wwii 14th air force intelligence report

8/9/2019 WWII 14th Air Force Intelligence Report

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I 1ST I 3 "LI E,

TELLICENCESUMMARY

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EK ENDING :r,s7py No - . : J l ._ '*oUNCLASSIFSHEET PREPARED 24 SCU ED BY 2201ST ENGR.AVN REGT


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^ B y authority of theCommanding General,14th Air Force2 September 1945

FINAL ISSUE

FOURTEENTH A I R FORCE HEADQUARTERSW E E K L Y I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y

Transfer of 14th Air Fore Headquarters during early August preventedreg ula r public atio n of the 8 and 15August Weekly Intelligence SummariesWith tfee cessation* fcheaj, pf ho&til*i t i e s i t was thought approfirlafc topostpone th nxt issu e u n t i l o ff ic ia lV*tf Bay t o incittd a 3\amraaiy iactivity during the fin al two wholesof eanbat# Moreover, boe&us* the 14thAir Fore Saamayy hcta almod rin Itsinception to synthesize and disseminatonly such information as bor ljnmdiately upon the 14th Air Force mis a ionag ains t the enemy wi thin the ChinaTheater, i t is furth er approp riatethat with the successful conclusion ofthat mission the Weekly IntelligenceSummary should, with th is is sve , appearfor the last time*

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SENTOURTIESTH 1 RENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSESJULY 1942- AUGUST 1945AERIAL COMBAT ON GROUND TOTALDESTROYED 1291 1057 2348PROBABLY DESTRD. 558 220 778

VSC.AIF 8 FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE LOSSES

AIR COMBAT - GROUND FIRE - ON GROUND464

ENEMY SHIPPING LOSSESJULY 1942 - AUGUST 1945SUNK PROBABLY SUNK DAMAGED

9 9 4 , 3 8 9 TONS 414,700 TONS 861,600 TONS

TOTAL-2,270,689 TONS

REPRODUCED BY 2 20 IS T ENGR. AVN . REGT.


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ENEMY TRANSPORTATION LOSSESLOCOMOTIVES R.R.CARS TRUCKS BRIDGESAPPROACHES

DESTROYED 1072 1243 4783 573

DAMAGED 2707 5725 7354 654

CASUALTIES INFLICTEDBY AIR ATTACK

PERSONNEL HORSES

66,782 19,757

REPRODUCED BY 22 0 ) ST ENGR. AVN. REGT


5/42

SUMMARY OP THE WEEKSDuring the--week 2 - 8 A ugus t ope ra t i ons o f t h e 1 4 t h Air Force dropped sh arp ly as a r e s u l t of bad weather andthe commencement.of 10th Air Force operat io ns in C hina,Total mis sio ns flown were on ly 85 as compared to 235last v/eek. Combat sorties decreased also from 627 to 257.P-51 's few 160 s o r t i e s ; B- 25 's, 4 6; P-47s, 30; F-5s, 7 ;F -6 f s, 6; P-61s, 4; P-40s, 4; and P -3 8 's , 0 ,Only 658 br ief ed tr an sp or t s o rt ie s were flown duringthe week, about one-ha lf the us ua l number .Lea fle ts were dropped over ta rg e ts from French Indo-China to Worth China, Ho con sol ida ted fig ure s on t o t a ldroppings were available*

. . . . - w

.There were no in te rc ep tio ns repo rted during the week.One twin-engin e and on*e si nglq -e ngin e plane were damagedby s tr a fi n g a t TSINAN a i r f i e l d . One 14th Air Force planewas destroyed by ground f i r e .Targ ets ranged from th e North China ra il ro ad s southto the North River area# No miss ions wero flown th is weekin French Indo-China. ^Bridges, ro ll in g stock , ri v e r

shipping, troop concentrations, convo;?-movements, groundin st al la ti o n s and build ings wore, atta ck ed . In add itionseme missions were flown in co op erat ion with th e Chineseground forces in the CHJANHSIEN-Jil TGYANG-.PAOCHING area ,and in the nor thern SICHWM are a .In North China there were 24 f ig h te r , 3 medium bomber,and 1 esc or ted medium bomber combat miss ion s flow n. Th eirp ri n ci p al ta rg et s were ra il ro a d brid ges along the PINGEAN,the TSINFU, the TUNGPU and the LUNGHAI r a i l r o a d s . At l e a s t15 br idge s were rep or ted damaged or rende red com pletelyun se rv ic ea b le . 81 locomotives and an uncs timated numberof ra il ro a d cars were destro yed or damaged.Honan Province was attacked only oneG .-"by f ig h te rsin the SICHV7AN b a t t l e a re a , A Japanese hoadquart-ers fbu ild in gs , were att ac ke d and damaged and an unostitnetednumber, of c as u al ti es was in fl ic te d *The YANGTZE River area around EANKOW was a ttacked onceby f i g h te rs . In this a t tac k 12 x-150f barges were damaged.In Kunan Prov ince th ere were 12 combat f ig ht or and5 medium bomber miss ion s flow n. Those woro co nc en tra ted incooperation with the ground forces a ttac kin g in th is ar ea .SINNING was bombed and strc-fod on at le a s t 4 o ccasio ns .

Bu ildi ng s, tr en ch es , p il lb o x es , e sp ec ia lly in SINNINGwore ..heavily bombed and s t r a f e d . Six teen P- 51 !s"at tackodin one missio n, and 15 in an othe r on th is area incon cen trated ra id s* Convoys which were s t i l moving up*th e SIAMG River v a ll ey wore bombed and st ra fe d co nt inuo us ly .H3NGYANG, PAOCHING and CHCJANHSIEN wore a l l a ttacked asdirected by panels .


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Kiangsi Province was attacked only 4 timos by fightersin tho KAN River va l le y. JB H K ^^ ^^ R ja pa ne so withdrawalin th i s area had boon completed. B uildin gs and supplydumps woro dest roye d and an est im ated 100 Japanese tro op swore ki l led.

t; In KWANGTUNG Province the NORTH River area was a t tackedtwico by f ig h te r s and once by esco rt ed medium bombers*From YINGTAK to SAI-SHUI 20 sampans were damaged and 2cargo boats 'wo re-'sunk* From ICHANG to LOKCPIONG, 11 junkswere destroyed or damaged*Due to reg rou pin g of u n i t s no m iss ions were flown inFrench Indo-China t h i s week. * .

#

During the week 9-15 August op6rations of the 14thAir Force were further reduced. Total missions flown wereonly 68. as compared to 85 last-week. Combat sorties alsodecreased from 257 to 219# P-51's flew 174 sorties;B-25 fs, 21 ; P-47's, 1 3; P-61's, 7; and F-5's, 4.Only 381 briefed transport sorties were flown duringthe week.

. Leaflets were dropped in North China -in the SIANGand YANGTZE River areas and around CANTON, No figureson total leaflet droppings wore available.No enemy interceptions were reported during the week.No planes were destroyed on the ground and no 14th AirForce planes were lost to ground fire.Targets were localized In three general areast theNorth China, railroads, YANGTZE River area and in HUNANProvinceo Rolling stocky river shipping, warehouses and

troop concentrations were attacked.In North China there were 19 combat fighter missions-flown* Their targets wore bridges on the T-SINPU, TUNGPU.and PINGHAN railroads Locomotives and railroad cars worodestroyed or damaged. In addition ground targets .woro *attacked at PUCHOW, YUHSIANG, TUNGCHEN, and FENTINGTUKOW.In these attacks warehouses and other buildings weredestroyed, gun positions wore hit and an uno-stlmatodnumber of casualties was inflicted*Eleven fighter and one escorted medium bomber combatmissions were flown. These missions attacked shipping

from.HANKOW to POYANG LAKE damaging or destroying 33sampans, 38 junks, 44 boats and 16 steamers of more than100 foot. Buildings and warehouses In towns along thisroute were also attacked. In.HUNAN Province there wore- 16 fighter, 6 mediumbomber and 1 escorted medium bomber combat missionsflown* Supply and troop movements north from HENGYANG and


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CHANGSHA wore attacked. Thereagainst the enemy troopof LILING and ISUHO PERRY. Many buildings wore destroyed.Rivor shipping was heavily bombed and strafed with143 junks, 104 sampans and 13 large boats reporteddestroyed or damaged.

Since the cessation of hostilities 14th Air Porcomissions have been of a reconnaissance, photo andleaflet-dropping natur e. Leaflets announcing thesurrender of Japan have boon dropped in a groat ma nyareas of occupied China.

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SUMMARY-OF GROUND OPERATIONS FROM 1 AUGUST t oTHE END OF HOSTILITIES

Japanese forces in Kunan conti nued th e i r withdraw aldur ing t h e l a s t two weeks of combat a c t i v i t y f a l l i n gback t o p r e p a r e d p o s i t i o n s in the TUNGANHSI2N a r e a , sou thwest of HSNG-YANG, Between t h i s po in t on the r a i l w a y and PAOCHING, due n o r t h , t h e enemy line had l a r g e l y d i s in te gr at ed , t roops hav ing evacuated to the PAOCHirG- area*Chinese operat ions along t h e l e n g t h of the Hunan re t reatroute rep resented only moderate p ressure d ire cte d atsever ing the r a i l ro a d and highway. In the PAOCHING andYOUNGFEfJG a r e a s , Chinese e lem ents ma in ta in ed contactalthough stubborn Japanese defense of these flankingpositions had successfully withstood whatever Chinesest re ng th had been ooznrai/bted. Cons tant a i r recon nai ssanceover the SIAHG River v a ll ey das clo sed an in ce ss an t flow,mo stly at ni g h t, of troo ps and sup plies, by r iv e r andconvoy toward CHANGSHA and XOCHOW. M anifestly the enemyw as making an al l - o u t ef fo rt to s h if t the bu lk of manpowerand equipment reserves in Hunan to the HANKOW area fortra ns fe r northward, In Kwangtung Japanese forces had presented onlytoken resistance to attacks by Chinese regulars andcommandoes at TANCHUK during the first week of August*What had been a major Fourteenth Air Force base untilOctober of 1944 was again in Allied hands* Thereafter smallremaining.Japanese garrisons along the WEST River movedwith increasing speed toward CANTON, Meanwhile, east ofCANTON in the WAICEOW-PINGSHAN area marked concentrationswere reported similar in strength and the nature of theirpreparations to the concentrations preceding the initialwithdrawal movement from the 7/AICIIOW area in late Kay,Sources in southern Kwangtung anticipated a second major

withdrawal operation toward either EUKONG or KANCHOW,Troops and supplies were also gravitating toward CANTONfrom the south. However, there were no indications that23rd Array Headquarters or those of the South ChinaExpeditionary Forces were moving out of southern KWANGTUNGwhere approximately 60 - 75,000 Japanese troops appearedcommitted to the defense of the CANTON-HONGKONG areaagainst possible Allied landing operations, Enemy unitsstill held SV/ATOW in token strength as the eastern anchorof what had earlier represented a strongly fortifiedcoastal belt .In no rth ern Kiangsi Frovince during the la s t twovroeks of h o s t i l i t i e s the body of 15 - 18,000 troo ps movingno rt h along the KAN River v a ll ey had completed i t st ran s fe r to NANCHANG* Likew ise, th e movement eastw ardfrom the CEAHGSKA-HE&GYANG- area of ,a s im ila r sized body-had merged w ith-those from the south in th e NANCHANGK ItTEIANG aro a , Tho s e m o v in g o a s t f rom th e SIANG Val leyrep res ente d the bulk of two di vi sio ns seeking to avoidheavy lo ss es in per son nel and equipment being suf fere dby enemy for ces in tho congested narrow tr a n s i t co rri do rfrom CKANGSHA through YOCHOW t-3 HANKOW, 14th Air Force


