the metasemantics of memory

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The metasemantics of memoryAuthor(s): Sanford C. GoldbergSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition

, Vol. 153, No. 1, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION,PACIFIC DIVISION, 2012 MEETING (March 2011), pp. 95-107Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41487618Accessed: 12-11-2015 21:36 UTC

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2/14

Philos

tud

2011)

53:95-107

DOI

1

.

1

07/s

98-0

-9642-9

The

metasemantics of

memory

Sanford .

Goldberg

Publishednline:November010

Springer

cience+Business

edia .V.

010

Abstract

In

Sven Bernecker'

excellentnew

book,

Memory

he

proposes

n

account f what

we

might

all the

metasemantics"f

memory:

he

onditions

hat

determinehe contents f the mental

epresentationsmployed

n

memory.

er-

necker ndorses

"pastist

xternalist"

iew,

ccording

o which he

content

f

a

memory-constitutingepresentation

s

fixed,

n

part,

y

the

"external" onditions

prevalenttthe past)time f thetokeningf theoriginal epresentationtheone

from hich he

memory-constituting

ne s

causally

erived).

ernecker

rgues

hat

thebestversion f a

pastist

xternalismbout

memory

ontents ill

have theresult

that here an be

semantically-inducedemory

osses

n

cases

involving nwitting

"world-switching".

he burden f this

paper

s to

show

hat

ernecker'

argument

for his

onclusion oes not ucceed.

My arguments

n this core

have

mplications

for ur

picture

f mind- orld

elations,

s these

re reflected

n

a

subject's ttempts

to recallher

past

thoughts.

Keywords

Semantics Metasemantics

Memory

Externalism

World-switching

1

The

metasemantics

f

memory

Bernecker'book imsto

present

nd defend

broadly

ausal

theory

f

memory.

n

the ourse f

doing

o he has

occasion o address he

semantics f

memory,"

r the

contents f those

representations

hat re

deemed

to

constitutememories.

he

question

ernecker

ursues

s not

so much his s what

we

might

all themeta-

semantics f

memory:

e aims

to

dentify

he

ypes

f

fact hat

ix

he ontent f a

given

memory-constitutingepresentation.

n this core

Bernecker

dopts

what

he

callsa "pastistxternalism."ormulatednterms fmemorytates atherhan he

S.

C.

Goldberg

El)

Department

f

hilosophy,

orthwestern

niversity,

880

ampus

rive,

vanston,

L

60208,

SA

e-mail:

[email protected]

Springer

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/14

96

S. C.

Goldberg

representation

hose

tokening

onstituteshe

memory

tself,

hisview amounts o

the laim that

...thecontentf a memorytate s fixed,nceandfor ll,bythe nvironment

the

ubject

was n at

the imehe

had

the

riginal

hought.

hen ome ontent

is stored

n

memory

t

is inert o all

subsequent

nvironmental

hanges.

(Bernecker

009,

p.

168).

Thisclaim s a version fex

ernalism,

n that t

regards

he

ubject's

nvironments

relevantothe ndividuationfthe ontentsfhermental tates

enerally;

nd t s a

pastist

xternalism,

n

that,

when t

comes

to

thosemental tates hat onstitute

memories,

he

ontent

f

the

tate s

"fixed,

nce

and for

ll,

by

the

nvironment

he

subject

was

n

at the

ime

e had

the

riginal hought

" As a

version

f

externalism,

Bernecker'view ontrasts ithnternalistccountsfthe onditionshat etermine

content. ut even

among

xternalistiews of

content,

ernecker' view contrasts

with

wo

other xternalist

ccounts

f the onditionshat

etermine

he

ontents

f

memory.

One of these is

a

view Bernecker abels

"presentist

xternalism,"

according

o which

"memory

ontents re determined

y

past

and

by present

environmental

onditions";

nd

with

"futurist

xternalism,"

ccording

o

which

"memory

ontents

epend

not

only

on the

past

and

present

ut also on future

environmentalonditions."

p.

168).

I

agree

with erneckerhat ne

ought

o

prefer

xternalisto nternalistccounts

of the contents f

thought

enerally,

ncludingmemoryGoldberg

007a);

and

1 also agreewithBerneckerhat,f we weregivena forced hoice amongthe

externalistccounts f the emantics

f

memory,

hemost

referable

ne wouldbe

pastist

xternalism

Goldberg

007b,

c).

But within heclass of

pastist

xternalist

accounts

f

the semantics

f

memory,

think ernecker

avors

version

hat s

suboptimal.

t is the im of this

paper

o

explain

nd defend his ontention.

2

Versions f

pastist

xternalism

Given the

commitments

f

externalismnd

the

possibility

f certain

ypes

of

("world-switching")

ases,

we must

istinguish

etween everal ifferentersions

of

pastist

xternalism. ssume

the externalisthesis hat ome contents

o not

supervene

n "what's in the

head,"

with the resultthat

therecan be two

dopplegngers,

s alike

on

the

nside

including

heir

espective

istories f their

insides)

s

any

two distinctndividuals an

be,

yet

who differ

n

the

propositional

attitudes

hey

nstantiate

n

virtue f differences

n their xternal

nvironment.

