william james and yogācāra philosophy- a comparative inquiry

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William James and Yogācāra Philosophy: A Comparative InquiryAuthor(s): Miranda Shaw

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 223-244Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

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Miranda Shaw William James andYogiacra philosophy:A comparativeinquiry

INTRODUCTION

A generalkinship etween hephilosophyfWilliamJames nd certain spectsofBuddhisthoughts mmediatelypparentndfrequentlyoted. Thiskinshipis most pparentntheir hared onviction hat he elfs not permanentntityor "soul-substance," ut s rather n aggregate fprocesses Buddhism's kan-

dhas) ncluding momentaryeries f tates fconsciousnessJames' stream fconsciousness" nd Buddhism'scittasamt?na).2here are, however,deepercomparisons hatcan be made betweenJames nd specific uddhist hinkers.For instance,he oncept f"pureexperience"nthephilosophiesfJames ndNishida Kitaro havemuch ncommon.David Dilworthhas written splendidessayon this,3 nd myarticle s meant n a sense to complementhatstudy.Dilworthnotesthat the founder ftheKyoto school of Zen philosophywasinfluencedyJames, aving een ntroduced o James'booksbyD. T. Suzuki.4Dilworth

xplainshatJames'

philosophytruck familiarhordfor

Nishida,highlightingtreamsfthoughthatwere lready resentnBuddhism, utfullyenough bsorbed nto thebackgroundhatNishida was inspiredomake them

explicit nce again, n theprocess ddingthedistinctiveouchof thereligiousgeniusforwhichhe is renownedntheglobalphilosophical rena.TheKyotoschoolofphilosophynturnhas cometo theWest and is stimulating estern

philosophy n a processof cross-fertilizationhatcharacterizeshe currentinternationalntellectuallimate.

Thepurpose f this ssay s toexplore omeofthe imilaritiesetween ames

andBuddhist houghthatrenderedheCantabrigian's hilosophyo compat-iblewithNishida'sZenphilosophy.n order o do this, will nalyze heparallelsbetween ames' houghtndthat fearlyYogacara philosophy,ne ofthetwomainstreams fMahayana philosophyn India.Yogacara philosophy, o lessthanMadhyamaka,wasfamiliaro and assimilated ytheformulatorsf Ch'aninChina.Whatsuggests comparison f WilliamJames nd Yogacara Bud-dhism s thenumerous arallelsbetween heir nalysesofexperiencend the

pragmaticheoriesftruth hat hey eveloped o retain degree f pistemolog-icalrealismnviewofthose nalyses.Mydiscussion eginswith section n the

primacy fexperience orbothJames ndYogacara, sincethis onstituteshecornerstonef their espectivemetaphysics.he rest ftheessayexamines he

nexusofphilosophicalnsightshat nformshe nterpretationfexperienceyeachsystem,nder heheadings f 1) experiences a constructivectivitynd

abhutaparikalpa,2) the externalworld:a pluralistic niverse nd paratantra,

(3) pureexperiencendparinispanna,nd (4) pragmatismndarthakriyd.

MirandaShaw sa doctoral andidate t HarvardUniversity.AUTHOR'S NOTE: would ike to thankProfessors liot Deutsch,Paul J. Griffiths,asatoshi

Nagatomi,RichardR. Niebuhr,nd YuichiKajiyama orhelpfulommentsn this ssayat variousstages,while bsolvinghemrom esponsibilityor tscontent,inceon somepoints havenot hosen

to ollow hemuch-appreciateddvice received.

Philosophyast and West, olume37,no. 3 (July 987). © bytheUniversityf HawaiiPress.All rights eserved.







224 Shaw

The discussion f Jamesdrawson an array f hiswritings. developed hisdiscussion n thebasisof hisEssays nRadicalEmpiricismpublishedn 1912)because it embodies his maturephilosophy.However, uotations re drawnfrom rangeofhisworks, tartingwiththerelatively arlyPsychologytheBriefer ourse,1892).James'philosophysconsistent n thetopics overednthis ssay.Thedescriptive odelofexperiencend itsmetaphysicalnderpinn-ingsoutlinedn Psychologyorm hebasis of theunderstandingfexperiencethat nformsll of hissubsequentwork.Further,sychology as an exercisentheempiricismhatEssays advocates,whilepragmatism ervades ll of his

writings.5hediscussion fYogacara focuses n theMadhyjntavibhcga-sdstra,"Treatise nDiscriminationetween heMiddle ndExtremeViews)," hefirst

systematicormulationf Yogacara philosophy.6My translations re fromSusumu Yamaguchi's critical Sanskrit edition of the Madhydntavibhdga(hereinafterited s Y withpage citations),which ncludesVasubandhu's om-

mentarybhsyya)nd Sthiramati'subcommentaryt'kd).7One issuethat rises t theoutset sthat f thepossible nfluencefBuddhist

thoughtngeneral ndYogacara inparticularponWilliamJames. here snodoubtthatJameswasexposed oBuddhisthought. e and hisneighbor harlesLanman, Sanskritcholarwhoworkedmainlywith arlyBuddhist exts,wereclose friends,nd he knewPaul Carus, another tudent f earlyBuddhist

thought.8 ames lso owned and annotated number fbooks on Buddhism,such as Paul Carus' History fBuddhism,Warren'sBuddhismnTranslations,Koeppen's Die Religiondes Buddha, nd Max Muller'sHistory fAncient

Sanskrit iterature.9espitehisacquaintancewithBuddhist hought,hereslittlevidence hathisphilosophysdeeplynformedyBuddhism. heworks owhichhehad accessdiscuss hebasicdoctrinesfBuddhism, ut James arelyrefers othese octrinesnhiswritings.nisolated eferenceccurs nVarietiesof Religious xperience:

I am ignorant fBuddhism.. butas I apprehend heBuddhistic octrine fKarma, agree nprinciple ith hat.10

InhisPsychology-wherein

amesays

out theviews ftheelf, erception,

ndthestreamof consciousness hatare so acutely nalogous to those of Bud-dhism-he doesnot citeBuddhism, ut baseshisdiscussions n his ownscien-tific nowledgefphysiologyndpsychology,ponwhich oundationedoubt-lesscouldhavedevelopedhis views ndependentlynd then erhapsnoticed heBuddhist arallels ater.

Furtherdisconfirmationf Buddhistphilosophical nfluence pon Jamesis theselectivityfhisown nterestnworldreligions.twas notan interestnphilosophy,ogic,ordoctrine hatguidedhisstudy fworldreligions,ut his

interestnpersonal eligiousxperiencendmeditativermysticaltates,owardthe ndofdevelopingnobjectivecience freligionsasedonthepsychologyfthat xperience. ames' nterestnthepsychologyatherhan hephilosophyf







225

Buddhisms seen n Varieties, herein e discussesnot the doctrines fBud-

dhism, utBuddhistmeditativetates.11 romthis, nemightnferhatJameswas moreknowledgeableboutthepsychologicalhanthetechnicalspectsofBuddhistphilosophy.Given the stateof Buddhist cholarshipn his day,he

certainly ouldnothave been awareof theYogacara doctrines hat o closely

parallelhis own. Whilethe

questionfthe nfluencef basic Buddhist octrine

uponJames' houghtmustremain n openquestion, heres no doubtthathe

developedhisphilosophy f "experience nly" independentlyfthatsystem.Therefore,hesetwo highly nalogous philosophies rose independentlyn

second-centuryndia andnineteenth-centuryewEngland.

