u.s. runway safety briefing
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U.S. Runway Safety Briefing. ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM Runway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference John Pallante, ARI-2 October 2002. Global Airspace Characteristics. Growing demand for air travel and system capacity. Millions of operations a year. Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
ICAO NAM/CAR/SAMRunway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference
John Pallante, ARI-2
October 2002
U.S. Runway Safety BriefingU.S. Runway Safety Briefing
Global Airspace CharacteristicsGlobal Airspace Characteristics
Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety
Millions of operations a year
Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft
Thousands of airports
Thousands of air trafficcontrollers
Growing demand for air travel and system capacity
Runway Safety Realities Runway Safety Realities
Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to
Operations
Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are
Significant Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and
Individual Ownership
Types of Runway IncursionsTypes of Runway Incursions
Pilot DeviationsPilot Deviations
A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.
A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.
Vehicle/Pedestrian DeviationsVehicle/Pedestrian Deviations
A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.
A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.
A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land.
The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of the following error types.
Operational ErrorsOperational Errors
An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:
An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:
Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include, vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways)
An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft
Runway Incursions (All Categories)Runway Incursions (All Categories)
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
304
329
405407
338
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY0266.21 68.67 67.68 65.47
Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02
est. 64.85
Distribution by Type of Runway Distribution by Type of Runway IncursionsIncursions
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
FY 1998-2001 FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)
OE/D22%
PD56%
V/PD22%
OE/D24%
PD57%
V/PD19%
Runway Incursion Severity CategoriesRunway Incursion Severity Categories
Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity
Category DCategory D Category CCategory C Category BCategory B Category A
Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion
Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision
Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision
Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision
Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the event results in a collision
Increasing Severity
Available Reaction
Time
Available Reaction
Time
Evasive or Corrective
Action
Evasive or Corrective
Action
Environmental Conditions
Environmental Conditions
Speed of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle
Speed of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle
Proximity of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle
Proximity of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle
Increasing Severity
An incursion that resulted in a runway collision
CollisionSeparation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision
Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision
Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion
Category A
Category A&B Runway IncursionsCategory A&B Runway Incursions
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
59
69 67
53
37
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY0266.21 68.67 67.68 65.47
Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02
53 = FY02 Perf Limit
est. 64.85
Severity Distribution of Runway Severity Distribution of Runway IncursionsIncursions
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
FY 1998-2001 FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)
D61%
C28%
B8%
A3%
D47% C
36%
B11%
A6%
Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities (FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal).
Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities (VNY & LAL).
Category A and B Runway Incursions Category A and B Runway Incursions (CY 2000 and 2001) (CY 2000 and 2001)
Traffic Flow
2001 A Events
2000 A Events
2001 B Events
2000 B Events
66% or2/3 of runway
Location of Collisions at ToweredAirports (1990 – 2001)
Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 - 2001)- 2001)
NIGHT VMC
DAY IMC
NIGHT IMC
DAY VMC
2 1
5 0
TOTAL OPERATIONS
4 Year Total = 268 Million
Annual Average = 67 Million
TOTAL OPERATIONS
4 Year Total = 268 Million
Annual Average = 67 Million
TOTAL INCURSIONS
Total Incursions = 1460
Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years
TOTAL INCURSIONS
Total Incursions = 1460
Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years
INCURSION RATE
Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations
INCURSION RATE
Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations
Frequency and Rate of Runway Frequency and Rate of Runway Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)
LAX STL IAD
34 Incursions 30 Incursions 3 Incursions
Airport complexity influences the number and Airport complexity influences the number and rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)
Severity Distribution at the 32 Severity Distribution at the 32 Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001)Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001)
The Benchmark Airports accounted for– 18% of all operations (approx. 61
Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period
– 26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied
The Benchmark Airports accounted for– 18% of all operations (approx. 61
Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period
– 26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied
The Benchmark Airports accounted for – 38% (38/87) A events,
– 36% (59/163) B events,
– 35% (178/509) C events,
– 16% (113/694) D events
The Benchmark Airports accounted for – 38% (38/87) A events,
– 36% (59/163) B events,
– 35% (178/509) C events,
– 16% (113/694) D events
0
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10
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20
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35
40
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MIA
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Current Situation
Runway Safety Goals
What the FAA is DoingWhat the FAA is Doing
Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions
Primary Performance Factors of Primary Performance Factors of Runway Incursions (1997-2001)Runway Incursions (1997-2001)
Pilot Deviations – Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short
instructions– Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position
and hold instructions
Operational Errors
– Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting runways
– Runway crossing separation errors
Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations
– Crosses a runway without communication or authorization
– Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions
Runway Safety BlueprintRunway Safety Blueprint
8 Goals– 39 Objectives
1. Education and Training – Safety Seminars
2. Surface Safety Awareness – Mass Mailings
3. Procedures – Modeling and Simulation
– Advisory Circulars
4. Data Collection – Surface Incidents
– ASRS
8 Goals– 39 Objectives
5. Communications – Phraseology Workgroup
6. Situational Awareness – Paint Study
7. Local Solutions – Special Emphasis Program
8. Technology – Flashing PAPI– Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X)– Moving Map– LED Lights
Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)
TechnologiesTechnologies
ARI sponsoring technologies with industry-wide potential
– AMASS 18 Commissioned 6 Operational Suitability Demo 13 Remaining
– LED lighting Enhances hold position
markings at runway/taxiway intersection
Omaha system activation July 2002
SummarySummary
Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-dimensional approach.
