The Election of 1968

PROBLEM-BASED HISTORY

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

Where does Nixon fit in?

President Johnson campaigned in the 1964 election with the promise not to escalate the war. "We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves," he said. But following reports that the North Vietnamese had attacked an American destroyer (which was engaged in a clandestine intelligence mission) off the Vietnamese coast, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, giving President Lyndon Johnson power to "take all necessary measures." Johnson justified the use of ground forces by stating that it would be brief, just six months. But the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were able to match our troop build-up and neutralize the American soldiers. In North Vietnam, 200,000 young men came of draft age each year. It was very easy for our enemy to replenish its manpower. By April 1967, we had a force of 470,000 men in Vietnam. We were learning that there was no light at the end of the tunnel.

From www.digitalhistory.uh.edu - Vietnam

The Johnson administration's strategy--which included search and destroy missions in the South and calibrated bombings in the North--proved ineffective, though highly destructive. Despite the presence of 549,000 American troops, the United States had failed to cut supply lines from the North along the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran along the border through Laos and Cambodia. By 1967, the U.S. goal was less about saving South Vietnam and more about avoiding a humiliating defeat. Then, everything fell apart for the United States. We suddenly learned the patience, durability, and resilience of our enemy. The year ended with Westmoreland telling the American public “… with the enemy increasingly resorting to desperation tactics.” He could not have been more wrong!

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. BrownFrom www.digitalhistory.uh.edu - Vietnam

A Whirlwind of Change:

JANUARY & FEBRUARY

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

PRELUDE TO DISASTER

Westmoreland brought home To tell people how wonderful the war was going

RFK decides not to run (at least not yet) Actually is afraid of splitting the party

Turning the corner in Vietnam “Light at the end of the tunnel”

Eugene McCarthy only anti-war candidate with national appeal

But he didn’t poll very well (2-3%)

LBJ is feeling good at the turn of the new year

TET

January 30, 1968 Squads of suicide sappers attack the American

embassy in Saigon One reporter said it looked like “A butcher shop in

Eden” Also attack dozens of other towns, villages,

hamlets, and installations Outcome is important on two levels:

1. Widened and gave vision to a credibility gap between the government and the general public

2. Was a devastating military defeat for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong © 2010 AIHE, 2008 R.

Brown

TELEVISION Walter Cronkite lost faith in

the war “What the hell is going on? I

thought we were winning the war!”

“It seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience in Vietnam is to end in stalemate…”

TV ushered in the end of the people trusting the LBJ admin Ironically LBJ had used TV in the

early 60’s to dupe the American people © 2010 AIHE, 2008 R.

Brown

IMPACT OF TET

1. LBJ’s popularity plummets2. People object to LBJ’s handling of the

war3. Majority of Americans STILL support

the war4. Symbol of America’s failure

Four Main Things:

DISSENT IN THE RANKS

Fired McNamara George Kenan and

Dean Acheson say the war cannot be won

No way to militarily win w/o destroying South Vietnam and American society

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

Was fundamentally changed with Tet

Possibility that anti-war democrats could defeat LBJ’s bid to run again

New Hampshire primaryMcCarthy support jumped42% of the vote20 of 24 delegates

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

LBJ: THE INTERNAL MECHANISMS

Relationship between mother and father and he “I thought my father was God.”

Need to build consensus Physical bullying of opponents The Texas attitude

The Alamo Honor and commitment

Façade of listening to all points of view

Foreign policy was a matter of loyalty and patriotism

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

The heir apparent?

ROBERT KENNEDY

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

HIS DECISION TO RUN

His initial refusal to run = split the party

Power of incumbency of LBJ

Tet gave him the opportunity to run not as a divider but as a uniter

Seen by some as Johnny-come-lately

LEGACY OF JFK

Wanted to carry forward his brother’s New Frontier - maybe more radical than JFK

Dedicated to the under-classes War in Vietnam caused money to be siphoned

off from Great Society Kerner Commission report - two societies,

one white, the other black

RFK ON VIETNAM Was critical of Vietnam policy

Wholesale destruction of villages and towns

Deaths of millions of civilians - “women and children”

The effect of trying to win a limited war

DOCUMENTS

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

Dissent by 1967 and Johnson’s earlier attempts at justifying the war.

… that we can decide in DC what cities, what towns, what hamlets in Vietnam are going to be destroyed? … Do we have a right here in the US to say that we are going to kill tens of thousands, make millions of people … refugees, kill women and children? … I very seriously question whether we have the right.

- Robert Kennedy 1967

Anything resembling a clear-cut victory in Vietnam appears possible only at the price of literally destroying South Vietnam, tearing apart the social and political fabric of our own country …

- Asst Sec of Air Force Townshend Hoops 1968

There is a line to be drawn between the honorable meeting of commitments and pig-headed pushing in the direction of a course that has become more and more sterile.

- Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) to Sec State Dean Rusk

By 1967-1968… we have slipped into a gross over-commitment of national prestige and resources… Our national interest now demands that we find ourselves a face-saving avenue of retreat…

- State Dept Advisor James Thompson 1967

TONKIN GULF INCIDENTLast night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

TONKIN GULF INCIDENTOur policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.3. Our purpose is peace.. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence,

- President Johnson’s Message to Congress, Aug 5, 1964© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 August 7, 1964

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

TONKIN GULF RESOLUTIONSection 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress. © 2010 AIHE, 2008 R.

Brown

DOCUMENT CONCLUSION

What are the common themes (if any) in the two documents about Tonkin?

What have we learned about how LBJ gets things done?

How do the Tonkin documents compare with the three quotes?

What conclusions can we draw between the two sets of documents?

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

What are we going to “solve”?

If you were LBJ in this situation, what would you do?

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

Alternate answers to help “solve” the problem

AVENUES OF DISCUSSION

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

INCREASE THE COMMITMENT…

Send more men and material to Vietnam Commit more funding for Great Society

programs back home Issues:

What problems could arise from such a course of action?

What could be the possible benefits of increasing commitments to America’s two most pressing problems?

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

FORMULATE AN EXIT STRATEGY

Create a formal plan to end American involvement in Vietnam

And expand Great Society programs Issues:

What problems could arise from such a course of action?

What could be the possible benefits of getting out of Vietnam?

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown

The Historical Outcome

LBJ’S DECISION

MARCH 31 SPEECH

March 31 speechSometimes called his

Peace Speech“Tonight I want to talk to

you of peace in Vietnam …”

“I have decided that I shall not seek, and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President.”

WHY LBJ SAID HE DID NOT RUN AGAIN

“… chased on all sides by a giant stampede coming at me from all directions. On one side the American people were stampeding me to do something about Vietnam. On the other side the inflationary economy was booming out of control.”

“Robert Kennedy had openly announced his intention to reclaim the throne in memory of brother …”

THE REAL REASON?

Johnson’s treasured consensus had failed

The nation was in turmoil and he could not avoid a messy and protracted conflict

Deep down he feared fundamental conflict and shied away from it

CONCLUSION

1. How did LBJ’s decision not to run “solve” the problems that America faced in 1968?

2. An ex-Marine that I know stated “LBJ sent my a$$ to Vietnam then didn’t have the guts to finish the job!” How does this fit into the context of 1968?

© 2010 AIHE, 2008 R. Brown