armor magazine, july-august 1988

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, July-August 1988

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Seventy years ago this September, U.S. tankersin French-built anks fought their first armor bat-tle. ARMOR'S assistant editor, Bob Rogge, tellsthe story of Colonel George S. Patton's 304thTank Brigade and its role in the St. Mihiel offen-sive of 12 September 1918 and the Meuse-Ar-gonne campaign later the same month. While ourtank size has increased tenfold from about 7 tonearly 70 tons in 70 years, some things have notchanged that dramatically. Note Patton's logisti-cal problems with transportation and fuel supply,and command, control, and communications.In an associated story, MG WilliamR. Kraft Jr.traces the saga of "The Five of Hearts," one ofthe Renault FT 1917s that fought in those first

U.S.Armor battles. We follow the tank into thesalients through the words of Sergeant ArthurSnyder, who commanded the Five of Hearts afterhis lieutenant was wounded. General Kraft is theHonorary Colonel of the 66th Armored Regiment,which traces its lineage directly to the 344th TankBattalion, one of the two battalions comprisingthe 304th Tank Brigade. The Five of Heartsstands today at Fort Meade, Maryland.A British officer inWorld War I s credited withsaying, "Most attacks seem to take place atnight, during a rainstorm, uphill, where four map-sheets join." MG Terry Allen's 1st Infantry Division

employednight attacks in North Africa in 1943 totake positions near El Guettar, which would havebeen difficult to carry indaylight because theenemy would spot any movement. The Britishneutralized the Argentinian advantages of openterrain and long field of fire by attacking indark-ness in the Falklands in 1982. There are dozens

of historic examples in every war, of large andsmall units achieving surprise through nightoperations. But night attacks require detailedplanning, close coordination, violent execution,and well-trained, disciplined troops. Few wouldargue that we train as much after sundown aswe do during the day. Captain Jim Greer offers asolution in "B y Night As By Day" for how to setup night training while minimizing disruptionofthe unit and aggravation for the soldiers.

Since 1945, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), ratherthan conventional frontline combat has been thepredominant armed conflict around the world. In"Armor in LIC," Major Mike Matheny examinesthe U.S. experience with LIC in Vietnam, andhow armor doctrine evolved mostly through trialand error. Despite what we learned, he saysthere is still little written doctrine on how toemploy Armor in LIC, which is a company andbattalion commander's fight. In a following ar-ticle, Matheny examines the Soviet experience inAfghanistan.First Lieutenant Dennis Verpoorten is a tankand scout platoon observer-controller at the Na-tional Training Center. In this role, he has seendozens of platoons in the defense. He says in"Platoon De fensive Operations" that they loseto the OPFOR inmany instances because theplatoons did not fight as a team, and the defen-sive battle turned into a free-for-all. Verpoortenshows how to organize a platoon defensive posi-tion through the use of rangecards, platoon fireplans, and control measures.We think we have a full plate for you. Devour.Enjoy. - PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

R. L. DILWORTHBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-I 7-88-4 (Test)Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICKJ. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS H. TAlT

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is publishedbimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any informationpresented n other official Army publications.

Official distribution Is limited to one copy foreach heavy brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalionheadquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armorcompany, and motorized brigade headquartersof the United States Army. In addition, Armylibraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA andMACOM staff agencies with responsibility forarmored, direct fire, ground combat systems,organizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the U.S. Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponencyincludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively; training for all SC 12A, 126, and12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlistedsoldiers; and information concerning thetraining, logistics, history, and leadership ofarmor and armored cavalry units at thebrigadehegiment level and below, to includeThreat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.July-August 1988,VOIXCVll No. 4

Features9 Armor in Low-Intensity Conflict

by Major Michael R. Matheny16 By Night as By Dayby Captain James K. Greer20 Platoon Defensive Operations

by First Lieutenant Dennis M. Verpoorten23 Fort Knox Terrain Matches Europes for OPFOR Training

by Sergeant Larry Redmond24 The Battlefield Development Simulator System (BDSS)

by Captain Robert M. Lynd, Jr.26 The 304th Tank Brigade

by Robert E. Rogge35 The Saga of the Five of Hearts

by Major General William R. Kraft, Jr.39 The Combat Service Support SituationalTraining Exercise

by Major Glenn W. DavisDepartments2 Letters6 Commanders Hatch7 Drivers Seat8 RecognitionQuiz

41 Professional Thoughts48 The Bustle Rack51 Recognition Quiz Answers52 Books


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OnCohesion...As in Combined ArmsDear Sir,In 1968, after sewing 19 months in the

11th ACR (team leader and squad leaderin the Aero Rifle Platoon and in flightoperations), I was assigned as a platoonsergeant in a cavalry troop of the 6th ACR.

While with the Aero Rifle Platoon, I hadridden cavalry troop vehicles, but I hadneve\ been h a cavalry troop. When dis-coverlig what I had in a cavalry platoon, Iwas amazed.

Wow! I said when told that I, a 22-year-old infantry sergeant, was then respon-

sible for a full-fledged cavalry platoon -a tank section, an infantry squad, a scoutsquad and a mortar squad. The platoonwas like having a mini-company - anks,scouts, infantry and mortars. In short, com-bined arms.

Times change. Infantry companies nolonger have mortars; cavalry troops nolonger have tanks. But one thing hasn'tchanged - we still have problems withcombined arms.

After only a couple of days of my firstAnnual Training period with a NationalGuard mechanized infantry company, itwas evident even to a bone-headed in-fantryman like me that problems will

occur as long as theory, practice anddoctrine state that a war can be won bycross-attaching infantry to armor andarmor to infantry. We all have faced theproblems inherent in cross-attachment,logistics and mlndset usually theprevalent problems. But what about unitcohesion? Where does cohesion go whena company or a platoon is pulled fromamong friends, thrust among strangersthe soldiers know nothing about?

Easy answer. Cohesion goes downrange, blown out the main gun tube, withno regard for deflection or elevation. Inother words, the target (combined arms)is missed. By several miles. Add an en-gineer squad from some unknown bat-

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.DIRECTORY - Points Of Contact Commercial prefix is Area Code 5o2-624-m).

ARMOR EditorialOffices U.S. A R M Y A R M O R SCHOOLEditor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick J. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensAssistant EditorRobert E. RoggeProduction AssistantVivian Thom psonContributing ArtistSFC Robert Torsrud

22492249261026102610

MAILING ADD RESS: ARM OR, ATTN: ATSB-MAG , Fort OX, KY 40121-5210.ARTICLE SUBM ISSIONS: T o improve speed andaccuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals orclear copies, either typed or printed out in near-letter-quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on

5-1/4 floppy disks in M icrosoft W OR D, MulliMate,Wo rdperfect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (plcase in-clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra-tions submitted.PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problemsor changes of address to Ms. Conn ie Bright, circula-tion manager, (502)942-8624.MILITARY DISTRIBUTION Report deliveryproblems or changes of address to Ms. VivianThompson, AV 464-2610;comm ercial: (502)624-2610.Requests to be added to the free subscription listshould be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

Commandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas H. Tait 2121Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)Deputy Assistant Com mandan t (ATSB-DAC)BG Dennis V. Crumley 7555COL C laude L. Clark 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM John M. Stcphcns 4952Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS)Weapons Dept. (ATSB-WP)

COL Garry P. Hixson 8%COL A. W. Krem er 5855LTC(P) G eorge R. Wallace 111 1055Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD)COL Donald E. Ap ple r 7250Directorate of Combat Developm ents (ATSB-CD)COL Donald L. Smart 5050Dir. of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES)CO L Robert A. Korkin 3346Training Group (ATZK-TC-TBF)LTC Clarenc e Bclinge 3055NCO Academy/l)rill Sergeant Sch ool ( A T N U ; )CSM Johnny M. Langford 5250Director, Reserve Componen t Spt (ATZK-DRC)CO L James E. Dierickx 1351Office of the Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)LTC Albert F. Celani 7809Army Armor & Engineer Board (ATZK-A E)CO L Garrett E. Duncan 7830TRADOC Sys Mgr for Tank Systems (ATSB-TSMT)CO L Eugene D. Colgan 7955

I 2 ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 1988


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talion, and the mixture of branches in thepot does not simply boil over; it bums.

We talk combined arms: we bow to thetheory: we raise our arms in praise. Yea,though I walk through the valley of theshadow of death, combined arms willlead me to the light at the end of the tun-nel.As presently constituted and practiced -balderdash and poppycock!

The answer - the only @ answer - tothe combined arms problem lies in or-ganizing, manning, equipping and train-ing combined arms battalions and=m.

Forget about cross-attachment. Forgetabout exchanging a tank company for aninfantry company. Make the swap per-manent! Make one company in each tankbattalion an infantry company. Make onecompany in each infantry battalion a tankcompany.

And, yes, get @ radical: Make oneplatoon in each infantry company a tankplatoon: and one platoon in each tankcompany an infantry platoon.

Forget about collar brass. When I ex-changed crossed rifles for sabers, itwasn't the most pleasant thing I had everdone, but a lot of things were more un-pleasant. (Sucking jungle water comes tomind.) But there was a job to be done,and if replacing my crossed rifles andremoving my blue rope made that jobeasier to accomplish, thzn who was 1 tocomplain?

Infantry and Armor have been fightingeach other (literally and figuratively) sincethe first track mashed the ground. Isn't ittime to end the arguments?

We always hear that infantrymenhankersdon't understand the limitations andcapabilities of tanksfinfantry. Making realcombined arms teams is the most logicalway of ending the problem.

Let's call a halt to this wasteful throwingtogether of heterogeneous masses ofsteel and soldiers and get to work solvingthe problems.

