afrikaners, nationalists, and apartheid

Afrikaners, Nationalists, and ApartheidAuthor(s): Brian M. du ToitSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 531-551Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/159088 .

Accessed: 21/12/2014 21:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern African Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Sun, 21 Dec 2014 21:52:13 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/159088?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, 4 (I970), pp. 531-51

Afrikaners, Nationalists,

and Apartheid

by BRIAN M. DU TOIT*

IT seems that one of the major fallacies today is that of generalisation. We have all had our fill of the writer or speaker who refers to 'the African and his animistic religion', 'the Zulu and his impi-membership', or the 'military syndrome' in African politics. Every intelligent reader and student is conscious of the danger of generalisation and the tendency to lump under some uniform heading 'the African', 'the Negro', and 'the Afrikaner'. While animism, the impi, or military coups may mark or may have marked particular groups of people at a particular time, it is as dangerous to use such generalisations as it is to use the sweeping term 'the Afrikaner'.

We should differentiate between several aspects of what constitutes a people. There is of course always the genetic aspect, which produces the physical being, actually a neutral being who is able to learn any language and participate in any culture once he has been exposed to a

learning experience or socialisation process. We can also differentiate the linguistic aspect, which would allow us to point at the Frenchman as

against the Englishman, but here we are pointing only at linguistic group membership and not at political loyalty, nationality, or other

group affiliation. In fact, we would usually refer to 'a speaker of French'. We may also want to refer to political loyalties, in which case we could refer to 'the French' or 'the Germans', but in today's world of rapid change it is not very clear what we are referring to in this case. We may also refer to cultural groups, which may be political minority or

majority groups, in or outside the political loyalty expectations of the

particular country. It seems to me that we should think of the Afrikaner first of all in this light.

We define Afrikaner in terms of language and culture and also in terms of his country of residence and/or loyalty. We would hardly expect to find an English-speaking Afrikaner, nor would we expect to find an Afrikaner who does not come from the Dutch cultural tradition which gave rise to this particular group of people. But Afrikaner does not necessarily imply rightist or leftist political views, particular church

* Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Florida, Gainesville.



membership, or residential patterns restricted to the southern tip of Africa. We recognise both Albert Hertzog and Abram Fischer as

Afrikaners, just as we speak of some Afrikaners in the Presbyterian or other 'English' churches-and even the Christian Institute-and in fact there were Afrikaner communities in Kenya, Zambia, and even as far afield as Argentina. While the ultra-conservatives, particularly the members of the Afrikaner Broederbond, like to think of 'Afrikaner' as

referring to a particular linguistic, political, and cultural group, I think that we would not be far wrong in thinking of a more general and more

heterogeneous group. Probably the only criterion which all classifica- tions will have in common, and which I will use here, is that of native

linguistic-group membership. An Afrikaner is a speaker of Afrikaans with a special loyalty to South

Africa. Since the members of this group gradually emerged in an

anglicised Cape of Good Hope and formed themselves into particular church congregations, they were identified with the Dutch Reformed Church (which had as its first ministers Presbyterians from Scotland), with the South African interior, and only very recently with the Nationalist Party, which was formed as late as I934 by Dr D. F. Malan. Their loyalty is to South Africa, for this is the only country with which

they can identify and on which they have any claims as homeland. As the American Negro cannot claim Ghana or Nigeria as 'home', and as the white American cannot lay any claims to Europe, so it is with the white South African, but especially the Afrikaner.

This article might have been entitled 'the Nationalist Party member and his view of apartheid', for within the group called Afrikaner we will find every possible shade of political ideology. We must, however, see this through the visual filter of time and space, elements which qualify our statements and restrict their applicability to the Republic of South Africa in the early 1970S. Simultaneously we should keep the historical

perspective in mind, namely the political conditions and social circum- stances which were influential in the appearance of the Afrikaner. Elsewhere I have stated that:

He was born on the outposts of the Dutch settlement at the Cape; weaned in the vast expanses of the interior while withdrawing from British domination and struggling against hordes of African tribesmen; came of age after being thrashed by the British troops in the Second War of Independence [the Anglo-Boer War]; and matured as the ruler of South Africa. In his personality and make-up is ingrained the struggle for recognition in the years during which he opposed Anglicisation, and fear of the possibility of being swamped by the numerically superior Africans. These two aspects must be kept in mind when looking at the

532 BRIAN M. DU TOIT



AFRIKANERS, NATIONALISTS, AND APARTHEID

Afrikaner element in South Africa.1

I would like to go further in an attempt to explain why it is that the Afrikaner has developed this policy of ethnic differentiation and geographical separation. In all of this we should keep in mind that ethnic differentiation is not unique to South Africa but that segregation, domination, and separation have always marked the relations between different cultural, linguistic, and religious groups, and unfortunately also between different racial groups. What set South Africa apart until

very recently was the insistence on geographical separation. In the light of Australia's immigration policy, and the views of French-speaking Canadians, Black Power Americans, and some African states, it seems clear that apartheid as philosophy and as policy is no longer unique to South Africa.

THE RISE OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALISM

The rise of South Africa as a political entity has to be seen against pressures which were brought to bear on her. At this stage we will focus on the white population groups.

