Industry Description and Strategic Recommendations for CubeSat Market

By

The NewSpace Business Group

Eller College of Management, University of Arizona

Jonathan Card

John Fawkes

Erin Forsyth

ii

Table of Contents Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ ii

Table of Figures ................................................................................................................. iii

1 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1

2 Disruptiveness of CubeSat Market ............................................................................... 2

1.1 Description of Christensen Model ......................................................................... 2

2.1 Overview of Interview Results .............................................................................. 4

2.2 Interpretation of Secondary Research .................................................................... 6

3 Parties Showing Interest ............................................................................................... 8

3.1 Interested Industry Members ................................................................................. 8

3.2 Interested University Members .............................................................................. 8

4 Value Network Overview ............................................................................................. 9

4.1 Description of Value Network Model.................................................................... 9

4.2 Launch Providers ................................................................................................. 10

4.3 Component Vendors ............................................................................................ 13

4.4 CubeSat Communications .................................................................................... 14

Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 16

List of Interested Parties ............................................................................................... 17

List of Launch Providers ............................................................................................... 20

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Table of Figures Figure a. Characteristic profile of disruptive innovation versus the status quo in relation

to the market. Chart generated by authors to demonstrate relationships, not from

particular data.............................................................................................................. 3

Figure b. CubeSat component vendors .......................................................................... 14

1

1 Executive Summary

In this paper, the NewSpace Business Group explores the question of whether CubeSats

are positioned to be a disruptive innovation to the traditional satellite market. The specific

innovation under consideration is to approach satellite construction based on:

1. Off-the-shelf-parts and

2. The extensive use of standards to constrain design.

As the study progressed, it became clear that it may have missed the key point, which is

whether the design principles listed above are themselves the disruptive innovation and

whether the traversal up-market of that innovation would consist of those principles being

used in traditional satellite construction, rather than studying whether CubeSats in

particular could be a disruption to the traditional satellite market. There is evidence to

suggest that this is possible; the Iridium satellite constellation used many of these

approaches in the late 1990s. However, that conclusion will have to wait for another

study.

This study concludes that CubeSat technology may on some level be disruptive to

traditional satellites, but there is still a great deal of noise surrounding the emergence of

the new technology. Upon analysis of the technology itself, there is still a dearth of data

points to effectively analyze its emergence. The intent of this study is to outline methods

of further analysis that could be pursued to resolve these questions.

The main concern is still that there are no commercial customers that use CubeSats in a

commercial setting. The market still seems dominated by research organizations. This

could be because there still remain elements of the value chain that do not have candidate

disruptions. The launch provider market has speculated about a number of launch

paradigms, namely Interorbital, Virgin Galactic, and XCOR, but these have not yet begun

in earnest and the existing launch platforms may not be able to serve CubeSats effectively

in their own paradigm. The component vendors are still ambiguous whether they fit a

new value network, and the existing regulatory structure surrounding space

communications poses a difficult hurdle for this new paradigm.

CubeSats could represent a new way of moving forward with spacecraft production It is

interesting, important, and potentially profitable to watch this phenomenon unfold in the

marketplace and we attempt here to outline the important factors to monitor of the next

several years.

2

2 Disruptiveness of CubeSat Market

The writers have taken as their belief that the CubeSat market is potentially disruptive not

because the size of the CubeSat is itself important, but that the standardization of parts

and protocols allows for a different paradigm of satellite design. By standardizing on

shape, weight and dimension, the satellite designer is able to make inefficient design

decisions based on decent assumptions and indirect sales channels to suppliers and

complementary services rather than efficient design decisions based on extensive, and

expensive, research and direct sales channels. Our principal interest is in this design

paradigm, but we have adopted the disruptive nature of CubeSats themselves as an easier

proxy for the disruptive nature of the paradigm. In conversations with our sponsor, we are

questioning whether a better comparison would be whether the CubeSat market is

capable of disrupting the traditional approach when applied to other kinds of nanosats.

We cannot yet conclude whether CubeSats are capable of disrupting the satellite market.

In some cases our limited resources prevent us from applying the model to the current

market due to a lack of information. However, one of the key factors in the study is the

complete lack of an identified initial market for CubeSats. The question of disruption of a

given innovation is determined by its capability to transcend from a “toy” technology to

replacing the existing technology paradigm. CubeSats have not demonstrated that they

are even a toy in the commercial market. There are at least two statements that can be

taken as null hypotheses that have not been rejected and it is not clear which should be

taken as the null hypothesis to our problem:

1. CubeSats are not disruptive to the satellite market;

2. The CubeSat paradigm could be disruptive, but the particular standards adopted

are incorrectly specified;

3. The CubeSat paradigm could be disruptive, but less than the entire value network

(discussed below) has yet had the new paradigm applied to it, erecting a barrier to

the development of any CubeSats.

