where have all the flowers gone- sustainability of reduction in opium in afghanistan (2010)

7/27/2019 Where Have All the Flowers Gone- Sustainability of Reduction in Opium in Afghanistan (2010)

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Overview

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is currently in decline. This isnot just in the north, centre and east of Afghanistan, as has been thecase in the past, but also in the south, where opium poppy cultivationhas become increasingly concentrated since 2007. In fact, between2008 and 2009 the amount of opium poppy cultivated fell by anestimated 34,000 hectares (ha) in the province of Helmandoftenreferred to as the most prolic opium producing area in the world.Reductions were also seen in some of the other more prolic opium-producing provinces in the south and west of Afghanistan in the last12 months. Early indications suggest that cultivation will largely bemaintained at this lower level in 2010 with the possibility of somefurther, albeit more marginal, reductions in production in areas closeto the provincial centres of Farah, Kandahar and Lashkar Gah (inHelmand Province).

Reasons for the current fall in opium poppy cultivation differ byarea. In the provinces of Balkh and Nangarhar, it is clear that theactions of the governors have been critical. In Balkh, Governor AttaMohammed Noor has gained a level of control over the province byfavouring his former jihadi commanders and offering them positionswithin the security ministries. He used his position to eliminate opiumproduction in 2007 and has continued to maintain this ban into the2009/10 growing season. In Nangarhar, Governor Gul Aga Shirzai hasrelied more on the informal relationships that he has establishedwith tribal elders and local strongmen, who were appointed topositions of power by his predecessor, as well as the US military, toexert his inuence over the province. He has drawn on the delivery

of aid, inferences that he can direct the US military effort, and,where required, his own personal wealth to offer patronage andcement deals with local powerbrokers to impose a ban on opiumpoppy cultivation.

Reductions in opium production in other provinces are less to do withthe actions of powerholders and more to do with economics and thepriority farmers place on food security. The dramatic rise in the priceof wheatwhich began in the last quarter of 2007 but continueduntil the wheat harvest of 2009along with declining opium prices

AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNITBrieng Paper Series

WHERE HAVE ALL THE FLOWERS GONE?Assessing the Sustainability of Current Reductions in Opium Production in Afghanistan

May 2010David Manseld

Contents

Introduction.............. 3

1. Where Have all theFlowers Gone? ........ 3

2. How Resilient arethese Reductions? ...13

3. A Policy Refocused? ...20

4. The Way Forward ...23

About the Author

David Manseld has

conducted research onthe role of opium in rurallivelihood strategies in

Afghanistan for the last14 growing seasons. Heis currently a Fellow atthe Carr Center, HarvardKennedy School and hasauthored a number ofother papers on opiumfor AREU. He would liketo thank Richard Brittanand Alcis Ltd for mapsand AREUs Jay Lamey forpublishing support.

Contact AREU

Flower Street

(Corner of Street 2)

Shahr-i-Naw, Kabul

Tel: +93 (0)799 608 548

www.areu.org.af

[email protected]


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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

have been integral to the fall in opium poppycultivation in a range of different provinces,including those as diverse as Helmand and Ghor(in the central region). The impact of high wheatprices on farmers continues to resonate in the2009/10 growing season, particularly in the well-irrigated areas of the south. During the winter

planting season in October and November 2009,many feared a further rise in wheat prices in early2010 due to the deteriorating security situationand escalating wheat prices across the border inPakistan (the major source of imported wheatour to Afghanistan in the past).

What becomes clear from a detailed analysis ofthe continuing reductions in opium productionis that they are not the result of a single actionor intervention by an internal or externalactor, but the outcome of a complex web of

interrelationships and interdependencies thatare constantly evolving and shaped by ongoingevents. Consequently, successfully transferringan approach or model that has proveneffective in one province to another, or evenreplicating that same approach over time inthe same province, will typically prove elusive.Because the reasons for opium poppy cultivationare contingent and contextuala function ofwhere, who and whenand highly dependent onlocal factors, so are the factors that lead to itsreduction.

While support for local strongmen appears tohave paid dividends in Nangarhar and Balkh interms of drug control, these provinces representregional economic hubs with employmentprospects and, more importantly, are placeswhere local elites can extract rent from thelarge volume of ofcial and unofcial cross-border trade. In these provinces there is a clearpeace dividend. The same cannot be saidfor a province like Helmand, where the legaleconomy is limited and therefore there is avested interest amongst local powerbrokers(on all sides) to continue the conict andthe extraction of rent from the drugs trade.However, even in Nangarhar and Balkh thepolitical and economic environment is uid andit remains unclear whether the governors willbe able to continue to pursue another year ofpolicies that are proving increasingly unpopularwith the rural population. All deals would be offif these governors are moved on.

The sustainability of the current reductions is alsohighly dependent on the viability of the alternativesto opium. In areas near provincial centres, opiumpoppy has been replaced by a combination of arange of high-value horticultural crops, livestockand non-farm income opportunities. This strategyhas served to reduce the risk of market or crop

failure, as well as to diversify and in many casesincrease household incomes. However, this processof diversication is in contrast to the majority ofareas that have reduced opium poppy cultivationover the last three seasons. These less accessibleareas have typically substituted opium poppy forwheat and consequently their current reductionsin opium poppy cultivation remain fragile.

Ultimately, it is important to recognise thatincreasing levels of wheat production do notreect a sustainable shift from opium production,

but instead are a sign of market failure, growingconcerns over food security, and coercion.Offering wheat seed to farmers as a way ofencouraging them to abandon opium poppy isa distraction. Supporting these efforts throughlocally enforced eradication, with its associationswith corruption and the targeting of the mostvulnerable, can reinforce the public view thatthe state is predatory. Short-term investments bydevelopment organisationsbe they national orinternational, government or nongovernmentdolittle to build farmers condence that there will

be the necessary long-term support required forthe transition from opium production to morediverse livelihoods in which horticultural cropsoccupy a greater proportion of agricultural land.

Given this situation, a return to opium poppycultivation in the future does not necessarilyreect a failure of the counter-narcotics effort, inthe same way that reductions over the last threeyears do not necessarily represent a success.Instead, any resurgence in cultivation will bethe result of an evolving economic and politicalenvironment, primarily due to shifting priceexpectations but also to changes in the politicaland security environment, which has in part beenshaped by the economic impact of prohibitionand the fall in the price of opium. Understandingthe issue of attribution is important if we are notto see a return to the language and policies ofcomprehensive eradication and further attemptsto reduce opium production through the provisionof short-term agricultural inputs.


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Where Have all the Flowers Gone? Assessing the Sustainability of Current Reductions in Opium Production in Afghanistan

Levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistanhave fallen for two consecutive years and it nowappears that cultivation will be maintained atthis relatively low level for another year. While

this allows for progress to be declared againstmore short-term, area-based counter-narcoticstargets, the reasons for the continued decline incultivation are far from clear.

This paper illustrates that current reductions arethe result of complex economic, political andenvironmental processes that are both context-specic and difcult to maintain. It argues that thecoincidence of actions and events that have ledto the current fall in production have set in playtheir own dynamic that could further destabiliseparts of rural Afghanistan if not held in check.

The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1draws on detailed eldwork in two distinct provincesas a way of exploring the different factors that liebehind the current reductions in opium productionin Afghanistan. It shows how reductions in Nangarharare largely a consequence of the concerted effortsof the current governor and the political deals he hasstruck with tribal leaders, local powerbrokers and tosome extent the US military, whereas in Helmand

the reductions in cultivation are primarily drivenby shifts in the terms of trade between wheat andpoppy and continuing concerns over food security.

Section 2 explores the resilience of thesereductions. It initially examines what opiumpoppy has been replaced with and highlights thatreductions based on wheat are precarious and

unlikely to be sustained. The section goes on toanalyse the unfolding political environment inAfghanistan and how it might impact levels ofopium production in the future, suggesting thatthe current political settlements that have beencritical for reducing opium poppy in provincessuch as Nangarhar and Balkh remain fragile andhighly dependent on incumbent governors.

The nal section looks at the current policyenvironment for counter-narcotics. It suggeststhat counter-narcotics efforts and objectiveshave largely been relegated in Afghanistan,where counter-insurgency reigns supreme. Thisis not completely unwelcome because it hasforced the drug control community to evaluatetheir interventions not simply based on theachievement of short-term, area-based targetsbut to consider the complex relationship betweenthe achievement of counter-narcotics objectivesand the broader goals of improving governance,security and economic growth. However, tensionsstill exist and this paper suggests that the

trajectory of counter-narcotics policy is far fromclear, particularly if production were to rise inthe 2010/11 growing season.