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fighters flying ciay and night missions OVGT the SIANG Valleywere inflicting sufficiently heavy d a m a ^ to force diversionof troops and supply colunns from this"corridor eastward toNANCIIANG* Such diversion, however,' proved only partiallysuccessful in escaping attack; fighters and medium bombersranged almost daily from CKIHKIAKG into north KIANG'SI strikingat moving columns and supply area s. Throughout the courseof these withdrawals through the Chinese 9th War Area, enemytroops vjore: forced to resist constant harassing activities"by Chinese olononts under the command of General Ksieh Yo tFTho Tiger" - Conmandor of the 9th War Area. At the outsetof the JananosG movement north from KAFCIIOW down the K MRiver valley .toward, NAECIIAIIG, General Hsieh had candidlystated that ho could not hope to prevent the operation withforces and equipment then available") to hi m But he assuredunrelenting harassment so long as the. enemy was with in thearea for which he had assumod responsibility, Ke made goodKis 'promises*

Alons; the length of the YANGTZE River valley fromIIA1TKOW to^ NANKING and SHANGHAI the ground situation was fluid.Into HANKOW wore gravitating outlying garrisons in the BulgeArea - principally froiu KINGMSN, TAN07AHG- and ICHANG, thepoint on the YANGTZE beyond which the Japanese failed topenetrate from, late fall in 1938 until the end of the war.Traffic counts taken at arbitrary points along the PingHanRailway north of IIA1TKOY7 showed a large preponderance of trafficmoving north with only incidental .supplies being shippedsouth* Movement was n o longer restricted to the protectionof''daylight-hours attesting to the mounting urgency oftransferring men and supplies to the north* Transit downthe YANGTZE River was equally dressing, although hamperedb: extensive mining of the river. Special barracks areas andadministrative posts had been established betweenKIUKIANGand WTJHU to accommodate large bodies of enemy troops

Fragmentary infornation from Honan indicated whatappeared to bo substantial troop movements eastward fromextensively prepared positions along the HAN and Till! Riversin western Eonan*. Since., early Juno whan determined Chinesedefenders stalled the enemy's westward drive in the mountainsbetween HANYANG and HSIA2J, Japanese strategists abandonedthe campaign for the 14th Air Poreo northern pattern offields in favor of securing defenses along the western edgeof the. Honan buffer zone protecting the PingHan Railway.Fully cognisant of the rehabilitation program among Chinesearmies constituting an increasing countor-offensive threat totheir positions throughout central and north-central China,the Japanese progressively committed men and material to "strengthening western defenses. Applied to the Honan area,the policy called for expanded defenses .at HSIHSIAKOU,SICEWAN, LIKUAHCHIAO, and LAOHOKOW to oppose possibleChinese operations directed at the progressively crucialPingHan corridor. Despite continuing troop movements outof the defensive area, there was evidence to supportthe assumption that enemy strength along the HAN and TANRivers was being maintained through adequate replacement.Throughout the remainder of North China, the characteristicpaucity of information continued to obscure specificdevelopments. Strength in the Yellow Hiver Bend and farthernorth in 'Shan si Province was being reduced. Progressive.


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deployment of strength ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^the Kiangsu coast was generali^aKkumid> aithd3gh"Sr iPel ligence was not su ffic ien tly spe cific to reveal un it s ,stren gths involved, or the de tail ed nature of c oastaldefenses* What could be safely demonstrated and supportedwas the gene ral impression of despe rate enemy e ff or ts toprepare vulnerable co as tal ar eas and major l in es of troopand supply movements aga ins t in ev it ab le A llie d atta ck*# *

Since the close of h o s t i l i t i e s , a Japanese documentsubmitted to Chinese m i l i t a ry a u th o r i t ie s at CHIHKIANGduring i n i t i a l surren der 'ne gotiation s revealed thepresence in China of 100,000 enemy troops under theJapanese 23rd Army Command, i . y . j in Kwangtung, the LuichowPeninsu la and Hainan Is la nd ; 350,000 troops in the areaunder 6th Area Army Command, i . e . Hunan,Kwangsi, andHupeh; 340,000 in the 6th and 13th Army a reas , i . e . , theYangtze River Valley, NANKING, SHANGHAI, and the Hang chowBay a re a ; 300,000 in North China. The to t a l fig ure accordingto the Japanese document wad 1,090,000 troops in China proper.The Japanese surre nde r to Chinese a u th o ri ti e s has forthe most par t been ord erly and in good f a i t h . In theKwangtung and coastal areas, the Japanese insisted uponcompletion of formal surrender "at the top" before lay ingdown arms. Reports from Hunan have de scribed ir re gu la rJapanese conduct in the PAOCHING area with loo ti ng , bu rn ing,and raping following the end of h o s t i l i t i e s . However,Genera l Ho Ying-ch in, Commander of a l l Chinese groundforc es, has of fic ia lly denied the re po rts , and regularizedne go tia tio ns have gone forward at assigned po ints in theHunan a re a . In North China an is o la te d insta nc e of insolen ceand bravado was repo rted wherein an ind iv id ua l Japanesega rr ison commander thre ate ne d to fig ht Independently andre so rt to gas in defending his po sitio n to the end. Gen erally,however, Japanese commanders and ra nks, a l ik e , areacknowledging th at the end has f in a ll y ar rive d and that thedefe at of th e ir cause .is complete and unequivocal*

x. V


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^?U . S. S. R

\O U T E R M O N G O L I A

M A N C H U Q I A

V

HSIAM

3 o CHEMGTU

'CHUNGKING

KUNMINGKVMCIYANG

WANNING

iKONG

F. l.C. 02.

5OUN0ASIES OF JAPANESE OCCUPATIONAT ENO OF H O S T I L I T I E SPQ EP ARE O BY A-Q SECTION 14T-M U.5.A.A.F.

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i iREPRODUCED BY 2201ST ENGR AVN REGT


12/42

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X xI O B J E C I V EXtrxI N T E L L I G E N C E tX Xt

X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X'-X-X-X-X

THE CURRENT CAPACITY OF CHINESE RAILROADS

DATA ON AIRFIELDS

C L I H A I E OF SHANGHAI

TRANSPORTATION - DAMAGE A!!D R E P A I R

LATE REPORTS OF P REV I O U S M I S S I O N S

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13/42

THE CURRENT CAPACITY OF CHINESE RAILROADS

1# The c a p i t u l a t i o n of tho Japanese armed forces inChina and th e r e s u l t i n g n e c e s s i t y of rapidly reoccupyingvas t a reas of t e r r i t o r y u n t i l now under enemy control, .poses a l o g i s t i c a l p ro b l e m of cons ide rab le magni tude .Not only must occupying tr oo ps be moved into key p o s i t i o n swi th t h e gr ea te s t d i s pa tch , bui? m i l i t a r y supp l ie s andequipment must be laid down in q u a n t i t i e s . t h a t w i l lc e r t a i n l y t a x t h e c a p a c i t y of a l l exis t ing means oft r a n s p o r t a t i o n . In add i t ion the re i s t he problem, equallyu r g e n t , of main ta in ing t h e civilian economy of the l a r g ej c i t i e s of the eas te rn seaboard .,! .;..2 I t i s ev iden t the re fore tha t an e v a l u a t i o n of the/ a c t u a l c u r r e n t s t a t u s of the v a r i o u s r a i l l i n e s i s ama t t e r of the f i r s t i mp o r t a n c e . The fo l lowing two r e p o r t sare presented f o r what va lu e th ey may have in determiningthe extent t o which tfrc China railroad system may beemployed as a ns we ri ng c u r r e n t l o g i s t i c a l n e e d s .

3 . The f i r s t r ep o rt , Military Traffic on theSouthern PingHan;Railwayf was prepared early in August,before V-J Day, by OSS, R & A, attached to A-2, 14thAir Force. It i s believ ed tha t th is gives a f a ir lyaccura te p ict u re of the amount of m ili ta ry tr a ff icac tu al ly moved by tho Japanese over the r a i l lin e betweenHANKOW and th e YELLOW River during tho l a t t e r part ofJune and the f i r s t half of Ju ly . There is no reason tobeliev e th at the capacity of the lin e has been m ate ria llyimproved since tha t da te* I t must be borne in mind th atoperations c it ed were ca rr ie d on at a time when tho li newas subject to inten sive ai r atta ck with the re su lt tha ta high percentage of tr a ff ic was lim ited to the hours ofdarkness* Fu ll twenty-four hour op era tion , under peacetime con dit ions , does not mean, however, tha t tr a f f iccould auto m atically be doubled or tr e b le d . As pointedout in the re po rt, one of the chief lim itin g fac tor s isthe curren t sho rtage of locom otives and i t seems mostimprobable that th is condition can be m at er ia llyre lie ved for some time to come.

