aristotle on knowledge. aristotle 384-322 bc 384-322 bc student of plato (429-327) student of plato...

Aristotle on KnowledgeAristotle on Knowledge

AristotleAristotle

384-322 BC384-322 BC Student of Plato (429-327)Student of Plato (429-327) Teacher of Alexander (353-323)Teacher of Alexander (353-323) Founded ‘Lyceum’Founded ‘Lyceum’ We have his lecture notesWe have his lecture notes

Posterior AnalyticsPosterior Analytics MetaphysicsMetaphysics

FormsForms

Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of FormsForms ‘‘Third Man’ argumentThird Man’ argument

We recognise Bob as a man because he We recognise Bob as a man because he participates in the Form of Manparticipates in the Form of Man

We recognise the Form of Man as the Form of We recognise the Form of Man as the Form of Bob because both have something in commonBob because both have something in common

Both participate in a further Form of Man – the Both participate in a further Form of Man – the Third man.Third man.

We recognise the Third Man as a Form of Man We recognise the Third Man as a Form of Man because of a Fourth Man … because of a Fourth Man …

FormsForms

Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of FormsForms Forms can’t explain changeForms can’t explain change

A thing which is small may become largeA thing which is small may become large It began participating in SmallIt began participating in Small It ends by participating in LargeIt ends by participating in Large How?How?

Forms and MatterForms and Matter

Aristotle had a theory of FormsAristotle had a theory of Forms Forms are the patterns of existing thingsForms are the patterns of existing things Forms impose a pattern on MatterForms impose a pattern on Matter

Duck, daisy, dish – same matter, different Duck, daisy, dish – same matter, different formform

The two exist together – they are only The two exist together – they are only logically logically distinctdistinct

Matter and Form constitute Substances – Matter and Form constitute Substances – the basic things in the worldthe basic things in the world

SubstanceSubstance

Substances are the things that have Substances are the things that have propertiesproperties

Aristotle lists ‘categories’, or kinds of Aristotle lists ‘categories’, or kinds of property.property. Quantity, quality, relation, location, time, Quantity, quality, relation, location, time,

position, habit, action, passionposition, habit, action, passion Change can now be understoodChange can now be understood

Substance takes on new propertiesSubstance takes on new properties Socrates was sad but becomes happySocrates was sad but becomes happy

Material of Substance takes on new FormsMaterial of Substance takes on new Forms Socrates was young but gets old, and diesSocrates was young but gets old, and dies

CausesCauses

Aristotle proposes 4 type of causeAristotle proposes 4 type of cause1.1. MaterialMaterial

The statue is brown The statue is brown becausebecause it is bronzeit is bronze

2.2. FormalFormalThe statue has legs The statue has legs becausebecause it is the it is the

image of a manimage of a man

3.3. EffectiveEffectiveThe statue looks like a man The statue looks like a man becausebecause the the

bronze was bronze was poured into a man-shaped mouldpoured into a man-shaped mould

4.4. FinalFinalThe statue was made The statue was made because because it it

honours Pericleshonours Pericles

ExplanationsExplanations

These ‘causes’ are really kinds of These ‘causes’ are really kinds of explanationsexplanations They are answers to the question ‘Why They are answers to the question ‘Why

is S a P?’is S a P?’ Why is the statue brown? (Why is it a brown Why is the statue brown? (Why is it a brown

thing?)thing?) Why is the moon eclipsed?Why is the moon eclipsed? Why is the child ugly?Why is the child ugly? Why go walking?Why go walking?


What explains why S is P?What explains why S is P? Look at the standard ‘syllogism’ in his LogicLook at the standard ‘syllogism’ in his Logic

SSocrates is a ocrates is a MMananAll All MMen are en are PPersonsersonsSSocrates is a ocrates is a PPersonerson

This This justifies justifies believing believing that that Socrates is a Socrates is a PersonPerson

It also It also explains why explains why Socrates is a Person (S Socrates is a Person (S is P)is P)


Take any argument of the formTake any argument of the form

S S is is MMMM is is PPSS is is PP

We can say: Why is S a P? Because S is M We can say: Why is S a P? Because S is M and M is Pand M is PTo find an explanation we just need to find To find an explanation we just need to find the right M (called the the right M (called the Middle TermMiddle Term) to go ) to go between S and Pbetween S and P


So: Why is the Statue Brown? We So: Why is the Statue Brown? We have:have:

Statue Statue is is MMMM is is BrownBrownStatueStatue is is BrownBrown


So: Why is the Statue Brown? We So: Why is the Statue Brown? We have:have:

Statue Statue is is BronzeBronzeBronzeBronze is is BrownBrownStatueStatue is is BrownBrown

The reason is, because the Statue is The reason is, because the Statue is Bronze and Bronze is BrownBronze and Bronze is Brown


