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Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
1
A Report by
9 Bedford Row
10 December 2015
9 Bedford Row
London
WC1R 4AZ
0044 207 489 2727
www.9bri.com
The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
2
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 4 1.1 SUBJECT MATTER OF REPORT ........................................................................................................ 5 1.2 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................. 7
CHAPTER 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 9
THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD RULE ......................... 9 2.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 10
2.1.1 The Peoples’ Revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood ...................................... 10 2.2.1 Longstanding distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood ...................................................... 12 2.2.2 Separating the army from politics ....................................................................................... 15 2.2.3 The army never planned to get involved in politics ..................................................... 16
2.3 ARMY DEMONSTRATES LOYALTY TO MORSI GOVERNMENT ................................................... 20 2.3.1 Army continues to back Morsi amidst rising tensions ................................................ 20 2.3.2 Pressure grows on army to support demands of Egyptian people ....................... 27 2.3.3 Tipping point ................................................................................................................................. 29 2.3.4 The government rebuked al-Sisi’s attempts for proper dialogue among all political parties ............................................................................................................................................. 33
2.4 THE END OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD GOVERNMENT ..................................................... 36 2.4.1 Former close allies of Morsi now supported army intervention ............................ 36
2.5 AGREEMENT TO REMOVE MORSI INVOLVED A BROAD AND REPRESENTATIVE COALITION –
ARMY DID NOT ACT UNILATERALLY! .......................................................................................................... 39 2.6 CLOSING REMARKS........................................................................................................................ 42
CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................................................................................43
THE REVOLUTION ..........................................................................................................................43 3.1 3 JULY 2013 .................................................................................................................................. 44
3.1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 44 3.1.2 3 July 2013: Morsi’s rejection of the ultimatum ........................................................... 47 3.1.3 3 July 2013: Response to Morsi’s rejection of the ultimatum ........................................ 49 3.1.4 3 July 2013: Army Response to Morsi’s rejection of the ultimatum ........................... 52 3.1.5 3 July 2013: Last minute negotiations ..................................................................................... 53 3.1.6 3 July 2013: Al-Sisi’s speech .................................................................................................... 56 3.1.7 Coalition Roadmap ..................................................................................................................... 62 3.1.8 3 July 2013: Legitimacy............................................................................................................. 65 3.1.9 3 July 2013: Morsi after al-Sisi’s speech ............................................................................ 69 3.1.10 3 July 2013: Media ................................................................................................................. 71 3.1.11 3 July 2013: Responses to al-Sisi’s announcement .................................................. 72 3.2 Transitional Government ......................................................................................................... 74
3.3 CLOSING REMARKS ........................................................................................................................ 79
CHAPTER 4 ........................................................................................................................................80
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S RESPONSE ..........................................................................80 4.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 81 4.2 PROVOCATION OF SECURITY FORCES ......................................................................................... 82
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4.2.1 Inciting violence ........................................................................................................................... 82 4.2.2 Attacks against security forces ................................................................................................... 87
4.3 CONDITIONS AT AL-NAHDA SQUARE AND RABAA SQUARE PRIOR TO 14 AUGUST 2013 92 4.3.1 Disruption to local residents .................................................................................................. 92 4.3.2 Violence in the camps ................................................................................................................ 96
4.4 INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO CLEAR THE CAMPS USING PEACEFUL MEANS..................................... 99 4.5 BARRICADING THE CAMPS .......................................................................................................... 107 4.6 OVERVIEW OF THE DISPERSAL .................................................................................................. 110
4.6.1 Rabaa Square dispersal ......................................................................................................... 110 4.6.2 Al-Nadha Square dispersal ................................................................................................... 112
4.7 USE OF FORCE BY SECURITY FORCES ........................................................................................ 114 4.8 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 116
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................................... 118
COMPARISON WITH OTHER CONFLICTS ............................................................................. 118 5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 119 5.2 UNDERSTANDING EGYPT IN THE CONTEXT OF LIBYA AND SYRIA ....................................... 120 5.3 THE EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONFLICTS IN LIBYA AND SYRIA ............................. 121 5.4 SPILL OVER INTO EGYPT ............................................................................................................. 127 5.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 130
CHAPTER 6 ..................................................................................................................................... 132
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 132 6.1 THE IMPASSE AND PEOPLE’S REVOLUTION OF 2013 ........................................................... 133 6.2 TRANSITION FROM REVOLUTION TO STABILITY .................................................................... 135 6.3 RESTORING SECURITY AND ORDER IN THE STREETS OF CAIRO .......................................... 137
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
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Against the Muslim Brotherhood
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1.1 Subject Matter of Report
1. This report is the third in a series of reports commissioned from members
of the 9 Bedford Row International Practice Group, by the State Lawsuit
(Litigation) Authority of Egypt which aims to present an independent and
comprehensive review of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allied groups
and organisations. The first report, entitled “The History of the Muslim
Brotherhood” (hereinafter, Report 1)1 was released on 2 April 2015. The
second report, “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Power 2012 – 2013” (hereinafter, Report 2)2 was released on 3 June 2015.
2. This third report looks at the final days leading up to the collapse of the
presidency of Mohamed Morsi and an analysis of the key events that
unfolded in the weeks following his removal from office. Specifically, it
reviews the revolution of 30 June 2013 when the Egyptian people forced
Morsi to step down on 3 July 2013 and the following clashes that ensued
between security forces and Muslim Brotherhood supporters.