Introduction

1. Where Have all the Flowers Gone?Early indications suggest that, at the nationallevel, opium poppy is in its third year of decline inAfghanistan. The reasons for reductions are variedand differ between areas. This section explores boththe political and economic factors that lie behindthem in the provinces of Nangarhar and Helmand,

drawing on in-depth eldwork undertaken in bothprovinces over a number of years. Both provinceshave been signicant producers of opium. For

example, throughout much of the 1990s Nangarharconsistently produced around 25 percent ofAfghanistans total opium crop, and between 1994and 2004 there was only one year in which less than15,000 ha of opium poppy were cultivated thereand that was in 2001 under the Taliban ban. Helmandhas been even more prolic, typically cultivating as

much as half of the total area allocated to opiumpoppy in Afghanistan through the 1990s, culminatingin the growth of an estimated 103,000 ha of opiumpoppy in 2007. The factors that explain the declininglevels of cultivation in each province are distinctand specic, and highlight just how precarious the

current reductions in opium poppy cultivation are.

1.1 Political settlements and poppycultivation: Enforcing the ban inNangarhar

Opium poppy production has undergone a series ofbooms and busts in Nangarhar in the rst decadeof the 21st century. Typically, a dramatic reductionin cultivation in the province has been matched


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by a resurgence in cultivation, either the seasonimmediately following a ban on opium productionor after two seasons of low levels of opium poppycultivation. The 2009/10 season may set a newrecord for the province with three consecutive yearsof negligible levels of opium poppy cultivation.While the political and economic consequences of

sustaining such low levels remain far from clear,an analysis of the socioeconomic and politicalenvironment in which these reductions have beenobtained, as well as the political settlementson which they are based, suggests the ongoingprohibition of opium in Nangarhar remains fragileand could prove destabilising for many parts of theprovince.1

As noted, previous reductions in cultivation inNangarhar have not been maintained beyond ayear or two. For example, the dramatic reductions

in cultivation achieved under the Taliban in the2000/01 growing season were met with resurgencethe subsequent year, following the collapse of theregime and the exponential rise in the price ofopium that accompanied the almost nationwideprohibition that the Taliban had imposed. In late2005, the then governor of Nangarhar, Haji DinMohammed, used many of the same mechanismsand levers applied by the Taliban during theirprohibition, and also drew on President Karzaispolitical capital following his inauguration, toreduce cultivation from an unprecedented high

of 28,213 ha in the 2003/04 growing season toan estimated 1,093 ha in 2004/5.2 Despite thetransfer of Haji Din Mohammed to the governorshipof Kabul and the arrival of Governor Gul AgaShirzai, in the lower and more accessible areasof the province opium poppy remained negligiblefor a second consecutive year, while cultivationincreased to an estimated 4,871 ha in the moreremote areas.

By the 2006/07 growing season it was not possibleto impose a ban. Fearing reactions from their

1 This section is based on detailed eldwork undertaken

by the author in Nangarhar for AREU on an annual basisbetween 2006 and 2008, as well as for Deutsche Gesellschaftfr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in 2005 and DAI in2009. Outputs from the research for AREU can be found onthe AREU website (www.areu.org.af).

2 David Manseld, Pariah or Poverty?: The Opium Ban in

the Province of Nangarhar in the 200405 Growing Seasonand its Impact on Rural Livelihood Strategies (GTZ Projectfor Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan, 2005).

communities, local powerbrokers refused to detercultivation and opium poppy once again ourishedacross every district in Nangarhar, except thoseadjacent to the provincial centre. For most farmersthe respite was only brief. Many maximised theamount of land that they cultivated with opiumpoppy while they could. While the three districts

adjacent to Jalalabad (Behsud, Kama and Surkhrud)continued to cultivate only a negligible amount ofopium poppy in 2007, farmers in many of the moreaccessible and better irrigated parts of the provincecultivated opium poppy extensively and establishedinventories of opium. In the more remote areas,where land is in short supply, higher levels of opiumproduction supported improvements in the qualityof food consumed, better access to health care,and allowed accumulated debts to be repaid.3

It only took Governor Shirzai one year to consolidate

his position with local powerbrokers in the province,as well with the US military, and re-establish a banon opium production. He could do so knowing thatopium poppy cultivation in the 2006/07 growingseason had helped establish an economic cushionfor some, particularly the local elites that he reliedon to implement the ban, and that the developmentassistance planned prior to and during his rstyear as governor was nally delivering a moresignicant effect in the lower-lying areas of theKabul River valley.4 By the 2007/08 growing season,opium poppy cultivation was once more in rapid

decline in Nangarhar, so much so that in 2008 theUnited Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared the province poppy free,5 down fromalmost 19,000 ha in 2006/07.

Governor Shirzai has certainly proven more resolutein his efforts to sustain reductions in NangarharProvince than his predecessors. Some refer tohis political ambitions as the primary motive andhis personal wealth as critical to managing thepolitical settlement required to maintain theban. In contrast to the previous prohibition on

3 David Manseld, Resurgence and Reductions: Explanations

for Changing Levels of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarharand Ghor in 2006-07 (Kabul: AREU, 2008).

4 David Manseld, Poppy Free Provinces: A Measure or a

Target? (Kabul: AREU, 2009).

5 The United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

declares a province poppy free when it estimates thatcultivation has fallen to 100 ha or less. In 2008, the UnitedStates Gvovernment (USG) estimated that cultivation inNangarhar was 265 ha.


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Opium poppy in upper Shinwar in 2007 (top left). The same land was used for wheat in 2007 and 2008 (top right),which was intercropped with melon in 2010 (bottom left). Bottom right, an example of potentially more sustainablemixed agriculture: onion, cucumber and sugar cane with citrus trees in Bati Kot, Nangarhar. Photos by David Manseld.

opium production between 2005 and 2006, therewas not a signicant return to cultivation in the2008/09 growing season, even in many of the moreremote parts of the province, and for a secondconsecutive year negligible levels of cultivationwere maintainedalthough it was not low enoughfor the province to maintain its poppy free statusaccording to the UNODCs criteria.

This second year of low levels of cultivation came ata price; not in those districts near Jalalabad, wherediversication of on-farm, off-farm and non-farm

income has largely been benecial, but in thoseareas where there are currently few alternativesto opium production, such as Achin, Khogyani andupper Shinwar in the Spin Ghar piedmont.6

These areas typically do not have an alternativewinter cash crop to opium poppy and are heavily

6 The discussion on the impact of the ban in 2009 is based onwork by the author for DAI and produced as an unpublishedpaper, dated 26 May 2009.

reliant on good precipitation and the possibility ofgetting a good summer crop, as well as off-farmand non-farm income, as a way of preventing asignicant deterioration in living standards when

opium production is banned. For example, inupper Khogyani summer cash crops of tomatoesand ground nut have helped reduce the economicimpact of the loss of opium. In the summer of2009, these crops fared particularly well due tothe availability of irrigation water, which allowedfor a greater area to be cultivated during thesummer and better yields even in the lower, drier

part of the district. In upper Achin, a summermarijuana crop and higher farm-gate prices have

gone some way toward easing the economicburden of the ban on opium in 2009.

However, the income from summer cash cropsand wage labour has not been enough to offsetthe losses incurred due to the opium poppy banin the Spin Ghar piedmont, particularly after avery difcult year in 2008, during which the


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price of food almost doubled and summer cashcrops7 suffered due to inadequate water supply.In response, many households further reducedtheir consumption of relatively expensive fooditems such as meat and fruit during the 2008/09growing season, and minimised expenditureson areas such as health care, even for serious

illnesses like hepatitis. In some cases teenagechildren were withdrawn from further educationand tasked with nding employment, includingin the Afghan National Army (ANA). The sale oflong-term productive assets, such as livestockand land, was also reported to have increasedin response to the opium ban in the southerndistricts of Nangarhar in 2009.

