the world bank presented to: world bank staff core course on public sector governance prem knowledge...

The World Bank

Presented to:World Bank StaffCore Course on Public Sector GovernancePREM Knowledge & Learning WeekWashington, DC April 23, 2007

Presented by:Sanjay Pradhan

DirectorPublic Sector Governance

Poverty Reduction & Economic Management (PREM)

Strengthening Strengthening World Bank Group World Bank Group

Engagement on Governance & Engagement on Governance & AnticorruptionAnticorruption

The World Bank

Sanjay PradhanPublic Sector Governance Course

OutlineOutline

A. Context

B. The World Bank’s Governance & Anticorruption Strategy

1. Country Level

2. Project Level

3. Global Level

C. Implementation

The World Bank


An Unprecedented Global ConsensusAn Unprecedented Global Consensus

AFRBurkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Republic of Congo,

Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda

LACArgentina, Bolivia,

Dominican Republic, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Mexico, IACC

EAPAustralia, Cambodia,

China, Japan, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia,

New Zealand, Philippines,

Thailand, Vietnam

MNAEgypt, Jordan (planned), Morocco,

Tunisia (planned), Yemen

ECAAlbania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova,

Russia

EuropeBrussels, the Hague,

London, Madrid, OECD, Paris, Rome, Stockholm

North AmericaOttawa, Washington DC (IMF, MDBs, US Government, CSOs,

private sector, unions)

SARBangladesh, India, Nepal

Consultations held in 35 developing countries, 12 donor countries, & four global events, reaching more than 3,200 people

Proactive engagement & unanimous endorsement by the Board

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Governance is the door to anticorruptionGovernance is the door to anticorruption

The manner in which the The manner in which the statestate acquires acquiresand exercises its authority to provide and exercises its authority to provide public goods & servicespublic goods & services

Use of Use of publicpublic office for office for privateprivate gain gain

GovernanceGovernance

CorruptionCorruption

•Corruption is an outcome – a consequence of weak or bad governance

•Governance reform – strengthening capacity & accountability – helps combat corruption by addressing its underlying causes

The World Bank


Consistent Approach: While there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’, the World Bank will

apply a consistent approach across countries & continue to allocate more

aid to better governed environments (PBA)

Consistent Approach: While there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’, the World Bank will

apply a consistent approach across countries & continue to allocate more

aid to better governed environments (PBA)

Seven Guiding PrinciplesSeven Guiding PrinciplesGovernance &

Anticorruption for Poverty Reduction: Poor governance and

corruption undermine the World Bank’s mission of

poverty reduction

Governance & Anticorruption for

Poverty Reduction: Poor governance and

corruption undermine the World Bank’s mission of

poverty reduction

Country Leadership & Ownership:

The World Bank is committed to supporting a country’s own governance & anticorruption priorities

Country Leadership & Ownership:

The World Bank is committed to supporting a country’s own governance & anticorruption priorities

Staying Engaged: The World Bank will seek creative ways to

provide support, even in poorly-governed

countries—“don’t make the poor pay twice”

Staying Engaged: The World Bank will seek creative ways to

provide support, even in poorly-governed

countries—“don’t make the poor pay twice”

Multi-Stakeholder Engagement:

The World Bank will scale up good practice in engaging with

civil society, media, parliaments, judiciary, private sector in its

operational work

Multi-Stakeholder Engagement:

The World Bank will scale up good practice in engaging with

civil society, media, parliaments, judiciary, private sector in its

operational work

Strengthening Country Systems:

Better national institutions are the long term solution to mitigating fiduciary risk

for all public money

Strengthening Country Systems:

Better national institutions are the long term solution to mitigating fiduciary risk

for all public money

Working Together: The World Bank will work

with donors & other actors at the country & global levels

to ensure a harmonized approach—“the World Bank should not act in isolation”

Working Together: The World Bank will work

with donors & other actors at the country & global levels

to ensure a harmonized approach—“the World Bank should not act in isolation”

7 Guiding 7 Guiding PrinciplesPrinciples

The World Bank


Project Level

Combating corruption in

World Bank Group operations

Country Level

Deepening support to countries to

strengthen governance

Global Level

Working with development

partners, sharing experience & addressing

transnational issues

Key Elements of World Bank’s StrategyKey Elements of World Bank’s Strategy

The World Bank


Public Management

Public financial management & procurement,

monitored by PEFA

Administrative & civil service reform

Governance in SectorsTransparency & participation

Competition in service provision

Sector-level corruption issues (EITI, forestry)