Five years after a relief station was established at the Cape of Storms to supply water, meat, and vegetables to their ships, the Dutch East Indies Company was instrumental in the birth of the Afrikaner. In that

year, 1657, the first 'free burghers' were permitted to establish small farms close to the Fort. As the future emerged more promisingly, the southern tip of Africa became known as the Cape of Good Hope. This also spelled an increasing need for supplies to passing ships and so

larger farms, situated further from the protective psychological centre at the Fort, were granted to the burghers. Already, due to their contact with local native peoples and the particular ecology which emerged, gradual changes were occurring in the dialect and behaviour of thebe early homesteaders.

As it became clear to the Dutch administration that this was going to be a permanent settlement, immigration was encouraged. During these early years settlers were sent out from Holland and Belgium, joined by German and French immigrants. The latter comprised primarily the Huguenots, who had first settled in Holland and in April 1688 sailed for the Cape of Good Hope; these were hard-headed men of conviction who were willing to sacrifice a home and a country for

1 Brian M. du Toit, 'Politics and Change in South Africa', in International Journal of Comparative Sociology (Dharwar, Hyderabad), vII, , 1966, p. I09.

533




their religious freedom. They blended well with the keen individualists who were farming the frontier of the day. The boldness which marked these early settlers carried them in the next century and a half to the northern and eastern frontiers-hundreds of miles from the Cape- where they were confronted by settled indigenous communities and southward-migrating Bantu speakers.

By this time already the idea of a distinctive language and culture was emerging. In time they developed from Dutch colonists, who spoke 'Cape Dutch', to 'Afrikaanders' and finally Afrikaners, who spoke Afrikaans. As early as 1707 Hendrik Bibault, opposing arrest in Stellenbosch, had declared: 'K ben een Africaander...' (I am an Afrikaner). By the last quarter of the eighteenth century there was even a Patriot movement and a revolt based on the claim that a people should have a say in the government. By 1795 Swellendam and Graaff- Reinet, on the eastern frontier, had revolted and more was heard now of 'our fatherland' as these two independent districts appointed governments which represented the 'voice of the people'.

Into this atmosphere of growing nationalism and the gradual emergence of a distinctive language and culture came British administration. Attempting to counteract French sea power and thwart

Napoleon's rise to supremacy, Great Britain 'temporarily' occupied the

Cape between 1795 and I803. In I806 British rule became permanent and with it an attempt to eliminate this emergent language and culture. The anglicisation policy is understandable in retrospect, but to the local people it seemed a denial of their rights. English soon became the language used in the civil service and in most official trade and business relations. A series of language laws was passed, in 1823, I825, and I827, and English became the only medium used in schools- even those which had been Dutch. The urban centres were now English islands in a rising rural sea of Afrikaans. As Dutch was disallowed in Parliament (I854) and in state schools (I865), and as the British settlers, who arrived in I820 and the years following, started to influence the smaller towns and farming regions, the policy showed signs of success.

During these years, too, British schoolteachers and Scottish Presby- terian ministers were brought in to assure the successful eradication of the Afrikaner language and culture. While it had this effect in the larger population concentrations and while education, public life, and trade became unilingual, the same was not true for religion. The I834 Synod which met in Cape Town consisted of 23 members-I3 of whom were Scottish-but this was a temporary phenomenon in the Dutch Reformed Church. The Church provided considerable opposition to the




replacement of Dutch by English, since most people were conservative in the religious sphere 'and feared that if the language of the Church was suppressed, religion itself would suffer... If English were to enter the Church there was a danger that the pure Dutch characteristics of the Church would be lost."

If Afrikaner nationalism had been more meaningfully established, and possibly if the geographical confines had been more limiting, one could have expected a movement of cultural adjustment at this stage. Instead we find that these frontiersmen migrated northward in the Great Trek and established a number of independent republics in the South African interior. Once again their nationalistic ideals were thwarted when the British occupied Natal and confronted the independent republics north of the Orange River.

This latter half of the nineteenth century was of great significance for South Africa. It was marked by the discovery of diamonds and gold, and the influx of large numbers of foreigners who came to prospect and develop these mining concerns. The Uitlanders, or foreigners, were a sharp contrast to the conservative, religious, and largely rural Afrikaners. Stimulated by this new threat and by British political pressure on what is now Transvaal, there was a new awakening of Afrikaner language ideals and a real nationalist development in the whole of South Africa.

Here we have the second Afrikaans language movement. In 1875 the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (Association of True Afrikaners) was formed with the basic aim of standing for 'our' Language, 'our' Nation, and 'our' Country. There was a very strong movement for the translation of the Bible into Afrikaans, and it was also decided to publish a monthly journal, Die Afrikaanse Patriot. Out of this meeting, too, came the first South African national anthem, the words of which appeal across provincial boundaries to all people of South Africa. The first verse, in translation, reads:

Each nation has its own HOMELAND, For us-South Africa that strand. No dearer, fairer land unfurled For us throughout the whole wide world. We bear, as children at her side, Her name-South Africans-with pride.2

1F. A. van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1868-1881 (Cape Town, I96I), p. 40.

2 My translation conveys the same meaning as the Afrikaans text but may not be the best possible literary rendering.

535




Here, for the first time, is a broad appeal to the loyalty of all white South Africans. In an Open Letter to the public the leaders of this new association point out that there are three kinds of Afrikaners. 'There are Afrikaners with English hearts. And there are Afrikaners with Dutch hearts. And there are Afrikaners with Afrikaner hearts. The last group we call TRUE AFRIKANERS and we call on them to unite us.' Two years after its first appearance, Die Patriot changed to a weekly publication, and this greater frequency increased its influence in uniting Afrikaners and developing South African nationalism.

