Trophy Hunters & Conservation: Exploring Certification of

Sport Industries in Tanzania

Monique Borgerhoff Mulder

Department of Anthropology,

Graduate Group in Ecology,

Center for Population Biology

1. Sport hunting - the problem

• Definition – for trophies, by foreigners

• Less scenic areas than photographic tourism

• Affects 420,000, 188,000 and 420,000 sq kms of communal, commercial and state land (SADC)

Sport hunting - vulnerabilities

• “Canned” hunting

• Corruption (bush & capital)

• Centralization leads to exclusion of local communities from decisions and benefits

OUTCOME – ecologically unsustainability; lack of social & economic justice

Sport hunting - Solutions

• Ban (permanent or temporary)

• Stricter governmental monitoring

• Decentralization (WWF-LIFE, Namibia)

• Major land reform (e.g., privatization)

Sport hunting – List of “Best Practices”

• Maintaining quality and standards of the SH industry

• Monitoring and administration of the SH industry

• Quota setting

• Maximizing economic & social benefits

Barnett, R., and C. Patterson. 2006. Sport hunting in the SADC region: An overview. TRAFFIC

2. Is More Regulation the Way to Go for Tanzania?

• No panaceas

• Case specific solutions

• The Tanzanian case …

• Inclination to decentralization & community control (Brooks et al. Cons. Biol.)

Tanzania – Land law

• Land Act 1923

but• NP and GR land is state

managed (25% area)• Alienation of land from

customary control for agriculture, ranching and protective reserves (Land Act 2001, Village Land Act 2001)

Tanzania - Natural resources

• Huge biodiversity

• Current threats

Killing of wildlife for trophies & meat

Incursions into protected areas

Land conversion

Tanzania – Policy

• Arusha Manifesto 1961 … President Kikwete• 1974 Wildlife Conservation Act• 1996 Policy for Wildlife Conservation and

Utilization (Policy and Management Plan for Tourism)

No implementation, back to WCA 1974 “Hunting of Animal Regulations”

Tanzania – 100 yrs of SH industry

• 1920s Annual licenses issued• 1950s Fees in Selous; Game Controlled Areas• 1960s Game Reserves; 47 blocks in Selous• 1973 Ban in order to nationalize SHI; reopened 1978 under TAWICO• 1988 TAWICO disbanded; Wildlife Division control • 1999 ~ 35 private operators (1100 clients) under WD

• Worth $27.6m (Baldus & Cauldwell 2004)• 13.7% per annum increase• Worth less than photo safaris (13m of $68.5m in 1989)• Lower returns per area ($70/km2 vs. $130/km2 for photo safaris)

Tanzania – Structure of SHI

• Resident hunters (low fees, modern weapons)

• Sport hunters (expats, high fees, modern weapons)

Industry under WD; some hunting blocks under the WD, others under the regional governments; chronic lack of coordination

What happens? Facts

• 130 blocks (concessions) covering 250,000 km2

• 5 yr leases from Wildlife Division ($7500 p/ann.)

• Complex set of additional fees to WD

• Must take >40% of quota

• Required antipoaching, block development and community development

What happens? Baldus and Cauldwell’s (2004) study

• No transparent and open market competition for blocks

• Quotas on guesswork, and too late• No centralized system of

monitoring• Available data (Selous) suggest too

low and too high utilization rates; & some species over-hunted

• Subleasing• No control on resident hunting at all• No criteria for antipoaching, block

and community development

What happens to the money?

• Highly complex fee structure• 75% game fee to Treasury, 25% to

WD (plus all other fees)• 1992 presidential directive

– District 9%, – Wildlife Division 25%, – Game Reserves 37%, – Treasury 28%

If we consider taxes and all other fees government WD and Treasury still get lion’s share

What happens – do communities receive any benefits?

• Few tangible benefits, despite a commitment to Wildlife Management Areas (CBRNM)

• Small successes – Selous Conservation

Programme (GTZ)

– Friedkin Conservation Fund, Cullman and Hurt Community Programme (voluntary programs)

– CAMPFIRE; WWF-LIFE (Namibia)

What happens – Summary

• A corrupt system

• No ecological monitoring of sustainability

• Financially inefficient

• Little to no social benefits for Tanzanians

3. What to do? • Ban hunting • More government control • Decentralization • Major land reform• Certification

– SFRC (Minnesota, Feb 2006)

– SFTZ (Arusha-based NGO, August 2006)

– IUCN London, Oct 2006

SF mission is to provide practical solutions for conserving African wildlife while mitigating human/wildlife conflict and reducing poverty in rural areas

