the neoliberal political–economic collapse of argentina ... · the main preoccupation of...

The neoliberal political–economic collapse of Argentinaand the spatial fortification ofinstitutions in Buenos Aires,1998–2010Themis Chronopoulos

This paper demonstrates how social and political conflict is inscribed in urban space by focus-ing on the neoliberal political–economic collapse of Argentina, which was a conflict-riddenprocess with ordinary people protesting against institutions responsible for the neoliberaliza-tion of the economy. These protests affected the architecture of banking and governmentinstitutions, especially in Buenos Aires, which is the political and financial center of Argen-tina. Facing popular unrest and continuous political mobilizations, these institutions decidedto physically fortify themselves and in the process displayed their vulnerability and illegiti-macy. The fact that spatial fortification became a permanent feature of state institutions butonly a temporary feature of international banks, raises questions about the way that neoli-beralism operates and the way that blame for neoliberal failures is allocated. It also provideshints about the unsatisfactory political–economic outcome that emerged after the collapse,despite the fact that orthodox neoliberalism was at least rhetorically abandoned.

Key words: spatial fortification, Buenos Aires, resistance in the neoliberal city, neoliberalcollapse, neoliberal urbanization, banks, government buildings

In 2001–2002, enraged protesters inun-dated the streets of Buenos Aires attack-ing the buildings of private and public

institutions with government entities andmultinational banks becoming the mostcommon targets. The demonstrators wereangered with the continuation of neoliberaleconomic policies by the Fernando De laRua Administration (1999–2001) at a timeof a severe and prolonged economic reces-sion and resented the confiscation of theirbank deposits so that the financial systemcould stay afloat. The institutions attacked

by protesters had a long history of enacting,promoting and implementing free marketreforms in Argentina. On 20 December2001, President Fernando De la Rua,himself, resigned in the midst of a violentuprising that left at least 21 people dead.The president escaped the House of Govern-ment, whose surroundings had beenengulfed with furious protesters, in a heli-copter (La Nacion, 2001a).1

Known as the 2001–2002 crisis of Argen-tina, the events that transpired immediatelybefore and after De la Rua’s resignation can

CITY, VOL. 15, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2011

ISSN 1360-4813 print/ISSN 1470-3629 online/11/050509–23 # 2011 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2011.595107

be more precisely defined as a political–econ-omic collapse. The problem with employingthe term crisis for 2001–2002—a term thatmost observers have used (Grimson andKessler, 2005; Chronopoulos, 2006; Epstein,2006)—is that since at least the 1960s, Argen-tina has found itself in a continuous economiccrisis; indeed, the management of the economiccrisis nationally and internationally has beenthe main preoccupation of Argentina’s govern-ing regimes.2 More than this, the neoliberal

economic crisis of Argentina started in 1998when the country went into recession and didnot end before 2003 when Nestor Kirchnerwas elected president and the Argentineeconomy displayed signs of continuousgrowth.3 David Harvey (2005) has argued thatneoliberal institutions have been especiallyskillful in the management and manipulationof crises; however, the management of the1998–2003 crisis in Argentina failed, with theneoliberal political–economic system collap-sing in 2001–2002. Of course, the collapse ofneoliberalism in Argentina did not preventwhat Harvey (2005) has termed ‘accumulationby dispossession’ under which there weretransfers of ownership from middle- andworking-class people to upper-class popu-lations whose resources allowed them to over-come the negative effects of the crisis.

The parameters of the political–economiccollapse in Metropolitan Buenos Aires werestaggering.4 In May 2002, the unemploymentrate reached 22%. By October 2002, 42.3%of households and 54.3% of the populationfound themselves below the poverty line.Although the poverty rate among individuals

Figure 1 A fortified Bansud branch on Callao Avenue in Microcentro. Owned by Mexican Banamex, Bansud becameone of the most indebted banks in Argentina during the neoliberal collapse of 2001–2002. In January 2002, Banco Macro(which became a subsidiary of Citigroup in 2001) acquired Bansud from Banamex (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos,2002).

Figure 2 Metal barricades (2 × 2 m2) protecting theHouse of Government before a rally in Plaza de Mayo(Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

CHRONOPOULOS: THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL–ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 511

had persistently lingered above 20% in the1995–2000 period, it did not cross the 30%mark before May 2001 (INDEC, 2003).During this period, neighborhood mealcenters that had arisen in Greater BuenosAires in the 1990s to feed indigent familieswere overwhelmed, while the number ofbarter clubs and other alternative exchangesystems increased substantially (Grimson andKessler, 2005). The numbers of cartoneros,people gathering recyclables in urban areas inorder to survive, also grew and so did thenumbers of people who began to stay overnighton the streets of the City of Buenos Airesbecause they lacked the resources to travelback to Greater Buenos Aires (Chronopoulos,2005; Schamber and Suarez, 2007).

The primary goal of this paper is to demon-strate how social and political conflict isinscribed in urban space by focusing onthe neoliberal political–economic collapseof Argentina, which was a conflict-riddenprocess with ordinary people protestingagainst institutions responsible for the neoli-beralization of the economy. These protestsaffected the architecture of these public andprivate institutions, especially in BuenosAires, which is the political and financialcenter of Argentina (Figures 1 and 2). Facingpopular unrest and continuous politicalmobilizations, these institutions decided tophysically fortify themselves and in theprocess displayed their vulnerability and ille-gitimacy. Although neoliberal entitiesattempted to discredit the protesters as youth-ful, misinformed and radical, this failed. Giventhe history of public and private repression inArgentina, a few confused or radical youngpeople would never be able to directly chal-lenge powerful political–economic insti-tutions. What actually happened is that asizable cross section of the populationrevolted against neoliberalism and its mostpotent spatial manifestations. The fact thatspatial fortification became a permanentfeature of state institutions but only a tempor-ary feature of international banks, raises ques-tions about the way that neoliberalismoperates and the way that blame for neoliberal

failures is allocated. It also provides hintsabout the unsatisfactory political–economicoutcome that emerged after the collapse,despite the fact that orthodox neoliberalismwas at least rhetorically abandoned.5

This paper represents an intervention in theliterature of neoliberal urbanization. In recentyears, human geographers and urban scholarshave viewed the growing proliferation of for-tified enclaves and gated communities to beone of the most important manifestations ofurban neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore,2002; McKenzie, 2005; Pow, 2009). Evenscholars who do not directly associate forti-fied enclaves with neoliberal restructuringconsider the development of residential forti-fication to reflect a reaction to late-20th-century processes that have been associatedwith neoliberalism. These processes includethe rise of inequality, the desire of socioeco-nomic exclusivity, the redefinition of nationaland local governments, the privatization ofpublic space and the fear of crime (Blakelyand Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2000; Low,2003; Atkinson and Blandy, 2005; Glaszeet al., 2006). While attention to this type ofspatial fortification is important, since resi-dential fortified enclaves have become thenew urban and suburban planning norm inmany parts of the world, this literature hasseldom explored the growing fortification ofpublic and private institutions. The fortifica-tion of institutions has been taken for grantedbecause there have never been completelyunsecured financial institutions or governmentbuildings and because the fortification of suchinstitutions can be explained as a responseto (real or imagined) security and terroristthreats. Moreover, many scholars havefocused on the shrinkage of public space,which can be part of institutional fortification,but not necessarily the exact same process(Sorkin, 1992; Mitchell, 1995; Kohn, 2004;Nemeth and Hollander, 2010). My argumentis that institutional fortification also representsa response to the growing resistance of the neo-liberal management of the economy. As thecase of Buenos Aires shows, institutional forti-fication is one of the methods that the public

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and private sectors associated with neoliberal-ism employ in order to manage popular dis-content during economic crises.

