the future of colombian coal exports international steam coal … · 2017. 9. 27. · our research...
TRANSCRIPT
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The future of Colombian coal exports –
International steam coal market
in the era of climate policies
IAEE European Conference; Vienna, 6th September, 2017
Dr. Pao-Yu Oei, Dr. Roman Mendelevitch
Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP; TU Berlin); German Economic Research Institute (DIW Berlin)
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Agenda
1. Motivation
2. Colombia`s role in the international steam coal market
3. Trends in current import partners, mainly Europe and US
4. Perspectives for possible new export partners in South-East Asia
5. Implications of the upcoming global coal phase-out
- 2 -
Motivation: 70-90% of coal, 30-60% of gas and 30-60% of oil
reserves has to stay unmined to reach the 2°C target
Source: McGlade & Ekins (2015)
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Times are changing for coal
The success of renewables (and lower gas prices in some regions) have lead to a reduction of
coal demand in the western world. Several smaller countries in the EU are already coal-
free or will phase-out in the 2020s.
The Republic of China has introduced a moratorium on new coal power plants and mines and
India is observing a much slower increase of coal demand than expected.
As a result, steam coal production declined by around 28% between 2005 and 2015.
Coal companies world-wide are struck with low prices and are challenged by ongoing
divestment movements.
0
50
100
150
200
US
D Eurozone CIF
FOB Richards Bay
FOB Newcastle
Crude oil
Source: HWWI commodity prices in the Thompson Reuters Datastream database.
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Colombia`s future as 4th largest exporter of steam coal
There already exists a wide range of studies that put foci on various environmental and social
implications of the coal mining industry in Colombia (e.g., see Moor and van de Sandt 2014;
CAN 2016b; Hawkins 2014; Chomsky and Striffler 2014; CINEP/PPP 2014; Schücking 2013).
Our research focus lies on: How will coal exporting countries, such as Colombia, be affected
by the decline of the coal industry?
Doing so, requires an analysis of
• the competitiveness of the coal exporting country (in this case: Colombia),
• current market development in other coal producing and consuming countries,
• prospects for future Colombian coal exports.
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Agenda
1. Motivation
2. Colombia`s role in the international steam coal market
3. Trends in current import partners, mainly Europe and US
4. Perspectives for possible new export partners in South-East Asia
5. Implications of the upcoming global coal phase-out
- 6 -
Colombia: Coal mining activities and its electricity system
based mostly on hydropower
The Colombian coal sector is dominated by three
international firms:
• Cerrejón, owned by a consortium of BHP
Billiton, Anglo American and Glencore;
• US-based Drummond; and
• Prodeco, a Glencore subsidiary.
In Colombia, two areas – La Guajira and Cesar –
account for over 90% of the annual production.
Currently, around 30.000 people are directly
employed by the three biggest coal companies.
Source: Own illustration based on UPME (2014) and USGS (2006).
Electricity from
Hydro
Gas
Coal
Port
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The competitiveness of Colombian steam coal: High quality…
• The degree to which a particular supplier of steam coal can be substituted depends on the
specifics of the power plant and on the coal it is designed for.
• Colombian high quality coal is compatible with modern high efficiency power plants. Coal
from Indonesia and South Africa on average is of lower quality and needs future
preparation and beneficiation before it could substitute Colombian coal in high efficiency
supercritical and ultra-supercritical boilers.
• Coal-fired power plants in India and South-East Asia are designed for low quality coal and
cannot easily switch to other suppliers offering high quality coal, such as from Colombia.
Region Calorific value in kcal/kg Energy content in GJ/t
USA Appalachia 6949 29.075
China Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia 6597 27.600
Australia Queensland 6500 27.196
Colombia 6375 26.673
Australia New South Wales 6300 26.359
South Africa 5500 23.013
Indonesia 5450 22.803
India West 5209 21.793
USA Powder River Basin 4781 20.004
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… at relatively low supply costs.
In Colombia, much of the infrastructure for transport to and at the export terminals is
undergoing expansion or has recently been expanded despite the negative outlook.
The widening of the Panama Canal in 2016 is expected to increase the competitiveness of
Colombian steam coal exports also on the Pacific market. Potential drawbacks for this
route are, however, an additional fee of $300,000 per capesize ship (resulting in a mark-up
of ~2$/t coal) and maximum loading restrictions due to the canal's draft restrictions.
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- 9 -
Coal exports from Colombia
Colombia increased its export volumes steadily from 14Mt of coal in 1990 to 82Mt in 2012.
Having become the 4th largest exporter of steam coal, its export figures stayed relatively
constant until 2015.
The value of these coal exports ranks second with 14% (behind Crude Petroleum comprising a
share of 34%) of overall Colombian exports. Most coal exports are bound to the USA and
the European Union.
These export volumes make Colombia vulnerable to changes of global resources’ demand and
prices. A reduction of international steam coal prices resulted in a strong decrease of
Colombia´s coal rents from an all-time high of 2.3% of GDP in 2008 to 0.5 in 2015.
Main export destinations of
Colombian steam coal
Source: VDKI and IEA/OECD
(2016).
- 10 -
Agenda
1. Motivation
2. Colombia`s role in the international steam coal market
3. Trends in current import partners, mainly Europe and US
4. Perspectives for possible new export partners in South-East Asia
5. Implications of the upcoming global coal phase-out
- 11 -
Coal capacities in Europe observe a decreasing trend.
Coal free countries in the EU: BE, CY, EE, LT, LU, LV, MT
Source: CAN database / Sandbag (2016)
2025
2025
2025
2020
2020s
?
2016
- 12 -
The outlook for coal in the US is negative. The change of
national government will not influence the global dynamics.
The share of coal in total electricity generation declined from 52.3% in 2000 to 34.3% in 2015.
This is largely on economic grounds and in particular, due to the boom in production of low-
priced domestic shale gas, and the availability of cheap renewable technologies.
Further important drivers are federal and state level promotion of wind and solar energy as well
as environmental policies for coal-fired power plants. Given the aging coal-fired power plant
fleet (with 85% older than 30 years and 50% older than 40 years) the environmental policies
mentioned above were supposed to lead to power plants increasingly being decommissioned
rather than refurbished.
Numerous U.S. coal producers (including Peabody Energy Cooperation, Arch Coal Inc., and Alpha
Natural Resources, listed first, second and forth in the top four U.S. coal mining companies) have
filed for bankruptcy and 271 mines were closed in the last years.
The current U.S. administration, however, targets to take back measures
introduced in the Climate Action Plan and instead to support clean
coal technology, soften emission standards for new coal-fired power
plants, lift the moratorium on new coal mine leases and announced
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. However, for the next years
the competitiveness of the US domestic coal sector will be
governed by the evolution of the gas price and cost of
renewables rather than by the rollback of environmental
regulation by the Trump Administration.
Source: SPON (2017).