Suppose

ne

environment

ontains

ater,

he ther

water

a

clear,

hirst-quenching,

transparentiquid

otherwise

uperficially

ike

waterbut whose chemical

ompo-

sition s

fundamentally

ifferent

let us

say,

t

is

composed

f

XYZ rather han

H20). Now imaginethe following low-switchingossibility: he earth-bound

subject

s

switched,

ithout er

knowledge,

o

Twin

Earth,

where he resides

or

long

time,

o

that,

y

the

ights

f our externalist

ccount,

he

has interacted

ong

enough

with

water,

nd

with win-Earth

peakers,

hat he

can use theword-form

'water,'

s

they

o,

to refer o

twater.

resumably

his

means

hat,

s

it

currently

^

Springer



4/14

Themetasemantics

f

memory

97

figures

n our

ubject's

exicon,

water'now can be

used to

express concept

ther

thanWATER.

Let us

use

'CNew'

to

designate

his

oncept.

There re several uestionshatwe can nowask.

First,

what

concept

s

CNEW?

There would

appear

to be at

least two main

candidate nswers. he firsts that

t

is

simply

WATER,

the

concept

hat ther

(life-long)

win

Earthlingsxpress

with heir

ses of water'.The

second s that t s

some

amalgam

made

out of the two

concepts

WATER

and TWATER

perhaps

WATER-OR-TWATER,

r

maybe

ven

WET,

THIRST-QUENCHING

LIQUID.

I will

call answers f

the

former

ort

non-amalgam

nswers and

those

f

the atter

sort

malgam

nswers.

Second,

oes

Cnew

replace

he

oncept

ur

ubject xpressed

ith

water'

while

she was

living

n

earth

WATER),

or

merely

upplement

hat

oncept?

Call

the

former iew thereplacementiew and the atter he upplementiew.

We now have a matrix f

two

dimensions,

dentifying

our

ossible

views one

can take

regarding

he "semantics

f

switching."

hese

views can be considered

against

ne another hen t

comes to

assessing

he

emantics f

memory.

ake a

subject

call him

Oscar who

grew p

on

earth,

nd

whoformed

thought

before

ever

having

eft

earth)

which he

expressed

with

"Water s

my

grandmother's

favorite rink."We can assume

hat,

iven

xternalism,

his

hought

nvolved

he

concept

WATER. But what

happens

when

Oscar,

fter

aving pentyears

n Twin

Earth

without

nowing

bout

the

switch),

nd

having cquired

Cnew

aims to

rememberhe

thought

e had

years

go?

He

might

laim:

"Oh

yes,

remember:

waterwasmygrandmother'savorite rink "What oncepts expressed yhis use

of water' n

this

xpression

f

his would-be

memory?

s it

Cnew?

s itWATER?

Or

what?

Andwe

might

onsider variants well: what

would

happen

o

the

ontentf

his would-be

memory

f he

came to

realize

hat

e has beenthevictim

f a world-

switching peration,

ithout

oming

o

learn the details

of

his

world-switching

regimen?

nd

what

happens

when

he learns hosedetails?

Regarding

he

emantics f

switching,

ernecker imself

avors

replacement

view.

Since

I

wasn't

entirely

lear

whether e favored

he

amalgam

view or the

non-amalgam

iew,

my

riticisms

on't urn n

assuming

ither

ne.)

The result f

this s that erneckerccepts hatfa subject cquires new water'concept,hen

she is

prevented

rom

ecalling

houghtsnvolving

er

prior

water'

concept

as

that

oncept

s no

onger

vailable o

her.Bernecker

ecognizes

hat his iew

omes

at

a

cost,

but

he

thinks,

ll

things

onsidered,

he costs are

outweighed y

the

benefits

or

at

least

by

the

higher

ostsof the

ompeting

astist

xternalist

iews).

I

disagree

withhim

bout

his.

Most of what want

o

say

n

the

remainderf this

paper

will

be

directed

gainst

itherwhathe

has to

say

n

favor f

the

replacement

view,

r whathe

has to

say

against

he

upplement

iew.

3 Bernecker gainstthesupplemental ccountof thesemantics fswitching

3.1

Bernecker's

irst

rgument

gainst

he

supplemental

iew of the

semantics f

switching

s that t

best t works

nly

for ases

of

preservative emory,

ot for

Springer



5/14

1

This

ccount

s

developed

n

Brge

1993).

Springer

98

S. C.

Goldberg

cases

in which "the

subjectrepresents

ome

past

content, vent,

r

image..."

(Bernecker

009,

p.

193).

Against

his,

submit hat here

s

at least

one

popular)

account fpreservative emoryhat an be extendedo cover ases inwhich the

subject epresents

ome

past

ontent,vent,

r

mage..."1

f this s

so,

then ven f

Berneckers

right

hat

he

upplemental

iew

only

works or ases of

preservative

memory,

e is

wrong

o think

hat his s an

important

imitationf the ccount.

On the

preservative

ccount

n

question,

he 'mechanism'

hat underwrites

preservative

emory

s the same mechanism

hat

underwriteshe

possibility

f

reference-preservation

n

the use of

pronouns

n a

given

text:

naphora.

onsider

how in an extended

assage

a

subsequent

se

(or uses)

of

'he' can

preserve

he

referencef

a

prior

se of he'

(or

some other

eferring

erm):

he

ubsequent

ses

do so

in

virtue f

being

anaphorically

onnected

o those earlier

uses.