People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people make mistakes.
Education, training and procedures are important solutions, but they are always susceptible to human error. To be successful, a balanced approach also requires improvements in airport design and technology, and a determination to take ownership of the issue of runway incursions.
Backup SlidesBackup Slides
ApproachApproach
Analyze the incident data to determine areas of greatest risks– What are the types and relative frequencies of
different types of error?
Identify mitigation strategies for managing human error– Procedures– Technologies
Where do we go wrong?Where do we go wrong?
Controllers– Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that
they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or cleared to land)
– Get distracted– Fail to coordinate (teamwork)– Don’t catch all readback errors– Act human
Where do we go wrong?Where do we go wrong?
Pilots– Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line
up on the runway)– Takeoff without a clearance– Get lost (with and without poor visibility)– Misunderstand the clearance– Act human
Resulting in:Resulting in:
Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking off or landing
Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position
and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway
Other scenarios
What Controllers Can DoWhat Controllers Can Do
Optimize teamwork Recognize limitations of human memory and
attention Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you
plan on it being there for more than a minute Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that
the runway is clear Good communication techniques
What Pilots Can DoWhat Pilots Can Do
DON’T “mind your own business” – do whatever you can to increase your awareness of the airport operation– LISTEN UP– LOOK OUT– Airport diagram “out and in use”– Is there a runway between you and the gate?– Is there an aircraft on final?
What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)
Both pilots should listen for clearances to land, taxi, and take-off
When in doubt, about your position or your clearance - ASK
SOPs and Recommended Practices– Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is
received (signal that aircraft is rolling)
– Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off and have been lined up and waiting for more than 90 seconds
TechnologiesTechnologies
BAA ActivitiesBAA Activities
Background– Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement
(BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology solutions
– Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology– Proceed to technology/solution development phase based
on operational transition potential
Status– Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001
(summary on next slide)– Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002
System demo - November 2002
BAA Activities (cont’d)BAA Activities (cont’d)
Technology/Product Contractor Site Status
Multilateration/IR Sensor Fusion
Sensis and Tri-Space
Memphis, TNDemonstration conducted in August and October 2001.
Magnetic Sensors HoneywellMinneapolis, MN
Demonstration conducted in October 2001.
GPS/RF Data Link Vehicle Tracking
Veridian Engineering
Warminster, PA
Demonstration conducted in December 2001.
Ground Marker Airspec WJHTCDemonstration conducted in November 2001.
Addressable Signs/SmartBoard
Technology Planning Inc.
College Park Maryland Airport
Demonstration conducted in October 2001.
Radar guns and Runway Status Lights
Architecture Technology Corporation
Long Beach, CA
Demonstration conducted in April 2002.
Other Projects (cont’d)Other Projects (cont’d)
Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights– Three phases testing at Omaha
LED stand alone LED with motion sensors Special scenarios - TBD
– Operational Assessment complete Jan 2003
Other Projects (cont’d)Other Projects (cont’d)
VHF audio alert with motion sensors for non-controlled airports– Two months data collection at Millard Airport
completed in May 2002– Detection rate and false alert rate need
enhancement
Other Projects (cont’d)Other Projects (cont’d)
Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)– Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an
aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or other critical position on the runway
– System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach
– Article 7 Brief August 12, 2002
– Field Demo September 10-12, 2002
Technologies DeploymentTechnologies Deployment
Short Term– Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and
Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and high traffic intersections to increase the awareness of pilots and vehicle operators
North Vegas Long Beach
– Phase in automatic control such as loops and motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness
Technologies Deployment Technologies Deployment (cont’d)(cont’d)
Mid Term– Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to
improve runway safety Addressable Sign – TYS LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA 75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center
Long Term– Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports– Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground vehicle tracking
– Integrate existing and future certified warning equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and vehicle operators