Belief in hypothesis 2 may be driving the development of the TubeSat standard being

driven by Interorbital Systems and questions whether the new paradigm should be

applied to larger satellites as an extension of the work begun by Iridium in the late 1990s.

Belief in hypothesis 3 is a valid source for further inquiry that could be very rewarding.

1.1 Description of Christensen Model

The fundamental profile of a disruptive innovation, as described by Dr. Christensen of

Harvard University, is when the trajectory of improvement of an inferior, or simplified,

technology that has non-traditional benefits is steeper than the trajectory of increasing

technology requirements by the majority of the consumers of the technology. The

principal characteristics, therefore, of a disruptive innovation are not of the innovation

itself, but of the consumers of the innovation. These characteristics are:

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1. The disruptive innovation is currently perceived as inferior to the traditional

innovation,

2. The disruptive innovation is improving according to the characteristics used to

evaluate the traditional way of doing business faster than the marketplace is

demanding improvement in the traditional way of doing business, and

3. There exists a current market that is underserved or not served by the traditional

technology

This last characteristic is to provide a market for the disruptive technology to sell into

until it disrupts the traditional way of doing business.

The typical representation of a disruptive technology is a graph like in Figure a.

Growth of a Disruptive Technology

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Year

Te

ch

no

log

y c

ap

ab

ilit

y

TraditionalInnovation

Demand,Std DevHigh

Demand,Median

Demand,Std DevLow

DisruptiveInnovation

Figure a. Characteristic profile of disruptive innovation versus the status quo in relation to the

market. Chart generated by authors to demonstrate relationships, not from particular

data.

The market demand is characterized by a distribution because not all customers desire the

same level of technological complexity; currently, they are likely served by buying

technology similar to the state-of-the-art in form and function, but at reduced

functionality. In year 0, this is their only option as the best incarnation of the disruptive

innovation has even less capability than the low-end incarnation of the traditional way of

doing business. However, the rate of improvement of the disruptive innovation’s

capabilities is greater than the increase in the customers’ needs and, in year 2, the best the

disruptive innovation can offer surpasses what the median of the market requires. This

does not constitute a “tipping point” except insofar as there is often a moment when the

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larger market becomes aware of the encroachment of the new innovation; the disruptive

technology has been increasing its ability to serve more and more of the market gradually

for the entire period, serving the “long tail” of customers whose needs are far below the

median.

Note: Despite Figure a, we do not assume that the distribution of the

market’s demand for technological complexity is normally distributed. As we

are principally interested in market share and number of sales, the measure

of the center of the distribution that we will be using is the median of the

distribution, not its mean.

Notice that the disruptive innovation does not necessarily disrupt the entire market. It is

not necessary for the innovation to have any particular rate of improvement relative to the

traditional technology, and the traditional technology can be assumed not to increase

faster than there are any customers who desire that level of sophistication. In Figure a, the

rate of improvement of the disruptive technology is equal to the increase in demand for

technological complexity of those customers one standard deviation from the mean.

Neither these customers nor the technology vendors who serve them will be disrupted by

the new technology. For example, while the desktop computer was disruptive to the

majority of the minicomputer and mainframe markets, manufacturers who manufacture

very high-end computers to serve very particular customers continue to exist, such as

Cray. It does not negate the disruptiveness of the desktop to admit that Cray will never go

the way of Digital, because Digital served the median niche and Cray served the

undisrupted high-end niche. By the same token, transistors disrupted vacuum tubes from

the bottom in a similar way, but with a trajectory of improvement that was greater than

the improvement of vacuum tubes; there is no high-end vacuum tube market remaining.

What are not depicted in Figure a, are the factors that create value for those customers

who do not value the typical market measures of value; that is, those customers who

demand technology that performs significantly below the market median.

To establish the disruptiveness of CubeSats, therefore, we will be charting the

technological demand in the major drivers of value in traditional satellites, as measured

by the median capability purchased in a given year, against the increase in capability in

those measures that CubeSats have demonstrated in that year.

