56 ccfc opposiiton to sup ct rule 11 mtn

8/13/2019 56 Ccfc Opposiiton to Sup Ct Rule 11 Mtn

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-i-PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN

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Colbern C. Stuart IIIEmail: [email protected] Pacific Highway Ste. 102San Diego, CA 92110Telephone: 858-504-0171Facsimile: 619-231-9143In Pro Se

Dean Browning Webb (pro hac vice pending)Email: [email protected] Offices of Dean Browning Webb515 E 39th St.Vancouver, WA 98663-2240Telephone: 503-629-2176

Attorney for Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC, andLexevia, PC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA COALITION FORFAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BARASSOCIATION, et al.,

Defendants

Case No. 13-cv-1944-CAB BLM)Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo

PLAINITFFS OPPOSITION TO THESUPERIOR COURTS MOTION FORSANCTIONS

Date: December 19, 2013Time: 3:30 p.m.Courtroom:4C

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTEDSUBJECT TO COURT APPROVAL

Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1

II. DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................... 1

A. Authority ............................................................................................................... 1

B. The Rule 11 Motion is a Cut-N-Paste Version of Superior Court Defendants

Motion to Dismiss, Failing to Address Relevant Analysis ......................................... 2

C. By Posing the Rule 11 Motion on the Same Grounds as the Motion to Dismiss,

The Superior Court Doubles Down on the Merits of the Motion to Dismiss ......... 3

D. The Complaint Satisfies all Three Certifications ................................................. 4

1. Evidentiary Foundation of Plaintiffs Claims (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) ................. 4

2. Claims Are Presented to Remedy Injury and Effect Reform--Not to Harass,

Delay, Increase Costs, or Other Improper Purpose (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1)) ............. 5

3. The Complaint Seeks No Change, but Enforcement of Federal Law

(Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) ................................................................................................ 7

E. The Superior Court Lacks Standing to Assert Claims of Other Co-Defendants . 8

F. Counts Relevant to the Superior Court: ............................................................... 8

1. Distilling Relevant Counts ................................................................................ 8

2. Analysis of Remaining Counts by Each Ground of Attack ............................ 10

III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 21


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIESBaltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935) ............................. 17

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416, (1997) ...... 14

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 399 (1989).......................................... 14Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp.,835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987) ........................................... 2, 3, 4

Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 523 (9th Cir.1997) ....................................... 14

Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................ 14

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 (1996) ........................... 17

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999) 16

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)................... 14

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, (1986) ......................................... 14

Tadros v. State Bar of Cal., United State Supreme Court, Case No. 12-1438 (cert.

den. 571 U.S. __, (October 7, 2013) ........................................................................ 15

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.1996) ...................................................... 14

Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 98485 (9th Cir.2002) ........ 14

Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir.2008) ............... 14

OTHER AUTHORITIESCommittee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure146 FRD 401,

590 (1993) .................................................................................................................. 2

Sandra Equivocal Child Abuse (2013) ........................................................................ 15

The Quest for Justice in California (2013) .................................................................. 16

Whores of the Court (1997) ......................................................................................... 15

RULESFed.R.C.P. 11 ................................................................................................. 1 et passim

General Order 550 ........................................................................................................ 11


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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const., amend. VII ............................................................................................... 17

U.S. Const., amend. XIV ............................................................................................. 17


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Plaintiff opposes Defendant Superior Court, County of San Diegos1Motion For

Sanctions (Rule 11 Motion) as follows:

I. INTRODUCTIONThe Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion is off-target. The Motion is brought on

virtually identical grounds as the judicial Co-Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Complaint (Dkt#16) (MTD); a pleading-stage attack. The Rule 11 Motion simply

parrots the MTDbarely addressing the relevant issues in a Rule 11 motion

violations of the certifications required under Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1), (2), and (3). In

parroting the MTD, which is brought by all eleven judicial defendants, the Rule 11

Motion asserts arguments which are not relevant to the sole moving party in this

MotionThe Superior Court. This disconnect between the MTD and the Rule 11

movants creates an irascible confusion of arguments, evidence, and claims. Should

the Court venture to follow the untangling of the morass attempted hereinbelow, it

may conclude that the Rule 11 Motion is even less meritorious than the MTD brought

on precisely the same grounds. Such unfaithful hard ball litigation conduct is itself

unfaithful, sanctionable behavior. If at all, sanctionable litigation behavior thus far

has occurred solely among judicial defendants. See, Plaintiffs Mtn. Rule 11

Sanctions (Dkt#39).

II. DISCUSSIONA.AuthorityDefendants assert Rule 11 violations of three certifications relating to the

Complaint, that:

it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

1The Superior Court for San Diego County insists that it is erroneously sued in thatname; Plaintiff insists the name is correct. Because the official title of the Court isa key element relied on by one Court of Appeals decision in relieving the LosAngeles Superior Court of liability on Eleventh Amendment grounds, thiscontroversy is legally significant. For simplicity of reference and without concedingthe issue of official title, this defendant shall be referred to herein as The SuperiorCourt.


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unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation (FRCP 11(b)(1));

the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing

law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing

law or for establishing new law (FRCP 11(b)(2)); and

the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, if specifically so

identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for

further investigation or discovery (FRCP 11(b)(3)).