ROBERT C. MERRIMANPSG, TXARNGSulphur Springs, TXWhere's the Div Cav Squadron?Dear Sir,As usual, Major General Tom Tait was

right on target when he readdressed caval-

~ ~~ ~ ~~

ry in the March-April 1988 issue ofARMOR Magazine

I fully support his views as to the in-ability of the division cavalry squadron oftoday to provide the division commanderthe type of information he requires to ef-fectively win the Airland battle. He suc-cinctly threads his reasoning throughouthis hard-hitting article in such manner thatthe force structure and doctrinal folks,especially at the senior level, should takeheed of his thoughts!

Several years ago I expressed toARMOR Magazine my deep concern inplacing the division cavalry squadrondirectly under the purview of the aviationbrigade. I still have this concern now thatit is set in concrete - not because 1 haveany type of adversarial view toward avia-tion - but simply to me it just "doesn'tmesh." When the aviation brigades trulycome to full measure within the divisionthey will have more than enough to do asthey impact their clearly-defined mission.Should there be strong coordination be-tween the cavalry squadron and the avia-tion brigade? Absolutely! But leave thecavalry squadron totally under the controlof the division commander and his head-quarters.

1 recognize we are striving to fully in-tegrate the two organizations but, withonly two ground troops in the squadron, Ibelieve it will be primarily in an aviationenvironment even with the advent of athird ground troop in the squadron, asurged by General Tait. In my limited view,I would hope this issue will bereexamined going fonvard.

Finally, what a classic idea whenGeneral Tait proposed a "pure" cavalrydivision. In the fast-moving action ofmodern warfare, it seems to me such anorganization (if I understand it properly)would fill a needed void between heavyand light divisons. Fast moving and, in ef-fect, making each of the cavalry regi-ments a combat-sustaining force with itsown small components of mechanized in-fantry, artillery, and combat engineers, adivision of this type would brlng a newand added dimension to the AirLand bat-tle.

We of the ArmorlCavalry community areindeed fortunate to have a warrior leaderand thinker of General Tait's caliber asChief of Armor.

PHILLIPJ. ZELLER, JR.,Brigadier General, AUS, (Ret)

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Task Force BaumAnd Arracourt ComparedDear Sir,Major Michael K. Robel's comments in

March-April issue of ARMOR regarding"Destruction of Task Force Baum" provideexcellent thoughts on how to conduct asuccessful deep, but dangerous, groundattack. However, one should keep inmind the logistical and fire support re-quired to sustain these operations.

Such was accompllshed by the lateGeneral Bruce C. Clarke during his as-sault by CCA, 4th Armored Divislon,across the Moselle River on 13 September1944, and the subsequent deep penetra-tion, exploitation, and mobile defenseoperations in the Arracourt (France) areaduring the following two weeks.

Then Colonel Clarke tucked in his logisti-cal tail, keeping his trains with him in thisand numerous other operations. It's truethat maps were in critically short supply,requiring our frequent use of Michelln orany other road maps. (On one occasion,B37th Tank Battalion received the vlllagemap of Francaltroff two days following itsseizure on 20 November 1944.

My friend Major Robel must haveblinked during our conversation, however,for he apparently missed my point thatthere are no "always" or "nevers" in Armordoctrine. Yes, we used roads when wecould to our advantage. Why go cross-country at the expense of time, commandand control of the formation, and wearand tear on equipment and troops, whenroads are available, and the tactical situa-tion favors their use?

One must remember the enemy doesnot always get off the first shot.

JlMMlE LEACHPast Hon. Colonel, 37th Armored Regt.and Honorary Professor of Armor,USA Armor School

Harmon in RetirementDear Sir,A small quibble with Colonel John W.

Mountcastle's article on Major GeneralErnest N. Harmon in the 100th anniver-sary issue of ARMOR. Rather than retirebecause he had found "no worthwhlle as-signment" (with the implication GeneralHarmon did nothing really worthwhile forthe rest of his life), he became presidentof Norwich University, the nation's oldestprivate military college, which has beensending the Army cavalry/armor officers

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for some time. Among them were GeneralI.D. White, former President of the ArmorAssociation, and the officer to whomGeneral Harmon handed over "Hell onWheels."

General Don Starry, another president ofthe Armor Association, received anhonorary doctorate degree from Norwichseveral years ago, from the hands of yetanother distinguished tanker, MajorGeneral Russell W. Todd, the current Presi-dent of Norwich University.

If Colonel Mountcastle believes that run-ning Norwich isn't a worthwhile continua-tion of an armor officer's career, and notworth mentioning in a piece aboutGeneral Harmon, I suggest that he talkthat odd perception over with yet anotherex-"Hell on Wheels" commander, MajorGeneral George S. Patton, who is a Nor-wich trustee.W. E. BUTTERWORTHFairhope, AL"Lone Star Range" ComplexDedicated at Ft. HoodThe formal dedication of the "Lone Star

Range" Complex at North Fort Hood washeld March 12 and was heralded as aprime example of what the Active andReserve components can do when work-ing together to solve a training problem.

Lieutenant General Crosby E. Saint, com-mander of 111 Corps and Ft. Hood, andMajor General James T. Dennis, the ad-jutant general of Texas, together solved asignificant training shortfall for the 49th Ar-mored Division, a major command in theTexas Army National Guard with amobilization mlssion under 111 Corps.

Three years ago, the 49th began to in-crease Its training to a level where the useof major tank ranges only during Its an-nual two-week training was no longer con-sidered to be a viable training program.Major General James B. McGoodwin,division commander, realized that in orderfor his soldiers to train for the mobilizationmissions assigned, a significant increasein weekend use of major tank rangeswould be required.

None of the Texas National Guardweekend training sites could be used for.50 caliber or larger gunnery training.This restricted the 49th to use of majortank ranges between times scheduled foractive units. During this same period, the1st Cavalry Division and the 2d ArmoredDivision range requirements were in-creased because of NTC rotations and thenew gunnery requirements placed on the

infantry with Bradleys. In addition, Ft.Hood was undergoing a major rangemoderlnization program with several newranges under construction.

MG Goodwin directed his staff to com-plete a study to identify methods of resolv-ing the division's range availabilityproblem. Because of range use by activecomponents, it was decided to requestthe adjutant general of Texas and LTGSaint to approve the 49th Division con-cept to build a Ft. Hood range complex,one specifically designed for weekenduse and to have two tank ranges. GeneralSaint requested permission to build theranges as a "troop" project with resourceassistance from Ft. Hood and the adjutantgeneral's department. An agreement wasreached allowing the 49th to build a two-range, multi-use complex at North FortHood near the old and seldom used RuthRange.

The new ranges are primarily for theM60A3, ank with Tank Tables IV, V and VIfired on the North Range, and Tables IVand V on the South. The multi-use rangecomplex is also suited for .50 caliber useby all units, Active and Reserve.

PAO, 49th Armored DivisionTXARNGWhat's The Score?Dear Sir,1 would like to add my voice in supportof the comments by SFC Bunce in the

March-April issue of ARMOR Magazinewith regard to tank battalions being desig-nated cavalry. It is certainly an improve-ment over designating infantry regimentsas cavalry, but is a practice that should bediscontinued. it is getting so you cannottell the players even with a scorecard.

I also praise MG Tait for his commentsin the same issue on essentially the sametopic but from a different perspective. The1st Cavalry Division hasn't been cavalrysince 1943. Given its illustrious history, Iam pleased to see It retained on the ac-tive rolls, but why not make it a cavalrydivision? One Immediate benefit fromadopting General Tait's recommendationwould be a significant reduction in thefailures in effective employment of com-bined arms task forces so common at theNTC. To paraphrase the general, allregimental cavalrymen are used to fixedorganizations, and, I add, where com-bined arms operations is the norm. Aug-mentation of the cohesive regimen-tal/squadron structure with tanks or in-fantry to meet mission requirements

should certainly be simpler to Implementthan current procedures in task force con-struction. The 1st Cavalry Division or-ganized along the lines suggested byGeneral Tait would be a truly formidableand uncommonly flexible force. Make ithappen!

C.P. FRINKS,Major, AR (AUS, Ret)Burke, VATCCT II ChangesDear Sir,This letter is in response to the recent

changes in the Tank and Scout Com-mander Certification - Test Level 11,(TCCT 11) As a master gunner in aseparate USAREUR cavalry troop, it sad-dens me to see the armor communitylower its standards again.

I am one of seven TCCT or SCCT Itgraduates in this troop, seven of only 17in the U.S. Army (in Europe). It is the unan-imous opinion of these people (andmyself) that the Armor School has done lt-self an incredible disservice by loweringthe standards on these difficult tests.

We were under the impression thatthese tests were designed to give the high-ly-skilled, deserving, and motivated E-5 achance to earn 50 additional promotionpoints, serve as a prerequisite to mastergunner's school and, be recognized as anarmor soldier who would be expected toaccomplish great things.

In this day and age of higher technol-oqy. isn't it apparent that we need to raise

CorrectionARMOR apologizes to BG

James M. Lyle and Major WinnNoyes for using their outdatedbios with their article, "Subal-tern Stakes," (MayJuneARMOR).

At the time they wrote the ar-ticle, Lyle commanded the 3dACR, and Noyes was theregimental S3, s stated.

BG Lyle is presently assistantdivision commander, 2d AD, atFort Hood and COL JarrettRobertson presently com-mands the "Brave Rifles."

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the standards, not lower them, so thatonly those soldiers who have that burningdesire to excel be afforded the oppor-tunity to do so?