2.1 Overview of Interview Results

We established the following characteristics as integral to determining the sophistication

of a satellite system:

1. The power system,

2. The precision of the attitude control (that is, the ability to reliably focus the

satellite along a particular vector in 3-dimensional space), and

3. The complexity of the propulsion system.

These results were gathered through interviews with high-ranking executives of

companies that manufacture mid-range satellite systems and operate significant satellite

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constellations. Given that the manufacturers and the satellite operators were remarkably

similar in their characterization of the important factors in assessing satellite systems, we

decided to move forward with the secondary research.

We did not have the ability to conduct a survey to quantify the extent of industry

agreement that these characteristics were important due to our limited budget and access

to industry members. Therefore, we can only testify to the existence of these

characteristics as a concern; the significance of these characteristics, the relative

importance of these characteristics, and the possible existence of other important

characteristics are left to the reader to establish to their satisfaction

One source of value that was raised by the interview subjects was attitude control. The

degree of reliable accuracy when directing the satellite to a particular orientation, usually

with respect to a point on the surface of the Earth, was a large source of value in a

satellite. This extended to the level of vibrations caused by moving parts, or “jitter”. An

example of a high-value satellite in this respect was commercial remote sensing satellites

like Digital Globe’s satellites. They required a high degree of precision so that they could

generate full coverage of the Earth in as few orbits as possible with a high resolution,

which limited the footprint of the orbit on the surface of the Earth. This combination of

requirements led to the functional requirements that subsequent orbits must have minimal

overlap, leading the orientation precision of the camera to have very tight tolerances, and

the camera must be capturing continuously as the solar panels reorient to track the sun,

leading the bearings and actuators controlling the solar panels to offer sufficiently low

vibrations that they do not blur the photographs taken in high telephoto.

Another source of value that was raised by the interview subjects was propulsion. The

sophistication of the propulsion system grew in a non-linear fashion as the requirements

of the system grew in complexity. That is, it did not grow by a metric such as thrust per

kilogram of satellite mass. Some satellites can be placed in orbit and left alone without

propulsion. Some require the ability to relight, but are not interested in efficiency and

thus can use hypergolic propellants, which do not require an ignition system. Some may

require the ability to change orbits completely on their own and therefore need greater

efficiency; these may upgrade to LOX-hydrocarbon systems that require an ignition

system. Still others may require such high efficiencies that they use cryogenic fuel

systems, which store propellants at near 0 Kelvin and thus have complex cooling

systems.

A third source of value that was raised was power. Some satellites, such as

telecommunication satellites have large power requirements. The data transmission speed

from a telecommunications satellite is governed by the frequency upon which they

transmit, the width of the frequency band, and the strength of the signal on the Earth’s

surface when transmitted down. Improving each of these increases the power needs of the

satellite. As the only source of energy to a satellite in space is solar power, this puts a

heavy burden on the designers to increase solar power efficiency and decrease power

requirements from other systems.

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We expected weight to be a significant factor in the design of a satellite. However, the

results were mixed. Those in manufacturing said that weight was usually given to the

manufacturer as a design constraint set by the customer’s budget, which had dictated the

model of launch vehicle to be used. This decision set the maximum weight limit of the

satellite with very low marginal cost for variations in the weight below that maximum.

Therefore, the weight of the satellite was not considered to be a major consideration

within that constraint. The satellite operator, which designed and manufactured a great

deal of their satellites internally, started with industry cost-per-pound estimates for the

various launch vehicles and a rule-of-thumb which said that 50% of the budget of a

satellite is in launch. This in combination with their budget generated the weight target

for each satellite in the constellation, which settled the question of the launch vehicles.

This then drove the maximum weight limit and the other concerns asserted themselves.

These different methods do not necessarily conflict if we assume that the operators

contracting the manufacturing firms had gone through a similar process before

contracting with them.

2.2 Interpretation of Secondary Research

Having identified the factors that establish value in traditional satellites, we can establish

whether CubeSats may be disruptive by analyzing trends in CubeSats’ capabilities in

these areas to see if they overtake the market median.

Power System

Our initial belief that this will be the easiest factor to measure was mistaken. While we

were able to form a survey of traditional satellites launched in the last 10 years, we were

not able to determine the wattage of their power systems.

However, the solar panel industry has experienced radical improvements in recent years

due to government subsidies and growing markets in the third- and second-world

countries. These improvements in the off-the-shelf equipment that CubeSat

manufacturers are likely to purchase in the dominant design pattern gives strong reason to

believe that it is possible. It seems unlikely that, with the exception of telecommunication

satellites and their increasing desire for increased bandwidth, the power needs of

satellites are growing at the same rate that the underlying technology is improving.