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Agenda
1. Motivation
2. Colombia`s role in the international steam coal market
3. Trends in current import partners, mainly Europe and US
4. Perspectives for possible new export partners in South-East Asia
5. Implications of the upcoming global coal phase-out
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The global coal power pipeline is currently observing a major
hault, dominated by the happenings in China and India [MW]
Coal capacities are displayed in GW; Source: Shearer et al. (2017).
Emerging countries are expecting rising energy demands due to population growth and
economic development resulting in the construction of numerous new coal power plants.
China and India accounted for 86% of global installed coal power capacity 2006-2016.
Many projects, however, were shelved in the last year; see coal power plant pipeline in 2017:
- 15 -
Dramatic changes to China’s coal pathway with a big
uncertainty about future developments
• Electricity generated by coal peaked in
2013, coal power capacity cap of 1,100GW
to be reached in 2020 (921 GW installed as
of January 2017; representing 47% of global
installed power capacity).
• Capacity factor of power plants
decreased below 50% in 2015 and 2016.
• Plans to retire older coal power plants.
• Suspension of new plant approvals and
halt on construction in several provinces;
Total amount of cancelled projects between
2010 and 2016: 203 GW. Cancellation of
100 specific plant projects from September
2016 to January 2017.
Sources: Climate Action Tracker (2017a); Endcoal (2017a, 2017b); Isoaho (2016); Shearer et al. (2017).
The implemented climate and environmental policies have already resulted in a hault
of coal consumption and the beginning of a Chinese coal phase-out earlier than
expected.
China, therefore, needs alternative renewable energy sources.
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Status-quo of coal in India
• Installed coal capacity grew from 71 GW in 2007 to
212 GW in January 2017 (11% of global capacity).
• Rapid expansion resulted in falling capacity factors.
• Leading coal power producers (e.g. Adani) suspended
investments and further development.
• Draft Electricity Plan: No new coal capacity needed
between 2022-27, apart from the 48 GW already under
construction.
• India implemented a tax on coal of US$ 3.2/t coal;
revenues go to the National Clean Environment Fund.
Indian coal consumption has grown much slower
than expected.
India needs alternative energy sources to provide
all people with cheap electricity.
Sources: Climate Action Tracker (2017b); CoalSwarm (2017); Shearer et al. (2017)
Installed
capacity
Put on hold in
total (end 2016)
Previously under
construction put on hold
Cancelled
during 2016
Pre-
construction
Active
construction
212 82 13 115 129 48
Coal capacities in 2017 [GW]
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Agenda
1. Motivation
2. Colombia`s role in the international steam coal market
3. Trends in current import partners, mainly Europe and US
4. Perspectives for possible new export partners in South-East Asia
5. Implications of the upcoming global coal phase-out
- 18 -
The upcoming coal phase out effects countries differently and
therefore needs a combination of various political instruments
Need to differentiate between countries:
that only mine coal (e.g. Colombia)
• employment
• income from exports
those burning coal (e.g. UK and many countries in Europe)
• energy security
• (employment)
those doing both (e.g. US, China, India, South-Africa, Germany)
• energy security
• employment
• (income from exports)
that only mine coal (e.g. Colombia)
• employment
• income from exports
those burning coal (e.g. UK and many countries in Europe)
• energy security
• (employment)
those doing both (e.g. US, China, India, South-Africa, Germany)
• energy security
• employment
• (income from exports)
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Coal phase-out concepts need to incorporate different regional
aspects
Financial paymentsas compensation fora moratorium on new mines
--------------------
Support for RES tomeet rising energydemand, enableenergy access & create jobs
Active & passive labour marketinstruments toenable a just transition
e.g. Colombia
Moratorium on newmines
Existing coal power plant fleets need tobe closed
Support for RES toreplace fossil capacities & createjobs
Active & passive labour marketinstruments to enablea just transition
e.g. Europe or
USMoratorium on newmines; maybe linkedwith compensations
Moratorium for newplants to prevent(stranded) assets
Support for RES tomeet rising energydemand, enableenergy access & create jobs
Active labour marketinstruments tocreate new jobs
e.g. China or
IndiaFinancial paymentsas compensation fora moratorium on new mines
--------------------
Support for RES tomeet rising energydemand, enableenergy access & create jobs
Active & passive labour marketinstruments toenable a just transition
e.g. Colombia
Moratorium on newmines
Existing coal power plant fleets need tobe closed
Support for RES toreplace fossil capacities & createjobs
Active & passive labour marketinstruments to enablea just transition
e.g. Europe or
USMoratorium on newmines; maybe linkedwith compensations
Moratorium for newplants to prevent(stranded) assets
Support for RES tomeet rising energydemand, enableenergy access & create jobs
Active labour marketinstruments tocreate new jobs
e.g. China or
India
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Direct effects of the upcoming coal phase-out for Colombia
The speed of the coal phase-out will not be driven by the remaining coal reserves. The
main driver for the coal phase-out will be shrinking global demand due to climate
and environmental policies as well as direct competition from cheaper and
cleaner energy sources. This trend can be seen in the Atlantic as well as Pacific
steam coal market.
Coal exporting countries, such as Colombia, are at risk not only to lose high shares of
their state income but also to be left alone with mono-industrialized regions with
low chances for a transition towards alternative and more sustainable industry
sectors. Not needed mining investments can be categorized as stranded and
should be redirected to prevent unnecessary use of financial means and resources.
Divestment strategies or bankruptcy of coal firms might lead to insufficient provisions for
mining recultivation and result in additional costs for the Colombian state and its
people. The Colombian case is at risk of becoming another example of the
“resource curse”.
A consistent global and national policy mix and strategies are needed for the closure
of older coal plants, the ban on new coal mines and plants, the diversification of the
technology mix, and investments into lucrative renewables to manage this transition.
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The future of Colombian coal exports –
International steam coal market
in the era of climate policies
IAEE European Conference; Vienna, 6th September, 2017
Dr. Pao-Yu Oei, Dr. Roman Mendelevitch
Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP; TU Berlin); German Economic Research Institute (DIW Berlin)
- 22 -
Colombia´s electricity system is mostly based on hydropower
Steam coal is therefore mostly exported
Installed Capacities and future capacity expansions:
Source: UPME (2014).
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Port
Port Electricity from
Hydro
Gas
Coal
- 25 -
Different policy instruments exist to enable a coal phase-out
(demand and supply side, technology support, labour)
PROPOSED MEASURE EXPECTED EFFECT
Forbidding new mines Terminating current plans for new minings sites
Closing existing mines Reducing mining volumes of active mines
Increasing the CO2 price / EU-ETS reform Price signal through the introduction of market stability reserve (MSR);
CO2 floor price CO2 certificates would become more expensive
Minimum efficiency Closure of inefficient power plants
Flexibility requirements Closure or singling out of inflexible power plants
Coal phase-out law Maximum production [TWh] or emissions allowances [tCO2] for plants
Emissions performance standard (per
unit; for new plants and retrofits)
Restrictions for new plants and retrofits (without CO2 capture) [< x g/MWh]
Emissions performance standard
(emissions cap for existing plants)
Reduce load factor for depreciated coal-fired power plants (e.g., >30y) [< x
g/MW]
Capacity mechanisms or reserve plants Incentive for construction of less CO2-intensive power plants
Climate contribution fee Additional levy for old CO2-intensive power plants
Support of RES & technology transfer Enabling suffcient clean energy sources to replace coal plants
Active & Passive labour policies Creation of new job opportunities; ease potential job losses
Source: Updated from Oei et al. (2014).