I. THE PRIMACY OF EXPERIENCE

WilliamJames tated hathe intended o formulate philosophy ased solelyon postulatesdrawn from xperience,nd he called his philosophy adical

empiricism:To be radical,an empiricismmust neither dmit nto its constructionsnyelement hat s notdirectlyxperienced,or xclude romhemnyelementhatisdirectlyxperienced.12

Guidedbythis riterion,e derivedwhatforhimwas theprimarynd incon-testable act:

The first nd foremost oncrete act s thatconsciousnessfsomesortgoes on... [;] states fmind' ucceed ach other.13

That s,theprincipal act fexperiencesexperiencetself. hisfact, orJames,isalso an encompassingact. ince n experienceonsists f tscontent,heresno reason,nor s itpossible, o imagine n experiencepartfrom tscontent:

Whatrepresentsnd what s representeds herenumericallyhesame; ... wemust ememberhatnodualism fbeing epresentedndrepresentingesidesntheexperience erse.... There s no self-splittingf t into consciousnessndwhattheconsciousnesss 'of.' Its subjectivitynd objectivityre functionalattributesolely, ealized nlywhen he xperiences taken,' .e.,talked-of,wice... bya newretrospectivexperience.14

Thus,forJames, he content hould be included n thecategory fexperienceratherhanna separate ategory. ust s anexperiences ndistinguishableromits ontent,oits ontents nextricablerom he xperience.ames tates hat hefirstreat itfall hathisradical mpiricismreventss "an artificialonceptionof therelations etween nower ndknown." 5

On the basis of the indivisibilityf experience, amesconcludesthattheconsciousfield,tsobject, he ttitude oward heobject, nd the enseofa selfto which he ttitude elongs ll meldtogetheroform a fullfact, hekind o

which ll realities elong, nlike he bstractobject'when aken lone."16Here,theencompassing ature fexperienceorJames ecomes lear whenhestates

that all realities" reenveloped y t. Hismoreradicalwayofstatingt sthat







226 Shaw

experiences all theres,themateriarima feverything,hich annotbepinneddowntoeithernner r outer eality. This sone of hemeaningsfJames' erm"pureexperience."For theother,moretechnical, sagesee sectionV.) "Pure

experience"n this ontexts a slightly isleadingerm,ortconnotes form rlevel f xperiencehatspure rcontentless,hileJamesmeansby t hatwe ive

ina world hat spurely,hat s,solely, xperience.Just s experiences thecornerstone f James' mpirical hilosophy,tpro-vides hepoint fdepartureor hephilosophynfoldedn theMadhyantvibhaga.The textopensinkdrika .1 with he statementimaginationxists" abhuta-parikalpo sti).That s,thementalifenall itsvicissitudessuncontestablyeal,an undebatable ostulate fYogacara philosophy.magination ere s synony-mous withwhat James alls experience, ut theSanskrit ompound s more

descriptiveecause tcontains nexplicit eferenceo tsmisleading uality. hefull ranslationftheterms "imagination f thefalse or unreal)."The next

phrase pecifies hat smisleadingbout t:"There s no dualityn t" (dvayamtatrana vidyate).Like James,Yogacara upholds the ultimate ntegrityf

experiencen its indivisibilitynto"experience" nd "content." n Yogacaraterminology,xperiences"empty" sunya) fthis ivision. ommentingnthis

verse, thiramatixplains hat the maginationfwhat sfalse, eing evoidofa realsubject ndobject, s saidtobeempty"abhutaparikalpoigrdhyagrdha-kasvariparahitahunyaucyate) Y10). SthiramatigreeswithJameswhenhe

explains hat oth ubject ndobject reencompassed y xperiencer magina-

tion,nd hence nextricablerom t:

Indeed, t s not thecase that he maginationf what s false s theperceiverfanything,or s itperceived y anyone. Y1 1)

Imagination f what s false s to be treated s an indivisible nit. t is not the

perceiver f anything ecause it encompasses tsobject; similarly,ue to its

enveloping ature,tcannotbeobjectified.ames grees hat xperienceannot

experiencetself:

Experiencenitsoriginalmmediacys notawareof tself,tsimplys,and thesecond

experiencesrequired

orwhatwecall awareness f tto occur. 8

That s,theprocess fwitnessingannotbewitnessed;t implyccurs.nJames'words, We shouldsay it thinks' s we say it rains'or simply: hought oeson'" 19

Therefore,ogacara, ikeJames, pholds xperiences the olereality. oga-cara treatises efer o thispostulate s cittamdtrar vijnaptimdtra.lthoughoften ranslated s "mindonly," heuse ofthenoun"mind"tends o substan-tialize he onceptna waythatYogacaradid not ntend,yconjuringn imageof permanentubstancend thennvitinghe abel of bsolutism, hen t sthe

processualife f hemind-the conceptualizingrocess nd the motions-thatis meanthere, nd not a staticmental ubstrate r "cosmicconsciousness"underlyingariegatedxperience.







227

II. EXPERIENCE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY AND ABHUTAPARIKALPA

Theprevious ection iscussed owJames nd theMadhydntavibhdgaoth reat

experiences an encompassing ategoryhat nvelops xperiencerndcontent,orsubject ndobject, na single ategory hrough hich definiteividinginecannotbe drawn.That s,experiencesan intermixturef ubject ndobject nd,

due to thesubjective lements,xperiences constructiveather hanpassive.James sserted hat"realitys an accumulation fourownintellectualnven-tions." 0Yogacara's parallel ssertionsimplicitn tswordfor rdinary xpe-rience,bhiutaparikalpa.heverbal ootofparikalpaspariJk.p,"toconstruct,create,magine, ivide," rangeofmeanings hat xpresses ow thismodeof

experiences disjunctiverdualistic nd also constructive,reatingherealitythatweexperience.hus,experiencenbothphilosophiess notsimply ynony-mouswith ensation r perception, ut is an apperceptivend interpretativeprocess s well.

Bothphilosophies ivide xperiencentotwo mainphases,prereflectivendreflective,nd demonstrate ariouswaysthat xperiences constructeduringthe eflective,rconceptual, hase.On thewhole,James rovidesmore xtensive

exemplification,fferingn Abhidharma-likeatalogofmental rocesses, artlybecausehis thesiswas more novel n his intellectual radition nd partlybe-causehe wasdoingpioneering ork nthefield fpsychologys well.Yogacara,on the otherhand,workedagainstthebackground f an extensive orpusofAbhidharma iteraturedetailedpsychophilosophicalnalysesof the con-

stituentsf experience) nd a pan-Buddhist onviction hat all mentalphe-nomena reconstructedr"conditioned"samskrta). nother easonfor erse-ness ntheYogacaracase isthat he extwas meant o serve s a springboardora teacher's ral commentary, hileJamesprovidedhisowncommentarynd

exemplification.James nd Yogacara similarly escribe prereflectivehase ofexperience,

althoughJames'descriptionarriesmore rhetorical orce, ince he was goingagainst heprevalenthilosophical rain.He wasarguing gainstHume's atom-istic heoryfexperiencewhich ositsno connectinggent) ndCartesian nd

Kantian epistemological ualism.James describes he prereflectivetage ofexperiences direct,mmediate,nd intuitivend callsthisphase "sensation,"while the subsequentmentaloperationsperformed pon sensationhe calls

perception,onceptualization,rclassification:

'Ideas' abouttheobjectminglewith he wareness f tsmere ensible resence,we name t,classit, ompare t,utter ropositions oncerningt.... In general,thishigher onsciousness bout things s called Perception, while] hemereinarticulateeelingf their resences Sensation.21

Jamesdescribes heunity hatcharacterizeshestageofsensation r imme-diateawareness, singtheexampleoflooking t a pieceofpaper. n thefirstmoment fexperience,hepaperand theobserver reunitary:







228 Shaw

There s nocontext f ntermediariesrassociates o standbetween ndseparatethethoughtnd thing.. butrather n allround mbracingf thepaper bythethought.22

To say"This sa pieceofpaper, t which amlooking" nvolvesnterpretation,whichsa constructiver ntellectualrocess.ndeed,what sexperienceds notan external

ieceof

paper,but "the immediate esults

ponconsciousness f

nerve-currentss they nter he brain."23All thatone can really ayis thatsensation rexperience as occurred:

The paperseenand theseeing f t areonlytwonamesforone indivisible actwhich, roperly amed, s thedatum,he henomenon,rthe xperience.24

TheYogacara (and indeedpan-Buddhist)quivalents fJames' sensation"aresparsa, iterallycontact"betweenense-organndobject, ndvijndna,he"consciousness" hatresults rom heir ontact.The Madhydntavibhdgaom-

mentaterscho James'descriptionf theprereflectivehaseofexperience:Consciousnessvijndna)s thecognizance f the mere hingarthamdtradrsti).'Mere' means hat articularttributesvisesa) renot ognized; heresonly heperceptionupalabdhi) f thethingtselfvastusvaripa).Y31)

After henondichotomousnd direct xperiencef thedatum r mere hing,hesensations redigested rre-presented,s itwere, nd their ignificancestab-lished. t is inthis eflectivehase-perception, onceptualization,rclassifica-tion nJames' erminology,nd vikalpa, rapanca, r sa.mjndnYogacara's-

that xperienceecomes constructiverocess. hesensations re nterpretednlight fpast experience,ncludingultural ndlinguisticonstructsnd individ-ual interestsndpreferences.