Precision of Attitude Control

We have discovered a number of attitude control systems for CubeSats, from hysteresis

rods to magnetorquers. However, we haven’t discovered sources for the degree of

accuracy demonstrated on either the systems on the CubeSats or on traditional satellites;

however this is an area of active development. In the last 5 to 10 years, the number of

CubeSats with attitude control and the increasing sophistication of these systems has been

clearly evident.

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Complexity of the Propulsion System

This characteristic was the most difficult to measure accurately. We did not receive

strong guidance on what this means, but we believe that it means the nature of the

propulsion system itself. The difficulty is that there does not seem to be a universally

comparable metric to compare propulsion systems. Different applications of satellites

require different families of propulsion technologies of varying sophistication. For

instance, while some satellites may not require any propulsion or only a single burn to

achieve the desired orbit, others may require low-thrust for “station keeping” activities, in

which case a Hall thruster system may be sufficient. Others still may require the ability to

change orbits completely, so a chemical rocket with relight capability may be necessary.

Still others may require very high efficiency, leading to a choice of cryogenic fuels with

the subsequent need for complex cooling systems. These options all are of increasing

capability, but are difficult to compare properly in the method outlined in the section

describing disruption measurement.

The proper research tool to investigate this would be a conjoint analysis. We wanted to

do an analysis where features such as ion acceleration, relighting a chemical rocket,

cryogenic fuels, and other characteristics of satellite propulsion systems were identified

and then an orthogonal set of sample propulsion systems were presented to each of a set

of experienced satellite product leaders, who would then be asked to sort the systems in

order of increasing complexity or difficulty. The relative loss of rankings associated with

changes in feature sets would provide us with a means of assigning importance to each

feature, which could then be used to score propulsion systems on actual satellite launches

over the past years. Trends in these scores would provide us with the median market

demand for propulsion system complexity.

However, this analysis does not seem necessary, as there are not a significant number of

examples of propulsion technologies in CubeSat systems to compare those trends. We

have found records of one system, the CanX-2 from the University of Toronto, with a

record of a propulsion system but we have not been able to identify whether it was

successful.

We do not believe this indicates that CubeSats are not disruptive. Just as in statistics, the

entire population should be treated as a sample of the complete theoretical population, the

fact that no CubeSat systems have yet to be built with propulsion does not indicate that

no system could possibly be built. It is expected that the un-served and under-served low-

end markets would be the first served by a disruptive technology, and this includes

simple systems that do not require propulsion. While we do not have sufficient data to

identify a trend and make a conclusion whether the increase in CubeSat propulsion

capability is improving faster than the market need for traditional satellite propulsion

systems, we cannot discount it, either.

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3 Parties Showing Interest

The background research into the list of entities provided by the National Reconnaissance

Office did not reveal interesting results. The universities provided were all U.S. schools

and the companies are mostly defense contractors. It seems clear that this list only

includes organizations that have worked with the U.S. government; it does not appear to

be a representative sample of the industry.

Based on a more general survey of the record of actual CubeSat launches, there has been

limited commercial interest except for Aerospace Corporation and Boeing, who launched

demonstration CubeSats in 2007.1 These CubeSats were platforms for demonstrating

components.

3.1 Interested Industry Members

A preponderance of companies manufacture sensors & communications equipment.

Almost entirely military contractors, this list was probably only meant to include

companies that have worked with the NRO. That selection bias may limit the utility of

this data.

3.2 Interested University Members

Out of 50 schools listed, the Academic Ranking of World Universities ranks 17 of them

in the top 100 universities worldwide. Several of the remainder are ranked between 100

and 200, but the exact rank could not be determined. Also, several schools on the list are

excellent but are unranked simply because they are too small or specialized. It should

also be noted that this list only included U.S. universities, although foreign universities

also participate in CubeSat projects.

1 <http://mtech.dk/thomsen/space/cubesat.php> Accessed 04/16/2010. This site is a very

useful survey of CubeSat launches up until mid-2009. It’s author is unknown, but it

includes all CubeSats our research has revealed, and more.

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4 Value Network Overview

The findings from the analysis of the value chain in the CubeSat market is that there are

companies that might be forming a separate value network from the traditional satellite

market. There are launch providers such as Interorbital, Virgin Galactic, and XCOR that

might be forming launch providers for nanosatellites and CubeSats. However, their

success in competition with the efforts of companies like SpaceX to service nanosatellites

is not yet certain. CubeSats are principally constructed by companies that do not typically

supply parts to space technologies, although the parts are typically used in non-space

technologies. These could also be considered a separate value network from traditional

satellites, though they are not separate value networks from other types of technologies.