On

the

accountof preservativememory am identifyingere,the same holds for

preservative

emory:

present

epresentation

f "some

past

content, vent,

r

image"

can have ts ontent

etermined

ybeing anaphorically

inked'

o

the

tate

fromwhich he

memory

tate

ausally

derives.

This idea can be clarified

y example.

n the

passage

"Sam

is a nice

man;

he

often

ives

money

o

charity,"

he

peaker

ntends he

use of he' to

pick up

the

reference

f Sam.' It is the

peaker's

ntention

hat nderwrites

he

naphoric

ink.

(Of

course,

he

peaker's

ntentionan

only

o

so

much;

t

an'toverride

onstraints

that re writtennto he emantics

r the haracters

f therelevanterms

tc.)

Now

(to

turn o a

memory xample)

magine

hat ur

subject

Oscar

is

trying

o recall

"somepast ontent,vent, r mage,"under onditionsn whichhehas been low-

switched,

nd

so

under

onditions

n which

he

possesses

the

concept

CNEw-

n

particular,

et us

suppose

he is

trying

o recall

ome distant

mental

mage,

tored

from

hildhood,

egarding

is

grandmother.

nd hen

he

magepops

nto

mind: he

was

standing

t that ld faucet

n her ncient

ouse

one

evening, ouring

erself

tall

glass

of

water,

hen he

dropped

he

glass

andthe

water

went ll over he

lace,

making veryone

augh.

The

image

s

vivid n Oscar's

mind

now.The

proposal

n

offers

that,

nsofar s we

are

assuming

he

upplemental

iew

and the

naphoric

account f

preservative

emory,

scar's

attempt

t recall an be

seen

s an nstance

ofpreservative emory.scar'switnessinghe riginalcenemade n impression

on him the

mage

was

immediately

tored

n his

memory

we

can

assume)

and

the ontent

fthe

mage

the act hat

t s an

mage

f

water,

ather

han water

is

preserved

n

memory.

ere,

what

makes t

the ase

that herecalled

mage

nherits

its ontent rom he

riginal

mage

s notOscar's

ntentions,

ut

rather

hefact

hat

the recalled

mage

s

just

that

a recalled

mage,

ne

causally

derived

rom he

earlier

mage.

t is in the

nature f this

ortof

memory

o

preserve

imagistic)

content.

Still,

ne

might

wonder:

f asked to

report

n this

mage,

nd

on

whathe was

thinking

t the

ime t which e

experienced

his

cene,

would

Oscar's

verbal

eport

express he onceptWATERor the oncept new?Thisquestion cquires point

insofars we are

assuming

he

upplement

iew,

ince,

given

hat

iew,

he

word-

form

water' s itoccurs

n his exicon

t

the ime f

recollection

s

associated

with



6/14

Themetasemantics

f

memory

99

both

WATER and

CNEw-

ut the nswer

s

obvious.

nsofar s themental

mages

presently

eforehis

mind's

eye

are

causally

derivedfrom

perceptual mages

acquired n an occasion nearth,rior

o his

slow-switchingegimen,

hese

mages

are

mages

f water

the

ontent f

the

mages

has been

preserved).

What s

more,

insofar s

his verbalized

houghts

re based on those

mages,

his

use of water'

n

giving

erbal

xpression

o the ecollection

xpresses

WATER,

not

CNEw-

fter

ll,

Oscar

is

aiming

to

capture

he scene he witnessed

hen,

nd so intends o

be

speaking

bout

hat ame tuff

and

to

be

thinking

bout hat tuff

n

the

way

hat e

thought

bout

t

on

earth,

amely, hrough

he

oncept

WATER).

This s the

oint

f

the

appeal

to

anaphora:

Oscar's

present

se of 'water' can inheritts reference

anaphorically,

y way

of

his

intention

o be

picking p

thereference

f the tuff

represented

n his

present

mental

mage

f the cene.Since the

mage

was an

image

ofwater,s I arguedbove, t s notproblematicosuppose hat scar'spresentse

of

'water',

n

reporting

ow what

he then aw and

thought,

efers

o

water,

nd

expresses

WATER.

Now

my present oint

sn't to defend he

foregoing

iew

(although

think

something

ike

this

might

e

right:

oldberg

007b,

).

It is rathero

say

that,

ven

if

Bernecker

s

right

hat

he

supplemental

ccount

an

only

workforcases of

preservative

emory,

e is

wrong

o think

hat

his hows

that he account an't

handle ases

n which the

ubject epresents

ome

past

ontent,vent,

r

mage..."

(p.

193).

3.2 Bernecker'

second

rgumentgainst

he

upplemental

iew s that ts best

incarnationBurge's preservativememoryhypothesis"commits us to the

classical-computational

ccount f

cognitive sychology."

193)

I

don't see this.

Is one committedo the

lassical-computational

ccount f

cognitive sychology

f

one offersn

anaphora-based

ccount f

the

eference

f

pronouns?

don't ee

why

thiswouldbe. And

yet

he

preservative

ccount f

memoryust

described

eally

s

no more ommitted

n this core thanwas the

anaphoric

ccounts f

pronouns.

