wind hazards & building loads in the context of community
TRANSCRIPT
Wind hazards &
building loads in the
context of community
resilience
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
John W. van de LindtGeorge T. Abell Professor in Infrastructure
Co-Director, NIST Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Hurricane Disaster Infrastructure Resilience and Planning Workshop II, May 25-26; Madison WI
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Resilience Needs (Center Research Objectives)
• New measurement science to enable communities to study disaster resilience and make risk-informed decisions.
• Physics-based models of interdependent and cascading hazards and their effect on buildings, bridges and transportation infrastructure, and energy, water/wastewater, and communication networks.
• Modeling and integration of socio-economic support systems and their interfaces with physical infrastructure systems.
• Resilience-based community performance criteria and metrics.• Decision support system embedded in a state-of-the-research
computational environment (IN-CORE).
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Thrust 1: The Development of IN-CORE
Individual Hazards
Multiple and
Competing Hazards
Nonstat. in Long-term Resilience
Assessment
Buildings Transpo.
Networks
Water & Wastewater Energy Comm.
Networks
Social Systems
Economic Systems
Optimization Strategies
Centerville
EQ
Tornado
Seaside
Oregon
EQ
Tsunami
Memphis
TN, MSA
EQ
Flood
Galveston, TX
Hurricane
-Surge
-Waves
-Wind
Two tiers
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Tier 1 Research Tools: Executed completely within IN-CORE using libraries and plug-ins developed as part of the CoE.
Tier 2 Research Tools: Will run in IN-CORE but import data for the hazard portion of the analysis, e.g. a wind field shape file from an outside software (or other) source, overland surge flow from ADCIRC, etc.
Scenarios
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Earthquakes Tier 1• Rupture• Magnitude• Distance• Depth
• Earthquakes Tier 2• 3-D physics-based• Seismic wave
propagation• Example MMSA
• Windstorms – Tier 1• 3-sec wind gust over specified region
• Tornado – Tier 1 • Statistical representations• Historical estimated wind field from an
event
• Hurricane: Wind, Wave, and Surge – Tier 1• Data-driven wind field models from past
hurricanes• USACOE Coastal Hazard System
• Hurricane: Wind, Wave, and Surge – Tier 2• ADCIRC, SWAN• Surrogate Models
Scenarios
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• WUI Fire – Tier 1• Propagation in wildlands using CA• Propagation inside a community
• Tsunami – Tier 1• ASCE 7 Procedures
• Tsunami – Tier 2• Time dependent numerical model• Specified bathymetry and bare-earth
topography
• Flood – Tier 1• NFIP Maps• Flood depth w/o velocity
• Flood – Tier 2• Fluvial (riverine)• Pluvial (excessive precipitation)• Coastal (sea level rise)• Example will be available for Wolf
River basin in Shelby Co., TN
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Physical Infrastructure Modeling in IN-CORE
Buildings Transpo.
Networks
Water & Wastewater Energy Comm.
Networks
A few features:• Wind Damage and Repair fragilities – 19 building types• Damage for tsunami, floods• Combined wind-wave-surge building fragilities under development• Modeling of EPN and water networks with dependencies• Transportation systems – primarily bridges, road and railway• Aging and deterioration modeling
Physical Infrastructure: Transportation
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Simulate existing roadway and rail networks• Evaluation of critical routes for recovery• Assess impact of select retrofits on network performance• Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and tsunamis
• Damage fragilities include:• Roadway Bridges (as-built and retrofitted) for
earthquake and flood scour• Roadways for earthquake and hurricane
wave/surge• Railway bridges for earthquakes, hurricane, flood,
and tsunami)• Repair fragilities include:
• Bridges, roadways, railway bridges, rail tracks
Misra and Padgett, 2017
Physical Infrastructure: Water/WW
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Water/Waste water• Predict physical damage and functionality• Includes deterioration analysis• Critical path ID for recovery• Novel recovery functions based on priority,
available resources, etc.• Interdependencies with other physical and social
systems
Central
Water
Treatment
Plant
WellfieldAuxiliary
Pumping
Station
Guidotti et al, 2016
Physical Infrastructure: EPN, NGN, and TN
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Electrical Power Networks (EPN)• Modeling of generating plants, substations, transmission poles, power poles• CA algorithm to determine service areas based on capacity-demand balance• Repair duration algorithms with interdependencies and critical path ID
• Natural Gas Network (NGN)• Includes damage for processing plant, compressor
stations, pipelines, etc.• Network recovery modeling with critical path ID
• Telecommunication Networks (TN)• Wired and wireless/cellular• Recovery dependent on electrical poles
Attary et al, 2017
Physical Infrastructure: Buildings
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Seismic Analysis: Many existing fragilities• Modeling at both the individual and portfolio level• Default damage fragilities for new steel, RC, masonry, wood,
and mobile homes• Earthquakes and tsunamis; tornado and straight-line winds;
coastal storm surge, waves, and flooding• Four damage states• Five functionality states • New functionality taxonomy - interaction with the community• Interdependency with other physical infrastructure, services,
and the local economy
Lin and Wang, 2017
Attary et al, 2016
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Social Science, Economics, and Decision
Social Systems
Economic Systems
Optimization Strategies
• Computable General Equilibrium Model• Social vulnerability modeling• Population Dislocation Modeling• Housing recovery models• Business Interruption models• Vacancy modeling for buildings• Influx of capital for financing recovery• Metrics to track/identify recovery
Decision Support for optimal:• Pre-event planning• Investments• Recovery planning
• Risk-informed!