This ambiguity gives a suggestion that CubeSats may be emerging with this characteristic

of an innovation that could disrupt traditional satellites.

4.1 Description of Value Network Model

Dr. Christensen describes a phenomenon in the value chains of disruptive innovations

that he calls a “value network”.2 The phenomenon suggests that the general model of the

value chain in a disruptive innovation is identical to that of the traditional way of doing

business, but that it will consist of different firms from those which supply the traditional

way of doing business.

For example, the desktop computer was disruptive to the market supplied by

minicomputers. Both desktop computers and minicomputers had hard disk drives, but the

minicomputers contained 8” drives and desktop systems had 5¼” drives. Ultimately, the

5¼” drive systems were disruptive to the 8” drive market. The same held true for other

components of the computer system markets. The same forces that kept out the vendors

of traditional ways of doing business from adopting the disruptive innovation, such as the

unknown market size and initially low sales estimates, prevent the component vendors

from investing in the necessary capital to supply the disruptive technology. Therefore,

new firms that can thrive on low absolute numbers of sales can supply the disruptive

technology.

It is not clear whether all components must come from separate vendors for an innovation

to be considered disruptive. If separate value networks arise, that seems to be compelling

evidence. However, it is not clear that some components that are commercially available

for other industries cannot be used in the disruptive technology. Good examples of this

are not forthcoming.

2 Christensen, Clayton M. Innovator’s Dilemma. New York: Collins Business Essentials,

1997. p. 36.

10

Below, we explore the value chain of the CubeSat market to determine whether there is

evident of a separation of the value networks supplying CubeSats and traditional

satellites.

4.2 Launch Providers

Currently, the same companies that launch traditional satellites launch CubeSats with one

notable exception. Due to their small size, CubeSats typically share launch vehicles with

larger satellites. It is generally impossible to fill an entire launch vehicle with CubeSats,

though this could change if CubeSats become more common in the future. CubeSat

launch providers include government agencies, government-owned corporations, and

private corporations, both old and new.

Overview of Launch Providers

Government launch providers so far include NASA and the ESA, and in the future are

likely to include the Chinese space agency. NASA is restricted from undercutting the

American private sector by offsetting the cost of competing with the private sector with

taxpayer monies3 and this is expected to prevent it from being a major competitor in the

CubeSat launch industry if and when commercial launch options become widely

available. The Russian Federal Space Agency is also unlikely to compete heavily and

directly in the CubeSat launch industry, as this would bring it into competition with ISC

Kosmotras, of which it owns half.

ISC Kosmotras is the primary government-owned corporation in the CubeSat launch

market. It is a joint venture between the Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakh governments. It

launches primarily out of the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, but also out of a new

base in Russia, Dombarovsky, just north of the Kazakh border. It has launched several

vehicles carrying CubeSats from this site. In 2006 it suffered a launch failure that

destroyed 14 CubeSats,4 potentially damaging its reputation, but that has not stopped it

from receiving more business. ISC Kosmotras uses rockets converted from

decommissioned Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs, allowing it to

reduce costs when compared to purpose-built rockets. It has roughly 150 ICBMs in stock

that are projected to be useful until 2020. After this, however, it will need to find a new

type of rocket to use, and may lose the cost advantage of using converted ICBMs.

There are several private corporations offering CubeSat launch services, and more are

likely to enter the market in the near future. Space Exploration Technologies Corporation

3 Reference to this regulation is made here

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1985/03/Government-Obstacles-to-the-

Commercial-Use-of-Space> by The Heritage Foundation, but we have still be unable

4 Clark, Stephen. Russian rocket fails: 18 satellites destroyed.

<http://mtech.dk/thomsen/space/cubesat.php#3> Accessed 04/25/2010.

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(SpaceX) has attempted CubeSat launches in the past several years.5 A string of early

failures damaged its reputation, but in 2008 it conducted the first successful launch of a

privately funded, privately developed orbital launch vehicle. It has only made one other

launch since then, but has several on the way. If the next few launches are also

successful, SpaceX will likely become a leading competitor in the CubeSat launching

market.