The fortification of banks

On Friday, 15 February 2002, hundreds ofprotesters participated in cacerolazos outside

the branches of private banks in Microcentro(downtown Buenos Aires).6 Many of the pro-testers had brought with them hammers,screwdrivers and other instruments in orderto break and disassemble the metallic protec-tive structures of the banks. As their marchproceeded in a busy section of the city, somedemonstrators broke the glass windows of aBanco Galicia branch while others tried butfailed to remove the metal plates from theexterior of a Citibank branch. Other bankbranches were also attacked (Pagina 12,2002a). Three days later, on Monday, 18 Feb-ruary 2002, the protest actions escalated witheven larger crowds attacking bank branchesand armored vehicles transporting moneywith hammers, axes, firebombs, burningtires, stones and graffiti. The branches targetedincluded those of Mexican BanSud (Figure 1),Spanish BBVA Banco Frances (Figure 3), USBankBoston (Figure 4), British HSBC(Figure 5), Italian Banca Nazionale delLavoro (Figure 6), US Citibank (Figure 7),

Figure 3 BBVA Banco Frances in Florida Street. Demon-strators attacked this bank with hammers, but the metal for-tification held. Spain’s BBVA acquired Banco Frances, oneof the largest private banks in Argentina, in 1996. In thefollowing year, the group took over Banco de CreditoArgentino (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

Figure 4 BankBoston branch in Callao Avenue inMicrocentro after an attack by demonstrators. BankBoston(under its previous names) had a presence in Argentina formost of the 20th century. In 2004, Bank of America pur-chased the merged bank of BankBoston and Fleet Bankand in 2006 it sold the Argentine BankBoston operationsto South Africa’s Standard Bank. On the facade of thebank one can see spray-painted the words, ‘RATAS’(rats), ‘CHORROS’ (thieves in slang) and ‘YANKEES’,which functions as a derogatory way to refer to peoplefrom the USA. During this period, the USA was blamedfor the exploitation of Argentina, and US institutions andbusinesses became objects of contention (Photograph:Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

Figure 5 HSBC in Florida Street. HSBC chose to have astronger type of metal shell in this location than otherbanks. Britain’s HSBC acquired Midland Bank in 1992and most of its holdings of Banco Roberts in Argentina.In 1997, HSBC took over the rest of Banco Roberts, estab-lishing an important foothold in Argentina. The messagesspray-painted onto the facade of this bank include ‘CHOR-ROS’ (thieves), ‘LADRONES’ (thieves), ‘ASESINOS’ (mur-derers) and ‘DELINQUENTES’ (officials who havemisappropriated money). There is also a message againstEduardo Duhalde who at the time had been appointedcaretaker president. The message reads ‘DUHALDE ASE-SINO CHORRO NARCO DEBES IRA LA HORCA’(Duhalde, murderer, thief, drug dealer, should be hanged)(Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).


Figure 6 A fortified Banca Nazionale del Lavoro branch in Callao Avenue in Microcentro. Italian Banca Nazionale delLavoro had been operating in Argentina since 1960. HSBC acquired its Argentine operations in 2006 (Photograph: ThemisChronopoulos, 2002).

Figure 7 Citibank in Florida Street. Graffiti messages such as ‘NO HAY BANCOS’ (there are no banks), ‘LADRONES’(thieves), ‘FORROS’ (cheaters) and ‘DUHALDE’ (as complicitous to the bank’s actions) can be seen in the reinforced steelfacade of the bank. US Citibank has been operating in Argentina since 1914 under various names. The bank participatedin the privatization of ENTel, the public telecommunications monopoly, in 1990, and acquired Banco Mayo in 1998 (Photo-graph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

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Argentine Banco Galicia (Figure 8), BritishLloyds Bank, Canadian Scotia Bank Quilmes(Figure 9) and Spanish Banco Rıo. Publiclyheld Argentine banks were mostly spared.7

In the aftermath of the demonstrations, thefacades of many foreign banks located indowntown Buenos Aires were damaged.Demonstrators also managed to invade a fewbanks and destroy them (Pagina 12, 2002b).

There were efforts to characterize theseprotest actions as irrational and the work ofmisled radical youths. This attempt toportray collective action and civil violenceas irrational has a long history in socialtheory and political culture: it is, however,overstated (Rule, 1988; Tilly, 1978). Argenti-na’s main business newspaper, Ambito Finan-ciero, developed a discourse that separatedthe peaceful middle-class deposit holderswho organized cacerolazos outside banksfrom the communist youths who had been

Figure 8 Banco Galicia branch in Corrientes Avenue inMicrocentro. Despite its name, Banco Galicia is one of theoldest private Argentine banks. In the 1990s, the ownersof Banco Galicia refused to sell it to foreign institutions.During the neoliberal collapse of 2001–2002, the Govern-ment of Argentina provided a generous bailout to BancoGalicia, which had suffered debilitating losses. During thisperiod, the bank also became an object of contention forprotesters (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

Figure 9 A shut down Scotiabank Quilmes branch. The messages written on the shutter of the bank include ‘TERROR-ISTAS’ (terrorists) and ‘HAGA PATRIA MATE UN BANQUERO’ (be patriotic, kill a banker). Canadian Scotiabank acquiredArgentine Banco Quilmes in 1997. After Scotiabank withdrew from Argentina, Banco Macro acquired its branches (Photo-graph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).


infiltrating these events and were trying todamage banks (Ambito Financiero, 2002b).In fact, caretaker President EduardoDuhalde (2002–2003) promised to crackdown on radicals who were smashing bankswith hammers and assured them that he wasnot a weak president (Ambito Financiero,2002a). The reality of the situation was, ofcourse, more complicated. Attacks againstbank branches would not have been toleratedeven a few months before; the fact that theyoccurred so frequently signified the loss oflegitimacy of these banking institutionsamong portions of the Argentine population.Although some members of radical or-ganizations participated in these protestactions, the majority of people demonstratingwere middle and working class. Many ofthem were unemployed or underemployedbecause of the economic downturn, many ofthem had money trapped in the banks, andmany of them participated in the smashing

of the banks regardless of original intentionor political affiliation (Ethnographic Research,2002). Moreover, during this period, foreignbanks were involved in a power strugglewith the government over economic policy.Many of the protesters were aware of thisstruggle and were opposing the complete take-over of Argentina’s financial sector by theseinstitutions.