RAYMONDF. CHANDLER, 111SSG, USAFRG

(The Chief of Armor responds.)After carefully monitoring the test

results, and after a close look at the test,we found that there were several am-biguous questions, and the test was toolengthy. We revised the entire test andtest notices to a =question test.

The standards on this test are higherthen on the previous test fielded, and thepass rate is 70 percent. TCCT/SCCT-II isdesigned to identify Armor/Cavalry crew-men who have demonstrated excellentproficiency at lower skill levels and exhibitthe potential to continue to excel into thesenior grade levels.

A sergeant (5) must be enrolled in theEIA Program, must be a BNCOCgraduate, qualify 80 percent on his SQT,and be recommended by the command-ing officer. Passing TCCT/SCCT-IIqualifies a sergeant (E5) for early promo-tion to staff sergeant (E6) and early recog-nition for attendance at the Master Gun-ner's course.

Under the EIA Program, the minimumtime-in-service requirement for promotionto staff sergeant (E6) is four years. Afterpassing the TCCT/SCCT-II, he will receive50 additional points for inclusion into thepromotion points worksheet.

The TCCTISCCT-I1 test will be availablefrom our servicing Training Standards Of-ficer (TSO),ho will administer it twice ayear. However, candidates will only be al-lowed to take the test one time on apass/fail basis (only a sergeant E5 cantest).

It is absolutely necessary that an intensestudy program exist prior to the exam,that the soldier obtain the advance noticefrom the TSO, and that he use the mastergunner to assist in studying for the exam.

Wthout BNCOC and a programmedstudy requirement, success is minimal.We believe this program can accomplishits stated purpose only if leaders in thefield understand and enthusiastically en-dorse it..

Some Problems ..Some SolutionsDear Sir,As is my wont, I'm writing this in order

to send up a few more trial balloons forpossible discussion here on the armorsounding board.

First, in working with the Ml/MlAlseries of vehicles, I have noticed thatunder certain conditions of light, the flat,planar surfaces of this vehicle can reflecta significant glare that can be detected atranges that could provide an adversarywith a priceless bit of information. Thisglare-producing quality is morepronounced as the paint covering thevehicle wears and becomes smoother. Italso seems to become more apparentsooner with the current generation CARCpaints.

A possible solution to this would be tocoat those surfaces that are visible fromthe frontal 60-degree arc with the rough-textured non-skid coating that Is currentlybeing applied to the vehicles' upper sur-faces as a safety measure. The areas thatI envision being covered would includethe armor skirts, hull sides, turret sides (toinclude the stowage boxes), the turret"cheeks," and the upper half of the gunmantlet, thermal shroud and boreevacuator. I recall a number of years agoin this magazine a method of camouflagepainting referred to as Dual-Tex in whichthe different colors used were to have dif-ferent textures, though if memory serves,just how this was to happen wasn't reallyexplained.

Second, I am still rather puzzled as towhy we seem to have given up on theidea that the M2 HB machine gunmounted on the Ml/MlA1 can be used atnight. Currently, armor battalion/cavsquadron TO&Es do not allow for issue ofthe passive crew-served weapon sight.While in a regimental cav platoon in Ger-many, I had the opportunity to "MOSSlevel" one of these sights from one of mylTVs that had this sight issued but did notcarry an M2 HB. Using this sight on anumber of occasions pointed up someproblem areas that would need to be cor-rected if this sight were to be issued totanks.

When using the provided mountingbracket for the M2 HB on the com-mander's weapon, the night sight sat sofar back on the receiver that it was notpossible to elevate the machine gun tofull elevation. Approximately 35 degreeswas its maximum capability before the

eyepiece of the night sight makes contactwith the forward unity periscope. Thiscould be remedied by adding a projectionto the adapter bracket that would act as amechanical stop. Elevation capabilitywould still be limited to 30-35 degrees,but damage to the sight would beprevented. The other problem that I ob-served was that, while moving at speedsof ten miles per hour or greater on hard-surfaced roads, a readily visible, rapidvibration is induced into the mountingcradle that, over time, would probablylead to failure of a relatively delicatedevice such as the crew-sewed weaponsight.

My gut feeling is that this vibrationcould be damped out rather simply, or atleast reduced to the point that the sightcould survive it. However, it might bedone, my point is that, in not providing anight firing capability for the M2 HB onthe Ml/MlAl, we limit the tank com-mander's choice of available weapons sys-tems with which to engage targets, andwe potentially increase our vulnerabilityduring night defensive engagements be-cause of the necessity of moving to an ex-posed firing position to allow the gunnerto engage targets that could be handledby a suitably equipped M2 HB.

Finally, while I agree wholeheartedlywith Staff Sergeants Goodknight andCapobianco in their comments on a pre-vious letter in this magazine ("Tank Gun-nery Comments" by CPT Mark T. Littel,ARMOR Letters, Jan-Feb 1988), the tenorof their writing seems more appropriate toafter hours at the NCO club rather than ina publication that provides an opportunityto expose oneself to a wide variety ofviews in a professional forum. As a mastergunner myself, I have learned that amaster gunner's effectiveness in largepart is a result of the rapport that is estab-lished between the master gunner and hiscommander. "Tank Table Vlll is the verypeak!" is a sentiment that is common incommanders to whom gunnery is bet-your-bars time, and an effective mastergunner can help his unit to progressbeyond this, and at the same time satisfyhis commander's requirement for TT V11excellence in the only way that counts -with results. This has to be done with tactand understanding, though - qualitiesthat the good sergeants mentioned abovewould probably find helpful to develop.

JOHN S. ALLISONSFC, SAE Trp, 6/12 CavFt. Knox, KY

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MG Thomas H. TaitCommanding GeneralUS . Army Armor Center

On WinningThe great sportswriter, GrantlandRice, once wrote, "It's not whetheryou win or lose; it's how you playthe game." That philosophygoverned ou r attitudes for years andformed the bedrock of many ol ou rolder soldiers' ideas about winning.Secretary of State Harry Hopkinsshowed this attitude in the early1930s. When our intelligence com-munity suB este d ways to spy on o urpotential enemies, he commentcd,"Gentlemen don't read others' mail."Perhaps the most quoted contem-porary authority on winning wasVince Lombardi, the great coach ofthe Green Bay Packers and theWashington Redskins, who pro-claimed that "Winning is the onlything." This should be our credo. be-cause we riiiist win - anything elseis absolutely unthinkable; there isno second place in war. The conse-quences of a lost war are just toogreat.Our challenge is how to develop awinning attitude - through hard,well-planned, well-thought-out train-ing. War is not an amatcur sport -and training for war, by its very na-ture, must be tough, and profes-sionals must conduct it: profes-sionals who have high standardsand insist that everyone else havethem as well. And they must coverevery facet of military life: training,supply, maintenance, individual andarea appearance, and discipline. Ifone cannot or is unwilling to makecorrections and do things right, then

there will be no vic-tories, only hollowlosses and explana-tions of why wedidn't do better.The point is that we must beprofessional in everything il we in-tend to win the next war. We areoutnumbered - thus, we must besignificantly better than o ur pro spec-tive opponcnt. The only way we cando that is to eliminate theamateurism from our ranks. We areand must bc pros.We are about to make an enor-mous investment in simulators. Theyare essential to good training, butthey do not replace hard, toughticld exercises. We must rememberthat the simulator training environ-ment is basically benign - easy onthe body. And we should alsoremember that training doesn't haveto be miserable, even though we areoften m iserable when training.O ne of our greatest attributes, ifyou bclicve our rhetoric, isflexibility. Do we really possess thatflcxibility of mind of which we areso proud? In convcrsations with ourallicd friends, 1 have found theybelieve we are rigid, we do not usewarning orders and so on to get ourunits moving. Do we have a rigid ad-herence to doctrine, and frown oninnovation? Do we use doctrine asan excuse not to change broken or-ganizations (division cavalry) whenour entire experience from actuallessons learned from World War 11

to the sophisticated JANUS war-gaming tells us that our organiza-tion is wrong? We are thwarted atevery avenue when we try to correctthe problem. Where can we find thetactical innovator, the bold, auda-cious risk taker? Certainly not inthe ranks of those who plod behindthe plow of the familiar. The MGBob Wagners, who innovate on adaily basis, are not anywhere inquantity.How to fight and win cannot belcft to bureaucrats - but every timean innovative idea such as the Ter-rain Index Reference System(TIRS) comes along, il is shot downbecause it is not secure. However,we are secure at battalionkompanylevel, and platoon situations areusually so dynamic and changingthat not to use a quick reference sys-tem is counter-productive. 1 don'tthink we are nearly as flexible andwarrior-like as we think we are; theErnie Harmons, Doc Bahnscns,Bob Wagners were and are flexible.We need more warriors in theirmold.As I stated earlier, war is not anamateur sport - we need dedi-cated, tough, smart, bold, audaciousrisk takers to carry us into the nextcentury. He lp me identify and- nur-ture them.Tre at 'Em Rough!

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Was ItWorth the Wait?-1

The cnlisted promotion rcsults forArmor have taken a lot of heat.Comments from senior commandersand senior NCOs were many. Somepeople degraded the Armor andCavalry NCO Corps as a result ofthe articles that appeared in variousmedia. Where do we stand now?And was it worth the wait?

The setback in promotions camefrom some hard decisions based onimproving the quality of the forces.Was the need for quality senior non-commissioned officers paramount?Compelling? We were selecting out-standing senior NCOs at the top ofthe list, but the hottom part of eachlist was not a health selection. Forexample, we were mandatorily retir-ing 30-year selectees before theywere promoted to sergeant major,or shortly thereafter.

After the review of the ArmorForce, a few hard, fast rules wereput into the system to ensure wepromote noncomissioned officerswho have served in the key areassuccessfully. It was a tough decision,but a necessary one to ensure sol-dier quality throughout the ranks.