Economic Modeling and Analysis
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Spatial dynamic computable general equilibrium model (SD-CGE)
• Incorporate infrastructure damage and population disruptions
• Provide range of economic and fiscal impact• Code changes, scenario type
• Includes:• Losses in production, wages, jobs in local econ sectors• Investigates with policy levers; optimal allocations of
resources
Emsi
Social Science Modeling and Analysis
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Population and employee dislocation
• Housing restoration and recovery
• Business interruption and restoration
• Identify socio-demographic and socio-economic vulnerability characteristics Daily Express
Dependency and Interdependency Modeling
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Buildings -- transportation, EPN, TN, water/WW, occupants• Transportation routes -- EPN, TN• Water/WW – (two way) -- population, businesses, services• Social systems and services -- buildings, EPN, TN, water/WW,
transportation, healthcare, education, governance• Economic systems and services -- buildings, EPN, TN, water/WW,
transportation
Community Goals and Metrics
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Community goals are aspirational levels for metrics
• Each analysis will contribute to community metrics• e.g. % buildings functional • 4 goal areas of community resilience
(stability areas)
CNN
DRR.com
Centerville, USA: A Virtual Community
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Purpose: Provide researchers a simplified illustration of how individual infrastructure portfolios and infrastructure and their dependencies can be modeled; linkages to social and economic systems.
• 19 building archetypes for wind developed from Centerville
• Archival documentation in Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure
• Illustrative example for EQ and tornado, but users can explore other hazards using Centerville
• The Centerville storyline was completed in early 2017; some extension ongoing
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Hindcasting the Joplin Tornado
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
May 22, 2011 Tornado•EF5 multiple-vortex
•Fatalities:161, Injured: 1150
•Costliest single tornado in US history :
US$2.8 billion
•Population: 51,316 (2014 estimate)•Housing units: 23,322 •Median value of housing: US$103,300
City of Joplin, Missouri
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Resolution Sensitivity Analysis
50x50 ft
100x100 ft
200x200 ft
500x500 ft
1000x1000 ft
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Resolution Sensitivity Analysis
50x50 ft100x100 ft200x200 ft500x500 ft1000x1000 ft
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Resolution Sensitivity Analysis Results (DS4>50%)Type 1000x1000ft 500x500ft 200x200ft 100x100ft 50x50ft Actual Event
T1-T5 9431 7092 5523 4968 4709 4551
T6 0 32 75 146 171 185
T7 81 115 136 138 140 139
T8 21 9 11 17 22 21
T9 0 0 0 8 9 9
T10 0 0 5 5 5 5
T11 0 0 0 2 1 1
T12 0 18 13 12 17 19
T13 0 1 6 13 20 21
T14 0 0 2 5 7 7
T15 0 1 5 6 5 6
T16 0 0 2 6 5 5
T17 110 49 24 13 14 11
T18 0 0 0 1 1 1
T19 0 69 109 172 204 218
Mode Scenario (DS4>50%)
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Building’s Probability of Completing Repairs
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Population Dislocation 20,820 People in the Tornado Path
87% Non-Hispanic White ResidentsRegion EF1 EF2 EF3 EF4 EF5 Total
Number of Residential Buildings 2592 1414 1771 823 613 7213
Population Estimation 7482 4081 5112 2376 1769 20820
Peacock, Walter Gillis, Betty Hearn Morrow, and Hugh Gladwin (1997). Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology of Disaster. London: Routledge. Details also available in Clapp T. (2016)
From Texas A&M Univ. Andrew Data
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
Population Dislocation
25
Time EF1 EF2 EF3 EF4 EF5
1 Day 0.138 0.340 0.578 0.784 0.920
2 Months 0.085 0.274 0.539 0.780 0.931
5 Months 0.075 0.221 0.436 0.665 0.852
8 Months 0.055 0.164 0.338 0.549 0.757
10 Months 0.046 0.120 0.236 0.389 0.575
Probability of Population Dislocation
Testbed Community Modeling
73071
73069
73072
8.0 miles
9.0
mil
es
More than 90% of Norman’s population.