For the majority of the urban population ofArgentina, international banks representedthe most visible aspect of the neoliberaliza-tion of the economy. Besides increasinglydominating finance in Argentina, multina-tional bank branches began to also dominatehigh-profile commercial areas by taking overthe centers of smaller cities and expandinginto numerous middle-class neighborhoods oflarger cities. By the late 1990s, there were somany bank branches concentrated in centrallocations of Buenos Aires that many touristsfelt that it resembled the center of a Western

Figure 10 A fortified BankBoston branch located right next to stores without any fortification (Photograph: ThemisChronopoulos, 2002).

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European city where private banking hasbecome dominant for decades. However,many ordinary portenos witnessed this swiftbanking expansion with suspicion and disbe-lief, especially when the branches replacedpopular coffee shops and stores located nearsubway stations and major thoroughfares intheir neighborhoods. The spatial effect of thismultinational bank involvement in Argentinawas staggering and unavoidable even for themajority of the population, which continuedto have no bank accounts or other businessrelations with banks (Themis Chronopoulos,Ethnographic Research, 2003 and 2005). Con-trary to claims by bank executives that attackson their branches represented a general trendof lawlessness that could be demonstrated bythe vandalism of other facilities, neighborhoodpeople generally targeted international banksand left adjacent commercial establishmentsunscathed (Figure 10).

International financial institutions weretransformed into objects of popular contentionin December 2001 when Economy MinisterDomingo Cavallo announced the corralito,which limited the amount that depositorscould withdraw from their bank accounts to250 pesos per week (later to be raised to 300).Cavallo claimed that this measure was aneffort to avoid a run on the banks, haltcapital flight and restore confidence in thefinancial sector. However, the corralitoamounted to the collapse of the existing mon-etary system of Argentina, which since 1991,had been based on the principle of convertibil-ity between the US dollar and the Argentinepeso on a one-to-one basis8 (De La Torreet al., 2003). A few months after the corralito,convertibility was abandoned with the pesoset to a fixed rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollarbefore being allowed to freely float. As thecorralito remained in place and newmeasures regarding monetary policy wereannounced in 2002, the anger of depositholders increased.

The global banks of Argentina attemptedto dissociate themselves from the corralitoarguing that it was a government measurethat was taken without their input.

However, the government promoted themeasure as a mechanism designed to savethe banks along with their depositors. Mostdeposit holders failed to understand howthe corralito was going to save them, if theirmoney remained trapped in the banks; butthey did associate the corralito with thewell-being of banks, especially multinationalones. To make things worse, multinationalbanks adopted a confrontational attitudetoward depositors. Instead of hiring morebank tellers to meet increased demand, mostbranches slowed down customer service andhired additional security guards, whichmany deposit holders considered to be goonsquads. Fearing trouble, the banks alsoallowed only a few people inside their pre-mises at a time, meaning that most peoplehad to wait for three or four hours underthe hot summer sun in order to receive theirweekly allowance of 250 pesos. Sometimesbranches discontinued service and shutdown for reasons that appeared to bedubious to people waiting outside; theexcuses for closing early included shortagesin cash, unruly clients or computer problems.Before long, demonstrations outside bankbranches were led by indignant depositorswho were joined by neighborhood peoplewho also had grievances against these privatebanks, even if they had no money in them(Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2003).

Most deposit holders felt betrayed by mul-tinational banks. Before convertibility thegreat majority of the population had nomoney in banks because Argentina sufferedfrom high inflation rates. Instead, individualsand families spent their pay immediately onfood and other basic needs and changedwhatever money they had left into USdollars, which they stored in their homes(Ethnographic Research, 2002). With con-vertibility, inflation was tamed and thevalue of the peso remained stable in relationto the dollar. Multinational banks engagedin advertising campaigns in which they pre-tended that deposits in their branches inBuenos Aires were as safe as deposits intheir branches in London, New York City


or Madrid. They explicitly stated that in theevent of a financial crisis, their headquarterswould provide all necessary liquidity totheir subsidiaries and local branches (Mar-shall, 2008). More than this, they pointedout that deposits in pesos were fully andeasily convertible to dollars or other curren-cies, reminded people that crime rates hadbeen rising and that their money was saferin banks than in their homes, and representedthemselves as customer-friendly entities thatwere more efficient and caring than publiclyheld domestic banks. Finally, multinationalbanks offered various prized financial pro-ducts to people willing to open accountssuch as credit cards, certificates of deposit,small loans, checks and debit cards, not tomention various gifts handed out when indi-viduals opened accounts (Themis Chrono-poulos, Ethnographic Research, 2002 and2003). These marketing narratives gave thewrong impression to people who had neverbeen courted by banks before; the realitywas that the international headquarters ofbanks entered the Argentine market inorder to make money, not to assist depositorsin case of a crisis. Throughout the constantdraining of banking deposits in 2001, itbecame obvious that banks in Argentinawere not receiving additional liquidity fromtheir headquarters. If anything they repa-triated larger amounts of dollars than everbefore (Marshall, 2008).

The repatriation of record amounts ofdollars became the subject of intense conver-sations among depositors and protesters andfurther fueled their anger; some of these con-versations approximated the level of conspi-racy theories. Many individuals recountedthe situation in central Buenos Aires, a fewdays before the corralito was announced,when hundreds of armored trucks drivingfrom the offices of foreign banks in down-town Buenos Aires to the airport causedextreme vehicular congestion that was defi-nitely noticed by the government. Thesetrucks were transporting US dollars to Amer-ican Airlines planes, which flew them to thesafety of the USA and Western Europe

(Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2003).Reporting on this story and capital flight,the mass media maintained that by 2001foreign-owned banks had made all theprofits they could, so they sent them home,preparing to close shop (Marshall, 2008). InJanuary 2002, federal judges Norberto Oyar-bide and Marıa Servini de Cubrıa began toinvestigate capital flight from Argentina.They ordered raids on the central offices ofHSBC, BBVA Banco Frances, Banco Rıo,BankBoston, Citibank and Banco Galicia;confiscated videos from highway toll oper-ators; seized records from armored vehiclecompanies; and examined the logs of theairport authorities of Ezeiza, JorgeNewbery, Don Torcuato and San Fernando(La Nacion, 2002a). Senior officials of thesebanks were prohibited to leave the countryand were questioned by the judicial auth-orities. Even former Economy MinisterDomingo Cavallo was jailed for over threemonths for irregularities during his term inoffice (Marshall, 2008).

Although in the end, there were almost nosuccessful prosecutions against internationalbank officials, it is definitely the case thatforeign-held banks sent record amounts ofmoney to their home countries in 2001, ineffect causing the monetary collapse.Deposit holders and other bank protesterswidely believed that this had been the caseand this is why in their demonstrationsthey depicted bank officials as thieves(Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2003).

