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There seems no reason whatsoever for supposing this to be high. At best,therefore, this third hypothesis could only compete on equal terms with theother two hypotheses and given that it lacks any generating ‘mechanisms’one might justifiably argue that the probability must be small (p. 161).

This passage illustrates two problems which infect many of Bartholomew’sarguments: vagueness in assigning probability values to various hypotheses(a problem faced by everyone who approaches these questions in this way,it should be noted), and speculation based on sketchy arguments. Readersaccustomed to precision and careful justification will find both of thesefeatures problematic.

In conclusion, Bartholomew’s book canvasses a wide variety of interest-ing topics and contains many intriguing arguments. But the flaws describedabove, which infect many of his arguments, imply that he fails to showthat Christian belief is rationally supported by evidence which every rationalperson would accept.

Scott A. DavisonMorehead State University

William J. Wainwright (ed.), God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture.Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996, 87 pages, $19.95

The essays collected here developed out of the perception that, while “philos-ophy of religion” is practiced extensively both in the American PhilosophicalAssociation and in the American Academy of Religion, the nature of theresearches carried out under that label in the two communities tends to bedifferent. This perception led William Wainwright to organize a panel onthe topic at the AAR, featuring Nicholas Wolterstorff and Merold Westphal(APA), and Walter Lowe and Stephen Crites (AAR). Later he invited addi-tional essays by Wayne Proudfoot (AAR), and by Philip Quinn, C. StephenEvans, and Robert Adams (APA), and added an introductory essay of his ownto complete the volume.

The contributors are justifiably wary of the notion that we have here aneat dichotomy, but they do agree that differences exist and also on the mainoutlines of what they are. Most APA philosophers of religion are analyticphilosophers, and they tend to pay little attention to Continental philosophysince Kant (with the notable exception of Kierkegaard). Most AAR practi-tioners, in contrast, are heavily invested in post-Kantian Continental philos-ophy, and pay little attention to analytic philosophy (again with a notableexception, in this case the later Wittgenstein). Relativism and anti-realism arepervasive in the AAR but uncommon in the APA. APA philosophers focus on

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religious beliefs, often of a generally orthodox cast, and place a high priorityon evaluating the truth and rationality of such beliefs. AAR philosophers,in contrast, are more interested in a broad variety of religious practices, andaccord to social scientific explanations of religion a prestige they lack inthe APA. Finally, many more APA philosophers of religion are theists, orat least take theism seriously as the most significant religious option. MostAAR philosophers of religion are not theists and regard theistic religions asno more significant than a variety of other religious stances.

The causes of the split between the two approachesare not quite as clear, buthere also there is considerable agreement among the contributors. AAR-typephilosophy of religion is typically practiced in religious studies departmentsand in the more liberal theological faculties, while APA philosophers ofreligion are housed in traditional philosophy departments. The pressures toavoid the taint of sectarian indoctrination may contribute to the reluctanceof AAR philosophers to advocate specific religious positions or to engage incognitive evaluation of religious beliefs. In recent years, the upsurge of theismamong APA philosophers of religion may well have led religious believersto self-select into philosophy as opposed to religious studies. There is a greatdeal more to be said about this, and quite a bit is in fact said by variouscontributors to the volume, but there is no reason why the causation of thedifferences need be seriously controversial.

With regard to the relative merits of the different approaches, on the otherhand, there is no neutral, impartial ground on which to stand. Among theseessays, the evaluation of the differences is addressed most sharply by Crites,in “The Pros and Cons of Theism: Whether They Constitute the FundamentalIssue of the Philosophy of Religion”, and in Evans’ essay, “On Taking GodSeriously: Philosophy of Religion in the APA and AAR”, which is in goodpart a response to Crites. Their most important disagreement concerns thecentrality of theism as a philosophical issue; to convey the flavor of the dis-cussion I will mention some theses Evans extracts from Crites’ paper, as wellas Evans’ responses to those theses. Crites holds that “‘Theism’ is an abstrac-tion dealing with second-order notions that are not closely connected to theliving practices of religion.” While admitting that philosophical discussionsof theism (like virtually all others) are abstract, Evans observes that “Theismis simply a way of talking about a significant number of beliefs of ordinaryreligious people, beliefs that inform the lives and religious practices of thesepeople” (p. 62). Crites thinks theistic talks exceeds the limits of meaningfulhuman discourse. Evans remarks that in this case second-person address toGod in prayer (which Crites wants to preserve) is also suspect; he chidesCrites for assuming the non-cognitivity of religious language without consid-ering seriously the defenses of cognitivity which have been given in recent

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analytic philosophy. Crites views theism as a “parochial set of beliefs”; Evanswonders how one can dismiss as parochial ideas that are central to the livesof hundreds of millions of human beings on all continents of the earth.

Regrettably, the book’s format did not allow for a further response fromCrites; one hopes the discussion will not be allowed to die. In the meantime,God, Philosophy, and Academic Cultureis warmly recommended to everyonewith more than a passing interest in the philosophy of religion.

William HaskerHuntington College

C. Stephen Evans,The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: TheIncarnational Narrative as History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, xiii +386 pages, $60.00

C. Stephen Evans undertakes to show that the Incarnational Narrative, the“story of Jesus of Nazareth, taken from the New Testament as a whole, asthat story has been traditionally taken by the Christian Church” (p. 2) canreasonably be accepted in its historicity – historicity in the sense that it reallyhappened very much in the way that it is told. The book stands in the tradi-tion of rethinking the heritage of the Enlightenment, a heritage which Evanssees as leading to the more sceptical views of many biblical scholars. Thisundertaking is important because the story, as Evans views it, depends on itshistoricity for its validity.

The heart of the book is the central section on epistemology. Evans’ carefulpresentation of an epistemology which can show how we can know thetruth of the Incarnational Narrative rejects classic foundationalism and movesto an “externalist” epistemology which is evaluative of knowledge alreadyacquired rather than deontological or doing what is sensibly required ofa responsible thinker. Such an epistemology will build on certain beliefsas basic (thus in a limited sense foundationalist), but these basic beliefsare not incorrigible. The approach to specifically Christian claims makesthe epistemology more precise by taking as complementary two traditionalapproaches, one proceeding by making judgments about evidence, the other,the Reformed approach, grounded in the witness of the Holy Spirit.

The philosophical setting in which the question of historicity is framed isthat of the theism of such thinkers as William Alston and Cornelius Plantinga.In the background stands Scottish realism. Hegel, Kant (except for his reli-gious rationalism), and the whole hermeneutical tradition, so important inthe background of New Testament studies, are not serious dialogue partners.

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