The Superior Courts Motion for Sanctions (Dkt#23-1) (Rule 11 Motion) 2:5-7.

Seeking Rule 11 sanctions concurrent with a motion in order to leverage the

motion is prohibitedindeed itself sanctionablelitigation conduct. Gaiardo v.

Ethyl Corp.,835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987). Sanctions are inappropriate where there

exists legitimate controversy. Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure146 FRD 401, 590 (1993). Simply adding a request for sanctions

without addressing the Rule 11 certification issues is itself sanctionable conduct:

The use of Rule 11 ... has become part of the so-called hardball litigation

techniques espoused by some firms and their clients. Those practitioners are

cautioned that they invite retribution from courts which are far from enchanted with

such abusive conduct. Gaiardo, supra at 485.

B.The Rule 11 Motion is a Cut-N-Paste Version of Superior CourtDefendants Motion to Dismiss, Failing to Address Relevant Analysis

The Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion undertakes no substantial analysis of the

three Rule 11 certification violations it asserts(1) improper purpose, (2) frivolous

arguments under existing or extensions of law, or (3) lack of evidentiary support.

Rule 11 Motion 2:5-7. The Rule 11 Motion is little more than a parroting of the

arguments in the judicial defendants Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Dkt# 16)

(MTD). The MTD is a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion directed attacking preliminary

pleading stage matters. As properly drawn (which the MTD is unfortunately not), it

cannot address controverted evidentiary matters. As such, ground 3, above


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evidentiary supportmay not be raised in either the MTD or Rule 11 Motion. All

such arguments in the Rule 11 Motion may therefore be immediately disposed of.

The remaining attacks of (1) harassment purpose and (2) frivolity suffer similar

disabilities. The Rule 11 Motion parrotspro haec verbathepleadingarguments of

the MTD, then welds a one-liner bald claim that thosepleading arguments also

establish a basis for Rule 11 sanctions. Compare MTD Dkt#16-1 Rule 11 Motion

Dkt#23-1. In simply welding a Rule 11 one liner to each of the Rule 12 attacks,

Defendants commit exactlythe hard ball leverage tactic admonished by Gaiardoas

independently sanctionable. See details per Rule 11 Ground hereinbelow.

Similarly regarding the frivolity grounds of Rule 11(b)(2), merely attacking or

even prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim is not sufficient proof of

frivolity. Where an issue is debatable, even if the moving party ultimately

prevails on the issue, Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate. More must be shown to

prevail on a sanctions Motion, yet The Superior Courts cut-n-paste tactic provides

no more reasoning for frivolity than the grounds it asserts in an attempt to prevail

on the merits. Welding the term is frivolous to the analysis does not cure this

defect. As such, the entire Rule 11 Motion directed to Rule 11(b)(2) is infirm as

directed to a standard of proof for the Motion to Dismiss (failure to state a claim as a

matter of law) rather than Rule 11s frivolity.

C.By Posing the Rule 11 Motion on the Same Grounds as the Motion toDismiss, The Superior Court Doubles Down on the Merits of the

Motion to Dismiss

Because The Superior Court has brought its Rule 11 attack on the very same

grounds on which it brings the MTD, it effectively doubles down on the Motion to

Dismiss. In this case, Plaintiff has opposed the MTD with a Motion to Strike

(Dkt#19) and Opposition (Dkt#21) asserting the MTD is meritless and attempting

improper procedure. Where a moving party brings a Rule 11 motion on the same

grounds as an affirmative motion, yet fails on the underlying affirmative motion, it


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cannot be heard to claim that its Rule 11 Motion was filed in good faithlosing the

underlying motion is at leastprima facia evidence that a concurrently-filed Rule 11

Motion on the same grounds is impermissible hard ball attempt to leverage a

debatable (or in this case meritless) motion. Gaiardo, supra. Thus, should the

Court deny the MTD, counter-sanctions to the Rule 11 Motion for impermissibly

bringing the Rule 11 on debatable (indeed meritless) grounds are warranted. By

aggressively posing a quick-trigger Rule 11 Motion on top of a meritless Motion to

Dismiss, Defendants have stacked their chips quite high.

D.The Complaint Satisfies All Three CertificationsThough Defendant fails to articulate discernable argument toward the relevant

Rule 11 certification issues, Plaintiff offers the following should the Court wish to

visit these issues.

1.Evidentiary Foundation of Plaintiffs Claims (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(3)Plaintiff STUART has conducted extensive investigation and research into

each of the factual and legal allegations of the Complaint over a period of many

years. The allegations of the Complaint are not created by a lawyer interpreting a

clients experiencetherefore giving rise to the typical Rule 11 duty to investigate

factual foundations of the clients claims. Here, the pro se Plaintiff is the client and

witness. Almost all of the facts in the Complaint are given on personal and

professional knowledge and experience. This experience includes seventeen years

practicing law in the States of California, Nevada, and Arizona since 1995, 96, and

97, respectively, and federal districts therein. Plaintiffs experience includes

litigation, trial, mediation, and arbitration of dozens of matters for a variety of clients,

including federal civil rights, commercial fraud, legal malpractice, and similar state-

court matters. Though Plaintiff is not a divorce lawyer, he is familiar with California

state practice and procedure generally applicable in all California Superior Courts

through seventeen years of litigation experience.