Another issue that mobilized protesterswas the connection of international bankswith the last military government of Argen-tina. During one of the marches to theHouse of Government on 20 December2001, security guards of HSBC opened firefrom the bank’s central offices to the crowdthat had gathered outside, killing 23-year-old Gustavo Benedetto. The judiciary investi-gating the killing acquired a video from thebank, which showed that about 50 shotscame from inside the bank, and that Lieute-nant Jorge Varado, chief of security forHSBC, had shot Benedetto. Varado was a

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retired elite military officer who was activeduring the military dictatorship of 1976–83.In the 1995–2001 period, multinationalbanks hired thousands of former militarymen to provide security to their centraloffices and branches (Cların, 2002; Klein,2003). Attacks against foreign-held banksintensified after Benedetto’s killing.

International financial institutions have ofcourse a longer history in Argentina andmany people familiar with that history ofinternational development also viewedforeign banks with suspicion. Until theearly 1970s, Latin American countriesreceived foreign aid in the form of loans andgrants from international agencies such asthe US Agency for International Develop-ment, the World Bank, the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, the Export–ImportBank, or directly from the US government.This changed when oil-rich countries thathad taken advantage of the 1973 oil crisisdeposited their growing reserves of petrodol-lars in private banks in the USA and WesternEurope. Flushed with money, the bankssought new clients for loans and foundthem in the developing world, especially inLatin America (Sampson, 1981). Convincedthat sovereign governments seldom go bank-rupt and encouraged by the experiences ofChile and New York City, which enactedsweeping neoliberal reforms after the mid-1970s, the banks lent more money to LatinAmerica than all the international agenciesput together (Harvey, 2005). In the case ofArgentina, these banks handsomely bank-rolled the military government of 1976–83despite its political illegitimacy, its humanrights violations and its failure to comprehen-sively enact free market reforms. In 1975,Argentina’s total external debt stood at $7.8billion; by 1982 it had ballooned to $43.6billion and much of this increase was due tothe lending policies of private financial insti-tutions (Basualdo, 2006). This involvementof US and Western European banks in LatinAmerica backfired after the Mexican crisisof 1982; most countries suspended the servi-cing of their external debt for much of the

1980s and Argentina did not represent anexception (Fryer, 1987). Foreign banksbegan to reenter the market of Argentina in1992 when the Carlos Menem Adminis-tration (1989–99) restructured the Argentinedebt and provided various favorable invest-ment incentives to banks.

Many people protesting outside bankbranches felt that the international bankshad become so powerful that they were com-promising the political sovereignty of Argen-tina. Indeed, from December 1994 toDecember 2001, foreign banks raised theirparticipation in the Argentine bankingsector from 18 to 61% (IMF, 2000; Bankfor International Settlements, 2001;Salomon, Smith, Barney, 2001; Moguillanskyet al., 2004). They took advantage of the1994–95 Tequila effect on the Argentineeconomy, when the near collapse of theMexican peso rattled the Argentine bankingsystem. Determined to maintain convertibil-ity right before his reelection campaign of1995, and encouraged by the IMF and theWorld Bank, which promised to support theprivatization of provincial banks, PresidentCarlos Menem ordered the reorganizationof the banking system (Clarke and Cull,2002). Reorganization meant the establish-ment of more rigid capital requirements,which in turn amounted to the privatizationof most state-owned provincial banks, theshutting down of four dozen of the weakbanks, and the offering of generous subsidiesand guarantees to foreign financial insti-tutions willing to invest in Argentina(Alston and Gallo, 2002). Multinationalbanks, which at the time were facingincreased competition because of financialderegulation in their home countries,invested in Argentina because their financialofficers viewed this emerging market to beproviding an opportunity for easy profits.Indeed this is what happened. Lacking thecapitalization and reputation of their foreigncounterparts, Argentine national banks lostsome of their local and multinational corpor-ate clientele to international banks. They alsolost numerous smaller creditworthy business


and personal clients, who were lured by theoffers of multinational banks (Gnos andRochon, 2004–2005; Clarke et al., 2000). Asinternational banking institutions began todominate banking in Argentina, they alsoincreased their bargaining power in relationto the government, intimidating the adminis-tration of Fernando De la Rua (1999–2001).They ultimately contributed to the collapseof convertibility by moving too muchmoney out of the country.

After De la Rua’s overthrow, internationalbanks became involved in a power strugglewith the Argentine government and this isone of the main reasons that protestsoutside bank branches became more violent.In mid-January 2002, a group of the largestinternational banks, led by Emilio Cardenaswho was president of HSBC’s operations inArgentina, proposed the dollarization of theeconomy. Cardenas announced that if thegovernment pursued dollarization, Argenti-na’s foreign banks would recapitalize them-selves, in effect ending the corralito. TheIMF supported the foreign banks and prom-ised assistance if the government chose thedollarization route. Dollarization would ulti-mately allow international banks to comple-tely take over Argentina’s financial systemand to absorb the remaining Argentinebanks, which had no sources of external capi-talization. Former President Menem, impor-tant members of the central bank and eventhe judiciary came out in favor of the plan.Almost immediately, there was the creationof the pesofication camp, which opposedthe dollarization plan. Supporters of pesofi-cation included all the public and privateArgentine-held banks along with membersof the federal government including Presi-dent Duhalde (Marshall, 2008). Their argu-ment was that Argentina had to reclaimcontrol of its monetary system by reducingits reliance on the dollar.

As the pesofication camp appeared to havethe upper hand, some foreign banks tookactions that had the potential of destabilizingthe Argentine economy even more. Scotia-bank Quilmes, which had warned that it

would withdraw from Argentina if the gov-ernment did not pursue policies favorable tothe private sector, shut down its operationsin Argentina in mid-April 2002. Its Canadianheadquarters refused to recapitalize the bank(La Nacion, 2002b). Ten days later, BancoSantander of Spain announced that it wouldnot put any additional funds in its Argentinesubsidiary Banco Rıo and that it would closeits branches when it ran out of money (Alga-naraz, 2002). Spanish Prime Minister JoseMarıa Aznar defended Banco Santander’sannouncement, declaring that no one couldforce Spanish banks and other companies tostay in Argentina given its economic situ-ation. On 19 May 2002, French Credit Agri-cole, which owned banks Bersa, Bisel andSuquia in Argentina, made a surpriseannouncement that it was withdrawingfrom Argentina as well. Given that the Sco-tiabank Quilmes withdrawal had posedserious problems to the economic system ofArgentina, many observers expected thewithdrawal of Credit Agricole to be the laststraw before the government would have toreopen negotiations with the dollarizationcamp. However, the federal governmentwas now better prepared to deal withforeign bank withdrawals from Argentinaand made Credit Agricole’s banks subsidi-aries of the national public bank Banco de laNacion Argentina. As all three banks beganto fully operate a couple of weeks later, theArgentine government adopted a tougherstance toward international banks (Marshall,2008). The dollarization camp was comple-tely defeated in 2003, when Menem failed tobe elected president.

