The Use of Force in a

36 The Advanced Contemporary Affairs (Book 93)Pakistans Domestic Affairs 37

Evolution of Democratic System in PakistanM Imtiaz Shahid[footnoteRef:1] [1: This chapter is taken from M Imtiaz Shahids recently published book Pakistan Afairs Paradigms.]

Democracy and participatory governance are popular political notions in todays world. Fair and free elections are the key pre-requisite of democracy. However, democracy lacks substance unless the electoral process is coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and civil and political rights and freedoms for the people. The state must practice the principle of equal citizenship irrespective of religion, caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee security of life and property of its citizens.While it easy for the rulers, political leaders and parties, and others to pronounce their commitment to these principles, the real challenge lies in making them operational. The key question is how does one create and sustain institutions and processes that reflect the spirit of democracy and participatory governance? A large number of states are unable to fulfill these conditions. The commitment of many rulers, leaders, and organizations to democracy is merely rhetorical or they view democracy as an instrument to achieve power and then implement a partisan non-democratic agenda. Others selectively employ some aspects of democracy to create a faade. Still others hold elections, establish elected legislative bodies and install elected governments but do not empower these institutions and the people holding key positions in them. Power is thus exercised by an elite group while a semblance of democracy is created to legitimize its rule. These operational realities create the problem of quality and substance of democracy.Professed Values and Operational RealitiesIn Pakistan, the rulers, political parties and leaders and the civil society groups support democracy at the normative or conceptual level. The politically active circles demand representative governance and participatory decision making in the political and economic fields. They highlight fair and free electoral process, the rule of law, socio-economic justice and accountability of those exercising state power as the pre-requisites for a political system.However, there are serious problems with these principles at the operational level in Pakistan. Power structure and style of governance often negated these principles. Most rulers, civilian and military, pursued personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance, assigning a high premium to personal loyalty and uncritical acceptance of what the ruler or the party chief decides. .This was coupled with partisan use of state apparatus and resources, and an elitist and exploitative socio-economic system.A conflict between the professed democratic values and the operational realities of authoritarianism and non-sustainable civilian institutions and processes is the main feature of Pakistani political experience. The redeeming feature of this conflict is that despite the long spells of authoritarian and military rule, the theoretical commitment to democracy and participatory governance has persisted in Pakistan. None of the two political trends has been able to overwhelm each other. If democracy could not function on a continuous basis, the authoritarian and military rule did not get accepted as a normal or legitimate political system. This engenders the hope that the overall commitment to democracy would continue to persist as one of the most cherished norms in the polity and a governance system that falters on democracy would not be able to cultivate voluntary popular support.The failure to institutionalize participatory governance has caused much alienation at the popular level. A good number of people feel that they are irrelevant to power management at the federal and provincial levels. The rulers are so engrossed in their power game that they are not bothered about the interest and welfare of the common people. Such a perception of low political efficacy is reflected in the declining voting percentage in the general elections. A good number of voters maintain that their vote does not matter much in the selection of the rulers. Invariably they express negative views about the rulers as well as those opposing them. Despite all this, the people have not given up on democracy. While talking about their helplessness with reference to changing the rulers, they continue to subscribe to the norms of democracy and participatory governance and emphasize the accountability of the rulers. They are therefore vulnerable to mobilization for realization of these norms and values.The political system of Pakistan is characterized by intermittent breakdown of constitution and political order, weak and non-viable political institutions and processes, rapid expansion of the role of the military bureaucratic elite, military rule and military dominated civilian governments, and authoritarian and narrow-based power management.Pakistans political history can be divided into different phases with reference to the dominant style of governance and political management:1. Civilian political government: August 1947-October 1958 December 1971-July 19772. Direct Military Rule:October 1958-June 1962March 1969-December1971 July 1977-December 1985 October 1999-November 20023. Selective use of Democracy by the Military (Post-military rule) June 1962-March 1969March 1985-November 19884. Militarys influence from the sidelines on policy making under civilian governments December 1988-October 19995. Militarys direct involvement in power management after the end of military rule; constitutional and legal role for the militaryOctober 1999-20086. . Militarys influence from the sidelines on policy making under civilian governments2008-to dateHistorical OverviewPakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a parliamentary system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and the federal government exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistans early rulers did not pay much attention to democratization of the political system because their major concern was how to ensure the survival of the state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of the collapse of the state reinforced authoritarian governance and political management.Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition process These included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between India and Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the troubled relations with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up a federal government in Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked experienced civil servants and military officers.While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment of Pakistan. This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions and fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local stature and did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics. This made it difficult for the political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards the problems and issues of the early years. They were unable to develop consensus on the operational norms of the polity and took 8 1/2 years to frame a constitution which did not enjoy the unqualified support of all the major parties, leaders and regions. By the time the constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of violation of parliamentary norms was established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was unable to assert its primacy. The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/ President.The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of the political leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass power. He manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of governments. Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55) and a combined military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor General/ President Iskander Mirza (1955-1958); they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the military for support. This contributed to the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani politics which further undermined the prospects of democracy.By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers along with the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security issues and domestic affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, overthrew the tottering civilian government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The latter was knocked out of power by the generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since then the top brass of the military have either ruled the country directly or influenced governance and policy management from the background.The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to June 1962, when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an end but the 1962 Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayubs centralized and authoritarian rule which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian institutions and processes, although the state media projected his rule as the beginning of a new era of participatory governance. His governments political management and economic policies accentuated economic disparities among the people and the regions and caused much political and social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was then East Pakistan.Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayubs 1962 Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in Pakistans politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East Pakistan for socioeconomic equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely brutal military action in East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India (November-December 1971). Pakistans military debacle at the hands of India led to the breakup of the original Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major military and political setback forced General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whose Pakistan Peoples Party had the largest number of the National Assembly seats in what was left of Pakistan, i.e. the present Pakistan.Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to July 5, 1977) against the backdrop of the serious damage to the militarys reputation in the wake of the military debacle of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the militarys command structure. However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he began to cultivate the militarys support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed authoritarian methods to deal with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-Bhutto agitation on the pretext that the government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition parties welcomed the military take over because it removed Bhutto from power.General Zia-ul-Haqs martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of direct military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox and conservative Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was helped by his governments partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing Afghan-Islamic resistance to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state for the U.S. policy to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, General Zias government obtained international financial and diplomatic support which contributed to sustaining his military rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and militancy, undermining the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and processes. These trends continued after he civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued centrality to governance and political management.In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top commanders closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on political and security matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their professional and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July 1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian government and the top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depended on their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military commanders during the fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing to stay on the sidelines and viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated a direct and constitutional role for the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional role to such an extent that it could not give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide ranging commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care, education, and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial governments for civil construction projects. Given the militarys expanded interests and its involvement in governance, its role in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.The Musharraf ModelGeneral Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff since October 1998, assumed power after his top commanders dislodged the elected civilian government of Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. He designated himself as the Chief Executive and suspended the constitution to impose military rule, avoiding the use of the term of martial law.General Pervez Musharraf carefully tailored the transition to constitutional and civilian rule in 2002. The underlying consideration was his staying on as an effective President in the post-military rule period and the continuation of the policy measures adopted by his military regime. The transition process was deigned to share power with a section of the political leaders rather than transfer power to civilian political leaders.He ensured his continuation in office before starting the transition process by holding a state managed uncontested referendum on April 30, 2002 to get him elected as President for five years. This was followed by the introduction of far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution to enhance his powers and to give a constitutional cover to the role of the top brass in policy making through the issuance of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) in August. Meanwhile a breakaway faction of the PML-Nawaz Sharif, labeled as the PML- Quaid -i -Azam, was co-opted for partnership. The PML-Q enjoyed state patronage which enabled it to emerge as the single largest party in the National Assembly and it obtained a clear majority in the Punjab Provincial Assembly. The military regimes major adversary, the PPP, came second in the National Assembly and obtained the largest number of seats (not an absolute majority) in the Sindh Provincial Assembly.The Presidency and the intelligence agencies played an active role in creating the PML-Q led coalitions at the federal level and in Sindh and Balochistan. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had a majority to form the government. Thus, the National Assembly began to function on November 16 and General Pervez Musharraf took the oath as the elected President for five years. The provincial governments were installed in November-December and the Senate, upper house of the parliament, was elected in the last week of February 2003 and resumed functioning on March 12, 2003, which marked the full restoration of the 1973 Constitution as amended by the LFO.Pakistan thus returned to constitutional rule with elected parliament and provincial assemblies as well as elected governments at the federal and provincial levels. However, the political arrangements were dominated by the Presidency. President Pervez Musharraf not only exercised the enhanced powers under the LFO but he also continued as the Army Chiefan unusual combination in a democratic polity-which gave him an overriding clout in the polity.The focal point of the post-2002 political order is President-Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf who functions as an effective ruler, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the Parliament. This political arrangement could be described as the Musharraf model of governance and political management. The effective powers are concentrated in President-Army Chief Pervez Musharraf and his army/ intelligence affiliates who command the political system both at the federal and provincial levels. The establishment of the National Security Council in April 2004 which provides a legal cover to the expanded role of the top brass of the military further reinforces the position of the President and the brass of the military.The Musharraf model emphasizes the unity of command, centralization, management rather than participation and the guardianship of the political process by the military. The elected government and the parliament have to function within the space made available to them by the top commanders. The political clout of the civilian leaders depends on their ability to work in harmony with the top generals.The parliament and the provincial assemblies have not been able to acquire an autonomous and assertive role in the polity. The effective power at both federal and provincial levels is located outside the parliament and the provincial assemblies. Consequently, the seekers of state power and resources focus on the presidency and its Army/ intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates. The assemblies have done limited legislative work and their functioning has been marred by bitter exchanges between the government and the opposition, violation of parliamentary norms, the quorum problem and boycotts by the opposition parties. The members complain about the frequent absence of the ministers from the two houses of the parliament and the inadequacy of the answers by the government to their questions. The assemblies have to make a real effort to fulfill even the constitutional requirement of the minimum working days in a year.The prime ministerial changes in June 2004 (Zafarullah Jamali to Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein) and August (Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein to Shaukat Aziz) demonstrated the weakness of the National Assembly and the ruling coalition led by the PML. The decision for these changes was made in the presidency and the National Assembly and the PML simply endorsed it. Jamali got his budget passed from the parliament which amounted to a vote of confidence for his government. Two days later, he had to quit under pressure from the Presidency. The PML accepted the change and his entire cabinet was reappointed under the new prime minister.This system restricts the participatory opportunities for the mainstream political parties, i.e. the PPP and the PML-Nawaz, which are viewed as the major adversaries of the Musharraf dominated political order. The confrontation between the government and the opposition has increased over time. This means that the political process is not moving in the direction of consensus building and its support base continues to be narrow, limited to the co-opted section of the political elite.The strains in the federal-provincial relations have increased because the provinces complain about the domineering role of the military dominated federal government. The federal government has not resolved many federal-provincial issues which have created a strong impression in the smaller provinces that the federal government was deliberately doing this to keep political and financial pressures on the provinces. Some of the major issues are the determination of the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award on distribution of revenues between the federal and provincial governments,, the construction of dams for storing water and power generation, the Greater Thal Canal issue, the share of the KPK in net profit of hydel power generated in that province, the gas royalty for Balochistan, and the federal government mega development projects in Balochistan and the construction of new army cantonments in that province. If confrontation and bitterness persist in the political system and the competing political interests do not adopt accommodating disposition the sustainability of the present political system may not be guaranteed.Problems of DemocracyThe major features of the Pakistani polity show serious problems of democracy. At times, democracy and participatory governance are either totally non-existent or their quality is poor.Institutional ImbalancePakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of independence in August 1947. The state apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, the military and the intelligence services, was more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first Interim Constitution, 1947, also strengthened bureaucracy and authoritarian governance. This imbalance was reinforced by two inter-related trends in the political domain.First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after independence. The Muslim League that led the independence movement, lacked sufficient organization and capacity for state and nation building. A good number of Muslim League leaders had feudal or semi-feudal background, and were motivated by personal or power ambition rather than building the party as a viable organization capable of standing on its own feet. Other political parties also suffered from similar problems of internal disharmony and conflict, indiscipline and a lack of direction. As a consequence, they were unable to offer a viable alternative to the Muslim League and failed to articulate and aggregate interests within a participatory national political framework. They also failed to create viable political institutions or processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-economic policies.Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by hierarchy, discipline, and esprit de corps. The serious administrative problems in the early years of independence led the civilian government to seek the support of the military and the bureaucracy. Pakistans security problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped to strengthen the militarys position in the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a strong defence posture and allocated a substantial portion of the national budget to defence and security. The militarys position in the polity received additional boost with Pakistans participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances in the mid- 1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by Americans in Pakistan and the U.S. which increased the militarys efficiency and strike power. Thus, the degeneration of the political machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and confidence of the military.These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of the civilian leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves without the support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the bureaucracy and the military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they began to dominate politics. In October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political institutions and established its direct rule, with the bureaucracy as the junior partner.The role of various civilian and military intelligence agencies expanded in the political domain during the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1985) when the military regime used the intelligence agencies to divide and fragment the political forces. The war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1980-1989) and the linkages between Pakistani intelligence agencies and their U.S. counterparts in the context of the Afghan war helped to put more material resources at the disposal of Pakistans intelligence agencies. Some of these agencies have been playing active political role since 1988, helping some political parties and groups while building pressure on others keeping in view the militarys political agenda. They have interfered in the national and provincial elections which has raised doubts about the credibility of the electoral process. Some of these agencies were active in politics during after the 2002 general elections. These were also instrumental to creating the ruling coalition at the federal level and in Sindh and Balochistan after the October 2002 elections. The active political role of the intelligence agencies weakens the autonomous growth of civilian political institutions and processes.Political Consensus-buildingThe democratic process cannot become functional without a minimum consensus on the operational norms of the polity. The minimum consensus is the beginning point. As the political process functions over time and it offers opportunities for sharing power and political advancement, it evokes more support from among different sections of the society and the polity. The scope of consensus widens when more groups and individuals enter the political mainstream through the democratic norms as set out in the constitution and law. This makes the political institutions and processes viable.The Pakistani polity has been unable to fully develop a consensus on the operational political norms. Whatever understanding developed among the competing interests at one point of time was allowed to fitter away with the passage of time because of the non-accommodating disposition of the competing interests and an open defiance of constitutionalism and norms of democracy. Therefore, all constitutions turned controversial with the passage of time because they were violated by the power wielders.Pakistan functioned without a constitution for years under martial law imposed by the Army Chief which made him the repository of all authority and power in the country. If constitution can be easily set aside or subordinated to the will of the military ruler, the tradition of constitutionalism and participatory governance cannot develop. The civilian rulers also amended the constitution in a partisan manner by employing parliamentary majority, and disregarded the need of building consensus.A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national issues has hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The dominant elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing with them. It is not merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups manifest intolerance and use violence against those who question their views.The steady growth of Islamic extremism and militancy and Islamic-sectarian movements since the early 1980s has stifled the free flow of ideas on the issues of national importance. It gave rise to religious and cultural intolerance and increased the level of civic violence. The rival extremist religious groups did not hesitate to use violence against each other. The major victims of these trends were social and cultural pluralism, political tolerance and accommodation of dissent. The participatory processes also suffered as the religious extremists gained strength in Pakistan. Such a political and cultural environment is not conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.Political Parties and LeadershipPolitical harmony and democratic evolution is facilitated primarily by political parties and leaders. These are important instruments of interest articulation and aggregation and serve as vehicles of political mobilization. In Pakistan, political parties have traditionally been weak and unable to perform their main function in an effective and meaningful manner.The role of the political parties has suffered due to, inter alia, periodic restrictions on political activities under military rule, infrequent elections, weak organizational structure and poor discipline among the members, absence of attractive socio-economic pogrammes, and a paucity of financial resources. Political parties also suffer from factionalism based on personality, region and ideology.The Muslim League that led the independence movement failed to transform itself from a national movement to a national party. It suffered from organizational incoherence, ideological confusion and a crisis of leadership. The parties that emerged in the post-independence period could not present a better alternative. They suffered from the weaknesses that ailed the Muslim League. Consequently, the political parties could not work for political consensus building and political stability and continuity.Most Pakistani political parties lack resources and trained human-power to undertake dispassionate and scientific study of the socio-political and economic problems. The emphasis is on rhetoric and sloganeering which may be useful for mobilization purposes but it cannot be a substitute to serious, scientific and analytical study of the societal problems. The level of debate in the two houses of the parliament and provincial assemblies is low and these elected bodies often face the shortage of quorum which shows the non-seriousness of the political parties and their members in the elected houses in dealing with the national issues and problems. Quite often the ministers and parliamentary secretaries are not available in the house to respond to the issues raised by the members.The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power since the mid-1950s were either floated by the establishment (the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies) or these enjoyed its blessings. The coalition building at the national level in pre-1958 period and especially the setting up of the Republican Party in 1956, provides ample evidence of the role of the establishment in party politics. Generals Ayub Khan patronized a faction of the Muslim League which was turned into the ruling party in 1962-63. General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a similar strategy. He co-opted a faction of the Muslim League which ruled with his blessings after he restored civilian and constitutional rule in 1985. General Pervez Musharraf has done the same by co-opting a faction of the Muslim League and installed governments under its leadership at the federal level and in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab in November-December 2002.The only exception to this rule of state sponsorship of the ruling parties is the Awami League (pre-1971) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) which did not owe their origin and rise to political eminence to the establishment. The Awami League won the 1970 general elections despite the strong opposition of the military government. So did the Pakistan People Party (PPP) which won majorities in the 1970s in the Punjab and Sindh. In 1971, the Awami League was pushed out of Pakistan. The military transferred power to the PPP after it lost the war to India in December 1971. The PPP continues to face the distrust of the establishment.The political parties formed electoral alliances and political coalitions. These have generally been ephemeral in nature because of differences in their political orientations and limited experience of working together. Furthermore, each party suffers from internal incoherence which undermines its role in a coalition. Political parties have been relatively more successful as a movement for pursuing a limited agenda like the overthrow of a sitting government, than as a political party because this requires a viable organization and a broadly shared long term political agenda.Islam and PoliticsA predominant majority of Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani political system must have some relationship with Islam. However, there are strong differences on the precise nature of relationship between Islam and the polity. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and processes to be set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the Islamic state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality, socio-economic justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and participatory governance. To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical foundations of the polity rather than offering a specific political structure or a legal code for the modern times. Another debate pertains to the political disposition of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan: Did he advocate an ideological Islamic state or a secular system with no links with Islam or a modern democratic state that viewed Islam as one of the sources of law and ethics? Still another issue is how far the Two-nation theory is relevant to the post-independence period for shaping political choices? Was Pakistan created as a Muslim state or an Islamic state?General Zia-ul-Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative interpretation of the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious groups. He made several administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the orthodox and conservative groups. This increased religious and cultural intolerance and religious extremism in Pakistan. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against the notion of participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and political rights as western implants in Pakistan.The post-Zia civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws made by the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq. General Musharraf talked of enlightened moderation as the organizing principle for the Pakistani political system but he too did not revise the Islamic laws and punishments introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq. He was constrained by the need of the support of the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for staying in power. The rise of Islamic orthodoxy has also increased Islamic-sectarian violence which poses a major threat to the fabric of the Pakistani society.The inconclusive debate on Islams relationship with the Pakistani state and the political system adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Most conservative and orthodox Islamic groups reject democracy as a western system or support it to the extent of using the electoral process to attain power and then implement their notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of consensus on the precise relationship between Islam and the Pakistans constitutional, legal and political system, democratic institutions and processes would not fully develop and become sustainable.Military Rule and Constitutional and Political EngineeringThe repeated assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape the Pakistani polity in accordance with its political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability of democratic institutions and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or suspended it to acquire supreme legislative and administrative powers. This disrupted the development of civilian institutions and processes and made it impossible for them to develop strong roots in the polity. After every ten years or so, the military returned the country to square one, promising to introduce a system designed to respond to the needs and aspiration of the people and reflected the operational political realities of the country.While establishing the post military rule political order the military regimes did not pursue a non-partisan approach. The overriding consideration with the military rulers was to ensure their stay in power and the continuity of the policies introduced during the period of direct military rule. They engaged in constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution (Ayub Khan in 1962)) or by making drastic changes in the existing constitutional system to protect the interests of the military regime. Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced far reaching changes in the 1973 constitution in 1985 and 2002 respectively to sustain their centrality to the political process and to ensure that no political party could unilaterally alter the policy measures adopted by the military regime.Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite that was willing to play politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers and supported their continued stay in power. Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf resorted to co-option of a section of the political elite. Their co-option strategy focused on some faction of the Muslim League. The strategy of co-option pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the military-initiated political arrangements. This strategy was adopted by the above named military rulers for replacing direct military rule with new political arrangements based on sharing of power between the top brass of the military and the co-opted political leadership. Another strategy adopted by the Pakistani military rulers was the holding of carefully managed general elections to ensure that the co-opted leaders performed better than their adversaries.The political institutions and processes created by the military regime reflected the military ethos of hierarchy, discipline and management and were often based on a narrow and selective consensus. These institutions and processes could not develop an autonomous political profile and remained closely associated with the generals. That was the major reason that they often faltered in responding to the demands for political participation and socio-economic justice. The quality of democracy was poor in the post-military rule political arrangements.Geo-Politics: A Stark Reality[footnoteRef:2] [2: Shamshad Ahmad, The Tale of Democracy in Pakistan http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/the-tale-of-democracy-in-pakistan/#1]

Pakistan could not change its geography, nor escape from its social, cultural, political, economic and strategic influences. On its independence in 1947, Pakistan was a house divided not against itself but by more than 1000 miles of hostile Indian territory. The world itself was divided in two rival and mutually hostile blocs presenting our foreign policy with a difficult choice; either align with the free world represented at that time by Western democracies or accept subservience to the authoritarian and monolithic Communist system.The most important factor circumscribing democracys growth in Pakistan has been its geopolitical location which not only shaped its personality as a state but also conditioned its domestic as well as external behaviour. Emerging from the trauma of sub-continental turmoil, the young state of Pakistan, faced with the stark reality of its geo-political environment, especially its troubled relationship with India due to last-minute British manipulations in leaving behind disputed borders, gravitated naturally to the pole that stood for freedom and democracy in that intensely bi-polar world.It sought alliances with the West. In making that deliberate choice, Pakistan obviously was also guided by its over-riding security and economic interests. On its part, the West, especially the US looked at Pakistan and its special geo-political importance as a strategic asset in its containment policy against Soviet expansionism. They could not find a better partner than a country with Pakistans exceptional location and potential for a crucial role in the final stages of the Cold War. The ensuing sequence of history speaks for itself in determining what really happened to democracy in Pakistan.The US-Pakistan relationship has, no doubt, seen ups and downs with rotating phases of engagement and estrangement depending on the nature of regional and global dynamics. Notably, every US engagement with Pakistan was issue-specific and not based on shared perspectives. The spells of close ties between the two countries have been, and may continue to be, single-issue engagements of limited or uncertain duration. (Cold war, Afghanistan and now terrorism)Interestingly, during each phase in which relations with the US were good, we in Pakistan had either a military or military-controlled government, whereas in Washington, the policy direction on Pakistan was in the hands of a Republican White House with Pentagon and the CIA playing a central role. Also, ironically, most of the estrangement phases of the US-Pakistan relationship happened when we had a civilian elected government and they had a Democrat Administration.As a painful legacy of these episodes of engagement with Washington, we continue to carry a huge baggage in terms of massive Afghan refugee influx and a culture of drugs and guns, commonly known as the Kalashnikov culture which has almost torn apart our social and political fabric. Since 9/11, Pakistan has been a frontline state in the US-led war on terror. In addition to invisible emotional fall out, this war has cost Pakistan staggering military burden, irreparable economic loss and an unquantifiable collateral damage in terms of internal displacement, social chaos, political instability and endemic violence.While there is a cumulative historic perspective to our political crises, we have suffered most from the legacy of two long spells of military rule in our country, eleven years of General Zia-ul-Haq and nine years of General Pervez Musharraf. Both came to power through military coups in breach of their constitutional oath and both subverted the Constitution, destroyed institutions and ruined our social fabric by fueling religion-based militant extremism as a tool of their statecraft.But lets be honest. The problem is not the US-Pakistan relationship. The problem is its poor and self-serving management on both sides. For Washington, it has remained a transactional relationship. On our side, the problem is the nature that our successive self-centred rulers have always sought to give to this relationship as their political and economic lifeline through their opportunistic policies and notorious deals. It is time for both sides now to remake this important relationship on the basis of universally established norms of inter-state relations.The objective must be not to weaken this equation but to strengthen it by infusing in it greater mutually relevant political, economic and strategic content. It must no longer remain a transactional relationship and must go beyond the issue of terrorism. It must reach out to democratic and liberal forces and the business community in our country, and also the younger generation in Pakistan which may resent US power but not its ideals.And in their success alone lies the very future of Pakistan as a strong and stable democratic country with a moderate and progressive outlook and as a factor of regional and global stability. Democracy, pluralism, security, market economy and people-oriented development must be the constant features of this relationship.What is Wrong with Pakistan?Given the common history, everyone wants to know why India is democratic and Pakistan is not. What after all is wrong with Pakistan? Instead of finding rational answers to this question in history, Prof. Sumit Ganguly, like many others, seems to have succumbed to the temptation of attributing Indias democracy to Hinduism and Pakistans autocracy to Islam. That is not the case.For us, it is not sufficient only to attribute