Through his personal experience with his own dissolution litigation and in


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assisting dozens of similarly-situated parents enduring modern family court

malfeasance, fraud, and abuse, he has become an informed observer of family court

practices at several levels. He founded Plaintiff California Coalition for Families and

Children to address those common concerns and provide a vehicle for domestic

dispute industry reform, education, and engagement toward those ends. Stuart Decl.

This experience, activism, scholarship, research, and personal observation is

described at 71-75, 77-99, 100-101, 110, 113-123.

This case is unusual in that fewfactsin this case will be in legitimate dispute

Plaintiff accuses widely-known, and increasingly widely despised, practices of public

institutions and private industry cohorts. Except perhaps for an answer to the

question why has such illegal conduct been tolerated for so long? few legitimate

factual issues will arise.

2. Claims Are Presented to Remedy Injury and Effect Reform--Not to Harass, Delay,Increase Costs, or Other Improper Purpose (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1))

The claims of the Complaint are presented not to harass, cause unnecessary

delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation but to remedy independent

injury caused during the course of Plaintiffs reform efforts, and to cure the systemic

affliction which Defendants have proven incapable or unwilling to cure for

themselves. CCFC and the parent community it supports have undertaken extensive

efforts prefacing the filing of this lawsuit to effect reform by other meansbut such

efforts have been unsuccessful, and at times met with violentresistance by present

Defendants and their cohorts. See, Compl. 124-136; August 20, 2013 Press

Release, Stuart Decl. Ex. A. The injury precipitating the STUART ASSAULT and

this lawsuit was orchestrated by Defendantsprecisely to frustrate Plaintiffs efforts

while engaged in such reform. Litigation is not a preferred choice, but as with many

civil rights struggles in our nations historyfederal courts are a uniquely

appropriate and often the last recourse to defending the interests of an afflicted

minority. Given Defendants tactics of abusing color of law police power to silence


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Plaintiffs efforts, remedy for injuries thereby caused are appropriate and uniquely

available in this forum.

The Superior Court claims that the inclusion of home addresses of certain

Defendants in the Complaint had no ostensible purpose other than harassment.

Rule 11 Motion 7:12-14. This is a misstatement of fact and law. Averment of where

an individual defendant "resides" or "may be found is an entirely ordinary and

requiredmeans to establish jurisdiction and venue within a federal district. 28 U.S.C.

1391(b). In compliance with this requirement, the Complaint avers the residence

address of Defendants Schall, Trentacosta, and Wohlfeil as they were readily

available from phone books, online records, online skip-trace searches, or other

public resources. No private records were disclosed. The practice of averring

residence or location of individual defendants to establish jurisdiction and venue is

not prohibited by any rule, order, or lawit is requiredby such. Plaintiffs

compliance with law and unremarkable practice in doing so in this action is

permissible, entirely ordinary, and has obvious appropriate purpose other than

harassment.

The Superior Court also incorrectly alleges that Plaintiffs refused to take any

steps to correct their violation. This assertion is a stunning and demonstrable

falsehood. The Courts files reflect that as a courtesyto defendants bellicose

demands that Plaintiff remove all addresses from the Internet and Court files,

Plaintiffs promptly undertook steps to redact home addresses from the Complaint,

removed the unreacted Complaint from its publically-accessible web servers,

coordinated the removal of the same from third party servers, and re-filed a redacted

version of the Complaint with this Court. Redacted Complaint, Dkt#8; Plaintiffs Ex

Parte Motion for Temporary Harassment Restraining Order, Dkt#4.

The remaining allegations of harassment motive in the Rule 11 Motion (Rule 11

at 7:17-8:10) do not support The Superior Courts claim that the Complaint was filed

to harass. The number of times the Complaint had been viewed on the Internet, that


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the Complaint also included home addresses of other Defendants which have not

objected and are not represented by The Superior Court or its counsel, and this

Courts courteous, yet not required, sealing of the original and redacted Complaints

to which no plaintiff objectsare not consistent with an intent to harassthey are

the ordinary and expected behavior of civil rights plaintiffs publicizing their efforts to

a nationwide community of similarly-situated domestic dispute industry professionals

and victim-litigants closely watching this case as an augur of the future of reform.

Further, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants post-filing take-down demands

coerced by threats of San Diego County Sheriffs Department Detectives acting

without warrant or probable causeto remove the Complaint from public locations

are legally indefensible, and themselves constitute further illegal deprivation of

Plaintiffs rights of free speech and access to courts which will be redressed in due

course. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs claim that such take down activity was illegal

and indeed reprehensible state censorship, Plaintiff undertook substantial efforts to

accommodate Defendants less-than-courteous demands. See Ex Parte Motion for

Emergency Harassment Restraining Order, Dkt#4.

Defendant has not shown a motive of intent to harass sufficient to establish a

violation of certification under Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1), and as such its Motion may be

Denied.

