the future of the u.s.-south korea alliance

8/14/2019 The Future of the U.S.-south Korea Alliance

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F E B R U A R Y

2 0 0 9

Going Global:

The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance

By Kurt M. Campbell, Victor D. Cha, Lindsey Ford,

Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, and Vikram J. Singh
http://www.cnas.org/


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Acknowledgements

We wold like to thank the Smith Richardson Fondation or their spport and nding or this important project. Their dedicationto elevating debate and discssion on critical national secrit aairs remains a model or man ondations arond the world.Rand Schriver and Victor Cha have contribted excellent articles or this report and or their hard work and dedication we arethankl. We wold also like to thank or colleages at the Center or a New American Secrit (CNAS) or their helpl commentsand excellent sggestions throghot the research and writing o this report, especiall Lindse Ford or her dedication andintellectal and written spport to this project. Research intern Satoko Kameshima also provided fne research editing or this report.Whitne Parkers creativit and assistance in the pblication process was indispensible and helped take this fnal prodct romelectrons to realit. O corse, we alone are responsible or an errors or omissions.


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The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance

By Kr M. Cmpbll, Vcr D. C, Lndsy Frd,

Nrv Pl, Rndy Scrvr, nd Vkrm J. Sn

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 9

T A B l E o F C o n T E n T s

Acknowledgements

Introduction 3

Chapter I: Outperorming Expectations: 7

The U.S.-ROK Alliance

By Victor D. Cha

Chapter II: The U.S.-ROK Alliance: 33

Regional Challenges or an Evolving Alliance

By Randy Schriver

Chapter III: Going Global: 57

The Future o the U.S.-South Korea Alliance

By Kurt M. Campbell, Lindsey Ford,

Nirav Patel, Vikram J. Singh

Appendix A: U.S. Senior Strategic Review Group

Appendix B: Republic o Korea

Senior Strategic Review Group


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About the Authors

Dr. Kurt M. Campbe is the co-ounder and Chie Executive Ocer o the Center or a New

American Security.

Dr. Victr D. Ca is the Director o Asian Studies and the D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair at

Georgetown University as well as a Senior Fellow at the Pacic Council. He was the Director o Asian

Aairs at the National Security Council rom 2004 to 2007 and Deputy Head o the U.S. Delegation to

the Six-Party Talks.

nirav Pate is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center or a New American Security.Rady scriver is a Partner at Armitage International and the president and co-ounder o the Project

2049 Institute. He was previously the Deputy Assistant Secretary o State or East Asia and the Pacic

under President George W. Bush.

Vikram J. sig is a Fellow at the Center or a New American Security.

lidey Frd is a Consultant at the Center or a New American Security.


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i N t R o D u C t i o N

Itriic Vaue, Gba Ptetia:Te U.s.RoK Aiace r te net 50 YearThe United States and the Republic o Korea

(ROK) have one o the most ormidable and

durable military alliances in the world. This alli-

ance has preserved peace and stability in Northeast

Asia and ensured nuclear restraint among Asian

powers. It has weathered extreme domestic

unpopularity in South Korea and pressures to

reduce U.S. overseas deense obligations. 1 During

the lietime o this military al liance, the junior

partner has transormed rom a war-battered,backward military dictatorship into a prosperous

democracy with the worlds most wired popula-

tion and one o the worlds largest economies. Most

American and Korean strategists agree that the

value o the alliance goes ar beyond security on

the Korean peninsula.

Yet, the contours o that uture U.S.-ROK alliance

are elusive. Cooperation on the peninsula itsel

oten brings the partners into conict, most oten

with Seoul seeking a more conciliatory stance thanWashington toward Pyongyang. Can two part-

ners so oten at odds on their most proximate and

pressing challenge really expand their cooperation

eectively? Some analysts also warn o alliance

creep. Would continuing the military alliance be a

costly strategic error based more on nostalgia than

a sober assessment o both sides national security

needs? Finally, although it has made tremendous

strides, South Korea is a young and populist

democracy and a relative newcomer to the world

stage.2

Is the ROK ready to take on a greater role inthe Asia Pacifc and beyond in ways that support

mutual U.S. and South Korean interests?

The Center or a New American Security (CNAS),

with the strong support o the Smith Richardson

Foundation, undertook a 12-month project to

By Kr M. Cmpbll, Nrv Pl,

nd Vkrm J. Sn

1 Most notably, President Jimmy Carter set into motion the withdrawal o U.S. orces rom the Korean Peninsula ater his elec tion in 1976. A statement putting those plans on hold

was issued by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski on July 20, 1979.2 South Koreas populism is a well-known act o lie that put s tremendous pressure on governments regardless o party. Internationally, the ROK only joined the UN in 1991.


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assess new rontiers or these powerul alliancepartners. The project was structured to look at

disconnects and opportunities or improved

cooperation on the peninsula, in the Asia-Pacifc

region, and around the world, particularly with

regard to transnational threats. Over the course

o the past year, the project authors have traveled

to South Korea numerous times and engaged a

variety o government ofcials and academics. In

addition, CNAS has hosted numerous workshops

with members o the Senior Strategic Review

Group as well as smaller mini-workshops on eachchapter. It is our hope that this project will help

shape both countries strategic-level discussions

on the uture o the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Cage ad opprtuityAs a new administration takes control in

Washington and aces an unprecedented array o

global challenges, America is looking to reset and

revitalize its alliances or the 21st century. U.S.

power has been sorely tested over seven years o

war. No U.S. alliances have escaped unscathed by

demands to support the global war on terror and

the controversial invasions o Aghanistan and

Iraq, with their lengthy and inconclusive stabi-

lization and counterinsurgency requirements.

Allies have been asked to do extraordinary things

in support o missions that most viewed, at best,

with skepticism. As a result o a relative decline in

Americas unipolar power, global fnancial turmoil,

and growing transnational threats, the Obama

administration is now seeking to reestablish con-

structive, mutually benefcial partnerships withits allies.

Outside o NATO, the most critical o those part-

nerships are with Americas treaty allies in Asia:

Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and

Thailand. Asia is one oreign policy area in which

the United States has scored well over the past

eight years. A broad and pragmatic center remains

dominant in Americas Asia policy community.

Strong bipartisan commitment to the U.S.-Koreaalliance has been and will continue to be critical

in order to strengthen the relationship.

Yet, the way orward is not without any contro-

versy or disagreement. In the region, Japan is

viewed as the preeminent U.S. partner and China

the most worrisome potential adversary. Australia

has sacrifced tremendously to support the United

States in military operations in Aghanistan and

Iraq and is oten reerred to as a top-tier ally a

prominent club. South Korea has also been a key

supporter o American combat operations in Iraq,

but more oten than not Seouls strategic utility

is overlooked. This is unortunate because Korea

oers the best potential or a change in ocus rom

narrow shared interests to broad global aims.

Japan is limited by its constitution and politi-

cal turmoil; Australia is near the limit or such a

small orce; and the Philippines and Thailand ace

internal challenges that keep them rom being sig-

nifcant partners beyond their own borders. Korea,

on the other hand, has large and well-trained

ground orces, substantial power projection capa-

bilities, great naval potential, and a battle-ready

military that has been at a high state o readiness

or generations.

This short volume presents three views on U.S.-

ROK relations inormed by the research and

discussions conducted by CNAS in 2008. Dr.

Victor D. Cha explores the principles on the

peninsula that will be prerequisites or any real

expansion and growth o the alliance. Randy

Schriver details the regional potential or theU.S.-ROK alliance. Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel

and Vikram J. Singh stretch the possibilities o the

alliance to the global and transnational level.

Several themes resonate across all o the chapters

in this volume. First, all o the authors see the

potential or the alliance to be one o the bedrock

partnerships o U.S. and international security or


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decades to come. As best described by Cha, theysee the potential or the alliance to be o intrinsic

rather than narrowly strategic value. Second, all

three papers raise concerns about complacency.

Recent changes in the al liance particularly the

transer o wartime operational control (OPCON)

to the ROK and the relocation o U.S. orces to

the south o the peninsula out o hair trigger

range could provide the oundations or greater

collaboration i properly and actively managed.

