tirol.star paper vs simbol.labor

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G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, Petitioners,vs.

RONALO . SI!BOL, "IL#REA N. CO!IA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.

OCTRINE$

The policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates therights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code. It is not a valid eerciseof management prerogative unless there is reasonable business necessity.

#ACTS$

Petitioner !tar Paper Corporation "the company# is a corporation engaged in trading $principally of paper products. %osephine &ngsitco is its 'anager of the Personnel and(dministration )epartment while !ebastian Chua is its 'anaging )irector.

The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo ). !imbol "!imbol#, *ilfreda+. Comia "Comia# and Lorna . strella "strella# were all regular employees of the company.

!imbol was employed by the company on &ctober -, /001. 2e met (lma )ayrit, also anemployee of the company, whom he married on %une -, /003. Prior to the marriage,&ngsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them shouldresign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in /0045

/. +ew applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he6she has 7a8 relative, up to 7the81rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.

-. In case of two of our employees "both singles 7sic8, one male and another female#

developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided toget married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above

!imbol resigned on %une -9, /003 pursuant to the company policy.

Comia was hired by the company on :ebruary 4, /00. !he met 2oward Comia, a co;employee, whom she married on %une /, -999. &ngsitco likewise reminded them thatpursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comiaresigned on %une 19, -999.

strella was hired on %uly -0, /00<. !he met Luisito =u>iga "=u>iga#, also a co;worker.Petitioners stated that =u>iga, a married man, got strella pregnant. The company allegedlycould have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on )ecember

-/, /000.

Respondents o?er a di?erent version of their dismissal. !imbol and Comia allege that theydid not resign voluntarily@ they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.(s to respondent strella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co;worker =u>iga whomisrepresented himself as a married but separated man. (fter he got her pregnant, shediscovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoiddismissal due to the company policy.

&n +ovember 19, /000, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the&rthopedic 2ospital to recuperate for twenty;one "-/# days. !he returned to work on)ecember -/, /000 but she found out that her name was on;hold at the gate. !he wasdenied entry. !he was directed to proceed to the personnel oAce where one of the sta?

handed her a memorandum.

The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. !he refused tosign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty;one "-/# days and has not beengiven a chance to eplain. The management asked her to write an eplanation. 2owever,after submission of the eplanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. )ue toher urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in echange for herthirteenth month pay.



Respondents later Bled a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,separation pay and attorneys fees.

Labor (rbiter 'elDuiades !ol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

&n appeal to the +LRC, the Commission aArmed the decision of the Labor (rbiter on %anuary

//, -99-.

The Court of (ppeals reversed the +LRC decision.

ISSUE$

*hether or not the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the samecompany is a valid eercise of management prerogative

HEL$

+&.

The court did not Bnd a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.

The courts that have %ro'l( construed the term Emarital statusE rule that it encompassedthe identity, occupation and employment of oneFs spouse. They strike down the no;spouseemployment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reasonthat the no;spouse employment policy violate the marital status provision because itarbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees without regard to theactual e?ect on the individualFs DualiBcations or work performance.

These courts also Bnd the no;spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer topresent any evidence of

%)*i+** +-**i( other than the general perception thatspouses in the same workplace might adversely a?ect the business. They hold that theabsence of such a %o+ /' o--)pio+l )li/-io+ invalidates a rule denying

employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the sameoAce.

Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of thebusiness reDuire a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available oracceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer maynot discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse.

*e note that since the Bnding of a bona Bde occupational DualiBcation GustiBes anemployers no;spouse rule, the eception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these statecourts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative eists otherthan the discriminatory practice. To Gustify a bona Bde occupational DualiBcation, theemployer must prove two factors5 "/# that the employment DualiBcation is reasonably

related to the essential operation of the Gob involved@ and, "-# that there is a factual basis forbelieving that all or substantially all persons meeting the DualiBcation would be unable toproperly perform the duties of the Gob.

It is signiBcant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were foundBt for the Gob, but were asked to resign when they married a co;employee. Petitioners failedto show how the marriage of !imbol, then a !heeting 'achine &perator, to (lma )ayrit, thenan employee of the Repacking !ection, could be detrimental to its business operations.+either did petitioners eplain how this detriment will happen in the case of *ilfreda Comia,then a Production 2elper in the !electing )epartment, who married 2oward Comia, then ahelper in the cutter;machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employeesmarried to each other will be less eAcient. If we uphold the Duestioned rule without valid

GustiBcation, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of aperceived danger at the epense of an employees right to security of tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co;employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co;employees. The Duestionedpolicy may not facially violate (rticle /1H of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionatee?ect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass Gudicial scrutiny is ashowing that it is r*o+%l despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, e?ect. Thefailure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the Duestioned



policy cannot preGudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination basedupon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.

tirol.star paper vs simbol.labor

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