3. The Complaint Seeks No Change, but Enforcement of Law (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(2))The Complaint certainly asserts that a change in family law as practicedis in

immediate orderbut only to conform that practice with existing and longstanding

principles of state and federal lawscommercial, health and welfare, and

constitutional standards which are flagrantly disregarded by institutionalized

Domestic Dispute Industry public and private interests. To the extent that State laws

and practice are inconsistent with federal law, the Complaint properly and in good

faith prays for declaratory and prospective relief to conform or invalidate those

inconsistent laws and practices. Should Plaintiffs seeking enforcement of the


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fundamental liberties of some of our most vulnerable citizens be viewed as

harassment or bad faith by present defendants, the proper judgment day for that

proposition may and should await the presence of a trier of fact rather than be quelled

by improper use of Rule 11 hardball. See, e.g., Plaintiff, and millions of parents and

children nationwide, eagerly await that day.

The Superior Courts specific arguments regarding the merits of specific

Counts of the Complaint (Rule 11 Motion III.A.1-11) are addressed below.

E.The Superior Court Lacks Standing to Assert Claims of Other Co-Defendants

The Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion is brought only by the Superior Court,

yet the motion asserts objections as if all eleven judicial defendants and Mr. RODDY

are joined. Because judicial Defendants are represented by common counsel and

maintain substantial common interests, a joint Motion to Dismiss simplified pleading.

However, by carving out only The Superior Court to assert the present Rule 11

Motion, The Superior Court creates a disconnect between the two motions.

This disconnectapparently unanticipated by The Superior Courtcauses

substantial structural infirmities. For that reason alone, the Court may save itself and

all parties unnecessary frustration in parsing issues relevant to The Superior Court by

discarding the entire Rule 11 Motion at this point as incomprehensible.

Should the Court desire to endure an unwinding of The Superior Court from

the irrelevant Co-Defendant grounds for the motion, further analysis is attempted as

follows:

F. Counts Relevant to the Superior Court:An attempt will be made to distill the Counts relevant to the Superior Court,

and analysis will proceed thereon.

1.Distilling Relevant CountsThe Superior Court is a named Defendant only in Counts 3, 6, 12-15, 18, and 21,

RICO Claims for Relief 2-10, and Prospective Relief Count 2. By contrast, the Rule


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11 Motion attacks all Counts. It is necessary therefore to first dispose of any Rule 11

arguments or grounds related to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-11, 16, 17, 19, and 20, RICO

Claim for Relief 1 and Prospective Relief Count 1.

The remaining relevant Counts for purposes of the Rule 11 Motion are as

follows:

Count 6municipal liability; Counts 12-15 (1985(2), (3)(a), (b), (c)obstruction of justice based on the

facts of the STUART ASSAULT/CHILLING;

Count 18 CULPABLE breach of duty relating to municipal liability inCount 6), (supervision of DOYNE, INC.);

Count 3CULPABLE breach of dutya blanket allegation adding a levelof intentCULPABILE (defined in detail in the complaint) to each of the

other underlying Counts. CULPABLE intent establishes a foundation for

additional claims, remedies, and grounds for reliefsuch as a substantive due

process violation for the underling conduct, extreme and outrageous conduct

enhanced and punitive damages, criminal liability for federal civil rights and

predicate crimes under Title 18, United States Code. Pled as a single blanket

count applicable to other Counts, it provides notice of an intent to pursue both

ordinary or unreasonable intent necessary for one version of a claim (i.e.,

negligence, deliberate indifference, without probable cause) from an

enhanced version of the claim (intentional interference, emotional distress,

inducement to breach, etc.). Like intent generally, CULPABLE intent need not

be pled with particularity, and does not impact the underlying facts of the

underlying Count, and may thus be pled generally, and efficiently, in a single

Count;

Count 21False Advertising; RICO Claim for Relief 2Honest Services Fraud; RICO Claim for Relief 3, 4-10Witness Tampering and Retaliation;


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Prospective relief count 2Declaratory Judgment; Superior Court is also alleged to be an operative in Rico Enterprises 1, 2, 3, and

4.

2.Analysis of Remaining Counts by Each Ground of AttackStripping non-moving Defendants and irrelevant Counts from the 11 Grounds

asserted for the Rule 11 Motion impacts each Rule 11 Ground to a different degree

some fatally, others not at all. A suggested distilled analysiswhich is The Superior

Courts burden herefollows (quotations are lifted directly from Rule 11 Motion 2:8-

26):

Ground 1: CCFC and Lexevia's attempt to proceed in propria persona in

violation of the laws of the states in which they were organized and the Local

Civil Rules:

This attack is identical to the Superior Court Defendants MTD IV.A.1

(Dkt#16-1), and is opposed in Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt#19) II.B.5,

incorporated herein by reference. In short, CCFC and Lexevia are represented by Mr.

Webb, who is not yet admittedpro hac vicein this District. STUART is proceeding

to retain local counsel for both entities in compliance with Local Rule 83.3(c)(4) to

sponsor Mr. Webb. STUART appearspro se. (Declaration of Colbern Stuart in

support hereof). Defendants cite no authority supporting the claim that a party in

process of obtaining local counsel to sponsor apro hac viceadmission as grounds for

dismissal, and as such the same is an impermissible hard ball tactical use of Rule

11 sanctions.