Civil Society, Media & Oversight Institutions

State oversight institutions (parliament, judiciary, SAI)

Transparency & participation (FOI, asset declaration, user

participation & oversight)

Civil society & media

Local GovernanceCommunity-driven development

Local government transparency

Downward accountability

Private Sector

Competitive investment climate

Responsible private sector

Coalition building across stakeholders

Helping Countries to Improve Governance Helping Countries to Improve Governance Through Various ‘Entry-Points’Through Various ‘Entry-Points’

The World Bank


The new international aid

architecture emphasizes the

principle of mutual accountability

Scaling up of donor assistance requires sound PFM systems

and reduced corruption in partner

countries

Strengthening PFM Systems a key priorityStrengthening PFM Systems a key priority

Increasing recognition that

"ringfencing" projects will not work – need to strengthen

country systems

The World Bank


Comprehensive Fiscal oversight:

Are the aggregate fiscal position and risks are

monitored and managed?

Comprehensive Fiscal oversight:

Are the aggregate fiscal position and risks are

monitored and managed?

Information:Is adequate fiscal, revenue and expenditure information produced and disseminated to meet decision-making and management

purposes?

Information:Is adequate fiscal, revenue and expenditure information produced and disseminated to meet decision-making and management

purposes?

Comprehensive, Policy-based, budget:

Does the budget capture all relevant

fiscal transactions, and is the process, giving regard to government

policy?

Comprehensive, Policy-based, budget:

Does the budget capture all relevant

fiscal transactions, and is the process, giving regard to government

policy?

Budget Realism:Is the budget realistic, and implemented as

intended in a predictable manner?

Budget Realism:Is the budget realistic, and implemented as

intended in a predictable manner?

Control:Is effective control and stewardship exercised

in the use of public funds?

Control:Is effective control and stewardship exercised

in the use of public funds?

Accountability and Transparency:

Are effective external financial accountability

and transparency arrangements in place?

Accountability and Transparency:

Are effective external financial accountability

and transparency arrangements in place?

PEFA’s Performance Measurement PEFA’s Performance Measurement FrameworkFramework

Six PFM System Aspects

The World Bank


Strengthening Demand for Public Strengthening Demand for Public Financial AccountabilityFinancial Accountability

Participatory Budgeting,

Puerto Alegra(Brazil)

Civil Society Oversight; transparent, competitive

procurement(Slovakia)

Strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions

(Hungary)

Public Expenditure Tracking & Information Campaigns (Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia)

Procurement oversight by

CSOs (Philippines)

Strengthening Public Accounts Committees of

Parliament(India)

Transparent, competitive e-procurement(Latin America)

Strengthening Public Accounts Committees

of Parliament (Kenya, Ghana, Zambia --

AFR)

Accountability, Transparency & Integrity

Project(Tanzania)

Key Issue: Instrument to Support Demand-side Interventions

The World Bank


Tackling Corruption in Key SectorsTackling Corruption in Key Sectors

Manufacturing

Registration

Selection

Procurement

Distribution

Prescription & Disbursement

Random inspections

Monitoring based on

transparent & uniform

standards

Tracking systems

User surveys

Media coverage of drug

selection committee meetings

Transparency

Reference: Jillian Clare Cohen, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Pharmacy and Director, Comparative Program on Health & Society, University of Toronto

Tracing Vulnerabilities in Value-Chain:

Pharmaceuticals

The World Bank


Participatory Participatory prioritization of prioritization of

policies & public policies & public spendingspending

Investment OperationsBrazil Rural Poverty Reduction Project Rio Grande do Norte; Malawi Third Social Action FundDevelopment Policy LendingArmenia SAC IV; Laos PRSC1; Timor-Leste Consolidation Support Program Policy Grant, Vietnam PRSC (I to IV)

Innovative Examples of Multistakeholder Innovative Examples of Multistakeholder Engagement in WB OperationsEngagement in WB Operations

Strengthening Strengthening transparency & transparency &

oversight over the oversight over the use of budgetary use of budgetary

resourcesresourcesInvestment OperationsBangladesh Public Procurement Reform Project

Development Policy LendingHaiti Economic Governance Reform Operation I and II

User participation User participation & oversight in & oversight in

service provisionservice provision

Investment OperationsAndhra Pradesh, India District Poverty Initiatives Project; Morocco Initiative for Human Development Support ProjectDevelopment Policy LendingBrazil PHDSRL I; Georgia PRSC; Peru PSRL IIIEthiopia, Protection of Basic Services