The area was divided into 0.16 square
kilometer (one-sixteenth square miles) grids.
Tornado-induced Wind Load
Parameters Description Approach A Approach B
Tornado Pressure Adjustment
Uplift Pressure
MWFRS Te 1.8 - 3.2
1.0
Ti 0.0
C&C Te 1.4 - 2.4
Ti 0.0
Lateral Pressure
MWFRS Te 1.0 - 1.5
Ti 1.0
C&C Te 1.2 - 2.0
Ti 0.0
External Pressure Coefficients, GCp ASCE 7-10 ASCE 7-16
1
• Two alternative approaches were proposed—namely approach A and B:
• Tornado-induced wind pressure can be calculated by (Masoomi and van de Lindt 2016):
h e p i pip q T GC T GC
Te = tornado external pressure adjustment
Ti = tornado internal pressure adjustment
• There is high level of uncertainty in Te and Ti.
Schools During Past Tornadoes
Xenia, Ohio 1974 (F5 tornado)
Michigan 1980 (F3 tornado)
• Xenia senior high school was demolished and reconstructed.
• St. Augustine elementary school was demolished and reconstructed.
Moore, Oklahoma 1999 (F4 tornado)• Kelly elementary school was demolished and reconstructed.
Enterprise, Alabama 2007 (EF4 tornado)• A school collapsed and 8 student fatalities were reported.
Joplin, Missouri 2011 (EF5 tornado)• Joplin High School, Franklin Technical Center, and Joplin East Middle
School were extensively damaged.
Moore, Oklahoma 2013 (EF5 tornado)• Briarwood Elementary School, Plaza Towers Elementary School, and
Highland East Junior High School were extensively damaged.
Damage States for School Building
Xenia senior high school
Xenia, Ohio
was hit by an F5 tornado
in 1974.
DS Roof Cover Failure Window/Door Failures Parapet FailureNon-load-bearing Wall
Failure
Roof Structural
Failure
Load-bearing Wall
Failure
0 ≤ 2% No No No No No
1 2%< and ≤15% 1 or 2 No No No No
2 15%< and ≤50% 1 or 2< and ≤25% No No No No
3 50% < 25% < Yes Yes No No
4 Typically 50% < Typically 25% < Typically Yes Typically Yes Yes Yes
Tornadic Fragility Flowchart
GCp : from ASCE 7-16
Te = Ti = 1.0
GCp : from ASCE 7-10
Te : from Hann et al. (2010)
Ti : 1.0 or 0.0 (Table 2)
Random Load
using equations (1) and (2)
Approach A
Approach B
Random ResistancesFailure Condition
of Components
Condition of
Damage States
MCS
Components
Failure Probability
Damage States
Occurrence Probability
After n MCS After n MCS
Plot
Fragilities After covering a wide range of wind speeds
Building Fragility Curves- Approach A
Type Construction Description
M1 Fully Grouted, M/S, PCL
M2 Partially Grouted, M/S, PCL
M3 Ungrouted, M/S, PCL
M4 Ungrouted, N, PCL
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3 EF4
9022 45 67
DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
URM1:
M/S, PCL
Fully Grouted
22 34 45 56 67
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3
DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
URM2:
M/S, PCL
Partially Grouted
22 34 45 56 67
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3
DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
URM3:
M/S, PCL
Ungrouted
DS1 DS3
DS4 DS2
URM4:
N, PCL
Ungrouted
EF0 EF1
4522 27 3631 40 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 75 100 125 150
P[ D
S >
ds |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 100 150 200
P[ D
S >
ds |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 75 100 125 150
P[ D
S >
ds |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 60 70 80 90 100 110
P[ D
S >
ds |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)
(m/s) (m/s)
(m/s) (m/s)
Community Components Properties
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 100 150 200
P[ L
S >
ls |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3 EF4
9022 45 67
(b) Approach B Fragilities
22 34 45 56 67
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 75 100 125 150
P[ L
S >
ls |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)
(a) Approach A Fragilities
Prob
abili
ty o
f Fai
lure
Prob
abili
ty o
f Fai
lure
(m/s) (m/s)
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3 EF4
9022 45 67
DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 100 150 200
P[ D
S >
ds |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)(m/s)
EF0 EF1 EF2 EF3 EF4
9022 45 67
DS1
DS2
DS3DS4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
50 100 150 200
P[ D
S >
ds |
v ]
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (mph)
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (km/h)(m/s)
(b) Approach B Fragilities(a) Approach A Fragilities
Roof cover fragility curves:
Building fragility curves:
Community Components Properties
A set of fragility curves for each
community component.