Ground 2: Lexevia's pursuit of claims without the capacity to do so as a

suspended corporation

This attack is identical to the Superior Court Defendants MTD IV.A.2, and is

opposed in Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt#19) at II.B.5, incorporated by

reference. In short, Defendants confound capacity and standing under state and


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federal law. Lexevia is presently suspended for failure to file a Statement of

Information with the Secretary of State. The Statement of Information has been filed

curing the suspension. Stuart expects revival to good standing to occur within 90

days (Declaration of Colbern Stuart in support hereof, Ex. B). Because capacity

does not impact standing, Lexevias lack of capacity does not deprive it of standing.

As The Superior Courts argument grossly confounds the issues of capacity and

standing under both state and federal law, its Rule 11 Motion double down on the

same issue is an impermissible hard ball litigation tactic.

Ground 3: Plaintiffs' inclusion of the residential addresses of defendant

judicial officers in the Complaint

The Superior Count has no standing to bring this claim as it is only relevant to

certain non-moving individual Defendants whose addresses were identified in the

Complaint. The argument is also refuted by Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion for

Harassment Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt#4) incorporated herein by reference.

Should the Court wish to entertain this Ground even absent The Superior Courts

standing, Plaintiff submits that this Courts General Order 550 does not apply to this

civil case despite its close affinity to a criminal action. General Order 550 provides:

h. Privacy

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, parties must refrain from including, or

must partially redact where inclusion is necessary, the following personal identifiers

from all pleadings and documents filed with the court, including exhibits thereto:

5. Home address. In criminal cases, if a home address must be included only the

city and state should be listed.

Though Racketeering and the predicate crimes on which it is based are chargeable

federal felonies, and Plaintiffs have asserted 34 indictable federal offenses in the


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Complaint against certain Defendants, this action is not a criminal case (General

Order 550) in any ordinary sense of that term. Though Plaintiff may and does seek

punitive damages, and statutorily trebled enhanced damages, costs, and fees, it

cannot seek criminal sanctions.

Ground 4: Plaintiffs' filing of a frivolous, 1,300-page complaint:

This attack is identical to the Bucket of Mud attack in Superior Court

Defendants MTD IV.B and is opposed in Plaintiffs Opposition II.B, C, and

Motion to Strike (Dkt#19), II.E.2 incorporated herein by reference. In short, the

Complaint is admittedly complex, as it must be to plead to the extraordinary relief of

federal intervention in what is averred to be widespread institutionalized legal

consumer fraud involving Domestic Dispute Industry courts, attorneys, psychologists,

social workers, and bureaucrats nationwide. To the extent the Complaint is not a

model of clarity, Plaintiff apologizes to the Court and counsel should they take

exception to the Complaints form of pleading. The Compliant is draftedas

appropriateto give notice and with the expectation that substantial discovery will

be appropriate in fleshing out the notice provided in the Complaint. Defendants

insistence for more detail while simultaneously complaining of the Complaints

length and inclusion of supporting exhibits itself suggests unfaithful litigation

harassment and delay. If such is deemed appropriate, Plaintiff has proffered a present

ability, though no desire, to expand on the Complaint at length in an amended

pleading.

Ground 5: The Superior Courts Claim to Eleventh Amendment Immunity

This attack is identical to the Superior Court Defendants MTD IV.C.

Plaintiff provides analysis in the Opposition to the Motion To Dismiss II.A.2.C as

well as in the Opposition to the Commission Defendants Motion to Dismiss on

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, filed concurrently with this Opposition.

The legal analysis of both is germane hereto, and incorporated herein by reference.

In short, the Superior Court may not aspire to State level sovereign immunity


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on the present record. No Defendant in this action is named as the State of California

or an employee or agent thereof, Plaintiff disputes that any beneath State-level

Defendant is entitled to be elevated to State level status, and certainly no Defendant

has or may make such a showing of fact at this, the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. As such, the

Eleventh Amendment immunity attack fails as to all Defendants on the present

record, and the hard ball tactic of seeking to double down with Rule 11 sanctions

is itself sanctionable.

Ground 6: Plaintiffs' filing of claims against judicial officers and Mr. Roddy

in the face of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity:

The Superior Court has no standing to assert claims of judicial officers and Mr.

Roddy to quasi-judicial immunity. The Superior Courts cut-n-paste attack on this

Ground is an inexcusable miss. The argument is also refuted at MTD Oppo.

II.A.2.b, incorporated herein by reference. This misfire can be nothing other than

wildly misguided hard ball tactics subject to sanctions.

Ground 7: Plaintiffs' presentation of civil rights claims relating to the so-called

Stuart Assault at the family law seminar that ostensibly lack evidentiary and legal

support and are barred by the statute of limitations:

This Rule 11 attack is substantially corrupted by the standing disconnect

between The Superior Court and its judicial Co-Defendants. The Superior Court is

not named in each of the Civil Rights claims attacked in this Groundonly Count 6

(municipal liability), Counts 12-15 (1985(2), (3)(a), (b), (c) (obstruction of

justice/CHILLING), Count 18 (relating to supervision and municipal liability in

Count 6), and Count 3 (culpable breach of dutya Count adding an allegation of

CULPABLE intent (defined in detail in the complaint) to each of Counts above).