James dentifieshefirstgent fconstructions attention,ecauseattentionselectswhich spectsofa field fawarenesswillreceive tsfocus:

Consciousness salways nterested ore nonepart f tsobject hannanother,andwelcomesndrejects,rchooses, llthewhiletthinks....AccentuationndEmphasis representnevery erception ehave.25

ForJames,

heresult fttentions the eificationf ertainspects fthe ealitythat s transmittedythe ensations:

Out ofwhat is in itself n indistinguishable,warmingontinuum,evoidofdistinctionremphasis.... Attention.. picksoutcertain ensations s worthyofnotice, hoosing hose hat resigns ous ofthings hichhappenpracticallyoraestheticallyointerests,towhichwe thereforeive ubstantive ames ndtowhichwegivethe tatus f ndependencenddignity.26

James otes hatnames ndseeminglyndependenthingsre theproductsfthereificationrocess.The independenttatusof objects s purely n attributed

status ccording o Jamesbecause,as discussed bove in section , he claimssubjectand objectto be inextricablynterfusedn theprereflectivehase ofexperience. ames urtherotes hat heworldweconstructsstable nduniform







229

while xperiencend phenomena redynamic nd ever-changing.27imilarly,forYogacara andindeed ll Buddhism,hebasicproducts hat hehypostatiza-tionof thefield fawareness roduces rephenomenawhose eeming ndepen-dence beliestheirunderlyingnterconnectednessnd whose seeming taticitybetrays hemomentarinessfexistentsnd the tream f consciousness.

For both James nd theMadhydntavibhdga,hesenamesand forms ave aninterreferentialharacter,or hey re establishedhroughmutual pposition-for xample, ubject s opposedtoobject, houghto thing, eing ononbeing,black to white-and also throughmutual interrelationship-forxample,above,below,more,farther,righter,imilar, nd so forth. amesholdsthattheresno single, bjective uality hat oes notvary ccordingo ts ontext.n

PsychologyndEssays,hegivesmany xamples fthisnterreferentiality.few

examples rom hevisual phere rethat omethingiolet ppearsmore ntensewhen uxtaposedwithyellow;black looks darkernextto white hanto gray;

something right ecomesdull with he ppearance fsomethingrighter;ndso forth.28n addition, bjectstend to be definedn terms f their unction,which gain expresses relation, amely, ohumanneedsandpurposes. ome

qualities reclearly alues thathavebeensubjectivelyttributednd cannotbesaidto nheren thephenomenahemselves,uch s preciousness,angerousness,rarity, eauty, nd repulsiveness.et, Jamespointsout,these amequalitiescannot imply e relegatedo the mental rpurelynonobjectiveealm, ither,because theyhave a physicalrealmof activityn their ffects pon human

physiologynd evenbehavior.29

Therefore,whilereflectioneems to revealdefinitemages and objectiveattributes,hat nfact soccurrings a complex lassificatoryrocess hat akesinto ccount varietyfcontexts,unctions,nd relations. heserelationsccurwithin xperience, ormingts self-referentialualityand supporting ames'thesis hatwhat we experiences, after ll, not an externalworld,but pureexperience:

Mythesissthatfwestartwith he uppositionhat heresonly neprimal tuffor material n theworld .. and ifwe call thatstuffpureexperience,' hen

knowing an easilybe explained s a particular ort of relation owardsoneanotherntowhichportions fpureexperiencemayenter. he relationtselfspartofpureexperience.30

For thisreason,James ikens onsciousnesso a streamn which

every efinitemage nthemind s steeped nddyed n thefreewater hat lowsround t .. the enseof tsrelations....Thesignificance,hevalue,ofthe mageis all inthishalo orpenumbra hat urroundsnd escortst,-or ratherhat sfusedntoone with t.31

On thispoint,Yogacara agreeswithJames hat hestream fconsciousnessconditionstself. orJames, ach mage nthe treams"steeped nddyed"bythe surroundingmages,that s, by the interreferentialontextprovidedby







230 Shaw

experiencetself. or Yogacara, too,previousmomentsn the stream fcon-sciousness ondition ater nes Y25):

Dualisticthoughtvikalpa) s constructedyother ualistic houghtY23)

and

Consciousness riseswith he ppearance fobjects hroughheripeningf tsown seeds. Y 11)

These seeds (blja) incubate n thealayavijnina, "storeconsciousness" hatfunctionso shapefuturections, erceptions,ndfeelingsn thebasis ofpastonesthroughhe ction f"perfuming"vdsand). healayavijninasanintegralpartofabhitaparikalpand,as itsunderlyingausal basis hetupratyaya),s itsfundamentalrbasal structureY33).

Because of their trong mphasis n theunity f subject nd object n the

prereflectivehaseof xperiencend the ctive oleofthe ubjectnconstructingthereflectivehaseofexperience,othJames ndYogacarahave attimes eencharacterizedspropoundingorms f dealism. ames asbeen haracterizedsa Berkeliandealist yE. C. Moore and A. O. Lovejoy.32Althoughome urrentstudies redisputinghisnterpretation,33ogacaraconsistentlyas been nter-

preted s idealism.For instance,AshokChatterjee aysthatforYogacara theworld sunreal nd"consciousnesssthe olereality."4SurendranathasguptaclaimsthatYogacara is an "uncompromisingdealism"forwhich heexternalworlddoes notexist, ut sconstructedy"ignorantminds." 5T. R. V. Murti

calls t"idealism arexcellence.. the nly enuinelydealisticchool n ndia,"36while no less a Buddhologist hanEdward Conze calls it "a metaphysicalidealism,which eaches hat onsciousness.. creates tsobjects ut of ts owninner otentialities."37hesevarious ssessmentsightlycknowledgehepri-macyof experiencen its constructiver illusionaryspectsforJames nd

Yogacara. However, hey o notrecognizehatJames ndtheYogacara of the

Madhyantavibhdgand itscommentarieso notdeny he xistence fphenom-enal reality.Rather, hey onflate ubject nd object, nner nd outer,ntoasingle ategoryhat ncludes oth.TheMadhyantavibhdgatself ever tates hat

abhitaparikalpareates r magines hephenomenalworld;what t magines rcreates sdualism,mostnotably ubject-objectualism. thiramatixplains hatthis swhatmakes t maginationf what sunreal:

The termunreal'meansthat his the xternalworld] oes not exist nthewaythat t sconstructed,.e. intheform fsubject ndobject. Imagination'meansthat n objectdoesnot exist nthewaythat t s imagined.Y13)

James, oo, encompasses ubject nd object n a single ategory ather hanreducinghe xternalworld othe ubject's onsciousness.

The aforementionednterpretersfJames lassify im s a metaphysical,rontological, dealist long withBerkeley,whiletheinterpretersf Yogacarasimilarly lace t nthemetaphysicaldealist amp.Thattheyrenotmetaphys-







231

ical idealists, ut share position fphenomenal ealism,onstituteshe hemeof thenext ection.