Requircments such as successfulleadership assignments and NCOESattendance and successful comple-tion have significantly enhanced thequality of the force.

Soldiers selected for promotion tosergeant first class are now very suc-cessful vehicle commanders, mastergunners, drill sergeants, orrecruiters. First sergeants havebeen highly successful platoon ser-geants in a TOE unit and in staffwork. Command sergeants majorand sergeants major have been high-ly successful first sergeants and staffNCOs, having already attended orbeen selected to attend the Ser-geants Major Academy.

The number of Armor soldierssclccted to attcnd the SergeantsMajor Academy has increased,giving us more than the numbers weneed lo promote. That decisionalone greatly increased our promo-tion quality.

Now, the force is in great shape!However, we cant look back. It ismost important that we continue to

evaluate our rcsources and man-power.

Its great that we have and gel toattend all kinds of schoolhouses; butif we cant successfully accomplishour mission, we are half-steppingand kidding ourselves.

Yes, the wait for better quality sol-diers was worth it! Commanders Ihave visited have nothing but praisefor the senior Armor NCO, but westill need feedback. How does allthis accomplish the wartime mis-sion? Is the NCOES strong enoughto produce a leader, tank com-mander, platoon sergeant, or ser-geant ma.jor who is capable ofdefeating his adversary, if and whenthe time arrives? Does the structureof NCOES allow the training thatneeds to be accomplished? Theseare very hard questions to answer,but they need to be up front at alltimes.

We stand on solid ground as aforce! Thanks to a lot of com-manders, the wait was worth it.Dont let complacency creep backinto the system.

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, .

'i...

b

Armor in Low-Intensity Conflict:The US.Experience in Vietnamby Major Michael R. MathenyArmor came into existence to ful-

fill a tactical role on the high-inten-sity battlefield.' Since WW 11, thisrole has been well understood andcontinues to drive the developmentof armor organization, equipment,and tactical doctrine. Since 1945,however, wars of low-intensity haveincreased in frequency. Unlike high-intensity warfare, armor's role at thelower end of the spectrum of warhas not been so well understood.

Both the United States and theSoviet Union have gained ex-perience with employing armor inlow-intensity conflict (LIC). In eachcase, the cxpectation of armor's roleon the low-intensity battlefield wasdifferent from the tactics finallyhammered out in the field. For ex-

ample, the planners in the U.S.Military Assistance Command inVietnam originally saw no need fortanks with forces deploying to thatcountry. When tanks first arrived inVietnam in March 1965, it was byaccident. In fact, when informedthat American tanks had beendeployed, Maxwell Taylor, Ambas-sador to Vietnam, was upset thatsuch equipment, "not appropriatefor counterinsurgency operations,"had been sent.?

Despite the planner's apprehen-sions, once armor had proved itsvalue, the number of armor units inVietnam steadily increased. By theend of the war, 24 percent of thecombat maneuver battalions in Viet-

nam were either mechanized in-fantry, armor, or armored cavalry.3

This article will focus on thedoctrinal issues that emerged fromthe American employment of armorin Vietnam. A later article Will con-sider the Soviet experience witharmor in Afghanistan and will drawrclevant implications from both theU.S. and Soviet use of armor in LIC.

There is little theory and even lessdoctrine that addresses armor inLIC. J.F.C. Fuller, the grand oldtheorist of armored warfare, did notignore the employment of armor inconflicts short of full-scale war. Infact, he claimed that armor couldbe most useful in policing the mostremote corners of the British Em-

~ ~~

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The Marines were the first U.S. troops to usetanks in Vietnam. Below, Marine M48s are fer-ried ashore. At right, 3d Marine Divisionriflemen, still carrying the M14 rifle, hitch a rideon a tank in action in 1966.

pire. Perhaps his greatest contribu-tion, however, was in pointing outthat we must see and develop thetraditional arms in accordance withtheir tactical functions on the bat-tlefield, which he listed as finding,holding, hitting, protecting, andsmashing!

The true value of combined armsat any level is apparent through anassessment of the ability of eacharm to fulfill these functions. Ter-rain and the nature of the enemywill affect this ability at any level.Armor doctrine in LIC must beevaluated within the framework ofFuller's tactical functions. AsAmerica became involved in its firstmajor challenge in LIC, this was notwell understood. Difficult terrainand an elusive enemy argued forbreaking apart the combined armsteam. Our experience in Vietnam af-

firms Fuller's analysis of tacticalfunctions and the value of the com-bined arms throughout thespectrum of war.

The first U.S. tank unit to move toVietnam was actually a platoonfrom the 3d Marine Tank Battalion.This platoon was part of the Marinebattalion landing team sent to DaNang in March 1965. These werethe tanks which Ambassador Taylordeemed inappropriate for counterin-surgency operations. Many senior of-ficers, including Chief of StaffGeneral Harold K. Johnson, sharedAmbassador Taylor's views. Whenthe 1st Infantry Division wasscheduled for Vietnam deployment,General Johnson decided that itwould deploy without its two or-ganic tank battalions or mechanizedinfantry. The chief believed, 'Thepresence of tank formations tends

to create a psychological atmos-phere of conventional combat ..."'

Eventually, armor units did deployto Vietnam and they quickly provedtheir value. As a test case, GeneralJohnson approved the deploymentof th e 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalrywith its tanks. In November 1965, atA p Bau Bang, Tro op A, 1/4th Caval-ry, demonstrated that the firepowerof an armor unit was a valuableasset in defeating determined VietCong attacks. With this positive ex-ample, the Army approved the re-quests of MG Frederick C.Weyand, commander, 25th InfantryDivision, to take his mechanizedunits to Vietnam!

The decision to deploy cavalrysquadrons, tank battalions, . andmechanized infantry in support ofthe infantry divisions was sig-10 ARMOR - Uly-AUgUSt 1988


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nificant. Even more significant wasthe decision to send the 11th Ar-mored Cavalry Regiment.

As early as 1965, GeneralWestmoreland, commander, U.S.Military Assistance Command inVietnam (MACV), requested thecavalry to provide highway securityalong Route 1. With th e arrival ofthe 11th ACR in September 1%S, itbecame the largest U.S. armor unitto serve during the war. With sub-stantial armor forces in Vietnam,the question was how to use them.

Previously, armior was doctrinallyriveted to the potential high-intcn-sity battlefields of Europe. The firstmanual to mention "operationsagainst irregular insurgent forces,"was FM 17-1, Amtor Operatiom,published in 1963. The three pagesdevoted to the sub.ject offered littlepractical advice. FM 17-95, 77te Ar-mored Cavalr?,in CoiatterirtsitrRertc?!published in 1960, made no mentionof unconventional warfare. I n 1962,however, the Combat DevelopmentAgency at Ft. Knox produced astudy titled, Role of Aniiorcrl Caval-ry in Coiut ter i~ ts i i~e~i~~.his far-sighted report suggested that aproperly modified ACR might beused to conduct offensive opera-tions to include encirclement, raid,

pursuit, ambushes, and counterat-tacks. The official manuals,however, obviously focused on high-intensity warhe. The early ar-mored units in Vietnam, "literallyhad to invent tactics and techni-ques, and then convince the Armythat they worked."'

By 1966, U.S. advisors in Vietnambegan to confirm some of the asser-tions in the Ft. Knox study. TheMay-June issue of Anitor Magazinecontained an articlc by LTCRaymond Battreall, the seniorarmor advisor in Vietnam, titled,"Armor in Vietnam." LTC Battreallobserved that armor is of little usefor reconnaissance; it is bestemployed in offensive operations tostrike, encircle, or sweep. In theseoperations, armor provides thenecessary firepower to destroy theenemy. The author further notedthat the M113 was used essentiallyas a main battle tank. Clearly, thisobserver believed that t h e functionof armor was not that of finding, butof hitting.

"The first units toarrive sufferedfrom a lack of ade-quate doctrine. A"no tanks in thejungle ' attitudeprevailed at MAWheadquarters.I

jungle" attitude prevailed at MACVhcadquartcrs. In 1965, the 1/4Caval-r y held its tanks at the squadronbase? Senior decision makers,General Westmoreland amongthem, believed the Vietnamese ter-rain was unsuitable for tanks. Infact, a survey later showed that ar-mored vehicles could traverse 46percent of Vietnam year round? Ittook six months to convinceGeneral Westmoreland that tankscould conduct combat operations."

With the deployment of additionalarmor units in 1966, the pattern of

An M48 of the 11 h ACR movesthrough a rubber plantation nearBen Dong in the fall of 1966.When first deployed, the 11thACR was used frequently forroute security.

The Army did not begin todoctrinally address these issues untilalmost a year after U.S. armor unitsdeployed to Vietnam. The first unitsto arrive suffered from a lack of ade-quale doctrine. A "no tanks in the

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Aerial view of tracks left near an11th ACR command post, above,give some indication of the numberof armored vehicles used in Opera-tion Cedar Falls. The operation wasintended to eliminate enemy troopsand supplies in the so-called "Iron Tri-angle" northwest of Saigon.offensive employment began toemerge. Although MACV rc-quested the 11th ACR to provideroute security for Highway 1, the11th ACR was soon involved in fre-quent search and destroy missions.In executing Operation Atlanta toclear Highway 1, the regiment con-ducted search and destroy, routesecurity, reconnaissance, and basesecurity missions. Thirty-nine per-cent of the missions mentioned inthe after-action report were searchand destroy. Significantly, the reportmentions only four reconnaissancemissions out of 70 operations. Al-most from the moment they arrived,the regiment's squadrons were usedas regular combat maneuver bat-talions rather than in the traditionalcavalry role.The tank battalions that deployed

to support the infantry did fulfilltheir traditional function of provid-ing firepower. The firepower of thetanks was in great demand and, as aresult, the tank companies andplatoons were farmed out to the in-fantry. In one notable case, a tankplatoon from the 1st Bn, 69thArmor, was under the operationalcontrol of the 173d Abn Bde and

operated 250 miles from its parentbattalion."