During this period too, and no doubt stimulated by the linguistic awakening, we find for the first time an Afrikaner nationalism. Van Jaarsveld gives a clear picture of its emergence in the Transvaal and the Free State, and then among the Afrikaners in the Cape. 'The years 1868-I881 were of vital importance in the history of South Africa', he

says. 'One can rightly say the foundations of present-day South Africa were laid round about 1881, and that forces were then brought into motion which are still operating today.' Perhaps the most important force originating at that time was Afrikaner nationalism, which was not

present in South Africa before I877. This nationalism was a natural reaction to, and a direct outflow of, the challenge of British Imperialism in South Africa.' It was also fanned by the British annexation of the Transvaal in I877, by the dominance of British interests in mining and

commerce, and finally by the Anglo-Boer War. This unfortunate milestone in Afrikaner-British relations must stand

as one of the blemishes on British foreign policy, and as the high point in Afrikaner courage and endurance. When it was over, I55,000 men, women, and children had to be removed from concentration camps and returned to the land. This repatriation was literally 'to the land', since

many farms and houses had been destroyed. While houses had to be rebuilt and farms restocked, the people had to be fed and clothed, and those settling in towns and urban centres provided with jobs. In addi-

tion, there were some 33,000 prisoners of war, of whom two-thirds were in camps in India and Ceylon, St Helena, and Bermuda, who had to be returned to their homes and families. Many of these families, left destitute after the war, became the core of the 'Poor White Trash' with which the Union of South Africa was saddled for more than three decades. Neither they nor their relatives could look with any favour on the outstanding job of reconstruction done by Britain after the war.

George Rossouw, speaking of nationalism and language as uniting forces, states that the defeat and suffering of the Anglo-Boer War com-

1 Van Jaarsveld, op. cit. p. 2I4.



AFRIKANERS, NATIONALISTS, AND APARTHEID 537

pleted the unification at last of the Afrikaner people in the whole of South Africa into one nation.1 He explains this with a quotation from T. B. Muller's Die Geloofsbelydenis van n Nasionalis (The Confession of Faith of a Nationalist):

Just as a child best develops a self-conscious personality when he not only associates with children but also with adults, so our national self-consciousness appeared in full when we not only had to do with Kaffir tribes, but rather, with the powerful British nation as a whole. And was not the fact that the greatest empire on earth did not bring a small expeditionary force against us, but a large army, the best evidence that they respected us and regarded us as equal to their European enemies ? What many of us did not know ourselves, martial law taught us, namely, that we were one with the Republicans and had to suffer with them whether we wanted to or not. As if we were a nation, the enemy sought to destroy us altogether, with the result that we emerged as really one from the oppression. In suffering and anxiety our nation was born. The sword inscribed our birthmark upon our foreheads. The ruins of the two Republics became the fertile soil in which the new Africander Nation rooted itself from the Cape to Congoland and from German West to British East Africa.

Immediately after the war had been ended by the Treaty of Vereenig- ing (31 May 1902), the High Commissioner for South Africa, (later Sir) A. Milner, explained that, while it was no longer a war of bullets, it was still war. 'Time still remained for South Africa to be "made British now".'2 While Milner realised that the best way to avert further trouble was to grant independence to these new colonies, he feared that this would only create further problems. And so he concluded that 'too soon is also dangerous. We must increase the British population first.' Milner at this time was considering the immigration of from 3,000 to I o,ooo settlers. Here once again is the threat of foreigners being brought in to balance the population, to neutralise the nationalist ideals of a defeated people.

When considering South Africa and the attitudes of its peoples around the establishment of Union, it is important to keep Milner in mind. Since he represented Britain, his policy of attempting to suppress Afrikaner nationalism was interpreted as representing official policy from London. The opposition, which was natural, was as much against the danger of immigration as against the victors in war.3 The period between the war and the granting of self-government could have been used in various ways by the dominating power; Milner employed the

1 George S. H. Rossouw, 'Nationalism and Language' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1922), pp. 44-5.

2 G. B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa, Igo2-lg o (Oxford, I955), pp. I54 and 198. 3 R. H. Brand, The Union of South Africa (Oxford, I909), p. 12.




interval for anglicising and outnumbering the Boers. As G. B. Pyrah has put it,

Milner looked at the over-all question in the following light: the grant of responsible government depended, for safety, on the general political situation throughout South Africa. Natal and Rhodesia were safe in any case. But with the re-enfranchisement of the Cape rebels he feared a reassertion in that colony of political predominance of the Bond.' That would increase the risk involved in granting self-government to the Orange River Colony, unless a prosperous and loyal Transvaal could be absolutely relied upon to restore the balance. That he considered the key to the whole South African situation. The Transvaal must be made British in order to be sure of British political supremacy throughout South Africa. The High Commissioner directed his reconstruction policy essentially to that end.2

The Union of South Africa was formed on 3 I May 191 . At this time we note a strange dichotomy in the social structure of this independent political union. The white population was about equally divided between English and Afrikaner, and yet the former were primarily urban while the Afrikaners were primarily rural. This meant that most of the salaried officials, most teachers, and especially the mine-owners

belonged to the English-speaking part of the population. Mining might even be treated separately, since the owners were rich Englishmen rather than English-speaking South African residents. While political union was achieved, there was no union of the population.