3. Chapter 2 reviews the final weeks of the Morsi regime and charts the key
incidents and decisions that precipitated his downfall. It discusses the
resignation of key cabinet ministers that had at this point lost faith in
Morsi. Further, it focuses on the repeated efforts, in particular by then
Minister of Defence Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, to encourage Morsi to form a
1 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 2 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015.
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more inclusive government and meet the demands of the people and
thereby continue in office. In particular, the chapter highlights the
collective voice of the vast majority of Egyptians who had become
disenchanted with life under a Muslim Brotherhood government and
ultimately demanded that Morsi step down.
4. Chapter 3 looks in depth at the events that unfolded on 3 July 2013 when
Morsi was removed from office. It reviews the build-up to these events
and the formation of the broad and representative coalition that was
formed to reflect all ethnic, political and religious groups in the country
and which would eventually make the decision to oust Morsi. It also looks
at the various demonstrations and violent incidents that occurred around
the country in clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and anti-
Morsi protestors.
5. Chapter 4 goes on to chart the events that occurred in the weeks following
the removal of Morsi and the response of the Muslim Brotherhood to this
event. In particular, it focuses on the contextual and relevant background
surrounding the dispersal of Muslim Brotherhood supporters from mass
sit-ins at al-Nadha Square and Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, which had
paralysed the daily functioning of the country.
6. Chapter 5 looks at the 30 June 2013 revolution in Egypt in the context of
other popular uprisings in the Middle East, in particular those that
occurred in Syria and Libya. It provides an analysis of how events in
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neighbouring countries acted as a warning sign to the Egyptian people
and prompted a ‘call to action’ against Islamist extremists and militant
groups – particularly where such exercise near absolute power in the
country.
7. Finally, Chapter 6 offers an assessment of the events that led to the
collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt and the events that
followed in the weeks thereafter. The evidence examined reveals that there
was no plan or pre-existing intention to either remove Morsi from power
or use force against Muslim Brotherhood supporters when it became
necessary to intervene to disperse the mass sit-ins and restore a measure of
normalcy and calm.
1.2 Methodology
8. This report was produced using both open-source materials, drawing
heavily on news reports and other public sources, as well as official
documents, speeches, interviews and records obtained from key
individuals and the Egyptian government. Where reference is made to
sources freely available on-line, hyperlinks have been inserted for ease of
reference.3
3 All open source links were last accessed at the time of publication of this report.
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9. Further information as to the purpose and objective of these reports, as
well as a glossary of terms, is provided in Report 1. 4
4 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015.
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Against the Muslim Brotherhood
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CHAPTER 2
The Beginning of the End of the Muslim
Brotherhood Rule
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“Egypt’s first revolution was to get rid of the dead hand, the second revolution was to
get rid of the deadheads and the third revolution was to escape from the dead end.” 5
Thomas L. Friedman,
on Egypt 2011-2013
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 The Peoples’ Revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood
10. Events in Egypt since the start of the revolution that ousted Mubarak in
January 2011 suspended the country in a state of social, political and
economic limbo. Over the next two-and-a-half years, Egyptians witnessed
the overthrow of a decades-long dictatorship, the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the formation of a new Islamist government and
constitution.
11. Celebrated author and three-time Pulitzer Prize winner, Thomas L.
Friedman, put it in a nutshell.6 Between 2011 and 2013 Egypt, he says,
went through three revolutions. The first revolution happened because a
large number of mostly non-Islamist Egyptian youths grew fed up with
the suffocating restrictions of the Mubarak era. The generals who replaced
Mubarak proved so incompetent at governing that many liberal Egyptians
were ready to vote for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi over a
former Mubarak-era general in the June 2012 elections (the second
5 Friedman, T. L., “Egypt’s Three Revolutions”, The New York Times, 23 July 2013. 6 Friedman, T. L., “Egypt’s Three Revolutions”, The New York Times, 23 July 2013.
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revolution). Once president, Morsi however proved more interested in
consolidating the Muslim Brotherhood’s grip on power than governing
himself, culminating in millions of people taking to the streets on 30 June
2013 “virtually begg[ing] the military to oust Morsi” in what was to
become, according to Friedman, the third revolution.7
12. The previous report in this series, Report 2,8 discussed the election of
Mohamed Morsi as president and the Muslim Brotherhood-led
government as well as the events that led to its eventual downfall.
13. This chapter reviews the last days of the Morsi government and considers
the circumstances that ultimately led to the popular revolution that would
remove Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power.
14. A comprehensive review of the key factors that led to the downfall of the
Morsi government after only a year in power is set out in Report 2.9
Accordingly, only a brief summary of the key factors is provided in this
chapter.
7 Friedman, T. L., “Egypt’s Three Revolutions”, The New York Times, 23 July 2013. 8 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 9 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015.
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2.2 Collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood government
2.2.1 Longstanding distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood
15. Tensions among non-Islamist government officials and other government
institutions (in particular the police and security services) were
immediately apparent upon news of the election of Mohamed Morsi as
president in June 2012.10 The distrust among many officials and public
sector workers of the Muslim Brotherhood was palpable and the thought
of serving under a Muslim Brotherhood government caused widespread
consternation.11
16. Such concern was not without basis. Little attention was paid in the last
days of the Mubarak regime when a group of Muslim Brotherhood leaders
broke free from their cells in a prison in the far off Wadi el-Natroun desert.