In combat operations, tanks oftenled the way through the jungle be-cause they could protect the in-fantry. They crushed their waythrough the antipersonnel minesand booby traps so deadly to thefoot soldiers. However, the tanksalso protected routes and bases. Infact, the tank battalions were moreoften used defensively than offen-sively. In the after-action report ofthe 1st Bn, 69th Armor, for thequarter ending 31July, 1966,60 per-cent of the missions mentioned con-sisted of either base or routesecurity.

By 1967, the U.S. buildupprovided considerably more armorunits. In January, the U.S. Armybegan large-scale offensives withOperation Cedar Falls. The targetof Cedar Falls was an extensiveenemy base area in the Iron Tri-angle, northwest of Saigon. Twomechanized infantry battalions, atank battalion, and a divisionalcavalry squadron helped seal twosides of the triangle. The 11th ACR(-) attacked west from the point of

the triangle to cut the area in half.Then, from all sides, the U.S. forccsbegan to close in and conductsearch and destroy operations.

Although Cedar Falls failed to bagmany insurgents, it did destroy alarge enemy logistics base. Perhapseven more significant was thedemonstration of the value ofmechanized forces in low-intensityconflict.

Mechanized infantry battalions,often fighting mounted in theirM113s, provided to some degreethe same advantages of fuepower,mobility, and protection as other ar-mored units. BG Richard T.Knowles, commander, 196th In-fantry Brigade, sang their praises."Mechanized infantry has proven tobe highly successful in search anddestroy operations.

With their capability for rapidreaction and (their) firepower, amechanized battalion can effectivelycontrol twice the terrain as an in-fantry battalion."12 Colonel WilliamW. Cobb, commander, 11th ACR,claimed the operation demonstratedthe tactical flexibility of his unit."

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Operation Junction City, inFebruary 1966, further de-monstrated t h e utility ofmechanized forces. This operationcalled for the 1st and 25th InfantryDivisions to establish blocking posi-tions in the shape of a large horse-shoe in War Zone C, northwest ofSaigon along the Cambodian bor-der. Once the blocking positionswere established, the 11th ACR anda brigade of the 25th ID attackednorth into the open end of thehorseshoe. The targets were theheadquarters of the communist in-surgency (Central Office of SouthVietnam, (COSVN), the VC 9thDivision, the lOlst NVA Regiment,and the enemy bases within thearea. The operation went asplanned and brought on severalengagements. When the smokecleared, the bases were destroyed,the VC 9th Division was battered,but the COSVN escaped. Theengagements in which mechanizedforces took part pointed to theirfunctionon he battlefield.The battles of Prek Klok I1 and

Suoi Tre emphasized the firepowerand ability of mechanized forces toreact. At Prek Klok 11, the VC at-tacked the 2d Bn, 2d Infantry(Mech), during the night of 10March. The firepower of the U.S.units, asssisted by air and artillery,made it a rather one-sided affair;the VC lost 197 men, the defenderslost three.14 At Suoi Tre, the 3d Bn,22d Infantry and the 2d Bn, 77thFA came under heavy night attackat Firebase Gold. The VC ham-mered the firebase with mortarsand assaulted with infantry waves.The next morning, the situation ap-peared desperate. A relief columnconsisting of the 2d Bn, 34thArmor, and the 2d Bn, 22d Infantry(Mech), was dispatched. By 0915hours, "...the mechanized infantryand armor column broke throughthe jungle from the southwest. Withtheir 90-mm guns firing canister and

all machine guns blazing, theymoved into the advancing VietCon& cutting them down. Shortlyafter, the enemy began towithdraw.""

As impressive as these actionswere, they pointed to some sig-nificant problems. Prek Klok II andSuoi Tre were defensive victories.Junction City had attempted to find,fq and destroy the enemy. Al-though numerous insurgent baseswere destroyed, the enemy simplymoved into Cambodian sanctuaries.Essentially, a very large encircle-ment operation failed to find or fucthe enemy. The VC were destroyedonly to the extent they were willingto offer themselves up to destruc-tion. Mechanized units againdemonstrated they could conductcombat operations in a counterinsur-gency environment. They couldreact quickly and bring substantialfirepower to bear whenever theycould make the enemy fight, butthey could not materially assist infinding or fi ing the enemy.

A key problem with the tactical of-fense in counterinsurgency is to find

and fvr the enemy. Even if found,unless fvred it will be impossibile todestroy him. 11 is the inability to Fvrthe insurgent which grants him theinitiative.

Referring to the enemy in theCedar Falls and Junction City opera-tions, General Bernard Rogersnoted, "It was a sheer physical im -possibility to keep him from slip-ping away whenever he wished, if hewere in terrain with which h e wasfamiliar... generally the case.r16 En-circlement still appeared the bestmeans of f i n g the insurgent, butlarge-scale operations were not thesolution.

Large-scale offensive operationswere rarely attempted again. At thesame time in which Cedar Falls andJunction City took place, a team ofofficers and civilians conducted acomprehensive study of armoroperations in Vietnam. TheMechanized arid Aniior CombatOperations in I/iebiam (MACOV)study was a multi-volume reportwhich covered doctrine, tactics, or-ganization, mobility, and related

Operation Junction City

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matters. The study confirmed thepattern of offensive employmentthat had begun to emerge in 1966:that cavalry squadrons were mostoften used as combat maneuver bat-talions. The study emphasized thatthe advantages of mobility andfirepower were so great that foot in-fantry was often cross-attached tomechanized infantry. Cross-attach-ment was frequent among all thecombat arms. In this way all thearms could complement the func-tions of the others. The very factthat the armored cavalry was abalanced combined arms team en-couraged its employment as aregular maneuver battalion.

The functions that the combatarms fulfilled in Vietnam made forinherent strengths and weaknessesin their employment. Helicopterunits attempted to find, airmobile in -fantry attempted to fm (block andencircle), while mechanized unitsprovided their armor-protectedfirepower to hit. Invariably, artilleryand tactical air assets finished ordestroyed the enemy. The strengthsin this arrangement lie in minimiz-ing American casualties and playingto the U.S. technological advantage.

The weakness in this tacticaldoctrine was that it often handedthe initiative to the enemy. Most ofthe offensive contacts took the formof meeting engagements. Once con-tact was made, the maneuver forceattempted to fur the enemy whilecalling in all the available artilleryand tactical air assets. In order tosafely use these indirect fires, unitswould, at best, not press the light,or, at worst, withdraw. The attemptto finish or destroy the enemy by ar-tillery and air often resulted inbreaking contact. This is one keyreason why the enemy retained theinitiative - he could escape.Another problem with using in-direct fires to finish the enemy wasthat of their destructiveness. In LIC,

\ \.CHANH LUUA Y I J G MMOVEMENT- srigon (20 mi.)

1 roes)WGHTMWEMENT-U W M AlRuFr .................

the counterinsurgency force has avested interest in limiting thedestruction in a nation they intendto save. As U.S. forces attempted torestrict the employment of indirectfires, they weakened the systemupon which their tactical offensivedoctrine was based.

The most effective use of thisdoctrine was in cordon searchoperations, in which the devastatingfire of artillery was not needed. Aclassic cordon search thatdemonstrated the potential functionof armor within the combined armsteam occurred at Chanh Luu inAugust 1968. Chanh Luu was asuspected VC supply base, whichhad been presiously searchedwithout result. The 3d Squadron,11th ACR, drew the mission to con-duct a cordon search of the village.The squadron was task-organizedwith I and K troops; two tankplatoons from M Company; B andD Companies, 2d Bn, 16th Infantry;and was further supported by the5th Division, South Vietnamese

Army (ARVN). The plan called fora deception effort, a quick cordonby U.S. units, and a search byARVN troops. The deception effortaimed at convincing the enemy thata nearby village, Binh My, was thetarget. False messages and troopmovements supported the decep-tion.

On 8 August, K Troop was 25kilometers from Chanh Luu. Start-ing its move at O600, K Troop had,by 1600,moved to Firebase Norman-dy I1 and picked up D Company.Mounted in K Troops M113s, theforce moved north in the directionof Binh My. At 1400, B Companywas airlifted northwest of Norman-dy I1 and also began a sweep awayfrom the real target. I Troop, with:the two tank platoons, began asweep from Firebase Normandy Isouth, away from Canh Luu. Atvarying times during the night, allfour elements turned back to con-verge on Chanh Luu. By 2300, thecordon was established.

At 0700, elements of the 5thARVN division airlanded, advanced

h

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"Organization of combined arms at thelowest level is the best means of applyingcombat power. For this reason, to the extentarmor can contribute to low-intensity warfare,armored cavalry is its best weapon. Ion the village, and conducted thesearch. Sporadic fights erupted,and, later that night, the VC at-tempted to break through the cor-don. The firepower of themechanized units defeated every at-tempt, and, by 10 August, the vil-lage was declared clear.

The results were impressive: 22VC killed, including one NVAgeneral, 122 VC prisoners, and agood deal of equipment and sup-plies captured.17 In this case, intel-ligence found the enemy, and the cn-circlement fvred him. It was a primeexample of how mechanized forcescan function within the combinedarms team to fq hit, protect, andcontribute to the destruction of theenemy in LIC.