Suffice it to say that protests outside banksheated up after the announcement of the Car-denas plan in mid-January; large mobiliz-ations against international financialinstitutions followed closely developmentsof this conflict. The power struggle betweenthe dollarization and the pesofication planswas to an extent a battle between proponentsof neoliberalism and proponents of hetero-dox capitalism. The neoliberals attempted tomanipulate the economic crisis to their

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benefit, but failed. And contrary to accountsthat the Argentine government retaliatedagainst these banks in an unreasonablemanner, Duhalde was under intense pressureby ordinary people who were out in thestreets every day and were threatening totopple his government. The continuous pol-itical mobilizations precluded a settlementfavorable to the international banks andinternational finance organizations.

The fortification of governmentinstitutions

In 2001, as the economy of Argentina contin-ued to deteriorate, protest actions outsidegovernment buildings in Buenos Airesbecame more massive, acrimonious andregular. In particular, demonstrators madecollective claims on the state outside twoimposing buildings: the House of Govern-ment and the Congress (El Palacio del Con-greso de la Nacion Argentina), whichhouses the legislative branch of Argentina.In December 2001, the demonstrations inten-sified, with President De la Rua resigningduring the uprising of 20 December.

Although spatial fortification became amore common attribute of Buenos Airesduring the 1990s, security barricades did notbecome a permanent feature of the exteriorof government buildings before December2001. For example, as late as September1998, there were no such barricades outsidegovernment institutions on a regular basis.At the time, the teachers union CTERA wasplanning a protest action under which itsmembers would pitch tents and occupyPlaza de Mayo, the square located in frontof the House of Government. A federaljudge sided with President Carlos Menemand Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires Fer-nando De la Rua and ruled that CTERAwas prohibited to set up a tent city in Plazade Mayo because it could undermine theintegrity of the area, which is a national his-toric site. The Menem Administration hadthe federal police install protective barriers

around the perimeter of Plaza de Mayo, inorder to prevent the protesters from enteringit (La Nacion, 1998b). As the economy dete-riorated in 1998 and political mobilizationsbecame more frequent and violent, theauthorities began to use metal barricadesaround the Congress and the House of Gov-ernment more often. Before major demon-strations, the police would set up thebarricades and remove them in the days thatfollowed. However, by 2000, metal barri-cades would remain outside governmentbuildings for longer periods than before. InJuly 2000, Ricardo Cordero wrote a letterto the editor of La Nacion in which he com-plained about the quasi-permanent ‘unplea-sant riot fences’ that surrounded the Houseof Government. Cordero argued that thesefences suggested to tourists ‘third world, vio-lence, institutional insecurity, and lack ofpeace’ (2000). The more frequent employ-ment of perimeter barriers reveals thegrowing opposition that the federal govern-ment was facing because of its neoliberalpolicies.

This opposition to neoliberal reforms ori-ginated in the provinces of Argentina. Thefirst large-scale uprising in the 1990s involvedabout 5000 residents of the northern city ofSantiago del Estero, which is the capital andgovernment seat of the province with thesame name. On 16 December 1993, demon-strators burned the Government House, theLegislature, the Courthouse and a dozenprivate residences of some of the most impor-tant local politicians and public officials. Theprotesters who had endured unpaid salariesand pensions for three months were demand-ing immediate pay and the end of politicalcorruption (Auyero, 2004). To be sure, thispopular rebellion was in a distant province;yet, it exhibited the extent to which govern-ment power was tenuous in Argentina, andthe possibility of such uprisings in Metropo-litan Buenos Aires. After all, the governmentof President Raul Alfonsın (1983–89) ended afew months early in 1989 after supermarketlooting that started in Rosario, Santa Fe,spread to areas of Greater Buenos Aires


(Robinson, 1989; Acuna, 1995). As pooreconomic performance continued, Menemwho replaced Alfonsın also faced a wave offood riots in February 1990, though thiswave was contained before spreading(Auyero, 2007).

After 1993, political mobilizations byunemployed and underemployed peopleliving in the provinces intensified. Whatbecame known as the piquetero movementemerged with thousands of people blockingmajor transportation arteries and makingclaims to the government. In fact, what hap-pened was a convergence of town uprisings(puebladas) like the one of Santiago deEstero and the blocking of highways(Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). One of the firstcomprehensive road blockades occurredaround the towns of Cutral-Co and PlazaHuincul of the province of Neuquen inJune 1996. Protesters demanded meaningfulemployment in an area where unemploymentwas close to 30% and more than half of thepopulation lived below the poverty line.Until 1992, the government-held petroleumcompany functioned as the economic, socialand cultural lifeline of the area. However,the Menem Administration privatized thepetroleum company and the new ownersshut down the Cutral-Co facilities. Theblockade succeeded after the majority of thepopulation of Cutral-Co and Plaza Huinculmobilized in 1996; the governor ofNeuquen signed an agreement with thedemonstrators, which promised publicworks that would generate employment, thedelivery of food, and the reconnection ofelectricity and gas to thousands of familieswho had been unable to afford it (Auyero,2003).

In the years that followed, the frequency ofsuch mobilizations increased and spread tothe provinces of Rıo Negro, Santa Cruz andTierra del Fuego in the south of thecountry, Cordoba and Santa Fe in thecenter, and Jujuy, Salta, Corrientes, Chacoand others in the north (Auyero, 2007). Themajority of these movements was usuallyindependent of political parties and local

powerholders and demanded that govern-ment officials negotiated with them directly(sometimes government officials wouldarrive in helicopters to participate in suchnegotiations). One of the early victories ofthe piquetero movement included the insti-tution of unemployment subsidies by thegovernment (Sitrin, 2006). Gradually somepiquetero groups along with labor organiz-ations assumed the means of production bytaking over workplaces that were going toshut down. Although this phenomenon wasnot as widespread before the political–econ-omic collapse, in the 2001–2003 period,workers formed cooperatives and took overhundreds of ‘failing’ workplaces while neigh-borhood people largely supported them andeven defended them whenever the policetried to reclaim those spaces (Lavaca Collec-tive, 2007; Rebon, 2007). In the days that pre-ceded De la Rua’s resignation, picketers alsoforced large supermarket chains to distributefood to the poor, though looting of foodstores also occurred (Auyero, 2007).