Orbital Sciences Corporation is another private corporation that is just now entering the

CubeSat launch market. Like ISC Kosmotras, it uses converted (American) ICBMs as

launch vehicles. OSC has been operating launch vehicles for close to 20 years. It is not

focused on the micro-satellite market, but also launches large satellites as well producing

anti-ballistic missiles. Its Minotaur IV launch system is scheduled to make a CubeSat

launch in May 2010, but OSC has also launched CubeSats as far back as 2006 on older

rockets.6

Interorbital Systems is a relatively new company, founded in the U.S. in 1996, which is

developing a small rocket for launching small satellite payloads, as well as a series of

larger rockets that can be used for human spaceflight or cargo. It is developing a new

method of launching rockets at sea, which has the potential advantages of lower

regulatory hurdles, greater safety, flexibility of launch site, and added launch velocity due

to launching from directly on the equator. Interorbital Systems is also notable for

vertically integrating into the nanosatellite market; it has recently offered the TubeSat

satellite bus for sale at a price of $8000. The TubeSat is not a CubeSat, but is slightly

smaller and tube-shaped, and close enough in size that it would largely serve the same

customers as CubeSats.

ISIS is another company that deserves mention as a launch broker, rather than a launch

provider. ISIS is primarily a maker of small satellite (sub)systems, but also offers to act

as a launch broker for its customers, taking on the task of finding a launch provider, a

launch time, and negotiating a launch contract, which it bundles into a service package

with the components it produces for its customers.

Virgin Galactic has expressed interest in augmenting their tourism business model with a

business focused on launching small satellites, which would include CubeSats.7 This

5 Chin, Alexander, Roland Coelho, Lori Brooks, Ryan Nugent, Dr. Jorgi Puig-Suari.

Standardization Promotes Flexibility: A Review of CubeSats’ Success.

<http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS6/SESSIONS/SESSION%20IV/4006_CHI

N/4006P.pdf> Accessed 04/25/2010.

6 Michael’s List of CubeSat Satellite Missions.

<http://mtech.dk/thomsen/space/cubesat.php#Solo2> Accessed 04/25/2010

7 David, Leonard, Virgin Galactic Deal Targets Small satellit Launches, Space.com

<http://www.space.com/news/090728-virgin-galactic-satellite-launch.html> Accessed

04/19/2010.

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pursuit is said to be a significant part of their recent equity sale to an Abu Dhabi

company. If this venture is successful, it might represent the start of a new, parallel value

network. There has also been mention at ISDC 2009 that XCOR is interested in pursuing

this market with the Lynx craft, but that vehicle is also not flight-ready and little has been

said in detail.

Cost of a CubeSat Launch

The commercial price of CubeSat launches has ranged from $40,000 to $2 million in the

past. However, these are market prices; the actual launch cost is lower, possibly much

lower. Because CubeSats usually piggyback on the launches of other, larger satellites,

they can often take up space and weight that would otherwise be filled only with ballast,

allowing for a low marginal cost. According to one estimate by a professional cost

accountant, the marginal cost of launching a CubeSat could be as low as $1,000.8 As

more companies enter the launch market, competition is likely to drive launch prices

closer to actual costs, possibly even commoditizing orbital launches.

As the author of this article points out, this low marginal cost estimate is based on the

assumption that CubeSats piggyback onto other launches that would take place with or

without them. This $1,000 figure may be inapplicable for rockets carrying many

CubeSats, as the launch cost of the CubeSat at that point may no longer be considered

marginal. However, even if a rocket were to carry only CubeSats, the launch cost per

satellite could potentially be lower than the $40,000 minimum previously charged by

commercial providers. SpaceX, one of the few companies to publish its pricing,

advertises the launch cost of the Falcon1e rocket as $9.1 million. With a payload of

1,010 kg to low-earth orbit, the Falcon1 could potentially carry as many as 1,010

CubeSats. This equates to a theoretical minimum launch cost of $9,010 per CubeSat,

assuming the rocket could be fitted out with the maximum possible payload.

Conclusions on Disruptiveness

Because CubeSats can, and do, piggyback onto the launches of larger satellites, they have

so far been launched by pre-existing launch providers on the same rockets that are used

by other satellites. Therefore, CubeSat technology has not yet proven disruptive to launch

providers. It may show the characteristics of a disruptive technology in the future,

however. Smaller satellites create the potential for smaller launch vehicles. Because

rockets must carry the weight of their own fuel, launch costs tend to increase

exponentially with payload weight. This means that lighter payloads could achieve lower

launch costs. CubeSats, and small satellites in general, create the possibility for a new

generation of smaller launch vehicles that could offer greater launch flexibility and lower

launch costs. At least one company (Interorbital Systems) is working on such a launch

8The full article may be seen at http://www.satmagazine.com/cgi-

bin/display_article.cgi?number=602922274

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vehicle. If these new, smaller rockets do indeed offer lower launch costs and greater

flexibility, CubeSats will likely prove to be a disruptive technology to launch providers.