These changes could also herald a degradation o

the commitment and confdence in the partner-ship on both sides. Finally, non-military issues,

particularly economic, seem to dominate the long-

term uture o the alliance and are likely to play

a signifcant role in determining its global poten-

tial. Failure to ratiy the Korea-U.S. Free Trade

Agreement (KORUS FTA) could unnecessarily has-

ten perceptions in Asia o a protectionist American

trade policy, and a lack o cooperation and collabo-

ration on overseas development assistance (ODA)

could also undermine the alliances potential.

Proessional alliance management and attention

will be critical or advancing the transormation

o the U.S.-Korean military alliance into a more

meaningul strategic partnership. Getting the key

principles on the peninsula right will allow the

United States and South Korea to coordinate and

integrate their power to support mutual inter-

ests, rom humanitarian relie and peacekeeping

operations to maritime security and counterpro-

lieration. Understanding the background is key

to shaping this possible uture. To paraphraseKierkegaard, alliances can only be understood

backward and inward, but they must be directed

orward and outward. We expect this volume to

go some distance in helping leaders in Washington

and Seoul understand and eectively direct the

partnership toward regional and global priorities.


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CHAPTER I:

outPeRFoRMiNg exPeCtatioNS:the u.S.-RoK aLLiaNCe

By Victr D. Ca


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Despite gloomy predictions in 2002 that this alliance was in trouble, the alliance has ar

outperormed expectations, achieving more positive changes over the past several years

than in any comparable period in the alliances history.


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o u t P e R F o R M i N g e x P e C t at i o N S : the u.S . -RoK a LLia NCe

By Vcr D. C

Itrducti: Tree Pricipe Fr TeAiace FutureThe U.S.-South Korean alliance has outperormed

expectations since its inception in 1953. The rela-

tionship has been instrumental in managing the

most daunting national security challenges that

the United States has aced since the end o World

War II, and these successes have enjoyed the strong

support o two generations o Americans as well

as that o a vibrant Korean-American diaspora.

Although the alliances scope or its frst hal-

century has been narrowly ocused on deterringNorth Korea, the challenge or the next hal-

century will be to broaden the aperture to the

regional and global arena.

Three principles should guide the eort to achieve

this standard. First, the alliance must be seen as

standing or common values, rather than just

standing against North Korea. The common values

o democracy, market economy, rule o law, and

respect or human dignity naturally lead these

two countries to seek similar objectives in manyparts o the world. Key to the uture vitality o the

alliance is an agenda that continues to push the

envelope or alliance-based cooperation beyond

North Korea.

Second, as the alliance expands in scope, its

craters must strive to make the alliance an insti-

tution o intrinsic rather than just strategic value.

Throughout its history, the U.S.-South Korean

alliance has been o strategic value or the United

States as a bulwark against communism and as a

ront line o deense or Japan. In short, it has been

important to keep the ROK out o the adversarys

hands, but beyond this utilitarian purpose, the

alliance has not had value in and o itsel. As a

democratic ROK plays a more signifcant role in

the world, one beftting a global citizen dealing

with 21st-century problems, the alliance becomes

intrinsically valuable. Korea becomes a key partner

not only in traditional security terms, but also in

addressing broader transnational challenges. The


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U.S.-ROK alliance thereore becomes sustainablelong ater the North Korean threat dissipates.

The third principle is to run hard do not coast.

The craters o the alliance must constantly push

themselves to orge areas o common cooperation

that increasingly defne the alliance outside o a

peninsular context. One area in which the ROK

has already demonstrated the alliances extra-

peninsular context has been in the global war on

terror. South Korea played a signifcant role in Iraq,

providing the third-largest ground contingent, and

in Aghanistan, where it provided logistics and

medical support. Yet, there are many other areas o

potential growth; Koreas proven record o peace-

keeping operations in places such as East Timor

and Lebanon show that Seoul can play an increas-

ingly prominent leadership role in other areas o

domestic instability including Arica, the Middle

East, and the Pacifc island nations. The ROK Navy

can perorm important regional tasks to maintain

reedom o navigation in Asian waters. Koreas

emphasis on nuclear power makes it a major player

in eorts to move countries such as China away

rom carbon-based strategies to cleaner and more

carbon-neutral energy development. Additionally,

Koreas record as a responsible Non-Prolieration

Treaty (NPT) member could become even stron-

ger in the uture through the potential leadership

role that Seoul could play in dismantling a nuclear

program inherited rom a collapsed Democratic

Peoples Republic o Korea (DPRK). Seoul is also

seeking to enhance its global profle as a provider

o development assistance, in particular by help-ing countries make the transition into modernity

through assistance in inormation technology.1

Because it has similar views on entrepreneurial

development assistance to those o the United

States and Japan (versus those o Europeans),

there are opportunities or growth in everything

rom improving the business climate in Indonesia

to state building in Palestine. In the early 1990s,

Korea started its own small but growing versiono the Peace Corps, which can serve as a natural

transmitter o democratic values around the world.

Koreas orward engagement in global issues

oers the deeply rooted bilateral relationship

ertile ground in which to grow a global con-

nection. History has shown, however, that Seoul

sometimes remains constrained by a version o its

own parochialism, which has oten stood in the

way o elevating the alliance to an international

role. Although many South Korean governments

talked about a globalized Korea (segyehwa) in

the 1990s, or example, all o the resources that

might have been put toward such an eort were

ultimately beholden to North Korea. Those in

avor o the Sunshine Policy wanted all resources

devoted to the peninsular dilemma rather than to

global problems. In this regard, the Lee govern-

ments ocus on South Koreas global profle rather

than an insular fxation on North Korea oers a

great opportunity or alliance growth. The global

fnancial crisis puts obvious constraints on the

ROK, as it does to many other nations, but the

mandate to map out a new political direction or

Seoul is clear, which bodes well or the U.S.-ROK

alliances uture.

The promise o a uture path or the relation-

ship, however, does not ensure a smooth ride.

As the history o this rocky alliance has shown,

there have been and will continue to be many low

points. Moreover, there is still much work to be

done in terms o revising elements o the alliance.

Nonetheless, the alliance holds the potential to beone o Americas most enduring relationships in

Asia. Staying on the right path will require smart

policy choices by leaders in Washington and Seoul.

In order to provide a strategic context or how

the U.S.-ROK alliance should manage peninsular

challenges, this paper is broken down into three

parts. Part One will survey the alliances unusual

1 This point is expanded upon in the third section o this edited volume (see page 57).


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resiliency and recent accomplishments despite itsturbulent history. Part Two will delineate some

o the uture challenges or the alliance. Part

Three evaluates the challenge o North Korea or

Washington and Seoul.

Part 1: outperrmig EpectatiAs recently as six years ago, many Korea experts

and pundits were openly predicting the end o the

U.S.-ROK alliance. Anti-American demonstrations

erupted in the streets o Seoul in 2002 over U.S.

policies in Iraq and, closer to home, the death o

two Korean schoolgirls run over by a U.S. military

vehicle.2 South Koreans elected a let-o-center

president, Roh Moo-hyun, over the pro-Amer-

ican conservative candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, in

December 2002. Critics urther blamed President

George W. Bushs 2002 State o the Union speech,

in which he designated North Korea as part o

an axis o evil (with Iran and Iraq), or leading

many young, auent, college-educated, English-

speaking South Koreans to defne the United States

as a greater threat to peace on the peninsula than

North Korea.

When the second nuclear crisis with North Korea

broke out in December 2002 and South Koreans

sought to mediate and assure American hardlin-

ers that engagement was the best way to deang

the Norths nuclear threat, longtime riends o

the alliance bluntly stated in outright rustration:

Its Seoul s choice, the U.S. or the North.3 Others

talked about the runaway ally on the peninsula. 4

The verdict was that the United States would lose

the Korean peninsula an ally in the South andthe nonprolieration battle in the North and that

Bush would turn over to his successor a Korean

peninsula in tatters.

The record o U.S.-ROK relations that President

Barack Obama inherits, however, is not nearly as

bad as some might have predicted. In act, there isa sturdy oundation upon which the new admin-

istration can build. Despite gloomy predictions in

2002 that this alliance was in trouble, the alliance

has ar outperormed expectations, achieving more

positive changes over the past several years than

in any comparable period in the alliances history.

This progress was enabled by strong bipartisan

support or the alliance in Washington and in

Seoul, a key sign o its strategic importance.