In Metropolitan Buenos Aires, most pique-tero organizations were located in theworking-class neighborhoods of GreaterBuenos Aires and their developmentcoincided with the disappearance of workand the establishment of more intense Pero-nist clientelist networks. This new versionof clientelist politics in Greater BuenosAires during the neoliberal era originated in1989 when Eduardo Duhalde becameMenem’s vice presidential running mate,and was credited with helping to deliver thevote of the Province of Buenos Aires to thePeronists9—unless the Peronist candidate isable to receive a large proportion of thevote from the heavily populated and politi-cally organized working-class districts thatsurround the City of Buenos Aires, s/he hasalmost no chance of prevailing. Duhalde, astrongman of Lomas de Zamora, a districtin the southern zone of Greater BuenosAires, was a populist political entrepreneurwho cultivated clientelist networks withlow-income populations in Greater BuenosAires. However, Duhalde was not fond of

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Menem’s neoliberal reforms and resignedfrom his post as vice president in 1991 inorder to run for the governorship of the Pro-vince of Buenos Aires. Duhalde was alsoplanning to run for president in 1995,though it was clear that Menem wanted tochange the constitution so that he couldseek reelection himself. Duhalde andMenem came to an understanding underwhich the federal government heavilyfunded social and public works programs tobe carried out by the Fondo de ReparacionHistorico del Conurbano Bonarense.Duhalde was given full control of this organ-ization; in return he did not oppose Menem’sefforts to change the constitution. Each year,Duhalde used the hundreds of millions ofpesos (at the time equal to US dollars) forpublic works in an effort to solidify the Pero-nist Party’s hold of the province and to pos-ition himself for higher office.10 His wife,Hilda Chiche Gonzalez de Duhalde, headeda food distribution program to poor residentsof the province called Plan Vida operated byneighborhood women known as manzarenas.The workers, volunteers and beneficiaries ofthis plan were expected to deliver the voteto the Peronists during elections. Thispatronage system began to fall apart whenPresident Menem reduced its funding,because Duhalde would not agree toanother change in the constitution so thatMenem could run for a third consecutive pre-sidential term in 1999 (Lewis, 2009). As por-tions of the Peronist clientelist networksestablished by Duhalde broke down and manypeople continued to lose their jobs because ofthe privatization of public companies and theclosure of factories unable to compete interna-tionally, piquetero organizations became aneven more potent mobilizing force in GreaterBuenos Aires (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003;Oviedo, 2004). The first piquetero organizationsformed in La Matanza and in the southern zoneof Greater Buenos Aires (Oviedo, 2004). Theirrepertoires of contention were influenced fromthose of picketers in the provinces and by thelate 1990s they could be found blockadingtens of bridges, highways and other roadways

in Metropolitan Buenos Aires (Svampa andPereyra, 2003).

During this period, many middle- andupper-class Argentines viewed the piqueteromovement with suspicion. They subscribedto the culture of poverty ideas, which blamepoor people for their socioeconomic con-dition, believed that these groups weremanipulated by Peronist politicians, andthought that picketers sought handouts andnot work (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003;Oviedo, 2004; Sitrin, 2006). The movement,its goals, its political affiliations and thesources of poverty were, of course, not assimple.

The frequent use of barricades outside gov-ernment institutions in the City of BuenosAires emerged in 1998 and achieved a quasi-permanent quality as the economy continuedto deteriorate and demonstrators includingpicketers began to march in the downtownof the city. Although the federal policeexperimented with different types of barri-cades, the decision was to settle with metalbarricades whose size was approximately2 meters × 2 meters (Figure 2). These barri-cades were easier to carry than heavier andlarger ones and besides, as the police discov-ered, demonstrators could easily tip tallerbarricades over. The barricades were usedaround important government buildings,such as the House of Government and theCongress in order to avoid their invasion bydemonstrators. In many cases, police in riotgear stood in front of the barricades and con-fronted demonstrators while non-riot policestayed behind the barricades ready todefend them in case the riot police failed.There were also other combinations ofdefense including the police force in itsentirety staying behind the barricades usingtear gas, mace and other methods in orderto make demonstrators go away. The daythat De la Rua resigned, the barricadedefense largely held, though this onlyoccurred after a heavy-handed counterattackof the police against protesters and becauseof the news that the president was resigning(Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2005).


During this period, there was a merger ofpiquetero groups with middle-class neigh-borhood organizations. Whether it wasoutside banks or outside government build-ings, one could hear chants saying ‘piquete,cacerola, la lucha es una sola’, whichroughly meant ‘blockades and pan-beatingsrepresent the same struggle’. The point ofthis message was that the closure of streetswas the work of picketers who wereusually low income while cacerolazos wereusually the protest manifestations ofmiddle-class people, but that these groupshad now come together. Indeed, in manydemonstrations of this period, one could fre-quently see truly diverse crowds with peoplefrom different spatial, social, cultural, politi-cal and income backgrounds comingtogether (Oviedo, 2004; Sitrin, 2006). Thisalliance signified the radicalization of themiddle classes of Metropolitan BuenosAires and the possibility of widespreadsocial change.

After De la Rua’s resignation, the Argen-tine Congress appointed the Governor ofSan Luis Adolfo Rodrıguez Saa to the officeof the president. Rodrıguez Saa who wasalready not immensely popular amongArgentines made two strategic mistakes.The first was that he publicly appeared withformer president Menem who enthusiasti-cally approved his presidency and statedthat Rodrıguez Saa should govern until Dela Rua’s term officially expired in 2003 (LaNacion, 2001b). The second was that heappointed a cabinet whose chief was theunpopular former mayor of Buenos AiresCarlos Grosso (La Nacion, 2001c).

On Friday, 29 December 2001, demonstra-tors took to the streets of Buenos Aires andstarted to attack the Congress and theHouse of Government once again. ThatSaturday morning and while Rodrıguez Saawas out of town, demonstrators were ableto subdue the barricade defenses in front ofthe House of Government and Congress. Inthe House of Government, protesters set afire near the entrance and hurled stones andother objects at the building. As they tried

to enter it, the police used rubber bullets,tear gas and water hoses and pushed themaway. Protesters participating in a cacerolazooutside Congress were also able to invade it;they removed some desks and chairs, threwthem into the street and burned them.Demonstrators also destroyed numerousbanks near the House of Government andthe Congress. The next day, the walls of theHouse of Government were filled with graffitiwith messages that rejected the interim gov-ernment of Rodrıguez Saa. Many of the exist-ing barricades had been overturned and someof them had been fully bent. About 12 policeofficers were injured. These new attacks ofgovernment buildings ended the presidencyof Rodrıguez Saa who could no longer counton the support of his fellow governors andresigned (La Nacion, 2001d; Carabajal, 2002).

By Monday, 31 December, the federalpolice had fortified the perimeter of thesegovernment institutions even more. Thepolice used three sets of metal barricades infront of the House of Government ratherthan one thinking that this measure wouldmake it impossible for protesters to success-fully fight the police in all of them andreach the building (La Nacion, 2001d). Even-tually, the federal police settled with usingtwo sets of barricades around the House ofGovernment (Figure 11) with one of thembeing away from the building and coveringmost of Plaza de Mayo (Figure 12). Since asizable avenue passed through the front ofCongress (Figure 13), the usage of more setsof barricades was not practical there (Ethno-graphic Research, 2005). However, the Presi-dent of the Chamber of Deputies EduardoCamano ordered the placement of sturdybarriers at all entrances of Congress (Pente-nero, 2001) while the authorities calculatedthat with adequate police presence, the possi-bility of demonstrators being able to over-come the barriers and then successfullyclimb the steps or walkways of the buildingwas not realistic (Figure 14) (Themis Chron-opoulos, Ethnographic Research, 2005).