4.3 Component Vendors

Component vendors, just like the components themselves, come in all shapes and sizes.

Figure b outlines some key component vendors.

After viewing the component vendors we see that many of these companies did not start

to sell components for CubeSats, they started by making components for larger satellites.

In some cases, CubeSat builders found what these companies offered and realized that

their products could be used to further the industry. Companies that already make

components for different uses may be making production runs for the other industries

they sell to, which may reduce the costs for the CubeSat industry. However, many of

these companies are small and it may be more reliable to procure components from a

company who has a larger parent company, such as Spectrolab, which is owned by

Boeing. With a more prominent parent in the picture, the scale and quality of the

purchased product may increase. Overall, if potential CubeSat builders do not find

companies who are already making components for other markets, they may have to go

to companies that have the ability to do special orders, and in the case of a job shop

environment, prices are always higher.

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Company name Website Products Notes

Pumpkin http://www.cubesat

kit.com/ Cubesat outer structure.

Build it yourself kits.

Pumpkin has one of

the most

comprehensive

websites combining

and organizing

masses of

information.

Clyde Space http://www.clyde-

space.com/

Design and production

of high performance

power subsystems,

lithium polymer

batteries and high

efficiency solar panels.

Clyde Space has the

first online Cubesat

store.

Spectrolab http://www.spectro

lab.com/

Offers low-cost, high-

efficiency solar cells in

a unique form factor.

A Boeing Company

SpaceLink Co

Ltd.

http://www.spaceli

nk.biz/

offers the IGPS-1

Micro GPS receiver for

small satellites in LEO

orbits

Most of the website

is in Japanese

Figure b. CubeSat component vendors9

4.4 CubeSat Communications

There are many things involved in CubeSat Communications. The communication needs

to be able to uplink, and downlink from the CubeSat and the operators need to make sure

the frequencies used for the CubeSat communications comply with federal regulations.

Overall, communications seems to be one of the many difficulties that must be overcome

9 more component vendors can be found at http://www.cubesatkit.com/content/links.html

15

in order to succeed in the CubeSat development industry. After researching the various

CubeSat vendors, a communications vendor did not seem to be present. Our team

decided to contact Pumpkin, the top provider of other CubeSat components to see what

they use for communications. Pumpkin referred us to California Polytechnic State

University, the leading university researching CubeSats. Didier Jourdain at California

Polytechnic State University, when asked about hardware for radios said, “Icom and

Yaesu seem to be the most popular companies for radios.” As far as communications,

Brian Castello at California Polytechnic State University, stated “Well we use Amateur

radio frequencies to talk to our satellites. However, that is generally reserved for

Universities and non-profits. Government organizations such as NASA will generally use

other non-Amateur bands in the Radio Frequency Spectrum. We use frequencies around

437 MHz but again there are lots of options.” Mr. Castello was correct in that there are

many frequency bands to broadcast on, however, the company operating the CubeSat

would have to ensure that frequency was available for use with the FCC.

The current regulatory environment for satellites is for each operator to individually

communicate with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a frequency band

in a particular orbit. The FCC sponsors that application to the United Nation’s

International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which grants final approval contingent

on the operator demonstrating use of the frequency band by broadcasting on that

frequency from that orbit.

16

Appendices

17

List of Interested Parties

Universities

Auburn University- not in top 100

University of Alabama- Not in top 100

Tuskegee University- Not in top 100

Arizona State University- 94

University of Arizona- 77

Boston University- 74

Cal Poly State University- Not in top 100 (but ranked very high in other rankings)

San Jose State University- Not in top 100

Stanford University- 2

University of California, Irvine- 46

University of California, Santa Barbara- 35

University of Chicago- 9

University of Colorado- 34

Florida Institute of Technology- Not in top 100

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University- Not in top 100

University of Hawaii- Not in top 100

University of Illinois- 25

Purdue University- 65

Taylor University- Not in top 100

SUNY Genesco- Not in top 100

Iowa State University- Not in top 100

University of Central Florida- Not in top 100

University of Florida- 58

University of Southern California- 46

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School- Not in top 100

University of Kansas- Not in top 100

University of Louisiana- Not in top 100

U.S. Naval Academy- Not in top 100

Dartmouth College- Not in top 100 (Somewhere in the low 100’s)

Michigan Technological University- Not in top 100

Washington University- St. Louis- 29

Montana State University- Not in top 100

Cornell University- 12

Polytechnic University NYC- Not in top 100

North Carolina State University- Not in top 100 (Was 99 in 2003)

University of North Dakota- Not in top 100

University of Oklahoma- Not in top 100

University of Texas at Austin- 38

Texas Christian University- Not in top 100

Texas A&M- 88

Utah State University- Not in top 100

George Mason University- Not in top 100

18

University of Washington- 16

George Washington University- Not in top 100

Morehead State University- Not in top 100

University of Alaska, Fairbanks- Not in top 100

University of Kentucky- Not in top 100

University of New Mexico- Not in top 100

Santa Clara University- Not in top 100

University of Arkansas- Not in top 100

Industry Participants

The Aerospace Corporation- Technical and advisory services to space programs since

1960.