This judgment runs contrary to the conventionalwisdom, which saw the letist President Roh

Moo-hyun and the hawkish Bush administra-

tion as completely incompatible. Roh, who sought

to ollow his predecessors policy o open-ended

engagement with Pyongyang, clashed with an

2 The soldiers were acquitted o manslaughter in a U.S. military court.3 Richard V. Allen, Seouls Choice: The U.S. or the North, The New York Times (16 January 2003).Section A2.4 Nicholas Eberstadt, Tear Down this Tyranny: A Korea Strategy or Bushs Second Term, Weekly Standard(29 November 2004), at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/

Public/Articles/000/000/004/951szxxd.asp.

Despite gloomy

predictions in 2002

that this alliance was

in trouble, the alliance

has ar outperormed

expectations, achieving

more positive changesover the past several

years than in any

comparable period in

the alliances history.


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American president who saw the North as part othe potential terrorist threat to the United States

ater the September 11th attacks. This author can

personally attest that the tone in the relations

between the White House and Blue House during

the Roh-Bush years was at times undeniably di-

fcult, and the temperature was sometimes rigid.

Yet, there is an important distinction between

tone and substance. Alliances are judged not

cross-sectionally but longitudinally. That is, an

overall assessment o the alliances health should

not be induced rom the rhetoric and tone o any

particular moment in time. Alliances should be

measured by their outcomes or results across a

broader expanse o time, not by day-to-day inter-

action. All a lliances undergo periods o riction

in which the tone in the relationship is bad: the

U.S.-British, U.S.-Israeli, and U.S.-Japanese rela-

tionships have all had their bad moments. What

matters in the end is whether agreements can sti ll

be reached in those difcult times and whether the

alliance partners can still work together. By this

metric, historians o the uture are likely to record

the past several years as one o the toughest but

most successul tests o the U.S.-ROK alliances

strength and resilience. Some o the most impor-

tant results relate to the alliances core constitution

and mechanics. These revisions enable the allianceto continue its core mission while remaking its

suitability or the uture.

An EFFICIEnT AllIAnCE

Across the range o criteria that determines the

unctional success o a military a lliance, the U.S.-

ROK al liance has done well. Efcient alliances

do not just provide or a states security, but do so

in a relatively cost eective (both politically and

economically) manner than would otherwise be

the case (i.e., versus the sel-help option). In this

vein, an alliances success is measured by the extent

to which it: (1) serves as a acilitator o power

accretion and projection; (2) operates as a uni-

fed command; (3) enables common tactics and

doctrine through joint training; (4) promotes a

division o security roles; (5) acilitates coopera-

tion in production and development o military

equipment; and (6) elicits political support among

domestic constituencies.

The U.S.-ROK alliance enabled the stationing o

37,000 American troops directly at the point oconict on the peninsula, providing the South

with an unequivocal symbol o Washingtons

deense commitment and deterring the North

with its tripwire presence. The alliance has also

constituted an integral part o a larger security

triangle in Northeast Asia with the U.S.-Japan alli-

ance. Despite the historical antagonisms between

Japan and Korea, the United States has encour-

aged the cohesion o this triangle and treated the

two al liances as strategically complementary. The

presence o U.S. ground orces in South Koreawas as much an extended rontline o deense or

Tokyo as it was or Seoul. The American 7th Fleet

and Marine units in Japan provided rear-guard

support or the ROK. This relationship was spelled

out in 1969 with the Nixon-Sato Korea clause, in

which Japan acknowledged that Korean security

was crucial to Japan and thereore would allow the

United States unlimited access to bases in Okinawa

to deend the South.

Yet, there is an important

distinction between

tone and substance.

Alliances are judged not

cross-sectionally but

longitudinally.


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In exercises as well as actual maneuvers during theCold War, Japan and Korea essentially comprised

one integrated unit in U.S. deense planning. U.S.-

ROK military exercises regularly employed bases

in Japan or logistic support; U.S. tactical air wing

deployments rotated requently between Japan and

Korea; and U.S. air and naval surveillance o the

North operated out o bases in Japan. In addition,

Seoul and Tokyo conducted periodic exchanges o

deense ofcials, developed bilateral ora or dis-

cussion o security policies, and engaged in partial

sharing o intelligence and technology.5

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and South

Korean militaries represented the classic example

o an al liance operating under a joint, unitary

command (the Combined Forces Command, or

CFC) with a common doctrine and clear division

o combat roles practiced through requent and

extensive joint training. Although there have been

some negative civi l-military externalities associ-

ated with the stationing o U.S. orces in Korea,

overall host-country support or the alliance

remains reasonably strong.

REPosTURInG FoR ThE FUTURE

Despite the U.S.-ROK alliances efciency, its Cold

War-era constitution was in dire need o revision,

as aspects o both the regional and global envi-

ronment changed in the post-Cold War era. For

the United States, Korea presented an anomaly

in terms o overall global orce posture. It was a

heavy, ground-based presence built to deal only

with a potential North Korean attack. In this

sense, the presence there did not ft with overallU.S. aspirations or its military deployments to

be capable o deploying regionally and in global

contingencies. At the same time, the U.S. mili-

tarys large physical ootprint in Korea most

conspicuously at the 8th Army headquarters in

central Seoul became increasingly anachronis-

tic in a country that was democratic, educated,

and auent, a ar cry rom the war-torn country

that frst hosted the American presence ater the

Korean War. A wakeup call came in the winter

o 2002, when a U.S. military courts acquittal o

two soldiers involved in the killing o two Korean

schoolgirls during a training accident led to wide-spread protests in Korea.

These trends impelled signifcant changes in the

location o American billets in South Korea. Since

2002, the two governments have agreed on a

major base realignment and restructuring agree-

ment constituting the most ar-reaching changes

in U.S. presence on the peninsula since the end o

the Korean War. Measures include the removal o

U.S. orces rom the Korean Demilitarized Zone

(DMZ), the move o U.S. Army headquarters

(Yongsan garrison) out o the center o Seoul, and

the eventual return o more than 60 bases and

camps to the ROK. These base moves ft with larger

U.S. military transormational needs, centering

more air and naval capabilities out o Pyongtaek

and Osan, but they maintain the same level o

credible U.S. deense commitments to Seoul.

5 For elaboration on these points, see Vic tor Cha,Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanord, CA: Stanord University Press, 1999)

ch. 23.

U.S. service members stationed throughout South Korea attenda town hall meeting with Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman othe Joint Chies o Sta, in the Black Cat hangar at Osan Air Base,South Korea, Aug. 16, 2007. Deense Dept. photo by U.S. Air ForceSta Sgt. D. Myles Cullen


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Moreover, the reduction o the large U.S. militaryootprint in the center o Seoul the equivalent

o putting a oreign military installation the size o

Central Park in New York City serves to reduce

civil-military tensions in the alliance.

Another watershed agreement was reached on the

return o wartime OPCON to the ROK by 2012.

U.S. control over ROK military orces through the

United States role as head o the United Nations

Command (UNC) beore 1978 and thereater

as head o the CFC was originally provided by

President Syngman Rhee during the Korean War.

The original OPCON agreement was a bilateral

arrangement which enabled Korean leaders to

allow ROK orces to participate in wartime under

U.S. command.6 To this day, it remains in the

minds o many Koreans as one o the most extraor-dinary concessions o sovereignty in modern

international relations, and has been a source o

anti-Americanism among younger Koreans who

eel oended by this quasi-colonial arrangement.

When Roh took ofce, he spoke publicly o

the wartime OPCON transition as regaining

sovereignty rom the Americans, which playedto certain segments o the Korean population

but underplayed the complexity o the issue. War

plans, specifc roles and missions, and contingency

plans were built upon a single integrated com-

mand or decades. Moving to a new arrangement

o two independent military commands operat-

ing under some agreed-upon guidelines is a major

step that requires upgrading o ROK capabilities

including weapons systems, planning and reorga-

nization o orces. Moreover, this transition to two

independent military commands must be takenwithout damaging the credibility o the United

States deense commitment to the ROK. The 2012

timetable or returning wartime OPCON was

thereore a source o concern or some Korean con-

servatives who believed that the Roh government

was pressing or a rapid turnover or ideological

reasons and without adequate consideration o the

external security environment and the readiness o

ROK orces.