III. THE EXTERNALWORLD: A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSEAND PARATANTRA

SincebothJames ndYogacaradefineealityn terms f experience nly," heir

philosophies ave been mistaken ormetaphysicaldealism,whichdeniestheexistence f the xternal orld fphenomena. et neitherhilosophy enies heexistence fexternalbjects hat xistndependentlyfthe xperiencingubject,howevermuchthey elimit hat ndependence. othphilosophiesmaintain nelement f realism,but theynuance that realismwith a recognition f the

relativityf allphenomena. ames' iew frelativitymergesnhischaracteriza-tionoftheuniverse s pluralistic, hile orYogacara itappears nthediscussionofparatantra.

Jameswasquite traightforwardnhisphenomenal ealism.He characterized

himself s a "realist" 8 and declared hatI am ... postulating ere standing ealityndependentf the dea thatknowsit.39

Some of hiscolleagues, uch as RudolfLotze,held that thing hat s taken ntworelations annotbe the amethingneach,that s,that heM in M-L mustbe differentrom heM inM-N. In opposition o this tomisticandHumean)position,Jamesasserted hat "one and the same world is cognizedby ourdifferent inds."40He argued hat hevariousrelations, eing onceptual, re

substitutionalndvariable,while heM ineach case is the amepieceofsensibleexperience.41his hearkens ack to hispsychologyfexperience, hich ositstwophases: 1) direct ensation nd (2) conceptualknowledge,which onsistsofestablishingarious relations.Jamesnevermeantto denythe existence fexternalbjects;hesimplynsisted hat here s no dualism fsubject ndobjectinexperience.

Yogacara's affirmationfthereality fphenomena eflectshenecessityf

treadingheBuddhistmiddle athbetween heontological xtremes f nihilismandabsolutism,rnegationapavdda) ndreificationsamdropa),f xistents.n

chartingts course between hesetwoextremes, ogacara used as itsguidingprinciple hecrowningMahayana doctrine femptinesssunyatd). mptinesswas as misunderstoodnsecond-centuryndia as it stoday, or tperenniallysmistaken or nothingness"r"nonexistence," doctrine f totalistic ihilism.

Yogacara was aware of and consciously ddressed hismisconception,ome-timeswith note of rony, s whenSthiramatiomments:

The definitionfemptinessswronglynderstoodfone thinkshat verythingexists r thatnothingxists. or onething,hiswouldmeanthenonexistencef

emptiness,oo. (Y 14)Simplytated, or omethingo beempty,omething ust xistWhen thiramati

saysthat







232 Shaw

emptiness ouldnotbepossiblefwhat sdesignateds empty erenonexistent,like mpermanencend so forth,Y14)

heis appealing o thefact hat hedoctrine femptiness,ike thoseofnonself,impermanence,ndmomentariness,rose norder odescribeomething,hroughantecedent redication. hat is, "emptiness ertains o one thingn terms f

somethinglse" (anyenahianyasya unyatd rsta) Y14), as when tpertainsoa monasteryn terms felephants r absentmonks.42According o theMad-

hydntavibhdga,maginationftheunreal xists,ndemptinesssthe bsence f

dualityn t.Sthiramatiomments:

Emptinesss ndeed his ery hing,he bsence f ubject ndobject n magina-tionof what sfalse; herefore,mptinesss notnonexistence.Y1 1)

Here,both ubject nd objectare held to be illusory;t s notsimplyheobjectthat s llusory. eing Buddhist hilosophy,ogacara is ustas concerned iththe abandonment f belief n a selfas it is withthe cessationof mistakenreificationsfphenomenal eality. he sdstrasvery xplicitnstatinghat he

experiencerbhoktrvastu)semptysunya) longwithwhat sexperiencedbho-janavastu) (Y53). It emphasizes hatthe subjectand objectare inseparablyrelated o oneanother, hichwouldnotbepossible f ither id not xist rwerereducibleotheother. heir nseparable elatedness rmutual elativityswhatthecommentaryn thispassagecalls"great mptiness"mahasunyatd)Y54).

Havingestablished hatemptiness oes notimply he nonexistencefphe-nomenalreality, ogacara neverwavers n thepoint hat oncepts f external

objectsdo not mirror r graspthoseobjects.Yet to say thatexperiences amental onstructparikalpaorvikalpa)s notthe ame as saying hatwhatoneis experiencingspurelymental.According otheMadhydntavibhdga:

It (an object)does not exist s itappears,but tdoes not exist nevery espect.(Y20)

A relevantmetaphor ccurs n theLahkdvatdra-sutra,hich ikens heopera-tionof maginationf what s false o a magician's onjuration:

Depending pongrass,wood, shrubs,ndcreepers.. allbeings nd formsake

shape .. which ppearendowedwithndividualityndmaterial ody.... Like-wise .. thefalse maginationecognizes varietyfappearances.43

Experiencemayhavean illusoryspect, ike magic how,but tdoes notarisein a vacuum. The grassand creepersn themetaphor epresentheobjectivecause (alambanapratyaya)r basis asraya)ofconsciousness,he"mere hing"(vastumdtra), hilethebeingsand forms re theverbaldesignations f theexperience,which,however llusory,s dependent pon objects.A classicalYogacarametaphornvoked ySthiramatisthat f ropemistakenor snakeinthedark ordue toa magical rick:

Thenature f a snake sabsentfrom herope;therefore,herope semptywithregard o thatthat s, snake) t alltimes, ut he ope snotemptyneveryway(that s, snotnonexistent).Y14)







233

TheYogacara concept f"consciousness nly"does not mply heexistenceof theexperiencernd thenonexistencef external henomena,nordoes itabsolutize bhutaparikalparalayavijndnas thebasal structurefabhutapari-kalpa.Sthiramatisquiteexplicitbout not ntendingo subordinateheobjectto the ubject r maketheobject omehow educible o the ubject:

Subjectivitygrdhakatvam)snotpossible fno object grdhya)xists.Y26)Since theresno object nthe bsenceofa subject,t s notpossiblefor here obe a subjectwhen here s no object. Y1 1)

To upholdthe ole existencefthe ubject revenofconsciousnesstselfwouldbe to fail o attain henondual, ranscendentisdom fa bodhisattva hat histextmeans to impartY27). It is simply hat thesubject nd object, n their

oneness, elativizeach other.

Thus,neither amesnorYogacara denies heexistence fan externalworld,

andboth gree hat t sthebasis ofourmultifariousnterpretationsf t.This sa phenomenallyealistic iew;what hey rotests the rdinary ayof eeing heworld s external,eparate rom he xperiencer,ndconsistingfdiscrete,taticentities. heysharea visionof therelativitynd interrelatednessf all things.Section I precedingiscussed heir ejectionfthehypostatizationfthe low f

experiencentoabsolute, ermanentntities. ames aments owconcepts on-struct worldofmutual xclusion:

What weconceptualize, ecut outandfix, nd exclude verythingut whatwe

have fixed.A conceptmeans that-and-no-other.44In the amevein, thiramatiays:

Indeed, onsciousness akeson the ppearance fmanifoldmages,n theformof ll sorts f ndependenthings,ike he yes nthe ailof peacock... (but)theindependentlementsdharmasvabhdvah).. aremerelyllusionbhrdntimatra).(Y31)

Clearly, henon-separatenessfsubject ndobjectforJames ndYogacara isnot imitedothat ase,butextends o allphenomenan some ense.This s seen

inJames' nsistencepona pluralisticniversendYogacara's adherence o theclassicalBuddhist octrine fmutual ausation,mplyinghe nterconnectednessof all things.n Buddhism,his nterconnectednesss all-embracing.here snolimit o the auses of given vent.AsVasubandhu tatesnhisAbhidharmakosa:"All the elementsof theuniverse) re thegeneral ause of an event."45Thevision thatemergesand is so powerfullynd poetically vokedby Hua-yenBuddhism)s one ofuniversalooperationnd nterpenetration.his sexpressedin theYogacara term orwhat xists, aratantra,iterally,other-dependent."tis also evokedby the verb fromwhich tantras derived, /tan,"to weave,"

suggestinghe nterweavingfnumeroustrands fexistence. his s the evel fthingsustas they re,which s experiencedirectlyn thepreconceptualhaseofawareness,nd hence s unformulablenwords:







234 Shaw

Paratantrameansruledbyothersparavasa).... It isnotconstructedakalpita),is born from auses,and is thoroughlynexpressibleanabhildpyasarvathd).(Y22)

Further,aratantras defined s the"pure,worldly omain" suddhalaukika-gocara), that s, phenomenaunobscured y ignorance r mentaldefilements

(Y22). To see realityn thiswayis not to lose sight ftheparticularities,orexample, he separateeyes n the tail of a peacock. It is simply o see their

connectedness,o see thatno one thing as independentsvabhdva) xistence.UnlikeYogacara,Jameswasmaking n original tatement ithhisvision f

a pluralisticniverse. e devotes t easthalf fAPluralistic niverseorefutingwhathe calls the"absolutisticmonism"of Bradley, pinoza, and Emerson,becausetheymakean abstract whole"prior otheexperienced arts.He also

rejectsheories hatdisjoinphenomena otallynorder oprovide n alternativeto monism.James rguesforan abandonment f thesetwoextremesn the

ground hat heyhave no empirical asis:

Neither bstract nenessnorabstractndependencexists;onlyrealconcretethingsxist.46

Inkeepingwithhisempirical rientation,earguesfirst or move wayfromthepurely bstract ack to therealmofexperience, hereinhingsre indeed

experienceds continuousnd as enteringnto arious elations ith ne another.The ontological mplications f theseexperiencedontinuities nd relationsshouldbe taken nto ccount,hesays, ina worldwhere xperiencendrealitycometothe amething." 7 nthe ase of nyA andB,thevery act hat hey anenter ntorelation hows,forJames, hatthey re not entirelyistinct,not

separated ya void,"notmutuallympenetrabler irrelevant;ather,hey re

co-implicatednd "musthavean inbornmutual eferenceach to each."48For James, hemutualrelatedness fphenomena oes notcancel out their

separateness, owevermutually xclusive helogicalcategories f unity nd

disunity,neness ndmanyness,may eem o be: "In life istincthingsan anddo commune ogetherverymoment."49 hus,James ptsfor nonmonistic

and nonatomisticosition hat losely esembles hat fBuddhism, olding hatinone sensethings etain heir articularity,nanother hey re nterconnectedandcompenetrable:

Withoutbeingone throughout,uch a universe s continuous. ts membersinterdigitateith heir extneighborsn manifold irections,nd there re nocleancutsbetween hem nywhere.50

James ffers visionof nfinitend all-embracingelativityhat quals thatofBuddhism:

Our multiverse'tillmakes 'universe'; or very art, ho tmaynotbe nactualorimmediateonnexion,sneverthelessn somepossibleformediated onnex-ion,with very ther arthowever emote,hroughhefact hat achparthangstogether ith tsvery extneighborn nextricablenterfusion.51







235

James aysthat his version funity s not "the monistic ype,"butwhathe

preferso call "thetype fcontinuity,ontiguity,rconcatenation,"2whichsin effectn equivalentof the Buddhistdoctrineof pratTtyasamutpddand

Yogacara's conception fparatantra.

IV. PURE EXPERIENCEAND PARINISPANNA

As discussedn theprecedingection, he xternalworld snotunreal orJamesorearly ogacara,butthey gree hatwhat sreal annotbeapproached irectlythroughwords or concepts. t can onlybe experiencedhrough irect,un-mediated xperience. his is themore technical sage ofJames'term pureexperience."Whenhe usesthe erm nthis echnicalense,trefersodirect, re-conceptual, ndunreifiedxperience:

'Pureexperience's the name which giveto the mmediate lux flifewhichfurnisheshematerial oour aterreflectionith tsconceptual ategories.53

What sexperiencednpureexperiences

a thatwhich s notyet nydefinite hat, hoready o be all sorts fwhats.54

A concept s partof the tream fpureexperience,oo, nsofar s it s directlyexperienced;owever,heconceptdisplaces hecorrespondinghenomenonstheobject fdirectwareness.5Similarly,etrospectiveonceptualizationbouta given onceptreplaces tas the mmediate ontent f theongoing tream f

experience.

A phenomenonn tspure tate, nqualifiedyconcepts, eforeven tsnamehasbeenconceived,swhatJamesmeansto indicate y"themere hat"and is

preciselywhatBuddhism ries o capture n the terms athatd nd dharmatd,variouslyranslateds "suchness," thatness,"nd"barereality." ames greeswithYogacara that this awareness vijnhna) ccurs in the firstmomentofsensation.According o James:

It reduces o thenotionofwhat s ustenteringntoexperience,nd yetto benamed .. before nybelief bout thepresencehad arisen,before nyhuman

conception adbeenapplied.... Wemayglimpset,butwe never rasp t;whatwegrasp s always omesubstituteor t.56

James ouldhavebeenwriting Yogacara treatise ere, aying hat he ontentof uch xperienceomesbefore eliefdrsti) ndconceptionvikalpa) ndcan be

glimpsedrseen darsana),butnotgraspedanupalabdhiranupalambha). heyalsoagree nthevividness fpure xperience. peakingike seerwho sfamiliarwith hismodeofexperience,ames eportsts larityndvividness, a charac-teristic f direct xperiencehat heYogacara logicians xpressedwith heterm

sphutatva.58Thus,therealm fpure xperiences not a transcendentalrobjectless ealm

for ither ames rYogacara. It stherealm fordinaryife ndphenomena,ut

experienced irectly, ithno interveningonceptualization.heYogacara term







236 Shaw

forthismode of experiencesparinispannalaksana,efined s the"sphereofnondiscursive isdom" avikalpajndnagocara)Y22). There s onlyonereality,paratantra.Whenviewedwith ttachment, ith mindthat ngages nfalselydualistic onstructionsvikalpa), aratantra ecomesobscuredby imaginativeprojectionsparikalpita).t becomes amsdra, herealm fsuffering.henthe

experiencereesthroughhedualisms hat /hehas injectedntoan inherentlywholisticrocess, aratantras seen as itreallys" (yathdabhfutrtha)nd hence sinthat enseperfectedrconsummatedparinispanna).59een forwhat ttrulyis, thisworld has becomenirvana,herealmofbliss, erenity,nd liberation.

Clearly,he hreenatures" fYogacara'stripartitecheme onotdescribe hreelevelsof reality.Theydescribedifferentaysof experiencingeality,whichremains hesamethroughout,nd this onstitutesheunity nd interchange-ability f thethree atures.

In theprocess fawakening oreality,maginationf what s falsehas to be

purified visodhydrtham)f dualityor illusion. This purifications possiblebecause,as stated n Madhydntavibhdga.1,"emptiness xists n it," that s,because t s ultimatelympty fsubject-objectuality nd all dualism.There-fore, mptinesss the basis ofpurification"visuddhi-dlambana)Y48). Empti-ness salso thebasis ofpurificationecause testablisheshe dentityfthe hreenatures hemselves.t is emptiness,heabsenceofunchangingubstances ndintrinsic,ndependent,ixed dentities,hatmakespossibletheir nterchange-abilitynd transformabilityntoone another.

For Yogacara,parinispanna,hemodeofpurifiedwareness,s thegoal ofBuddhist ractice. he term s a past passiveparticiplemeaning perfected"r"consummated,"howing hat t s somethinghat s theresult faction; t s amodeofexperience,otan ontological ategory.60nJames'philosophy,ureexperience t first lanceseemsonlyto be a descriptiveermforthe directawareness hat ccurs nthe irst oment f veryensation. etJamesnvisionsa soteriologicalole for ure xperiences well.He acknowledgeshat onceptsand philosophy ave a practical alue,butgoeson to saythatultimatelyheymustbe abandoned f direct xperiencefrealitysto begained:

Theoretic nowledge.. isknowledgebout hings,s distinguishedromivingcontemplationrsympatheticcquaintancewith hem.