4.. The second re p o rt , Current Status of Railroads inOccupied China, was prepared by M .I .S ., Washington, on13 Ju ly, 1945. Although a po rtion qf the m ate ria l in th isrepo rt duplica tes information previously presented in th isSummary, the rep or t is.rep rod uced hero in to to as atirioly synthesis of int ellig en ce on Chinese r a il r o a d s .Barring des truc tion of in st al la ti o n s by the Japanese orthrough g u e rr il la fig ht in g, i t appears probable that theca pa cit ies given, here represen t a close approximation ofthe cu rre nt s ta tu s of tho lines when due allowance is madefor the difference in gene ral op era ting -ef ficie nc y betweenwar-time- and peace-time conditions,* Such an a lt e ra ti o n instatu s is esp ecia lly applicable in J&Q case of the southernTatung-Puchow, the Poiping-Hankow, VHilliAftfi&iLkon-Hankowlines*


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MILITARY TRAFFIC ON THE .SOUTHERN PING-HAN RAILWAY(Prepared by R. & A, OSS, Attached t o 14th'AF Hqs#)

In t e l l i g e n c e s u p p l i e d "by t h e Office ' of S t r a t e g i cServ ices conce rn ing ra i lway t r a f f i c on the southern Ping-HanRR pro vi de s th e f i r s t d e t a i l e d i n fo rma t i o n on t ra ff ic movements a long th is s t r a t eg ic r a i l l in e* This informat ion in .turn affords a p a r t i a l c h e c k on the p r e s e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s ofthe l i ne .as . aff ect ed by Four teen th A ir Fore attacks onrai lw ay bridg es and ioco?:iotives. .

The data are in the form of claily re por ts on t ra inmovements nort h and sou th a t a po in t near KSINYANG (32-O6N,114-05E),.130 miles north of HANKOW. Such movements aro,re po rte d on 20 days during the 26-day pe riod from 24 Juno-,to 19 July 1945 , I t i s assumed in the a na ly si s which followsth at a l l tr a ff ic occurring on these 20 days was duly reported*Whether there were additional unreported movements.on theremaining' 6/days 'i s not known, bu t the 20 d ai ly re po rts canprobably be taken as rep res en tat ive of tra ff ic during themonths of June and July.From these r e p o r ts , supplemented by other info rmation ,i t appears th at the so uthern Pin^-Han was able, during Juneand July to carry a volume to tr a ff ic which was su b st an ti alin re la tio n to rou tine Japanese m il it ar y requirements inth is ar ea , though incapab le of handling heavy troo p andsupply movements and p a rt ic u la rl y of effe cti ng quicktransfe r between HANKOW and the YELLOW River, The l in e wasbeing operated well below i t s estimated ca pa city , eith orbecause no ad dit io na l t ra ff ic was required -for m il it a rypurposes, 'or because a dd it io n al locomotives could not bespared from other li nes * Air. at ta ck s had. no t reducedoperating ca pa city below the lev el req uired to meet tho

ord ina ry maintenance needs of the Japanese Army in th i sregio n, but they precluded it s use for la rg o- sc al e, speedy ro-deployment of combat di vi si on s to other a re a s .Traffic Pattern

Th irty-one northbound t ra in s to ta ll in g 723 cars, woreobserved on the 20 days between 24 June, and 19 Ju ly .-T heaverage d a i ly t ra in movement nort h toward HSIN-YANG wastherefore 1.5 t ra in s , or 36 c ar s.Southbound movement was only 85$ of northbound movement, tho 20-day t o t a l amounting to 25 tr a in s aggreg ating

613 c a r s . The average da i ly movement south from HSIN-YANGwas there fore 1.25 tr a in s , or 31 ca rsNorthbound t r a in s wore ap pa ren tly loaded more or le ssto capacity with Japanese troops and m ili ta ry su pp lie s.By c on tr a s t, of the to ta l of 613 car s moving south , 344(56$) were repo rted empty. In addi tion, many othe r ca rsmay have ca rr ie d only p a r t i a l l oa ds . This confirms otherground in te lli ge nc e ind ica ting th at inil ita ry movementsalong the southorn Ping-Plan in June and July were pro-don inan tly northward from HANKOW.


15/42

The average nor thb ou n^ ^^in 0| |A s 23 cars in le ng th .The average southbound teUBMJftl^Bo^cara. These trainlengths seem su rp ris in gl y long for th is r e la ti v e ly weakrailway* However, average t ra in tonnage remains low.Over hal f the southbound ca rs were emp ties ; while perhapsas many of 40$ of the northbound ca rs ca rr ie d troop s, anda high proportion of tho remainder carri ed t ru ck s, tan ks,and guns. This resu lte d in 'a com paratively li g h t tonnagepe r c a r. The sane number of 30-ton car s loaded to ca pa cit ywith heavy fr ei gh t might have requ ire d 50-75$ more lo co motives.,Rollin g sto ck in tho HANKOW yards to ta l l e d 141 cars

on 11 Ju ly and 136 ca rs on 21 Ju ly , Traf fic north andsouth a t HSIN-YANG du ring th is pe rio d averaged about 45cars each way per day. If the l a t t e r also ref le ct s tr af fi ca t HANKOW, tli is ind icates a 3 - t o - l ra ti o between r ol li ngstock in the yards and da ily ar ri v al s and de pa rtu re s.In othe r words, th e average turn -aroun d time a t HANKOW wasabout 3 day s, if al l cars observed were in serv ice* . .Of 20 northbound t ra in s for which a r r iv a l time a tHSIN-YANG is report ed , over ha lf (13) reached th at poin tbetween 0200 and 0700 hours in the m orning. Of 19 s ou thbound t r a i n s , 9 le f t HSIN-YANG between 1900 and 2400 hoursin the evening an'd 8 between 0600 and 0900 hours in the

morning, ' ' . ' . . . vT r o o p M o v e m e n t s '' ";/Northbound tr a ff ic was*almost 100$ m il i ta ry inch a ra c te r. Troop movement. predom inated, the t o t a l numberof troops moving no rth by r a i l during the 20 days beingrep or ted at 13,900 men. Tho average per day was 700; thoaverage per tr ai n 450, If a l l troops tra ve lle d in :boxcarsa t 50 men pe r ca r, ^ th ey occupied 280 ca rs or 40$ of thet o t a l . Movement a t ' t h i s r at e represents th e-t ran sfe r ofone fu ll inf ant ry div isio n with supporting Army u n it s(20,000 men) pe r month* . :Troop movement south by r a i l amounted to only 1,500men during the 20 repo rte d da ys . Tho average pe r day was.,there fo re only 75 ; the average por tr ai n 6 0. Presumablythese, were la rg el y replacomeis being shipped to .the HANKOWa r e a s . *

M il it ar y Supplies and EquipmentAt l e a s t 60$ of the 723 ca rs moving nor th throughHSIN-YANG were loaded w i th .m i l it a ry su pp lie s and equipment.Total amounts itemized in daily reports were as follows:

trucks 219tanks ' 118horses 800 .'cannon* (guns?) - 170am -unition (boxes) 1,900gasoline , a lcohol ,i 'G's , r i c e , clo th in g, etc.-*-- .


16/42

M ilit ar y froighiT tr a ff ic on"this sc al e, approximately20 freig ht cars per day, is also ju st about suf fici entto move in one month the equipment of a Japanese in fa ntr ydiv isio n as such di vi sio ns are l ik e ly to,-be equipped inChina today.Southbound freight movements, "by contrast, includedl i t t l e in the way of ammunition, ordnance., veh ic le s orfu el . They con siste d almost wholly of ri c e , s a l t , charcoal and bridge con struction materials probably als olargely for Japanese use.As in the case of troop movements th is contr as t

between northbound and southbound fre ig h t confirms thefact' th at the-Japanese have been usin g the Ping-Han,RR. to. carry out - evacuation of troops and equipment fromHANKOW ra th e r than rein forcem ent of the a rea .Effectiveness of Air Attacks in In te rd ic tin g T ra ffi c.

During the 4-week period under review the southernPing-Han was sub jec t to a number of a tt ac ks by Four teen thAir Force pla ne s. Daylight sweeps, or the fear of them,served to confine t r a g i c to nigh t movement duringfl yable wea ther . Bricl^e a tt acks south of HSIN-YANG hadput twp bridges out of serv ice a t the beginning of theper iod (24 June)* They remained out through, the la s tweek of June* and a t JLeast one of them through the f i r s ttwo weeks of Ju ly . . ' ' . . , -1 .

North of HSBT-YANG, in the s t r e tc h between HSBT-YANGand HSIN-CHT2NG, there were 5 su ccess fu l a ttacks on 4bridges during the period* At le as t one of these bridg eswas un se rvice ab le fron 24 June to 2 July and 2 to 4 ofthem (including by-passe s) a ft er th at d a te . On the en ti resouthern Ping-Han, th er ef or e, 3 bridg es wore out duringthe l a s t week of Juno and 3 to 5 brid ges during the f i r s t3 weeks of Ju ly , .*From the above tr a ff ic re po rts i t is evide nt th atthese opera tions ag ain st the Ping-Han, while occasioningdelays and temporary int er ru pt io ns , did not suffic e toin te rd ic t movements of troop s and sup plie s on the sec tionsouth of ESIN-YANG. Lacking evidence of congestion a tpoin ts north i t must bo concluded th at through tr af fi cto the YELLOW River was sa t i s f a c t o r i l y maintained a tth is lev e l . As noted above, car movements amounting t o 723 ca rsin 20 days, or 1,000 per month, are s u ff ic ie nt to tra ns fo rtroops northward at a ra te of one fu l l divi sio n of20^000 men with d iv is io n a l ordnance and equipment pe r

month* T*his includ es an a ll oca ti on of 650 c a rs .f o rsupp lie s and equipment. At 15 shor t tons per c ar, 650cars r ep rese nt a ca pa city of 9,000 tons per month* Actualtonnage moved was co ns idera bly below th is owing to thehigh proportion of trucks> ,.tanks, guns an d.ho rs es .