The United States has since reafrmed to Rohs

conservative successor, President Lee Myung-bak,

that the 2012 timeline needs to be adhered to in

order to ensure adequate transition planning on

both sides. It will be critical or uture U.S. admin-

istrations to ensure that the transition process

takes ull account o the external security threat

and that the two U.S. and ROK commanders are

satisfed that the two militaries are ready or the

transition. In the end, the transer o OPCON to a

more than capable ROK military will go a long way

toward ridding the alliance o another source oanti-Americanism in Korea.

UPGRADInG ThE AllIAnCE

At 3:30 am on the morning o Rohs June 2005

visit to the White House, I was awakened by a

phone call rom the Situation Room. I was patched

through to U.S. Department o Deense (DoD)

6 Bruce Bechtol, Change o US-ROK Wartime Operational Command, Brookings Institution (14 September 2006), at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/0914southkorea_

richard-c--bush-iii.aspx. Operational control over ROK orces in peacetime was transerred to the ROK in 1994.

this transition to two

independent military

commands must be

taken without damaging

the credibility o the

United States deense

commitment to the ROK.


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ofcials who had just received word rom UnitedStates Forces South Korea (USFK) that an elderly

Korean woman pushing a ood cart had been hit

and killed by a U.S. military vehicle. An action

plan was instantly put into place in which DoD

and U.S. embassy ofcials in Seoul provided

redress to the aggrieved amily members while

we awoke our South Korean National Security

Council (NSC) counterparts in Washington to

alert them o the death and our actions. Both sides

sought to address the situation in a prompt and

proper manner in order to avoid the mistakes o2002, when two Korean schoolgirls were killed

during a training incident. When Bush greeted

Roh in the Oval Ofce later that morning, his

frst words were an apology or the death o the

Korean woman. As tragic as the event was, it did

not become politicized as a rallying cry or anti-

American demonstrations seen in 2002.

This level o coordination and cooperation

reected a signifcant upgrade in the institutions

and communication channels that have under-

girded the alliance over the past several years.

Traditionally, the alliance has been dominated by

DoD and military channels o communication, the

most prominent o which was the long-established

Security Consultative Mechanism (SCM) dating

back to March 1968. 7 Although this was the key

institution upon which the alliance was built and

upon which successul deterrence o North Korean

aggression rested, there was a perceived need to

deepen the institutional oundations o the alliance

as its scope grew beyond a military alliance. On thediplomatic ront, the Bush White House oversaw

the creation o an inormal but highly eective

channel between the two NSCs. The primary

orms o communication were phone calls between

the national security advisors or deputy national

security advisors and periodic visits to Washingtonand Seoul at the deputy national security advisor

level. This channel was used to convey policy pri-

orities but also to clear the air whenever statements

on either side were picked up by the press as signs

o alliance discontent. In addition to managing

mini-crises such as the one on the morning o the2005 summit, this channel was instrumental, or

example, in clariying misunderstandings created

by Rohs public comments in March 2005 about

Koreas role as a balancer between the United

States and China.8 This channel also was critical

in coordinating policy with Seoul (and Tokyo) in

the atermath o the North Korean missile tests

in July 2006 and nuclear test in October 2006.

Real-time communications among point people in

Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo ensured that initial

statements and messages regarding details o thetest were perectly coordinated and uniorm. In

the ollowing days and weeks, daily communica-

tion helped to precipitate a strong UN Security

Council resolution.

7 The rst SCM meeting took place in March 1968 between the deense ministries to coordinate policy in response to North Koreas seizure o the USS Pueblo, and became a regular

consultation thereater.8 Roh stated in an address to the Korean Military Academy that Seoul should act as a neutral party bet ween its American ally and Chinese neighbor. Korea to Play Balancer Role in

Northeast Asia: Roh, Korea Herald, at http://www.korea.net/News/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20050322018&part=102&SearchDay= .

In the end, the transer o

OPCON to a more than

capable ROK military

will go a long way toward

ridding the alliance o

another source o anti-

Americanism in Korea.


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In addition to the NSC channel, a ormal bilateralinstitution known as the Strategic Consultation

or Allied Partnership (SCAP) was approved

by Bush in November 2005 and inaugurated by

Secretary o State Condoleezza Rice in early 2006.

This dialogue is chaired by the secretary o state

and oreign minister, and is held at the working

level by the deputy secretary or undersecretary

or political aairs. The agenda or this institution

has been and should remain wide ranging, reect-

ing the broadened scope o the alliances activities

around the world.

The NSC channel and the SCAP helped to expand

the scope o the U.S.-ROK alliance beyond the

peninsula to areas o mutual global concern. Akin

to the global alliance concept or Japan, theROK proved to be an important coalition partner

in Iraq, providing the third-largest contingent o

ground troops in the country, which perormed

everything rom humanitarian operations to pro-

tective missions or U.S. Agency or International

Development and UN ofces and training and

equipping o other coalition orces (e.g., those

o Mongolia). The ROK also provided logistics

support and a feld hospital in Aghanistan. InLebanon, it contributed some 350 troops or peace-

keeping operations. Because Seoul saw many o

these overseas deployments as politically sensitive,

decisions were usually made within the Blue House

rather than at the deense ministry. This concern

led the U.S. command in Iraq to flter requests

or the ROK through the NSC channel to ensure

strong ROK participation.

These alliance accomplishments are impressive

when one considers the starting point. Anyone

who had bet in 2002 that the United States and

the ROK would have been working together in

Aghanistan and Iraq and completing base moves

would be a rich person today. Institutional coop-

eration between the two governments was key to

these accomplishments, but sustained eorts by

particular individuals have mattered greatly. The

key players in the orce reposturing eort were

Assistant Secretary o Deense Richard Lawless

and his senior country director Michael Finnegan.

The initiatives to grow the alliance institution-

ally started with key individuals in Bushs frst

term such as Deputy Secretary o State Richard

Armitage and Michael Green at the NSC. In the

second term, two quiet but important trips to

the region by Deputy National Security Advisor

J.D. Crouch were critical to advancing the global

agenda or the alliance. More importantly,

these upgrades o the alliance provide a strong

oundation upon which the next U.S. adminis-

tration can build the relationship, once again,

beyond expectations.Part 2: Wat Are Te Future Caege?More work can clearly be done on both sides to

advance U.S.-ROK relations and to build the alli-

ance or the uture. Carrying out the basing moves

and the realignment agreements are clearly an

important task or the new U.S. administration.

Nevertheless, they are operational issues that do

Akin to the globalalliance concept or

Japan, the ROK proved to

be an important coalition

partner in Iraq, providing

the third-largest contingent

o ground troops in

the country


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| 17

not provide a strategic roadmap or the uture othe U.S.-ROK alliance. Three important challenges

are on the horizon in the near uture: ree trade,

populism, and education.

FREE TRADE

The frst challenge is to fnish the KORUS FTA.

Signed on June 30, 2007, KORUS is the most

commercially signifcant FTA in more than two

decades. Korea is the United States seventh-largest

trading partner, and the United States is Koreas

second largest market. KORUS constitutes the larg-

est bilateral FTA negotiated by the United States,

and the second-largest FTA next to the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The

agreement has clear economic benefts or both

sides. Nearly 95 percent o bilateral trade in con-

sumer and industrial products will become duty

ree within three years o the agreement. For the

United States, the agreement will provide or the

immediate removal o ROK taris on 64 percent or

$1.91 billion o American arm exports, including

bee, wheat, corn or eed, and cotton, as well as a

broad range o high-value agricultural products

rom almonds to bourbon to rozen rench ries

and pet ood.

The agreement includes a broad range o provi-

sions aimed at removing the ormidable non-tari

barriers erected to protect Koreas auto market

rom U.S. cars and addressing the acute asym-

metry in auto sales between the two markets. The

FTA establishes a stable legal ramework and pro-

tections or the roughly $19 billion o U.S. oreign

direct investment that enters Koreas manuactur-ing, banking, and trade sectors each year.9 Despite

signifcant political challenges in South Korea to

the FTA, including the virtual shutdown o the

Lee government ollowing an agreement to allow

U.S. bee imports into Korea, the deal has been

championed and is soon due or a ratifcation vote

in the National Assembly.