This incident triggered a series of further prison breaks by other Muslim
Brotherhood members around the country resulting in deadly clashes.
Among those who escaped from prison were future president and Muslim
Brotherhood member, Mohamed Morsi. 12
10 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also, Ezzat, D., “Egypt: The president, the army and the
police”, Ahram Online, 27 December 2012. 11 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also, Ezzat, D., “Egypt: The president, the army and the
police”, Ahram Online, 27 December 2012. 12 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also, Ezzat, D., “Egypt: The president, the army and the
police”, Ahram Online, 27 December 2012.
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17. Other events exacerbated the feelings of distrust and anxiety about the
Muslim Brotherhood. For example, the January 2011 attacks by Muslim
Brotherhood members on public institutions and police buildings which
left over 200 police officers dead meant that colleagues who survived the
attacks were now obliged to obey orders from their killers, resulting in an
inevitably precarious working relationship between police and security
officials and their new paymasters. 13
18. A detailed history of the Muslim Brotherhood, mapping its hierarchy and
structure and documenting its culture of violence and association with
international Islamist terrorist groups, is set out in Report 1.14
19. Morsi’s brief period in power saw the Muslim Brotherhood impose itself
as the real ‘power behind the throne’. 15 Its influence over Morsi was
obvious from the start with a raft of decisions in the first few weeks and
months of his presidency designed to place him and his Muslim
Brotherhood-dominated government beyond the law16 so as to consolidate
13 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. 14 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 15 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 16 See generally “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”,
9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015. For further information see, “Egypt's Morsi assumes wide
powers”, Al Jazeera, 23 November 2012; El-Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: Whose Constitution?”, The
New York Review of Books, 3 January 2013. See also, “Morsi 'power grab' angers Egypt
opposition groups”, The Guardian, 23 November 2012.; Kirkpatrick, D., and El-Sheikh, M.,
“Citing Deadlock, Egypt’s Leader Seizes New Power and Plans Mubarak Retrial”, The New
York Times, 22 November 2012; “Top judges, opposition protest Morsi’s power-extending
decree”, RT News, 24 November 2012.; Sabry, B., “Absolute Power: Morsi Decree Stuns
Egyptians”, 22 November 2012.
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power and facilitate a sweeping Islamification of all segments of
government and society. 17
20. Outside of Morsi’s cabinet, which throughout his rule became increasingly
populated with Muslim Brotherhood members or supporters,18 there was a
broad recognition within key state institutions that Egypt was being taken
down the wrong path and that the Muslim Brotherhood had effectively
taken the reins of power to further its self-confessed objective of creating
an Islamic caliphate. 19
17 See generally “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”,
9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015. For further information see, “Former top court judge challenges
Egypt's new constitution”, CBC News, 8 January 2013.; El-Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: Whose
Constitution?”, The New York Review of Books, 3 January 2013.; Essam El-Din, G., “Egypt
PM Qandil makes some surprise, controversial ministerial choices”, Ahram Online, 3 August
2012.; Nordland, R. and El-Sheikh, M., “Egyptian President Names Minister in Interim
Cabinet as Premier”, The New York Times, 24 July 2012.; “The Brothers of the Cabinet”,
Egypt Independent, 10 August 2012.; “Media under Morsi: chains remains in place”, Daily
News Egypt, 18 September 2012. Accessed at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/09/18/media-under-morsy-chains-remain-in-place/ 18 Essam El-Din, G., “Egypt PM Qandil makes some surprise, controversial ministerial
choices”, Ahram Online, 3 August 2012.; Nordland, R. and El-Sheikh, M., “Egyptian
President Names Minister in Interim Cabinet as Premier”, The New York Times, 24 July
2012.; “The Brothers of the Cabinet”, Egypt Independent, 10 August 2012.; 19 El-Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: The Rule of the Brotherhood”, The New York Review of Books, 7
February 2013.; “Egypt's Morsi grants himself far-reaching powers”, CNS News, 22
November 2012.
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2.2.2 Separating the army from politics
21. Morsi represented Egypt’s first civilian president since 1952 20 and the
army made clear its desire to respect the result of the elections by keeping
a distance from politics.
22. Former general, Talaat Mosallam, plainly stated that the military “has no
interest in going back into politics.”21 Al-Sisi, as newly appointed Minister
of Defence, reiterated the army’s non-political stance and announced his
ambition to prioritise a “comprehensive programme that develops real
training for the forces in all military branches.”22
23. Al-Sisi was clear as to his mandate; he was to stick to matters pertaining to
the armed forces and military strategy. Politics was a matter for the civil
government. 23
24. There was no indication at this early stage that events were to unfold over
the next few months which would eventually force the army, albeit
reluctantly, to change its position and take a firmer stance with Morsi and
the Muslim Brotherhood government.