17/42

If pe rsonne l h|fd bG,e^;^Qy*^Py other means andthe railwa y given over en ti r e ly to movement of sup pliesand equipment, a movement of 1,000 fr e ig ht car s permonth each with a 15 ton load would haul 15,000 to n s .This larger tonnage could probably have been achievedwith the same number of locom otive s, fo r a 23-ca r tr a inwould s t i l ca rry los s than 350" to ns , which is no more ,than ha lf the tr a in load on most North China rai lways*M il itary supply to the amount of 15,000 shor t ton s'is a consid erable tonnage- in rel at io n to the ro utin erequirem ents of th e Japanese forc es in China* A ty pi ca lJapanese div ision which is engaged in garr iso n d u ty inChina with l i t t l e or*no combat a c ti v it y is estim ated to .requ ire no more than 600-750 m etri c tons of su pp lies.and replacements of equipment (excluding food, forage andconstruction materials loca l ly procured). In sharp f i t t ing of a continuous c ha ra ct er , "Its maintenance requirementsin'the field rise to 2,500-3,000 tons. Thus 15,000 shorttons per month Will meet the ga rris on needs of a t le a st15 di vi sio ns , or w ill maintain at lea st 4-5 div ision s inactive combat (excluding supply losses from air attack)*These est im ates are "cited here because of a commontendency to over-estimate the logistical requirements ofthe Japanese Army in China under p res en t condit io ns;also to under-estimate the Japanese ab il it y to maintain

the neces sary minimum of m il it a ry tr a ff ic even on r a i l ways under continuous a i r a t ta c k . (See R&A/OSS, Hq 14thAF, Supply Requirements of the Japanese Army in China,30 July 1945UI t may be added tha t even a t th is lev el of t r a f f i c ,the southern Ping^Han was probably being operated wellbelow capacity during most of June and July. There 'is noreason to assume th at the li ne even with tr a f f ic confinedto nig ht ope rations and delayed loy several damaged bridgescould not have handled 2 or 3 times the June--July'movement,or up to 30,000-50,000 tons p er month each way if the ,average load per car were as much as 15 to n s . This would

s t i l mean -only 3 to 5 tr a in s per day no rth and south,each c a r d in g 350 ton s;Locomotive requirem ents would be corresponding lyincrea sed, of co ur se . As many as 15 locomotives areprobably needed now to handle 1.5 t r a in s each1way perday on the 334-m ile run from HANKOW to the YELLOW River,for the average haul per engine under present conditionsis un lik ely to exceed 6(7-75'miles. To tre bl e the tr a ff icwould run the requirement up to ne ar ly 50 loco motive s.This number the Japanese could i l afford to devote toth is exposed and vu lne rable l in o except in an emergency,for th e ir to t a l North China pool has probably now been

reduced to no more than 700 locomotives in ope ration fora l l purposes. At. thi s lev el of tr a ff ic , too, congestionsof troops and supplies might develop in r a i l yards and atdamaged b ridg es , bring ing increased ri sk of lo sses fromst ra fing and bombing atta ck s*


18/42

I t should bo noJS8f>fihQt -a weakened l ine l ik e thePing-Han can only accomplish rath or slow movement oftr a f fi c , oven at i ts present low le v e l. To nove troopsand supplies the length of the sec tion below the YELLOWRiver probably takes 3 to 5 days now# The time nightwell be even longer if so larg e a proportio n of thetr a ff ic were not tro op s, tru c k s, ho rses , and southboundempties which can be trans-shipped across damaged bridgesno re -ea sil y than heavy m il it ar y freigh t* At present theelement of speed may bo of' com para tively l i t t l e momentto the Japanese providing they can maintain a stead yflow of t r a ff ic ; but in a ta ct ic al s i tuat ion dicta t ingrapid transfers''% 'of troops and supplie s -tine might wellbe the c r i t i c a l fac tor , . *The net r e su lt s of ai r at tac ks on th e southernPing-Han to da te , the n,"h as been to confine tr a ff icto m il it a ry movements of com paratively sm all pro po rtion sand comparatively slow speeds,. The tonnage'moved hasne ve rth eles s been appre ciable in terms of imriodiatoJapanese requirements* Complete int er di ct io n w il lreq uir e a more inte ns ive and continuous a tta ck on bridg esand other in s ta ll a ti o n s than has yet been undertaken*This conclusion i s e n ti re ly co ns iste nt w ith Europeanexpe rience, where very heavy and pe rs is te n t at tac ks wererequired to-cut through the cushion of non-ossentialtr af fic and" in te rd ic t the cr i t i c a l movements necessaryto sus tai n the German Army's fr o n t- li n e ope ration s*

# * #

CURRENT STATUS OF RAILROADS IN OCCUPIED CHINA,(Mil i tary In te l l igence Serv ice , Washing ton)

1+ General features* A ll t h e , t r u n k r a i l r o a d s ofOccupied China a r e s tandard 4f8g-" gauge except t h eP e n g - l i n g - t u - Taiwan sec t ion of the Tatung-Puchowr a i l r o a d and the Tungkuan-Luan line in Shansi which %are meter gauge* A ll l i n o s a r e single t racked except a'shor t sect ion of the Foiping-Mukden railroad betweenT'ang-shan and C h f i n - h u a n g - t a o . I t v/as former ly bel ievedt h a t t h e s e c t i o n of t h i s l i ne be tween 'Pe ip ing and T !ang-kuhad been double t ra ck ed by the Japanese , b u t r e c e n t a e r i a lphotos, while n o t abso lu te ly conc lus ive , seem t o i n d i c a t esingle tracking only* (Note: "From a s tudy of a v a i l a b l ep h o t o s , th e following general summary of the condi t ionof t h e t rackage i s compi led :1) Peiping t o Tanku - s i n g l e t r a c k .2) Tangku t o Tangshan - single except ' f o r 2 sho r tdoub le sec t ions .3) Tangshan t o Shanhaikwan - mostly double withsome s ing le se ct io ns 4) Shanhaikwan t o Mukden - 70 to 80% double t rackwith many short an d a few long s in g le t ra cksections .


19/42

I t has boon im possib le on tho ba sis of on l^ M^fe'sife-lT^tomedium sca le photos av ai labl e on the gre at er pa rt of theli n o , to. be completely accu rate in de lim iting the sin gleand double tra ck se c ti o n s. Soo: Rr ilroa ds in OccupiedChina, Special P . I . Report no . 40> Vol. X II I, The"P oipin--Mukdon Rai lroad , Eq. 14th A. F ., 5 Aug. 1945, p* 1 f f . )Tho lino s were o ri g in al ly w ell c onstruc ted and used stoneb a ll a s t and wooden s le ep e rs . The weight of r a i l s on mostof the s tand ard gauge lines is from 80 to 85 lbs* peryard, although thoso used on the Japanese constructe dPeiping-Chinhsien li ne and on the s ec tio ns in Shansi betweenT a-t 'u ng , Taiyuan, and -Shih-chia-chu.'ong arc be lieve d tobo possibly as ligh t as 60 lb s . Lighter r a i l s probablyY/ere als o used in tho reco ns tru ctio n of the southern pa rtof the Poiping-Hankow li ne and the Cant on-Hankow l i n o . Onthe meter gauge lin es 50 Ib . r a i l s are- us ed . Host of thebridges were stool structures with loading capacitiesvarying between HS20 and 3-50 . However, numerous b r id g es ,especia ll y on the Poiping-Eankow and Canton-J-Iankow l in e s ,have been so damaged, by a o r ia l att ac ks tha t th e ir cap acityhas been g reatl y reduced . In other cases temporary woodenst ru ct ur es are used to' rep lac e he av ily damaged or destroy edbr idges .

2 Current carry ing ca pac ity . The North China railwayshave a ra ted cap acity of 3,500,000 m etri c tons of fr ei gh tmonthly. Because of numerous d if f ic u lt ie s encountered inop era tion s, th is cap acity was not atta in ed during 1944,and it is believed tha t the ra ilr oa ds are curre ntly carryingnot more than 2,700,000 tons per month. These figures donot include troo p movements, for which no average ra teis av ai la bl e. No sim ilar ov erall estimates are av ailab lefor Central and South China ra il ro a d s, but i t is b elieve dth at tonnages ca rr ied on these lin os arc not lar ge andth at thoy arc oporat ing at much less than tho oro t ica 1capaci ty .

3 . Operating d if fi c u lt ie s. The d if fi c ul t ie s encounteredby tho China ra ilr oa ds are chi ef ly tho follow ing:a. Shortage of r o ll in g stock caused in par t by ahigh rate of meghanical breakdowns and air raid damage.Tho si tu at io n is fu rth er complicated by the use of larg enumbers of Uorth China cars in the Nanking-Shanghai area,tho Hankow area and on long freig ht ha uls to Manchuria andKorea. I t is estimated th at the r o ll in g stock of tho *v.-rthChina railways amounts to between 1,050 and 1,250 locomotives and 14,000 to 15,000 fr ei gh t ca rs , sev era l thousandof which for practical purposes are permanently in CentralChina or in Manchuria and Korea. If to tho above figure areadded the locomotives, and ca rs belonging to Ce ntra l Chinara ilr oa ds , i t Is believed that the to ta l roll in g stock ina l l of China would not exceed about 1,400 locomotives and

16,000 to 18,000 freig ht c a r s . Probably 25% of these locomotives are permanently out of use because of breakdowns ordamage from aerial attacks.b . Inadequate re pa ir ca pa cit y, caused more byshortage of m ate ria ls and ski lle d personnel than by lackof shop fac i l i t i es .c. Aerial attacks against bridges, shops, yards andother ins ta lla t i on s, as well as against roll in g stock.


20/42

d. Shortage of engineers, trainmen and otherrailway personnel, A largo proportion of the workersarc- Chinese, and they are inclined to desert becauseof fear of air attacks. e. Severe weather is known to have interferedvery seriously with rail operations during the wintermonths.

4. Capacities of individual lines. Captured documentsand other sources indicate that the Japanese rate themaximum, capacity of main lines at about 20 trains a dayIn each direction; that they consider' the mean capacityas 15 trains and the minimum "capacity as 8 trains. Uponthe basis of evidence- available as to actual operations,it is believed that these maximum capacities are practically never attained, and that the mean capacity morenearly represents the maximum number of trains which arelikely to be operated. In recent tines it is believedthat none of the railways have operated more than 12freight trains daily, and n many cases considerablyloss than that.

In the table below the estimated capacities ofthe various linos arc given in terms of short tons ofm ili ta ry supplies da ily in each d ir e c tio n . Tonnageca pa ci tie s fo r bulk commodities, such as coal and ore,would be about 30% gr ea ter than in the case of m il it a rysu ppl ie s, although the number of t ra in s d a ily wouldremain the same. All estimates take in to consid eratio ngrades, track cha ra cte r is t ics , and the trac t ive effortof locom otives known to have been used or li k e ly to beused on the lin es * Locomotives with a tr a c ti v e ef fortof from 30,000 to 32,000 lb s , a re believed to be usedon most of the standard linos of North China,Smaller locomotives are undoubtedly used on partsof thG Peiping-Hankow line. The use of a 0,000 lb.tractive effort locomotive has been issumed on thePGlping-Kukden lino and a 20,000 lb. ractive effortlocomotive on the motor gauge lines. The length oftrains generally vary from 25 to 40 cars. Cars varyin capacity from 15 to 50 metric tons with the majoritybeing 30 ton cars. The net load of military suppliesis estimated to average between 16 and 20 short tonsper car.