The economic benefts o the FTAs ratifcation

are clear, but perhaps more importantly,

the agreement represents the elevation o the

U.S.-ROK relationship to a dierent and higher

plane o interaction. It represents a deepening

o the relationship beyond its traditional pre-dominantly military aspects and a broadening o

exchanges representative o a mature and close

consultative partnership. Koreans are always look-

ing or ways to improve bilateral ties and increase

trust in the relationship; there could be no more

important way o doing this than through the

FTA. The U.S. Congress inability to pass this

agreement would be seen as an undeniable set-

back in the evolution and growth o the alliance.10

Granted, it would not end the alliance, as there is

still too much that is shared in terms o values and

interests. Seoul, however, would respond to this

disappointment by continuing to aggressively seek

FTAs with China, the EU, and Latin America, and

U.S. companies would operate at a disadvantage in

this important market.

9 Oce o the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade with Korea: Brie Summary o the Agreement (2 April 2007), at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/

Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_upload_le355_11035.pd.10 The FTA requires approval o the implementing legislation by both houses o Congress (unlike ratication, which only requires Senate approval).

Inside the new Incheon International Airport.


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Moreover, people underestimate how impor-tant KORUS is to the vision o a larger ree trade

area in the Asia Pacifc. With the breakdown o

multilateral trade ora such as the Doha Round,

one scenario or advancing ree trade is the cob-

bling together o bilateral FTAs into a multilateral

arrangement. In this regard, the KORUS FTA is

seen as a high-quality agreement that could oer

a model or other major economic agreements,

unlike the superfcial FTAs negotiated by China.

When the United States announced the launch o

ree-trade negotiations with the ROK, countries

such as Japan watched politely but dismissively;

ater the agreement was negotiated, Tokyo dem-

onstrated quiet but palpable interest in starting

pre-talks on ree trade.

The implications o non-ratifcation could

extend more broadly to the U.S. position in Asia.

Protectionist rhetoric out o Congress over the last

two years is at a high not seen since the Smoot-

Hawley tari, and Asians are nervously awaiting

its implications. Americas support o ree trade is

undeniably one o the components o its leadership

and preeminent position in Asia. A new U.S.administration that opposed ree trade and did not

act on the KORUS FTA, Americas largest bilateral

FTA, would be recorded in history as being the frst

administration that eectively walked away rom

ree trade, and with this, substantially weakened its

long-term leadership position in Asia. No FTA is

perect, and KORUS may have aws that need to be

reviewed, but ratifcation o this agreement needs

to be treated not just as an alliance issue but also

as a larger strategic issue or the promotion o ree

trade in Asia and or the long-term U.S. positionin Asia.

MAnAGInG PoPUlIsM

The second challenge or the alliance relates to

managing populist ervor in Korea. Although

it is a consolidated democracy by most metrics,

the ROKs intense nationalism, very active non-

governmental organizations (NGOs), and tightly

interconnected society lead to occasional are-

ups o populist anger and protest that can be very

destructive to the alliances reservoir o goodwill.

In the early spring o 2008, or example, the newly

elected Lee government was paralyzed by dem-

onstrations throughout the country. The streets

o Seoul were blocked by candlelight vigils in the

city center. The opposition party reused to attend

the opening session o the National Assembly in

which the newly elected president would tradi-

tionally give a State o the Union speech. Joining

the civil society NGOs in the protests were labor

unions that undertook a work stoppage that cost

the Korean government tens o millions o dollarsin lost productivity. The ostensible reason or the

demonstrations was Lees perceived rash decision

to accede to the reopening o the Korean market to

U.S. bee imports. Protestors saw this as a high-

handed decision by a CEO president who was out

o touch with common Koreans concerns about

the saety o American bee and who sought only

to improve his relationship with Bush prior to his

No FTA is perect, and

KORUS may have aws

that need to be reviewed,

but ratifcation o this

agreement needs to be

treated not just as an

alliance issue but also as alarger strategic issue


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| 19

trip to Camp David (the frst such trip by a Korean

president to the Maryland retreat in the history o

the alliance).

These bee demonstrations demonstrated the

unpredictable nature o populist movements in

Korea. Just when things looked as though they

were back on an even keel and the memories o the

2002 anti-American demonstrations in Korea had

started to ade, these protests recalled all o the

perennial difculties in the alliance relationship.

The bee demonstrations do represent a chal-

lenge to the alliance or the new administration in

Washington. Yet, these all-paralyzing protests were

not about American bee, which is sae by interna-

tional standards. (Indeed, U.S. bee took some 39

percent o the Korean domestic market within one

week o its return to grocery store shelves). Instead,

they represent a undamental new problem or

Koreas populist democracy that is, the capacity

o Koreas political let to operate eectively within

established democratic institutions.

With Lees election in December 2007, the pro-

gressive let in Korean politics ound itsel out o

power both in the executive and in the legislature

branches o government or the frst time inmore than a decade, dating back to the presiden-

cies o Kim Dae Jung and Roh, when the 3-8-6

Generation o ormer student dissidents held

the reins o power.11 This decade o rule came to

an abrupt end when the conservative Lee won in

2007 by the widest margin o any Korean presi-

dent since the establishment o democracy in 1987.

Following Lees election, the April 2008 National

Assembly elections put the conservative Grand

National Party back into power with an almost

two-thirds majority.

In the history o Korean democracy, this was a

novel situation: the political let that had ought or

democratization took to the streets to voice oppo-

sition to the new conservative government (using

American bee as the entry point) rather than

operating through the very democratic institu-

tions they ought so hard to establish. Whether or

not the decision to take the protests to the streets

was merely an instinctive reaction rom the let

and civil society groups, what was most disturbing

was opposition party legislators joining the street

protests rather than trying to operate through

the legislature. This was an undeniable ailure o

Korean democracy, hopeully only a momentary

one sparked by the unprecedented nature o the

political situation. Continued attempts rom the

streets to stymie the incumbent government in

Seoul have real costs or the ROK and or the alli-

ance. The nearly our months o protests in 2008

that paralyzed the government have been esti-

mated to cost the economy $2.5 billion, accordingto a Korea Economic Research Institute study. 12

Rectiying this situation is outside the purview o

the alliance. Nonetheless, how the Koreans are able

to fnd ways or the political opposition and ruling

parties to work through their political dier-

ences through established institutions rather than

11 3-8-6 Generation reers to the Koreans that were in their thirties when the term was coined, born in the 1960s, and attended university in the 1980s, and that were at the

center o the ght or democracy in Korea, and in some cases, against the United States or the perceived support o military dictatorships in Seoul.12 Bee protests cost e conomy $2.52b, Korea Herald(10 July 2008).

South Korean citizens in downtown Seoul protest against U.S.

bee imports in one o many protest rallies during the summero 2008. (Associated Press)


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populist politics is an important variable in thealliances resiliency.

REFoRMInG EDUCATIon

A third challenge and an important domestic

determinant o the uture relationship that receives

scant attention in the policy studies community

is the reorm o the education system in Korea.

The combination o a poor public school system

and a strong letist teachers union creates an ill-

inormed jingoism among Korean youth that helps

to uel the runaway populism sometimes ound in

Korea. In the autumn o 2008, Lee, like his three

predecessors, tried to address long-term education

reorm. He called or providing public school cur-

ricula in the English language, instituting schoolrankings and a teacher evaluation system, and

seeking initiatives to reduce the fnancial burden o

runaway spending on private tuition, among other

measures. These eorts at education reorm could

have direct and long-term eects on the alliance.

The secondary-school education system in Korea

is broken. Parents pay billions o dollars to educate

their children in high-priced hagwons (tutorials)that provide specialized training outside o regu-

lar school hours. A Bank o Korea report ound

that household spending on education totaled an

obscene $13.72 billion in the frst hal o 2008, rep-

resenting a 9.1 percent increase over 2007.13 Korean

amilies spend an average $600 per month or

private education, totaling some $30 billion or 4

percent o annual gross national product. The daily

commute on buses to and rom these educational

institutions rom 3pm to 11pm every evening is a

standard part o the lives o Korean children.