Direct cquaintance nd conceptualknowledgere ... complementaryfeachother.... But f, smetaphysicians,e aremore urious boutthe nner ature frealityrabout what eallymakes tgo,we must urn urbacksuponourwingedconcepts ltogether....Dive back into the flux tself .. ifyouwishto knowreality.61

James haracterizeshe tate fmind hatdivesback nto heflux frealitys apassive,uminous,intuitiveympathy,"hichwouldmake fine ranslationftheBuddhist erm ordirect,ntuitive isdom, rajnd.James greeswithYoga-carathat hepurpose f ife nd ofphilosophystorestore ure xperiencen tsdirectmmediacy:







237

Reality alls in passing ntoconceptualanalysis; t mountsn living ts ownundivided ife-it buds and burgeons, hanges and creates.... Philosophyshould seek thiskindofliving nderstandingf the movement freality, otfollow cience nvainly atching ogether ragmentsf tsdead results.62

Otherphilosophies ry .. to restore he fluent ense of lifeagain.... Theperfection ithwhich nyphilosophymaydo this s themeasure f tshuman

success nd importancenhumanhistory.63From thepreceding iscussion, t shouldbe clear that fJames nd early

Yogacara were to be included n the idealistcamp, it would be on thesideof epistemologicaldealism ratherthan of ontological dealism. Nonethe-

less,neitherhilosophyonstitutespure rthoroughgoingpistemologicalde-alismeither, ecausethey onsider nly hereflectivehaseofexperienceobe

subjectivelyonstructed. hey both posit a level or mode of experiencenwhichexperiences unmediated nd hence has direct ccess to phenomenal

reality.V. PRAGMATISMAND ARTHAKRIYA

James' nd Yogacara's dichotomy etweenwords and realitywould seem toleave themwithoutnycriteria ordetermininghevalidity fa given oncept,statement,r practice, inceall verbal and conceptualconstructs alsifyhecontents fpure xperience. eteachphilosophy oes offeruch criterion,ndtheir riteria reremarkablyimilar. ames' nswer othis ilemma sexpressedbyanother amethathegaveto hisphilosophy, ragmatism,hichYogacara's

criterionomes ntheform f rthakriyd.he thrust fbothofthese ositionssthat ction s both thegoal and themeasure fthe truth f deas. That is,the

consequences f deaswhen hey re mplementedeterminesheir ruth. amessummed p theprinciplewhenhe wrote:

On pragmatic rinciples ecan notreject nyhypothesisf onsequences sefulto life low romt.64

Similarly,ne of themeanings farthakriyds "useful ction" while related

term,rthakriydkarin,eans capable ofuseful ction").n

boththeJamesianand the Buddhist ontexts,heconsequences f deascan be borneout in two

spheres fmeaning nd action. One is thatofordinaryife,wherein onceptsserve heattainment f thepracticalnecessities fdaily iving. he other s the

higherifeofhumankind, herein oncepts upport hepursuit fmoraland

spiritualims and aspirations.James ejects oncepts s a waytoapproach ruth,ut heacknowledgesheir

usefulnessn daily life: "The function f intellect s practicalratherthantheoretical."5The usefulness fanygiven oncept s measuredbyits conse-

quences, nd thisusefulnesss coordinatewith tsvalidityr truth:

They concepts] ave, ndeed, omeaningnd norealityf hey ave no use.Butiftheyhaveanyusetheyhave that mount fmeaning.66







238 Shaw

Thisunderstandingftruthsconsistent ith is tance f ubject-objectondu-

ality,because usefulnesss always dependent pon a specific ointofviewor

purpose:

Truth s a relation nside of the sumtotal,obtaining etween houghtsndsomethinglse, ndthoughts,s we haveseen, an onlybe contextualhings.67

Atthe ametime, ames' ragmatismetains ts mpirical asis,for hepragma-tic test f truthlso proceedsnreferenceopure, sensible" xperience. o be

proved s true, n intellectualperationmustbe confluent ith wavein the"finite tream ffeeling":

Only in so far as they ead us, successfullyr unsuccessfully,nto sensibleexperiencegain,areour abstracts nd universals rue r false t all.68

IfJames enied he xistence f a world xternaloconsciousness,he mpirical

testwould notbe

possible.fthoughts

werethings,

hen hethought

f a firewouldbevery andyfone were trandedna blizzard, ut, s James oints ut,some fireswillburn ticks nd warm ur bodies and somewillnot:

Mentalfire s whatwon'tburnreal sticks.... Mental knivesmaybe sharp,buttheywon'tcut real wood.... Withreal'objects, n the ontrary,onsequencesalways ccrue; nd thus herealexperiences et ifted romhemental nes,thethings rom urthoughtsfthem.69

To put tsimply,hepragmatic spectofempiricism eans hatwhen conceptis true tsapplicationwill work atisfactorily."0

Arthakriydan be translateds "to worksatisfactorily"r "workability."Otherpossible ranslationsre"causal efficacy,"successfulction," nd "use-ful ction."71Theconceptdoes notfigurentheMadhydntavibhdga,ut t was

developed by laterYogacara logicians-notablybyDharmakirtin his Pra-mdnavdrttika72-asartofpramdna heory,hetheory f thesources nd cri-teria f validknowledge. rthakriydasdesignateds themeans fdistinguish-ingbetween eal and erroneous erceptions. ne classicalYogacara example sthat ffire. ne canhavea validperceptionf a fire, mistaken erceptionfa

fire,rmerely mentalmageofa fire. hetest fvaliditys whetherhefire anburn uel ndcook food.73Anotherlassical xamplesthat f mirage. ne canhavea perceptionf waterwhenwhatone is infact eeingsonly mirage. hetest nthis ase as inthecase of fire s theconsequences f thecognitionwhenactedupon. fone can drinkndquench ne'sthirst,hen heperceptionfwaterhas beena validone.Admittedly,water" s a mental onstructvikalpa) nd

correspondsothe arikalpamode ofexperience.What sactually erceived,he

thingtselfvastumdtra),sultimatelyndeterminablenthe onceptual phere;tis onlydeterminablena specificontext. heMadhydntavibhdgadducesthat

where humanbeing eeswater, preta insatiable host) ees river fpusandexcrement, hile a yoginengaged n certain ypesof meditationmight eenothingt all ormightee n tsplaceskeletons r another bjectofmeditation







239

(Y21). Another xample hatmight e moredirectlyccessible o us might ethatofan apple.Wherewe see food,a physicistmight ee a configurationf

atoms, botanistmightee a seed-bearingehicle,n artistmightee a red pheretopaint, nativeofsome tribemight ee themanifestationf thegod of that

tribe,nd so forth. he apple exists, s paratantra,ut due to itsemptiness,tslack of ntrinsic

dentity,t an beseen s

many hings-inJames'

erms,akenn

manyrelations-dependingupon thepointof view and purposesoftheper-ceiver.Usefulness as to be usefulness osomeone; t is nota functionf the

object omuch s ofthe ubject, lthough he apabilityfusefulnessn variouscontexts-and ofgiving iseto a cognition, e it a cognition fwater, us,orskeletons-resides n the real object.It is theunresolvabilityf objects nto

universallyalidconcepts hatmakes test fvalidity ecessary. his ultimate

unresolvabilitys also what imits hevalidity stablished y arthakriydo a

particular ontext.Accordingto Dharmakirti, hatvaliditypertains o the

conventional evel of truth nd realityvyavahdra)74nd thuscannotclaimultimacy. ames cknowledgeshe ame imitationrcontext-dependencenhis

pragmaticest f truth:

How is success o beabsolutelymeasuredwhen here re somany nvironmentsand so many ways of lookingat the [successful] daptation? t cannot bemeasuredabsolutely;the verdictwill vary accordingto the point of viewadopted.75

In their ragmaticheories ftruth, ames ndYogacarawere oth oncernedwith he

practicalnecessitiesf

daily ife,ut also with hemoraland

spiritualdimensionf ife.Jameswasdeeplynterestednreligion ut, n accordancewithhispragmatism,as more nterestednreligious xperiencendinthefruits fa

spiritualife hanhewas inthedoctrinal r institutionalspectsofreligion. eheld thattheological tatementsan be subjected o the sametestoftruth s

practical nes,that s,by udging heir ractical esults:

Iftheologicaldeasprovetohave a valuefor oncreteife, heywillbe true, orpragmatism.76

Therefore,on pragmatistic rinciples,fthehypothesisf God works atisfactorilynthewidest ense f heword,t s true.Now... experiencehows hatt ertainlyoeswork.77

His Varieties fReligious xperiences a compendiumf thefruitsf various

religious eliefs nd even differentypes freligious elief nd temperament.These fruitsncludecourage; hope;moralstrength; ersonal ntegration;ndlivesofgreatpiety, haritableworks, ndmysticalttainment.learly,James'criteriaor eligiousruth-whichncludemmediateuminosityndphilosoph-

ical reasonableness long withmoralhelpfulness78-allow f a plurality freligioustruths."He acknowledgednddefended isconflationf thenotions

of"truth" nd"what sbeneficialrefficacious"9 ndconcluded: Whatother







240 Shaw

kind of truth ould therebe, for pragmatism],han all thisagreementwithconcrete eality?"0

The Madhydntavibhdgaoes notsaythatreligious eliefs nd practices re

justifiedytheir ractical onsequences, utthis tance haracterizesuddhismin general.Buddhistshave long upheldthe differenceetween onventional,

everyday anguage vyavahdra)nd ultimate ruthparamdrthasat),hich sexperienceableut notverbally xpressible. herefore,uddhist eachers m-

ploy updya, killfuliberativeechniquesndprovisional eachings,n order oteach heDharma.Thevalue ndmeaningfthese pdyanherentheir racticalresults,o they re meant o beempiricallyested nd then bandonedonce the

practitioneras reached hegoal. Thisattitude oward heBuddhist eachingsinforms omeof theradical statementsn Prajiiaparamitand Madhyamakaliterature hat there s no Buddha,no Dharma, and no path to liberation.

AlthoughYogacara would not disagreewithsuch statements,heydo not

characterizeogacaraliterature.necan nfer hat nereason hey onotmightbe theustificationor hem hat sprovided y he pistemologyresentedn this

essay.Thestatementstheresenlightenment"nd "theres no enlightenment"maybe equallyfalse nsofar s theyproceedfrom hedualistic hinkingf

imaginationfwhat s false.However, he tatementndconviction hat here s

enlightenments morehelpfulnd can betestednpracticewith plendid esults.Theremustbe somewayto differentiatehe tatementthere senlightenment"and other tatements freligious nd practicalvalue from otally eluded or

nonsensical tatements. harmakirti'sragmatic pistemologyrovides uchamethod.In conclusion, either amesnorYogacara completelyevalues oncepts s

purely ubjectivend divorced rom henomenal eality. heyhold thatcon-

cepts erve s a bridge hat an be crossed o that eality hroughraxis nd,as

such, revaluableand even ndispensable.

CONCLUSION

Inthis ssay havedocumentedarious arallels etween he houghtfWilliam

James and early Indian Yogacara philosophyas it is expressed n theMadhyintavibhdga-sdstrand Vasubandhu's and Sthiramati's ommentaries

upon t,focusingn their iews fexperiencendexamininghe nalogousnessoftheir espectiveonclusions hat ubject-objectualism s illusory, ealitysnotverbally ormulable r conceptually raspable, nd thepragmatic estof

validity rovides criterion ortruth.James nd Yogacara bothdevelopedphilosophieshat mphasize he ncompassing ature fconsciousness ithout

becomingmonistic,metaphysicallydealistic,ratomistic. orbothJames nd

Yogacara,the

pragmaticest of

validity ccomplishesdual

philosophicalaim.It preventsheabsolutereificationfanygiven onceptual onstruct ndat the ametime revents totally econstructiver nihilisticenialofmeaningand truth.







241

These similarphilosophical ystems rose in differentultural ontexts n

response oentirelyifferentntellectual ilieux. ameswasworking ithin he

empirical radition f Bacon, Locke, Berkeley,nd Hume. He protested he

subjectivisticdealismof Humean and Berkelian mpiricismnd soughttoovercome he pistemologicalualism fDescartes nd Kant.Yogacarawas heir

to theradicalvianegativa f thePrajfiaparamitaiteraturendsought mediat-ing epistemological lternative o Madhyamaka's two-truthheory,whichseemed oaccordtruth othenonconceptualphere fultimacyparamdrthasat)and leave little asisfordistinguishingetween alid and invalid onventional

(vyavahara) erbal nd mental onstructs.Eachphilosophyxerted remendousnfluencen tsownhemisphere. illiam

James' houghtefttsmarknthefields fpsychologyndcomparativeeligion.His philosophyontributedo theriseof modern ragmatism,ossiblynfluen-ced Husserlianphenomenology,81nd currently rovides resourceforthe

pragmaticizationfanalytic hilosophy.82n thereligious phere, ames' deasprovidedone of the inspirational orcesbehind the evolvingNew Thoughtmovement nd evenAlcoholicsAnonymous.n theEasternhemisphere,oga-cara modifiedMadhyamakaphilosophyver enturiesfdebate ndpermeatedT'ien-t'ai nd Ch'an formulationsnChina andTendai andZen inJapan.TheinfluencesfJames ndYogacarathen onvergednthemodernKyoto choolof

philosophy. udging rom he breadth f their espectivetreams finfluence,these hilosophies aveprovided compelling ey o ife ormany eople.They

both offer perspectivehat an accommodate pistemologicaldealism, he-nomenalrealism,nd thepossibilityfdirect,ntuitivenowledge freality,swellas a pragmaticustificationor he inguisticnd symboliconstructssedtopointto thatreality.

NOTES

1. See,for xample,Kennethnada andNolanJacobson, ds.,BuddhismndAmerican hinkers

(Albany,New York: StateUniversityf NewYorkPress,1984),pp. vii,xv,49, 76.

2. See D. C. Mathur,"The HistoricalBuddha (Gotama), Hume, and Jameson the Self:Comparisons nd Evaluations,"Philosophyast and West 8,no. 3 (July 978):262-270.

3. David Dilworth,The Initial ormations f'PureExperience'nNishidaKitaro ndWilliam

James,"Monumenta ipponica 4,nos. 1-2 (1969):93-111.4. Dilworth, InitialFormations," . 95. Suzukiprobablywasintroducedo James'writings y

PaulCarus,withwhomhe ived nd worked sa translator,ecauseCaruswaskeepingbreast f heformulationfAmerican ragmatismyJames nd CharlesSandersPeirce.This nformation asrelated o meby EugeneTayloroftheDepartmentfPsychiatry,arvardMedicalSchool,who hasan article, WilliamJames nd SwamiVivekananda:AsianPsychologytHarvard n the1890's,"forthcomingn Prabuddha harata, hatdocuments ames'personal onnections, oth direct nd

indirect, ithAsianscholars.

5. WilliamJamesEarle, "WilliamJames," n Paul Edwards,ed., Encyclopedia f Philosophy(NewYork: CollierMacmillanPub., 1973),4:242, 246.

6. Theauthorshipnd dateof heworkhavenotbeendetermined,lthoughhe ommentarynd

subcommentaryan be datedwith ome confidenceo thefourthr fifthentury. he text tself s







242 Shaw

attributed o a Maitreyanatha, ho taught r revealed t to Asanga.The exact dentityfMait-

reyanathasdebated, s is whether divine evealer r humanpreceptorsmeant.7. SusumuYamaguchi,ed., MadhydntavibhdgatTka:xposition ystematiqueu Yogdcaravij-

naptivddaNagoya, Japan:LibrairieHajinkaku,1934),hereinafterited s Y inbodyofessay. donot iteGadginNagao's edition ftheMadhydntavibhdga-bhdsyaTokyo:SuzukiResearch ounda-

tion,1964)because tdoesnot nclude thiramati'sTkd.8. Seemynote4 preceding.9. Eugene . Taylor, Psychology fReligion nd Asian Studies:TheWilliamJames egacy,"

Journal fTranspersonalsychology0,no. 1 1978):69-70.10. WilliamJames,Varieties f ReligiousExperience:A Study nHuman Nature New York:

RandomHouse, Inc., 1902),p. 512.11. James,Varieties,p. 391-393.12. WilliamJames, ssays nRadicalEmpiricism,d. FredsonBowers nd IgnasK. Skrupskelis

(Cambridge,Massachusetts: arvardUniversityress,1976),p. 22.13. WilliamJames, sychology,merican cience eries, riefer ourse NewYork:HenryHolt

and Co., 1982),p. 152.14. James, ssays,p. 13.15. James, ssays,p. 27.