A set of repair times for each
community component.
Developed here Lopez et al., 2009
Assumed here
FEMA
Network Component DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Residential Buildings Repair Time 5 1 20 2 90 10 180 20
Permitting Time 2 1 7 3 14 7 30 15
Workplace
Buildings
Repair Time 5 1 20 2 90 45 180 90
Permitting Time 2 1 5 2 10 5 30 15
School
Buildings
Repair Time 5 1 20 2 180 90 730 180
Permitting Time 2 1 10 2 30 5 30 5
Electric Power
Network
Transmission
Substation and
Distribution Substation
1 0.5 3 1.5 7 3.5 30 15
Transmission Tower - - - - - - 2 1
Sub-transmission Tower - - - - - - 1 0.5
Water
Network
Water Tower 1.2 0.4 3.1 2.7 93 85 155 120
Water Treatment Plant 0.9 0.3 1.9 1.2 32 31 95 65
1
Network Component DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
m ξ m ξ m ξ m ξ
Residential Buildings
Small, 1-story 39.6 (88.7)
0.14 47.0
(105.1) 0.12
53.5 (119.7)
0.11 51.9
(116.2) 0.15
Small, 2-story 36.6 (81.9)
0.13 42.9 (96.1)
0.12 49.9
(111.6) 0.11
54.6 (122.1)
0.14
Medium, 1-story 37.0 (82.7)
0.13 43.4 (97.0)
0.12 50.4
(112.7) 0.11
61.6 (137.7)
0.12
Medium, 2-story 41.7 (93.2)
0.13 47.9
(107.2) 0.12
54.6 (122.1)
0.11 61.6
(137.7) 0.14
Large, 2-story 42.5 (95.1)
0.13 48.4
(108.3) 0.12
53.5 (119.7)
0.11 47.5
(106.2) 0.15
Mobile Home 35.5 (79.5)
0.09 42.2 (94.4)
0.09 49.2
(110.0) 0.11
52.7 (117.8)
0.12
Workplace Buildings
Light Industrial 34.6 (77.5)
0.10 41.9 (93.7)
0.09 45.4
(101.5) 0.09
49.2 (110.0)
0.09
Heavy Industrial 40.2 (90.0)
0.10 45.4
(101.5) 0.14
60.0 (134.3)
0.10 71.2
(159.2) 0.19
Small Big-box 29.1 (65.0)
0.08 36.6 (81.9)
0.09 69.4
(155.3) 0.11
76.7 (171.6)
0.10
Large Big-box 34.1 (76.3)
0.09 40.9 (91.4)
0.08 65.4
(146.2) 0.10
75.9 (169.9)
0.10
Small Unreinforced
Masonry 31.3 (70.1)
0.09 44.5 (99.5)
0.09 52.2
(116.8) 0.09
69.1 (154.5)
0.18
Medium Unreinforced
Masonry 36.4 (81.5)
0.13 40.7 (90.9)
0.11 52.2
(116.8) 0.10
66.4 (148.4)
0.21
Large Reinforced
Masonry 32.6 (73.0)
0.12 42.7 (95.6)
0.11 49.2
(109.9) 0.11
71.2 (159.2)
0.12
Extra Large Reinforced Masonry
33.6 (75.2)
0.12 42.3 (94.6)
0.11 49.2
(109.9) 0.10
71.9 (160.8)
0.12
2-story Reinforced
Concrete 32.3 (72.2)
0.08 40.7 (90.9)
0.09 48.2
(107.8) 0.08
57.7 (129.0)
0.11
4-story Reinforced
Concrete 41.1 (91.8)
0.13 45.8
(102.5) 0.09
65.0 (145.5)
0.08 77.1
(172.5) 0.08
School
Network
High School 41.5 (92.8)
0.09 46.3
(103.5) 0.11
52.7 (117.9)
0.10 79.4
(177.7) 0.13
Middle School 40.6 (90.9)
0.09 47.2
(105.6) 0.11
52.7 (117.9)
0.10 70.4
(157.6) 0.12
Elementary School 39.1 (87.4)
0.09 47.2
(105.6) 0.09
50.6 (113.3)
0.13 60.6
(135.6) 0.22
Electric Power
Network
Transmission
Substation and
Distribution Substation
33.4 (74.8)
0.20 39.5 (88.4)
0.20 48.6
(108.8) 0.20
60.8 (136.0)
0.20
Transmission Tower - - - - - - 60.8
(136.0) 0.12
Sub-transmission Tower - - - - - - 55.9
(125.0) 0.12
Water Supply
Network
Water Tower 34.4 (77.0)
0.15 40.7 (91.0)
0.15 50.1
(112.0) 0.15
62.6 (140.0)
0.15
Water Treatment Plant 36.9 (82.5)
0.15 43.6 (97.5)
0.15 53.6
(120.0) 0.15
67.1 (150.0)
0.15
Tornado Path Simulation
EF5EF4EF3EF2EF1EF0
Transmission Substation Transmission Line
20 20 24 160 18 18 7 10 4 3 2 1 4 7
26 21 160 4 18 18 6 3 2 4 2
2 15 200 18 3 14 7 2 6
2 1 1 1 200 350 4 9 6 2 10 5
3 3 60 100 50 150 25 2 300 6 7 9 4 2 1
3 4 60 100 100 5 2 20 20 3 2 2 6
18 20 20 100 100 30 20 180 13 50 3 100 2 5 7 4
3 10 10 20 20 100 50 180 60 200 10 120 20 2 8 1 100 100 3 2 5 8 5 4 4
4 2 20 12 75 50 200 200 600 1000 600 300 150 125 125 40 50 60 30 5 4 3 2
7 15 15 100 150 200 1000 600 50 100 75 75 100 100 100 30 4 4 4
150 150 900 900 50 50 50 150 150 125 100 100 150 80 10 8 1
40 40 150 50 1100 900 100 100 150 150 100 100 50 75 100 150 150 10 8 1 2 1
50 50 50 50 50 150 200 200 450 150 3 100 100 50 75 1 2