After

ll,

the

preservative

emory ypothesis

s a version f an

anaphoric

iew,

s

on this

ccount

t s the

naphoric eference-preservation

hatmakes or

reservative

memory.

o

make

out his

case,

Bernecker ould have to

say

whether e would

level the ame

charge gainst

hosewho endorse

naphoric

ccounts f

pronouns,andif

not,

why

not

what

hedifference

s).

3.3 Bernecker's

hird

rgument

gainst

he

upplemental

ccount

p.

194)

is

that

it must

reject Kripkean

modal intuitionsat

least if

the

proponent

f

the

supplemental

ccount ndorses

he

malgam

iewdescribed bove.

Bernecker ses

the

following

ase to

bring

out his

allegation:

slow-switched

ubject

who

originated

n earth

and

who neverknewthat

water=H20),

ut who

by

now has

livedfor ometime n

Twin

Earth,

s told hat here s another

lanet,

ust

ikethis

one,

xcept

he

wateryiquid

n that

lanet

s

H20

ratherhanXYZ. Berneckersks

us to

magine

hat his

ubject

s

subsequently

skedwhetherhe tuff

hey esignate

on that ther lanetwith water'really s water.Bernecker rites hat,whilethe

Kripkean

modal intuition s

'no',

our

subject

should

answer

'yes'

if

the

supplemental-cum-amalgam

iew s true.

What

grounds

ernecker's ontentionhat

ur

ubject

hould nswer

n

this

way

if the

supplemental-cum-amalgam

iew is

true?

Suppose

thatour

subject,

now

Springer



7/14

100

S. C.

Goldberg

apprized

f her

world-switching,

s

posed

the

question y

way

of

the

following

interrogative

entence:

Q Is the iquidthat eopleonEarth esignates 'water'reallywater?

How should ur

ubject

call

her

Olive'

interpret

he

uestion osedby

Q?

Well,

consider

hat,

n the

upplemental-cum-amalgam

iew,

water'

n

Olive's lexicon

can

express

ither

WATER or

Cnew*

where

he

atters understood

o

express

n

amalgam

oncept.

o

long

s WATER and the

malgam oncept

NEW

re the

nly

two

concepts

ssociatedwith

he water'

entry

n

Olive's

lexicon,

however he

interprets

in

particular,

hetherhe takes he econd

occurrence f water' o

express

WATER

or the

amalgam oncept

CNEW

she will answer

he

question

posed by

Q

in

the ffirmative.

uppose

that he takes his ccurrence

f water' o

expressWATER. nthat ase shewill akeQ to ask whetherarthingsse water' o

designate

he

kind

icked

ut

by

WATER;

and the nswer s that

es, hey

o.

If

on

theother

handOlive takesthe second

occurrence

f

'water'

n

Q

to

express

he

amalgam oncept

new,

then he will

take

Q

to

ask

whether

arthlings

se water'

to

designate

hekind

icked

ut

by

the

malgam oncept;

ndonce

again

he

nswer

is that

es, hey

o. Either

way,

t

appears

hat

live

will nswer n

the ffirmative

precisely

s Bernecker ad advertised.

But

things

re

not o

simple.

On the

ontrary,

he

proponent

f

the

upplemental

view has

very ood

reason o

regard

ernecker'

argument

bove as an

argument

against

he

malgam

view

It is worthwhile

ursuing

his

hought,

ince t s based

on a kindof considerationhaveusedelsewhereGoldberg 007a), in a context

having

othing

o do with

world-switching

onsiderations,

o reach

very

imilar

conclusion.

As

I

noted

bove,

Bernecker

as to assume hat

Olive

will

nterpret

he econd

occurrencef water'

n

Q

as

expressing

itherWATER or the

malgam oncept

Cnew-

n

fact Olive

will

not

interpret

his occurrence f 'water' as

expressing

WATER;

or

rather,

f she

does,

she

wouldhave

misinterpreted

he

purport

f the

question

he was asked.For consider: is uttered

y

a Twin

Earthling,

ne who

speaks

Twin

English.

ut

by

hypothesis

water'

n Twin

English

oes not

xpress

WATER. So were ur

ubject

o

nterpret

he

uestion

n

such

way

hat he econd

occurrencef water'

xpressed

WATER,

hewould e

misinterpreting

he

uestion.

Thus t

seems hat f

Bernecker

s to tell he

tory

o that live does not

misinterpret

the

uestion

hat

s

being

ut

o

her,

ernecker ust ender

live

as

interpreting

he

second occurrence f 'water' as

expressing omething

ther

than WATER.

Assuming

he

upplemental-cum-amalgam

iew,

he

only

other

oncept

ssociated

with water' n her exicon s the

malgam

oncept.

ut and this s

a

point

think

Bernecker

isses

precisely

he amecriticism

ouldhold

f

Olive were o

employ

this

oncept

n

her

omprehension

fthe

uestion

osed

by

the

Twin

Earthling'

use

of

Q.

In

particular,

water'

n Twin

English

oes not

xpress

n

amalgam oncept,

and o does not xpresshe articularmalgam onceptnquestion.o onceagain f

Olive so

interprets

he

uestion osed

by

theTwin

Earthling'

use of

Q,

she would

have

hereby isinterpreted

he

urport

f

the

uestion

he

was asked.This alls

nto

question

whether

ny nteresting

onclusion an be established

y appeal

to this

scenario

o

described.