- 26 -
Coal phase-out concepts need to incorporate different regional
aspects
Existing coal power plant fleets need to beclosed
Support for RES toreplace conventionalcapacities
Active & passive labour market instruments to enable a just transition
e.g. Europe or US
Moratorium for newplants/ mines toprevent (stranded) assets
Support for RES tomeet rising energydemand and enableenergy access
e.g. China
or India
- 27 -
Main Findings on the upcoming global coal phase-out
1. The climate targets of Paris imply a global phase-out of coal. The majority
of resources has to stay in the ground.
2. There is a global trend to phase-out coal power plants in several
countries, which is economically efficient.
3. A global energy system based on 100% renewable energy sources until
2050 is technically possible and can be achieved at low costs.
4. A consistent global and national strategies and policy mix is needed
for the closure of older plants, the ban on new coal mines, the diversification of
the technology mix, and investments into lucrative renewables.
5. The access of all citizens to avordable renewable electricity is a major
challenge for some emerging countries. A just energy transition, however,
also creates new jobs and opportunities for various regions and sectors.
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Coal mining in Colombia
The coal mine “Cerrejon Zona Norte”, run by Cerrejon and located in La Guajira, is the largest
open pit mine in South America. Its annual production reached 34 Mt in 2014.
The second largest steam coal producer with around 20 Mt/year is US-based Drummond Ltd,
which operates two major mines near La Loma in the department of Cesar.
The third biggest operator Prodeco, a subsidiary of Glencore, is operating its mine Calenturitas
located between the municipalities El Paso, La Jagua de Ibirico and Becerril; in the department
of Cesar. Its production reached 11 Mt in 2015.
Production from smaller coal mining companies operating in Colombia sum up to 7.6 Mt/a.
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Coal mining
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The importance of coal for Colombia
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Articles (selection)
• Oei et al. (2016): „Kohlereserve“ vs. CO2-Grenzwerte in der
Stromwirtschaft – Ein modellbasierter Vergleich“,
Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 1-2/2016
• Collins, and Mendelevitch (2015): Leaving Coal Unburned: Options
for Demand-Side and Supply-Side Policies, DIW Berlin, DIW
Roundup 87, Berlin, Germany.
• Richter, Mendelevitch and Jotzo (2015): Market Power Rents and
Climate Change Mitigation: A Rationale for Coal Taxes?, DIW Berlin,
DIW Discussion Paper 1471, Berlin, Germany.
• Holz, Haftendorn, Mendelevitch, and Hirschhausen (2015): The
COALMOD-World Model: Coal Markets until 2030, in R. K. Morse and
M.C. Thurber (Eds.) “The Global Coal Market - Supplying the Major
Fuel for Emerging Economies”. Cambridge University Press.
• Oei et al. (2014): Modeling a Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage
Infrastructure for Europe“. Journal of Environmental Modeling and
Assessment 05/2014
Politikberatung kompakt and DIW Wochberichte (selection):
• Oei et al. (2015): 104: Auswirkungen von CO2-Grenzwerten
für fossile Kraftwerke auf Strommarkt und
Klimaschutz in Deutschland. Politikberatung 104.
• Oei et al. (2014): 84: Braunkohleausstieg – Gestaltungsoptionen im
Rahmen der Energiewende. Politikberatung 84.
• Oei et al. (2014): Kohle und Klimaschutz. DIW Wochbericht 14-26
Publications by DIW Berlin on coal and lignite (Selection)
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Electricity Generation in the EU: Coal vs. Gas Phase-out
Source: Agora Energiewende 2016
- 37 -
Reserves of lignite and hard coal in Europe (2012): The
majority has to remain in the ground to meet climate targets
So
urc
e: E
ura
co
al(2
01
3)
- 38 -
Most coal power plants in China are located at the east-coast
Sources: Climate Action Tracker (2017a); Government of China (2015); Coal Swarm (2017).
Note: The numbers tell
the number of generating
units at each location.
- 39 -
Share of installed capacity in 2015
Coal RES (without hydro)
Northern Region 58% 2%
Western Region 64% 17%
Southern Region 47% 28%
Eastern Region 83% 3%
North Eastern Region 15% 7%
Islands 0% 24%
India Total 59% 17%
The coal phase-out will have different structural effects shown
by an analysis of current dependencies on coal & renewables
Especially the Northern and Eastern Region are vulnerable to the upcoming
structural changes of the energy transition, as they have a high dependence on coal
and very small amounts of renewable energy capacities.
Source: Own calculation based on Central Electricity Authority (2017): Installed capacity. http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/installedcapacity/2017/installed_capacity-05.pdf
- 40 -
Modeling a 100% Renewable Energy Scenario for China with
the Energy System Model ReMSYS based on wind and PV
Source: Own modeling results with ReMSYS..
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Ele
ctr
icit
y g
en
era
tio
n [
TW
h]
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Modeling a 100% RES Scenario for India with the Energy
System Model ReMSYS: Rising electricity demand met by PV
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Ele
ctri
city
ge
ne
rati
on
[TW
h]
Source: Own modeling results with ReMSYS..
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Hypotheses about India‘s future energy transformation
Hypothesis 1: Cheaper than expected renewables can satisfy India’s growing electricity demand
without any more added coal capacity than the power plants already under construction.
Hypothesis 3: A change in leadership (Prime Minister Narendra Modi) brought about a new vision
of a solar future, threatening the old fossil fuel based power structures in industries and politics.
Hypothesis 2: To create a successful Indian sustainability energy transition, the access of all
citizens to electricity and a drastic reduction of poverty are indispensable.
Hypothesis 4: The current complex energy sector governance hinders policy developments. The
transition will be led by state governments, and has to be fostered across classes and castes.
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Dramatic changes to China’s coal pathway with a big
uncertainty about future developments
• Electricity generated by coal peaked most likely in 2013, capacity factor of power plants was
below 50% in 2015 and 2016, coal accounted for 66% of total energy consumption in 2014
• China’s 13th Five-Year-Plan: maximum 58% share of coal in national energy consumption by 2020
• Increasingly low utilisation rate of coal plants, reaction by China’s National Energy Administration
and National Development and Reform Commission:
Suspension of new plant approvals in 13 provinces and regions
Ban on new coal mines from 2016-2018
A halt on construction in 15 provinces and regions
Exception for projects in poor areas and old revolutionary base areas
Plans to retire older coal power plants
• Coal power capacity cap of 1,100GW (921 GW installed as of January 2017; representing 47%
of global installed power capacity)
• Cancellation of 100 specific plant projects from September 2016 to January 2017 (Allowed
projects in 2015:142 GW, in 2016: 22 GW. Total pre-construction capacity in the pipeline: 134 GW
• Total amount of cancelled projects between 2010 and 2016: 203 GW.