16. James,Varieties,. 489.17. James, ssays,p. 69.18. James, ssays,p. 65.19. James, sychology,. 152.20. WilliamJames, heMeaning fTruth,d. FredsonBowers nd IgnasK. SkrupskelisCam-

bridge,Massachusetts: arvardUniversityress,1975),p. 43.21. James, sychology,. 13.22. James,Meaning fTruth,. 35.23. James, sychology,. 12.24. James,Meaning fTruth,. 36.25. James, sychology,. 170.

26. James, sychology,. 171.27. James, sychology,. 154.28. James, sychology,. 155.29. James, ssays,pp. 75-76.30. James, ssays,p. 4.31. James, sychology,p. 165-166.32. E. C. Moore, WilliamJames New York: Washington quare Press,1965),p. 144;A. O.

Lovejoy,TheThirteenragmatismsnd Other ssays Baltimore, aryland:Johns opkinsUniver-sity ress,1963),p. 142.

33. Notably,Janice Dean Willis,On KnowingReality:The TattvarthaChapterofAsahga'sBodhisattvabhumiNew York: ColumbiaUniversityress,1979);Thomas A. Kochumuttom,

Buddhist octrine fExperience: NewTranslationnd nterpretationftheWorks fVasubandhutheYogdcdrinDelhi:MotilalBanarsidass, 982);StefanAnacker, evenWorks fVasubandhu. heBuddhist sychological octor (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1984); Bruce CameronHall, "TheMeaning fVijnaptinVasubandhu'sConcept fMind,"Journalfthe nternationalssociationfBuddhisttudies ,no. 1 1986): 7-23.

34. AshokChatterjee, he Yogacara dealism Delhi,Varanasi,& Patna:MotilalBanarsidass,1975),p. 24.

35. Surendranathasgupta,AHistoryf ndian hilosophy,Delhi,Varanasi, nd Patna:MotilalBanarsidass, 975),vol. 1,p. 145. n all fairnesstshouldberemarked hathe basedthis nterpreta-tion n his tudy f theLahkdvatdra-sutra,hich ontainsmany xtremelydealistic assages nd snota classicalYogacara text, ut sonly oosely ssociatedwith he chool.See note43 following.

36. T. R. V. Murti,TheCentral hilosophyfBuddhismLondon:GeorgeAllen ndUnwinLtd.,1960),p. 316.37. EdwardConze,Thirty earsofBuddhisttudiesLondon:BrunoCassirer, 967),p. 78.







243

38. James,Meaning fTruth, . 106.39. James,Meaning fTruth, . 88.40. James, ssays,p. 49.41. James, ssays,pp. 50-51.42. Yogacara based tsdefinitionf mptinessna formula oundntheCulasunnata-sutta,othe

effecthat mptinesssthe presence f nabsence,"which equireshe bsence f omethingndthe

presence f hat romwhich t sabsent. he sutta ives he xamples f meditation allthat semptyof lephantsnd a foresthat semptyfvillages. eeGadginM. Nagao, "What RemainsnSunyata:A Yogacara InterpretationfEmptiness,"nMinoruKiyota, d.,Mahdydna uddhistMeditation:

TheoryndPractice Honolulu,Hawaii: UniversityressofHawaii, 1978),pp. 67-69 and pagesfollowing.

43. Daisetz TeitaroSuzuki,trans.,The Lahkdvatara uftraLondon: Routledge& Kegan Paul,Ltd.,1932), . 51. The earliest ogacarin ocite his utrawasSthiramati.or a discussion f tsdateandassociationwith heYogacara school, ee Jikido akasaki,"Sourcesof theLahkdvatarandits

positionnMahayanaBuddhism,"nL. A. Hercus, d., ndologicalndBuddhist tudies:VolumenHonour f Professor . W.deJong n hisSixtieth irthdayCanberra,Australia:Faculty fAsian

Studies,1982):545-568.44. WilliamJames,A Pluralistic niverse,d. FredsonBowers nd IgnasK. SkrupskelisCam-

bridge,Massachusetts: arvardUniversityress,1977),p. 113.45. Abhidharmakosa1.50, rans. nd citedbyF. Th. Stcherbatsky,uddhist ogic New York:

DoverPub., 1962),vol. 1,pp. 130-131.46. James, luralistic niverse,. 32.47. James, ssays,p. 30.48. James, luralistic niverse,. 31.49. James, luralistic niverse,. 116.50. James, luralistic niverse,. 115.51. James, luralistic niverse,. 146.52. James, luralistic niverse,. 147.53. James, ssays,p. 46.

54. James, ssays,p. 46.55. James, ssays,p. 66.56. James, ragmatism,. 119.57. James, sychology,. 14.58. F. Th. Stcherbatsky,uddhist ogic NewYork:DoverPub., 1962),2:398 n. 5.59. GadginM. Nagao, "TheBuddhistWorld-ViewsElucidatedntheThree-Natureheory nd

ItsSimiles," asternBuddhist 6,no. 1 Spring1983):14.60. Nagao, "BuddistWorld-View," . 2.61. James,PluralisticUniverse, p. 111-113. Throughout hechapterhe alternates etween

presentingt sBergson's osition ndadvocatingt s hisown, eachedndependentlypp.xxiii, xiiin. 8,andn. 101.3).

62. James, luralistic niverse,. 118.63. James, ssays,p. 45.64. James, ragmatism,. 131. Potential roblemswithJames'spragmatic heory ftruth re

discussed y srael Schefflern FourPragmatists: CriticalntroductionoPeirce,James,Mead and

Dewey NewYork:Humanities ress,1974),pp. 110-116.65. James, luralistic niverse,. 110.66. James, ragmatism,. 131.67. James, ssays,p. 66.68. James, ssays,p. 49.69. James, ssays,p. 17.70. James,Meaning fTruth, . 131.

71. For a comprehensiveiscussion f thephilology nd rangesofmeaning f thisterm, eeMasatoshiNagatomi, Arthakriyd,"dyarLibrary ulletin 1-32, Dr. R. RaghavanFelicitationVolume 1967-68): 53-72.







244 Shaw

72. For a discussionof Dharmakirti's hilosophical ffiliations,ee DalsukhbhaiMalvania'scritical dition ftheDharmottarapradipaPatna: KashiprasadJayaswalResearchnstitute,955),pp. xvi-xxiv.

73. Nagatomi, Arthakrivy,"p. 56,62.74. Pramdnavdrttikavrtti,1.6-7, itedbyNagatomi, n"Arthakriyd,". 62; seealso p. 63.75. James,Varieties,. 367.

76. James, ragmatism,. 40.77. James, ragmatism,. 143.78. James,Varieties,. 19.79. James, ragmatism,p.42-44.80. James, ragmatism,. 44.81. Fordiscussions ftherelationshipetween ames ndphenomenology,eeespecially ruce

Wilshire,WilliamJames nd PhenomenologyBloomington,ndiana: Indiana Universityress,1968); JamesM. Edie, "WilliamJames nd Phenomenology," eview fMetaphysics 3, no. 3(March 1970):481-536; RichardStevens,James nd Husserl: The Foundationsf Meaning TheHague: MartinusNijhoff, 974);MichaelTavuzzi,"A Noteon Husserl'sDependence n WilliamJames,"JournalftheBritishociety orPhenomenology0,no. 3 (October1979):194-196.

82. RichardRorty, onsequencesfPragmatismMinneapolis,Minnesota:UniversityfMinne-sotaPress,1982),p. xviii.

william james and yogācāra philosophy- a comparative inquiry

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