20 Black, B., “Mohamed Morsi Victory is a Landmark for Egypt – but a Qualified One” The
Guardian, 24 June 2012. 21 Fleishman, J., and Abdellatif, R., “Egypt’s Morsi leans on uncomfortable alliance with
military” Los Angeles Times, 9 December 2012. 22 Khalaf, R., “Morsi code reveals stance on army” Financial Times, 8 October 2012. 23 Khalaf, R., “Morsi code reveals stance on army” Financial Times, 8 October 2012.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
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2.2.3 The army never planned to get involved in politics
25. International media and reports have tended to focus on the army’s role in
the revolution of 30 June 2013 with some commentators identifying it as
the spearhead in the revolution that removed Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood from power.24
26. The reality is that the seed of the revolution was planted long before the
army got involved and the primary impetus for Morsi's removal came not
from the army but from the civilian masses.25
27. Almost immediately after assuming power, the Muslim Brotherhood
signalled its intent in a string of controversial moves that set the clock
ticking on its time in government (see Report 2).26
28. Following the violent mass protests against Morsi‘s infamous 21
November decree,27 senior army officials offered to act as mediators in an
24 Shafick, H., “A tale of two revolutions: Egypt 2011-2013”, Open Democracy, 1 November
2013. See also, “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi”, BBC News, 4 July
2013. 25 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. 26 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 27 El-Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: The Rule of the Brotherhood”, The New York Review of Books, 7
February 2013.; “Egypt's Morsi grants himself far-reaching powers”, CNS News, 22
November 2012.; “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 –
2013”, 9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015.
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effort to calm tensions 28 between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and
anti-government protestors (see also Report 2).29 Despite the dictatorial
nature of the announcement, the army, while opposed to the president’s
decision, continued to support the government and did not block the new
draft constitution.30
29. Morsi defiantly dismissed the army’s offer of assistance and called off a
meeting sought by senior military officials to discuss what action the
government should take to calm the brewing storm and avoid further
bloodshed. 31 This was seen as a move that demonstrated not only Morsi’s
own independent authority but also the army’s position that it was not the
latter’s place to get involved in politics – a position the army, and al-Sisi,
dutifully accepted. 32
30. Illustrative of the army’s aversion to interfere in government matters, one
army Colonel when asked about Morsi’s refusal to allow the army to get
involved as an intermediary stated,
28 “Transcript: Egypt's army statement”, Al Jazeera, 3 July 2013. See also, Abdelaziz, S., Sayah,
R., and Wedeman, B., “Egypt's military gives Morsy ultimatum”, CNN, 2 July 2013.;
Kirkpatrick, D., El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New York
Times, 6 July 2013. 29 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 30 Stacher, J., “Why The Generals Back Morsi” Foreign Affairs, 20 December 2012. 31 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. 32 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013.
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"It was a veiled message to stay out of politics, and we got it, as
we understood that [Morsi] was an elected leader and (it) would
be hard to defy that, … but it was clear by then where his rule
was driving the state.” 33
31. Far from plotting to overthrow the government and take power, the army
was – unlike several key institutions within the public sector34 - keen to
give Morsi’s government a chance. The frustration with the army’s
reluctance to get involved in political affairs was revealed by a senior
security officer of the Minister of Interior who commented,
“The army, like many people who have not dealt directly with
the Brotherhood and seen their dirtiness wanted to believe that
they have something to offer to Egypt.”35
32. According to both military as well as government sources,36
“[Al]-Sisi's call for dialogue, intended to reconcile the president
and leaders of the opposition's National Salvation Front was
33 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also, Mourad, H., “Why Egypt’s army overthrew
Morsi”, Ahram Online, 13 July 2013. 34 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also Mourad, H., “Why Egypt’s army overthrew
Morsi”, Ahram Online, 13 July 2013. 35 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also, Mourad, H., “Why Egypt’s army overthrew
Morsi”, Ahram Online, 13 July 2013. 36 Ezzat, D., “Egypt: The president, the army and the police”, Ahram Online, 27 December
2012.
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initially undertaken with the approval of the president but was
cancelled after the president changed his mind due to
opposition from the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim
Brotherhood, from which Morsi hails.” 37
33. The Muslim Brotherhood’s political strategy of ‘Ihkwanization’ (see Report
2)38 was being exerted to great effect within the government. However, it
knew that to become all-powerful, it would need the army onside and
therefore repeated attempts were made by members to infiltrate it so as to
“Brotherhoodise” the army. 39
34. Apparently, al-Sisi did not want the army to play a political role.40 Rather,
he preferred that army to remain neutral. The Muslim Brotherhood was so
persistent however, that al-Sisi was eventually forced to make a public
statement on 14 February 2013 stressing that he would not allow the
Muslim Brotherhood, or any other political group, to dominate the army. 41
37 Ezzat, D., “Egypt: The president, the army and the police”, Ahram Online, 27 December
2012. 38 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 39 Mourad, H., “Why Egypt’s army overthrew Morsi”, Ahram Online, 13 July 2013. 40 Mourad, H., “Why Egypt’s army overthrew Morsi”, Ahram Online, 13 July 2013. See also,
Kirkpatrick, D., El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New York
Times, 6 July 2013. 41 Mourad, H., “Why Egypt’s army overthrew Morsi”, Ahram Online, 13 July 2013.
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2.3 Army demonstrates loyalty to Morsi government
2.3.1 Army continues to back Morsi amidst rising tensions
35. Morsi’s relationship with the army began as one of suspicion,42 following
years of persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood members by the military
under the former regime (see Report 1 and Report 2).4344 In conjunction,
the army too became disillusioned by its leaders, in particular with
General Field Marshal Tantawi, who it was perceived had mismanaged
the army’s institutional and strategic interests and, as a result, national
security.45
36. Morsi’s announcement on 12 August 2012 to reshuffle five senior military
figures, forcibly ending Tantawi’s twenty-year career as Minister of
Defence was welcomed.46 Known for his loyalty to Mubarak,47 Tantawi’s
dismissal marked a symbolic departure from the former government, and
the beginning of a fresh start between the military and the government.