• Additional 35 GW are under construction since 2016, 55 GW were put on hold since 2016.
Sources: Climate Action Tracker (2017a); Endcoal (2017a, 2017b); Isoaho (2016); Shearer et al. (2017).
- 44 -
China’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)
• Commitment to peak CO2 emissions around 2030, “making the best effort to peak early”
• Lower carbon intensity of GDP by 60%–65% below 2005 levels by 2030
• Increase share of non-fossil energy carriers in total primary energy supply to ~20% by 2030
• Increase forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic metres compared to 2005 levels
• Total GHG emissions likely to continue increasing until 2030: no sufficient policies addressing non-
CO2 GHG emissions (CH4, N2O, HFCs etc.)
• => China’s Paris Agreement NDC is less ambitious than China’s current policies and its national
targets. The NDC is not in line with a fair share of the 2°C (or the 1.5°C) target
Sources: Climate Action Tracker (2017a); Government of China (2015); Coal Swarm (2017).
Note: The numbers tell the number of
generating units at each location.
- 45 -
Additional Info China (1/2)
• Most populated country globally, second largest economy in the world, second largest
concentration of poverty in the world, large-scale urbanization still ongoing
• Autocracy; main parties: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 8 other small parties controlled by
the CCP
• National Program on Climate Change, the12th and 13th Five-Year Plan for Energy Conservation
and Emission Reduction, the Action Plan for Energy Conservation, Emission Reduction and Low-
Carbon Development, and the National Plan on Climate Change (2014-2020).
• Mix of regulatory approaches, financial support and market-based mechanisms to promote
renewables; long-term feed-in tariffs for solar, wind and biomass
• Less than 1% of China‘s 500 largest cities meet WHO air quality standards
• Rising societal pressures on ruling elite due to air pollution and environmental degradation =>
Clear shift in energy policies since 2005: implementation of renewable energy law
• State Council (i.e. the central government) sets broad directions for renewable energy policy
development; ministries and departments draft specific policies
• Advisory and coordination role in energy issues established in 2007: National Leading Group on
Climate Change Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction (NLGACCERCER);
members are leaders of the State Council and 20 key ministries
Sources: Government of India (2015); Isoaho (2016); Shearer et al. (2017).
- 46 -
Additional Info China (2/2)
• National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC): central role in climate policy and energy;
National Energy Administration (NEA) agency under NDRC responsible for renewable energy
policy formulation and implementation at the national level
• National Energy Commission (NEC): ‘super ministry’ in charge of drafting the national energy
development strategy
• => energy and climate change are located within the most influential agencies; implementation
remains nevertheless a challenge
• Regionally differing societal pressures: shut-down of plants in Inner Mongolia, pledges to build
power plants in inland provinces
• State council puts efforts on ‘clean coal’ and other fossil fuels: gasification, CCS, natural gas and
nuclear
• Lack in grid infrastructure
• China’s National Emissions Trading System to start in 2017
- 47 -
India and China in global Context
Source: Shearer et al. (2017).
- 48 -
Recent developments coal in China and India
Put on hold in
2016
On hold in total
(end 2016)
Put on hold, which was
already under construction
Active
construction
China 300 442 56 146
India no data 82 13 48
Coal capacities as of January 2017, in GW.
Source: Shearer et al. (2017).
- 49 -
• Solar capacity especially strong in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh (together
>60% of total capacity); dependent on solar radiation, coal availability and political feasibility
• Main barriers to renewable expansion: difficult finance environment (makes renewable projects
more costly than in other countries, political elites vested interests in fossil fuels, a corruption-prone
system requires bribes for new projects, difficult process of land acquisition for private companies
• The “discoms”, the state-government owned electricity companies, are highly indebted (electricity
theft, badly implemented subsidies and technical losses) and do not fulfill their renewable purchase
obligations, do not make necessary investments to integrate renewables and thereby scare away
investors of renewables
• Gujarat can be seen as a leading example for the transition away from coal => lessons to be
learned for other states on governance
• Split of electricity for agriculture from the rest, controls of necessity for subsidies,
stable political coalition
• The Indian population of very polluted regions do not protest against coal but instead against
higher environmental standards => because they are economically dependent coal and other
polluting industries
• :
Governance and regional differences
- 50 -
Recent developments coal in China and India
Put on hold in
2016
On hold in total
(end 2016)
Put on hold, which was
already under construction
Active
construction
India no data 82 13 48
Coal capacities as of January 2017, in GW.
Source: Shearer et al. (2017).
- 51 -
India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)
• 40% non-fossil fuel capacity of installed power capacity by 2030 (~26-30% of generation;
conditional on the provision of resources by industrialised countries)
• Lower GDP emissions intensity by 33-35% by 2030 below 2005 levels (-20-25% by 2020)
• Additional cumulative carbon sink of 2.5-3 GtCO2e through additional forests by 2030
• Current policy developments:
• 175 GW installed renewable energy by 2022 (NDC pledge 100 GW). Despite rapid
expansion not enough to satisfy growing electricity demand
• 100 GW solar capacity by 2022
• Draft Electricity Plan: After 2022 no new coal capacity apart from the one already under
construction (48GW) needed
Sources: Climate Action Tracker (2017b); Central Electricity Authority (2016); Government of India (2015).
India’s NDC is less ambitious than current policies, both pathways
are not in line with the 2°C (or the 1.5°C) target
- 52 -
Additional Info India
• Solar power revolution: government proposal to install 215 GW renewables by 2027
• Estimated total CO2 emissions for 2021-22 and 2026-27 are 983 million t and 1,165 million t respectively
• Around 17.5% of the world population (second most populated country), around 363 million people (30% of the
population) live in poverty (largest concentration of poverty globally), around 24% of the global population without
access to electricity (304 million), about 30% of the global population relying on solid biomass for cooking and 92
million without access to safe drinking water, wide disparities amongst its people and regions.
• Democracy; 6 national, 49 state and >1700 unrecognized parties, strong autonomy of states in India
• Policy framework on environment and climate change: National Environment Policy (NEP) 2006: promotes
sustainable development along with respect for ecological constraints and the imperatives of social justice.
• National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC): sharper focus on required intervention
• implemented through eight National Missions, outlining priorities for mitigation and adaptation to combat
climate change
• supplemented by actions of the State Governments, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), initiatives of the
private sector and other stakeholders. 32 States and Union Territories have State Action Plan on Climate
Change (SAPCC) including climate change concerns in their planning process.
• Energy Conservation Act encourages efficient use of energy and its conservation
• The National Electricity Policy (NEP) focuses on universalizing access to electricity and promoting renewable
sources of energy, as does the Integrated Energy Policy (IEP).
Sources: Government of India (2015); Shearer et al. (2017).