In 2003, Peronist Nestor Kirchner waselected president after Menem decided to

524 CITY VOL. 15, NO. 5

stand down in the runoff election rather thanexperience a humiliating defeat. A decline inthe number and intensity of demonstrationsduring the first few months of the newadministration gave the false hope that thesecurity barricades outside governmentbuildings would be removed. However, thisdid not happen. Government buildings werefilled with graffiti when security wasrelaxed in the spring and summer of 2003–2004. Piquetero organizations also escalatedtheir mobilizations and on 13 February2004 there was violence during one demon-stration in Avenida 9 de Julio, which is thewidest avenue in the City of Buenos Aires.A week later, picketers set roadblocks inmany parts of the country including

Metropolitan Buenos Aires in the largestnational mobilization against the KirchnerAdministration until then; a few thousandalso held a rally outside Congress. At thetime, the picketers were demanding the re-institution of 250,000 unemployment grantsand opposed a labor reform proposal debatedin Congress (La Nacion, 2004a). However,the turning point in social conflict occurred afew months later when the Legislature of theCity of Buenos Aires debated the modificationof the Code of Urban Coexistence (Codigo deConvivencia Urbana).

The Code of Urban Coexistence was passedby the first autonomous (from the federalgovernment) City of Buenos Aires Legislaturein 1998. Seeking to further its independence

Figure 11 The first interior metal barricade in front ofthe House of Government (Photograph: Themis Chrono-poulos, 2002).

Figure 12 The second exterior metal barricade in frontof the House of Government dividing Plaza de Mayo(Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

Figure 13 The Argentine Congress surrounded bymetal barricades (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos,2002).

Figure 14 The front of the Congress building (Photo-graph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).


from the federal government and trying tocurb police corruption, the city legislatureestablished a local judiciary and replacedheavy-handed federal police edicts with theCode of Urban Coexistence. The federalgovernment and many conservative citizensfound this code to be deficient because itdecriminalized prostitution, transvestism,loitering, vagrancy and public drunkenness(La Nacion, 1998a). However, this becamethe law of Buenos Aires and the police whoremained under the control of the federalgovernment grudgingly followed it.11

Pressured by conservative elected officials,the Legislature of Buenos Aires began todebate the amendment of the Code ofUrban Coexistence in 2004 and this generatedcontentious opposition. Besides proposals tore-criminalize loitering, prostitution andpublic drunkenness, the new code wouldpotentially address protest actions and pick-eter roadblocks. On 16 July 2004, a demon-stration against the reform of the code byprostitutes, street vendors, transvestites,picketers and others outside the building ofthe city legislature turned violent. The build-ing was damaged, many people were injuredand 23 protesters were arrested (La Nacion,2004b). In the weeks that followed, picketersorganized numerous rallies in front of theCity Legislature, the Congress and theHouse of Government protesting the pro-posed amendments of the Code of UrbanCoexistence and demanding the release ofthe jailed protesters from the 16 July events(La Nacion, 2004c).

Although the Code of Urban Coexistencewas eventually amended and the federal gov-ernment adopted its own stricter stanceagainst demonstrators, the picketers andother groups continued their mobilizationsand this rendered the metal barricadesoutside government buildings necessary. Forexample, piquetero groups set up a campand blockaded the House of Governmentfor 48 hours in August 2005 (Torres, 2006).The Kirchner Administration attempted toco-opt, discipline or isolate piquetero organ-izations depending on their willingness of

integration (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003).Although many piquetero organizationswere completely absorbed by the govern-ment, to the extent that their leaders wereoffered posts in the state and they advocatedthe complete withdrawal of protesters fromthe streets, independent piquetero organiz-ations that belonged to the left of the politicalspectrum as well as others that remained loyalto Duhalde’s lieutenants continued tomobilize. The authorities reacted by usingstrict interpretations of the law in order tolimit their repertoires of social protest. Hun-dreds of demonstrators were detained forproblematic reasons that did not stand inthe courts, though delays in processingthese cases because of a clogged up justicesystem meant that the demonstrators spentsignificant time in prison (Torres, 2006;Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). Regardless, thispolicy of repression failed to control politicalmobilizations or popular manifestationsoutside government institutions.

As these political mobilizations continued,the fortification of government buildings inBuenos Aires became permanent. In 2005, thefederal government decided to build a perma-nent perimeter fence around the House ofGovernment and the adjacent Colon park(Rocha, 2005). Although this fence had beeninstalled by 2007 (Figure 15), metal barricadescontinued to divide Plaza de Mayo (Figure 16),

Figure 15 Permanent metal fences in front of the Houseof Government (Photograph: Cesar Edgardo Soto Cepeda,2010).

526 CITY VOL. 15, NO. 5

providing the first line of defense. That year,Nestor Kirchner’s wife, Cristina Fernandez deKirchner was elected president. However, herdecree in early 2008 to raise the export taxes ofagricultural products to 44%, sparked fourmonths of protests, which included cacerolazossimilar to those of 2001–2002 in many neigh-borhoods of Buenos Aires including the frontof the House of Government (Svampa, 2008).This further solidified the permanence of barri-cades outside the House of Government.Despite complaints that these barricades wereugly, prevented the free movement of ped-estrians and compromised the historic value ofPlaza de Mayo, there is no expectation thatthe government is going to remove them(Videla, 2010). Permanent fences were alsoinstalled around Congress, making accessto the building more difficult (Figure 17).

Spatial fortification and resistance in theneoliberal city

As Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore haveargued, neoliberalization is a process contestedby various sectors of society: ‘Neoliberaliza-tion, understood as the attempt to imposemarket-based regulatory arrangements andsociocultural norms, is aggressively contestedby diverse social forces to preserve non-market or “socialized” forms of coordination

that constrain unfettered capital accumulation’(2005, p. 102). Most scholars view this con-testation as an everyday form of resistancesimilar to that advanced by James Scott; con-stant struggle by subordinate populationsthat falls short of ‘outright collective defiance’(1985, p. xvi). This resistance is present in theactivities of participatory networks such asIndymedia and its local independent journalistorganizations in many parts of the worldincluding Argentina (Chatterton andGordon, 2004); in cultural productions suchas the film Tar Angel and its treatment ofimmigration in the neoliberal city (Gilbert,2005); and the successful opposition againstthe privatization of public services by tradeunions such as Sintraemcali in southwestColombia (Mathers and Novelli, 2007). Whatis implied in most of these accounts is thatdespite its global dominance, neoliberalism iscontinuously challenged through small andsustained acts of opposition.

In the years that followed the neoliberal col-lapse of 2001–2002 in Argentina, variousBuenos Aires institutions followed differentroutes vis-a-vis fortification. On the onehand, government institutions continued tofortify and by the end of the first decade ofthe 21st century, security fences had becomepermanent. On the other hand, global financialinstitutions gradually removed the metal andwooden facades from their branches andachieved a representational sense of normality.