The result o this dynamic is that the actual school

day is o little interest both to the students and to

the teachers. Teachers, many o whom hail rom

the powerul (and letist) teachers union, use

their time to educate students about their days

fghting American support o Korean mili-

tary dictators, the 1980 Kwangju massacre, and

Japanese colonialism, among other choice topics.

These highly organized and politically powerul

unions account or between 10 and 33 percent o

the aculty in public schools. The aggregate eect

is that successive generations o school children

grow up with potentially very biased views o the

United States rom the 1970s and 1980s ingrained

in them at a very impressionable age. This does not

mean that anti-Americanism is increasing among

younger generations, but that existing strands o it

get perpetuated even as the U.S.-ROK relationship

evolves ar beyond that past. Liberal governments

rom 1997 to 2007 oered the best opportunity

to contend with the powerul teachers union, butthey were equally unsuccessul in gaining traction

on the issue. This is an issue outside the purview

o U.S. responsibilities, but it is important to the

sotware o the alliance relationship and the

sense o goodwill among younger generations.

The visa waiver program and the Work, English

Study, and Travel (WEST) program are two

13 South Koreas education spending growth hits ve-year high,Asia Pulse (8 September 2008).

The aggregate eect is

that successive generations

o school children grow

up with potentially very

biased views o the United

States rom the 1970s and

1980s ingrained in them at

a very impressionable age.


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| 21

initiatives undertaken by the United States thatshould be promoted by the new administration.

South Koreans longtime quest or accession to

the U.S. visa waiver program became a presiden-

tial initiative rom the Bush-Roh 2005 Gyeongju

Joint Declaration and was achieved in November

2008. In conjunction with the visa waiver, the new

WEST program will soon allow 5,000 students

to study and work or 18 months at a time in the

United States. A memorandum o understand-

ing was signed between the two governments in

September 2008, the implementation o which willall to the next U.S. government.

Programs such as WEST and the visa waiver, in

addition to the long-established Fulbright scholar-

ships, cannot be overestimated in terms o the role

they play in increasing people-to-people exchanges

between Koreans and Americans. Younger people

are more likely to take advantage o these pro-

grams and thereby gain frsthand knowledge o

the United States, which should redound posi-

tively or the alliance. In short, the average Korean

students experience with the United States used

to be a combination o hearing negative stories in

public school about America, and or those who

still sought to travel to the United States, being

orced to stand in a visa line or hours outside the

American embassy. With options such as the visa

waiver and WEST, the experiences o the next

generation o Koreans will hopeully not be as

negative, which can contribute to greater goodwill

in the alliance.

Part 3: A Te nrt Ge,s Ge Te AiaceYou know, I am not North Koreas lawyer, but you

must understand how they see the world was the

preace oten provided by Blue House ofcials as

they launched into spirited explanations or why

the DPRK undertook a nuclear test in October2006 and why the United States must not overreact

and seek continued engagement with the regime.

For many Americans, the sight o anyone trying to

deend the North ater such an act o international

defance was ludicrous, and or a treaty ally to do

so was unacceptable. The problem or the U.S.-

ROK alliance was not a lack o communication

regarding North Korea, as the Americans under-

stood very well the contorted logic and excuses

that oten seemed to apply only to North Korea,

but that undamental gaps sometimes emergedwithin the alliance about the threats posed by

the regime.

Policy on North Korea is perhaps the most

important challenge or uture alliance interac-

tion. During the Cold War, there was very little

daylight between the two allies on North Korea.

Both adhered to a airly rigid policy o contain-

ment and non-dialogue vis--vis the threat rom

Pyongyang.14 Policy gaps on North Korea started

to emerge with the process o democratiza-

tion in Korea and with the end o the Cold War.

Democratization eectively politically legitimized

calls or less containment and more engagement

with the DPRK. Prior to democratization, any-

one who expressed such a viewpoint under the

military dictatorships was immediately consid-

ered pro-communist and thereore treasonous.

As democratization expanded the range o politi-

cally legitimate views on North Korea in the South,

the collapse o the Soviet Union opened the range

o possible policies that the United States mightpursue with the DPRK beyond one-dimensional

Cold War-era containment. A watershed moment

came with the June 2000 summit between Kim

and DPRK leader Kim Jong-il in which the ull

spectrum o views on engagement and contain-

ment were cemented in the Korean polity.

14 The dtente years (1971-1974) saw a small gap in policies. A s the Nixon administration increased contacts with communist China and the Soviet Union, there were also small

indications o an American willingness to engage in contacts with the Nor th. The Park Chung Hee regime responded by opening secret contacts with P yongyang through its

intelligence agency, leading to a surprise announcement o a joint communiqu on July 4, 1972.


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This spectrum o views has impacted the U.S.-ROK

alliance through two basic dynamics. First, ten-

sions arise between Seoul and Washington when

the United States is perceived to be too solicitous to

the North while the ROK is advocating a tougher

line. This was the predominant dynamic during

the Clinton-Kim years when the United States

and the DPRK were engaged in bilateral nuclearnegotiations that made the South Koreans para-

noid about alliance abandonment. Bob Gallucci,

the lead U.S. negotiator or the 1994 Agreed

Framework, once quipped that ater a long day o

meetings with the North Koreans he would meet

with the South Koreans to debrie them and would

be met with the cynical question, So, what did

you give away today? Second, alliance tension also

rises when the United States is perceived as tak-

ing a harder line while the ROK pushes or greater

engagement with the North. Many will recall that

the frst term o the Bush administration with the

Kim and Roh governments reected this dynamic

juxtaposing Bushs axis o evil speech and the

ROKs Sunshine Policy.

PoTEnTIAl AllIAnCE GAPs

Three key issues account or the possibility o

disagreement between the two al lies: denuclear-

ization, inter-Korean cooperation, and human

rights. Washington has always prioritized denu-clearization, to the criticism o some past ROK

governments that have not seen this as the primary

threat. On inter-Korean cooperation, the United

States has generally sought South Korean support

in conditioning economic assistance to the North

on its cooperation in the denuclearization process,

whereas some ROK governments have preerred

to advance inter-Korean economic cooperation

separately (e.g, to help develop the DPRK economy

and prepare or a sot landing should unifcation

ever come). The third issue is human rights viola-tions by the DPRK regime, which Washington has

tended to emphasize while the ROK has not.

Denuclearization

The U.S. has worked with the DPRK, China, Japan,

Russia, and South Korea to create a denuclear-

ization roadmap, known as the September 2005

Joint Statement o the Six-Party Talks. The frst

implementation step was taken with the July 2007

shutdown o the Yongbyon nuclear acility, where

the DPRK made plutonium or nuclear bombs,

and the reintroduction o the International Atomic

Energy Association or the frst time in fve years.

In accordance with the February 2007 initial

actions agreement and the October 2007 second

phase agreement, the six parties sought to achieve

a ull declaration (including highly enriched

uranium, plutonium, and nuclear devices) and

permanent disablement o all DPRK nuclear

acilities and activities by the end o 2007. Despite

delays, on June 26, 2008, North Korea destroyed

the cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor and pro-vided a nuclear declaration, eectively taking the

world urther in the denuclearization o the DPRK

than ever beore.

The Clinton administration ended its two

terms in ofce having achieved a reeze-or-

compensation ormula with international

monitoring o Yongbyon in exchange or supplies

o heavy uel oil. The Bush administration leaves

to the Obama administration a status quo that has

North Korean and South Korean soldiers ace each other acrossthe DMZ.


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| 23

advanced beyond a reeze o the DPRK nuclearprogram to a permanent disablement o the plu-

tonium-based acilities at Yongbyon. Unresolved

issues still remain, including the Norths unde-

clared nuclear sites and its uranium-based and

prolieration activities. The road to this outcome,

which was ar rom smooth, included the DPRKs

accumulation o a larger stockpile o plutonium

and a test o a nuclear device in October 2006.