- 53 -
Additional Info Energy Market India
• Other policies include fiscal instruments like a coal tax, cuts in subsidies, increase in taxes on petrol and diesel,
market mechanisms including Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT), Renewable Energy Certificates (REC) and a
regulatory regime of Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO).
• No great societal pressures regarding air pollution, although 13 of the 20 most polluted cities worldwide are in
India; poor population dependent on polluting industries for economic growth and job creation
• Federal level only partly responsible for energy policy-making, more the state governments‘ responsibility, nodal
state agencies responsible for implementation
• Various mechanisms to promote renewables: grants, tax incentives and generation-based incentives
• Fifth largest wind energy producer worldwide
• At COP21 Prime minister Modi launched the International Solar Alliance (120 states commit to install >1 TW of
solar power by 2030)
• Difficult finance environment in India, which makes renewable energy projects more costly than in other countries
• Corruption-prone political elite with vested interests in the fossil fuel industry
• Other major problems: electricity thievery, and long problematic process land acquisition
- 54 -
1) The Indian Energy Sector
2) Modeling approach & Input Data
3) Results
Agenda
- 55 -
Modeling approach & Input Data
Key Data
• A total of 10 regions is being considered.
• The years 2020 - 2050 are modeled in 5-year steps, with 2015 as a baseline.
• Existing capacities in 2015 are included as residual capacities in our model.
• Demands are fixed and based on IEA 450ppm (World Energy Outlook 2015) datasets.
Source: Own Illustration, based on Gulagi, et al. (2017)
- 56 -
India - Demands
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Ex
ajo
ule
Power Low-temp. Heat High-temp. Heat
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Gp
km
Passenger Transport Freight Transport
Power & process heat demands more than triple between 2015 and 2050.
Overall heavy increase of energy demands over the years.
- 57 -
• Sets:
y Year f Fuelt Technology m Mode of Operationr Region l Time Slice
• Objective Function
min 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =
𝑦
𝑡
𝑟
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡,𝑟 +
𝑦
𝑟
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑦,𝑟
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡,𝑟 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡,𝑟+ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑦,𝑡,𝑟+ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑦,𝑡,𝑟− 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑦,𝑡,𝑟
∀ 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
Model Formulation – Objective Function
- 58 -
1) The Indian Energy Sector
2) Modeling approach & Input Data
3) Results
Agenda
- 59 -
100% Renewables Scenario
- 60 -
Development of Power Generation in PJ
Source: Own Illustration
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
TWh
- 61 -
100% Renewables – Heat low
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Pet
ajo
ule
Biomass
Solar Thermal
Heatpump
Oil
Coal
- 62 -
100% Renewables – Heat high
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Pe
tajo
ule
Biomass
H2
Electric Furnace
Gas
Oil
Coal
- 63 -
Development of Freight Transportation
Source: Own Illustration
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
millio
n f
reig
ht
km Rail Petro
Rail ELC
Road Conv
Road Bio
Road H2
Ship Conv
Ship Bio
- 64 -
India – Regional Power Production
Source: Own Illustration
- 65 -
India – Power Production per Timeslice w/ Storages
Source: Own Illustration
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2050 ID 2050 IN 2050 SD 2050 SN 2050 WD 2050 WN
TWh
- 66 -
Installed Capacity in 2050
- 67 -
Wind & PV Production Profiles, 2050
- 68 -
Trade Between Regions in 2050
- 69 -
450ppm Scenario
- 70 -
450 ppm - Power
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
TWh
- 71 -
450ppm – Heat low
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Peta
jou
le
Biomass
Solar Thermal
Heatpump
Oil
Coal
- 72 -
450ppm – Heat high
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Peta
jou
le
Biomass
Electric Furnace
Gas
Oil
Coal
- 73 -
Global CO2 Emissions per Energy Carrier in billion tons –
0% fossil fuels in 2050
Source: Own Illustration
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
100percent 450ppm newpolicies
Coal
Gas
Oil
- 74 -
Source: Oei, et al.(2014).
Germany‘s national GHG reduction target implies further measures…
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
GH
G E
mis
sio
ns
in
Me
ga
ton
s C
O2
eq
uiv
.
Non-ETS-Sector
EU-ETS
Coal_Non_ETS
Coal_ETS
Lignite_Non_ETS
Lignite_ETS
2050 target*:
- 80-95%
2020 Ziel*:
- 40%
2030 target*:
- 55%
*) Base line: 1990
Trend of the last years:
emissions going up!
- 75 -
Rhine
basin
Helmstedt basin
LusatiaCentral Germany
Power plant
Mining site
Lignite power plant
capacities built
[GW]
before
1980
1981-
2000
after
2001
Rhine basin 7 0.3 3
Helmstedt basin – 0.3 –
Central Germany – 3 –
Lusatia 1 6 0.6
Lignite in Germany
The electricity sector is responsible for
~40% of GHG emissions in Germany
• ~50% lignite power plants; of which
>50% built before 1990 (esp. in NRW).
• ~33% hard coal power plants; of
which 50% built after 2000
Effect of electricity prices below 30
€/MWh:
• Old hard coal power plants are shut
down for economic reasons
• Political measures could regulate
which power plants are closed down:
• Lignite power plants
• Newly built hard coal power plants
• Gas fired power plants
- 76 -
No need for new lignite mining pits in Germany;
constitutional conformity of new fields are being contested
Projected fields and Displacements :
Welzow Süd II (~210 Mio. t CO2 / 800 inhabitants)
Nochten II (~300 Mio. t CO2 / 1,700 inhabitants)
Jänschwalde Nord (~270 Mio. t CO2 / 900 inhabitants)
(Vision: Bagenz-Ost and Spremberg-Ost)
Exproprietation (relocalisation of inhabitants):
o Public interest needed for legality of new fields
o Energiewende: neither public interest nor necessity
o Possibility to sell electricity from lignite is not a reason
to justify expropritations
- 77 -
1. Standard to be respected at any moment (plant-specific limit per kWh)
• Prevents construction of new coal power plants (without CO2 capture)
• Discussed in USA for new-built, in force in Canada as of mid-2015
2. Limit of annual emissions
• Can incentivize emission reductions of existing power plants
• In force in the UK since 2013
Different instruments to reduce CO2 emissions are discussed;
among them emissions performance standard (EPS)
ELMOD: Introduction of a German EPS that
uses a gas power plant (450 gCO2/kWh)
as benchmark to achieve Germany´s
climate targets:
• limit annual emissions of all plants (EPS)
• only those older than 35 years (EPS 35)
- 78 -
Climate and energy policy has various proven instruments at hand to
account for external effects of electricity generation from fossil fuels.
Research Question
• Examining current trends of the German energy market with respect to
their compatibility with climate targets. Identifying additional instruments
besides a reform of the EU-ETS.
Publications
• Chapter in the book Energiewende (forthcoming)
• DIW Economic Bulletin, Wochenbericht,
Politikberatung kompakt (2012-2015)
• Newspaper articles (2014-2015)
Main Findings
• Coal-based power generation puts climate targets at risk.