Pakistans failure in democracy to its tradition of leadership miscarriages or military take-overs. There are in fact deep-rooted historical, socio-cultural and geo-political factors that have been conditioning the post-independence democratic tradition in Pakistan. Since independence, the politics and governments in Pakistan have remained hostage to the elite classes which have been inimical to any political liberalization in the country.Indeed, history never looks like history when you are living through it. Within less than a quarter of a century of our independent statehood, we lost half the country. Some blamed it on our physically being a house divided not against itself but by sitting astride more than one thousand miles of a hostile Indias territory. The reality however was that as a newly independent nation, we just could not cope with the challenges of freedom inherent in our geopolitical and structural fault lines. Language became our first bte noire. We are still possessed by the same ghosts in the name of culture, ethnicity and history.Unlike Indias Congress Party, the Muslim League, Pakistans founding party was almost wholly dominated by a few feudal families, whom the British had patronised before partition and were powerful enough to retain control over national affairs through the bureaucracy and the armed forces. While India was born with an intact bureaucratic apparatus in Delhi, Pakistan had to build an entire government in 1947 under a state of emergency.Besides military and the civil bureaucracy which wielded real authority, we saw a number of politicians being cycled through those political and economic crises. Invariably, the politicians proved to be corrupt, interested only in maintaining their political power and securing their own interests or those of their elite fraternity. As elected leaders, they never inspired hope for a democratic state that could provide socio-economic justice and fair administration to all Pakistani citizens.Even after Muslim Leagues disintegration, the same feudalised oligarchy consisting of different men at different times under different political flags has remained in power with or without military collaboration. The feudal power structure is indeed at the root of Pakistans political decay. It has also resisted land reforms in the country which it sees as a strike at its own roots.Instead of removing our systemic weaknesses and reinforcing the unifying elements of our nationhood, our power-hungry politicians have always succumbed to narrowly-based self-serving temptations. They rejected the popular will freely expressed in the December 1970 elections, and instead of exploring political remedies to the resultant crisis went along a military solution. It was the height of political opportunism and a humiliating military debacle leaving Pakistan physically amputated; the worst that could happen to any country.And yet, we learnt no lesson from our mistakes. We are repeating the same mistakes. The very reasons that precipitated the 1971 tragedy remained un-addressed in the new constitution which was adopted in 1973 under pressures emanating in the aftermath of the breakup tragedy rather than on merits of the document itself. Those who had no constitution-making mandate and were in fact responsible for creating a parliamentary gridlock leading to the breakup of Pakistan ironically became the authors of the flawed 1973 constitution.The political government formed in 1973 soon had problems with two provinces, the NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan. Governments were dissolved and governor rule was imposed in these provinces. This was followed by an armed uprising in some parts of Balochistan. The then prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then realised the need for systemic changes in the country. He went into early elections in the hope of a two-third majority in parliament to be able to amend the constitution. His plans were preempted by a military takeover.Since then, the 1973 constitution has been amended twenty-two times but no government has ever attempted to correct the systemic anachronisms in our federal structure or to redress provincial grievances. The so-called devolution under the eighteenth amendment provides no solution to the core issue of inter-provincial disparities.The problem is that the overbearing feudal and tribal power structure in Pakistan has been too deeply entrenched to let any systemic change take place. It doesnt suit them. They have always resisted reform in the country which they fear will erode their vested power and influence base.In the process, the country has failed to develop a sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the state institutions and the process of national integration. The country is also engaged in a precarious struggle to define a national identity and evolve a political system needed for its ethnically and linguistically diverse population.Pakistan is known to have over twenty languages and nearly 300 distinct dialects. This diversity contributed to chronic regional tensions and provincial disharmony, which not only impeded the process of constitution-making but also remained a potential threat to central authority.No wonder, there are demands now for more ethnic-linguistic provincial units in the country. No one agrees with the logic of these self-serving demands when we need greater societal cohesion, not fragmentation. We cannot afford new controversies reviving the old ethnic and linguistic chasms. But if inter-provincial disparities are to be removed, we cant simply wish them away. A surgical remedy would be indispensable.Systemic AberrationsAt the time of our independence in 1947, we inherited the Government of India Act, 1935, which remained our constitutional framework, with necessary adaptations and modifications in the form of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, passed by the British parliament. Seven years of debate failed to produce agreement on fundamental issues such as regional representation or the structure of a constitution. This impasse prompted Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to dismiss the Constituent Assembly on Oct 24, 1954, in what was the first coup of our history, though a civilian one.The new Constituent Assembly produced the first Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which came into force on March 23, 1956. It provided a parliamentary form of government with a president elected by the members of the National Assembly and the two provincial assemblies of East Pakistan and West Pakistan and a cabinet of ministers headed by a prime minister appointed by the president. Each province was effectively administered by a governor assisted by a small team of ministers.This constitution remained operative for about two-and-a-half years. Even with the abrogation of the constitution and declaration of martial law in October 1958, no change was made in this federal setup in the second constitution adopted in 1962.The late fifties and early sixties when this arrangement was in place was perhaps the only period during which the bulk of the population of this country lived in peace and relative prosperity with nominal unemployment. Other than constant political wrangling and intrigues among our politicians, we were a peaceful, tolerant, contented, liberal and law-abiding society till the 1971 tragedy, after which successive domestic and regional events tearing apart our social and political fabric, disrupted Pakistans progress as a model for Third World countries.In the 1970s, we also tried a half-baked version of socialism, the outcome of an arbitrary, personalised approach of an elected prime minister, who nationalised in one stroke our banks, schools and colleges and major industries. The whole systemic perversity had to be reversed at a cost still being paid by the nation. At the moment, we are stuck with another systemic perversity, with an elected president undemocratically also remaining the head of his party while virtually using the head of governments powers that do not belong to him. It is neither a parliamentary nor presidential form of government.Ours is the story of a society that has been going round and round in aimless circles for 65 years. Absence of democracy, rule of law and good governance is its continuing hallmark. The country has been engaged in a precarious struggle to define a national identity and evolve a political system for its ethnically and linguistically diverse population.This diversity contributed to chronic regional tensions and provincial disharmony, which not only impeded the process of constitution-making but also remained a potential threat to central authority. The question of provincial autonomy remains the key to addressing the issues of federalism in our country. There is a strong underlying resentment in Balochistan and in other smaller provinces against what is seen as continued Punjabi dominance and inequitable distribution of power and resources.In the former East Pakistan too, the problems started with a similar deep-rooted sense of deprivation and a feeling of political and economic alienation, which over time became a politico-constitutional crisis culminating into demand for larger autonomy and leading eventually to the break-up of the country. We find our provincial system not only fueling misrule and corruption but also aggravating sense of inequality and deprivation among different parts of the country.Our Constitution does not provide a solution to the genuine concerns on the inequality of the size of provinces and lopsided sharing of political and economic power. The need for drastic change in our present anachronistic set up is urgent to get rid of the same old usurpers of the countrys politics, outmoded social and political structures and elitist-led status quo in our country.The Way ForwardWe are currently suffering the worst governance crisis of our history. The gross inadequacies in governmental handling of serious problems affecting the common man, including continuing food and energy shortages, unabated violence and extremism and countrywide lawlessness have never been so acute. Our present rulers have been amply tested and inspire no hope. The nation desperately looks for an alternative, someone with integrity and credibility and a plan with an able team to remake the State of Pakistan like Malaysias Mahathir and Singapores Lee Kuan Yew.The country must come out of the farcical democratic mode opting for genuine democracy rooted in the will of the people and based on constitutional supremacy, institutional integrity, rule of law and good governance. It is never too late. It is also time for our armed forces to let the country be governed by democratically elected representatives of the people. For them nothing