Similarly for the other questionsSimilarly for the other questions Why is the moon eclipsed?Why is the moon eclipsed? Because it is darkened by earth’s

shadow, and to be darkened by Earth’s shadow is to be eclipsed

That is the formal cause


Similarly for the other questionsSimilarly for the other questions Why is the child ugly?Why is the child ugly? Because the father is ugly and ugly

fathers have ugly children That is the efficient cause


Similarly for the other questionsSimilarly for the other questions Why go walking?Why go walking? Because those who want to be healthy

go walking, and we want to be healthy That is the final cause

Scientific KnowledgeScientific Knowledge

EpistemeEpisteme is a collection of such is a collection of such deductionsdeductions

We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is (Post. An. 1.2)


‘the cause of that fact and of no other’


Given the first two premises only the Given the first two premises only the conclusion follows, and no otherconclusion follows, and no other


‘the fact could not be other than it is’


Given the first two premises the Given the first two premises the conclusion conclusion could not be other than it is (validity)


EpistemeEpisteme requires conditions on such requires conditions on such deductionsdeductions

the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause

Deduction with these conditions is Deduction with these conditions is Demonstration (Demonstration (ApodeixisApodeixis))

Demonstration thus excludes trivial or Demonstration thus excludes trivial or irrelevant deductions irrelevant deductions


‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true’ False premises make a syllogism unsoundFalse premises make a syllogism unsound

All men are vegetablesAll men are vegetablesAll vegetables are mortalAll vegetables are mortalAll men are mortalAll men are mortal

This syllogism doesn’t give us knowledgeThis syllogism doesn’t give us knowledge


‘‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be better known than and prior to the conclusion’’

There is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man; objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense. Now the most universal causes are furthest from sense and particular causes are nearest to sense, and they are thus exactly opposed to one another


‘‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be better known than and prior to the conclusion’’ Things may be known immediately to Things may be known immediately to

our sensesour senses That triangular patch of grass is greenThat triangular patch of grass is green

Such things are not Such things are not certain certain or or universaluniversal or or eternaleternal


‘‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be better known than and prior to the conclusion’’ Other things may be known less Other things may be known less

immediatelyimmediately The internal angles of a triangle sum to The internal angles of a triangle sum to

180180oo

Such things can be known more Such things can be known more certainly certainly as they are as they are universaluniversal and and eternaleternal


The demonstrations that constitute The demonstrations that constitute epistemeepisteme Form a structure of linked deductionsForm a structure of linked deductions Each link in the chain of deductions is Each link in the chain of deductions is

such that the causes are more general such that the causes are more general than the subject and predicate being than the subject and predicate being explainedexplained

IntuitionsIntuitions

Demonstrations are only as good as their Demonstrations are only as good as their premisespremises

How do we come to know them? Choices How do we come to know them? Choices are:are:1.1. Chain of premises and conclusions is endlessChain of premises and conclusions is endless

Episteme is impossibleEpisteme is impossible

2.2. Chain is circularChain is circularKnowledge has no foundationKnowledge has no foundation

3.3. First premises existFirst premises existThey are not knowable by demonstrationThey are not knowable by demonstration


First premises are known by First premises are known by induction from sense datainduction from sense data

Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort [for getting knowledge without demonstration.] ... And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception.


First premises are known by induction First premises are known by induction from sense datafrom sense data

But though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some the sense-impression comes to persist, in others it does not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul.



And when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience.



From experience again – i.e. from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all – originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being.



Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction (epagoge); for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive.



Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error – opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition (noûs) are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive.



From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises – a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.

InvestigationsInvestigations

Episteme is a structure of Episteme is a structure of demonstrationsdemonstrations Leading upwards from more general to Leading upwards from more general to

more particular truthsmore particular truths Giving the causes of thingsGiving the causes of things Based on undemonstrated conceptual truths Based on undemonstrated conceptual truths

We discover the bases through intuitionWe discover the bases through intuition

How do we discover the How do we discover the demonstrations?demonstrations?


Collect facts of appearances (Collect facts of appearances (phenomenaphenomena))

It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe.

The senses are generally reliableThe senses are generally reliableIt is their function to tell us about the worldIt is their function to tell us about the world


Consider reputable opinions Consider reputable opinions ((endoxaendoxa))

As in other cases, we must set out the appearances and run through all the puzzles regarding them. In this way we must test the credible opinions about these sorts of experiences – ideally, all the credible opinions, but if not all, then most of them, those which are the most important.


Apply dialectic (Apply dialectic (elenchuselenchus/Socratic /Socratic Method/…)Method/…)

Dialectic is useful for philosophical sorts of sciences because when we are able to run through the puzzles on both sides of an issue we more readily perceive what is true and what is false.



Furthermore, it is useful for uncovering what is primary among the commitments of a science; for it is impossible to say anything regarding the first principles of a science on the basis of the first principles proper to the very science under discussion, since among all the commitments of a science, the first principles are the primary ones.



This comes rather, necessarily, from discussion of the credible beliefs (endoxa) belonging to the science. This is peculiar to dialectic, or is at least most proper to it. For since it is what cross-examines, dialectic contains the way to the first principles of all inquiries.

aristotle on knowledge. aristotle 384-322 bc 384-322 bc student of plato (429-327) student of plato...

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