With limited on-farm income opportunities andassets to sell, the primary coping strategy inthese areas has been the search for off-farm and

non-farm income. Yet, as in previous years, theabsence of opium poppy in 2009 also led to theloss of the wage labour opportunities associatedwith the crop, especially during the harvestingseason when farmers previously earned as muchas US$8 per day in the eastern region. Lowerdisposable incomes also meant a wider economicdownturn in the province, with reductions inemployment opportunities in other legal sectors.The employment situation was made even moreprecarious in 2009 due to restrictions on Afghanmigrant workers in Pakistan and growing levels of

insecurity in Pakistan and in southern Afghanistanwhere migrant workers from Nangarhar had oftengone to work during previous bans on opium poppycultivation. With such limited options and in theface of the costs of two consecutive years of aban on opium poppy cultivation, the ANA has nowbecome an increasingly important safety net forcommunities in districts like Khogyani, Achin andupper Shinwar. Claims that some of those enlistingin the ANA are younger than the statutory age of 17and many are opting to be posted to the southernprovinces to obtain higher monthly salaries furtherhighlight the deteriorating economic situation inmany of these areas.

Ultimately, concerns for the safety of these recruitsand the belief that the provincial authoritieshave not delivered on promises of increased

7 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL),Agricultural Commodity Price Bulletin Year 4, Volume 5

(Kabul: MAIL, 2008), 1.

development assistance have led to growinganger toward both the government and the maliks(community leaders) who are held responsiblefor the enforcement of the opium poppy ban.

While the ban was never popular, in April 2009feelings were running particularly high. Farmersoften made verbal threats against the maliksduring discussions and accused them of acting asthe spies of the government, receiving bribesand appropriating the bulk of any developmentassistance that was delivered.8 There were evenclaims that an improvised explosive device attackin March 2009 was targeted at Haji Usman, oneof the maliks from Mohmand Valley in Spin Ghar,due to growing anger at his involvement in theenforcement of the opium ban.9 In one incident

in the main bazaar in Achin, a young manverbally abused a malik in public and was givenconsiderable support for his comments frompassers-by (see box quote).

The political situation had deteriorated furtherby October 2009, with a violent confrontationbetween one of the key maliks in the Shinwartribe, Malik Niaz, and anti-government elements,who it was said had been residing in the area forsome time. The murder of the maliks nephews byAfridi insurgents, allegedly at the instigation of atribal rival, and subsequent reprisals led to theformation of an armed tribal militia in Spin Gharand the malik relocating to Jalalabad. In late

8 Examples were given of roadwork in Achin wherelabourers were compelled to work longer hours to allow forthe payment of ghost workers who were related to themalik.

9 It was also reported that Haji Usmans brother was killedby an IED attack in Bati Kot in February 2010.

Youre a thief. Youre a corrupt person.You get some aid from the governmentand you take it to your own house. Youdont distribute it to the poor people.When some NGO comes to the village youintroduce your relatives and people. What

do you do for the poor people? You sharein the ban on opium poppy. You supportthe government. You are the intelligencedepartment of the government.

A young man to a malik in the mainbazaar in Achin


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1.2 Prioritising food security: Reductionsin Helmand

Opium poppy cultivation in Helmand fell by anestimated 34,000 ha between 2008 and 2009. Thescale of this reduction has not been achieved in asingle province over a 12 month period since theTaliban implemented its prohibition in the 2000/01growing season. It is likely that cultivation mayfall further in 2010, primarily in areas adjacent tothe provincial centre of Lashkar Gah. During the2008/09 and 2009/10 winter cropping seasons,wheat seed and fertiliser were distributed bythe provincial authorities to farmers in some ofthe central districts of Helmand, including all ofthe district of Lashkar Gah, and large parts ofNad-i-Ali, Nawa-i-Barakzai, Garamsir and NahriSarrajan area that has come to be known as theFood Zone. Those farmers who received seed

and fertiliser were required to sign a declarationsaying that they would not cultivate opium poppy.The Helmand governor has also issued threatsthat opium poppy will not be tolerated and thatthose who cultivate it within the Food Zone riskhaving their crop destroyed.

There may be a tendency to directly attributethe reductions in poppy cultivation in HelmandProvince between 2008 and 2009 to the efforts ofthe governor and the Helmand counter-narcoticsplan, particularly given that levels of cultivation

were reported to have fallen by 37 percent withinthe Food Zone and to have risen by eight percentin those areas outside.12 The increase in theestimated level of cultivation in the neighbouringprovince of Kandahar, from 14,623 ha in 2008 to19,811 ha in 2009 (reported by UNODC), is citedas further evidence of the effectiveness of wheatseed distribution in Helmand for reducing opiumpoppy cultivation.

While confusion over the actual level of cultivationin Kandahar (the US has estimated that cultivation

fell between 2008 and 2009 from 22,100 ha to17,000 ha, contradicting the UNODC gure) is noteasily resolved, a more detailed analysis of thedivergent patterns of cultivation within Helmand ispossible. Work by Craneld University in the United

12 Craneld University, cited in UNODC, Afghanistan Opium

Poppy Survey 2009 (Kabul: 2009), 8. Also cited in Bureaufor International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume 1(Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2010), 96.

January 2010, this relatively localised disputehad escalated and led to the elders of the entireShinwar tribe signing the Anti-Taliban ShinwariPact10 in return for a payment of one milliondollars from the US military, allegedly bypassingthe provincial government and Governor Shirzaialtogether. By mid-March, the merits of this pact

and the efcacy of favouring Malik Niaz were beingquestioned, with an ongoing dispute over landbetween different Shinwari subtribes, includingMalik Niazs Sepoy, breaking out in armed violenceand resulting in the deaths of 13 people.11 Thisgrowing conict is in addition to the murder ofHaji Zaman, a prominent jihadi commander andpolitical opponent of the former governor, HajiDin Mohammed, along with 14 others in thedistrict of Khogyani, only a few weeks after hehad returned to the province, demonstrating thepotential for future instability. There was also

continued speculation as to whether GovernorShirzai will remain in his post or will be promotedby President Karzai as a reward for his decisionnot to stand in the 2009 presidential election.

Yet despite this uid political environment andthe worsening economic position of many farmersin Nangarhar, opium poppy cultivation will remainlimited to the more remote parts of the SpinGhar piedmont in 2010, where the governmenthas little access. Across much of the provincean unprecedented third consecutive year of

negligible levels of opium poppy cultivation willbe maintained. During the planting season farmersstill believed the government retained sufcientcontrol during the day to enforce a ban on opiumpoppyeven in those areas where it no longer hascontrol at night. Despite increasing opium pricesand the absence of viable alternatives in manyof the southern districts of Nangarhar, wheat willonce again dominate the landscape across muchof the province. However, it remains to be seenhow long farmers, particularly those in the SpinGhar piedmont, will endure the current economicsituation and the degree to which maintainingthe ban will exacerbate local political tensionsand potentially destabilise the province.

10 Sgt Tracy J. Smith, Afghan Border Police Enlist TribalLeaders/Maliks to Protect Eastern Border, The Fighting48th 1, no. 5 (2010): 13.

11 Alissa Rubin, Afghan Tribal Rivalries Bedevil a US Plan,Associated Press, 21 March 2010.


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Kingdom highlighted that while opium poppycultivation rose by 8% between 2008 and2009 in those areas outside the Food Zone,the amount of land allocated to wheat in thissame area almost doubled from 24,689 to48,902 ha (see Table 1). The rate of increasein the amount of land cultivated with wheat

outside the Food Zone is almost identicalto that experienced within the Food Zone,where agricultural inputs were provided to anestimated 22,850 farmers.

What this more detailed analysis of croppingpatterns reveals is that while the 97 percentincrease in wheat cultivation within the FoodZone was achieved through lower levels ofopium poppy cultivation and some reductionsin cultivation of annual horticultural crops,outside the Food Zone the increase was

predominantly on land that had not beencultivated in 2008 but was planted in 2009due to better precipitation. In total a further21,370 ha of land outside the Food Zone wasunder active agriculture in 2009 comparedto 2008the vast majority of which wascultivated with wheat. Increases in opium poppycultivation largely seem to have been at the expenseof lower levels of annual horticultural productionand fodder crops. This suggests that wheat wasgiven priority both inside and outside the FoodZone, regardless of whether farmers were recipients

of wheat seed or not. The fact that so much of theadditional active land outside the Food Zone wasallocated to wheat and not opium poppy also raisesquestions over claims that opium poppy continues tobe the most lucrative crop.13

If the provision of wheat seed and other agriculturalinputs does not adequately explain the divergenttrends in opium poppy cultivation within andoutside the Food Zone, what does? Some mightsuggest that the threat of eradication was moresignicant in areas within the Food Zone, giventheir proximity to Lashkar Gah and the provincialauthorities, and that this may have led to farmers

13 Many of these claims are due to commentators focusingon gross returns on opium and other crops rather than netreturns. While it may be the case that none of Afghanistanslicit agricultural products can currently match the grossincome per hectare from opium as UNODC claim in theirWinter Rapid Assessment of February 2010 (p. 14), thenet returns on opium are much less favourable due to thelabour-intensive nature of the crop.

preferring wheat cultivation. Fieldwork in May 2009indicated that there was some truth to this claimin the environs of Lashkar Gah, particularly in theareas around Bost and Bolan, where opium poppycultivation all but disappeared in 2009 and hadshown a downward trend since 2007. Communities

in these areas were aware of the governors plan toreduce opium poppy cultivation and believed thatit would be implemented. In fact, it is possible tosee a move out of opium poppy cultivation intoboth wheat and high value horticulture in Bolanand Bost over the last two years. Both theseareas are on the outskirts of the city of LashkarGah and vegetable traders in the city report thatthey purchase crops directly from the farm gate,offering a stimulus to crop diversication.