150 150 150 150 150 100 500 200 200 300 750 200 100 3 100 50 150 4
150 150 150 150 75 150 300 300 100 300 150 150 150 150 130 130 80 80 1
150 150 150 150 150 650 300 75 150 150 410 200 100 100 130 1 3 3
100 150 150 150 150 600 150 400 80 150 150 100 100 100 100 950 150 15 100 100 120 30
100 150 150 150 150 150 400 320 75 150 150 150 100 680 50 75 250 150 10 10 610
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 800 280 150 150 150 150 150 150 400 850 850 150 150 500 75 150 150 150 150 150 2
2 75 150 150 150 150 150 480 300 500 800 150 150 150 150 400 100 750 750 750 150 50 450 100 150 150 150 100 150 2
200 200 150 125 900 250 75 100 75 100 150 150 150 150 125 100 150 100 150 100 900 150 50 200 50 100 100 100
5 5 150 150 75 300 100 150 75 75 150 150 150 150 125 800 150 150 150 150 150 150 50 8 100 100 100
50 75 300 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 1200 1200 100 150 100 150 150 75 100 150 75 100 5
570 40 75 75 150 150 150 150 1200 1200 500 40 150 150 150 100 125 125 10 7 12 12
100 470 760 100 125 125 150 150 1200 1200 150 160 240 100 500 150 150 125 100 100 4 10
450 150 150 100 150 150 150 1200 1200 50 150 40 100 150 150 150 150 125 150 6
100 150 150 150 150 150 150 240 240 30 100 75 150 150 150 150
20 150 150 150 150 150 150 25 25 100 100 100 100 200 100 100
20 150 20 150 150 60 100 400 50 50 370 200 20 50 80
150 150 125 300 300 50 100 100 150 300
150 100 20 150 50 50 150 6
40 20 200 80 60 50 50 20
30 150 150 100 75 25 25
150 150 50 30 50
200 50 10 40
15 10 5 2
Indian Hills Rd
Franklin Rd
Tecumseh Rd
Rock Creek Rd
Robinson St
Alameda St
Lindsey St
Cedar Lane Rd
Post Oak Rd
Imhoff Rd
60th
Ave
NW
48th
Ave
NW
36th
Ave
NW
24th
Ave
NW
12th
Ave
NW
N P
orte
r Ave
12th
Ave
NE
24th
Ave
NE
36th
Ave
NE
35
35
9 9
9
77
77
77
Subtransmission LineDistribution Substation
Water Treatment Plant
Water Towers (Million Gallons): 0.5 1.5 2.0
High
School
Elementary
School
Middle
School 1 mile
EF4
The parameters needed to
simulate a tornado path:
• Center Point
• Direction
• Length
• Width
Gaussian copula model
was utilized for
generating the correlated
length and width:
Spatial Damage Simulation
EF Scale
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed, m/s (mph)
Wind Speed Range
(McDonald and Mehta, 2006) Mean Value
EF0 29-38 (65-85) 34 (75)
EF1 39-49 (86-110) 44 (98)
EF2 50-60 (111-135) 55 (123)
EF3 61-74 (136-165) 67 (150)
EF4 75-89 (166-200) 82 (183)
EF5 >89 (>200) 101 (225)
1
3-Sec Gust Wind Speed (m/s)
Prob
abili
ty o
f Fai
lure
No
Dam
age
DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
A Set of Fragility Curves
EF0
EF1
EF2
EF3
100 Yard
V = N/A
V = 123 mph (55 m/s)
V = 98 mph (44 m/s)
V = 75 mph (34 m/s)
V = 123 mph (55 m/s)
V = 150 mph (67 m/s)
V = 75 mph (34 m/s)
In-Path Components
The range of
wind speed for
each EF scale:
Community Restoration Analysis
Generate an initiation time
Update time
Update the status of the repaired
components to “not-failed”
Allocate available resource units
to the damaged components in
the recovery sequence list
Create a recovery sequence list
Rep
eat u
ntil
all
com
pone
nts
in th
e li
st a
re r
ecov
ered
Calculate the performance indices
Release the corresponding
resource units
Restoration
Analysis
Record the percentage of affected
students, residential buildings, and
employees for each residential grid
Sort non-functional DSSs
based on their demand level
Find all paths from source
to each non-functional DSS
Select the DSS with
the highest priority
Select the path with the
shortest time for recovery
Add the damaged
components of the path to
the recovery sequence list
Sort the remaining*
damaged components of the
network based on their
repair time and add them to
the recovery sequence list
Rep
eat f
or a
ll no
n-fu
nctio