Springer



8/14

Themetasemanticsf

memory

101

In

fact,

we

might

ow think hat

he

foregoing

rgument

s in

fact n

argument

against

he

malgam

view

tself. or the esson

ust

learned

s

that,

nsofar s the

supplemental-cum-amalgamiew s assumed,Olive cannotnterprethequestion

posed by

Q

in

themanner hat t

was

intended. ither he

upplemental

iewor

the

amalgam

view

or

both)

must

go.

Below

I will

give

reasons or

hinking

hat

he

pastist

xternalist

houldwant o endorse

he

supplemental

iew.

Here,

restrict

myself

o

claiming

hat nsofar s

the

upplemental

iew

s

assumed,

he

foregoing

argument

an

be seen as an

argument

gainst

he

malgam

view.

And t is worth

noting,

oo,

that

nce the

pastist

xternalist

ives up

on the

malgam

view

while

retaining

he

supplemental

iew),

she has a

perfectly

atural

escription

f

the

scenario. uch a theoristan

now

describe live's

cognitive

ituation,

s she

faces

the

uestion osed

by

Q,

as

follows.

he termwater'

s itoccurs n

Olive's

lexicon

is associates with both WATER and TWATER. What is more (the account

continues),

t

would be natural

or Olive

to

interpret

he

second

occurrence f

'water'

o that t

expresses

WATER. After

ll,

this s what

water'

expresses

n

Twin

English,

nd it

s

a Twin

English peaker

who utters

.

So insofar

s Olive

intendso

grasp

he

uestion

hat

he

peaker

meant

o

pose,

Olive

must

nterpret

he

relevant

ccurrencef water' s

expressing

WATER;

and

nsofar

s Olive aims

o

be

responding

o

that

uestion,

he must

ontinue o

use 'water'

throughout

his

exchange

s

the

xpressing

he ame.

For

t

s

only

f

Olive

continueso

use water'

throughout

his

xchange

s the

uestioner

ad,

hat live can

be seenas

answering

the

uestion

hat

was

posed

to her.

Notice,

inally,

hat f

Olive

nterprets

he

econd

occurrence f 'water'as expressingWATER,then hewillregardQ as asking

whether

peakers

on Earth use

'water'

to

designate

he

liquid picked

out

by

TWATER. And

here he will

answer

his

uestion

n

the

negative precisely

s the

Kripkean

ntuition

ouldhave

t.

In

sum.Bernecker

s

explicit

hat is

target

s the

pastist

xternalist

ho holds

combinationf

two

subsidiary

laims: the

supplemental

iew,

and

the

amalgam

view of

the

emantics f

switching.

ut f

we insist

n this

ombination,

henwe

reduce

Olive

(the

low-switched

ubject

n

our

example)

o

having

o

misinterpret

the

question

osed by

Q

in

which

ase it is

dubious

whether e

can learn

very

much

from he

scenario.

n

thiswaywe see thatBernecker'argumentrom he

Kripkean

ntuitionailson its own

terms. ut

we can

say

more.This

first

esult,

together

ith

hefact hat f

we

give up

on

the

malgam

view

then

Olive can be

represented

s

correctly

nterpreting

nd

responding

o the

uestion

ut

o

her,

an

be

taken s

providing

ndependent

eason o

reject

he

malgam

iew.

This reaction

is

further

upported y

the

fact

hat,

n such an

interpretation,

live will

indeed

have the

Kripkean

ntuition.

3.4

Bernecker' final

argument

gainst

the

supplemental

iew

targets

he

motivation

or

heview.He

argues

hat

he

ppeal

to the

upplemental

ccount

oes

not

save

the

pastist

xternalist

rom

having

to

postulate

emantically-induced

memoryailuresn slow-switchingases. Semantically-inducedemory ailures

are

memory

ailures

rought

bout

y

relevant

hanges

n

environmental

onditions,

where

he

environmental

hange

has

the

effect hat

he content f

the

subject's

recollections

not the

ame as

the

content f

the

original hought

he is

trying

o

recall.

These

failures re

taken

y

many

heorists

o

pose

a

problem

or

xternalist

Springer



9/14

102

S. C.

Goldberg

accountsof content

enerally.

he

supplemental

ccount of the

semantics f

switching ight

e

thought

o

enable

he xternalisto avoid

having

o

acknowledge

memoryailuresf this ort.Bernecker'claim, neffect,s that he upplemental

view cannotbe

motivated

n this

way.

In

response

submit hat

Bernecker's

argument

n this score is not

persuasive,

or reasons

having

to do with

the

dialectical ontext f his

argument.

To

make uthiscase for

hinking

hat

emantically-induced

emory

ailures

ill

have to be

acknowledged

ven

by

those

pastist

xternalists ho endorsethe

supplemental

iew of

the semantics f

switching,

ernecker

ppeals

to

John

Gibbons'

1996)

paper.

On Gibbons' emantic

nalysis, oncepts

re individuated

not

only by

their

xtension ut also

by

their

functional

ole."

The burden f

Gibbons'

paper

was to

argue

that such a semantic

nalysis

has

interesting

implicationsor he emanticsfswitching. ore pecifically,ibbons adargued

that f functional

ole

partly

ndividuates

oncepts,

hen,

t least

in

a subset f

switching

ases,

every

xternalist

ill have to

acknowledge

hat.