For all practical purposes there were two population groups, which formed two sides of the political ideal. This division in the white

population was an important factor for nearly half a century. The

Englishmen or those of British sympathies could very well move to Britain without too great an adjustment. The Afrikaners, even then marked by national, linguistic, cultural, and religious features, would not be able to fit into the Dutch or other European cultural setting. They were already South Africans, not Europeans. The former group was English-speaking and, if possible, they sent their children to Britain for an education, and supported the Crown and the Union Jack, while

trying to return 'home' for occasional visits. These people were mainly in the towns and cities and represented the British administration which had for the past century attempted to anglicise the Afrikaner. The other was basically rural, from the stock of pioneers, farmers-and freedom-

fighters. They belonged to Afrikaner parties, such as Het Volk in the

Transvaal, which were organised to unite a young nationalism. They 1 This refers to the Afrikaner Bond, a political party formed in May 1881 in the Free State

aiming at unity for all Afrikaners in southern Africa. 2 Pyrah, op. cit. pp. I83-4.




spoke Afrikaans, even though they had to speak English if they wanted to get along in their own country. In addition to the policy of out-

numbering the Afrikaners, Milner had also decided that the denation- alisation of the Boers was to be accomplished through the schools.

Children, then, were educated in the English medium, and when they grew up and entered the labour market they had to speak English to

satisfy those who did the hiring. They were strangers in their own

country. As cultural continuity is assured or ruptured by what happens to

children, these young Afrikaners grew up with the idea of half-citizen-

ship, with folk memories of a century during which British administration had denied them their language and culture. Young people heard about the public hanging of five Dutch rebels at Schlachter's Nek

(i 815), the annexation of the Boer republics and especially of the South African Republic (1877), the Jameson Raid (1895), the war and the concentration camps (I899-I902), and now the frustrations of their elders. Brian Bunting has stated that the Anglo-Boer War left an indelible scar on the South African people.l While the Boer has risen to power in the Afrikaner political parties, he has neither forgiven nor

forgotten what the British perpetrated against his people during those

early years. Thus Rossouw points out that

the time is well remembered when pupils in the lower grades were severely punished if they dared speak their mother tongue during school hour or playtime...Africaans, the spoken language, was anathema to the English teacher... One thing, however, the educationists failed to accomplish. They failed to make English the spoken language of the Dutch. English, to be sure, became the literary language and the language of commerce and trade. But in the Africander homes Afrikaans persisted as the spoken language.2

During these early years of union, English was used in court and, although entrenched as one of the official languages, it was more important by far than the other, Dutch. A religious and church-going people, the Afrikaners did not even have the Bible in their language and, while the Rev S. J. du Toit had started the translation of parts of it, religious gatherings still used the old Staten Bybel in Dutch. In the South Africa Act of 1909 one section spells out the equality of the English and Dutch languages; only 16 years later was Dutch replaced by Afrikaans.

This does not imply that all English-speaking persons were anti- Afrikaner and vice versa. It is commonly accepted that, since the British had been the victors and had administered Milner's policies, they

1 Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (London, 1964), p. I6. 2 Rossouw, op.cit. p. 55.



forced out many of the conciliatory and compromising attitudes of the Afrikaners. When the Union was formed, General Louis Botha became Prime Minister as leader of the Het Volk party, but only two years later General Hertzog left Botha's cabinet to become the leader of those Afrikaners who would fight for equality, in theory and in practice, between Afrikaner institutions and traditions and those of the English. Thus was born the Nationalist Party, which became identified with Afrikaner language and culture.1 But this was nearly forced on the

Afrikaners, as Pyrah explains:

While Union, therefore, was fulfilled in the political field it experienced a more tardy growth in other spheres. Before either race could be expected wholly to embrace new South African loyalties, each would wish to see in them an assured and respected place for its own character and traditions. This, especially in the cultural field, the Boers signally failed to do, and in consequence their spirit of nationalism became intensified. On the British side, an extreme Unionist group showed little wisdom in its attitude towards the Boers, continually fanning the racialist flame. Instead of welcoming them into the great Anglo-Saxon brotherhood, those British regarded them with marked hostility. Having been from the first opposed to the Liberals' grant of self-government, they did not now trouble to conceal their distrust of Botha. True, their feelings were largely conditioned by the rash speeches of Boer extremists, and by the thought that they formed but a minority of the population as compared with the Boers. Even so, their intemperate haste in considering themselves as the only British-minded people in the Union and as having a monopoly of loyalty, and their provocative criticism of Botha, whom they chose to regard as planning Afrikaner domination within the Union and ultimate secession from the Empire, succeeded only in driving some of the moderate Boers into their own extremist camp. To propagate the 'Vote British' slogan at election time, to refer contemptuously to Afrikaans as a barbarous jargon, to express open resentment at the idea of sharing the Civil Service posts with the Boers-such activities were hardly destined to enhance a unity of outlook with their Afrikaner fellow citizens, and they provided Hertzog with ready ammunition for carrying on his campaign for complete equality between the races. 'Hertzog has been made by the Unionist Party.'2

Only once, in I914, did the diehard Boers rebel against Botha and

Smuts, whom they considered as traitors for being British-oriented. The rebellion was suppressed and the leaders, even though they had been Boer generals in the war, assumed the stature of British-oriented South Africans rather than Afrikaners. This action by Botha and Smuts seems

1 This should not be confused with the present ruling Party in South Africa, the 'purified' National Party, which was set up by Dr Malan in I934, after Hertzog and Smuts had amalgamated in the United South African National Party (S.A.P.).