Strengthening Strengthening participatory local participatory local

governancegovernance

Investment OperationsAlbania Community Works 2 Project; Bangladesh Local Governance Support Project; Ethiopia Capacity Building for Decentralized Service Delivery; Indonesia KDPDevelopment Policy LendingSierre Leone ERRC III

Strengthening Strengthening other formal other formal

oversight oversight institutionsinstitutions

Investment OperationsGuatemala Judicial Reform Project; Kenya Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project; Legal & Judicial OtherWBI Parliamentary Strengthening Program

Other actionsOther actions

Development Policy LendingBangladesh DSC III

OtherWBI Media ProgramCommunity Radio InitiativesPartnership for Transparency Fund

The World Bank


DecentralizationDecentralizationThe ChallengeThe Challenge

Decentralization is more likely to work when there is adequate capacity and two sets of accountabilities are in place Downward accountability between local governments and

citizens Allocation of responsibilities between central and local

governments• Assignment of service provision responsibilities• Assignment of fiscal resources (including local tax base)• Central fiduciary and performance oversight over local

In practice, the impulse for decentralization is political; high risk of being stuck in institutional ‘limbo’ (Albania; East Asia review – Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam)

The World Bank


Making the Private Sector an Advocate of Making the Private Sector an Advocate of Governance ReformGovernance Reform

The two faces of the private sector Competitive, productivity-focused firms thrive on a level-playing field

Corrupt, rent-seeking firms thrive in the shadows

How to support competitive, responsible private sector? Create sound business environments, benchmarked internationally (Doing

Business Indicators)

Showcase examples & evidence that ‘avoiding corruption is good for business’ (Celtel’s Mohammed Ibrahim)

Support initiatives to promote business ethics and voluntary codes of conduct (ICC Code of Conduct, TI’s Business Principles, WEF PACI, UN Global Compact) – and create external verification mechanisms

Build coalitions of businesses and other stakeholders for anticorruption (Indonesia Business Link, Makati Business Club, Global Integrity Alliance)

Enforce global/regional laws & regulations (OECD Convention, UNCAC)

The World Bank


Monitoring for ResultsMonitoring for Results Use aggregate governance indicators (e.g., CPIA, KKZ, TI

CPI) to indicate of extent and mix of governance problems

Use actionable & outcome indicators (e.g., PEFA, Global Integrity Index) to monitor progress in implementing priority governance and anticorruption reforms

Support participatory mechanisms for monitoring and mutual accountability (private sector, civil society)

Frontier challenge:

Improve menu of actionable and

outcome indicators

The World Bank


Combating Corruption in World Bank Combating Corruption in World Bank OperationsOperations

Prevention Strengthen country systems

Identify high-risk operations, mitigate risk upstream

Prepare project anticorruption action plans

Increase disclosure and transparency; greater oversight and participation from civil society organizations

Create anticorruption teams composed of field staff to review project design & rate risk

Focus on corruption in portfolio review

IFC-MIGA to strengthen ethical corporate practices across their operations

The World Bank


Combating Corruption in Bank Combating Corruption in Bank Operations (cont.)Operations (cont.)

Enforcement Independent review of INT in order to

strengthen investigation of corruption in projects

Continue to publicly sanction corrupt firms

Implement the Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP)

Sanctions reform: on separate track, Board approved

The World Bank


Coalitions

with civil society,

private sector,

parliamentarians, and

others (e.g., GOPAC,

PACI, Global Integrity

Alliance) to combat

entrenched

corruption networks

Donor

Collaboration

MDB harmonization

in high-risk settings

to avoid ‘mixed-

signals’;

coordinated donor

action to support

demand-side

initiatives

Global Collective Action Against Global Collective Action Against CorruptionCorruption

Global & Regional

Conventions (UNCAC, OECD, AU,

OAS, Asia-Pacific Action Plan)

need to be enforced to

curb transnational

corruption & facilitate

asset recovery

The World Bank


One Key Priority:One Key Priority:The Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) InitiativeThe Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative

Ferdinand MarcosFerdinand Marcos (President of the Philippines (President of the Philippines

1972-1986) $5-10 billion1972-1986) $5-10 billion

Sani AbachaSani Abacha(President of Nigeria 1993-(President of Nigeria 1993-

1998) $2-5 billion1998) $2-5 billion

Mobuto Sese SekoMobuto Sese Seko(President of Zaire 1965-1997) (President of Zaire 1965-1997)

$5 billion$5 billion

Mohamed SuhartoMohamed Suharto(President of Indonesia (President of Indonesia

1967-1998) $14-35 billion1967-1998) $14-35 billion

*Source for estimates of former Presidents above: Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2004. All sums are estimates of alleged embezzlement in US dollars.