would be more honorable than reverting to their constitutionally-defined professional role and respecting the legitimacy of their peoples democratic aspirations and socio-economic needs.In todays context, what is important for Pakistan itself is the need to be stable politically and strong economically so as to be self-reliant and immune to external constraints and exploitation. Our countrys peculiar socio-economic and political culture, based on feudal and tribal structure, high rate of poverty and illiteracy, and inequality of wealth and power are symptomatic of a lopsided situation that warrants the beginning of an end to the current socio-economic disparities and political exploitation of the people by the privileged few of our country.What in fact we need is the remaking of the State of Pakistan as envisioned by Quaid-e-Azam, free of ethnic and linguistic labels and sectarian, communal and regional disharmony. We need a new Pakistan where strict adherence to the Constitution shall be ensured as a solemn social contract enabling the citizens to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from fear, want, hunger, disease, illiteracy, corruption, intolerance, violence, oppression and injustice. We want our country to be the one in which democracy, not dictatorship will endure, where economic growth and social justice reinforce each other.Our new Pakistan must be strong enough to live at peace with itself and with the rest of the world as a highly responsible nuclear-weapon state committed to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, particularly the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, external non-interference and peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes. Pakistan must be seen in its region as a source of strength and stability, not as the hub of terrorism and extremism.And finally, instead of always blaming outsiders for our domestic problems, we should have the courage to admit that there is something fundamentally wrong with our own governance patterns. Our systemic perversities are the root cause of our governance failures. Our problems are not external; our problems are domestic. Our foremost priority is to fix the fundamentals of our governance. We need domestic consolidation through democracy based on constitutional supremacy, institutional integrity and independent judiciary, rule of law, accountability & good governance.The System Must ChangeOur Constitution has been amended umpteen times for furtherance of political power and expediency. If any further changes are needed in our Constitution to correct the systemic anachronisms in our federal structure and to redress provincial grievances, they should be made before it is too late to remove the underlying causes of injustice and socio-economic deprivation of the people of the smaller provinces.Every political leader is promising a change but doesnt seem to be ready yet to come out with any blueprint for the promised change. It is time for a surgical operation to root out the countrys systemic perversities. We cannot afford to remain complacent spectators any longer. Here are some suggestions for consideration before the coming election:1. 1. Presidential System: Given our pathetic performance in our political conduct and discipline since our independence, we, like most developing countries, are perhaps not yet fit for the parliamentary system. Britain struggled for centuries to reach its current parliamentary status. For us, it would be too long and too arduous a journey to be indefinitely chasing illusory goals. Temperamentally, we are a presidential nation. It is time we abandoned the system that we have never been able to practice. Even the Quaid-e-Azam had doubts about the practicality of a parliamentary system in Pakistan. We should explore an adult franchise-based presidential system suitably designed for and tailored to Pakistans needs. 1. 2. Proportional Representation: We must also adopt the system of proportional representation that ensures representation of political parties in national legislature proportionate to the percentage of popular vote they receive. It will provide greater access to non-feudal, non-elitist educated middle class people in elected assemblies.1. 3. Recasting Federal Structure: Also needed is rationalization of our federal system by revisiting our current provincial architecture looking for a pragmatic solution to the problems of regional disparities. Reason, not self-serving emotion should be our yardstick. Looking at the systems of other developed and developing countries, we find ourselves a unique example of a federation with almost no parallel anywhere in the world. No country, roughly equal to Pakistans geographical and population size has so few and so large provinces. While large unequal provinces are always prone to breed and fuel secessionist mindsets, smaller provinces serve as a safety valve against such tendencies. Nigeria, a large country, on its independence had three regions and soon started facing a religion-based secessionist war in Biafra Region in the 1960s. It solved its federal problems by forming smaller provinces and today, in addition to Abuja as the federal territory, it has 36 states subdivided into 774 local government areas. Most of the large and medium size countries in todays world have divided themselves into small size provinces or states as administrative units. Examples: China 34 provinces, India 28 states and 7 union territories, Iran 30 provinces, Indonesia 33, Egypt 26, France 26, Germany16, Switzerland 26 cantons, Nigeria 37, Philippines 80, Thailand 78, Turkey 81, UK 114 counties and USA 50 states. In any unequal, parochially defined set up irrespective of historical identities, no method of governance can work. It is a system designed for paralysis which we are already experiencing. Our present provincial set up has long been the cause of political instability with an ever-looming threat to the countrys further disintegration. Lately, there have been demands for more provinces on ethnic or linguistic grounds. If this trend were to continue, we will be left with a loosely wired skeleton of a federation with more political space available to self-serving, disgruntled and corrupt politicians to play havoc with this country. We must resist this opportunistic approach and remove the inherent flaws in our system by recasting our federal architecture. This we can do preferably by eliminating altogether the present four linguistic-ethnic-based provinces and replacing them with forty or more administratively-determined provinces both as federating as well as administrative units of the State of Pakistan. In case, our traditional feudalist mindset does not let this change happen and is bent upon retaining the present ethnic-based federal identities, we could still opt for an alternative restructuring of the federation by retaining the present four ethnic-linguistic-based provinces redesignated as states constituting the federating units of Pakistan with a constitutionally redefined role and status. The functions of the four redesignated states shall be limited only to an oversight and supervisory role over the provincial and district governments in their respective jurisdiction and maintaining liaison on their behalf with the Central Government in terms of administrative, judicial, police, law & order, and financial matters. In this task, the four states will have very small functional secretariats for supervisory coordination with their respective provinces administrations. All administrative responsibilities shall be transferred to the local levels obviating the need for state cabinets, assemblies or secretariats. The present provincial assemblies should be abolished and replaced with much smaller elected legislative bodies called State Councils for the needed law-making purposes within the respective states. There will be no state chief minister or cabinets and instead the elected governor as the representative of the federation will oversee the running of the affairs of the provinces with the help of the elected provincial administrations within his state.1. 4. New Provincial Architecture: In order to separate governance from ethnic-linguistic considerations and to eliminate at least one known tier of redundancy and dirty politics of greed and power, i.e., the present provincial structure, we create forty or more provinces as administrative units ensuring a balance in geographical and population size. In any case, a Sindhi will remain a Sindhi even as parts of Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpur Khas or Larkana Province and so would be other nationalities no matter where they reside. By dividing the country into smaller administrative units as provinces, we would not only be eliminating the causes of regional acrimony and discontent but also ensuring effective and efficient governance through elected bodies at local and grassroots levels. To avoid any large-scale fresh re-demarcation of land boundaries and re-channelling of irrigations canals and tributaries, the best solution will be to convert the existing divisional commissionaries into new provinces headed by elected administrators with a suitable title. (Suggested List of Provinces in Annex I)5. Districts as Basic Unit of Governance: The newly-designated provinces will have administrations comprising of elected councils headed by an elected administrator and assisted by professional burearocracy. But the basic unit of governance should be the present districts, each headed by an elected person with prescribed eligibility criteria, with the help of small elected bodies at all local levels. The new provincial units shall be responsible for an oversight and coordinatory role providing support to the district governments within their jurisdiction and maintaining liaison with the central government in terms of administrative, judicial, and financial matters. The district governments need to be strengthened through adequate resources for meeting citizens basic requirements like food, shelter, education, health, security and justice at the local level, and through a monitoring mechanism will be made accountable to ensure efficient functioning. Elected district, tehsil and mohalla/village/community councils will involve the people as in other democratic societies in the running of their affairs. Common mans problems shall be addressed at the local level with public safety, law and order and timely justice guaranteed and delivered to them at their doorsteps. Election to all local councils except district councils should be on two-yearly adult franchise basis and no member will be allowed more than two 2-year elected terms to widen the scope of democratic process at the grassroots level.1. 