2 Pyrah, op. cit. pp. 131-2.

BRIAN M. DU TOIT 540



AFRIKANERS, NATIONALISTS, AND APARTHEID 54I

to have contributed both to the growth of the opposition Nationalist

Party and to the establishment of the Afrikaner Broederbond. Alan Paton, in fact, suggests that Smuts, who served twice as South Africa's Prime Minister, 'began to lose the platteland in 1912 '.1 This platteland was the rural region, which was primarily Afrikaner-settled.

AFRIKANER APARTHEID AS AN IDEAL

In this atmosphere, which threatened their very existence, an Afri- kaner secret society was born. This was the Afrikaner Broederbond, which restricted membership to white males who spoke Afrikaans and were 'Afrikaner-oriented' in their values. It was also a society whose basic

philosophy set the Afrikaners apart from the rest of the people, and

especially from the British or British-oriented. This secret society was formed in 1918, originally as an organisation

called Jong Suid Afrika, and aimed at the general improvement of the

position of the Afrikaner as a language and culture group. Originally they were non-political, or at least pledged to abstain from the realm of party politics. Very soon, however, they were deeply involved in the party political struggle of the Afrikaner. In time this society became involved not only with the aims and ideals of the Nationalist Party but especially with its conservative wing. Elsewhere I have discussed the Afrikaner Broederbond and the role of its members in the power struggle of the Afrikaner in South Africa.2 The important point is that during these years of political and language struggle the Afrikaner, or at least his spokesmen in the cultural and language organisations, was realising that he would best achieve his position of power and dominance by setting himself apart from the other language groups in South Africa. I would suggest then that what we are dealing with is hardly diferent from Afrikaner apartheid. In this context then we can fully understand that the Afrikaners, and especially the Nationalist Party, which represented the political ideals of the majority of this group of people, developed a policy by which they could best achieve recognition of their cultural and linguistic unity and continuity. This recognition in fact was accorded to the other culturally and linguistically homogeneous groups in South Africa. Similarly, in time, we find the emergence of a policy aimed at self-preservation and continuity for similar ideals held by the non-white groups in South Africa. I am not suggesting that this was aimed first and foremost at the interests of the non-white groups, but in effect it

1 Alan Paton, Hofmeyr (Cape Town, I964), p. 511. 2 Brian M. du Toit, Beperkte Lidmaatskap (Cape Town, I965).

36



assured this ideal for the other population groups. While the United

Party, primarily a British-oriented party, called for a maintenance of the status quo, in which segregation and horizontal separation within South Africa would be perpetuated, the Nationalist Party developed the policy of apartheid. Granted that this was based first and foremost on self-preservation and self-perpetuation, it also allowed for national

development of the other population groups within the geographical confines of South Africa.

The policy of apartheid, originally ill-defined and vaguely conceived, within a decade gave way to a policy which allowed for the full national

development of African language and cultural groups within geographically defined regions of South Africa. Whereas Afrikaner nationalism initially aimed at the contrasting of Afrikaner (and South

African-oriented) with non-Afrikaner (and British-oriented), it in time

gave rise to the possibility of other groups finding national and linguistic self-expression. It is in this context then that we must see the emerging policy of geographical apartheid, which allows for a number of Bantu- stans or African national and language-based political states. This, state the proponents of the policy, will give rise to a number of independent political units, and will in fact prevent the repetition of a Congo- Katanga or Nigeria-Biafra type of confrontation.

A logical question has been raised: Why geographically separate areas for each ethno-linguistic group among the Bantu-speaking peoples, when all the whites, who represent different language groups, live together ? Why are there not separate regions for Afrikaners, English, Germans, Italians, and so on? The answer offered by proponents of

apartheid is, it seems, that Bantu-speaking peoples have traditional geographical, cultural, and linguistic areas, and these are being developed. The whites, though speaking different languages, are all resident in South Africa and should then be identified together. This argument breaks down when we look at the millions of Bantu in urban areas, for they are representative of the new African. It seems, moreover, that it would be politically less expedient to sub-divide the whites, since they already form a minority group. As the situation now exists the conservatives run the country and are insulated on all sides by the other white sub-groups.

THE AFRIKANER AND HIS VIEW OF APARTHEID

An important question which we should consider is whether the policy and application of apartheid is a static or dynamic one. In other words, are the Afrikaner's views of apartheid changing and, if so, in which direction ?





The political party that won the elections in I948 based their

approach on setting the Afrikaners apart from the other whites, and especially from the non-whites. Their policy was a negative one without any specific long-term programmes. Soon after this, two persons were drawn into the policy-making team of the Nationalist Govern- ment. The most important was W. W. M. Eiselen, a professor of anthropology, the other was a former professor of applied psychology, Dr H. F. Verwoerd. Together these two gradually moved the Government away from the status quo, stagnant policy of horizontal apartheid in the direction of a dynamic policy of vertical apartheid.

I shall not here argue the pros and cons of apartheid, nor the reasons and justifications given for keeping white and non-white apart. What I do suggest is that, given a final decision that there will be apartheid, geographical separation seems to leave more opportunities and long- term avenues for self-expression. And so the well-known Tomlinson Commission was appointed, and when it reported to the Government, J. G. Strydom, the Prime Minister of the day, and his planners hardly took notice of the document and its recommendations. The Government White Paper was issued and in a speech in Bloemfontein, Professor F. R. Tomlinson restated his conviction that it was essential to use European capital and talent to develop the reserves industrially, that tribal lands should be consolidated into large Bantu areas where individual landowners should live, and that the periphery and the interior of these reserves should be developed.' It is of some importance that all these points, rejected by Strydom, now form an integral part of the Government's policy.