Proposed activities include:Proposed activities include:

Persuading all jurisdictions to ratify Persuading all jurisdictions to ratify & implement the UN Convention & implement the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)Against Corruption (UNCAC)

Helping developing countries build Helping developing countries build capacity for requesting mutual legal capacity for requesting mutual legal assistance for asset recoveryassistance for asset recovery

Developing partnerships to share Developing partnerships to share information & experienceinformation & experience

On a voluntary basis, offering On a voluntary basis, offering expertise to monitor the use of expertise to monitor the use of recovered assets in order to ensure recovered assets in order to ensure transparency & development impact transparency & development impact (e.g., Nigeria)(e.g., Nigeria)

Cross-border proceeds from criminal Cross-border proceeds from criminal activity, corruption & tax evasion estimated activity, corruption & tax evasion estimated to be $1-1.6 trillion per year— half from to be $1-1.6 trillion per year— half from developing & transition countriesdeveloping & transition countries

Bribes received by public officials from Bribes received by public officials from developing & transition countries is developing & transition countries is estimated at $20-40 billionestimated at $20-40 billion

TI’s estimates of stolen assets include:TI’s estimates of stolen assets include:

The ProblemThe Problem

StAR is a joint initiative with the StAR is a joint initiative with the Bank & UNODC. Partnerships are Bank & UNODC. Partnerships are being developed with the OECD, being developed with the OECD, Norad, IMF, other MDBs, the G8, Norad, IMF, other MDBs, the G8,

& developing countries& developing countries

A Global EffortA Global Effort

The World Bank


Coalitions

with civil society,

private sector,

parliamentarians, and

others (e.g., GOPAC,

PACI, Global Integrity

Alliance) to combat

entrenched

corruption networks

Donor

Collaboration

MDB harmonization

in high-risk settings

to avoid ‘mixed-

signals’;

coordinated donor

action to support

demand-side

initiatives

Global Collective Action Against Global Collective Action Against CorruptionCorruption

Global & Regional

Conventions (UNCAC, OECD, AU,

OAS, Asia-Pacific Action Plan)

need to be enforced to

curb transnational

corruption & facilitate

asset recovery

The World Bank


Media

Private Sector

Municipal Government

Military

State (Bureaucracy)Political Parties

Civil Society International Legislative

Branch

Judiciary

1

Entrenched Corruption Networks: Entrenched Corruption Networks: The Case on Montesinos in PeruThe Case on Montesinos in Peru

Source: “Robust Web of Corruption: Peru’s Intelligence Chief Vladimiro Montesinos,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case C14-04-1722.0, based on research by Professor Luis Moreno Ocampo; Peru: Resource Dependency Network, 2000

Vladimiro Montesinos

Alberto Fujimori

The World Bank


Philippines: Procurement ReformPhilippines: Procurement ReformTransparency and Accountability Transparency and Accountability Network (20+ member groups)Network (20+ member groups)

Walang Ku-Corrupt Movement Walang Ku-Corrupt Movement (Youth)(Youth)

PAGBA &PAGBA &AGAPAGAP(w/in (w/in Gov’t)Gov’t)

CBCP(Church)

Philippine Contractors Association(private sector – main stakeholder)

Local chambers of Commerce (Private sector)

Procurement Watch:Procurement Watch:Drew other civil society groups Drew other civil society groups into the advocacy efforts and into the advocacy efforts and

coordinated the activitiescoordinated the activities

Forging Coalitions for ReformForging Coalitions for Reform

The World Bank


Scale up governance work where it matters most for development– alleviate governance constraints to poverty

reduction

Moving Forward: Moving Forward: What Will the World Bank do Differently?What Will the World Bank do Differently?