Because the Rule 11 Motion focusses primarily on Defendants and Counts other than

those relevant to The Superior Court, this section of the Rule 11 Motion is

irretrievably corrupted. An analysis of what can be distilled relating only to The

Superior Court is attempted as follows:


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The basis for The Superior Courts liability for all relevant Counts is the

independent acts or failures to act by a municipalitydescribed in the caselaw as

policy, custom, or habitactivity with an intent to deprive or acting/failing to act

in deliberate indifference to deprivationsetting in motion events causing

deprivation. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416,

(1997) (Souter, J, concurring). Municipal liability arises from the line of cases

beginning withMonell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658

(1978) and continuing through City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 399

(1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, (1986); Trevino v. Gates,

99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.1996); Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d

950, 964 (9th Cir.2008); Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984

85 (9th Cir.2002); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2003);Henry v. Cnty.

of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 523 (9th Cir.1997);Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d

1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011).

The foundation of The Superior Courts municipal and oversight liability is set

forth in the averments beginning with Compl. 9, 10, and those describing its

operations of policy and custom for oversight of other operations, including the

private commercial psychology enterprise (the Domestic Dispute Industry Forensic

Investigator Criminal Enterprise, or DDI-FICE; Compl. 284 et passim) and the

in-house Family Law Facilitators Offices (the Domestic Dispute Industry

Intervention Advocate Criminal Enterprise or DDI-IACE; Compl.281 et

passim):

9. Defendant Superior Court San Diego County (SCSDC) is municipal

entity chartered under and doing business in the County of San Diego. In

conjunction with the County, SCSDC operates facilities and judicial services at

nine San Diego County courthouses; creates and implements judicial policies,

customs, and practices administered by judicial officers, administrators, and

staff; and provides professional legal services and advice to the citizens of San


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Diego County, including services related to the practice of family law

divorce and paternity, custody and visitation, child support, domestic violence,

restraining orders, self-help services, frequently asked questions, form

selection and advice, and public information regarding court fees, rules,

locations, calendars, and proceedings.

10. SCSDC is part of a network of county courts governed by a 27-

member Judicial Council led by Ms. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice,

California Supreme Court. The Judicial Council is the policy-making body of

the California Courts and is responsible for ensuring the consistent,

independent, impartial and accessible administration of justice. The

Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is the support staff of the Judicial

Council.

These allegations also relate to The Superior Courts operation of the private

commercial psychology enterprise (DDI-FICE) and in-house domestic dispute

advocacy programs (DDI-IACE) described at Complaint 281-285. The Schemes

and Artifices to Defraud utilized by the DDI-FICE are disclosed at Compl.308-335.

Dr. Hagens publication Whores of the Court, Compl. Ex. 37,Equivocal Child Abuse,

Ex. 38, and the Petition for Certiorari in Tadros v. State Bar of Cal., United States

Supreme Court, Case No. 12-1438 (cert. den. 571 U.S. __, October 7, 2013); Compl.

Ex. 2, are also relevant to these allegations, and incorporated herein by reference.

As distilled, Ground 7remains to attack only allegations of (i) conspiracy

(Rule 11 MTN 11:12-20), (ii) class-based discrimination (Rule 11 MTN 11:20-22),

(iii) Definition of 1985(1) office, trust, position of confidence under the U.S. (Rule 11

MTN 13:22-23), and (iv) statute of limitations (Rule 11 MTN 14:1-11) involving The

Superior Court municipal and oversight operations described above. Remaining Co-

Defendants did not join the Motion and thus those lines of argument in the Rule 11


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Motion may be ignored, and their assertion considered impermissible hard ball and

unfaithful litigation conduct.

(i) Conspiracy: (Rule 11 MTN 11:12-20): Conspiracy allegations are

analyzed in MTD Opposition Section II.E.1, and M&C Sections III.C.2(f), III.C.3,

incorporated herein by reference. A conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime.

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999).

The conspiracy allegations of the Complaint need no creative mind to understand. A

simple walk through defendants own downstairs administrative operationsthe

Family Law Facilitator Offices (DDI-IACE) which counsels and facilitates illegal

DVILS ORDERS, paperwork, and enforcement (Compl. Ex. 1 and Exs. A, B

thereto); an illegal psychology enterprise (DDI-FICE) populated by fraudulent

forensic psychologists; to the legal communities which they participate inthe San

Diego County Bar Association and its Family Law Subsection (Compl. 4, 275,

Ex. 2) and the Family Law Community it serves (Compl. 71-73, 275-280, 320);

to the federally-funded quasi-public technical support and leadership corporations

it collaborates with on family law policy and operations levelsthe San Diego

Family Justice Center and National Family Justice Center Alliance (Compl. 262,

318, RICO Enterprises 2, 3, 4; Compl. Ex. 1); and to its leadership operations of Co-

Defendants Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Courts (Compl. 10,

13-16; Quest for Justice, infra.). An insightful public account of the history,

evolution, and independent control and operation of these entities is recently available

from former California Supreme Court Chief Justice and Chairperson of Defendants

AOC and Judicial Counsel Ronald M. George, entitled Chief: The Quest for Justice in

California(2013).2 Chief Justice George explicitly details how these defendants have

established themselves to be free from the micromanagement of legislators, who

dont understand how to administer justice.Id. at 453-454. For theater fans, A

2Supportive details describing the operation of these entities in collaboration with

their enterprise co-defendants is located at pp. 303-318, 380-81, Chapter 14, pp. 448-

459, 622-624, 660-665, 752-785.