Shortly after taking office as Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd introduced the Bantu Education Act, which among other things uses instruction in the mother tongue during the first two years of schooling. There were outcries over this and H. Khuthala declared, in an editorial in The Star, 'The retardation in progress that mother tongue instruction brings about is incalculable.'2 Once again it is of interest that educational planners internationally now recommend that in education the child should go from the known to the unknown. Mother-tongue instruction, in fact, is used from Singapore and Malaya to the American Indian. The important point, of course, is that the education should then gradually open up to enlarge the student's world and allow him increasing participation in a more international educational system.

Something of the same sort of outcries were heard when Radio Bantu 1 The Friend (Bloemfontein), 30 June 1956. 2 The Star (Johannesburg), 3 November I959.

36-2

543



was introduced in 1962 as a special service of the South African Broad-

casting Corporation. Why not let the Bantu listen to English and Afrikaans programmes? people asked. When should special programmes be designed? How can Bantu languages cater for the needs of literature, drama, and world news? In a recent editorial in The Star, Woody Manqupu surveys the changes in attitude and acceptance that have taken place. In 1962 Radio Bantu received 332,302 listeners' letters, in

1967 they received 3,412,694. Broadcasting in seven languages, it has a daily audience of over 2 million listeners, who own 2,II9,000 radio sets. On these programmes the audience hears anything from music and news to Shakespeare in Zulu. Plays by Bantu artists are also performed; for example, 'Nokhwezi', written and produced by the Zulu, Alexius Buthelezi. The S.A.B.C. entered it for the Prix Italia, where it received a very good reception and since then it has been broadcast by 12 over- seas stations, including the B.B.C.1

In any system or country we should differentiate between official

government policy and the actual thoughts, acts, and writings of large numbers of persons in the country. It was of some significance that the South African Psychological Association split over the membership of

non-whites, and this was not clearly along Afrikaner versus non- Afrikaner lines.2 Shortly after this the South African Association for the Advancement of Science refused to close its membership to non-whites.3 Here again we are dealing with members representing a variety of

linguistic, cultural, and political groups. In fact, it may be within the academic world that we find the greatest diversity. It was first of all academics and academically trained people who called from within the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs for talks and meetings with Bantu leaders;4 and most of them in fact were Afrikaners.5 It was also a

group of Afrikaner professors and ministers who wrote the highly critical and analytical studies such as: The Ethics of Apartheid, Suid Afrika Waarheen?, Die Trek is Verby, Vertraagde Aksie, and others. The last of these, also published in English under the title Delayed Action, was written by I I Afrikaans dominees representing all three Dutch Reformed

Churches, and was the culmination of a series of talks among more than

300 ministers in Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is important that all I authors were in one way or another connected with theological education in South Africa. In this book Professor B. B. Keet states: 'The

1 Ibid. 7 December I968. 2 The Friend, I6 June i962. 3 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 9 July I964, and Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 17 and

31 May 1964. 4 Rand Daily Mail, 2 April 1959. 6 Sunday Times, 3 May I959.





time has come for our Afrikaans churches to tell the government that the churches no longer see their way clear to support the apartheid policies and that better ways must be sought to solve our racial problems.'

We should keep in mind too that the Christian Institute, which is interracial and ecumenical in its charter and activities, was formed by an Afrikaner and is directed in all important aspects by Afrikaners. When the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church met in Cape Town in October I965, a number of committees were appointed to look into

specific questions, including 'mixed marriages'. The report submitted was given wide publicity in South African newspapers.l Briefly, the

Synod report concluded that the Holy Scriptures contained no direct commandment about, or prohibition of, the mixing of members of different races in marriage, which rested on the free choice of two

people. The Die Burger heading reads 'Racial Admixture not Pro- hibited'. This same position has just been taken by the Synod of the

Gereformeerde Kerk, the most conservative of the three Dutch Reformed

Churches, meeting in Potchefstroom.2 These are no great discoveries for you and me, but they are important statements in that country and are only some of the courageous things people are saying and doing in an attempt to change the attitude and behaviour of the general public.

THE CHANGING AFRIKANER

At the beginning of a new decade, with a conservative swing in both the United States and Great Britain, we might well consider the chang-

ing scene in South Africa.

According to the 1960 census data, by far the majority of whites over the age of I 5-who should be representative of those who have reached

voting age-are bilingual. Relatively few speak only Afrikaans, and less than I per cent, primarily recent immigrants, speak neither English nor Afrikaans. These data are set out in Table I.

It is of interest that in the 1970 census the question of bilingualism was not covered. Reviewing earlier census data, Dr E. G. Malherbe concludes that the proportion of Afrikaans-speaking people who could not speak any English has always been lower than that of English- speaking persons who could not speak any Afrikaans. The Afrikaners

traditionally were the more bilingual group, partly due to the history discussed above and partly due to immigration from English-speaking

1 E.g. Die Burger (Cape Town), 26 October 1965, and The Cape Argus (Capetown), 25 October, I965.

2 Dagbreek en Landstem (Johannesburg), I February 1970.

545



BRIAN M. DU TOIT

TABLE I

Persons 15 years and over Classified by Languagel

Number of Percentage Language speakers of total

Bilingual 1,654,661 79'48 Only Afrikaans 138,832 6*67 Only English 281,241 I3'5I Neither 7,202 0'34