42 Kirkpatrick, D., and El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New
York Times, 6 July 2013. 43 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 44 The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 45 El-Dine, C., “The Military and Egypt’s Transformation Process” German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, 6 February 2013. 46 Connolly, K., “Egypt Leader Mursi Orders Army Chief Tantawi To Resign” BBC News, 12
August 2012. 47 El Gundy, Z., “Meet General El-Sisi, Egypt's defence minister” Ahram Online, 13 Aug 2012.
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Tantawi was replaced by then Director of Military Intelligence, Abdel-
Fattah al-Sisi.48
37. A pious Muslim, al-Sisi and Morsi got on well together at first. 49 The
military and Morsi maintained a symbiotic relationship as the mutual
feeling was that each needed the other; the informal covenant being that
the military required the president’s support to maintain its strength and
standing in Egyptian society and in return it would support the
government and refrain from interfering in politics. 50
38. The 21 November decree, as well as other divisive decisions contradicted
Morsi’s promise of democratic and inclusive government and steered
Egypt onto what many feared was a ‘dangerous’ path.
39. Accordingly, Morsi’s plan to hope to persuade al-Sisi, who held the trust
and respect of the majority of Egyptian people (including non-Muslims
and moderates), 51 to continue supporting his and the Muslim
Brotherhood’s agenda, became strained.
48 Aboulenein, A., “Morsy assumes power: Sacks Tantawi and Anan, reverses constitutional
decree and reshuffles SCAF”, Daily News Egypt, 12 August 2012. Accessed at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/08/12/morsy-assumes-power-sacks-tantawi-and-anan-
reverses-constitutional-decree-and-reshuffles-scaf/. 49 Kirkpatrick, D., El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New York
Times, 6 July 2013. 50 Kirkpatrick, D., El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New York
Times, 6 July 2013. 51 El Gundy, Z., “Meet General El-Sisi, Egypt's defence minister” Ahram Online, 13 Aug 2012.
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40. Tensions between the army and the government had already started to
brew after the first few months of Morsi’s presidency. 52 Although there
was no question of replacing Morsi, the army was coming under
increasing pressure from all sides, including political parties and the civil
service. 53
41. In spite of this, al-Sisi and his senior officers resisted pressure from the
more rebellious factions in the Interior Ministry who openly expressed
their distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood government. 54 There was also a
growing security issue with larger, more frequent and increasingly violent
riots against the Muslim Brotherhood government’s self-serving policies
and decisions which, in turn, triggered counter-riots from Muslim
Brotherhood supporters (including other Islamist militant groups), often
with deadly consequences. This is illustrated in detail in Chapter 3 of this
report. See also Report 2.55
52 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also generally “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015. For further information see,
“Former top court judge challenges Egypt's new constitution”, CBC News, 8 January 2013.;
El-Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: Whose Constitution?”, The New York Review of Books, 3 January
2013.; Essam El-Din, G., “Egypt PM Qandil makes some surprise, controversial ministerial
choices”, Ahram Online, 3 August 2012.; Nordland, R. and El-Sheikh, M., “Egyptian
President Names Minister in Interim Cabinet as Premier”, The New York Times, 24 July
2012.; “The Brothers of the Cabinet”, Egypt Independent, 10 August 2012.; 53 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also, Kirkpatrick, D., El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned
Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New York Times, 6 July 2013. 54 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. 55 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
23
42. Public sources reveal that throughout the riots leading up to and following
the 2012 constitutional referendum, the army continued to protect the
president’s safety from the swarming protestors.56 On 5 December 2012,
the angry crowds had swelled and the police were forced to erect
barricades around the president’s offices.57 On 9 December 2012, when
thousands more joined the protests calling for Morsi’s resignation, the
Republican Guard deployed four tanks to ensure the protection of the
president. 58 It is clear that the army showed continued deference and
support to Morsi, even after his actions had begun to resemble that of the
authoritarian government before him.
43. Although al-Sisi continued to support Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood
government, he was not blind to the dangers apparent from the direction
the country was being taken under Muslim Brotherhood rule (see sections
2.3.2 and 2.3.3 below).
44. As early as December 2012, al-Sisi confronted Morsi and expressed his
concern about specific government decisions and, on one particular
instance, vocally opposed a proposed government plan (reportedly
directly channelled from the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood) to
sell land in Sinai to Palestinian and Qatari ‘investors’ for what was
56 Stacher, J., “Morsi’s Guns: The Officers Backing Egypt’s President” Foreign Affairs, 4
February 2013. 57 Hessler, P., “Big Brothers: Where is the Muslim Brotherhood leading Egypt?”, The New
Yorker, 14 January 2013. 58 “Egypt Army Deploys Tanks To Protect Morsi’s Palace” The Jerusalem Post, 6 December
2012.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
24
claimed to be “for tourist purposes”. 59 The concern was that this was a
Muslim Brotherhood ploy to covertly fund affiliated terrorist groups (see
Report 1).60 What precisely happened as a result of al-Sisi’s intervention is
unclear.