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feature-length documentary entitled DivorceCorp (www.divorcecorp.com) to be

released nationwide on January 10, 2014 graphically describes the Domestic Dispute

Industry Criminal Enterprise detailed in the Complaint. The Divorce Industry, it

seems, is enjoying a new day in the sun.3

Defendants no doubt will assert that the accused operations, though highly

coordinated, are not illegal. Plaintiff will be prepared to present that case to a trier of

fact at the appropriate time. For purposes of the Complaint, however, the above

allegations of coordinated action to accomplish an allegedly illegal purpose satisfy

any relevant pleading standard for pleading conspiracy.

(ii) Class-based Discrimination (Rule 11 MTN 11:20-22): Class-based

discrimination is analyzed in MTD Opposition section II.E.2, incorporated herein. In

short, the Complaint describes four EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES which are

defined by existing precedent, state law, and de facto practice and effect. Compl.

193-200 and references therein.

(iii) 1985(1), (2) office, trust, position of confidence under the U.S. (Rule 11

MTN 13:22-23): STUARTs status under the United States is averred at Compl.

102-106 and analyzed in MTD Opposition section II.D, incorporated herein. In

short, Plaintiff has alleged facts describing his practice as an officer of six federal

Districts, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, law practice in Commerce

and Trade, Intellectual Property, and Health and Welfare litigation under federal law,

civil rights activism, published Constitutional and federal law scholarship, and related

engagementsincluding those that found this actionsufficient to give Defendants

notice of a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985(1) and (2). Defendants will no doubt

3"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.

Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient

policeman."Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67, (1976);L. Tarango Trucking v. Cnty.

of Contra Costa, 202 F.R.D. 614, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Fair Political Practices

Com. v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 132, 153 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);

Original publication: L. Brandeis, Other People's Moneyat 62 (National Home

Library Foundation ed. 1933)


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contest that assertion, yet their doing so at the Rule 12 stage is inappropriate, and

certainly insubstantial basis as a double down hardball litigation tactic under Rule

11. See, e.g.,U.S. Const., amend VII, XIV;Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman,

295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935);Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371

(1996).

(iv) Statute of Limitations (Rule 11 MTN 14:1-11): Statute of Limitations

issues for civil rights allegations are fully analyzed in Opposition section II.G,

incorporated herein. Plaintiff has requested leave to amend to aver facts addressing

this attack.

Ground 8:Plaintiffs' pursuit of civil rights claims concerning Stuart's

dissolution proceeding that are also untimely and barred by theRooker-

Feldmandoctrine:

The Superior Court has standing only with respect to Count 18; CULPABLE

Breach of Duty causing deprivations of rights under the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th

Amendments to the United States Constitution relating to the supervision of

Defendants DOYNE, INC. Compl. 216-252. The bankruptcy of theRooker-

Feldmandoctrine is explained at Opposition II.H and incorporated herein. Because

liability of The Superior Court follows aMonellanalysis, it is not premised on any

judicial act. Rooker-Feldmanis therefore further unavailable to this Defendant.

Statute of limitations attacks are discussed above. This section represents an

impermissible double down hardball litigation tactic.

Ground 9: Plaintiffs' frivolous assertion of a false advertising claim, given the

Superior Court Defendants do not advertise or sell services and are not

commercial competitors of anyone:

The Superior Courts amenity to suit as a State under the Lanham Act, direct

misrepresentations to legal consumers, and collaboration with Co-Defendants in the

same are addressed at MTD Opposition II.I, incorporated herein. This section

represents an impermissible double down hardball litigation tactic.


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Ground 10: the filing of Plaintiffs' factually and legally unsupportable RICO

claims:

Analysis of the RICO counts is set forth in detail in the MTD Oppo. II.J and the

M&C sections cited therein, incorporated herein by reference. This Ground is wildly

off-base, evidencing impermissible hard ball litigation tactics.

Ground 11: Plaintiffs' Pursuit Of Claims For Prospective Relief Without

Standing:

Analysis of the Article III Standing issue is set forth at the MTD Oppo. II.K

and detailed in the M&C sections referenced therein, incorporated herein by

reference. Plaintiff has averred sufficient standing to satisfy relevant pleading

standards.

In the event the Court wishes to consider The Superior Courts assertions

absent standing of Defendants not present in the Rule 11 Motion, Plaintiff

incorporates by reference the additional analysis relevant to those Defendants as set

forth in the sections of the MTD Oppo., Mtn. to Strike, and M&C sections referenced

therein.

G.An Award of Sanctions In This Case Would be An Affront to JusticeAny award of sanctions must evaluate a sanctioned partys ability to pay.