The population in other parts of the Food Zonedid not believe that the threat of eradication wascredible. For example, farmers in much of Nad-i-Ali, Nawa-i-Barakzai and Nahri Sarraj perceivedthat there was little threat of eradication in 2009and in many areas there was little evidence ofcrop destruction in either the 2008 or the 2009eradication campaigns.14 Information campaigns

14 This included Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) and the

centrally managed Poppy Eradication Force (PEF).

Table 1: Cultivated area inside and outside theHelmand Food Zone, 2007-2009 (hectares)

2007 2008 2009

Change2008 to

2009

Change2008 to2009 (%

Inside the Food Zone

Opium poppy 38,235 33,937 21,452 -12,485 -37%

Cereal# 15,924 18,603 36,591 17,987 97%

Other* 40,488 45,514 36,685 -6,829 -15%

Activeagriculturalland

94,646 98,054 96,728 -1,326 -1%

Outside the Food Zone

Opium poppy 50,418 49,872 53,624 3,752 8%

Cereal 23,339 24,689 48,902 24,213 98%

Other 111,105 114,557 107,962 -6,596 -6%

Activeagriculturalland

184,681 189,118 210,488 21,370 11%

Source: Craneld University, Poppy and Cereal Cultivation in Helma

2007 to 2009 (unpublished, 2009). #Cereal includes wheat. *Otheincludes crops that were cultivated during the winter season as well land that was prepared for cultivation in spring (such as for cotton, meand watermelon) but left fallow at the time that the imagery was take


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warning that the opium crop would be destroyedwere typically viewed with disdain. For mostfarmers the fact that the government was notin a position to disseminate these messages,or indeed agricultural inputs, in situ simplyreinforced the view that the provincial authoritieswere not in control of the rural areas in these

districts. Despite the fact that they did not feareradication, farmers in these areas still reportedthat they had reduced the amount of land thatthey cultivated with opium poppy between the2007/08 and 2008/09 growing seasons and hadcultivated more wheat. Even in November 2009there were farmers in the more insecure partsof Nad-i-Ali, such as Chanjir and Doh Bandi,where the governments writ is limited, who hadnever had their crop destroyed and had nothingto fear from eradication and yet still reported apreference for cultivating wheat.

This analysis suggests that, almost regardless oflocation and circumstance, there was a preferencefor wheat cultivation in Helmand in the 2008/09growing season. Those outside the Food Zonetypically cultivated signicantly more wheat in2009, even though they had the opportunity toincrease the amount of land that they cultivatedwith opium poppy by much more than the eightpercent that was actually recorded. Farmersinside the Food Zone allocated more land to wheatregardless of whether they perceived the risk of

eradication as credible or whether they receivedagricultural inputs. Therefore, the divergenttrends in opium production in areas inside andoutside the Food Zone would appear to haveless to do with the interventions implementedunder the auspices of the Helmand counter-narcotics plan and more to do with the particularsocioeconomic and environmental conditions thatprevail in these different areas.

This is perhaps best seen in Nad-i-Ali along theBoghra Irrigation Canal (see Figure 1), whichserves as the demarcation line for the Food Zone.Farmers outside the canal typically have smallerlandholdings and higher population densities perunit of irrigated land than those inside. It is anarea that is typically irrigated by tubewells orpumps, with the substantial capital and recurrentcosts these involve. The areas outside the canalmostly do not get a second agricultural season(see Figures 2 and 3) and are reliant on theirwinter crops to meet a signicant part of their

needs in terms of both cash and consumption.There are also claims that this land has beengrabbed or purchased by commanders fromthe northern districts of Helmand and is largelyfarmed by sharecroppers.

Under these circumstances, farmers will retain

a commitment to opium production despitesignicant increases in the price of wheat andconcerns over food security. With such smalllandholdings, high population densities and nosummer cash crops, farmers need a reliable wintercrop that can be used to purchase the inevitableshortfall in wheat production that the householdexperiences each yeareven in years such as2009, when there was more active agriculturalland under wheat. Wheat decits are all themore acute for those farmers cultivating landunder a sharecropping arrangement, who only

receive up to half the winter crop after harvest.Sharecroppers can also get preferential access toloans by cultivating opium, which assists themduring the winter months when food scarcity is atits most acute. For landownersthe people whoultimately decide what is plantedopium poppyis favoured as it allows them to accrue a greatershare of the nal crop through inequitable tenureand credit arrangements. Finally, opium is alsohighly responsive to irrigation and a good yieldwill cover some of the capital and recurrent costsassociated with running a tubewell or pump.

The situation north of the canal stands in starkcontrast to areas south and downstream, wherefarmers typically get a good winter crop eachyear as well as a good summer crop (see Figures2 and 3). Landholdings are typically larger anddue to the second crop, population densities perunit of agricultural land cultivated are much lessacute. Farmers are not solely reliant on opiumas a cash crop but have, to varying degrees, apotential second crop of watermelon or cotton(both planted in the spring) as well as mungbean. Moreover, higher wheat yields due tothe availability of water and lower populationdensities per unit of land mean that households cancultivate enough wheat to meet their householdfood requirements. There is also little variationin the amount of active agriculture in the canal-irrigated area each yeareven in 2009, whenthere was signicantly more water available forirrigation. Consequently, within the canal and theFood Zone, farmers can only grow more wheat in


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The impact that prioritising opium productionover wheat had on household food security in the2007/08 growing season remains a vivid memory andcontinues to inuence farmers cropping decisions in2009/10. Although the price of wheat has fallen toas low as 15.5 Afs per kilogram, farmers typicallyexpect it to rise in 2010 due to the relativelyhigh price of wheat our in Pakistan18 and theexpectation that the security situation across theborder will deteriorate in the coming months. Underthese circumstances, concerns over food securitycontinue to be the primary driver for lower levels of

opium poppy cultivation in Helmand Province, evenin areas outside of government control.

18 In November 2009, wheat our was selling at the

equivalent of between 18 and 32 Afs per kg in Peshawar,depending on quality.

the winter season by reducing the amount ofland they cultivate with other crops. Giventhe low price of opium and the relativelysmall amounts of household land allocatedto horticultural crops across much of theFood Zone during the winter, particularlyin some of the more concentrated areas

of opium production such as Nad-i-Ali andNahri Sarraj, a signicant increase in wheatcultivation is likely to come largely at theexpense of opium production.15

With the price of wheat reaching as high as35 Afghanis (Afs) per kilogram in Helmandin November 2008 and opium prices havingfallen to 20,000 Pakistani Rupees (Rs)16per man17 at harvest time in May thatyear, some reprioritisation in the 2008/09growing season was inevitable (see box

quote). The rise in the price of cereals due togrowing insecurity in Pakistan and a continuedban on the export of wheat our fuelled concernsthat prices would rise further. The problemsfarmers faced purchasing wheat both locally andin Lashkar Gah in mid-2008 highlighted that manyhad overextended their opium crop and neededto give greater priority to ensuring that theycultivated enough wheat to meet their householdneeds. With higher wheat yields in 2009 due tobetter climatic conditions and greater investmentin their wheat crop, many farmers found

themselves less reliant on imported wheat ourthan they were in recent years.

15 David Manseld, Sustaining the Decline: Understanding

the Nature of Change in the Rural Livelihoods of OpiumPoppy Growing Households in the 2008/09 Growing Season,a report for the Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit of theUK Government (May 2009), 18; and unpublished eldwork,

May 2009 and November 2009.