Despite the doctrinal problems,mechanized forces were effective in

NotesThe author considers armor to consist

of those forces that tight mounted: includ-ing tank units, armored cavalry, andmechanized infantry.

General Donn A. Starry, w d om-bat in Vie- The Ayr Company, Salem,Nf. 1982.p. 55.

A total of 93 ground combat maneuverbattalions served in Vietnam. Of that num-ber. 71 were infantry. 10 mechanized in-fantry. 3 tank battalions. and 9 cavalrysquadrons. Shelby L Stanton. Vietnamm e r Of Bat&, Galahad Boob. Ne wYork. 1986.p. 333.

J.F.C. Fuller. "Tactics and Mechaniza-tion,"mN Journal, May 1937. p. 461.

2

Starry. op cit.. p. 56.13 Ibid. p. 63.' bid. p. 65.

Vietnam. Normally, within the com-bined arms team, armor functionedto protect U.S. troops and hi t theenemy. Its ability to quickly bringtremendous firepower against theenemy is undeniable. Armor'sability to do more to fvr and destroythe enemy was not so much theresult of terrain, but the product ofthe functions it served within thedoctrine. The tactical doctrineevolved from a number of influen-ces, the desire to save Americanlives and to avail ourselves of ourstrengths among them.

The doctrinal lessons are clear.The combined arms team is a win-ner at all levels of war, but we mustfind the right balance of functions.Only in this way can the arms trulycomplement each other and bringto the battlefield the synergistic ef-

' i d . p. 57.Department of the Army,

d and CombatQpmImns in Vietnam (MACOV). 1967.pp. 1-15.

lo Starry, op cit.. p. 57.LT C T.S. Riggs. "We Need A Few

More T a n k To...."-May-June 1966.LTG Bernard W. Rogers. Cedar Falls-ion Citx A T u r n P a

Washington. D.C.: Department of theArmy. 1974. p 77..

12

l3 Starry. op cit., p. 95.l4 R O S E . op cit.. p. 121.

Ibid. pp. 139-140.l6 Ibid, p. 157..l7 LTC John W. McEnery. "Mainstreet."

Jan-Feb 1969. pp. 36-39.

fect, which is their primary value.There is still little written doctrineon armor operations in LIC. Clear-ly, this doctrine must stress theutility of combined arms, encircle-ment, and small unit operations.LIC is a company and battalioncommanders' fight. Organization ofcombined arms at the lowest level isthe best means of applying combatpower. For this reason, to the extentarmor can contribute to low-inten-sity warfare, armored cavalry is itsbest weapon.

Following Vietnam, the Sovietsbegan their own experience witharmor in LIC, which reaffirmedthese lessons.

A later article will examine theSoviet experience with armor in Af-ghanistan and discuss implicationsrelevant to both U.S. and Soviet ex-perience with armor in low-intensityconflicts.

Major Michael R. Mathenytaught history at the ArmorOfficer Advanced Course atFt. Knox, KY, and at WestPoint. He is a graduate ofthe CGSC and the School ofAdvanced Military Studies.He has served as a tankcompany commander andas a tank battalion S3 withthe 3d Infantry Division inGermany. He is currently as-signed to G3 Plans, 1stCavalry Division, Ft. Hood,Tx.

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Not all armor battalions train ade-quately for night operations. Someconduct night training only duringmajor field exercises and as a partof gunnery training. Others conductsome night training the year round,but in an unorganized fashion. Few,if any, battalions have as good anight training program as their daytraining program .

Several unique night operationsfactors contribute to this situation.O n e of the most important and dif-ficult to correct is safety. Armorand wheeled vehicles moving quick-ly in limited visibility are always haz-ardous to themselves and to dis-mounted personnel. In each nighttraining exercise, there is the riskthat someone will fail to see adangerous situation developing.Nothing can d o more to inspire con -fidence in a units ability to conductsafe night operations than frequent,organized, night training.

Another factor is morale, whichwe can attribute to fear of th e dark.While not actually scared of thedark, many tankers become ap-prehensive as the sun goes down.The tank commander is continuallytense, waiting for the sickening dropas his tank falls off a cliff, whichneither he nor his driver saw. Theplatoon leader is sure that the sloperising ahead is Hill 431...or is it?These worries, and others, con-tribute to a certain reluctance, usual-ly not admitted, to conduct nighttraining. Also never admitted is thereluctance to conduct night trainingwhile in garrison. .Unless the soldierperceives night training as valuableand time efficient, he is probablynot going to want to leave his homeand family on a weeknight and thenhave to go to work the next morn-ing.

Mechanized units in Germanyhave the additional problem that

much of their training is conductedin Maneuver Rights Areas (MRA)where track vehicle movement atnight is prohibited.

As a result, units conduct nighttraining on an infrequent basis. Yet,ou r analysis of warfare tells us thatsuccessful night operations will becritical in the next war, and this hasled to new tank thermal sights, pas-sive night driving sights, grou nd sur-veillance radar, (GSR), etc. Evenso, our current night training prac-tices limit our effectiveness. We donot train to the full potential of ourequipment. Nor do we practice thetechniques that will maximize ou rability to op era te at night.

For example, many of our manualstell us to use ground GSRs duringperiods of limited visibility to guideadvancing units. But how Manyarmor or mechanized infantry com-panies have practiced with their sup-16 ARMOR - JUly-AugUSt 1988 I


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porting GSR teams the commandsand procedures necessary to suc-cessfully employ this technique?Probably not very many. Proficiencyin the skills peculiar to night com-bat, and confidence in our ability toconduct night operations, is missing.If we can achieve the former, it willlead to the latter. If we become ac-complished small unit night fighters,brigade-level and higher com-manders and staff will be able toplan and execute night operationsmuch as they do by day.

wasted time on weeknights. Judi-cious use of TEWTs and Jcep-Xsfor the leader training will avoidlengthy after-operations main-tenance on track vehicles. Combinethose tasks requiring track vehicleswherever possible. Limit training totwo or three hours a night, and givecompensatory time the next day. Su-pervised by the CO or XO, platoonleaders can train their platoons inindividual tank and platoon techni-ques and in the tactics of night fight-

We need to develop a night train-ing program for small units, withemphasis on the performance oftasks by squads, crews, andplatoons. It must be a year-roundprogram, incorporating training notonly in Major Training Areas(MTAs) training, but also in gar-rison and Local Training Areas(LTAs). The program must lead tocompetence in using our night fight-ing equipment, allowing us to prac-tice the appropriate tactics and tech-niques. Above all, the result mustbe to instill confidence in our abilityto fight at night.

The training program should beginwith a diagnostic phase. This shouldbe conducted in two parts - a tacti-cal exercise without troops(TEWT), and a field test. Bothneed only be about two hours longto effectively measure the unit'sability to fight at night.

The company commander shouldfirst issue the platoon leaders anOPORD late in the afternoon. Heshould observe their scheme ofmaneuver; do they recon, plan su pporting fires/illumination, and howdo they pass the order to their sub-ordinates? After dark, they shouldgo through the operation on theground. The critique should coverareas of strength/weakness and

what training needs to he conductedto sustain strengths and correctweaknesses. An exercise of this typewill quickly evaluate the leader'sability to navigate in darkness, hisuse of the control measures peculiarto night operations, his planningnight fire support, and his generalunderstanding of night operations.

One platoon at a time should runthe field test. The platoon shouldmove to the test site and arrive afterdark. The ini-tial task shouldbe to establisha night defen-sive position.An "enemy pa-trol should at-tempt to pene-trate the pla-toon position,testing its se-curity. Foot,wheel, andtrack ''en-emies" shouldapproach theposition to test target acquisition.They should attack the platoon totest its fire control and distribution.Next, t h e platoon should advance,using all the movement techniques.Radio listening silence, mission-oriented protection posture(MOPP) 4, and buttoning-up shouldbe imposed at various times. Finally,the test should end with a night tac-tical road march. After the exercise,critique the platoon in generalterms to give focus to the training tocome.

Follow-up training should centeraround short exercises designed totrain the crew or platoon in one ortwo tasks.

Careful preplanning and prepara-tion will be necessary to avoidmorale problems resulting from

ing. Each platoon should train onceevery two weeks. Intersperse leadertraining with platoon training tocoordinate and define the actions ofthe platoons..

Task selection night training isvery important. Tank crews andplatoons will probably already haveample night gunnery training. There-fore, unless you identify a specificproblem, stress other areas. Eachcrew must be able to perform atnight all those tasks they performduring the day. The onset of dark-ness makes many of these tasksmore difficult, requiring that thecrew or platoon practice so thatthere will be no loss of efficiency atnight. Some of these specific tasksare: night movement techniques,particularly if the crew is in MOPPor buttoned-up; target acquisition;

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use of visual signals; selecting firingpositions; camouflaging; install-inghetrieving mines; mount-ing/operating night observationdevices (NOD); and small armsfiring.

Other techniques specific to nightoperations, or performed in a sig-nificantly different manner at night,include: use of GSR to controlmovement and/or acquire targets;night control measures; use ofremote sensors to detect movement;use of range cards at night; naviga-tion; occupation of a night defensiveposition; fire support planning; andsecurity.

The above lists are not all-in-clusive. Instead, they detail many ofthe things we will have to be able todo if we are to successfully operateat night. Nor should we limit thistraining to the line platoons. Thescout, mortar, and support platoonsmust all practice thcir specilic nighttasks. The battalion tactical opera-tion center (TOC) should practicesetting up and moving at night. TheTOC is frequently lax in noiseand/or light discipline.