nal D
SS
*Because of redundancy in some
DSSs, there could be damaged
components that do not cause
non-functionality in the DSSs.
Recovery
Sequence
List
Plot mean restoration and
population outmigration curvesAfter n MCS
Assign a repair time to each
damaged component based
on its damage state
Population Outmigration Analysis
Plot restoration and population
outmigration curves
Community Components Properties:
1. Fragility Curves
2. Repair Time
3. Repair Cost
Community Modeling:
1. Topology of Components
2. Dependencies
3. Cross-Dependencies
Hazard Modeling:
1. Tornado path simulation
2. Find the in-path components
and associated EF intensities
Spatial Damage Simulation:
● Find the damage level for
each in-path component
(i.e., intrinsic failure status)
Find the extrinsic and
functionality failure statuses
for all community components
Restoration analysis for the EPN,
WSN, school network, residential
grids, and business grids
Mon
te C
arlo
Sim
ulat
ion
For example: for the EPN
Population Outmigration Analysis
0 0 0 0 0 2.34995 1.97134 2.39333 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.46287 1.53061 0.62792 0.86228 0.33601 0 0.1537 0 0 ####### ####### 0 0 0.22446 1.01076 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 3.35829 2.36823 0 0 0 0 ####### 0 1.69343 1.68446 0.45037 ####### ####### 0.19137 0 0 0 ####### 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ####### 1.8969 0.36236 0 0 1.79788 0 0 0 ####### 1.21416 0 0.59616 ####### 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.66344 0 0 0
####### 0 0 ####### 0 0 0 ####### 0 ####### 0 0 0 0 0 ####### 0.75161 0.68676 ####### 0.92422 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.56092 0
0.21682 0 0 0.31752 0 7.64204 13.2528 6.47337 0 0 0 0 0 2.29715 0 ####### 0 0.46524 0.70986 0.87762 0.2577 ####### 0 0 0 0 0 ####### 0 0 0 0
####### 0 0 0.29584 0 8.00506 15.7704 13.6574 0 0 0.54813 ####### 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.04531 2.00739 ####### 0 ####### 0 ####### 0 0.66661 0
0 0 0 2.22289 2.95206 2.77573 15.8735 15.3104 0 0 0 0 1.09226 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.95417 ####### 0 11.3236 0 0 0 ####### 0.58341 1.33734 0 0 0.49176
0.35039 0 1.20202 1.15551 3.02505 2.78904 14.8148 8.16924 0 0 0 0 ####### 0 0 ####### 0.79405 0 ####### 0 0 0 12.2072 0 0.38562 ####### 0.49921 0.9582 0.82 0 0.48929 0.4848
0.28481 ####### 0 0 2.91547 1.54338 12.0789 8.19693 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.4513 0 13.2467 14.7895 5.3386 6.41244 0 0 8.9455 5.0384 0 0 0.71841 0.83692 0.33907 #######
0.78416 0 0 0 2.01499 2.01226 15.5594 42.2239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.7028 12.6081 11.1183 9.88946 14.9416 14.9401 16.3763 4.5864 0 0.56896 0.69058 0.56789 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 25.5064 42.5118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.59165 5.52958 6.01427 19.4834 22.3559 20.1326 14.7627 14.26 26.5628 12.5362 1.44521 1.00806 ####### 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 6.38756 27.398 15.6188 3.62639 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19.5035 18.8026 13.6084 15.1872 7.61282 11.6012 15.5041 27.7821 25.8948 1.53657 1.19723 ####### 0 ####### #######
0 0 0 0 6.57188 7.45052 4.49899 4.64266 6.82052 21.0793 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ####### 0 0 15.5694 14.7621 0 6.88628 12.9254 ####### 0 #######
0 0 0 0 20.6466 23.0942 13.525 15.238 22.1383 13.8232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22.8741 ####### 0 0 0 15.9027 0 7.32359 15.0423 0 0 0 0.37808
0 0 0 0 20.6394 27.428 29.3694 15.4795 10.9024 22.4511 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68.3774 32.3742 33.7807 17.6547 17.339 0 0 20.629 19.4223 11.5037 10.3041 0 0 ####### 0