16 Prices in southern Afghanistan are typically cited inPakistani Rupees. In May 2008, US$1 was the equivalent of64 Rs.

17 A man is a traditional unit of measure in Afghanistan. InKandahar, a man is the equivalent of 4.5 kilograms.

2. How Resilient are these Reductions?These two studies in Section 1 present verydifferent explanations for falling levels of opiumproduction in the provinces of Nangarhar andHelmand. In Helmand, reductions in opium arelargely a function of a preference for wheat in boththe 2008/09 and the 2009/10 growing seasons,

In 2007/08, I cultivated my land with sixjeribsof poppy and only onejerib of wheat. It was notenough wheat for my family. At harvest time Iasked my neighbours to sell their wheat to us,as the price of wheat in the city [Lashkar Gah]was too high. At that time we didnt have enough

money to buy wheat in the city as our opium wasstill fresh and we would have received a lowprice. But my neighbours refused. I had to borrowmoney from another person to buy wheat ourin Lashkar Gah. In 2008/09, I decided to growthreejeribs of poppy and fourjeribs of wheat soI never face this problem again. I have cultivatedthe same this year [2009/10].

A farmer in Helmand Province

due to the shift in the terms of trade betweenopium poppy and wheat and continuing concernsover food security. In Nangarhar, the governorsefforts are credited with the largely negligible levelsof cultivation. What remains less clear is whetherthe particular socioeconomic, environmental andpolitical factors that have led to the current fall

in cultivation can be sustained or whether thesereductions remain precarious and cultivation willrise again in subsequent seasons. This sectionanalyses the resilience of the current reductions indetail; initially it looks at the substitution of wheatfor opium poppy and asks whether it is sustainable,before exploring the nature of the political bargains


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established to ban opium productionin Nangarhar and Balkh and how thesecould evolve over the next twelvemonths.

2.1 Is wheat a replacement forpoppy?

In the provinces of Nangarhar andBalkh, the actions of the governorshave been critical to reducingopium production, whereas thereis little evidence of concertedcounter-narcotics efforts in manyother provinces. In the province ofHelmand, where the governor didmount a concerted counter-narcotics programmein the 2008/09 growing season, the writ of thestate remains largely limited to the environs of

Lashkar Gah and district centres. Despite thissituation, opium poppy cultivation has fallen andwheat areas have increased, even in areas thatare beyond the provincial authorities control inthe districts of Nad-i-Ali, Nawa-i-Barakzai andNahri Sarraj. According to data from the UnitedStates government, a similar pattern of reductionscan be seen in the districts of Panjwayi, Zharayand Maiwand in Kandahar Province and Bakwaand Bala Buluk in Farah Province.19 None of theseare districts where the government could beconsidered in control of the rural areas.

Evidence suggests that over the last two yearsopium poppy has largely been replaced by wheat.This shift can be seen not only in Nangarhar andHelmand but also in other provinces and datesback to the 20007/08 growing season.20 This trendcontinued in the 2008/09 growing season, evenin the southern provinces where opium poppycultivation has become increasingly concentrated.

19 USG district-level poppy cultivation estimates for

selected Afghan provinces, 2008-2009 (unpublished). UNODCdata differs from these estimates.

20 In the 2007/08 growing season, 90 percent of thoseinterviewed who reported that they had reduced the amountof land they had allocated to opium poppy had simplysubstituted all the land they had cultivated with opiumpoppy in 2006/07 to wheat in 2007/08. David Manseld,

Responding to Risk and Uncertainty: Understanding theNature of Change in the Rural Livelihoods of Opium PoppyGrowing Households in the 2007/08 Growing Season. AReport for the Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit of theUK Government (2008), 34.

In 2009/10, it appears as if levels of wheat andopium poppy will largely be maintained at currentlevels in the irrigated areas of the south.

However, the current move to wheat is not justevident amongst those who have previouslycultivated opium poppy. Farmers have reduced theamount of land devoted to a variety of differentcash crops and sown more wheat in the 2008/09growing season.21 This preference for wheat islargely a rational response to the rapid increasein wheat prices that the country has seen sincelate 2007. The combination of high world foodprices22 and growing insecurity in Pakistan led toan annual rise in the price of bread and cereals of

183 percent between May 2007 and April 2008.23At the same time, the farm-gate price of opiumfell to levels that have not been observed sincebefore the Taliban declared their prohibition onopium production in July 2000 (see Figure 4). Thedecline in the terms of trade between opium andwheat has been such that in parts of the centraland northeastern regions, where opium yields aremore marginal, farmers have been able to obtainmore wheat by growing it on their own land thanby producing opium and exchanging it for wheat,

as had been the case in these areas since 2001.

24

21 David Manseld, Sustaining the Decline.

22 Joachim von Braun, Food and Financial Crises:Implications for Agriculture and the Poor. A Food PolicyReport (Washington, DC: International Food Policy ResearchInstitute, 2008), 3.

23 MAIL, Agricultural Commodity Price Bulletin Year 4:

Volume 5 (Kabul: 2008), 1.

24 David Manseld, Sustaining the Decline.

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Cultivating opium poppy looks less attractive inthe 2009/10 growing season than it has for sometime. During the planting season in late 2009,farmers in Ghor, Baghlan and Balkh were unawareof the price of opium, an indication perhapsthat the farm-gate trade in opium currently liesdormant in these areas. In the south, prices for

wet opium were between 12,000 to 14,000 Rs perman, down from 16,000 to 18,000 Rs25 during theearly harvest period in April 2009 and from 20,000Rs26 in April 2008. Farmers did not expect pricesto rise in the foreseeable future.27 The same couldnot be said of wheat. In fact, concerns over theprice of wheat continue to preoccupy farmers,even though the price has actually fallen from35 Afs per kg to 15.5 Afs per kg over a twelvemonth period. Farmers anticipated that priceswould increase in 2010 due to the high priceof wheat our in Pakistan, an increase in the

cost of smuggling goods through the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan,and the expectation that there will be a furtherdeterioration in the security situation in Pakistan(as mentioned, the traditional source of the bulkof wheat our imports in Afghanistan).28

For the vast majority of farmers, expanding wheatcultivation is not a strategy aimed at maximising theeconomic returns on their land. Small landholdingsand large family sizes mean that only a minority ofhouseholds are self-sufcient in wheat, even in a

good agricultural year,29 and few have a marketable

25 In May 2009 US$1 was the equivalent of 80.5 Rs.

26 In April 2008, US$1 was the equivalent of 64 Rs.

27 In the south, farmers typically store and sell opium asfresh or wet.

28 Pakistan wheat policies have implications on bothnational and household food security in Afghanistan.Consistent and abundant supply of wheat and wheat our

from Pakistan keeps the prices stabilised and at an affordablelevel in Afghanistan markets. Famine Early Warning System,USAID Pakistan Wheat Subsector and Afghan Food Security

System (FEWS NET, 2007), 6.29 About 73% of all farms as estimated by the Winter Surveyhad less than 5 ha of arable land. The average size of thesesmall farms was 1.59 ha (1.1 ha irrigated and 0.48 ha rainfed land). Such reduced land area is in most cases not nearlyenough to feed a family. Considering the proportion of landsactually cultivated and average wheat yields, the averagefarm under 5 ha (if only wheat were grown) would supplyonly 200 kg of wheat per capita, not enough to cover seedreserves, post harvest losses and food needs. Cited in HectorMaletta, Arable Land Tenure in Afghanistan in the Early Post-

Taliban Era,African and Asian Studies 6 (2007): 13-52.

surplus.30 In the south, high transport costs andcommodity prices due to insecurity, as well as theinationary effect of the concentration of opiumproduction, typically renders those farmers thatcan produce a marketable surplus uncompetitivecompared with better quality imports fromKazakhstan.31

Instead, the focus has largely been on guaranteeinga minimum level of food security. Those withenough land have cultivated a level of wheat thatis commensurate with household requirements toattain self sufciency. Those without sufcientland have increased the amount of land allocatedto wheat to reduce some of the risks and costsinvolved in purchasing wheat our at the market,but on the whole have incurred a dramaticincrease in their cost of living due to their inabilityto grow enough wheat to meet their families

needs. It is clear that wheat is not a viable andsustainable alternative to opium poppy for mostAfghan farmers and that some source of cashincome is required from livestock, cash crops orwage labour.32

Farmers in some districts have moved out ofopium production and diversied their livelihoodstrategies. For example, in parts of Nangarharsome households have expanded their productionof high-value horticulture, including intercropping

30 Most Afghan farmers do not have a marketable wheatsurplus. Most are in fact net buyers of wheat (or our).

Many do not sell any straw or weeds either. Therefore manyfarmers do not derive any monetary revenue from growingwheat; many costs are provided from supplies originating inthe family or the farm, or purchased with payment in kind;even commercial inputs may be purchased with payment inkind, either immediately or on credit until the harvest. InHector Maletta, The Grain and the Chaff: Crop Residues andthe Cost of Production of Wheat in Afghanistan in a FarmingSystem Perspective (Unpublished, 2004), 4.