Figure 16 The exterior set of metal barricades in front ofthe House of Government dividing Plaza de Mayo still exist(Photograph: Cesar Edgardo Soto Cepeda, 2010).

Figure 17 Permanent metal fences in front of Congress(Photograph: Cesar Edgardo Soto Cepeda, 2010).


To be sure, after the crisis, the government ofArgentina restructured the banking sectorand many international banks withdrew fromthe country; the result was the strengtheningof Argentine public (and private) banks, atleast temporarily (BCRA, 2002, 2003, 2004,2005). However, the continuous fortificationof government institutions reflects thegrowing antagonistic relationship betweensectors of the population and the state. Thecontinuous fortification of government insti-tutions reveals the fact that ordinary peoplestill expect the state to manage the economyand that the state is ultimately blamed for econ-omic problems. Global institutions are blamedas well; however, they have the option of with-drawing from countries of the global southwhen the management of the political–econ-omic crisis fails. As global institutions fadeaway, the state is left behind bearing all theresponsibility and blame.

In the case of Argentina, the political–econ-omic system that emerged after 2001–2002 wasunsatisfactory. Although all the presidentialadministrations after De la Rua openly criti-cized neoliberalism and the international insti-tutions supporting it, actual policy continuedto be business-friendly without a meaningfulredistribution of resources. Since 2004, theannual economic growth has been in the neigh-borhood of 8–9%. However, much of thegrowth has been achieved because the privatesector has received generous government sub-sidies and because unsustainable practices ofresource extraction and agricultural pro-duction are allowed to continue withoutminding environmental degradation. More-over, the proceeds of this economic growthhave been grossly maldistributed with 62.5%of income going to the wealthiest 30% of thepopulation (rates that have surpassed those ofthe 1990s). Meanwhile, the unofficial and prob-ably more accurate inflation rate has been twoto three times higher than the official annual-ized inflation rate, which is 9.3%. Finally,low-paying informal, service and exploitativejobs have constituted the great majority ofnew employment (Svampa, 2008). This persist-ent social suffering helps to explain the reasons

behind the continuous and permanent fortifi-cation of government institutions.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks go to Cesar Edgardo SotoCepeda, Gabriela Garreffa, Jorge ManuelReboredo, Noemı Nicastro Oliveira, MagaliCamblong, Florencia Siri, Pablo Olender,Judith Conde and Eleonora Amisano fortheir valuable assistance.

Notes

1 The House of Government (Casa de Gobierno) isthe seat of the executive branch of the government ofArgentina. This is where the office of the president islocated. The House of Government is also calledCasa Rosada (Pink House) and presidential palace(even though the president does not reside there). Inorder to avoid confusion, in this paper only the termHouse of Government is utilized.

2 To be sure, there have been years when Argentinaappeared to have distanced itself from the economiccrisis, at least officially. However, those yearsrepresent notable exceptions with the 1991–97period viewed as the longest one, though even thisrequires qualification; there was a run on the peso in1992 that the government was able to manage,bank failures and an erosion of the foreign reservesin 1995 because of the Mexican Tequila effect, andbouts of high unemployment and poverty rates formuch of the period.

3 The economy began to grow again in 2002.However, the financial system was not fullyfunctional, the economy had contracted too muchbecause of the collapse and there were too manyuncertainties. The economic recovery was notcredible before 2003.

4 The spatial terminology regarding the Buenos Airesarea is as follows. Buenos Aires or City of BuenosAires refers to the Ciudad Autonoma de BuenosAires, which is a political subdivision that includesonly the city. Greater Buenos Aires refers to GranBuenos Aires, which includes a number of politicalsubdivisions located in the Province of Buenos Aires(Provincia de Buenos Aires) and surround the City ofBuenos Aires. Metropolitan Buenos Aires includesboth the City of Buenos Aires and Greater BuenosAires, areas that are administratively different, butnonetheless are socially and economicallyconnected (though not in a straightforward and easymanner). The City of Buenos Aires contains asignificant number of middle- and upper-class peoplewith northern neighborhoods being more affluent

528 CITY VOL. 15, NO. 5

and southern neighborhoods being more lowincome. Greater Buenos Aires varies widely, thoughthe great majority of its population is working class.

5 This paper is to a great extent based onethnographic research. Influenced by the way thatcultural anthropologists, human geographers,social historians and urban sociologists have beenconducting research, I began to design andimplement ethnographic and archival projects inNew York City neighborhoods in the mid-1990s.My methodology included spatial analysisaccompanied by the reading and making of maps;interviews, conversations and observationsrecorded in notebooks; the sequential photographyof neighborhoods and the subsequent catalogingand studying of these photographs; and the readingof primary and secondary writings about theseneighborhoods in libraries and archives. I decidedto do the same in Buenos Aires after the 2001overthrow of President De la Rua. My goal was tostudy the spatial effects of the economic crisis. Thefindings of this paper are based on first-handobservations of protest actions; the overhearing ofconversations among demonstration participantsbefore and after the contentious events; thephotography of institutions that were the objects ofcontention; and short snowball interviews. In theyears that followed 2002, I continued to conductshort interviews in order to fill gaps. In 2006, Ipublished an article on cartoneros, which wasderived from research conducted during the sameperiod. In designing this present paper, the selectionof photographs and the use of captions for them, hasbeen the most difficult part. Photographs seldomspeak for themselves and they usually hide as muchas they reveal. However, after presenting thesephotographs in talks in Argentina and in the USAand receiving feedback, I decided that they alsorepresent an important part of visual history thatmay be suffering from my interpretations (both visualand verbal), but can nonetheless help us understandthe relationship of political–economic power andspatial fortification.

6 Cacerolazos are usually demonstrations in whichpeople bang pots, pans and other utensils.However, during 2001–2002 in Argentina, theterm began to include other types of protest actionswith demonstrators using drums, wood, metal,soda cans, car keys and other devices to make anoise.

7 The only Argentine bank that was regularly attackedwas the sizable and privately held Banco Galicia.

8 In 1991 the price of the US dollar was fixed to10,000 Argentine australs. In 1992, the austral wasreplaced by the peso with 10,000 australsbecoming one peso.

9 Clientelism in Argentina has a long andcomplicated history that is outside the scope of thispaper.

10 This practice was also dishonest with a highpercentage of the funds going to corruptcontractors, government officials and politicalorganizations.

11 The insistence of the federal government to keep thepolice under its control has frequently generatedfriction between the government of Buenos Airesand the federal government, and is the topic ofunresolved constitutional questions. Besides theCode of Urban Coexistence, there are federalpenal and other laws that apply in the Republic thatthe police enforce.

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Themis Chronopoulos is a Postdoctoral Fellow atthe Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis,Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NewJersey, USA. He is the author of Spatial Regu-lation in New York City: From Urban Renewalto Zero Tolerance (New York: Routledge, 2011).Email: themis.chronopoulos @gmail.com


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