• A market-driven transition from coal to gas is unlikely to occur in the near
future. Additional instruments could be a CO2 floor price, minimum
efficiency levels and flexibility requirements, a coal phase-out law,
emissions performance standard, capacity mechanisms or a strategic
reserve for coal plants, a climate contribution fee or reduced transmission
grid expansion
- 79 -
Share of rising renewables lead to new job opportunities
Quelle: BMWI (2013) & BDEW (2014), Daten für 2014 sind auf Basis des ersten Halbjahres geschätzt: German Ministry of Economy and Energy (BMWI).[1]
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%1990
1991
1992
1993
19
94
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
20
07
2008
2009
2010
2011
20
12
2013
2014
9 105
14
2
12 13
5
26
4
3 2 0 1 0
63
0
8
0
50 0 0 0
61 0 1 0
5 6
0
7
1
8
1 0
6
0
32
40
16
2
1711
1
17
4
52 0
51
1 0 0 1 0
5 50
61
124 0
80
9
1 05
0
2 40
50
- 80 -
Comparing number of jobs in the coal and renewables sector
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
1998
2002
2004
2008
2010
2013
Beschäftigte in Tausende
BK - Tagebau
BK - Kraftwerke
SK - Bergbau
Erneuerbare
Die Lignite sector used to employ more than 150000 people in 1980. The hardcoal industry in the 1950s-60s employed 500000 people.
Source: Own depiction based on Ulrich und Lehr (2014) and Statistik der Kohlewirtschaft (2015).
- 81 -
Average age in the lignite sector: 75 % are aged over 40
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Source: Own depiction based on Statistik der Kohlewirtschaft (2015).
- 82 -
Lignite and hard coal production and imports in Europe (2015)
So
urc
e: E
ura
co
al(2
01
6)
- 83 -
Structure of Power Generation in selected EU-Countries (2013)
So
urc
e: E
ura
co
al(2
01
5)
- 84 -
Upcoming “Coal Reserve“ in Germany
Notification 11 days ahead; overall payments of 1.6 billion €
Owner Unit Power
[MW]
Age in
2020
Start of reserve
(shut down
after 4 years)
Particularities
Mibrag /
EPH
Buschhaus 352 35 10 / 2016 Plant was moved into reserve already in
September as the mining site was fully exploited
RWE Frimmersdorf P 284 54 10 / 2017 Last 2 (out of 8) units; facing economic
problems for several years.Frimmersdorf Q 278 50 10 / 2017
Niederaußem E 295 50 10 / 2018 Were already listed in the official list of expected
closures „Kraftwerksliste Bundesnetzagentur
zum erwarteten Zu- und Rückbau 2015 bis
2019“ with the closing date 2019
Niederaußem F 299 49 10 / 2018
Neurath C 292 47 10 / 2019 Similar efficiency factors as other 300 MW units
Vattenfall
/ EPH
Jänschwalde E 465 33 10 / 2018 Most recent units at the site Jänschwalde (start
of operation of the 6 units 1981-1989); it is
sometimes easier to start shutting down the last
units first.
Jänschwalde F 465 31 10 / 2019
Quelle: Eigene Recherchen basierend auf Daten der Bundesregierung, der BNetzA und Webseiten der Unternehmen
- 85 -
Longterm trends of CO2 emissions in Germany until 2035
The results show that the long-term decline of German CO2 emissions (301 Mt in 2014). The
green scenario resembles a faster coal phase-out by additionally restricting the full load
hours of coal power plants (e.g. due to limited coal reserves or an additional climate levy),
while the black scenario is a moderate business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.
The results are also influenced by developments in neighboring states. It is therefore in the
interest of Germany that other neighboring countries also take action and complement the
EU-ETS with national instruments to enable a generation portfolio in line with the European
climate targets (Visions 3 & 4).
127
136
120
110
119
127
115
107
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
Vision 1 Vision 2 Vision 3 Vision 4
CO
2-E
mis
sio
ns
in
Mt
black
green
- 86 -
The Role of Coal for Power Generation in Europe 2013
So
urc
e: E
ura
co
al(2
01
4)
- 87 -
The Phasing-Out of Coal is Politically Unanymous:
Different additional instruments are under discussion
PROPOSED MEASURE EXPECTED EFFECT POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS
Forbidding new lignite
mines
Terminating current plans for new minings
sites in Eastern Germany
No displacements of villagers; no retrofits for
lignite power plants; investment security for
all affected people
No effect for regions with sufficient already
granted mining rights
Closing existing lignite
mines
Reducing mining volumes of active mines
in North-Rhine Westfalia (NRW)
Concentration on one mine (instead of three)
reduces fixed costs and less displacements;
overall volumes insufficient for entire lignite
fleet leading to some clusures
Does not necessarily hit the oldest inefficient
power plants first
EU-ETS reform Price signal through the introduction of
market stability reserve (MSR); additional
measures: 900 mn EUA from backloading
directly in MSR, start of MSR in 2017
instead of 2021
EU-wide instrument; thus, no cross-border
leakage effects
targets several sectors besides electricity
Structural reforms uncertain from today's
perspective; the extent of the impact is
unpredictable due to high surplus of certificates
CO2 floor price CO2 certificates would become more
expensive
Investment security for operators Feasible prices probably too low to result in a
switch from lignite to natural gas in the short term
Minimum efficiency Closure of inefficient power plants More efficient utilization of raw materials Open cycle gas turbines (OCGT) could also be
affected; complex and time-consuming test and
measurement processes
Flexibility requirements Closure or singling out of inflexible power
plants
Better integration of fluctuating renewable
energy sources
Combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) could also
be affected; complex and time-consuming test
and measurement processes
Coal phase-out law Maximum production [TWh] or emissions
allowances [tCO2] for plants
Fixed coal phase-out plan & schedule
investment security
Outcome of auctioning of allowances would be
difficult to predict
Emissions performance
standard (per unit; for
Restrictions for new plants and retrofits
(without CO2 capture) [< x g/MWh]
Prevention of CO2-intensive (future
stranded) investments
Minor short-term reduction in emissions
- 88 -
Reductionof nuclear
energy
Share of RenewableEnergy
ReductionGHG-
Emissions
Reduction of Energy Demand
Gross final energy
ElectricityProductio
n
Primary Energy
DomesticHeat
Final Energy
Transport
ElectricityDemand
201520172019
-47%-56%-60%
2020 18% 35% -40% -20% -20% -10% -10%
202120222025
-80%-100%
40-45%
20302035
30% 50%55-60%
-55%
2040 45% 65% -70%
2050 60% 80%-80% bis
95%-50% -80% -40% -25%
Basis 2010 - - 1990 2008 2008 2005 2008
Source: Own Depiction based on BReg (2010, 2011, 2013)
„Energy Transformation“ in Germany (Energiewende)
- 89 -
**) CCGT: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
OCGT: Open Cycle Gas Turbine
Lignite power plants are not flexible enough for an electricity
system with a high share of renewable sources
Lignite CCGT** OCGT**
Change of load[%Pmax
p. minute]1 / 2,5 / 4 2 / 4 / 8 8 / 12 / 15
Hot start-up
(<8h)[h] 6 / 4 / 2 1,5 / 1 / 0,5 < 0,1
Cold start-up(>48h)
[h] 10 / 8 / 6 4 / 3 / 2 < 0,1
Source: Agora Energiewende (2014).