Savannas Forever

• Certify “outfitters” to make hunting more ecologically and socially responsible

• Goal – to develop standards measuring ecological impact, community outreach and public communication

• Strategy – regional chambers that seek solutions through certification– Rural communities, government, NGOs, wildlife

dependent businesses

Process of certification

• Following FSC develop standards with indicators that measure performance in the various domains

• Get government on board• Get all other parties on board (regional

chambers, lobbying, working with hunting industry)

• Ensure certification will be independent of industry (and SF)

• Ensure sustainability of program – industry must pay (survey of hunters & their clients)

DRAFT Certification Criteria (Principles, Criteria and Indicators)

Pr 1: Sustainability of Wildlife and Habitat in the Hunting AreaCrt. Antipoaching: HC should reduce illegal offtake of wildlife populations

Ind. HC records all arrests and details of poaching within concession

Pr 2: Promote Sustainable Livelihoods and Protect People

Pr 3: Monitoring and Assessment

Pr 4: Management Plan

Pr 5: Compliance with National Laws

Pr 6: Tenure and Use Rights and Responsibilities

Pr 7: CommunicationCrt. HC shall communicate with district government to identify priorities for

community developmentind. HC produce records of annual meetings with District DO

4. SFRC starts to monitor

• Base line conditions• Systematic

comparisons between affected and unaffected areas

• Rigorous quantitative analysis

Progress in monitoring

• Ecological monitoring. – National forum of users of LIDAR

• Sociological monitoring– Pilot completed– 4 teams surveying (all Tanzanians)– Sample– Household heads, village leaders and focus groups– Economic measures, institutional features,

conservation attitudes– Anthropometric surveys– Initial work in north

Protein Sources (by % of village eaten in last 7 days)

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Food Source

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Thanks to Dennis Rensch, Jennifer Schmidt, and other students at UMN

Boys' weights

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Age

Series3

Series7Singisi Natta

Thanks to Dennis Rensch, Jennifer Schmidt, and other students at UMN

Hypotheses under test

• That communities can benefit from SHI outreach and communication (h 1)

Increase human welfare in rural areas impacted by trophy hunting **

SHI outreach & communication achieves certification *

Perceived socioeconomic benefits of SHI outreach **

* Measured by certification body

** Measured by SFRC socioeconomic surveys and baseline protocol

HYPOTHESIS 1

Hypotheses under test

• That communities can benefit from SHI outreach and communication (h1)

• That the environment benefits from SHI ecological responsibility (h2)

HYPOTHESIS 2Increased environmental value, measured in target species numbers and other environmental indicators ***

SHI ecological responsibility receives certification *

More business/income to successfully certified companies *

* Measured by certification body

** Measured by SFRC socioeconomic surveys and baseline protocol

*** Measured by SFRC (National Spatial Database Initiative)

Successful securing of block for multiple years **

Hypotheses under test

• That communities can benefit from SHI outreach and communication (h1)

• That the environment benefits from SHI ecological responsibility (h2)

• That economic benefits confer environmental benefits (h3) or that environmental benefits confer economic benefits (h4)

HYPOTHESES 3&4

Increased environmental value, measured in target species numbers and other environmental indicators ***

Increase human welfare in rural areas impacted by trophy hunting (h1) **

** Measured by SFRC (socioeconomic surveys and baseline protocol)

*** Measured by SFRC (National Spatial Database Initiative)

Increase human welfare in rural areas impacted by trophy hunting (h1) **

or

Perceived socioeconomic benefits of SHI outreach and communication **

Increased environmental value, measured in target species numbers and other environmental indicators ***

SFTZ-coordinated Conservation Stewardship Council (2009) to agree on PCI WD

implementation

Top line work is mainly lobbying, facilitating and coordinating with key stakeholders (local communities, government, conservation organizations, development NGOs and hunting industry)

Bottom line work is mainly research

SFRC run research with two goals:

a. Baseline measures for monitoring

b. Development of knowledge base for best practice (to inform CSC 2009)

Testing of hypotheses for appropriate initiatives for each country

Questions

• Will expat hunters pay more for certified “outfitters”

• Is there a set of PCI that all stakeholders can agree to?

• Will areas/villages affected by responsible SH operators show differences in ecological, economic and social outcomes?

• Or … will we be shot?

http://www.savannasforever.org

Biodiversity in protected area

HC offtake

Quota setting rules

Institutional Outreach

Quota compliance

Direct outreach

Indirect outreach

Socioeconomic success

Attitudinal change

Behavioral change (retaliation killings, poaching, etc