Systematically scale up engagement with private sector & industrialized

countries – to tackle the supply side of corruption

Scale up multistakeholder engagement – with civil

society, media, parliaments, local

communities in policy making & service delivery

Work with donors & other int’l actors to ensure a

harmonized approach & collective action –

based on respective mandates & comparative

advantage

Systematically integrate governance in sectoral projects & programs – in extractive industries, infrastructure, forestry,

health, education

Strengthen country systems while enhancing

anticorruption measures in WB operations –

a/c action plans; enhanced disclosure, participation &

monitoring

The World Bank


Emerging Elements of GAC Emerging Elements of GAC Implementation PlanImplementation Plan

- Country Governance & Anticorruption implementation plans (CGAC)

- Competitive fund for topping up country Bank budgets

- Performance reward & innovation fund for teams

1Country-

drivenProcess & Incentives

2Leadership Capacity &

Organizational Arrangements

3Country-level:

Sectoral Governance

& Engagement

4Diagnostics, indicators & knowledge

5Project-

level: Risk Management

6Global

Collective Action

– Bankwide leadership team to coordinate GAC work

– Regional clusters (2 pilots)– Multisectoral organizational

arrangements– Field advisors in high-risk

settings

– Donor coordination in high-risk settings (OECD-DAC GovNet & MDG Task Force)

– StAR Initiative-asset recovery– Multi-statkeholder alliances in

sectors (EITI, FLEG, PROFISH, MeTI, CoST, GIA)

– Guidance & good practice in integrating GAC in sectors

– New instruments for private sector work to curb ‘supply-side’ of corruption

– Guidance on engaging with non-governmental stakeholders (media, etc.)

– Integrated fiduciary assessments in project preparation

– Risk reviews– AC action plans & teams– Enhanced disclosure & 3rd

party monitoring– More regional supervision

– Diagnostics for CASs & key sectors

– Guidance & good practice notes for staff

– Accelerate development & use of actionable & outcome indicators

– M&E to evaluate impact

The World Bank


Q&AQ&A

The World Bank


Civil Society MonitoringCivil Society Monitoring Service Provision: Bangalore Service Provision: Bangalore

Source: Public Affairs Center, India

5 6 49

25

1

14

4147

42

67

34 34

16

32 32

73

94

73

92

7378

85

96

77

n/a n/a0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

City c

ouncil

Elect

ricity

Wat

er s

upply

Telep

hones

Public h

ospita

ls

Police

Land a

uthorit

y

Public b

uses

Transp

ort au

thorit

y

Agencies

Per

cen

t S

atis

fied

1994 1999 2003

The World Bank


““BIR [Tax Collector] Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth”BIR [Tax Collector] Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth” By By Tess BacallaTess Bacalla, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

CAR MODEL BENEFICIAL OWNER REGISTERED OWNER

Nissan Patrol Edwin Abella BIR Reg'l Director, Quezon City

Sulpicio S. Bulanon Jr. 1817 Jordan Plains Subd., Quezon City (listed address of Abella in his SALs)

Suzuki Grand Vitara

Ditto

Merrick Abella (son of Abella)

24 Xavierville, Loyola Heights, Q uezon City

Nissan Cefiro Ditto Elizabeth S. Buendia 152 Road 8, Quezon City

BMW Lucien E. Sayuno BIR Reg'l Director, Makati City

Limtra Dev. Corp. Zone 4, Dasmariñas, Cavite

BMW Ditto Marie Rachel D. Meneses c/o Metrocor and Holdings, G&F, Makati City

Honda Accord Danilo A. Duncano BIR Reg'l Director, Quezon City

Daniel Anthony P. Duncano 2618 JP Rizal, New Capital Estate, Quezon City

Mitsubishi L200 Corazon P. Pangcog Asst. Reg'l Director, Valenzuela City

Alberto P. Pangcog (husband) B2 L23 Lagro Subd., Quezon City

Honda CR-V Ditto Alberto P. Pangcog 9 Ricardo St., Carmel 1 Subd., Quezon City

Owner: Regional Director in the Bureau of Internal Revenue forced to resign; currently facing corruption charges; other officials suspended, also facing charges

Media, Transparency & Combating Media, Transparency & Combating CorruptionCorruption

The World Bank


Improving PFM – A Platform ApproachImproving PFM – A Platform Approach

Platform 1A credible budget delivering a reliable and predictable resource to budget managers

Platform 2Improved internal control and public access to key fiscal information to hold managers accountable

Platform 3Improved linkage of priorities and service targets to budget planning and implementation

Platform 4Integration of accountability

and review processes for

both finance and

performance management

• Integration of budget (recurrent & capital budgets)

Strengthen macro and revenue

Forecasting

Streamline spending processes

Broad Activities Re-design

Budgeting

Classification system

Initial design of FMIS for core business processes

Strengthen external audit and define internal audit function

Re-design budget cycle (e.g. MTEF)

Pilot program based budgeting & budget analysis

Further fiscal

Decentralization

Full design of FMIS

Develop IT

Management

Strategy

Initial design of asset register

Enables a basis for accountability

Enables focus on what is done with

money

Enables more accountability for

performance management

Cambodia – Sequence of Platforms

Broad Activities

Broad Activities

Broad Activities

Source: See “Study of measures used to address weaknesses in Public Financial Management systems in the context of policy-based support,” by Peter Brooke, at www.pefa.org

The World Bank


Do community-based approaches support – Do community-based approaches support – or subvert – decentralization?or subvert – decentralization?