Estimated Capacities of China Railro ds(Short tons of military supplies daily in e h direction)Name of Net Load Max.Capa PracticalLine- per Train c i t y Operating; Capacity

Short Tons Trains Trains Short TonsDaily Daily DailyC an t on - Han k owLci-yang-Wu-ch'ang 200 800Pe ip ing-HankowHankow-Hsin-hsiang 400 4 1,600Hsin-hs i ang-Peip ing 700 15 10 7,000Shanghai-Nanking " 700 15 10 7,000T le n ts in-Pukow 700 15 10 7,000Lung-Hai 375 15 10 3,750


21/42

Nano of Practical "Lino 2r Train city Op era t ing C apa cItyJho Trains Trains Short Tonshort Tons Daily Daily Daily

Ts inan-Ts ing tao 700 15 10 7,000Tohsion-Shihchiachuang 700 15 10 7,0003h i.hch iachuang-Taiyuan 300 15 10 3,000Tatung-PuchowYung-chi-Ta iyuan 260 10 6 1,560T r, I yuan-T atun g 280 10 8 2,2


22/42

Tientsin-Pukow. Lino This is the nost. _ _ _ _ _ importantthoho railwaysf rallvTay connecting Centra l China with WorthChina, because i t has boon loss se rio us ly affectedby a e ri a l at tac ks and because a l l sections have beenin operation fo r a long time* A larg e pe rcenta re of thocoal used in tho Shanghai-Nanking area is c arr ie d southon this li n o . It also car ries s na il qu an tities of s al tand other commercial goods, as well as m il it a ry su pplie s.Southbound tr a ff ic is estimated at a monthly r a te frori150,000 to 200,000 metr ic to ns . Northbound tr a f fi cca rr ie s co al, iron ore, rock phosphate, and otherexport commodities destin ed for Japan , Korea and1 anchukuo in addition to local freight. The estimatedmonthly ra te of movenent of northbound export commoditiesis from 50,000 to 100,000 metr ic to ns . Current informationind ica tes tha t only about 10 fr e ig h t tr a in s a day areoperating in each di recti on on the li n o . It s ru linggrade is *67 par cent* The r a i l fe rr ie s at Pukow whichconnect this line with the Shanghai-Nanking line havebeen damaged at various times by ae r ia l a tt ack s, bu t theyare pre sen tly in op eration .

8 Tatung-Puchow Lino* This ra i lroad , runningthe leng th of Shansi Province, is divided in to twosoctions.North from Taiyuan to Ta-tTung i t is standardgauge, The southern sectio n from F ong-ling -tu toTaiyuan i s motor gauge, thus making through tr a f fi cim possib le. The southernmost s ec tion of tho lino fromFe ng -ling- tu to Yung-chi has been destroyed fo r sometime, but from Yung-chi no rth tho line is in operation*Tra ffic on tho line has boon se rio us ly dis rup ted byae ria l a tta ck s, and at present trai ns operate only atn ig h t. One passenger and two 15-car fre ight tr a in snig ht ly in each dir ec tio n are reported In operationon the southern section s of tho li n e . The ru ling gradeon tho meter gauge sec tio n south of Taiyuan is 1,25per cent and on the standard gauge sec tio n betweenTaiyuan and Ta -t'ung is about 1.80 pe r ce nt ,

9. Peiping-Suiyutan Lino* This lin o is in operationthroughout its ' en ti re leng th of 508 m ile s, but hasoften been disrupted by g u e rr il la a c ti v it y in theKue i-sui-P ao-t'ou sec tor and has been subjected toa e ri a l attac ks in the Ta-tfung area, Tho section fromTa-t'ung to Poiping is especially important becauseof the c oal , iron o re , pig ir on, wool and other rawm ater ia ls which i t ca rr ie s from. Inner Mongolia toNorth China, for use th ere and for export to Japan,Korea and Manchuria. The estimated southeastern monthlyra te of movement of those commodities i s about 100,000metric tons , Tho capacity of the lin e is lim ited bygrades of 3,3 per cen t in tho Nan-k'ou Pass no rth ofiGipxng Large Mallet engines are used in th is pass ,but oven so, the net loadhe net load per tra in of m ili ta ry supplieswhich can be carried northward, through tho pass isestimated at about 250 short tons per tr a i n . I t isbelieve d that not over 8 to 10 tr a in s d ai ly normallyoperate over the section between Peiping and Ta-tfungand th at oven fewer t ra in s operate between T a-t fungand Pao-t fou.

". 4 - ~ V


23/42

10 * Peiping-Mukden Lino This is tho mostimportant line connecting North Chinp g h w i t h 1o r h l a n u r ian c hu r i aand is foolloved to have the highest cap acity of anyof tho railw ays in North China* Thus fa r i t has notboon seriou sly inte rfere d with by ae ri al attacks^although it has at tines been disrupted by guerrillaac tiv ity * It is believed c urre ntly to be devotingmost of f ts ca pa city to the movement of coal , ironore, pig iron, phosphate rock, aluminous shale, saltand other raw m ater ia ls to Eoroa and JTanchukuo and toKorea for export to Japan. Estimated curre nt no rth eastward movement of th ese commodities i s about 300,000n o tr ie tons per month* Current information wouldind icate th at only about 10-12 fre igh t tra in s da ilyare operating in each di rec tion on the lin o #

11 Foiping-Chinhsien Line* This proyv^os ana l te rn a te route connecting Ivlanchukuo and North China.It passes through very rough coun try, however, and isbelieved to be a very low capacity line* Operationsat times have boon s erio us ly in ter fe re d with byg ue rr i l la ac tiv ity , and at present i t is doubtful tha teven 5 tra in s da ily arc in o pera tion.

V- ,


24/42

DATA .ON AIRFIELDSIn t h e f o l l o w i n g l i s t of a i r f i e l d s , those have "boons e l e c t e d i n t e r r i t o ry fo rmer ly occup ied b y t h e enemywhich a r e n o s t l i k e l y t o bo of s e r v i c e t o o r along t h er o u t e s of ro*-occunying forces. Only t h e l e n g t h s a n dd i r e c t i o n s of runways a r e giv en , tog eth er wi th t h ec o n d i t i o n of t he f i e l d as i t can be determined fron t h ebe st and most rec en t photo cover a v a i la b l e .

HANKOW-WUCHANG AREAM i s s i o n 5 MA 8 7 , 2 0 Aug 1945

1 . HANKOW A/D ( 3 0 - 3 6 N , 1 1 4 - 1 5 E )4 NNE-SSW runways 5000' x 150 f, 4400* x 150',3300' x 160' and 3100' x 160' .2 WNW-ESE runways 4100 x 160 and 4600* x 270'.1 NW-SE runway 3500! x 160',Field serviceable.2. mi CHANG A/D (30*31N, 114-203)1 N-S runway 4400 ! x 175T1 3-W runway 4100' x 175'F ie ld serv iceab le*3.T7UCIIANG SAT, A/F (30-37N, 114-22E)1 ME-SSW runway 5300' x 380'F ie ld se rv iceab le .4 . HANEOW SAT A/F (30-35N, 114-08S)1 NE-SW runway 4900' x 180'F ie ld se rv iceab le .5 . TSIIIGSHAN L /S (30-38ET, 114-29E)1 NE-SV; runway 5000' x 250'Missions 5 MC 192 and 193, 24 Aug 1945.

Runway and taxi strips o/opear abandoned and overgrown, probably usablo only in emergency. /

SHIEHWEIZ/LO AREAMission 5 ME 16 6, 25 July 19451 . SIIIHHWEIYAO L/S (30-1 5N, 115 -04S )1 NV/-SE runway 4500' x 150'Ru nv/ay un s o rv ic oab 1 e.

KIUICIANG AREAMission 5 ME 17 2, 28 July 19451 . KIUKIANG A/F (29-4 8N, 115-5713)1 NS-SV: runway 3000' x 170 '1 NW-SE runway 3000' x 285 'Servicibility doubtful.


25/42

2* ERH T?AO KOW L/S (29-49N, 115-565)1 NW-SE runway 3 8 0 0 ^ ^ 0 0 ^S t r i p und ervic ofib itR "^-'v-*^r"3 , KIUKIANG SAT L/S (29-45N, 115-58E)1 NE-SW runway 4400' x 215 'St r i p u n s e rv i c e a b l e

NANCHANG.AREAMission 5 ME 179, 15 Aug 1945

1, NANCHANG A/P (28-38N, 115-52E)1 NNE-SS" runway 3275f x 320!Field limited operational2 . NAITCHANG L / S (28-42CT, ' 1 1 5 - 4 9 E )1 NNW-SS3 runway 5900' x 180'5 MS 176, 15 Aug 19.45Strip probably/sorvicGablG.un

ANKING ixRMission 5 MS N10, 20 ,.ug 19451 , A I ING A /P ( 3 0 - 3 2 N , 1 1 7 - 0 4 - E )1 NE-SW runway 4525* x 305'

Fie ld serviccable2, ANKING SAT A/F (30-3211,- 117-063)1 N3-SW runv;ay 5500 x 215'Fie ld se rv iceab le .

VLUCHOW AREAMission 5 MD 17 , 9 Fob 1945

1 . LUCHOW L/S (31-52N, 117-19E)1 E-W runway 2900' x 160'1 NW-SE runway 2500' x 250 'S t r i p u n s e r v i c e a b l e .

WUHU. AREAMission 5 MB 56, 10 June 1945

1 . WTJHU A/P (31-24N, 118-23E)2 E-VJ runways 3500' x 160 f and 2450' x 110'Fie ld se rv iceab leo

NANKING, ;,REAM i s s i o n 5 MB 7 4 , 24 Aug 19 451 . MING KU KUNG A/D (32-02N, 118-48E)1 NE-SW runway 2800' x 320 '1 Nw-SB runway 2600' x 320 'F i e l d s e r v i c e a b l e . .


26/42


27/42

5 . HINGHWA A/D & SEA PL/JffE BASS (3 1- 1 0N , 12 1- 27 E )1 N-S r u n w a y 5 4 0 0 ' x 4;?0? * *1 E-W runwav 4300 * x 420'1 1TE-SW runway 4300' x 420'1 I7YJ-SE runway SgOC x 420 H5 r.B 71 , 19 ,iU#945aA/D and Seaplane baso probably se rv ic ea bl e.

6 . TACI-LJTG A/D (31-18N, 121-25E)1 N-S. runway 4800' x 200'1 E-VJ runway 4800' x 200'1 NE-SV; runway 3400' x 220'1 NY/-SE runway 5200' x 220Fiold sorviceable,7. "700SIJNG .,/D (31-25K, 121-18S)1 HW-SS runway 5700' x 320'

1 NE-3W runway 3600' x 320'Field serviceable* S-W extension of -1TE-S7J runwaynrobably unserviceable*V

AREAMission TTtS 161, 20 July 19451, 3BTYANG A/F (32-04N, 114-06E)5 1 ENS-WSVf runwav 2900! x 125' (^od)1 1TNW-S3E runway 3400' x 125' (sod)Runways probably unserviceable .