(+)

There are

slow-switching

ases

involving emantically-induced

emory

failures.

The

slow-switching

ases

in

question,

n Gibbons'

view,

re thoseon which he

subject

earns

f her

world-switchingegimen.

ibbons'

laimwas that n

learning

of thefact f her

past witching,

hefunctionalole

of her ermwater'will

shift,

and

so

will

be unlikethe functional

oles associated

with

either

WATER or

TWATER the4water'conceptshe hadprior o earningfher witching.nsofar

as a

difference

n

functional

olemakes or difference

n

concept,

he onclusions

that

he

now-knowledgeableubject

has

yet

a third

water'

concept

one

that s

identical

o

neither

WATER norTWATER and

that

his

s

the

concept

hat he

expresses

with eruse of water' fter

aving

earned

f

her

low-switching

istory.

As Bernecker nderstands ibbons'

argument,

he

argument oes

through

whatever ne thinks bout the debate

between he

replacement

iew and the

supplemental

iewof the emantics

f

switching.

ere s Berneckern thematter:

Combining

xternalism

ith

functional

ole

semantics,

ibbons

holds that

sameness fthoughtontents determinedot nlybysameness f relational

properties

ut

also

by

similarity

f functional

ole. Granted that slow

switching

oesn't

entail he oss ofold

concepts,

t

t2

possess

both water

concept

and a twater

oncept.

..

But,

Gibbons

maintains,

he

concept

expressed

y

S's term water'

at

t3

afterhe

finds ut thathe

has been

switched

differs

rom he

oncept xpressed

y

his

term

water' t

tj

and

t2.

The

reason s

that,

fter

S]

is

informed

f the

switch,

is

thoughts

bout

'water'2have a

different

unctionalole

thanbefore.Gibbons

.. concludes

that

ecause

at

t3

S]

employs

oncepts]

distinctrom hose

he]

employ[s]

t

t|,

[he]

cannot

ay

or thinkwhat

he]

was

thinking

hen.

But

if

[he]

cannot

thinkt, he]cannot now t.' (Bernecker009,p. 196;boldadded).

I thinkhat erneckereremeans

obe

peaking,

ot f he

ubject's

houghts

bout

water'

that

s,

her

metalinguistichoughts),

ut atherer

water'

thoughts,

hat

s,

the

houghts

he,

he

ubject,

expressesy sing

he

word-form

water'.

Springer



10/14


11/14

104

S.

C.

Goldberg

(assuming

hat ifferencesn

functionalole make

for

differences

n

concept)

t s

neither f

those

wo

oncepts.

ut

again

t s not

lear

why

his

hould e.

Granted

that

functional ole considerationsstablish hat a subjectwho learns of her

switching egimen cquires

third

oncept

one

distinct rom

othWATER

and

TWATER),

t s not lear

why

his hird

oncept

must e the

one

expressed

n

the

subject's

ttempt

o recall

a

past

water'-thought.

ibbons

ppears

o think

hat,

given

herole

of functional

ole considerations

n

concept

ndividuation,

nce the

subject

earns f her

world-switching,

ll of her

ubsequent

ses of

water'

will

be

affected

y

thenew

functionalole water'

has,

and

so all of these

uses shouldbe

renderedn

terms f this hirdwater'

concept

the

one

whosefunctional

ole

s

not

equivalent

o

that f eitherWATER

or

TWATER).

But

once we make

xplicit

hat

we

arenot

denying

he

upplemental

iewof

switching

once

we

"[grant]

hat low

switchingoesn't ntail he oss ofold concepts," s Bernecker asgrantedwe

need n

explanation

or

why

t s that

in

Bernecker'

gloss

on

Gibbons'

onclusion)

"knowledgeablewitching

rings

bout a

conceptual

hift hat

revents

s

from

accessing

ome

of

our

past thoughts

.

(Bernecker

009,

p.

196;

italics

dded).

Since

Bernecker oes not discuss the

matter

t

any

length,

ere

can

only

speculate

bouthis

reasoning

n this core.

In

pursuing

his am less nterestedn

whether

his s what ernecker

ctually

ad

n

mind,

han n whether

his s thebest

facethat

an be

put

n

his

position.) erhaps

he

reasoning

s as follows. nsofar s

the

ubject

as

nowthree istinct

oncepts

ssociated

n

her exiconwith heword-

form

water,'4

nd

nsofar s these re

subjectivelyndistinguishable

o

her,

t can

happen hat hedeploys hewrongne when hinkingboutherpast houghts.hat

is,

it

can

happen

hat,

n a

previous

ccasion he

thought

WATER-thought,

ut

that,

n

thinking

bout t at

some future

ime,

nd

asking

herselfwhat

he was

thinking

bout at

some

prior

ime,

he now

(on

at the

time of

"recollection")

deploys

'water'

concept

ther hanWATER.

True,

his

eading

oes notdeliver

the

trong

onclusion hat

knowledgeablewitchingrings

bout

conceptual

hift

that

revents

s

from ccessing

ome of our

past

houghts."

ut,

gain,

don't ee

how

Bernecker an hold such a

view,

given

that he is

willing

to

grant

he

supplemental

iew;

nd

n

any

ase

I

don't ee

how

else he can reach he onclusion

(+);

and t was to

establish

+)

that ernecker

ppealed

o Gibbons'

nalysis

n the

first

lace.5

Unfortunately,

uch a

position

aces an immediate

hallenge.6 implyput,

a

pastist

xternalist ho

endorses he

upplemental

iew has resources o

resist

his

4

They

re

WATER,

WATER,

nd he

onceptcquired

n

earning

f he

witchingegimen

a

concept

hoseunctionaloles

different

romhatf

oth

WATER

nd

WATER.