45. The Muslim Brotherhood ignored all dissent and criticism.61 Instead, it got
bolder in its attempts to consolidate power and was not averse to using
violence to achieve this. This is illustrated in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5
of this report (see also Report 1 for an illustration of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s history of violence and Report 2 where it used violence to
keep and consolidate power).6263
46. In one incident, government ministers in a meeting with Morsi –
seemingly unaware that they were on live television - suggested
sabotaging an Ethiopian project to build a dam on the Nile by arming
Ethiopian rebels, launching a campaign to boast of Egypt’s military might
and “finishing the job” with Egyptian fighter jets.64 Morsi refrained from
59 Ezzat, D., “Egypt: The president, the army and the police”, Ahram Online, 27 December
2012. 60 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 61 Hope, B., “Egypt faces descent into chaos as Morsi defies military ultimatum”, The
National - Abu Dhabi (English version), 3 July 2013; Kirkpatrick, D., and El Sheikh, M.,
“Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New York Times, 6 July 2013. 62 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 63 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 64 “Egypt frets, fumes over Ethiopia’s Nile plan”, The Washington Post, 12 June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
25
giving them explicit support but did not reject the proposal and later
declared that “all options are open.”65
47. It was to be Morsi’s strategy to tacitly accept the decisions made by the
Muslim Brotherhood leadership while being cautious not to directly
endorse them in public. One striking example of this (other examples are
discussed in Report 2)66 was during a pro-Syrian rebel rally on 17 June
2013 at which conservative Sunni clerics and high-ranking members of the
Muslim Brotherhood were present. 67 The Islamist speakers repeatedly
called for jihad in Syria.
48. This was seen by some as an attempt by Morsi to gain western favour to
help counter simmering social anger and discontent at home by ‘joining’
the international community in the fight against the Assad regime. It was
also seen as an implicit push by Sunni extremists for sectarian violence
against Shiites and Alawites. Although Morsi himself did not call for
violence, he failed to distance himself from other ultraconservative
Salafists speakers at the rally, including one who referred to Shiites as
infidels. Instead, he asserted that the Egyptian “nation, leadership and
army will not abandon the Syrian people.” 68
65 “Egypt frets, fumes over Ethiopia’s Nile plan”, The Washington Post, 12 June 2013. 66 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 67 “Morsi 1st president to declare war in a football stadium': Egypt's revolutionary sheikh”,
Ahram Online,17 June 2013. 68 “Morsi 1st president to declare war in a football stadium': Egypt's revolutionary sheikh”,
Ahram Online,17 June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
26
49. Through its support of the ‘Syrian people’, the Muslim Brotherhood (with
Morsi’s support or acquiescence) armed and funded Islamic terrorist
groups such as al-Qaeda in Syria under the guise of supporting the
international coalition against the Assad regime - actions that would also,
in part, give rise to the birth of the new Islamic State terrorist group69 (for
more on the links between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic
militant groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State see Report 1).70
50. These, and other decisions (see Report 2 on the Ihkwanization of the
Egyptian government),71 raised concerns among the Interior Ministry and
the non-Islamist political parties. 72 The pressure on the government, of
which al-Sisi was a part, became even more intense in the course of
continued and growing mass-protests against Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood.
69 “Morsi role at Syria rally seen as tipping point for Egypt army”, The Irish Times, 4 July
2013. See also, International Crisis Group, “Marching in Circles: Egypt’s Dangerous Second
Transition”, Policy Briefing – Middle East/North Africa Briefing No. 35, 7 August 2013.;
Mohsen, M., “Egypt to aid Syrian rebels”, Daily News Egypt, 15 June 2013 accessed at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/15/egypt-to-aid-syrian-rebels/;
“ 'Morsi 1st president to declare war in a football stadium': Egypt's revolutionary sheikh”,
Ahram Online, 17 June 2013. 70 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 71 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 72 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013. See also generally “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015. For further information see,
“Former top court judge challenges Egypt's new constitution”, CBC News, 8 January 2013.;
El-Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: Whose Constitution?”, The New York Review of Books, 3 January
2013.; Essam El-Din, G., “Egypt PM Qandil makes some surprise, controversial ministerial
choices”, Ahram Online, 3 August 2012.; Nordland, R. and El-Sheikh, M., “Egyptian
President Names Minister in Interim Cabinet as Premier”, The New York Times, 24 July
2012.; “The Brothers of the Cabinet”, Egypt Independent, 10 August 2012.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
27
51. Concerned about the rising tide of public anger and growing unrest, Al-
Sisi had, months earlier, warned Morsi that to survive and ward off
further popular protests the government needed to be more inclusive and
engage with other political parties.73 This advice was not heeded by the
Muslim Brotherhood as it was intent on consolidating power and
embarking on a full-scale Islamification of the country. 74 As a result, Morsi
became increasingly unpopular and the mass protests continued to grow.
52. Intent on giving the government another opportunity to fulfill its
democratic mandate, al-Sisi, as the Defense Minister, remained reluctant
to intervene and involve the army in government affairs.75
53. By June 2013 however, the febrile atmosphere had reached boiling point
and the country was close to descending into chaos.