As long as the next American president pursues

diplomacy (positive and, i necessary, coercive)

through the Six-Party Talks to denuclearize North

Korea, this will help to minimize the room or

dierences with Seoul. A good indicator o this

was Seouls positive response to the Bush admin-

istrations October 2008 decision to remove North

Korea rom the terrorism blacklist in exchange or

Pyongyangs agreement on a verifcation protocol

or its June 2008 nuclear declaration. Many in

Washington characterized Bushs decision to pre-

maturely delist a country he once put in the axis o

evil as a Hail Mary pass by an administration des-

perate or good news. The optics were undeniably

bad, as the delisting came ater North Korean mis-

sile tests, the ejection o international inspectors

rom previously locked-down nuclear acilities,

and good doses o fery North Korean rhetoric

against Seoul. The ROK, however, viewed it as a

positive step that put in place a verifcation scheme

that can acilitate the continued disabling and

degrading o the Norths nuclear capabilities. The

conclusion o an agreement may have the counter-

intuitive eect o deprioritizing the issue or thenext U.S. administration, but the overriding merit

according to many South Koreans is that it averted

a crisis while moving orward on denuclearization.

In the end, Washington and Seouls capacity to

stay on the same page regarding North Korea and

the Six-Party Talks will depend on their rela-

tive patience in managing the dilemma o DPRK

unreasonableness. Washington and Seoul must

engage in a Six-Party process in which every

agreement is negotiated with painstaking care;parties should hammer out specifc quid pro quos,

timelines, and the synchronization o steps, with

concomitant rewards and penalties. Yet, sooner

or later, Pyongyang will demand more than it was

promised or will do less than it should. Although

everyone will accept that North Korea is being

unreasonable, they must also realize that a ailure

o the agreement could mean the ailure o the

talks and the precipitation o another crisis.

At the core o the all 2008 impasse, or example,

was the Norths spurious claim that its Junenuclear declaration was sufcient or it to be taken

o o the U.S. terrorism blacklist and that verifca-

tion o the declaration was not part o the deal. As

a ormer deputy negotiator or the U.S. delegation

to the Six-Party Talks, I can attest that the North

Koreans ully understood our need or verifcation

as ar back as the September 2005 joint statement

(the roadmap agreement) and the February 2007

frst phase and October 2007 second phase

As long as the next

American president

pursues diplomacy

(positive and, i necessary,

coercive) through the

Six-Party Talks to

denuclearize North Korea,

this will help to minimize

the room or dierenceswith Seoul.


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implementation agreements, as did Seoul and the

other participants. Yet, although all expressed

outrage at Pyongyangs petulance, the parties,

including South Korea, end up pressing the United

States knowing ull well that the North was at

ault and was traversing the bounds o airness andgood aith but certain that the only chance o prog-

ress lay in American reasonableness. Generally, the

result is that any additional American exibility

is widely perceived in the region as evidence o

American leadership but is viewed in Washington

as some combination o desperation and weakness.

How well Seoul and Washington manage this bal-

ance will be important.

Inter-Korean Cooperation

As noted above, Washingtons preerence is or

Seoul to coordinate its inter-Korean economic

cooperation with progress in Six Party-Talks.

Without this condition, the provision o goods to

the North reduces all incentives or Pyongyang

to cooperate in the denuclearization talks. The

South Korean rationale or such conditionality

in inter-Korean assistance is not simply kowtow-

ing to U.S. needs, but judging that it is not in the

ROKs national interest to seek reconciliation with

a North Korea that retains nuclear weapons. Itis incumbent upon the ROK to portray the issue

publicly in such a manner. I it does not, the risk is

a popular view in Seoul (particularly among radi-

cals) that the United States is standing in the way

o Korean reconciliation.

One development that will improve U.S.-ROK pol-

icy coordination on North Korea is the diminished

role o the South Korean unifcation ministry in

Six-Party policy. With the advent o the Sunshine

Policy under President Kim Young-sam and Roh,

Seoul placed a priority on inter-Korean reconcili-

ation, eectively delinking this process rom the

Six-Party Talks. The unifcation ministry was

given a large budget or inter-Korean cooperation

and was able to spend it without much oversight

rom either the economic ministries or the or-

eign ministry. The result was that the unifcation

ministry gained a great deal o power within the

ROK government, oten operating at odds with

the larger policy objectives o the Six-Party part-

ners. Holding the purse strings and operating

with top cover rom the Blue House to improve

inter-Korean relations, the unifcation ministry

oten engaged unconditionally with the North

and disrupted the oreign ministrys ability to

align the ROKs inter-Korean cooperation policies

with the pace o the Six-Party Talks. There were

moments when the Roh government did condition

inter-Korean assistance on North Koreas posi-

tive behavior in the Six-Party Talks (e.g., ater the

October 2006 nuclear test), and this was eective

in getting the North to agree to the February 2007agreement. Yet, this was not the norm.

Under Lee, the unifcation ministry has been sub-

stantially stripped o its power. Nearly 40 percent

o the unifcation ministrys personnel have been

cut and most o its once-large budget has been

redistributed to the economic ministries. The

economic ministries have chaed at being obligated

to implement many o the fnancially irrational

projects or North Korea as dictated by the Blue

In the end, Washington

and Seouls capacity to

stay on the same page

regarding North Korea and

the Six-Party Talks will

depend on their relative

patience in managingthe dilemma o DPRK

unreasonableness.


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House and unifcation ministry ofcials. In the

atermath o the December 2007 election, these

economic ministries worked hard to persuade the

business-minded president-elect and his transition

team to rationalize economic policy toward North

Korea, and were airly successul in this eort.

Moreover, the oreign ministry, along with the BlueHouse, has a lso taken back the unifcation minis-

trys role in chairing the interagency coordination

meetings in which policy is hammered out (akin to

the American Principals Committee meetings).

What this means or the alliance is that U.S. and

ROK coordination on Six-Party policy should be

a lot smoother than it has been in the past. The

unifcation ministrys reduced power removes a

specifc bureaucratic obstacle to U.S.-ROK policy

coordination, reecting the larger ideological shitrom Roh to Lee.

Human Rights

Human rights are one aspect o the DPRK prob-

lem on which the United States and the ROK have

hardly been on the same page. During the Kim

Young-sam presidency, the ROK took a airly

tough line on human rights abuses by the DPRK,

demanding among other things that Pyongyang

return South Korean prisoners o war. Kim alsocriticized the Clinton administration or moving

orward with its nuclear and political talks with

Pyongyang in spite o ROK concerns. Some ten

years later, George W. Bush made North Korean

human rights abuses a major part o his policy,

appointing the frst-ever special envoy or DPRK

human rights abuses (Jay Lekowitz); overseeing

the creation o programs or the frst-ever resettle-

ment o DPRK reugees in the United States;

and inviting North Korean deectors into the

Oval Ofce.

Having seen President Bush interact with these

individuals, I believe that his concerns or the

people o North Korea were truly heartelt. In

terms o alliance relations, however, Bushs empha-

sis on human rights did not sit well with the Kim

Dae Jung or Roh Moo-hyun governments, which

perceived many o these U.S. actions as code or

a neoconservative desire to collapse the regime.

Seoul categorically reused to make critical state-

ments about DPRK human rights abuses, reused

to vote or UN resolutions, and only with great

difculty agreed to language in U.S.-ROK joint

statements discussing the dire conditions o the

North Korean people.

The Obama administration and the Lee govern-

ment have the opportunity to reboot and realign

their relative positions on human rights. Bush and

Lee, both deeply religious men, took a step in this

direction, agreeing to include a specifc reerence

to DPRK human rights problems in their 2008

joint statement. Additionally, the ROK under Leehas voted or the annual UN resolution on North

Korean human rights abuses (whereas previous

ROK governments did not). Nonetheless, there is

clearly room or more coordination. Seoul could

appoint its own special envoy or DPRK human

rights, who could host the frst international

conerence on the issue. Whatever the specifc

measures, the benchmark or United States and

the ROK should be to move beyond an agreement

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il duringtheir historic meeting in 2007.


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26 |

in words to achieving measurable steps thatimprove the lives o the North Korean people.

GUIDInG PRInCIPlEs FoR ThE FUTURE

The next American president must approach the

Six-Party negotiations not as a wide-eyed optimist,

but with a systematic strategy designed to test

and push the North to nuclear dismantlement. It

is entirely plausible that Pyongyang will attempt

new provocations, both to test the new American

president and to gain attention rom a new admin-

istration distracted by Aghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan,

and the fnancial crisis. In this regard, policy gapsbetween the United States and South Korea are

certainly possible. A new U.S. administration,

needing to prove its bona fdes, may be less toler-

ant o the inevitable North Korean antics because

it perceives them as tests o an untested admin-

istration. Meanwhile, a domestically weak Lee

government may crave more U.S. reasonableness

and patience in response to North Korean testing

in order to avert a crisis on the peninsula.