0 0 0 0 20.3695 28.4229 27.7252 15.5323 21.875 7.21468 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.0136 35.913 37.6805 0 0 0 0 15.877 14.9903 0 17.9677 ####### 0 0.3202 0.29749
0 0 0 19.9967 23.3156 25.8362 28.2725 28.6676 14.4562 14.5402 0 0 0 0 32.9901 38.5462 28.3288 28.3591 27.3774 28.3565 0 28.2335 1.66494 0 12.1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 21.2845 24.1136 26.5536 28.3831 30.0064 47.5732 14.6833 0 16.3801 33.9811 0 37.218 41.2276 30.0024 0 13.0333 20.3265 7.18721 28.5746 1.08531 0.94985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 29.0171 34.0085 25.1647 26.1946 30.3541 29.2959 43.5751 45.1605 0 0 22.2015 22.8907 23.7105 42.2488 29.4336 28.3767 5.89992 9.47161 0 56.9161 13.5115 0 8.86884 17.7977 16.4297 15.4767 31.3467 27.6383 0 #######
0 ####### 14.774 31.3299 23.3167 24.4036 28.5568 29.5879 0 0 0 0 21.659 23.4433 23.2909 23.0494 0 18.5057 3.85927 0 0 55.2967 5.79122 3.47059 11.4501 17.121 16.8472 15.5413 20.0836 27.5656 ####### 0
0 0 0 0 53.7 51.72 29.4125 22.956 0 0 11.122 15.4737 22.7305 32.3976 28.9033 30.2664 25.8395 29.2001 23.2005 27.0789 22.6142 14.963 18.4234 12.2682 0 36.8396 17.1509 0 9.64811 17.1955 17.4399 16.0414
0 0 0 0 0.90055 1.19725 25.6455 26.9226 19.5792 0 15.9065 22.3289 23.2816 23.4299 30.2004 28.8243 26.5746 30.1511 23.8359 27.834 22.7138 22.7151 18.9173 18.1098 41.4739 40.8398 19.4443 1.11777 0 19.7791 18.5979 16.4194
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.366 18.7397 0 0 15.5058 36.5631 36.9784 17.0603 36.8735 26.6522 31.2004 0 0 43.9734 22.6451 30.7536 46.843 17.0422 30.2161 38.2184 23.1479 16.1842 19.5454 0 0.89168
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.15911 28.1129 27.6427 16.2942 37.728 32.1018 32.6116 0 0 0 17.6069 46.6359 45.0346 16.8937 16.0932 20.4802 18.634 2.17056 1.19609 2.03306 1.85164
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.7897 0 19.0436 39.7159 31.4273 30.5285 26.0817 26.992 0 0 58.7149 0 0 26.5435 11.7175 38.673 20.8767 16.8087 21.1036 18.915 0.44666 1.49702
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.4644 61.0356 23.009 37.0453 27.7785 27.6202 0 0 0 54.5688 15.0854 26.6057 36.8743 21.7639 21.3679 19.8188 25.0496 29.4461 0 0.62155
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.81096 15.9638 16.5947 32.0206 34.4093 26.052 26.3286 0 0 0 0 0 11.6629 12.7538 10.0946 20.2586 18.3037 29.1185 27.3902 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.57996 15.877 15.803 34.104 34.3546 25.109 25.9977 8.94716 7.86424 0 0 0 0 12.5742 12.0636 12.1606 12.5168 0 0 0 15.1702
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.95216 15.4617 2.17252 16.2394 15.1424 0 0 0 14.9737 0 15.7077 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.9482 14.2969 12.3751 0 0 0 0 15.4365 30.5404 12.4726 0 0 0 19.9749 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13.261 9.40642 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.35463 0 6.63218 6.20749 19.469 0.55211 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19.1945 15.4926 6.2236 6.62621 0 2.27607 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.17247 40.7426 41.025 23.6626 0 0 0 2.72291 2.97201 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.2422 41.1099 10.6797 0 0 0 5.7208 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.7486 11.257 1.72974 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.58763 1.9247 0 0 0.41773 ####### 0 0
Indian Hills Rd
Franklin Rd
Tecumseh Rd
Rock Creek Rd
Robinson St
Alameda St
Lindsey St
Cedar Lane Rd
Post Oak Rd
Imhoff Rd
60th
Ave
NW
48th
Ave
NW
36th
Ave
NW
24th
Ave
NW
12th
Ave
NW
N P
orte
r Ave
12th
Ave
NE
24th
Ave
NE
36th
Ave
NE
35
35
77
77
77
9 9
9Mea
n N
umbe
r of O
ut-m
igra
ted
Peop
le
0-0.