31 Wheat prices in the south are typically higher thanthe national average and in Kabul. See the Agricultural

Commodity Price Bulletins by the Ministry of Agriculture,Irrigation and Livestock.

32 The characteristics of wheatrelatively low value,low labour intensity and correspondingly high usage ofAfghanistans scarce land and water resourcesmake it a poorand unsustainable alternative to poppy in the Afghan context.Moreover given that in good harvest years the country alreadycomes close to self sufciency in wheat and there are no

export prospects, stimulating substantial increases in wheatproduction would be counterproductive. In Ward et al,Afghanistan: Economic Incentives and Development Initiativesto Reduce Opium Production (World Bank/DFID), 29.


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and growing crops that produce multipleharvests. Similar patterns of change can be seenin other provinces, such as Balkh and Laghman.The adoption of less labour-intensive crops, suchas onion, green bean and okra, has also freedup family members to search for employment.Consequently, diversication has allowed some

farmers to both generate higher incomes andspread the risk of crop and market failure.However, as the Nangarhar example illustrates,this has not been the case for the majority offarmers in the province, particularly in the SpinGhar piedmont, where the economic and politicalconsequences of the ban on opium production aremost acute.

There is much less evidence of crop and incomediversication in the south of the country, even inthose districts around the provincial centres. In

districts like Nad-i-Ali and Nawa-i-Barakzai, whichboth border the provincial centre of Helmand, orin the district of Nahri Sarraj, in which the city ofGereshk is located, as much as 90 percent of theland cultivated in winter is consistently cultivatedwith either wheat or opium. The remaining tenpercent is either fodder or horticultural cropsproduced for household consumption. While theamount of wheat or poppy may vary each yearaccording to relative prices and concerns overfood security, the amount of land allocated tohorticultural and fodder crops seems to vary

little.

2.2 How does security inuence farmerscrop decisions?

While the limited size of the market forhorticultural crops in Afghanistan is clearly anissue, physical insecurity is a primary factorlimiting the extent of agricultural diversicationand constraining the move from opium intohorticultural crops in these areas of Helmand.However, current discussions about the impactof insecurity on opium production tend to focuson the absence of governance allowing opium toourish, or the Taliban encouraging productionand offering the rural population protectionagainst eradication efforts as part of a heartsand minds strategy. While there may be sometruth to these claims, they offer a rather partialpicture of household decision-making in areasof chronic insecurity. These explanations offerlittle if any insight into the constraints on the

transition to other cash crops or non-farm incomeopportunities. They infer that households aresomehow wedded to opium poppy cultivationand that it is the presence of insurgents andthe absence of government that allows them torealize their objective of cultivating the crop.

Farmers themselves report a more complexpicture as to how the ongoing violence andconict impact upon cropping decisions. Theyemphasise market constraints, high transactionand transportation costs, and how immobilityimpacts on plant husbandry. For example, in theprovinces of Helmand and Kandahar, and evenin districts like Khogyani in Nangarhar, farmersreport that both ghting and the fear of leavingthe household compound at night interrupts thetending of crops that require more attention andirrigation. This deters vegetable production and

has led to the persistence of crops such as opium,as well as cotton and mung bean, which despiterelatively low returns are considered relativelyrobust and can be easily stored for sale at a laterdate.

With regard to market constraints, both farmersand agricultural traders report that purchases atthe farm gate are limited in Helmand, largelyrestricted to the areas of Bolan and Bost inLashkar Gah district. In insecure districts likeNad-i-Ali, Nawa-i-Barakzai and Nahri Sarraj,

there is little evidence of traders purchasingwheat, vegetables or fruit at the farm gate. Anexception is the case of watermelon in Nad-i-Ali,which is considered premium quality. However,even here traders from Lashkar Gah and Gereshkare hesitant to buy at the farm gate unless theyhave good connections in the area, which allowsthem to better manage risk. Moreover, tradersfrom Ghazni, Kandahar and Kabul have beenincreasingly reluctant to travel to the area topurchase watermelon in the last three years,preferring to work through local intermediaries.It is notable that even these local traders areunwilling to pay at the farm gate for fear ofbeing robbed on the roads and instead requirefarmers to collect the money for their crop inLashkar Gah or Gereshk.

Trade with the primary market in Kandahar isequally if not more problematic for both farmersand traders from Helmand Province. The mainhighway through Zahre in Kandahar is considered


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particularly dangerous. There are even reports ofsome of the larger trucks veering off the mainhighway through the district and taking thedesert road to avoid being caught in what isseen as regular reghts between insurgents andcoalition forces. Trade continues but it does so ata cost. Haulers impose higher charges for moving

freight in such a risky environment. The number ofcheckpoints has increased, with a correspondingincrease in the facilitation fees to be paid, andthe risk of crop losses due to delays or accidentsis high.

Given this perspective, it is clear there is a morecomplex interaction between physical insecurityand opium production at work than one thatsimply asserts that insurgents are encouragingcultivation. While there is considerable talk ofthe abundance of well-irrigated land within the

Food Zone of Helmand or the irrigated areas ofKandahar, there seems to be little understandingof how insecurity prevents farmers in theseareas from realising their potential with regardto high-value horticultural crops.33 The currentprevalence of wheat in these areas does notreect economic opportunity but highlights thecontinuing market failures that prevail in areas ofchronic insecurity.

Similarly, the persistence of relatively widespreadopium poppy cultivation in the south at a time

when prices for fresh opium are so low suggeststhat farmers do not see many viable alternativesto opium production in the current environment.In fact, analysis of current cropping patterns inthe more insecure parts of Helmand and Kandaharsuggest that opium is less of a default as a resultof it being the crop with the highest returns, asUNODC suggests, but more that it is possibly one ofthe only crops that provides a guaranteed sourceof cash income amidst the levels of insecuritythat currently prevail in these areas.

33 There is a tendency to refer to Helmand Province asthe bread basket of Afghanistan. This is a descriptionthat is actually best reserved for the north of Afghanistanand not Helmand (Anthony Fizherbert, pers. comm., May2009). Indeed, historical data suggests that wheat yieldsin Helmand were some of the lowest in the world in the1970s and fell further once the Helmand Valley project hadbeen in operation for a number of years. See Nick Calluther,Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State,The Journal of American History89, no. 2 (2002): 535.

Yet, without a shift towards high-valuehorticulture and on-farm income the currentreductions in opium production are unlikely toprove sustainable. Wheat is no replacement foropium. When the price of wheat is high, themajority of farmers simply do not benet as theycannot cultivate sufcient wheat to meet their

familys food requirements. Consequently, whilethey can expand wheat production in an attemptto reduce the potential impact of higher foodcosts, ultimately most farmers will incur highercosts for wheat our and require a source ofcash income if they are to even meet their basicneeds. Without some kind of economic cushion tomitigate the high price of wheat, the economicsituation of the population and subsequently thepolitical conditions in these areas are likely todeteriorate further. High wheat prices are notsomething to be welcomed.

At the same time, there is need to question howdurable the impact of high wheat prices betweenlate 2007 and mid 2009 will be on Afghan farmers.After all, prices are considerably lower than theywere in mid 2008. With the increase in wheatour imports from Kazakhstan this winter season,it is possible that prices in Pakistan will have lessinuence on wheat prices in Afghanistan thanthey have had in the past. Yet another year inwhich farmers in the south maintain existinglevels of wheat cultivation might drive down

price expectations for subsequent seasons. Muchwill depend on the impact of this years relativelydry winter in Afghanistan and its impact on wheatyields, as well as the productivity of cerealsand imports of wheat our from neighbouringstates. An increase in opium prices this year inresponse to another season of relatively lowlevels of cultivation, as well as falling yields dueto disease, could further shift the incentive toreturn to opium poppy in the 2010/11 growingseason. In the south, the possibility of a returnto more widespread opium poppy cultivation in2010/11 would be limited by farmers memoriesof the impact opium overproduction had on theirfood security in the 2007/08 growing season, andto what extent agricultural diversication andjob creation can be encouraged. However, if thesecurity situation in the north, east and centralregions continue to deteriorate and opium pricesincrease, the authorities would nd their abilityto prevent a return to opium production in the2010/11 growing season further constrained


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after all, it is easier to enforce a ban when pricesare low.