-AFisTTon 5 1.ID 169, 26 July 194

l f CKENGESIEK A/F ( 3 4 - 4 4 1 ^ 113-44T3)j 1 IINE-SSV; runway 4500' x 165; Fie ld se rv iceable .2 . CHENGHSIEN SAT. L/S (34-43N, 113-43E); 1 VJNW-SSE runway 5300 f x 620 f1 NE-SW runway 5500? x 300f5 MD 150, 1 July 1945Str ip serviceable .

PUCHQU i,REAM i s s i o n 6'MC 164, 3. Aug 19451 . PIJCEOU A/P ( 3 4 - 5 5 N , 1 1 0 - 1 7 E )1 NE-SV; runway 4600' x 23 5 !F i e l d s o r v i c G a b l o *

-AAMT AREAHiss ion 5 MC 164, 3 Aug 19451. AHYI A/F (35-08N, 110-58E)1 E-"; runway 4800T x 240A/F appe ars abandoned. Runway u nse rv i ceab le .


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K i s s i o n 5 MC 1 6 4 , 3 *>uz 19451 . "&JNCHENG A/D ( 3 5 - O 2 1 T , 1 1 0 - 5 4 E )1 N3-SV/ runway 4700 ' x 3 2 0 f1 E-'J runway 4400f x 320'Field serviceable.

- / LIITFEN, ARE..M i s s i o n 5 EC 1 6 4 , 3 Aug 19 45

1 . LITTFEN A / F ( 3 6- 0 3H ,- I l l - o i l )1 M 3 - 3 S W r u n w a y 4 0 5 0 ' x 1 5 0 'Fie ld serviceable

L031UTG AREALlissicn 5 MC 167 , 4 Aug. 19451 . LOYANG A/P (34-43N, 112-24E)1 ENE-V/SW runway 3000 x 360Pie Id u n s o rv i c c a b l e

tLIOV/ RIVER-BRIDGE ^HEAMission 5 1-JC 158 , 31 J u l y 19451 , YELLOW RIVER BRIDGE L/S (34-59N, 113-34E)1 B-W runv/ay 5000f x 340 f ( sod)S t r i p

Mission 5 EC 172, 10 Aug 19451* ANYiiNG A/D (36-0811, 114-21E)1 NNE-SSU runway 4800 5 1 0 'Pio ld se rv iceab le-A .

SIFSI/J^TG ,,REAMission 5 HC 180, 14 Aug 19451 . "S INS IMG A/D (35-16N, 113-55E)1 NNS-SSl/ runway 5400 x 330 ' ( sod)

1 N-S runway 3350' x 330 !1 SNE-V/3W runway 3560 f .x 330'Fio ld se rv iceab le

Mission 5 M0 178 , 13 -ug 19451 . KAIFENG A/D (34-43H, 114-24E)1 NNS-S3V/ runway 4070' x 165Fie ld se rv iceab le .

-A ^ s & j ^


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OHUKIATSI AREAMission 5..MD 176, 4 Aug 1945

1 . CIIUKIAT3I A/F (34-26N, 115-443)1 N~S runway 4800' x 275' . Fie ld s e r v i c e a b l e . PSITG-PU AHSAMission 5 K 1A, 9 June 1945

1 . PE^GPU A/F(32- 57N, 117-2 53)1 NE-3W runway 5450* x 9 5 0 '1 NNS-S3W runway GOOO' x 950Field serviceable

SUCHOW AREAF i s s i o n 5 KG 1 6 7 , 4 Aur 19451 , STJGEGEOW A/D (34-17N, U7-12E)1 EN3-WSW runway 5000 ' x 320*1 MW-SSE runway 3300 x 5 0 0 ' ( s o d ) Field serviceable,2, SUCHOW A/F (34-18N, 117-103)1 N-S runway 2450 ! x 160f (sod) 1 S-W runway 2450 x 160 (sod)Field serviceable3 SUCHOW L /S (34-18N, 117-OGE) lNNE-SS'ir runway 3000* x 1 5 0 ' ( s o d )St r ip so rv icable#

- /

EAIGH0V7 AREAMiss ion 5 MG 1 3 5 , 12 J u l y 19451 . IIAICHOW A/F (34-36N, 119-083)No runways .Landing area s o d , 4000 f x 4000 'F i e l d s e rv i ceab l e .

Mission 5 KG 157 , 30 Ju ly 19451 # TAIYUAH A/D (37-56N, 112-31S)1 NNS-SSW runway 5500' x 2 3 0 '1 NW-SS runway 30001 x 320"Field serviceable*2* TAIYIJAN S A/F (37-4711, 112-36E)1 N-S runway 3000' x 240 'Fie ld probably se rv ic eab le , /

.SKIEGHIAGIIUANG AHEAMiss ion 6 Mb 13 4 , 12 J u l y 19451 . SIIIKCT;IACHUANG A/D (38-04N, 114-253)1 NW-SE runwaT 4 1 5 0 ' x 1 9 5 'Sod landing area 4500 x 1 5 0 0 ' 8c 5000 ' x 1 5 0 0 ' E andN of runway*F i e l d i s serviceable* 8

-18


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2 SFIECHJACHUANG L/S (38-03N, 114-4OE)1 N-S runway 5800f x 325*serviceable* /L'i*sTion'& 21ff166, 3 Au$ 1945

1. TTSISII-JN A/F (37-29N, l lo-223)1 T[-S runway 6800 l x 820'Field serviceable*

151,23 July 1945NCHS^ L/S (3G , )1 IT-3 landing rea ov'OC x 1SGOT graded anA rolled.servicocblo

en o JJ ', >Fission 5 tC 147, 19 July 1945l^TSIHA?- ' A/t) (o6-40H, 3.10-5513)

1 NEl-SSW imnwa-- 3900' x 340 '1 M3-SSW runv/ar 5000 ' x 7 0 0 ' (socl)1 im3-SSV' runway 3900' x 62 0 ' (sod )Flo Id .servic sable 2* TSBTAN Sat*"A/P (36-39:1, 116-543)No runway, sod. fiolo; 4000 ' x 3500'Pielcl irobrbl'5' sorvlceablo*-A

^ARBA3>"G 17 6, 11 Aug 1945GHMGTIELT A/?1 (3S-52H, 11S-00E)1 K-S runway .0300' x 625'Field serviceable** /

5lfC 190, S2 August 19451 . TSJlvOKTAO A/I) ( 3 6 - 1 0 1 ^ 120-24E)1 IT7-3:3 runwa'7 3790' x c90'1 TTS-sr runway 3575' x 520'Field sorvi.coa"ble.2 # TSINGTAO Seaplane Base (33-031! , 120-17S)2 concrete .soaplane i-'arnns 5 5 ' wide5 HC 185, 19 Aus 1G45Seaplane base rrobably serviceable3 LTI'TINa A/D (36-131?, 120-242)1 NN17-3SS runway 3400' x 170'1 ENS-T.V8W runway 3300* x 170'MC 165, 19 Aug 1945Bu ild ings on runwavs rend er f i e ld unservico'alxle /


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Mission 5* MD 122,. 24 May 1045LUMTSUN L/S (36-23^, 120-143)1 HW-SE runway 4000' x 620 'St r i p Drobably unservicea ble*

FAOTOU 4iT-iJAMission 5ltG 1 1 1 , 16 June 19451 . FAOTOU -A/F (40-35!?, 110-0233)1 NV7-SE runway 5200' x 3 5 0 'Field serviceable *.

-ATATUffG AI^AKi ss i on 5 KG 1 5 3 , 2 6 . J u l y 19451 . TATU1TG A/D (40-021T; 115-143)'1 NKW-SSZ runway 7200 f x 500T s o d ,F i o 1 cl s e rv ic eal) 1 e . -A

Kiss ion 5~IrC 96 , 23 Uay 1941. K/LLGAF A/> (40-471T, 1M-5C3)No run wa ys, aocl la nd in g ar ea 4300 x 3000*Fie ld probably u^ s e r v i c e a b l e 2 . KALGAIT S L/S (40 -4^ 114-53? ; )1 lTvw'-33 "runway 5300 f x G50 f 3o:?v i c ib H i t y d ouL> 11'u 1 3. KALGAN S/ L/S (4O-472T,' 114-52S)

1 NVf-SE runway 0500' x 660Field serviceable

4 . -HSUAIUnJA A /F (40-43IT, 114-57E)1 NW-SS ru n -ay 5000* x 230Sod lan din g ar ea 460 0' z: 2200v-aT u n s e r v i c e a b l e . -A

i^aTon 5 t!(T 155, 29 Ju l y 19451 . FAOTIKG A/F. (385^N, 115-3CS)1 NS-Sv; runway 3800 ! x 7 0 0 ' , sodSod "area 6800 1TITE-SSV? x 4500 ' 3Se rv i c i b i l i t T douo t fu l t

Hiss ion "5 MG 192 and 193 , 24 Aug 19451. NANYUA1T A/D (3C-47F, 116-241)

2 3-7 runways 2450 ! x 500 f, t 2550' x 185*1 S-V7 runway 3700' x 475', sod1 mi-S3 runway 343C s 630!1 E~!v runway 4150! x 200' .1 H-S runway 6550* x 630'2 1T-S runways 3200* x 60O & 3800' xFie Id s.erv ic eali


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2, LAF?IEITCEANG A/D (33-57N, 116-J1 K-S runwa^ 3200* x 210* '"1 N3-SW runwa^ 3000' x 1501 1TV;-S3 :^nwa7' 3000* x 150Flo Id ser vice abl e*3 . TUNGKSEH A/?1 (33-553$, 116-393)1. MS-SSV/ runway 5300< x 680 *Field serviceable*

Sf:7s r3TorrirW^193, 24 Aug 11 . TlSN^SIi;: A/D (39-0711, 117-22E)1 U!Tv"/-S3E runwar 3800 x 280*1 EN3-.7SW runwa7 370C1' x 200f1 FW-SE rvmviaj 3300f x 250fField serviceable

/HANiCJIOW .A?CALiission 5l.:?3 177, 16 Au; 1945

l riAFGC::ow A/D ( 3 0 - 2 0 1 , 120-141:)1 }!ES-SSW runwar- 4550 x 200 r1 NITW-SSE runway 2600 x 120^NS-SSV/ nmwa3 r so r v x ceab l e ,N N ' 7 - S S I J runway H a l t ed , s e r v i c ea b i l i t y .