However uid the environment, Seoul andWashington need to adhere to some basic and core

principles to minimize their dierences. First, the

United States must demonstrate that it remains

committed to a peaceul diplomatic solution.

Despite all o the speculation that the hardliners

in either a Republican or Democratic administra-

tion may consider coercive options and/or regime

change, and notwithstanding the obligatory

proclamations by any responsible leader that all

options, including military, must be on the table,

peaceul diplomacy is the only practical solution.Even during the George W. Bush administrations,

at no time did any high-level White House ofcial

advocate or present in Six-Party capitals the option

o regime change, contrary to the pundits views.

The second principle is that the North Korean

nuclear problem must be dealt with through a

multilateral approach. Ater the breakdown o the

1994 U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement, the view was

that a return to diplomacy must integrally involve

key regional players that have material inuence

on the DPRK, especially China. The United States

cannot aord exclusive bilateral negotiations with

the DPRK in which China would ree ride on U.S.

eorts to solve the problem but reuse to support

any pressure while providing backchannel aid

to Pyongyang to avoid regime collapse. Chinas

continued hosting o the Six-Party Talks orces it

to take ownership o the problem as Chinese ace

becomes integrally intertwined with preventing a

nuclear North Korea.

At each critical point in the crisis, U.S.-Chinese

cooperation has been important to achieving the

desired outcome. This was the case with regard to

Chinas unprecedented support or UN Security

Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 in response

to the DPRKs missile and nuclear tests in 2006.

Moreover, China has pressed the DPRK in material

ways that will never show up in trade fgures but

that have had a real impact. Pyongyangs palpable

It is entirely plausible

that Pyongyang will

attempt new provocations,

both to test the new

American president and

to gain attention rom

a new administration

distracted by Aghanistan,

Iraq, Pakistan, and the

fnancial crisis.


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distrust o Beijing is perhaps the most credibleindicator o this new dynamic. A relationship

once described as close as lips and teeth is no

longer the case. Any uture administration would

be wise to continue to press and shape China into

playing this role vis--vis the Six-Party Talks and

North Korea.

The third enunciated principle behind U.S. policy

should be to thoroughly test the DPRKs denucle-

arization intentions. Whatever negotiation tactics a

new administration might use, they should remain

consistent with the principle o systematically

deciphering DPRK motivations. The guiding tenet

should be to test whether the DPRK is serious or

just trying to socialize everyone to accepting the

North as a nuclear weapons power. Some would

argue that testing the DPRK is a bad principle

because it soon becomes impossible to distinguish

between diplomacy designed to test Pyongyangs

intentions and unbridled appeasement to DPRK

demands. For example, when the United States

gradually edged into more exclusive bilateral nego-

tiations with the DPRK toward the end o the Bush

administration, critics asked whether this new

ormat was designed to test DPRK intentions or

merely caving to North Korean demands by a weak

U.S. administration.

How ar should the next administration go to test

the DPRK? As is oten the case in the policy world,

the president and his national security team must

make this judgment call as events evolve. The

importance o the testing principle is that it dem-

onstrates U.S. political commitment and patience.What Asia has always asked o the United States is

to show true political will to deal with this isolated

country. Doing this aords Washington much

goodwill and political capital in Asia. Moreover,

adhering to the principle o testing the DPRK in

negotiations inoculates the United States rom

being perceived as the problem and shines the

spotlight or a breakdown in the Six-Party Talks

on the DPRK. The only conceivable circumstanceunder which China or South Korea (which still

have the most material inuence on the North)

would consent to ull sanctions against the DPRK

is ater Six-Party and U.S. testing o the North

had ailed. In this regard, even so-called hawks

in the next administration should see a continu-

ation o the Six-Party process as the vehicle that

best advances U.S. interests and best positions the

United States and the ROK or the success o the

denuclearization project.

In sum, the new U.S. administration should not

be a wide-eyed optimist on North Korea. Instead,

it will need to pursue a systematic diplomatic

strategy designed to test the DPRK. I Pyongyangproves to be serious, the Six-Party partners will

press the negotiation harder, moving to the fnal

phase o nuclear dismantlement. I Pyongyang

does not ulfll its end o the agreement, it will be

clear to all where the blame sits or the breakdown

o the agreement. This clarity will make it easier to

build a multilateral coalition or a tougher course

o action as needed.

Whatever negotiation

tactics a new

administration might

use, they should

remain consistent

with the principle o

systematically deciphering

DPRK motivations.


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28 |

PREPARInG FoR ChAnGE

A pressing task or the U.S.-ROK alliance is to

prepare or change in North Korea. An altering o

the political status quo north o the DMZ could

potentially be one o the most signifcant events

in postwar East Asian international relations. A

leadership vacuum in North Korea could have

ramifcations or Chinese and Japanese security.

It would impact U.S.-Chinese and Korean-

Chinese relations. I political leadership change in

Pyongyang led to a collapse o political order, the

potential or loose nukes or other military sce-

narios could create a crisis o proportions not seen

since the Korean War.

Those who have studied the peninsula might

entertain such concerns with a jaded sense o pas-

sivism. Ater all, when Kim Il Sung died suddenly

in July 1994, there was no collapse o the regime.

Ongoing nuclear negotiations with the United

States were completed a mere three months later.

The country went through a period o amine

in the 1990s the only industrialized society in

recent history to have suered one due to eco-

nomic mismanagement and survived. And Kim

Jong-il, despite his many eccentricities and health

problems, still appears to be in control.

Yet, a conuence o orces leads one to believe thatthe DPRK regime will come under severe stress

in the near uture. The frst actor has to do with

the rumors circulating about Kim Jong-ils health

in 2008. Although it is difcult to confrm any o

these rumors, it is airly clear that the 66-year-old

dictators physical wellbeing has reached a tipping

point. Having undergone at least one heart pro-

cedure in 2007 and likely another in 2008 based

on oreign press reports, the Dear Leaders time in

ofce appears limited. I not incapacitated already,

another stroke could be debilitating, i not atal.Major heart or brain surgery, moreover, would

carry a high mortality risk. Unlike the last leader-

ship transition, there is no clear line o succession

to any o his three sons.

The diplomacy related to Six-Party Talks has

reached a potential tipping point. Both good and

bad scenarios coming out o the current Six-Party

Talks will invariably put stress on Pyongyang.

The bad scenario is airly straight orward. I

Pyongyang balks at ulflling its end o the Six-

Party agreement, this will likely be ollowed

by tighter sanctions, activation o UN Security

Council Resolution 1718, and other types o fnan-

cial measures. The underlying rationale would be

that ater a nearly two-decade record o negotia-

tions requiring rather high levels o U.S. exibility

and political will, Pyongyang would have proved

its unwillingness to denuclearize. This would not

be a partisan assessment, but would be based on

a documented record o U.S. eorts going back

to the very able eorts o the Clinton adminis-tration, which achieved a verifable reeze on the

Yongbyon acility. This records carries through to

the end o the Bush administration, which frst saw

the status quo undone in 2002 ater revelations o

Pyongyangs involvement in nuclear activities in

violation o the 1994 Agreed Framework and the

North-South denuclearization declaration, but

then managed to push the negotiations beyond a

reeze to disablement o the main nuclear acility

An altering o the

political status quo

north o the DMZ could

potentially be one o the

most signifcant events

in postwar East Asianinternational relations.


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| 29

at Yongbyon (with some obvious bumps in theroad). The ault or the ailed negotiations would

thereore lie at the eet o Pyongyang, and no one

else, which should make regional partners consider

an alternate tougher course o action.

On the other hand, i things go well in the diplo-

macy, this could also put stress on the regime.

Pyongyangs accession to verifcation o its nuclear

programs could conceivably be ollowed by greater

economic and political interaction with the

outside world, which might be more contact than

the brittle regime can handle. Completion o the

second phase (i.e., declaration and disablement) o

the Six-Party agreement and the start o the third

phase or endgame (i.e., dismantlement) would

likely carry with it new channels o economic assis-

tance and

the future of the u.s.-south korea alliance

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