Early experience with social funds was problematic• Politicization of FONCODES in Peru (targeted swing localities)

But subsequent learning ...• Harness bottom-up synergies to strengthen local governance• Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia• Afghanistan, Albania, Kyrgyz, Tanzania, etc.• Even Peru ...

Since 2003, performance-based transition to fiscal transfer to district governments …

By end 2005, 384 of 1,578 districts accredited

The World Bank


0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1990 1991 1993 1994 1995

Equiv. US$ per student

Intended grant Actual grant received by primary school (means)

1999

Source: Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys

Tracking Education Dollars in Uganda

Empowering Local Communities with Empowering Local Communities with Information Can Reduce “Leakages”Information Can Reduce “Leakages”

Public info campaign

The World Bank


Strengthening Oversight: Judicial ReformStrengthening Oversight: Judicial ReformThree emerging lessons Three emerging lessons

1. Work simultaneously on independence and accountability ECA: independent courts, w/o accountability, result: court

corruption

2. Without explicit change management process, efforts to overhaul justice system will fail Latin American failure of efforts to modernize criminal justices

3. Informal, local justice systems govern as much as 95% of the population in some countries If goal is to improve justice for average citizen, look at both formal

and informal systems

…but we still don’t know much about what types of justice reforms are most effective in different

country circumstances …

The World Bank


Governance System Governance System Actors, Capacities and AccountabilityActors, Capacities and Accountability

Political Governance• Political Parties

• Competition, transparency

Executive-Central Govt

Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies

Subnational Govt & Communities

Formal Oversight

Institutions• Parliament• Judiciary• Oversight institutions

Civil Society & Private

Sector•Civil Society

Watchdogs•Media

•Business Associations

Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR)

Citizen

s/Firm

s

Citizens/Firms

Cit

izen

s/F

irm

sCitizens/Firms

Outcomes: Services,

Regulations, Corruption

The World Bank


Transparency: A Cross-Cutting ImperativeTransparency: A Cross-Cutting Imperative

Political Governance• Political Parties

• Competition, transparency

Executive-Central Govt

Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies

Subnational Govt & Communities

Formal Oversight

Institutions• Parliament• Judiciary• Oversight institutions

Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR)

Citizen

s/Firm

s

Citizens/Firms

Cit

izen

s/F

irm

s

Citizens/Firms

Private Sector Interface

Civil Society & Media

Transparency:Transparency:• Parliamentary

votes• Income & Assets • Campaign

contributions

Transparency:Transparency:• Free press• Freedom of information • Citizen Report Cards

Transparency:Transparency:• Fiscal transparency • Public Expenditure

Tracking Surveys (PETS)

Transparency:Transparency:• ‘Blacklisting’ firms bribing

in public procurement• E*procurement• Extractive Industries

Transparency Initiative (EITI)

The World Bank


Countries differ in their trajectories & entry pointsCountries differ in their trajectories & entry points

Trajectories are driven by political forces Key issue: How to sequence reforms?

Qu

ality

of

bu

reau

cra

cy

Quality of checks and balance institutions

Ι ΙΙ ΙΙΙ

Source: Global Monitoring Report, 2006

A Country Approach A Country Approach

In some countries, this will mean moving from reforms of In some countries, this will mean moving from reforms of bureaucracy to support checks and balancesbureaucracy to support checks and balances

The World Bank


ContextContext

In 1996, corruption was a taboo “c-word” – since then, the World Bank’s governance and anticorruption work has evolved rapidly

In recent years, stakeholders in recipient & donor countries are demanding better governance & corruption control – scaling up of aid also requires strengthening governance

On March 20, the World Bank’s governance & anticorruption (GAC) strategy was unanimously endorsed by the Board, and approved by the Spring Meetings in April

The strategy represents an unprecedented global consensus – a product of in-depth consultations

the world bank presented to: world bank staff core course on public sector governance prem knowledge...

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