An example of a night trainingperiod using the ground surveil-lance radar (GSR) follows:

When planning training for thequarter, set aside specific nights fornight training. During the writing ofthe training schedules, assignspecific tasks to each block of nighttraining based on previously as-sessed weaknesses. In the case ofusing GSRs to guide unit move-ment, coordination is made for theGSR team to link up with the unitat 1300 hours on the training day.The GSR team briefs the unit onthe operations and capabilities of

the radar team. Following this, acoordination period works outguide movement signals and com-mands. The unit practices duringdaylight, then everyone goes to sup-per. After the meal, the GSR team,tank platoon leader, and his tankcommanders move to the local train-ing area using the companys jeeps,and two jeeps borrowed from thebattalion Stinger section. Thc proce-dures learned and rehearsed duringthe day are then exercised so thateach tank commander has the op-portunity to work with the GSRteam and to receive commands viaradio and pyrotechnics. At the endof the training, hold a short critiqueand return the group to garrison.Then conduct post-training opera-tions, and release the unit. Compen-satory time already scheduled forthe following morning can be basedon the time of return that night.

Once the battalion is well into itsnight training program, it may con-sider conducting a period of reversecycle training (RCT). Reverse cycletraining occurs when the unit trainsat night and is off-duty the next day.This has the double advantage ofvastly increasing the amount ofnight training and of allowing thesoldiers bodies and personalschedules time to adjust to workingat night. However, some inherentfactors make the conduct of RCTdifficult: First, the lowest level atwhich RCT training is practical isthe battalion level. This is becausethe basic day-to-day communica-

tions with other units, higher head-quarters, and post/community agen-cies, (all on day schedule), mustcontinue. The battalion staff can dothis by operating split shift - heavyon personnel administration andlogistics during the day, and heavyon training at night.Additionally, any RCT is going to

have to be carefully worked intolong-range planning calendars toavoid conflicts. This is best done byplacing the entire battalion on RCTat one time, which is reflected onboth brigade and division calendars.In this manner, both brigade anddivision can provide their most im-portant support; i.e., managingother commitments and require-ments to keep the battalion free ofdistractions during the day so that itdoes not end up working aroundthe clock. Other considerations tobe taken into account are soldiersmedical, finance, and personnel ap-pointments.

You must make two decisionsbefore planning a RCT. The first iscycle length. Anything less than twoweeks will not allow soldiers bodiesand schedules to adapt sufficientlyto maximize the training benefits;while anything more than fourweeks will probably be too difficultto schedule, may cause familyproblems, and will accumulate somany small problcms from person-nel not being available during t h eday as to be unworkable. Thesecond decision is th e hours of train-ing. This will depend on several fac-tors, chief of which is the hours ofdarkness. For example, in someareas of Germany in summer it isonly dark from 2300 to 0500, whilein winter it is dark from 1600 toOYOO. Other factors affecting choiceof duty hours are: training to be ac-

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complished, maintenance andpreparation time, and whether youdesire to have battalion duty hoursoverlap with community activity orthe military units normal dutyhours. Once you make thesedecisions, yo u can conduct planningand preparation in detail.As an example, a battalion com-

mander takes command soon afterhis unit returns from the NationalTraining Center (NTC). After-ac-lion reviews from the NTC notenight fighting as a weakness, withnight movement techniques and con-trol of maneuver at company levelbeing especially poor. After sometraining in individual and crew nightfighting tasks, the battalion com-mander decides the unit needs RCTto gain the required level of platoonand company night maneuver exper-tise.

There happens to be a two-weekblock of t ime open a month beforethe battalions ARTEP at Ft. Pick-ett, VA, so the battalion com-mander decides to go with thatrather than have to wait sevenmonths for a longer block of opentime.

At the same time, since this is t h efirst time any battalion in thebrigade has conducted RCT, he isconcerned about coordination andcommunication with other units andagencies. Accordingly, he chooses1500 o 0300 as the duty day duringthe RCT period, with a typical dailycompany schedule being:1500-1700 Preparation for train-1700-1800Dinner1800-2200 Training2200-2300Midnight meal2300-0300 Training

ing/maintenance

In this manner, each company gctseight solid hours of night trainingeach day, with some overlap be-tween the battalions schedule andthose agencies/units on normalschedules. In order to have aprogressive night training progamthat will solve those problems iden-tified at the NTC, the battalion com-mander designates the first week forplatoon training and the secondweek for company training:

PlatoonWeekMonday - Driving techniques,Tuesday - Traveling overwatch,Wednesday - Occupy battle posi-7hrrrsday - Movement to contact,Friday - Maintenance.

traveling.bounding overwatch.tion, fight from battle position.move between battle positions.

CompanvWeekMonday - Bound by platoon, tacti-Tuesday - Movement to contactWednesday - Night attackThursday - Night active defenseFriday - Maintenance

cal road march

By varying which day each platoonand company conducts main-tenance, the training areas requiredcan be minimized.

RCT will be of great benefit inproviding night fighting expertise ifconducted as outlined above,.However, dont regard i t as a cure-all to correct basic weaknesses innight fighting abilities.

Yo u must integrate RCT into anorganizcd, progressive, programdesigned to achieve proficiency atnight operations. This must be the

1 ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 1988

I!.. To correct basicweaknesses in nightfighting abilities. RCTmust be integratedinto an organized,progressive programdesigned to achieveproficiency...This mustbe the same type ofplanned, prepared,p e fo rma n ce o rien-tated training that weconduct by day.same type o f planned, prcparlperformance-orienlated trainingthat we conduct by day. Then, andonly then, will battalions, brigades,and divisions be able to plan andconduct the night operations whichwill be vital to winning th e next war.

Captain James K. Greerwas commissioned fromWest Point in 1977. He is agraduate of the Rangercourse and the AOB. Heserved as a platoon leaderand XO with the 3d Bn, 5-33 Armor, Ft. Knox; as aproject officer for the XM1FSED Test at Ft. Knox, andas XO, D Troop, 10th Caval-ry, Ft. Knox. He was chief,M60A3 Mobile TrainingTeam in Egypt, and at-tended the Amphibious War-fare School at Quantico, VAbefore being assigned asS3, Special Troops, VCorps, FRG. Later, he wasCO, E Troop, 1-10 Cavalry;CO, HHC 1-68 Armor, FRG.Following a tour as an in-structor at USMA, he is at-tending the CGSC at Ft.Leavenworth.

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PlatoonDefensiveOperationsby First Lieutenant Dennis M. Verpoorten

A tank platoon combat trainer atthe NTC has the opportunity toevaluate about 28 tank platoons ayear as they go through several tacti-cal operations. A common, ma,jorproblem during defensive opera-tions was that platoon leaders wereunable to effectively control platoonfires.Too often, the OPFOR overran

battle positions because defenderslost control. Platoons did not knowwhen to fire, where to fire, and ex-actly how the platoon was to ex-ecute its defense. As a result, per-sonnel were needlessly killed,vehicles destroyed, and the missionsended in failure.AARs brought out many reasons

why missions fail. But in most cases,the platoons lost because they didnot fight as teams, and the entiredefense was nothing more than afree-for-all. The platoons did notmake up range cards, sketch cards,or platoon fire plans, or - if theyhad made them - they lacked vitalinformation, or were impossible toread or understand.

Unfortunately, units are puttingless and less emphasis on platoonfire plans during the preparation fora defensive operation. Our presentfirst-rate tanks, the M1 and theMlAl, give us a definite advantageover any adversary, but this doesntmean that we are excused from theplanning and procedures our tacti-cal doctrine specifies. A platoonleader must develop a defensive fireplan and maintain strong command

and control within his platoon if hisunit is to engage and destroy an at-tacker. This is especially true if thatattacker has a numerical advantage.At any given time, the platoonlender must be able to distributeand control the fires of all directand indirect weapons quickly andaccurately, maintain that control,and not become too involved in thefiring of his own tank.

Bcforc a tank platoon moves intoits battle position, the platoon com-mander and his tank commandersmust dismount and conduct a walk-ing reconnaissance of the position,observing it from the plannedengagement areas. Then the platooncommander will assign tank posi-tions and sectors of fire for eachtank. It is important, when choosingtank positions, to look for sitesproviding maximum fields of firewhile enhancing survivability withadequate cover and concealment.The platoon leadcr must place hisown tank in the position that willbest allow him to observe and con-trol his team, keeping in mind hisown cover and concealment needs.

He must ensure that fire sectorsoverlap, and that his platoon sectoroverlaps those of flanking platoons.If he does this, he will have at leasttwo tanks acquiring targets in over-lapping sectors. He will point out tohis TCs all avenues of approach, tar-get reference points (TRPs),obstacles, triger lines, final protec-tive fires (FPF), engagement areas,dead spaces, and key terrain. Afterthis, each TC will move his vchicle

into position and begin makingrange or sketch cards, in addition tothe other duties listed in his platoonSOP.

Many tankers mistakenly feel thatrange or sketch cards are no longernecessary. But they are, and forthree important reasons. First,crews that rely totally on the fullcapability of their primary fire con-trol system are not considering thepossibility of cquipment failure, orthe effects of foul weather. A rangeor sketch card will provide the TCand gunner with all the needed in-formation to fire in a degradedmode. Combat, unlike gunnery, willnot provide you a chance to re-qualiQ.

Secondly, a range or sketch cardwill give the entire crew a better un-derstanding of all the elements(TRPs, obstacles, FPF, etc.) withinits sector, reduce confusion, andremind them of actions to takeduring enemy contact. The more in-formation each crew member has,the better he will fight. In the eventof a relief in place, the new crewwill need the information on therange or sketch card, especially ifthe relief takes place during dark-ness.A third reason is that the platoon

leader will need a copy from eachcrew, including his own, so that hemay draw up his platoon fire plan.I t is important that each TC givethe platoon leader his copy no laterthan 30 minutes after he moves intoposition because his information

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may greatly affect the accuracy ofthe platoon lire plan. He may dis-cover there is more dead space thanwas originally expected, or that cer-tain crews might not be able tocover certain TRPs or obstacles.