5. Federal Government: The sanctity of separation of powers should be the basis of the federal system with three organs of the State functioning independently with usual checks and balances. The federal government should retain only ten to twelve ministries responsible to formulate and implement national policies in important areas, notably defence, economy, education, foreign affairs, national security, trade, communication, justice and law. All other subjects should be transferred to states for effective handling through the new smaller provinces and districts as basic units of governance. Bicameral system of legislature should continue with necessary adjustments giving all provinces equal representation in the Senate as at present except that all seats including those reserved for women and minorities should be filled through direct elections. Both houses together will legislate as in any presidential system on matters of national importance such as budget and economy, foreign affairs and national security to help the federal government in formulating and implementing policies on these subjects. Election to both houses should be held every four years through Proportional Representation system ensuring representation of political parties proportionate to the actual popular vote they receive in the polls. The National Assembly and the Senate will concentrate on their job of legislation, deliberate on national issues to help the government in formulating and implementing sound, well considered domestic policies including on national security, economy, budget and foreign affairs.1. 7. Balochistan Quagmire: Despite its abundance of natural resources, Balochistan remains the most backward province of the country and its legitimate political and economic grievances have long remained unaddressed. There is a strong underlying resentment in Balochistan (and in other provinces also) against what is seen as continued Punjabi dominance, inequitable distribution of political power and resources, and exploitation of provinces natural wealth. We must genuinely look for fair and permanent solutions. The problems in Balochistan will be resolved only through political and economic means, not by use of military force or through violence and militancy. These problems are also rooted in our flawed federal system and will be best resolved by the proposed restructuring of the federation. With smaller units of governance, the issues of governance and availability or distribution of resources shall also be easy to handle. The Baloch interests will also be best safeguarded in a strong and stable Pakistan and in an environment of peace and tranquility free of exploitation, blackmail or duress from any source. But like elsewhere in the world, the people of Balochistan also need to be freed of the outdated and exploitative Darbari and Sardari tribal system which keeps them backward to sustain its own privilege and power. Instead of fuelling self-serving nationalist unrest and obstructing genuine development and security related projects, the Sardars and Nawabs should come out of their exploitative mode and join the countrys political mainstream to genuinely work for the socio-economic well-being of their people. In implementing development projects, it will also be easier for the local governments to deliver in terms of improved infrastructure and better living facilities, including health and educational services, and access to the use of their natural resources.ADVANTAGES: The proposal to strengthen district governments, to form small equal provinces with a limited role in governance and a lean central government as outlined above, will bring about following major advantages:- It will eliminate the cause of acrimony and discontent among the different regions. The central government, unburdened from mundane routine affairs will be able to concentrate on formulating and implementing national level policies more effectively. It will end duplication of responsibilities between different levels now causing confusion and despondency in governance. Eliminating one tier of assemblies, cabinets and secretariats at provincial level and concentrating the role of legislation at the national level, will help in effective functioning of the country. By doing away with the provincial legislative and secretariat structures, we will be saving huge expenses now being incurred on maintaining provincial assemblies, minsters, advisors, parliamentary secretaries and large administrative secretariats. It will bring the desired level of political stability. The parties winning national level elections will be able to form stable governments at the centre without having to make compromises to form provincial governments. It will meet the demands of sub national group eliminating threats of further breakup of the Country as experienced in 1971, by removing causes of discontent, neutralising propaganda themes like hatred against Punjabis, developed by our adversaries for a long time. Disturbances and discontent in an area would be isolated, promptly addressed and problems easily resolved without affecting other areas. The role of State Governor to support the provincial and district governments in maintaining law and order by providing required force and in dispensation of quick justice by maintaining judicial infrastructure at his disposal will establish inherent checks and balance eliminating chances of district governments going overboard. Responding to the aspirations and genuine needs of the people of Pakistan, facilitating them in solving their problems at local level and ending acrimony on divisive issues, will act as catalyst to our progress and strengthen us as a nation. ConclusionDemocracy in Pakistan faced a host of difficulties which did not let the democratic principles, institutions and processes develop firm roots in the polity. Pakistan started with the parliamentary system of governance but the legacy of institutional imbalance and authoritarianism, problems encountered in the setting up of the new state, the external security pressures and the fear of the collapse of the state adversely affected the prospects of democracy. Other factors that caused the problems for democracy included the crisis of leadership in the aftermath of the demise of Jinnah, failure of the Muslim League to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party, fragmentation and degeneration of the political forces and the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite. Long before the first military takeover in October 1958 the dominant elite were talking about the unsuitability of liberal democracy for Pakistan.Intermittent constitutional and political breakdown, the ascendancy of the military to power and the efforts of the top brass of the military to introduce a political system that protected their professional and corporate interests made it difficult to create participatory political institutions and processes that could command the voluntary support of the diversified political interests. The military elite employed the democratic principles in a selective manner and their policy of co-option of a section of the political leaders and exclusion of others accentuated polarization and jeopardized the prospects of political accommodation and consensus-building.The experience suggests that democratic institutions and processes stabilize and mature if their natural evolution is not obstructed by partisan considerations. These must function in their true spirit over time, offering all citizens and groups an equal and fair opportunity to enter the political mainstream and compete for power and influence. This helps to build support for the political institutions and facilitates their sustainability. In Pakistan, periodic breakdown of the political order and repeated military take-over or attempts by the top brass to shape the political process to their political preferences did not ensure political continuity and the competing interest did not get equal opportunity to freely enter the political mainstream. .Democracy and the autonomy of civilian institutions and processes has been the major casualty of the expanded role of the military. Whenever Pakistan returned to civilian and constitutional rule, the quality of democracy remained poor. It is a case of democracy deficit. The long term endurance of the political institutions and the prospects of democracy faces four major challenges in Pakistan: the non-expansion of participatory opportunities for those viewed as adversaries by the military dominated regime, the poor performance of the elected assemblies, failure to build consensus on the operational norms of the political system, and a drift towards confrontation, religious and cultural intolerance and extremism.This does not mean that the people have given up on the primacy of the popular will, participatory governance, accountability of the rulers and governance for serving the people. The ideological commitment to these principles persists which will continue to question the legitimacy of non- participatory and authoritarian governance and political management.Unfortunately, when the gravest of problems stare us in the face, we tend to ignore them only because we cant do anything about them. As an expression of our helplessness, we just like to carry on with life, at times even ridiculing those who speak of the need for things to be set right. As a country and as a nation, at this critical juncture in our history we cannot leave ourselves to the vagaries of time or at the mercy of our corrupt and incompetent rulers. We cant even innocently continue to believe that everything will be all right, magically or providentially.We must remember that Pakistan of 1947 could not survive even for twenty five years. Despite the 1973 Constitution, the remaining Pakistan continues to face threat of further disintegration mainly due to unaddressed concerns of different regions. These are exceptional times warranting exceptional responses to our problems. We must avoid reaching points of no return. The nation desperately looks for an alternative, someone with integrity and credibility and a vision with an able team to remake the State of Pakistan like Malaysias Mahathir and Singapores Lee Kuan Yew.To avert the vicious cycle of known tragedies, we need a serious and purposeful national effort involving a holistic review of our governmental system and a parallel discourse among major political stakeholders and key civil society segments including the media and lawyers community to explore and evolve a national remedial and recovery plan before it is too late. Elections alone will not make any difference. They are just another exploitative exercise in which the power of wealth and feudal control remain the decisive factor. For qualitative change in the country, the system itself must change.