Total 2,081,936 Ioo0oo

countries. Now it seems this trend was being reversed by 1960, and the

political and national isolationism was being reflected in the language people spoke. Newell Stultz suggests that the Verwoerd era in South Africa will be remembered for its 'politics of security'.2 This security was characterised by peaceful withdrawal from an increasingly more

challenging British Commonwealth and the establishment of the

Republic of South Africa; by the cancellation of South Africa's invitation to participate in the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 1964 and the organisation of the South African Games which imitated the Olympics in more

ways than just the programme and the eternal flame; by a growing international opposition to apartheid and its symbols; and by a Govern- ment whose members seldom went abroad and a Prime Minister who never left the country. Internal security, then, was accompanied to an

increasing extent by isolation from the outside world. The persons most

important in influencing what foreign policy was formulated were:

(I) Dr Verwoerd, (2) Dr Verwoerd, and (3) Dr Verwoerd, as Edwin

Munger has suggested.3 The result of nearly a decade of this kind of introversion may very

well be represented in the language situation shown in Table i. It was most certainly the cause of two opposite political developments among the Afrikaners, namely a growing confidence among the ultra-conservatives, and a growing dissatisfaction among the more outward-looking,

progressive section. Here are the roots of the verkrampte-verligte split which has been the subject of so much discussion lately. Here for the first time, perhaps, the traditional categories-urban-platteland, English-Afrikaner, Sap-Nat (United Party-Nationalist Party)-became

1 These figures have been compiled from the 1966 Statistical rear Book (Pretoria), p. A 30. 2 Newell M. Stultz, 'The Politics of Security: South Africa under Verwoerd, I96I-6',

in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), vii, I, April I969. 3 Edwin Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, 1965),

p. Ioo.

546




blurred. For the first time in the 1966 national elections, large numbers of English-speaking voters supported the Nationalist Party, which also

captured such normally safe opposition seats as Florida, Jeppe, Turffon-

tein, and Benoni.

Following the assassination of Verwoerd, his successor, John Vorster, did not promise much in the line of changes. Gradually, however, it became clear that he was looking beyond the restricting boundaries of the Republic. Fairly early on there were overtures to neighbouring African countries. 'The South African Prime Minister lunches in Cape Town with the black Premier of Lesotho; visiting black cabinet ministers are entertained in a fashionable Cape Town hotel; the green light for 1968 is given by Pretoria to South African non-White athletes to compete interracially in the Olympic Games." During 1969 there followed the break with Dr Albert Hertzog and the emergence of the ultra-conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party, who oppose geographical apartheid, immigration, English-Afrikaner co-operation, and especially Vorster's outward-looking policy. The Government responded nega- tively to pressures for racially integrated sporting teams and a visa

application by tennis star Arthur Ashe. The reason no doubt must

partially be ascribed to an increasingly schizophrenic South African Government-one that must woo leaders in neighbouring countries and foreign pressure groups while maintaining support at home, that must appeal to the English-speaking voter and less conservative thinker, while also assuring the conservative and semi-skilled white voter that he is not being endangered. As Hertzog and his followers challenged the Government from within, he was first relieved of his portfolio, then left the Nationalist Party under pressure from the provincial chairman, and

finally formed his own party. At an early stage Hertzog had the

support of 19 members of Parliament, but as Vorster called for early national elections this support dwindled. The National Party was

trying to win back what looked like growing popular support for the ultra-conservatives.

On 22 April I970 the elections took place. The electorate, 74'35 per cent of whom thought it important enough to vote, proved again that South Africa is basically a two-party system. Minority parties, such as the Democratic National Party, the National Alliance Party, the

Independent National Party and others, were crushed. The two minor

parties which political analysts were watching were the Progressive

Party and the Hertzog-led Herstigte Nasionale Party. The first of these 1 Rev. C. Edward Crowther, 'South Africa's New Look', in The American Scholar (Washing-

ton), xxxvii, I, 1968, p. 47.

547



BRIAN M. DU TOIT

contested 19 seats and got 51,760, or 3'43 per cent of the total votes cast, the latter contested 78 seats and got 53,763, or 3-56 per cent of the votes. For Progressive Party supporters this was heartening, since

they had improved from 3-Io per cent of the vote in 1966 and had

strengthened the single seat they held in Parliament. It seems that the

schizophrenic role of the National Party cost it votes among the more

progressive, among the English-speaking, and among the ultra-conservative voters, who supported Hertzog. The Government lost eight seats to the United Party, of which a large number are now marginal, including Sea Point, which the Progressive Party failed to gain by a mere 231 votes. Among the seats which were lost were Florida, Jeppe, Turffontein, and Benoni, which had also changed in 1966. In summary form the election results can be tabulated as follows:

TABLE 2

Number Percentage of Number of seats of seats Number votes in Parliament

Party contested of votes ? _? ,A_A-

1970 1970 1966 I9701 1966 1970

National Party I45 820,968 58-62 54'43 I26 II8 United Party 150 561,647 37'05 37'23 39 47 Progressive Party 19 51,760 3I10 3'43 I I Herstigte Nasionale 78 53,763 - 356

Party Others 15 8,365 1-23 0-73

Immediately following the election, newspapers supporting the Government editorialised on the 'Setback for the National Party', calling for everybody from party leader to regular member to give an account of themselves. Simultaneously, voters in Langlaagte, awaiting a by-election, were reminded of what had happened nationally, and Die Volksblad predicted a strong National Party showing.2 The National

Party retained the seat, but their majority was lowered to just over 2,000 votes, thus placing it in the marginal category for the next election.