5

If hiss

whatithererneckerr

Gibbons

ctually

ad nmindand am

y

no

meansertain

f

this then

hey

ave onfusedn

pistemological

ssue ithn ssuen he

metaphysics

fmind.he

epistemological

ssues:

givensubject

ho asmorehan

ne

subjectively-indistinguishable)

water'

concept

ssociated

ith

er erm

water',

ow

an

he

now)

now hichnewas

mployed

n

previous

ccasionnwhichhe ntertained

'water'-thought?

ut venf ur

ubject

oesn't

now)knowhichwater'concepthethen)mployed,t s notheratterntirelyo ayhathe an'tccess

that

oncept

or

he

houghtsnvolving

t).

6

In

dditionowhatwill

rgue

n he ext

bove,

he

osition

sreconstructedere

lso

ppears

o ace

a

question

f

motivation

n

onnectionith

ts

ppeal

o

unctionalole onsiderations.nsofars

slow-

switching

ases

ive

he

ubject

'water'

concept

therhan

he

ne he

riginally

ad,

s externalist

Springer



12/14

Themetasemantics

f

memory

105

argument,

nd in so

doing

to resistBernecker' contentionhat here re slow-

switching

ases

regarding

which she

must

acknowledge emantically-induced

memoryailures. o see how Bernecker'contentionan be resisted,uppose hat

our

pastist

externalist

maintains hat

the contentof

a

memory-constituting

representation

s fixed

n

partby

the fact

hat

he

subject

ims to

be

recalling

previously-tokened

epresentation:

his

fact

ensures that the content f that

previously-tokenedepresentation

s

preserved.7

f

so,

such

anaphoric

elations

secure

gainst

he

possibility

f the

ort

f

error

he

bove

position

nvisages.

Now

I

submit hat either ernecker'

argument

s reconstructed

bove,

nor

he

ppeal

o

functionalole

considerations,

ear

against

his

naphoric

ccount.

n

particular,

once

the

upplemental

iew s

granted,

t s hard o

see

why subject's

earning

f

her

past switching

hould

prevent

er

from

ethinking

he

very hought

he

had

earlier; nd f tdoesn't, hen t doesn'tprevent erfrom edeployingherelevant

'water'

concept

n the

way

that he

naphoric

ccount

uggests.

n

sum,

nsofar s

Bernecker

unlikeGibbons)

s

prepared

o

grant

he

supplemental

iew,

onsider-

ations f

functionalole annot e usedto show hat herewillbe cases n which he

pastist

xternalists forced o

postulatememory

ailuresn

world-switching

ases.

4

In favorof

the

supplemental

iew

I

have

ust rgued

hat he onsiderations

ernecker irects

gainst

he

upplemental

view of the emantics fswitchingo not ucceed.Given hat version fpastist

externalism hich ndorses he

upplemental

iew s a

rival o theversion f

pastist

externalism hich ernecker avors n his

book,

heresults

that,

or ll

Bernecker

has

argued

n

his book

against

hat

ival,

t has

notbeenundermined.

till,

t s one

thing

o

argue

hat hevarious

rguments

gainst

his ival re

not

good,

nd

another

to offer

positive

rgument

n favor

f therival. t is to this hat

now turn.

My argument roceedsby way

of

reductio.

uppose

the

replacement

iew

is

correct. ow

imagine

thinkerorwhomTWATER has

replaced

WATER as the

concept

xpressed y

her

urrent se of water'

she's

spent

nough

ime

n Twin

Earth tc.)We will imagine, inally,hat he is ignorantf herworld-switching.

Now

imagine

hat he

thinks he

following.

Footnote

continued

views ave

t,

nd nsofar

s

this

ewwater'

conceptupplements

rather

han

eplaces)

he

ubject's

original

water'

concept,

sthe

upplemental

iew

as

t,

henhe

ubject ight

ake

he ortf rror

n

question:

he

mightriginally

hink

WATER-thought,et

n recollection

after

slow-switching

regimen)

egard

hat

hought

s a

TWATER-thought.

t would

ppear,

hen,

hat unctionalole on-

siderationsre fifth

heel:

hey

re ot

eeded

o

ecurehe

esiredonclusion.

7

Of ourse,s witheference-preservationithnaphoricronouns,otoo ere:he acthatsubject

aims o

e

ecalling

previously-tokened

epresentation

annotverride

onstraints

hat

re uiltntohe

semanticsf

er

xpressions;

ut

nsofars

theseonstraintslone onot ufficeo

eterminehe ontent

of

representation,

nd n

particular

eavet

pen

hether

hatontentnvolves ATERr

TWATER,

the act

hathe

ubject

ims obe

recallingpreviously-tokened

epresentation

an ettlehismatter.

I

discussheseorts

f onsideration

n

Goldberg

2005,

007b,

).