55-
1010
-20
20-3
030
-40
40-5
050
-60
60<
0.5-
5
EF5
0
10
20
30
40
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Mea
n PO
Time (days)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Mea
n PO
Time (days)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Mea
n PO
Time (days)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Tornado-Induced Casualties
The National Weather Service (NWS) Storm Prediction Center (SPC) has
a database of tornadoes in the United States since 1950. A tornado may strike a town in a populated area of a county or an
undeveloped part of a county.
The number of housing units and people in tornado path can be
approximated by using the tornado track information and the U.S. census
data. The U.S. census data for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 and
the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimate for the year 2015
were used in this study. The intercensal estimate was done for each tornado by simple linear
interpolation based on the year of occurrence.
Tornado-Induced Casualties
Counties Census Tracts Block Groups Census Blocks
The EF4 tornado occurred on April 27, 2011 in the city of Tuscaloosa.
T
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Tornado-Induced Casualties
Touchdown:
Longitude: -87.9350
Latitude: 33.0297
Lift-off:
Longitude: -86.7436
Latitude: 33.6311
Buffer
Tornado Path
IntersectCensus
Boundary
Shapefile
Tuscaloosa
Greene
Jefferson
The error can be as
high as 80% when
the census data at
the county level is
used.(a) County-level
(b) Census Tract-level
(c) Block Group-level
(d) Census Block-level
Tornado-Induced Casualties
Sources: Esri, HERE, DeLorme, USGS, Intermap, INCREMENT P, NRCan, Esri Japan, METI, Esri China (Hong Kong), Esri Korea, Esri (Thailand), MapmyIndia, NGCC,
© OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS User Community
Sources: Esri, HERE, DeLorme, USGS, Intermap, INCREMENT P, NRCan, Esri Japan, METI, Esri China (Hong Kong), Esri Korea, Esri (Thailand), MapmyIndia, NGCC,
© OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS User Community
(a)
(b)
The assumption of a straight line path may underestimate or overestimate the
affected community properties, e.g., Joplin tornado: A simplified angular
path which is close
to the observed path:
• P: 14,870
• H: 6,830
An assumed straight
path:
• P: 4,480
• H: 1,821
Tornado-Induced Casualties
The intercensal estimate was done 20,001 tornadoes in the filtered
dataset.
Three models were developed:
Model 1: explanatory variables are LENGTH, INTENSITY, and
POPULATION.
Model 2: In addition to variables in Model 1 it has SEASON,
DAY, and EVENING.
Model 3: In addition to variables in Model 1 it has DAMAGE.
Closure
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning
• Estimating building loads and damage is easy !
• Estimating the effect of these loads on community resilience is not !
Thank you.The Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning is a NIST-funded Center of Excellence; the Center is funded through a cooperativeagreement between the U.S. National Institute of Standards andTechnology and Colorado State University (NIST Financial AssistanceAward Number: 70NANB15H044). The views expressed are those of thepresenter, and may not represent the official position of the NationalInstitute of Standards and Technology or the US Department ofCommerce.Numerous researchers contributed to the contents of this presentationand a sincere thank you is due to everyone affiliated with the Center forRisk-Based Community Resilience Planning.
Some work presented here was supported by the National ScienceFoundation (NSF) under Grant No. CMMI-1452725. This support isgratefully acknowledged. All views are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the views of the NSF.