The swing away from the governing party was generally noted, but in the fashion of the mule driver most Nationalist newspaper editors

put the blinkers on their readers, or tended to soft-pedal the results. One Afrikaans daily quoted statistics to 'prove' that the National Party had received a greater percentage of votes than in 1966. An English- language paper on the other hand quoted a total of 675,635 anti-

1 The figures, from The Star, 22 April 1970, were calculated before the Langlaagte by- election. 2 Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), 23 and 24 April I970.

548




government votes, without reminding its readers that a large number of these were in fact more conservative than the Government. Schalk Pienaar, editor of the Afrikaans Sunday paper Die Beeld, warned the Nationalist Government that they were too sure of themselves after 22 years in power and were not in contact with the voters. 'People are pushed around too easily', the editor stated. 'Swallow your arrogant pride and listen to well-meant criticism. If you do not you will be in much more serious trouble than you are now."

The Prime Minister stated that the voters had clearly given him a mandate and immediately made plans to finalise a visit to Malawi which for obvious reasons could not be made public before the election. Had Hertzog known that Vorster was planning an official visit to a 'black' country, he would have had more fuel for his attacks. Had the Government had the courage to admit honestly that more was being done with the 'outward'-looking policy than talking about it, they would almost certainly have received more votes. The post-election weeks also saw a South African Prime Minister, for the first time in a decade, visit Europe in an obvious attempt at breaking the isolationist, laager mentality of which his country had been accused. Here too was a notable change from the Verwoerd era, as Vorster was accompanied by his foreign minister, first to Rhodesia and Malawi, and then to Europe. It is just possible that the election results might force the Government to redefine the requirements for its 'politics of security'.

But where is the Afrikaner in all this ? It is quite clear that votes were not cast according to linguistic-group membership, any more than they were cast along lines of descent. It will be recalled that nearly 7 per cent of the people were unilingual Afrikaans-speaking, yet Hertzog got less than 4 per cent of the votes. The unilingual English speakers constituted about 14 per cent of the population, and yet the Progressive Party (which is frequently represented as a non-Afrikaner party in all respects) got less than 4 per cent of the votes. There is simply no way in which voting preferences can be correlated with other categories of the population. The Star, a day after the elections, noted this, when the editor commented on 'Nationalism's big myth', that all 'good' Afrikaners are Nationalists while the rest are opposition members, and that no worthy Afrikaans-speaking person would belong to the United or Progressive Parties.2 The editorial in fact concluded: 'We forbear to

1 Die Beeld (Bloemfontein), 21 June 19 70. 2 It is interesting to note that the names of successful United Party candidates included

Basson, Bronkhorst, Cillie, Fourie, Malan, Moolman, and Steyn, to mention only a few. One could also point to Erasmus, Swart, or van Wyk Smith among the Progressive Party candidates.

549



BRIAN M. DU TOIT

mention the number of Afrikaners in the Progressive Party for fear of

precipitating cerebral thrombosis in some of Nationalism's mass media commentators.'l

The complexity known as the Republic of South Africa is infinitely more complicated than loyalty groups based exclusively on racial, linguistic, political, and religious grounds. This is simultaneously its

problem and its salvation.

CONCLUSION

Recently the newspapers reported and the public contemplated the

red-carpet treatment of non-white dignitaries, judges, and representatives visiting South Africa. An African diplomat representing Malawi has been received and recognised by the public. As far back as I957 the Pretoria News, published in the conservative northern Transvaal, ran an editorial on 'Diplomats of Colour', when the Government was pre- paring to receive a senior official from Ghana, and declared that 'These

representatives must of necessity be accorded the same full privileges which apply to the representatives of other friendly governments.'2 One

rarely hears adverse comments made, even by the South African man in the street, about such officials or highly trained academic persons. The major fear one does hear voiced is that the uneducated, unsophisti- cated, and 'uncivilised' Bantu will aim at the same kind of social

mobility and interaction. But there is a growing recognition of the man who is educated and sophisticated, irrespective of his colour.

It is perhaps of some significance that the man who then was Minister of Defence (and is now State President), J. J. Fouche, in delivering the

Day of the Covenant address in 1964, sketched something approaching a 'New Deal'. It is furthermore symbolic and important that this new approach was discussed at Dingaanstad. Die Volksblad quoted from it extensively;3 and The Star reported that Fouche's 'New Deal

speech' called for a change of heart in race relations, the dropping of such terms as 'apartheid', and 'separate development', and the acceptance of 'separate freedoms' as the aim of government policy.4 This

speech was important, coming only a month after Dr Verwoerd had

said, in Heidelberg, that 'ours is not a problem of race: it is one of multinationalism'.

I want to conclude my article with these words, not because they were used by the late Prime Minister but because they were used by an

Afrikaner, a Broederbond member, a man who was basically instrumental 1 The Star, 23 April 1970. 2 Pretoria News (Pretoria), 7 November 1957. 3 Die Volksblad, I6 December I964. 4 The Star, I7 December I964.

550




in designing-rightly or wrongly-a policy by which different nation- alisms would find expression in different national areas. This then is the new way in which the Afrikaner, or perhaps more correctly the Nation- alist Government supporter, irrespective of language and cultural affiliation, is viewing apartheid. This concept no longer turns on race alone, as it once did. South African racism may be giving way to the recognition of the territorial principle and linguistic-nationalistic loyalties, and along with this may be permitting more human dignity and respect. Apartheid grew out of a survival struggle; but, as this struggle is overcome and the Afrikaner is assured of his place in the sun, apartheid too may gradually decline, assuring a place in the sun for each man. This is my hope and my prayer.



afrikaners, nationalists, and apartheid

Documents