Source: VDE (2012)*
*) Read data as follows : „current power plants / state of the art / optimization potential“
- 90 -
… including a coal phase-out probably until 2040
Germany risks missing the -40% GHG reduction target until 2020 (base: 1990).
This is why additional national instruments, employed alongside the EU ETS, come into play
and are currently discussed by all relevant actors.
Official projections by the Federal Network Agency / Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) include a
reduction of lignite capacities from 21,2 GW in 2013 to 12,6 GW in 2025.
Resulting emission targets for the electricity sector are 187 Mt CO2 (2025) and 134 Mt CO2
(2035) compared to 317 Mt CO2 in 2014.
This implies a decarbonization of the electricity sector and a coal phase-out. Barbara
Hendricks (Federal Minister for the Environment) and the German Advisory Council on the
Environment (SRU) target the year 2040.
- 91 -
Planned reserve of lignite capacites
The current proposal includes moving 2,7 GW of lignite capacity into a “lignite reserve”
• three times 0,9 GW in 2017, 2018 and 2019
• each block is shut down completely after four years in the reserve
The reserve of 2,7 GW include
• 1 GW of lignite capacity in Lusatia (2 blocks of Jänschwalde) by Vattenfall and the
• power plant Buschhaus (350 MW) in Central Germany which was recently bought by Mibrag
(owned by EPH)
• 1,5 GW of lignite capacity run by RWE in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
- 92 -
Economic Risks for utilities:
Significantly reduced profitability for old and newer plants
Current Phelix Futures:
2017: EUR 24,05
2018: EUR 23,90
2019: EUR 24,00
2020: EUR 25,20
Development of Phelix Future (Phelix: physical electricity German wholesale power price)
Source: EEX, May 2016
- 93 -
Technical and Environmental Risks:
Iron Ocre: Threat for aquatic life and tourism in the Spreewald
Source: RBB
Source: www.reiseland-brandenburg.de
Source: dapd
- 94 -
Comparing jobs in lignite (BK) & renewables (EE) in affected
regions in Eastern Germany
Source: Own depiction based on Ulrich und Lehr (2013) and Statistik der Kohlewirtschaft (2013).
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Indirekte Jobs
Jobs
Climate measures lead to additional annual investments of 15 – 30 billion € in Germany. Meeting the
2020 climate targets would result in additional:
• 50.000 – 200.000 new jobs
• economic increase of 20 – 40 billion €.
- 95 -
Kohlelieferungen aus Mitteldeutschland nach Tschechien
2012 sind 160.000 t als
Probelieferung aus dem
Mitteldeutschen Revier nach
Tschechien geliefert worden.
„Das tschechische Kraftwerk hat mit
der mitteldeutschen Kohle
funktioniert.“
Das tschechische Kraftwerk
Opatovice befindet sich 100
Kilometer östlich von Prag und
ist ungefähr 300 km vom
Mitteldeutschen Revier entfernt
Bei einem Interesse aus Tschechien
kündigte Mibrag-Chef Joachim
Geisler an, werde man auch
weitere Kohle zukünftig dorthin
liefern. Dies wären dann deutlich
größere Lieferungen.
In 2015 bestätigte die Mibrag, dass
keine weitere Transporte nach
Tschechien geplant sind.
- 96 -
Es gibt keinen Bedarf für neue Tagebaue in der Lausitz
Darstellungen basierend auf eigenen Berechnungen
0
40
80
120
2013 2030 2042
Jänschwalde
0
100
200
300
400
2013 2030 2042
Welzow-Süd I0
100
200
300
400
2013 2030 2042
Nochten I0
5
10
15
20
2013 2030 2042
Cottbus-Nord
0
100
200
300
400
2013 2030 2042
Reichwalde
- 97 -
Das Braunkohlegebiet in NRW besitzt die größten Reserven
Quelle: Eigene Darstellung
- 98 -
Die Braunkohle aus dem mitteldeutschen Revier wird bis zu 150
km transportiert
0
2
4
6
Profen
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ver. Schleenhain
0
1
2
3
4
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
Profen
Schöningen
0
100
200
300
2013 2030 2040
Restmenge Profen [mio. t]
0
100
200
300
2013 2030 2040
Vereinigtes Schleenhain
KW Mumsdorf wurde 2013
nach 45 Jahren abgeschaltet
Belieferung KW Schkopau [mio. t/a]
Belieferung KW Lippendorf [mio. t/a]
Belieferung KW Buschhaus [mio. t/a]
- 99 -
E.ON verkauft das Helmstedter Braunkohlerevier an MIBRAG
Im September 2013 hat E.ON den Verkauf des Helmstedter
Braunkohlereviers bei Braunschweig an die Mibrag angekündigt.
Der Verkauf umfasst den Tagebau Schöningen mit allen
bestehenden Rückbau- und Rekultivierungsverpflichtungen
sowie das Kraftwerk Buschhaus.
Die Veräußerung ist Teil einer Umstrukturierung. E.ON trennt sich
auch von Anteilen des Gazprom-Konzerns, von Regionaltöchtern
und vom Gasnetzbetreiber Open Grid Europe, um zusätzliche
Erlöse zu erzielen.
Das Kraftwerk Buschhaus wurde 1985 in Betrieb genommen und hat
eine Brutto-Leistung von 390 MW. Ursprünglich war die
Stilllegung des Kraftwerkes zum Jahr 2017, gemeinsam mit dem
Auslaufen des Tagebaus, geplant.
Die Mibrag will Buschhaus ab 2014 bis 2030 hauptsächlich mit Kohle
aus dem 150 km entfernten mitteldeutschen Revier aus bereits
genehmigten Braunkohlefeldern weiterbetreiben.
Durch den Aufkauf des Kraftwerks bleiben ca.120 Arbeitsplätze am
Standort Buschhaus in Niedersachsen erhalten.
Es gibt jedoch auch Kritik an einer verstärkten Auskohlung der
Tagebaufelder zu Gunsten niedersächsischer Arbeitsplätze.
- 100 -
Investments in fossil fuels to decline on a global scale
Quelle: Extract from figure SPM.9 of IPCC Working Group III report 2014, p. 30
- 101 -
Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage (CCTS) stellt auf
absehbare Zeit keine Option für die Dekarbonisierung dar
No EU-funding
through NER-300
Longannet
(UK, 1 bn. £)
No CO2-priority
infrastructure
projects
Mongstad
(Norway)
0 finished,
10 delayed,
9 canceled
projects
19.10.2011
Jänschwalde
(De, Vattenfall)
05.12.201108.12.2010
Hürth
(De, RWE)
"Ob [CCS] in Deutschland
zur Anwendung kommt ist
eher zweifelhaft. [...]“
18.12.2012
14.07.2012
14.10.2013
20.09.2013
Source: Own illustration based on Tagesspiegel (2010), BBC (2011), Märkische Rundschau (2011), Vattenfall (2011),
Bundesregierung (2012), EC (2012), Bellona (2013), EC (2013), GCI (2013), EUWID (2014), BBC (2015); GCCSI (2011, 2015).