A platoon fire plan is nothingmore than a composite of all rangeor sketch cards with some addition-al information put in by the com-mander to help him in fire distribu-tion. Five copies should be made -one for each TC, one for th eplatoon commander, and one fort h e company commander whoshould gct his copy no later than 45minutes after the platoon is in posi-tion. Each TC must have a copy sothat platoon command may con-tinue if the commander losescommo or dies.The lire plan will be a simple

sketch showing key terrain featuresand enemy avenues of approach.The information will be everyhingthe platoon leader plans for hisdcfense, and should include the fol-lowing:.Target Reference P oints (TRPLTRPs are easily identifiable terrain

features that will help the platoonleader mass his fires, aid in callingfor indirect fire, and prevent con-fusion, within the platoon, aboutdirection of lire during the leaderslire commands. By looking at theplans tank-to-target list (which tankcan engage which TRP), the com-mander will immediately knowwhich tank can engage which target.The lire plan will list all battalionand company TRPs and indirectfire targets. He can identify andlabel as targets any key areas withinthe platoon sector not covercd bythese TRPs.

~ O b s b c l e s . The plan shouldshow all obstacles, man-made ornatural, and cover each obstacle bydirect and indirect lire. Obstacles

-Too often, leadersscribble fire plans onthe back of 2404s,MRE boxes, papersacks, a wad of toiletpaper, 3-by-5 cards,scratch paper, or onthe back of some-ones hand. This isprobably better thannothing...

will 5top, clclay, and/or canalize theenemy into engagement areas. Theywill also deny the enemy access tokey terrain. It is vital that theplatoon leader recognize and usethese obstacles by supporting themwith massed lires at key locations.The enemy will try to breachobstacles with all his assets. It is atthis time that he is most vulnerable.

.Dead Space. Dead space canprovide the enemy a protected areawhere he can hide and/ormaneuver. Defenders must denythese areas. They can cover themwith direct fire from anotherplatoon, or with indirect fire andobstacles.

.Trigger Lines. Trigger lines orpoints are easily identifiable areasforward of the platoons battle posi-tion which mark a point of entryinto the engagement area. This isthe point where the platoon willbegin its engagement if the platoonleader is unable to issue a fire com-mand. Showing trigger lines on therange or sketch card prevents con-fusion about when to lire. The useof trigger lines will prevent theenemy from closing in on the BP un-opposed.0 FPF. The plan must show a final

protective lire line. An FPF is aprearranged wall of direct and in-direct fire used as a last resort toslow or stop enemy movement onto

your position. Your PFP should beno closer than 1,200meters.

.Engagement k u . A n engage-ment area is the area the platoonleader designates for the concentra-tion of his platoons fires. Aplatoons engagement area is thesame as, or is in support of, thecompanys engagement area.

With all his information at hand,the platoon leader must completethe legend to his range or sketchcard. He must show his tank-to-tar-get list and any specific instructions.He must indicate magnetic north,his position ID, unit information,and datehime group. All this infor-mation is vital to a relief platoon.The platoon leader should placehimself in the position of a relievingcommander. Wouldnt he like t ohave all this information at hand ifhe was taking over a strange posi-tion?

The above information is the niini-iw im lor a lire plan. However, if thecommander desires, or if higherauthority requests it, a fire plan caninclude an M-8 alarm position,OPLP position, alternate and sup-plementary positions, forward pas-sage points, and trigger lines foreach weapon system. Unit SOPS willdictate additional items of informa-tion. You must also remember tomake range or sketch cards and fireplans for your alternate and sup-plementary positions.

Ensure that your fire plan is com-plete and legibile so that you oranyone else can understand andapply it. Too often, leaders scribblefire plans on the back of 2404~~MRE boxes, paper sacks, a wad oftoilet paper, 3-by-5 cards, scratchpaper, or on the back of someoneshand. This is probably better thannothing but a printed form is far bet-ter. With this form, all vital informa-tion is neatly listed and ready for

1

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Fig.2use by the platoon commander, hisTCs, or any relieving comman der.

Figures 1 an d 2 show two com-pleted platoon fire plans, each witha 1/25,000 grid system. Terrain andarea of responsibility will dictatewhether the fire plan must be drawnto scale. When completed, theforms will contain all the requiredinformation. Following the checklistwill ensure this.

When a platoon has a complctedand distributed tire plan at hand, itis ready to defend. Now it will fightas a team because each memberknows his mission and the platoon'smission. The platoon leader is bet-

ter able to control his platoon firesbecause he has all the informationin his fire plan.When the enemy attacks, tankcrews will identify the vehicles andsend accurate spot reports to theplatoon commander. He can then

call for accurate indirect fire at longranges which may cause the enemycommand and control to breakdown. As the enemy advances, spotreports will continue to flow to theplatoon leader. When the enemyreaches the obstacles, the platoonleader will be able to quickly dis-tribute his fires by shifting his in-direct fires and issuing a platoonfire command. He will know what

tanks can engage what targets bylooking at his fire plan. The planwill eliminate confusion within theplatoon because the firing tanks willknow the target type, its direction,the type of ammunition to use, andthe number of rounds to fire. Non-firing tanks will be able to assistfiring tanks by observing fire, whichwill result in the faster destructionof the enemy without wasting am-munition.When the enemy masses to breachthe obstacles, the platoon com-mander can mass his fires at thecritical points. Heavy casualties inmen and equipment will force theenemy to retreat. This all takesplace because the platoon leader isat all times in control because hehas adeq uate range or sketch cards.

Even with sophisticated weaponssystems such as th e M1 and MlAl,the platoon leader needs a clear,graphic fire plan for a successfuldefense. For this reason, theplatoon SOP should call for makingand using range or sketch cards,and platoon training must includethis process.Reactions must be automatic inbattle, and command and controlmust prevail to eliminate confusion.Advanced technology is useless ifwe cannot app ly it.

First Lieutenant DennisM. Verpoorten, commis-sioned in Armor in 1984 asa distinguished militarygraduate of the Universityof Nebraska, sewed as atank platoon and scoutplatoon leader in the 2-72Armor. Now sewing at theNational Training Center,he has been a tankplatoon and scout platoonobserver-controller.


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FortKnox's TerrainMatches Europe'sforOPFORTrainingby SGT Lany W. RedmondArmor officers will no longer ven-

ture untrained into the NTC desertto face Ft. Irwin's legendaryOPFOR because they meet andfight Ft. Knox's own OPFOR duringthe 12-week Armor Officer BasicCourse.

The OPFOR training at Ft. Knoxcomes during a "10-day war" whenclassroom theory is put to the grittytest of field work and whcn youngofficers learn just how hard it is tofight - even with blank ammunition.The crucial need for realistic train-ing was instrumental in acquiringthe funds and equipment for theOPFOR unit, said Captain RobertOrsini, who commanded t h e unit atits inception in July 1983. Troop E,1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, has 24M551 Sheridans and M113s withVISMODs resembling Soviet T-72tanks and BMP troop carriers. Thetroops wear Soviet-style uniformswith Soviet rank badges equivalentto their U.S.anks.

The Fort Knox OPFOR unit hasbecome so expert in its portrayal ofSoviet tactics that it has beenseconded by the first-place experts -the 32d Guards Motorized RifleRegiment, the reknowned OPFORat Fort Irwin, CA. On 10 May,Colonel Bill Wilson, then com-mander of the 32d Guards MRR,

presented th eFort Knoxunit with itsO P F O Rcolors and

named it the 6th Motorized RifleBattalion. He extended an open in -vitation to the Knox soldiers tocome to Fort Irwin at any time andadd to the combat luster of the 32dGuards MRR.

The AOB students practice theirbattle lessons on terrain that closelyapproximates that of Germany:wooded hills, small streams, gulleys,and some open fields. "You fightlike you train," is the maxim, andthe AOB and OPFOR units fightdeterminedly to win on terrainsimilar to that on which they maysomeday have to fight to win. Theterrain differences between Ft.b o x and Ft. Irwin are not con-sidered crucial because, as oneAOB officer remarked, "It's the tac-tics that count more than theground."

Prior to the formation of the GthMRB, students fought mock Soviet-American battles with Americanequipment and tactics. Now, the stu-dents face an OPFOR unit that usesSoviet tactics and vehicles closelyresembling the real thing. The dif-ferences are marked, and ad-vantageous to the students. "We arenot just providing an agqressive

fight," said Captain Orsini. "We aretraining them in Soviet tactics."

Time and experience havechanged the OPFOR's operations.In the past, the Command and StaffDepartment called the OPFORshots. Now, the department onlytells the OPFOR what type of battleto fight and lets it fight on its own.

The OPFOR doesn't spend all itstime fighting AOB students, it alsoprovides displays for the annualArmor Conference and is on handto work with the ROTC basic campduring the summer. Also, traineesin the 1st Armored TrainingBrigade slated to go to Fort Braggcan gain familiarization on theSheridan.

When engaging the AOB students,the OPFOR runs a variety of olfen-sive and defensive missions, whichgive the students a definite feel forthe speed and force that are basicto Soviet tactics. Captain Stockwell,current commander of the OPFOR,says his troops are not only currentin Soviet tactics and maneuvers,they also remain current in theirprimary MOS skills. This meansdouble training, but the soldierstake it in stride because they seethemselves as an elite unit, dedi-cated to training AOB and senior

armor magazine, july-august 1988

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