2.3.2 Pressure grows on army to support demands of Egyptian people
54. At the now-infamous rally at Cairo Stadium on 17 June 2013 (mentioned
in paragraph 47 above), attended by Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Sheikh Mohamed Abdel-Maqsoud, a conservative hardliner, described
73 Arabiya, A., “Is the Clock Ticking for Mursi? Opposition Sets Deadline for his Ouster” Al
Arabiya News, 1 July 2013. 74 Arabiya, A., “Is the Clock Ticking for Mursi? Opposition Sets Deadline for his Ouster” Al
Arabiya News, 1 July 2013. 75 Alsharif, A., and Saleh, Y., “Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the
state'”, Reuters, 10 October 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
28
those planning to take part in anti-Morsi rallies on 30 June 2013 as infidels
(see Report 276).77
55. The anti-government Tamarod campaign launched in May 2013 (discussed
in Report 2)78 was gaining momentum and with Morsi’s continued defiant
stance toward protestors, tens of thousands of anti-Muslim Brotherhood
protestors joined them on the streets demanding he resign and that new
elections be called.79
56. In response, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood called upon Islamist
supporters to launch counter-demonstrations with a view to disrupting
the anti-Morsi crowds and depict Morsi as a peacemaker and unfair target,
rather than the cause of the problem.
57. On 21 June 2013, tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of Muslim
Brotherhood supporters organised a demonstration in central Cairo,
demonstrating in support for the president.80
76 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 77 “Morsi 1st president to declare war in a football stadium': Egypt's revolutionary sheikh”,
Ahram Online,17 June 2013. 78 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 79 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015. 80 “Live Update, part 2: Hundreds of thousands at pro-Morsi rally in Cairo; 2 dead in
Alexandria clashes”, Ahram Online, 28 June. See also "Egypt Islamists warn opponents with
huge pro-Mursi rally”, Reuters, 21 June 2012. See also, “Updated: Egypt’s Islamist rally to
support President Morsi”, Ahram Online, 21 June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
29
2.3.3 Tipping point
58. In contrast to the anti-Morsi protestors, which were predominantly non-
violent,81 the Muslim Brotherhood once again showed its propensity for
violence to achieve its aims by arming themselves with home-made bombs
and steel batons.82 As illustrated in Report 1,83 violence has characterised
the group’s activities and core philosophy since its formative years in the
early 1930s.
59. Amidst the growing tide of civil unrest, on 23 June 2013 al-Sisi warned
Morsi that the army was prepared to act decisively to prevent chaos and
further bloodshed as fears rose that mass protests against Morsi planned
for 30 June could ignite fresh violence between his Islamists supporters
and the protestors.84 Once again, Morsi refused to listen. Al-Sisi was firm
in his rebuke, warning Morsi, that the army would, if necessary,
“prevent Egypt from slipping into a dark tunnel of civil unrest
and killing, sectarianism and the collapse of state institutions.”85
81 Engler, M., and Engler, P., “Did nonviolence fail in Egypt?”, Waging Nonviolence, 21
February 2014. See also Chapter 3 of this report and Report 2 of this series at “The Egyptian
Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015. 82 “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests” AL Monitor, 29 June 2013. 83 “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 9 Bedford Row, 2 April 2015. 84 Hubbard, B., and El Sheikh, M., “Egyptian General Warns Against Violence as Anniversary
Approaches”, The New York Times, 23 June 2013. 85 Abdelaziz, S., Sayah, R., and Wedeman, B., “Egypt's military gives Morsy ultimatum”,
CNN, 2 July 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
30
60. On 26 June 2013, Morsi delivered a two-and-half hour speech to the
nation. 86 It was expected to be a reconciliatory speech but was widely
viewed as provocative and full of threats and accusations targeted against
opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, including media presenters as well
as prominent individuals such as Ahmed Shafik, his former rival in the
2012 Egyptian presidential elections. 87 One reporter directly noted the
tone of Morsi’s speech as that of an “authoritarian ruler”,
“Morsi reminded his audience several times that he is indeed
the President of Egypt and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. Was this a subtle threat?”88
61. Morsi further presented dubious statistics in an effort to obfuscate the
reality of his government’s mismanagement of the economy.89
62. Following his speech, anti-Morsi protestors vowed that they were now
even more determined to take to the streets on the planned 30 June 2013
uprising against the president. 90 It was a clear message from the Egyptian
people that Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government had
irretrievably lost their trust.