Springer



13/14

106

S. C.

Goldberg

I

remember

hat ine

ay,

little

more han hree

ecades

go,

when

jumped

into

he ake

at

my

ummer

ottage

back

n

1978).

remember

ow

freezing

thewaterwas

-

and rememberhinkingtthe ime,I have never elt uch

cold water

n

my

ife '

I

begin

by noting

hat

low-switching

oes

not underminehe

ubject's bility

o

pick

out

via

description)

herelevant

iquid

=water).

f

asked

what

he

meant

y

'water',

he

might eply:

You

know,

he lear

iquid

thatwas

in the ake on that

brisk

ay

back

n

1978.

Ah

yes,

remember

he cene

very

learly..."

What s

more,

if our

subject

s

sophisticated

nough

o know

how to describe

oncepts,

hen he

world-switching

on't

undermine er

ability

o

pick

out

(via

description)

he

relevant

oncept

ither

=WATER).

Thus,

reflecting

n her

use of water'

n her

descriptions

f the

scene,

she

might ay

that

t

"expresses

he

concept hroughwhich

rdinaryeople

hennd there

hought

bout hewet, lear

iquid

n that ake

..." So

the

eplacement

iewhas to hold

he

following

ombination

fclaims:

first,

that he slow-switched

ubject

an

pick

out

the relevant

iquid

and

the

relevant

concept

y description;

ut

econd,

hat

he low-switched

ubject

annot

mploy

the relevant

concept,

it

having

been

replaced

by

TWATER.

This seems

wrongheaded

o me. It

will result

n

a

rather ncharitable

onstrual.

or now

imagine

hat ur

subject,

who

can

pick

out

the relevant

iquid

water)

nd the

relevant

oncept

WATER)

descriptively,

ays

he

following:

In

using

water'

now

to describe hat cene and

to

express

he

oncepts

then

sed,

intend

my

present

usesof water' opickout he tuffjustdescribed,ndtoexpress he oncept just

described."

he

replacement

iewmust

old

hat er ntentions

ill

be

thwartedo

long

s she remains

n

Twin

Earth.

ut this eems

o be

a

decidedly

nnaturalnd

uncharitable

onstrual.

he more

natural

hink o

say

is that

not

only

can

she

describe

he

oncept

n

question,

he can also

re-deploy

t,

ven as she

remains n

Twin Earth.

Here the

speaker's

descriptive

emantic

ntentions

erve to

fixthe

referent,

nd

n this

way

make lear

he

oncept

eing xpressed,

y

the

elevant

se

of

water,'

without

onstituting

ither he

meaning

f or

concept xpressed

y

that

use.

See

Goldberg

2005)

for

fulldefense

f this

Kripke-inspired

iew.)8

5

Conclusion

In

this

aper

have

presented

series f

challenges

o Bernecker's

ccount

f the

metasemanticsf

memory.

n

particular,

nce we

agree

on the

position

ernecker

describes s

pastist

xternalism

there re

still

variety

f different

ositions

ne

can endorse. ernecker

ppears

o favor

particular

ersion

fthe

pastist

xternalist

position

n which

here

will

be cases

involving

memory

ailures

wing

o

semantic

shifts.

However,

have

argued

thathis

case

in favor f

such

a

view,

and

his

8

In hisectionhave laimednlyhatheres strategyvailableo he astistxternalistho imso

avoid

aving

o

postulate

emantically-generated

emory

ailures

n

world-switching

ases. have

argued

hathis

trategy

s

vailable

o

ong

sour

astist

xternalist

ndorses

he

upplemental

iewnd

the

on-amalgam

iew f he semantics

f

witching."

n

particular,

othing

nBernecker's

reatment

f

themetasemantics

f

memory

ddresses

his

trategy.

owever,

he

vailability

f

his

trategy

eed ot

be he inal

ordn he emantics

f

witching:

oldberg

2005,

007b,

).

Springer



14/14

Themetasemanticsf

memory

107

corresponding

ase

against

n

opposing

iew,

re

unsuccessful.n

one

sense,

his

ought

o be

good

news

forBernecker:

he number

f

options

vailable to

those

theorists ho

ndorse

pastist

xternalism"

s

greater

han

e

supposed

n

his book.

Acknowledgments

ithhanks

o

ven erneckeror

elpful

omments

n

n arlier

ersionf his

paper.

References

Bernecker,

.

2009).

Memory:

philosophicaltudy.

xford:xford

niversity

ress.

Brge,

.

1993).

ontent

reservation.

hilosophical

eview,

02(4'

57-488.

Gibbons,

1996).

xternalism

nd

nowledge

f

ontent.

hilosophicaleview,05(3).

Goldberg,

.

2005).Non-standard)

essons

rom

orld-switching

ases.

hilosophia,2(1),

5-131.

Goldberg,. 2007a). nti-individualismMindndanguage,nowledgendustification.ambridge:

Cambridgeniversity

ress.

Goldberg,

.

2007b).

emanticxternalism

nd

pistemic

llusion.n

.

Goldberg

Ed.),

nternalism

nd

externalism

n

emanticsnd

pistemologvdd. 35-252).

xford:

xfordniversitvress.

Goldberg,

.

2007c).

nti-individualism,

ontent

reservation,

nd

iscursive

ustification.

ous,

1(2),

178-203.

Springer

the metasemantics of memory

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