Christian v. Mattel, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F3d 1118, 1125, fn. 4. Rule 11 sanctions

should not be used to chill creative advocacy, or legitimate causes asserted in good

faith. See, e.g., Chase v. Auerbach, 1994 WL 590588, *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 26, 1994)

(rejecting the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on a litigant for advancing a novel legal

theory in attempting to move an action to federal court to consolidate case with another

pending case); Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

146 FRD 401, 587 (1993) (explaining that replacing the 1983 version of the rules

standard of good faith with the 1993 term nonfrivilous was not intended to raise

the bar on creative advocacy brought in good faith which might be chilled by a

higher standard).


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Though Plaintiffs vigorously deny that sanctions against Plaintiff are

appropriate and assert precisely the opposite request for relief, any sanction award

against plaintiffs in this case would be unjust. Plaintiffs are a public benefit

corporation and their members and advocates which, in the course of attempts to

facilitate the reform of voracious criminal enterprises, have fallen victims to the

illegal tactics of those very enterprises. Stuart Decl. . It would be difficult to

exaggerate the devastating impact of Defendants illegal activities on the resources

available to Plaintiffs to continue their reform efforts, including this litigation. CCFC

is not a commercial operationit has no revenue other than donations and the

generous goodwill of many dedicated volunteers. It is a community of victims of

these very defendants heinousacts of fraud and abuse, who have formed to recover

their losses, but more importantly to prevent that same harm from befalling others

unaware of the maze of horrors that awaits them once they step behind Defendants

doors. Stuart Decl. X.

The Complaint details Plaintiffs efforts in seeking attention and assistance to

remedy and reform an industry few deny to be a notorious dystopia, yet almost none

have the knowledge, concern, or courage required to attend. Government agencies,

politicians, and the commercial and pro bono legal community have universally

respond yes, its a mess, but we dont know how to fix it. Present Defendants have

responded with offers to absorb even more resources in wastefully returning to the

lawless maze of family court, or more often responded not at all. Stuart Decl.

As the intended benefactors of that dystopiaparents and childrenwhove

instead of benefiting from that system have fallen victim to it, we have valuable input

of what is wrong and how to fix it. Yet Plaintiffs wealth of experience, knowledge,

and suggestions is not equaled by a wealth of material resources to implement them.

Like most family court litigants, CCFC members left family courts with little more

than harrowing nightmares and a very bitter taste in their mouths which, though

highly motivating, are accompanied by a debilitating fear of further legal reprisal or


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financial victimization by the very defendants present here. By anticompetitive

meansincluding the violentmeans deployed against Plaintiffs detailed in the

ComplaintDefendants have effectively monopolized or blockaded all venues for

effecting reform through state-level machinerycourts, judges, lawyers, bureaucrats,

and psychologists collaborate to police a poisonous toll-based maze they themselves

built which outrageously extracts wealth from unsuspecting families by artifice, trick,

and deceit. Stuart Decl.

That wealth and power, initially earned by the honest hands and brows of

parents working to provide for their children, has by trick and device been converted

into the hands of some of San Diegos strongest law firms, hired to defend the

schemes that pay their billsand today returns to a new scene to use impermissible

hardball Rule 11 litigation tactics pick those pockets yet again, by means of new

rules in a new courthouse. Plaintiff prays for a new awakening to a new, healthier

day for plaintiffs and defendantsalike. If we desire respect for the law, then we

must first make the law respectable. L. Brandeis, Other People's Money(National

Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).

Any award of sanctions against Plaintiffs in this case would only further the

perpetration of what will be proven to be a shameful and fraudulent abuse of

knowledge of public processes and institutions, public police power, and tainted

wealth by those operating under a public license, oath, and duty to protect those in

their care. Sanctions would be an affront not only to a meager pocketbook, but to the

courage, dignity, and public spirit of parents and children nationwide, who having no

recourse to defenders such as those they face, have barely the means to defend

themselves. A sanction against these Plaintiffs in this action would be a sanction

against equal justice itself.

III. CONCLUSIONThe Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion is almost entirely unwarranted by existing

law, structurally incomprehensible, and wildly off-target. It impermissibly seeks


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relief for Co-Defendants not present in the Motion, argues their case but not its own,

pleads to the wrong legal standards and only summarily acknowledges the correct

ones, and is infected with the same meritless arguments of the MTD and

inadmissible, impertinent, and scandalous evidence that work is based upon. The

Rule 11 Motion is itself an inappropriate litigation hard ball double down tactic by

those intimately familiar with such schemes and tools of prevailing in high-stakes

litigation games, making sanctions againstThe Superior Court for its unfaithful

litigation conduct in the present Motion appropriate. The Superior Court has chosen

the stakes of the table it sits at. It should not be permitted to walk away from the

accounting.

Respectfully Submitted:

DATED: December 5, 2013 By: /s/

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,

California Coalition for Families and

Children, PBC

in Pro Se

Colbern C. Stuart, III


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have

consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the

court's CM-ECF system per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b )(2)(E). Any other

counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and/or first class mail this

5th day of December, 2013.

By: /s/

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,

California Coalition for Families and

Children, PBC

in Pro Se

Colbern C. Stuart, III

56 ccfc opposiiton to sup ct rule 11 mtn

Documents