BUREAUCRACY: PILL OR PANACEAA CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTANDr. Aftab Ahmed Mangi, Dr. Hakim Ali Kanasro, Prof. Dr. Aslam Pervez MemonABSTRACTPakistan came in to being on 14 august 1947 under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah who became its first Governor General. It consisted of Muslim majority areas Bengal, Punjab, N.W.F.P, the Tribal areas, Sindh and Baluchistan, these were the parts of old British colony of the India. It was a country facing short resources for existence, seeking security and stability to maintain its identity. As a new born country its prime task was to develop a strong bureaucracy and political system to build a national integrity as the founder said the foundations of your state have been laid, and it is now for you to build. For the lack of administrative talent, political and administrative structure then followed the legacies of the British Raj left behind. The main problem of administrative development in the new state had to change the colonial bureaucratic practice with a new standard but imposed a highly centralized constitutional system by the government and could not change the old bureaucratic practice in a country which was physically and culturally distinct. As a developing country, the focus should have had been to change new concept from the colonial experience and the Western concept of bureaucratic as Riggs suggested for developing countries to bring about the desired change for political and economic stability which were fundamentals for leading a country to modernization.Keywords: Bureaucracy, Government, Colonial, Policies, Elites.IntroductionThere are two versions of the discussion which are the bureaucracy is good when it provide services to the inhabitants in the country keep justice, intact law and order and maintain peace final results is prosperity and sustainable growth in the economy. The second is bureaucracy is worst when it causes and nourishes nepotisms, corruption at grassroots level, lack competencies and promotes anarchy which leads to the failure of weak democracies. In the research paper it has been tried to outline the exploitation that has happened due to the bureaucratic involvement in the politics and could not focus duties and responsibilities. One cannot discredit bureaucracys achievements in the developed countries for providing essential services to the people but in the growth of democratic government or provincial autonomy it deemed not very conductive (Khalid B. Sayeed 1967). In the Report of Sindh Special Court of Inquiry, it had been proposed that secretaries should be allowed to draw attention of the Governor if the ministers disregarded the rules of business. Understanding the term bureaucracy can be traced to the writings of a German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), he said bureaucratic system is one in which officials have defined behavioral characteristics: the bureaucratic administrator must ultimately be compliant and must be prepared to administer rules peacefully; this meant that bureaucratic system develops more as possible. The focus was on the incapability of individual bureaucrats to follow the organizational policy due to a set of bad inducement that were uneven with the goals of bureaucracy. The ideas of the unsuccessful states contrasts from that of the delicate state has absence of ability and have to raise an environment favorable to stand progress. Bureaucracy must be above and beyond political the loyalty they are to serve the people not to one political person and the main function of the bureaucrat is to provide service to people with no political coalition and interference. There is a need to initiative the safety, tenure and control of the exceptional powers of rulers for appointments, transfers and promotions of public officials. The renovation of Pakistans bureaucracies has to commence with returning to the rule of system in bureaucracy and make sure protection of tenure with accountability. There is the prior need of job security of civil servants the political based decisions on promotion, recruitment, removal and career side for the officials makes disappointment among bureaucrats. The ever growing quantity of vacancies focus to political recruitments all back to decreasing competence of the bureaucrats. The connection between performance, reward and individual merit is uncontrolled due to political involvements and the effectiveness and output of the organization is bargained.Literature ReviewIt was argued in 18th century in France by De Gournay. Ferrel Heady (1984) stated that here are four different sets of meanings of bureaucracy. (1) A system of rule or governmental system in which official dominate. (2) Method of conduct the application of General rules. (3) The past explanation is concept of bureaucracy as Efficiency or inefficiency. Herman Finer (1945) said that the weaknesses of public bureaucrats in the action of their responsibilities creates the illness named bureaucracy, There are corrective, but not to the point of excellence, according to this concept bureaucracy is at best efficiency, involving unnecessary rules and procedures, and at worst the stifling of all initiatives by using these rules and procedures to block them; (4) bureaucracy refers to those who work in bureaus. Historical roots of Pakistani bureaucracy under the British colonial law and traces that the British structure of administration was established to uniform the desires of a colonial influence. In Pakistan the system of bureaucratic rules and regulations were not combined with much alteration at the time of freedom. The alternative to resolve the problem immediate and making grounds for future policies the government exceeded to creating bureaucratic control over politicians. The assumption arise that a centralized bureaucracy was influenced by Punjab province and it created reservations among the other province that their lack of development is due to the lesser access in decision-making at the national level and it presume even today. The reforms of civil services in 1973 established and a new system of common training program was compulsory at the civil services academy, Lahore. Classes among the government servants were eliminated and change by integrated grading system and the first batch accepted as the 1 st common. Lateral entry was introduced which was a direct risk to the bureaucrats because now political appointees would be a part of their system. There was a clash between civil servants who were armed with extraordinary powers, and politicians. The Chief Secretary, who was the head of the entire civil service of the province, was buildup an enormous amount of power for the purpose of better efficiency and coordination. The Chief Secretary was from Punjab and the civil service in the province was dominated by Punjabi and Urdu speaking people who had migrated from India. There was no meeting of minds among Bureaucratic elites and created a conflict between them and it became harmful in the political, social and institutional setting. The environment change into differences when one considered that the politicians of Punjab were much closer to their civil servants and military officers than the others could ever be Khalid B. Sayeed (1967). The Punjab province felt that to counter the aspirations of the Bengali Majority and Bengalis would obviously come to complain that their slight majority was being undermined through the principle of equality. Charles H. Kennedy. (1987) Describes that Pakistan as a bureaucratic state and its dominant rule in country, lobbying of the bureaucracy since the 1973 reforms. Ralph Briabanti (1967) Debates several sides of the administration it comprises serious evidence and can be used as a reference. Heeger, Gerald A. (1977) claims that Bureaucratic supremacy in Pakistan caused not due to supremacy of organization but the domination of government departments by the bureaucrats. The works on bureaucracy is mostly derived from the effort of German social scientist Max Weber in the 19th century. Weber (1968) in his view the bureaucrat has to follow these standards: Rationality, Specialization, political neutrality, Merit recruitment and long term career rankings. Bureaucrat has to offer the plan for assessing the unsympathetic role to the ruling party but ensure neutrality and the responsibilities of the bureaucrat are to enforcement actual policy as a part of their job. The regulations give the basis for bureaucracy that to achieve goal, protect political intervention, and urges to follow the standard of authority.Characteristics of Healthier BureaucracyBureaucracy is not the only cause of failure in the national development but political leaders and military interventions are also responsible. The common view is that the bureaucracy is responsible because of their corruption, nepotism, usual incompetence and thrust power beyond this illness there are the reasons counted as socio-political and socio-economic as an institution it is considered ill-organized. It means as an organization itself is not only responsible. There is no confusion that if state is able to give services based on rule of law, and bring prosperity to the public effectively it may be because of good bureaucracy. Pakistan is a country of180 million people cannot be managed without effective bureaucracy having rules, neutral decision making and proper training finally political neutrality, free organizational conduct covered by law and then hard accountability. The Politicians have confused the bureaucracy and turned it into a tool to serve their interest instead of public. Good bureaucrat playes role faire and follow rules, hierarchy of authority, accountability and professional ethics. The Politics have no role in administration but they have to follow the laws, goals and to decide strategy. The renovating laws and policies into proceedings is the job of bureaucracy, which are to be passed in clear and answerable ways. Bureaucracy can be successful only if it has the protection from the vindictive actions of rulers. Coverage of bureaucracy to the people and analysis medias watch will make them able to shrink the scale of dishonesty and to bring administrative improvement. Political parties are making pledge of carry peace, security, and provide jobs, minimize. The bureaucrats have recognized political intervention as a main concern. There is further need to investigate how to strengthening Pakistani bureaucracy; and to assess their observations in the bureaucracy where they were the part, their observation about them, their community, their superiors, and the organization they stand for. The bureaucrat be allocated to the position based on merit, and it would be his performance that would be enough to obtain him to the next level. All bureaucrats would work based on principles of hard work and free and neutral in judgment, no benefit to be achieved from favoritism with the political leaders and their impartiality also means that no political incursion in recruitments of public servants the appointments are only on the basis of merit. Political impartiality provides the sense of security to bureaucrat it is observed. The common view is that, if public service is provided freedom to work according to law and avoid to favoritism by the political government and intervention from any political part that can be more effecti