Lisa io n 5 I-':s 1.77, 18 Ju ly 10451 WHITS CLOUJ A/D (2 3-10N, 113-15:3)1 N1TE-3SV/ ^nnwa- 426C f x 400

1 li;-r.V-3SE runway 37:;:0 x 300'Piold serviceable*

2* Q1 IIDH 110 A/D (23-03F, 113-192)1 H-S runwar 5000 * :c 320T1 -3-7/ 2-unway 3100* x 1901Field serv iceablo .3 UlTIVS SITY L/S (D3-07IT, Ho-2033)1 1T/-3.3 runway 5400 ;c 350'S t r ip a o iv ic o ab l a .4 . ^IIAIJ^OA L/S (23-081T, 113-243)1 H-S runway 5000' x 30 0'S t r i p s c rv i o o ab1e .5 . WRITS CLOUD SAT, A/F (93-14ZT, 113-17S)1 FKS-SSV/ runway 3700 x 330fPieId serviceab1o,


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AREAMission 5 1*57, 18 July 1945KAITAK A/D & Seaplane Base (22-12N, 114-12E)1 NW-SE runway 4400 x 310'1 ECTE-WSW runway 4500 x 180'2 seaplane rarapa 50 f wideField serviceable.

AMOY AREAM i s s i o n 26 P S - 6 rS-5M164-D32E2V( 2 6 - 3 9 ) , 15 J u n e 1 9 4 5 .

AMOY A/D (24 -32 IT , 11 8- 08 E )1 NS-SV/ runway 4200 x 30C 1 1TT7-SS ru nw ay 2 6 0 0 ! ' lo n g , u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n , F ie Id s e rv i c ea b 1 e /S-.7AT0W AREAMission 20RS-6RG 5M170-22 IV ( 1 - 2 9 ) ,19 June 1945

1 . K.ILOK A/F (23 -2 3N , 11G-41E )1 NS-SW runway 3900 f x 1 5 0 !1 NOT-SSE runway 3600* x 3 1 5 , s o d .Field serviceable -ANINGFO AREAM i s s i o n 5 MC 4 , 16 Jan 1945

1 . 1TINGP0 k/F ( 2 9 - 5 4 N , 1 2 1 - 3 3 E )1 WNW-ESE ininway 5600 x 470 'F i e l d u n s e r v i c e a b l e an d a b a n d o n e d */


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CLIMATE OP SHANGHAI(Taken f#om Ge ner al Cli ma ti c In for ma tio n Guide fro. 19;submit ted b y 1 4 t h A i r Force Sta ff Weather Off ice r*)LOCATION AND' TOPOGRAPHY

The area covered b y t h i s 311 id i s t h e p o r t i o n ofthe coas t of China imnediatoly south o f t h e YANGTZE R i v e r .The c i ty of SHANGHAI i s l o c a t e d on the l e f t (wes t ) bankof t h e HWANG-HJ (WHANG-POO) R iver 12 miles from t h e mouthof t h e YANGTZE R i v e r , The re a r c a few i n s i g n i f i c a n t h i l l sin t h e v i c i n i t y of SHANGHAI r e a c h i n g e l e v a t i o n s u p t o400 f e e t. There a r c high er mountains fa r t he r t o t h e west ,about 80 m iles from SHANGHAI, b u t they have only minorinfluence upon t h e c l im a te REPRESENTATIVE CLIMATIC STATION

The climate of the e s t u a r y of the YANGTZE River i sr ep resen ted by the observat ions taken a t ZI*-KA-WEI#(31-12N, 121-26E, elevation*22 feet)? A ll cl imat ic elements re pre se nt ed . in thi s guide a r e based on recordsof 10 to 62 ye'ars of observations except fo r c e i l i n g s , v i s i b i l i t i e s and wind frequencies f o r which 6 years ofobservations were used*GENERAL CLIMATIC CONDITIONS "' ; .

The climate of the lowo r YANGTZE Ri ve r v a l l e y i sgoverned es se nt ia lly by.tho la tern atio n of maritime t ro pi ca lair from the East China Sea and tho continental tropical(summer) and co nt inen ta l po lar a ir (winter) from thein te ri o r of the Eastern As iatic co ntin en t. The maingoverning influence upon- th o 'c lim ate is tho change of thoseasonal monsoon winds which, In w in te r, ca rry pola rco nt inen tal a i r from the in te ri o r t o the sea and, in summer,.maritime.1 tropical air from the sea to the continent*TEMPERATURE- ,.

The*interplay be tween winter and summer monsoons c r e a t e sa cons ider able range of t e m p e r a t u r e . The mean f o r Januaryis ,40 degrees b u t cold waves occ as i on al ly depress normal lyhigh and' the war-"eat month i s August (mean 83 d e g r e e s ) , Thoabsolute maximum 1*0corded is 104 degrees Under t h o i n f luenceof clear skies in w i n t e r , th o night temperature goes belowthe f re ez i ng poin t on as many as 16 days i n J a n u a r y . Insummer, d a i l y maxima f re q u e n tl y exce ed 90 degrees a n d , frcmthe middle of May t o t h o middle of Octo ber, d a i l y maxima of75 degrees a r e normal. .PRECIPITATION. '

P r e c i p i t a t i o n , in t h i s a rea ha s a very marked ann ualv a r i a t i o n * Of the a n n u a l t o t a l of 45 i n c h e s , t h e m a j o r i t yf a l l s In the' summer with a maximum value in July when 7inches a month a r e normal* T-he cool season (November throughFebrua ry ) , wh i l e n o t a c t u a l l y d r y , h a s m e a n p r e c i p i t a t i o n^Located 5 miles west o f t h e c i t y of SIIANGK.


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below 2 inches. During tho sunnier monsoon, ex cess iv eamounts of p r e c i p i t a t i o n arc occasionally observed v/itha 24 hour maximum of 10 inches . Tho maximum monthly amountobserved is 19.4 inc hes . Long la st in g rain y sp el ls(7 or noro successive days) arc infrequent and c o n s t i t u t eless than 5% of tho cases in most months, July is anexception with 10$ of th e cases of ra in spe l l s l a s t ing7 d$ys or longer . The major i ty of a l l r a iny spe l l s ,however, la st, le ss than 3 days i n a l l seasons In March,April, August and October, nearly 75$ of a l l ra iny spoi lslast only 1 or 2 days in succession. Snowfalls areobserved nearly every year in the form of light snowf l u r r i e s , bu t .snow covers arc observed on the ground onlyin ex ception al, cases*CLOUDINESS . , .

Cloudiness i s relatively high from January throughSeptember. In tfhese months, more than .6 mean sky cover:5s observed with a peak of near ly .8 during the heightof the summer monsoon in Juno t From October throughDecember, moan cloudiness i s between .5 and .6.. DuringMay and June, 18 to 20 days a month a re cloudy (meansky cover more than 8 ) . ; Clear days during these samemonths (mean sky cover less than #2) can bo expected onlya t th e r a t e of 2 a month* From October through January,about 8 or 9 days a month a re c l e a r . Low c e i l i ngs are^ra the r r a re and do not occur on more than about 6 daysa year .FOG AND VISIBLITIES

Dense fog occurs on 3 to 4 days a month at theheight of the summer monsoon but is not unknown at anyse a son . V i s ib i l i t i e s ' be low 1-J- miles occur on 7 to 9days a month in the early morning hours from Novemberthrough March. Vis ibi l i t ies a re usua l ly be t t e r in daytime,although, during he winter, dust burdened a i r massesfrom tho i n t e r i o r of China are comraon and exce l len tv i s i b i l i t i e s a r e , r a r e . Tho lowest frequency of poorv i s i b i l i t i e s occurs from July through September, andg o o d v i s i b i l i t i e s aro prevalent in those months,e spe c ia l ly in daytime.WINDS ' ,

W i n d v e l o c i t i e s i n SHANGHAI a r e g e n e r a l l y l i g h t t ofre sh with calms and gale s occ urrin g only r a r e l y . FromAugust through November over 40$ of tho observed windv e lo c it ie s exceed 18 m .p.h . The change in pr ev ail ingwind d ir e ct io n s between w inte r and summer is s t r i k i n g .In winter , 61% of a l l winds come from tho no rther nqu adrant (N, NE, NW); in summer about 68$ of a l l w indsare from the southeastern quadrant (S, SE, S).Occasionally typhoons from the China Sea strike at thecoast n ea r SHANGIi/lI and extreme wind ve lo c i t ie s over80 moph have been observed in conjun ction v/ith th es estorms*


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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMPARABLE U.S. STATION

The climate of SHANGHAI Is most closely comparable'to that of Allondalo, South Carolina, 60 miles northof Savannah, Georgia. Moan January temperature forSHANGHAI is 40 degrees compared to 48 for Allendalo.The mean July temperature for both places is 83 degrees.The absolute n in mum. temperature is 10 degrees inboth places. The absolute maximum is 104 degrees inSHANGHAI compared with 106 degrees for Allendale.The total annual precipitation is 45 inches for SHANGHAI,44 inches for Allendale Maximum precipitation forSHANGHAI occurs in June while the maximum in Allendalefalls in July* However, while there is a slight monsoontendency In wind distribution in South Carolina, nostriking reversal of prevailing seasonal winds asobserved in SHANGHAI takes pla ce.AIR OPERATIONS (GENERAL)THUNDTHF-STORMS JU N E -A U G U S T 3 -6 D A Y S / M O D E C . - JA NNONE.S E V E R E IC IN G DEC-FSB 1-2 DAYS/MO.APRIL-SEPT

ABOVE 13000CEILING 1000 FT AND/OR NOV-MAR.7-9 DAYS/HO.JULY-OCT.3-4V I S I B I L I T Y l M IL ES DAYS/MO.GALES NOV-MAY 1 DAY/MO.JUNS-OCT,0-1DAY/MO SEY 8/10 CLOUD COVERED MAY-JUNE 18-20 DAYS/MO.OCT-DEC8-9 DAYS/MO,V I S I BI L I T Y 6 M I L E S ALL MONTHS (EARLY#,LL MONTHS AFTERHORNING 14-16 DAYS/MO)NOONS 5-8DAYS/MO.AIR OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHY"SKY 8 / 1 0 CLOUD COVERED MAY-JUNE 1 8 - 2 0 DAYS/MO. OCT -DEC,8-9 DAYS/MO.V IS IB IL IT Y 6 MILE S ALL MONTHS (EARLY ALL MONTHSMORNING 1 4 - 1 6 DAYS/MO . ) (AFTERNOONS S DAYS/MO.)PARACHUTE OPERATIONSWIND VELOCITY 16 M . P . H . AUG-NOV-JAN. MAR-JULY.( 4 0 - 5 0 ^ OF OB S.) (20-3 0?o OF OB S.)V I S I BI L I T Y 6 M I L E S ALL MONTHS (A FT ER- ALL MONTHSNOONS 2 2 - 2 5 DAYS /MO)(EARL Y MORNING14-16 DAYS/MOGROUND OPERATIONS-GlflTERALBAIN FREQUENCY AP RI L- JU NE 1 2 - 1 4 DAYS/MO OCT-DSC8 - 9 DAYS/MOTEMPERATURE 80 DEGREES F JUNE -SEPT 2 0 - 3 0 DA YS/MO .NOV-FSB.NONE.TEMPERATURE 32 DEGREES F t D E C - F S B . 8 - 1 1 DAYS/MO. APR-OC T.NONE,