27.01.2014
Schleswig-Holstein
(De) forbids CO2-
storage
25.09.2015
Drax pulls out of White
Rose project (UK)
15.12.2015
- 102 -
Lignite power plants are not flexible enough for an electricity
system with a high share of renewable sources (2/2)
Fraunhofer ISE (2013).
- 103 -
A Vision for the Future ??? (Train Station in Welzow, Sep. 2014)
- 104 -
70-90% of coal, 30-60% of gas and 30-60% of oil reserves has to
stay under the ground, even if available
(*) http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v458/n7242/full/nature08017.html
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK): 2°C target corresponds to 890 Gt CO2 (*):
Source: IPCC SRREN(2011), fig. 1.7
- 105 -
The CCS-Illusion: Pilot Plant in Jänschwalde cancelled on Dec.
5th 2011
- 106 -
Development of the CCS Projects since 2011
?
??
?
?
???
cancelled.
delayed?
??
Source: Own depiction based on GCI (2011, 2013) and MIT (2014).
- 107 -
Phasing-out Coal is Economically „Efficient“:The social costs of lignite, including externalities, are way above the revenue!
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Wholesale price (2014) FÖS (2012) AEE (2011) DIW Berlin & Fh-ISI (2010)
Co
sts
/ P
ric
e [
ct/
kW
h]
External costs of lignite according to different studies compared to the current electricity price in Germany
- 108 -
Vattenfall’s hybrid structure: Lignite dominates German business
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
SE FI DK DE NL UK
Pro
du
ced
Ele
ctri
city
in 2
01
3 [
TWh
]
Biomass
Wind
Oil
Hard Coal
Gas
Hydro Power
Nuclear
Lignite
- 109 -
Vattenfall‘s CO2 reduction target
Source: Own depiction based on Vattenfall (2014), Thru.de (2014).
65
4,1 4,18,4 8,4
10,4 10,4
60,3
42,2
0
20
40
60
80
100
VattenfallEmissions
2012
Possiblesolution
2020
Target 2020
Em
iss
ion
s in
Me
ga
ton
s C
O2
pe
r ye
ar
GER lignite
GER non-lignite
NL
DK
Target
„A cornerstone of Vattenfall´s long-term strategy is to reduce negative exposure to rising CO2 prices
by reducing emissions from the Group´s portfolio […]”
(Vattenfall Annual and sustainability Report, 2013)
Jänschwalde 2012:
24.8 Mt CO2
Boxberg 2012:
15.9 Mt CO2
Lippendorf 2012:
5.3Mt CO2 (Share Vattenfall)
Schwarze Pumpe 2012:
12.8 Mt CO2
*
*) Total CO2 emissions 2013 have risen to 88.4 Megatons
- 110 -
How to get rid of 15 Mt of CO2?
Source: Vattenfall Annual and Sustainability Report 2013
- 111 -
Überführung von Braunkohlekraftwerken in die
Sicherheitsbereitschaft / „Kohlereserve“
Quelle: Eigene Recherchen basierend auf Daten der Bundesregierung und der BNetzA
900 MW
350 MW
1.500 MW
Summe: 2.700 MW
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
>0 >5 >10 >15 >20 >25 >30 >35 >40 >45 >50 >55 >60
Kra
ftw
erk
sp
ap
azit
ät
Bra
un
ko
hlk
raft
we
rke [
GW
]
Anlagenalter in Jahren
Lausitzer Revier
Mitteldeutsches Revier
Rheinisches Revier
Buschhaus/MIBRAG (350 MW)
Jänschwalde/Vattenfall (900 MW)
„300-MW-Flotte“
(Frimmersdorf/Niederaußem/Neurath)/
RWE (1.500MW)
- 112 -
„Kohlereserve“: Technische Anforderungen und wer
bekommt/zahlt wieviel
Technische Anforderungen:
Startbereit innerhalb von 10 Tagen
+ 11 Stunden bis zur Mindestteillast
+ 13 Stunden bis zur Nettonennleistung
Kosten:
Jährlich 230 Millionen € für sieben Jahre
1,6 Milliarden € Gesamtkosten
Kraftwerke sind jeweils vier Jahre in Reserve
150 Mil. €/Jahr pro GW = 150.000 €/MW
≈ Erlöse am Strommarkt – Variable Kosten
Kosten werden über eine Erhöhung des Netzentgeltes um 0,05 Cent/kWh umgelegt.
Vom Netzentgelt befreite Akteure sind somit nicht betroffen.
Vereinbarkeit mit EU-Beihilferecht: Es gab Gespräche mit der Europäischen Kommission.
Ergebnis bei einer möglichen Klage unklar.
Quelle: Eigene Recherchen basierend auf Daten der Bundesregierung, der BNetzA und Webseiten der Unternehmen
- 113 -
Fazit zu regulatorischen Ansätzen für eine Dekarbonisierung
der Stromerzeugung
Zur Erreichung des Klimaschutzziels 2020 (-40% weniger THG ggü. 1990) und auch für die
langfristigen Klimaziele sind u.a. zusätzliche Maßnahmen im Stromsektor nötig.
Die „Kohlereserve“ von 2,7 GW Braunkohlekapazitäten (mit anschließender Schließung) ist ein
erster Schritt in Richtung Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors.
In Bezug auf das Treibhausgas-Minderungsziel 2020 wird der Effekt gering ausfallen, für einen
echten Beitrag ist die Reserve zu klein.
Die Einigung stellt eine teure „Abwrackprämie“ dar, die insb. von den Haushalten finanziert
wird; ein Teil der Anlagen würde in den 2020er Jahren größtenteils ohnehin abgeschaltet.
Überprüfung im Jahr 2018, (wo erst 1 GW in der Reserve ist,) ob durch die Klimareserve die
geplanten 12,5 Mil. t CO2 – im Vergleich zum Basisszenario – eingespart werden.
Möglichkeit des Nachsteuerns, zur Erreichung der Reduktionsziele für 2020.
Die Einführung von anderen diskutierten Optionen wie dem ursprünglichen Klimabeitrag oder
CO2-Grenzwerten wären für eine Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors besser geeignet.
Über Umweltauflagen sind weitere regulatorische Ansätze zur Dekarbonisierung des
Stromsektors abbildbar. Hierbei sind insb. die Europäische Wasserrahmenrichtlinie bzgl.
Quecksilber und die Umsetzung der IED RL bzgl. der NOx und SO2 Grenzwerte zu nennen.
Die Kosten der technischen Nachrüstungen verteuern die Kohleverstromung und können
im Einzelfall zur Unrentabilität von alten ineffizienten Anlagen führen.