2.3 A foundation of shifting sands?

Much of the narrative in the media and amongstpolicymakers regarding the ban on opium production

in Nangarhar focuses on the importance of thegovernor. Implicit within this explanation is thelanguage of the governors authoritycommand andcontrolover the province and his commitmentto reducing opium production.34 While some doubthis motives, no one doubts the results. A similarnarrative is used in the description of reductions inopium production in Balkh and to some extent recentefforts in Helmandalthough somewhat overstatedin the latter case.35 These discussions are oftensupplemented with claims of good governance.36While this narrative sits well within the language

of the warlord and the strongman so oftensynonymous with Afghanistan, it does not reect thecomplex and multilayered bargaining processes thathave been used to deliver reductions in cultivationin provinces like Nangarhar and Balkh, nor thelimitations of any single actor in such a complex andevolving environment.37

34 In some Afghan provinces we have seen that wherepolitical leaders have had the courage and foresight toweather short term criticism in favour of long term results,there has been progress. Bureau for International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs, International NarcoticsControl Strategy Report, 17.

35 Combined with economic factors, this reduction wasa direct result of the leadership of Helmands Governor,Gulabaddin Mangal. Bureau for International Narcotics andLaw Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics ControlStrategy Report, 99; The Governors efforts in Helmandhave been particularly effective in reducing and preventingpoppy cultivation in that province, Statement for theRecord of James A. Bever, Director of USAIDs Afghanistan-

Pakistan Task Force, US House Committee on Oversightand Government Reform, Subcommittee on NationalSecurity and Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Transnational DrugEnterprises (Part II): Threats to Global Stability and USPolicy Responses, 3 March 2010, 4.

36 See Adam Pain, Let them Eat Promises: Closing theOpium Poppy Fields in Balkh and its Consequences (Kabul:AREU, 2008); and UNODC/MCN, Winter Rapid Assessment(2010), 1.

37 As the moves of interdependent players intertwine,no single player nor any group of players acting alone candetermine the course of the game no matter how powerfulthey may be. N. Elias, cited in C. Mowles, R. Stacey and D.Grifn, What Contribution can Insights from the Complexity

Sciences make to the Theory and Practice of Development

The truth is that falling levels of opium productioncannot simply be attributed to the states capacityand willingness to enforce the law, as some mightsuggest. After all, in a country like Afghanistan,or indeed any other major drug-crop producingcountry, the state does not have a monopoly ofviolence and many of those that have acquired

formal positions in the government have a historyas violent entrepreneurs and perhaps evenprevious involvement in the drugs trade.38 Behindwhat would appear to be a province-wide banenforced by a dominant governor lies a set oflong and complex negotiations between formercommanders and combatants, each seekingto maintain or strengthen their political andeconomic interests. These individuals in turn haverivals and adversaries who seek to undermine theposition of the current dominant powerbrokerwith the local community to gain political and

economic advantage.

Engaging in efforts to reduce opium productionrisks the political capital of local powerbrokers.Consequently, local leaders who are involvedin counter-narcotics efforts have to be seen tobe distributing political and economic favour ifthey are to maintain influence. The longer a banon opium production is maintained, or perhapsthe higher the opium price during the period inwhich the prohibition is enforced, the greaterthe cost incurred by those communities in areas

where viable alternatives to opium poppy donot exist. Those local actors that do see somepolitical and economic advantage in supportingthe provincial governor in his efforts to reduceopium poppy will need to ensure that a criticalmass of the rural population gain something fortheir loss if they are not to find themselvesvulnerable to removal or acts of violence.It is for this reason that the internationalcommunity has sought to bolster the influenceof governors and those supporting poppybans at a district or subdistrict level throughdevelopment efforts and interventions such asthe Good Performance Initiative (GPI), whichspecifically rewards provinces in which poppy

Management?, inJournal of International Development 20(2008): 804-820.

38 Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Disguised Warlordism andCombatanthood in Balkh: The Presence of Informal Powerin the Formal Afghan State, Confict, Security andDevelopment 9, no. 4 (2009): 535-564, p. 546.


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cultivation has been significantly reduced oreliminated.39

However, as the example of Nangarhar shows, thepopulation in the Spin Ghar piedmont clearly ndthemselves economically disadvantaged. Effortsto bolster development assistance, including

through GPI,40

have often not matched the initialpromises made to communities and have beendelivered later than agreed. In fact, many of theseareas have received lower levels of developmentinvestment per capita than the more prosperousparts of Nangarhar, where opium has played afar more limited role in rural livelihoods.41 Withsmall plots of land, high population densities andcurrently limited opportunities for viable cashcrops, much of the population in the southerndistricts of Nangarhar has had little choice but tosearch for non-farm income opportunities, which

have been increasingly scarce.

While the ANA has proven to be an important safetyvalve in these more remote districts of Nangarhar, aswell as other parts of Afghanistan that have given upopium poppy,42 it is not without its risks, given thatmany regional and local commanders have over theyears found themselves increasingly unpopular andfaced violent unrest due to forced conscription.43Although the current process of enlisting young menin the ANA is not conscription per se, it is seen as adirect response to the governments ban on opium

poppy cultivation and the economic shock that thishas caused. It is not a choice that many would haveelected to make had circumstances been different.

39 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law EnforcementAffairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy ReportVolume 1, 101.

40 In Nangarhar province, thirteen micro-hydro projects

that generate electricity for rural villages have beencompleted in areas where poppy used to be cultivated.Bureau for International Narcotics and Law EnforcementAffairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Volume 1, 95.41 Richard Brittan, Livelihoods Data Analysis: InitialNangarhar Province Report, Unpublished Report for DFID(2008), 24-25.

42 Adam Pain cites examples in Badakhshan and Balkh, asdoes Paul Fishstein; pers. comm., 2009 and 2010.

43 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise and Fall of the Taliban,and Robert Crews, Moderate Taliban?, in The Taliban andthe Crisis of Afghanistan, edited by Robert Crews and AminTarzi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 94,262 and 265.

As such, some might argue that it is conscriptionby default, and were there to be an increase in thenumber of young men from these areas killed in theghting in the south it might provoke increasingresentment and potentially resistance to thegovernment and its policies.

Shifting political rivalries and alliances areoverlying the economic stresses communitiesare experiencing in the Spin Ghar piedmont andthe kind of precarious coping strategies thatare being adopted. Long standing animositiesbetween rival commanders are coming to thefore in the southern districts bordering Pakistan,exacerbated by the presence of insurgent groupsand the tensions associated with accusations ofpolitical patronage and favouritism during thepresidential elections. There is growing publicresentment toward the maliks who are seen as

instrumental in the implementation of the opiumpoppy ban. Accusations that they have receivedpayments for their support, both in kind and incash, are commonplace, as are complaints thatdevelopment assistance has been appropriated bythe maliks for themselves and their relatives.44Maintaining the support of the rural populationin this environment of shifting and competingalliances is challenging. As such, it is unclearwhether the recent Anti-Taliban Shinwari Pact is agenuine attempt to expel the insurgency from theve districts known as Loya Shinwar or an attempt

by an increasingly unpopular rural elite to presenta unied position and shore up further political,nancial and possibly military support from theAfghan government and international community.

There are also complaints in Balkh about the lackof compensation for not planting opium poppy,45but here Governor Atta has exerted a higherdegree of control over the security apparatus ofthe state than Shirzai has in Nangarhar.46 The shiftin the political sands for the Balkh governor liemore with his support for the losing candidate inthe presidential election than with a groundswellof public opinion opposing the ban. The districtsof Chimtal, Chahar Bolak and Sholgara are

44 David Manseld, Unpublished report for DAI (2009).

45 Paul Fishstein, forthcoming report on aid and security inBalkh (Ma: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University);and Adam Pain, Let Them Eat Promises.

46 Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Disguised Warlordism andCombatanthood in Balk, 535-564.


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considered markedly less secure than they weretwelve months ago.47 The police and army can onlygain access to some parts of these districts if theygo in force. The deterioration in security is largelyattributed to the presidential election and theview that Pashtuns, Hazaras and Uzbeks are seento have favoured President Karzai while the Tajik

population largely voted for Dr Abdullah. Politicalpatronage and the process of favouring particularcommanders in order to secure the vote for therespective presidential candidates exacerbatedexisting tensions between commanders fromdifferent political parties. In some casescommanders have been killed or have sided withinsurgents and each side has accused the other ofarming opponents.