QuakeFinder, LLC- Developing an earthquake forecasting system.

Tethers Unlimited- Developing space tether technology.

Globaltec- Chinese company selling electronics components, modules & software.

Global Imaging Systems- Sells and services automated office equipment, electronic

presentation systems, document imaging management systems, and network integration

and management services.

Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation- NPO to advance science & innovation in

Kentucky

Boeing- Major Aircraft Manufacturer

Pumpkin- Makes cubesats

Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab- University physics lab, largely doing defense work

AeroAstro- Designs & builds small satellites and satellite subsystems

Aerojet- Makes propulsion systems for missiles & spacecraft

Astronautical Development- Creates radio & interface hardware for small spacecraft

Azure Summit Technology- Communications software & hardware

BAE Systems- High-tech military equipment integrator

Booz Allen Hamilton- Tech & Strategy Consulting

Bridger Photonics- Makes lasers & sensors

Brimrose Tech Corporation- High-resolution radar equipment

Busek Co. Inc.- Spacecraft propulsion systems

Cal Poly Corporation- NPO, support services to Cal Poly San Louis Obispo

CU Aerospace- Lasers, space propulsion, space software, materials

Design_net engineering- Avionics and instrumentation

Digital Fusion Solutions- IT & Strategy consulting to government clients

Innovative Technology Systems- IT services for military & intelligence customers

Interorbital Systems- Space tourism, microsatellite launch, planned lunar rover

Design & Development Engineering Services Corp- Satellite subsystem design & testing

Planning Systems Incorporated- Network-centric systems for military & space use

ITT corporation- Defense products and pumps/fluid control systems

NASA/JPL-Ames- U.S. government space research lab

KOR Electronics- Military sensor/communications simulation & testing equipment

L-3 Communications- Military sensor, communications & propulsion systems

Linquest- Network-centric military satellite communications

19

Los Alamos National Laboratory- Research in energy, nuclear physics, medicine &

computing

Michigan Aerospace Corp- Sensor, computer & mechanical systems for space & marine

use

Microcosm, Inc.- Software & hardware copy protection and usage control

Microsat Systems- Microsatellites & satellite subsystems

Nanohmics- Engineering and development assistance (Very poorly explained)

Naval Research Laboratory- Develops all kinds of equipment for the U.S. Navy and

Marine Corps

Northrop Grumman- Military Aircraft & Electronic Systems

Qinetiq North America- Software, security equipment, product testing

Rincon Research Corp- Radar, digital signal processing

Science Applications International Corp- Integrator of high-tech equipment, largely

government work (lack of detail)

Space Dynamics Laboratory- Develops sensor & communications technology for space

use. An NPO run by Utah State University.

SRI International- R&D in a very diverse group of fields

Texas Engineering Experiment Station- Partnership of multiple Texas-based

organizations, both for-profit and non-profit. Engineering in homeland security, power

systems, computer systems & medical care.

Charles Stark Draper Lab- Sesnors, controls & robotics systems for military, space &

civil use.

Foster-Miller Inc.- Robotics, sensor systems, materials sciences

Miltec Corp- There are 2 or 3 Miltecs, and I’m not sure which one it is.

Malin Space Science Systems- Instruments for use on robotic spacecraft.

Vulcan Wireless- Sensors, communications & systems engineering

Optimal Synthesis- PC software & consulting services. Not much info.

20

List of Launch Providers

National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) ....www.nasa.gov

European Space Agency (ESA) .................................www.esa.int

ISC Kosmotras ...........................................................http://www.kosmotras.ru/

Orbital Sciences Corporation .....................................http://www.orbital.com/

SpaceX .......................................................................www.spacex.com

Interorbital Systems (planned future provider) ..........http://www.interorbital.com/

China National Space Administration (not a current launch provider, but a probable

future provider)

....................................................................................http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/cin

dex.html

ISIS (launch broker, not a launch provider)...............http://www.isispace.nl/