tank regi-

The task force commander and S3were concerned with the enemy'smassive amount of artillery, capableof firing 10,OOO-14,OOO rounds. Fiveenemy POWs captured that morn-ing gave evidence that enemy LRRPteams had infiltrated the sector theprevious night. Locations ofCO/TMsand obstacles were probab-ly known by the enemy, and madethe task force extremely susceptibleto an artillery attack. The com-mander decided to move theCO/TMs into hide positions in an at-tempt to avoid any "pinpointed" ar-tillery. OPs were left behind on allBPs, and once the enemy was iden-tified, the CO/TMs were to moveforward and reoccupy their BPs.

At 040, the scouts observedBMPs moving forward and infantrydismounting. Enemy troops startedmoving toward the reinforced scoutplatoon. Indirect fire was called im-mediately, and killed several enemysoldiers. In the battle that followed,two scout vehicles were destroyedby the enemy infantry. Three OPsand a GSR team were forced toreposition. However, the scoutplatoon was still combat effectiveand capable of carrying out its mis-sion.

The remaining dismounted enemyinfantry headed toward BP-2, whileanother dismounted companyheaded toward BP-1 in the north. Acritical factor in the north was thedestruction of the attached GSRteam by friendly tank fire (It wasmistaken for an enemy vehicle).Enemy infantry teams began breach-ing the obstacles and attacking theinfantry covering BP-2. Withinminutes, there were over 60 enemycasualties; however, the mechanizedteam was now almost combat inef-fective.

At approximately 0750, the enemyartillery barrage began rolling overthe scouts and through the sector.One scout vehicle was destroyed byindirect fire. The scouts reposi-tioned EAST (toward the enemy),and established two OPs (one dis-mounted) close to DP-1.At 0830, the scouts reported a pproximately 45 tanks and 15 BMPsapproaching DP-1 and turningsouthwest toward TAI-2. Shortlyafterward, a smaller unit passed DP-1 and turned north toward TALI.Because the infantry company hadheen decimated in the earlierengagements (unknown to the taskforce), it was not able to displace toits alternate position (vicinity TAI-21) or to report the movement ofthe regiment as i t turned at DP-2and headed towards TAI-6. In its

hide position, the tank company inthe south avoided the artillery, butits OPs were destroyed by OPFORdismounted infantry and indirectfire, and could not report that atDP-3 the regiment had sent a smallfixing force to the south, while themain body had turned north. Theregiment rolled through TAI-21.Contact with th e enemy was lost inthe rolling forest terrain and furtherreduced visibility caused by scat-tered snow. The tank company inreserve did not see the regimentuntil it was too late. The tank com-pany fought valiantly, destroyingover 30 enemy vehicles in just a fewminutes before bcing overwhelmedand destroyed by the regiment'smass and firepower.The IPB drove the concept ofoperation - enemy avenues of ap-proach, TAls, and DPs were iden-tified, and were for the most part ac-curate. A good counter-recon plan

was established and a good counter-recon battle was fought. The scoutsaccomplished their assigned mis-sion, surprisingly losing fewervehicles and personnel than ex-pected. But infiltration by t h eenemy infantry teams that identifiedBPs and obstacles was decisive andhad a major impact on the battle.Forced to hide its companies toavoid artillery, the task force leftcritical TAIs and DPs covered bylimited assets and not by th e over-lapping systems needed to ensurecoverage.

If the enemfs dismounted infantryintent had been detected, and if thetank company assigned BP-3 hadbeen able to reoccupy its position toattrit and give early warning, thereserve company could have beencommitted to TAI-2, plugging th ehole in the task force defense andpossibly changing the outcome ofthe battle.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL T.PIERSON was commissioned inMilitary Intelligence from Carson-Newman College as a Distin-guished Military Graduate in 1979.Pierson holds a Master of Arts de-gree in geography from East Ten-nessee State University, and at-tended the MI Officer AdvancedCourse and Combined Arms andServices Staff School. He servedat the National Training Genter asa scout platoon leader, OPFORregimental S2 , and commanderEWIREC for the OPFOR. He alsoserved as 5 2 of the 1st Battalion,35th Armor and is currently S 2 of2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division,Germany.

19uly-August 1987 ARMOR

armor magazine, july-august 1987

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