Uncertainty over the future political careers ofGovernors Atta and Shirzai fuels insecurity and

the possibility of further shifts in the politicalalliances and rivalries in the provinces ofNangarhar and Balkh. In Nangarhar, the belief

47 Fieldwork undertaken in November 2009 for the UKDrivers Report 2010 (forthcoming).

that the governor enforced a second year of theopium ban in the 2008/09 growing season to gainthe political support of the US government in casehe decided to run in the presidential electionin 2009 has only increased the populationsresentment toward him. The political situationin the province remains tense and it is becoming

increasingly unclear how events will evolve over2010 and into the next growing season in 2010/11.In Balkh, the resurrection of Attas politicaland military rival Abdul Rashid Dostum and thegovernors public differences with PresidentKarzai challenges the perception of the governorsauthoritarian rule and creates an environmentin which disgruntled commanders may look toexact more rent for their loyalty. It seems thateven if both governors remain in their posts, theuid political environments in Nangarhar and

Balkh will challenge their capacity to maintain

policies that are increasingly unpopular with therural population. All deals would be off if thesegovernors are moved on.

3. A Policy Refocused?It is clear from the analysis presented so farthat the reasons for the current reductionsin opium production in Afghanistan and theresponses are multifaceted and context-specic,differing from province to province and within

provinces. It is also clear that these reductionsremain precarious. They are largely built onthe substitution of wheat for opium poppy. Onlya few areas have replaced opium poppy withmore diversied livelihoods based on high-valuehorticulture and non-farm income opportunities.In fact, many who have abandoned opium poppyare incurring a high cost and do not have viablealternatives. The terms of trade between opiumpoppy and wheat have already changed and onceagain favour opium. While we can see that priceexpectations currently lag behind this shift in the

terms of trade, they may well adjust to lowerwheat prices in the next growing season. Whilecoercion not to plant has been effective in someprovinces, it has not been the determining factorbehind the move out of opium poppy acrossmuch of Afghanistan. Even in those provinceswhere governors have taken a proactive positionon opium and reached political bargains with

local elites to create the conditions for theprohibition of opium, the economic burdenimposed on much of the rural population, aswell as political developments associated withthe insurgency and the presidential elections,

raise questions about the sustainability of suchlow levels of cultivation. It is unclear whethernew political settlements could be establishedto continue effective prohibition if opium pricesrise, governors change or security worsens.

Counter-narcotics policy is also evolving. The

United States has refocused its efforts away fromeradication and toward both rural developmentand interdiction. Particular emphasis has beengiven to targeting trafckers thought to be

cooperating with insurgents. The metrics have

also been refocused; away from the number ofhectares of opium cultivated or destroyed, as hasbeen the priority over the last few years, towardincreasing licit crop production, the number ofpoppy free provinces and prosecutions of drugtrafckers. There are, however, tensions between

the new policy direction and the complex realitieson the ground, particularly with the evolution ineradication policy as well as in efforts to counterwhat has been referred to as narco-insurgent-


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criminal nexus.48 This section explores these twopolicy issues in more detail as a way of illustratingsome of the limitations and consequences ofattempting to narrowly dene and tame49 whatare complex evolving problems.

3.1 Poppy free provinces: Eradication

by another name?

With the current move away from a focus oneradication,50 the relentless discussion oncrop destruction, which seemed to occupy adisproportionate amount of time and effortcompared to what it actually delivered, hascertainly tailed off. Previous advocates of moreaggressive eradication have even temperedtheir views.51 However, eradication has not beenabandoned altogethernor should it be.52 Instead,it has gone through a process of Afghanisation.

The Afghan government is now in the lead, withGovernor-Led Eradication becoming the onlyvehicle for crop destruction. Indeed, recent plansreleased by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics(MCN) estimate a budget of US$2.2 million foreradication across 13 provinces this season.53

48 Commander of the NATO International Security AssistanceForce / US ForcesAfghanistan, ISAF Campaign Plan,November 2009, Slide 12. Abbreviations in the original havebeen expanded.

49 Unintended consequences tend to occur even morefrequently if the problem has been articially tamed, that is

it has been too narrowly addressed and the multiple causesand interconnections not fully explored prior to measuresbeing introduced. Australian Public Service Commission,Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective(Canberra: 2007), 12.

50 David Johnson, Bureau of International Narcotics andLaw Enforcement Affairs, brieng on the release of the 2010

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington,DC: 1 March 2010).

51 Target rich criminals not poor farmers. In the past thefocus was on eradication rather than interdiction. It didnot work. UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009Summary Findings (2009), ii.

52 For a considered discussion on eradication in Afghanistan,see David Manseld and Adam Pain, Opium Eradication in

Afghanistan: How to Raise Risk when there is Nothing toLose? (Kabul: AREU, 2006); and David Manseld and Adam

Pain, Evidence from the Field: Understanding ChangingLevels of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan (Kabul:AREU, 2007).

53 In these plans, the cost varies from zero in the province ofKapisa to US$810,000 in Helmand. The budget for eradicationin Nangarhar, a province that is considered almost poppyfree, is $270,000, while in Farah, where UNODC estimates

There are of course some risks associated withan eradication programme led by the provincialauthorities. There is certainly considerable evidencein southern Afghanistan of the authorities primarilytargeting those without the necessary nances andpolitical connections to deter crop destruction.Some of those involved in rural development

in the south have gone further, arguing that iferadication is the only face of the governmentin the rural areas and that face is sneering,partial and predatory, then crop destruction canundermine the legitimacy of the state. Hence,leaving eradication policy and implementationsolely to the Afghan authorities might well standcontrary to other efforts to increase Afghanscondence in their government.54

A further possible area of tension in the recent shiftin eradication policy may lie in the redening of the

metrics for judging the counter-narcotics effort.While a fall in the number of hectares cultivatedand the often related target of an increase inthe number of hectares eradicated are no longermilestones in the current US administrationscounter-narcotics effort, they have been replacedby another area-based target, that of increasingthe number of poppy free provinces. This couldbe inconsistent. In many cases a province willonly attain poppy free status this year if theresidual amount of opium poppy being cultivatedis destroyed. In fact, this is precisely the position

that UNODC is advocating, arguing for timelyelimination in 2010 in the provinces of Badakhshan,Baghlan, Faryab, Kabul, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarharand Sar-i-Pul.55 But what is known about these areaswhere opium poppy cultivation persists?

In Laghman, for example, negligible levels ofopium poppy are cultivated in the mountainousand remote areas of the districts of Alishing andAlingar, where landholdings are small and incomeopportunities are limited. The same is true ofNangarhar, where small amounts of opium aregrown in the more remote parts of the districtsof Achin, Hisarak, Sherzad, Khogyani and Lal Pur.In Baghlan, cultivation is reported to continue inparts of Andarab, a district where armed men can

that 12,405 ha of opium were grown in 2009, the estimatedcost is only $27,000. MCN, Survey and Monitoring Directorate,Provincial Eradication Plans (2010).

54 Statement for the Record of James A. Bever, 4.

55 UNODC/MCN, Winter Rapid Assessment, 2, 24.


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be seen in the main bazaar and where the writ ofthe government has never been strong. In KabulProvince, opium persists in Uzbeen in the districtof Surobi, and almost every district in Kunar hasjust a few hectares. None of these areas would beconsidered benign from a security perspective,nor are they areas where farmers have viable

alternatives.

In these circumstances, one has to wonder whatthe marginal benets of the destruction of a fewhundred hectares would be. The gain would be anadditional poppy free provincean incrementalmilestone that currently represents counter-narcotics progress. But what would be the loss,particularly in areas that already appear to beremote and insecure? If there is indeed a growingrecognition amongst policymakers that cropdestruction will only deter future opium poppy

cultivation if households have viable alternatives, itcould be counter-productive to pursue an increasein the number of poppy free provinces regardlessof the circumstances of those persisting withopium production in these areas. Is such a targetconsistent with a position that has argued thateradication undermined the counterinsurgencyeffort by targeting Afghan farmers?56

3.2 Targeting the insurgency-narcoticsnexus: A way to further undermine

governance?Much of the discussion in media and policycircles focuses on the role that the drugs tradeplays in funding and motivating the Ta

where have all the flowers gone- sustainability of reduction in opium in afghanistan (2010)

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