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MECHANIZED OPERATIONSRAINFALL JUNE-SEPT.SNOW COVER D S C -F E B . 1VEHICLE MAINTENANCETEMPERATURE 32 DEGREES PEIGH TEMPERATURESAND AND DUST STORMSENGINEERING CONSTRUCTIONHEAVY RAINS

RIVER STAGESFROZEN SOILSNOW COVERSUPPLIES AND STORAGETEMPERATURE 32 DEGREES FHIGH HUMIDITY

ROAD COMMUNICATIONSRAIN FREQUENCYSNOW COVER

5-7 INCHES MO. N O V - F E B . 1 , 5 - 2 . 3I N . MO.DAY/SEASON MAR-NOV. NO NE.

D E C - F E B , 8 - 1 1 DAYS/MO APR-OCT.NONEJULY-AU G (MEAN DA ILY NOV -APR(NOMAX.9O-91 DEGREES F . T R I P S ' 9 0 o p )DEC-FEB 2 DAYS/MO MAY-JULYNONE.

JUNE-NO V (MAX .MO . NOV-MAY(MAX.MO./ iMTS. 12 -1 9 INCHES AK TS .6 -9 INCHES;MAX. 24 HRS. 10 . 4 I N ^ A X . 24 HRS. 2.9INCHFSMAX. 42 FEET MIN.^4 FEETDSC-FEB 1-2 DAYS/ MAR-NOV .NONE.SEASONDEC-FEB 1 DAY/SEASON MAR-NOV .NONE.

DEC-FEB 8 - 1 1 DAYS/MO APR-OCT.NONE.ALL MONTHS(EARLY MORNING RE. HUM. 90% OR MORE)

APR-JUNE 1 2 - 1 4 DAYS/MO O C T - D E C . 8 - 9DAYS/MO, .DEC-FSB 1 DAY/SEASON MAR-NOV NO NE.

K . -'-*s ." - /v . ' , y%\ f\ . '- /\ -'
http:///reader/full/NOV-MAY(MAX.MOhttp:///reader/full/NOV-MAY(MAX.MO


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TRANSPORTATION - DAMAGE AMD

PIHGHAN RRThe hi gh -l ig ht of the fi n al days of combat op er ati on s,was the damaging of the Yellow River Bridge #195. Photo coveron 13 August rev ea led th a t two spans of the bridge were outat the nor th end. Inv esti gat ion of the source re su lte d inc red it for the damage ending up with the ground f o rc e s .,This was the f i r s t time tha t th e brid ge had been suc cess

fu l ly damaged, sin ce 14 Apr il when the second span from theno rth end was knocked out by an ae r i a l a t ta c k . Going backover the f i r s t 15 days of August which were not coveredduring 14th Air Force Headquarters moving operations, wofind th at br idge #84 at EAOYI had been skip-bombed on2 August and 2 spans wore destroyed as revealed by photoof 3 August. However, a by-p ass fo r the br idg o was nea ringcompletion* On the same day 20 0' of bridge #265 a t SINYMGwere shown by s t r ik e photos to have been de st ro yed . On1 August a p i lo t repo rte d th at ho had destroy ed 1 span anddamaged an abutment" of #256 a t KINEIAMG. Bridge #92 a tNEIKTJ rece iv ed s l i g h t damage to 1 span on 4 August and #105a t SILAHO was rendered un se rv icea ble by d i re c t h i t s on11 August The two bridges at ANYAHG, #126 and #130 v/hichhave always received more than th e ir share of at te n ti o nwore both h i t on 2 August but v/oro reve ale d as se rv ice ab leby photo on the follow ing day .WUCHANG LIUCHOW RR

The only ac tio n aga in st th is l i ne during t h e f i r s t h a l fof August was at SBTTSIANG whore bridges #46 and #47 woreropor tod as h i t on 1 August. Photos of the same date showed#46 as s e rv i c e a b l e and #47 unse rv iceab le bea r ing out theclaim that i t had been one-half d es t roy ed.TUNGPU RR

We think we can safoly say without fear of contradictionthat bridge #102 at YUTZS was the scene of more "Damage andRepair" than any other bridgo in the world for a corresponding period. It ended July out of service but started thofirst of August intact. A hit was reported on 4 Augustdestroying 1 span and possibly damaging another. Photo on5 August showed the bridge unserviceable but by the 9th itv/as again usable. The following day it was hit again anddamage claimed to a pier, an abutment, tracks and ties*This was a dull period in comparison to Juno &nd July.Two other bridges which received considerable attention inrecent months wore numbers 122 and 123 at KIEKSIU; #122was rendered unserviceable on 1 August but the by-pass wasintact by 3 August; #123 was reported hit on 11 Aug. with2 spans"and 1 pier reported destroyed and 1 abutment badlydamaged." At JIUNGTUNG bridgo #142 was hit on 4 Aug. destroying oho pier and dropping 2 spans. This damage had boonrepaired by 9 August when photo revealed that the bridgewas. serviceable.


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HUNANV

The highway bridge at TACKUENTIEN (-26-33N, 111-42E)west,pf tho railroad bridge #100 was attacked with avengeance on 28 and 29 July and is reported to -haveended, the month put of service-.Photos of 29 July: reveal that the road fromHENGYALTG to .CANTON Is in excellent condition and welltravelled. ' .

." ,4. J t ."./^ 4\ A 4\


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LATE REPORTS FROM PREVIOUS. J)JISSIONSBOMB DAMAGE

(Reports from Ground Sources and Photo CoverCompared with 14th AF Mission Reports)Prepared by Operations Analysis Section

20 July Attack at KA1FEETSChinese ground sources advise that on 20 July, 30 U.S.pianos attacked KAIFEMG killing more than 100 Jap troopsand Chin030, Freight train arriving at station wascompletely destroyed* An identical report was made byOSS ground sources.

14th AF Mission Report: No attack reported onthis date.20 July Attack on ANYANGFirst phase photo report of this bombing shows that allbursts wore in target area* Five gondola cars and railsat south end of yard wore probably destroyed* Extent ofdaraago to barracks area was uncertain because of smoke.

JL4th AF Mission Report: This mission not reported.21 July Attack on TAPiUANFirst phase report of bombing on this date shows 25^ ofbomb bursts in the target area. Ten direct hits on spurswithin target area probably damaged RR station and 1trackage.Similar damage was probably c aused by about 20 hits onspurs north and northeast of the target aroa. Concentration of bombs was such as to probably render tho chokepoint unserviceable.. Remainder of bombs struck a storagedepot northeast of target area; several small buildingswere probably damaged. Ho report by 14th AF.24 July Attack at ANKINGChinese ground sources report an attack on ANKIFG duringwhich a military supnly depot was completely destroyedand 4-0 Japanese, woro killed. OSS sources made an identicalreport. Ho report was given for this date by tho 14th AF .24 July Attack on HAINAN Island .OSS ground sources report an attack by Mustangs on thecity of LI NK AO on HAINAN Island. A tower 20* x 2 0 % 30'high, storing ammunition was hit, the ammo Q-xplodingfor 15 minutes, killing an estimated 100 Japanese

.. 14th AF Mission Reports None given'for this date*


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24 July Attack on PUCHI RR Bridge (No, 24)First phase report shows that one bomb landed in thesuperstructure at the, west end of the bridge with noapparent damage visible on available photos; four nearmisses observed* Bridge probably-serviceable, buttemporary damage to tracks or bridge deck may have beensustained by the.direct hit*

14th AF Mission Report: 4 Mitchells bombed RRbridge at PUCHI damaging superstructure of firstspan from south approach. 4 accompanying Mustangsscored 6 direct hits on gun positions, thenstrafed surrounding territory, probably damaging4 storage buildings.1 August Attack in SINSIAITG AreaFirst phase photo cover of this attack shows approximately 20 new craters in the railroad yards, 26 carsare shown to be damaged in addition to 15 cars end 3locomotives which, woro probably damaged by'near missesof the-bombs dropped by the 1st and 2nd elements.Bombs dropped by the 3rd element caused the-damage of10 additional railroad cars and 3 locos> 6"cars woreprobably damaged by near misses. Photos show that trackshave been disrupted in the center of the yards, throughservice, is probably temporarily out, and that the locorevetment area has been blocked off by bursts on thetracks .

14th AF Mission Report: None given for this date,1 August Attack on KAIFENOFirst phase photo cover shows that 7 freight cars..received diroct hits or near misses and wore probablydestroyed or severely damaged and that there was possibleminor damage to trackage in the freight depot. There wasprobable damage to 4 warehouse type buildings and tosorio passenger cars in the train in east section of theyards by near miss es,

14th AF Mission Report: None given for this date.5 August Attack on SUCHOWFirst phase photo cover of the South TSINPU RR YardsNo. 32 , SUCHOW, indicates the following damage: 1st and2nd -Iorients made 100'jo hits along center and west sectionof target and 100$ hits in south and center of targetarea. Estimate of results of third element's bombingis impossible duo to incomplete- cover. 20 cars weredestroyed, 25 severely damaged,- and 15 probably damaged;one car shed 90 T x 2 0' is 50% destroyed, and one warehouse 200f x 25 T received one direct hit. Strike photosof second element bomb bursts show a .coverage of 60%'in an area having a large' concentration of railroad cars,estimated at 20 0.


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14th AF Mission R eport: A mission re po rt isgiven fo r th is date ind ica tin g r. bombing ra idby 14 M itc he lls on Hit Yards a t an u ns ta tedloca t ion . 90% dire ct hi ts are clam ed; 6 largefi re s were st a rt ed with smoke ri s in g to 6,000fo o t. Many secondary exp losion s occurred ,probably emanating from o il and ammunition dumps

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wwii 14th air force intelligence report

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