86 Excerpts from Egyptian President Morsi Wednesday 26 June Speech, Ikhwanweb, 28 June
2013. See also “Ahram Online breaks down playbook for 30 June anti-Morsi Protests”, Ahram
Online, 29 June 2013, 87 El-Shazli, H.F., “Should Egyptians Believe Morsi?”, Jadaliyya, 28 June 2013. 88 El-Shazli, H.F., “Should Egyptians Believe Morsi?”, Jadaliyya, 28 June 2013. 89 El-Shazli, H.F., “Should Egyptians Believe Morsi?”, Jadaliyya, 28 June 2013. 90 “Egypt: opposition even more determined after Morsi speech”, Ansa, 27 June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
31
63. On 28 June 2013, tensions mounted and violence escalated. Several
individuals were killed during clashes between pro- and anti-Morsi
protesters in the city of Alexandria, including 21-year-old Andrew
Pochter, an American student who was reportedly stabbed to death as he
observed the demonstrations. 91
64. The following day, thousands of Egyptians converged on Tahrir Square in
Cairo to demonstrate against Morsi, demanding his resignation. 92 That
same day, violent clashes continued to erupt in Alexandria, Cairo and Port
Said between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and anti-government
protestors leaving several targeted protestors (including prominent
journalists)93 dead and many more seriously injured. 94 The deliberately
lethal nature of the attacks against protestors was illustrated by reports
alleging that homemade bombs (suggesting a significant degree of
planning) were hurled against crowds of protestors resulting in many
civilian casualties. 95
91 Abdelaziz, S., Sayah, R., and Wedeman, B., “Egypt's military gives Morsy ultimatum”,
CNN, 2 July 2013. 92 Hendawi, J. (via The Associated Press, Alastair Macdonald) "Egypt protests: Thousands
gather at Tahrir Square to demand Morsi’s ouster". The Star (Toronto), 30 June 2013; "Egypt:
BBC inside Tahrir Square amid demonstration". BBC News, 30 June 2013.; "Tahrir Square
protesters show President Mursi the 'red card'", Al Arabiya, 30 June 2013. 93 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor, 29
June 2013. 94 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor, 29
June 2013. 95 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor, 29
June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
32
65. As a result of the loss of confidence in Morsi and his government, nine
members of the parliament’s upper house resigned;96 among them, Nadia
Henry, who spoke at a press conference held by the Tamarod initiative,
where it was announced that the number of anti-Morsi signatories reached
22 million. 97 Henry read a collective statement from those members of the
upper house who resigned, stating,
“Today we join the national will and declare our mass
resignation.” 98
66. Meanwhile, dozens of opposition tents were erected around the
presidential palace. Posters carrying the now-common phrase “come
down in protest” were stuck on tents and handed out to cars driving by
the sit-in. Insults, political slogans and anti-Morsi graffiti were spray-
painted on the massive cement barricade built around the presidential
palace but violent attacks on pro-government supporters were rare. 99
What was clear was the degree of widespread anger against Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood government.
96 “Shura Council members resign”, Daily News Egypt, 30 June 2013 accessed at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/30/shura-council-members-resign/ 97 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor, 29
June 2013. See also, “Shura Council members resign”, Daily News Egypt, 30 June 2013
accessed at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/30/shura-council-members-resign/ 98 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor, 29
June 2013. 99 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor, 29
June 2013. See also, Hendawi, J. (via The Associated Press, Alastair Macdonald) "Egypt
protests: Thousands gather at Tahrir Square to demand Morsi’s ouster". The Star (Toronto),
30 June 2013; "Egypt: BBC inside Tahrir Square amid demonstration". BBC News, 30 June
2013.; "Tahrir Square protesters show President Mursi the 'red card'", Al Arabiya, 30 June
2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
33
67. Hamdi Hamza, a 70-year-old former government employee, captured this
sentiment. He stated,
“[Morsi is] a killer… he must and will leave […] [t]he Muslim
Brotherhood and Morsi proved to be a disaster to what is left in
Egypt, they occupied the country and instead of rescuing it; they
destroyed it further. The only reason he is in power is that we chose
him over Ahmed Shafiq, Hosni Mubarak’s alter ego […] [w]e now
regret it and we will topple him.”100
68. At the same time, just a few miles away, the Muslim Brotherhood led
several Islamist parties and movements in pro-Morsi demonstrations and
mass sit-ins. In stark contrast to the anti-Morsi protestors, they wore
helmets and were armed with wooden and metal batons and homemade
metal shields with some carrying homemade bombs,101 which, one can
surmise, are items not generally employed for peaceful protests. The pro-
Morsi protesters were there to fight.
2.3.4 The government rebuked al-Sisi’s attempts for proper dialogue among
all political parties
100 Sabry, M., “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests”, Al Monitor,
29 June 2013. 101 “Deadly Violence Breaks out in Egypt Ahead of June 30 Protests” AL Monitor, 29 June
2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
34
69. In anticipation of violent confrontations and attacks on government
facilities, Egypt’s military and its police and health departments started
deploying troops, armoured vehicles and ambulance units in and around
protest sites.102 This further demonstrated that, even at this point, the army
was fulfilling its duty to protect the president.
70. By 30 June 2013, thousands of protestors surrounded the presidential
palace 103 and a few days later sieged the Muslim Brotherhood
headquarters.104 Demonstrations were reported to be in progress in 18
locations across Cairo and in other different locations across the country.
With tens of millions on the streets the country was brought to a standstill.
Egypt was in chaos. 105
71. Still al-Sisi, who at this point was seen as the only viable peace broker
between the government and the protestors due to the respect he and the
army commanded from within both camps, refused to give up trying to
find a peaceful solution and allow the government to continue.
72. Al-Sisi had spent much of 31 June locked in meetings with his key
generals and with senior religious and opposition figures, including the
opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei, the country's leading Sunni cleric,
102 "Tahrir Square protesters show President Mursi the 'red card'", Al Arabiya, 30 June 2013. 103 "BBC in Egypt: 'People were not expecting this'", BBC News, 30 June 2013. 104 "Egypt protesters storm Muslim Brotherhood headquarters", BBC News, 1 July 2013. 105 Alsharif, A., "Millions flood Egypt's streets to demand Mursi quit", Reuters, 30 June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
35
Sheikh Ahmed Tayeb, and the Coptic pope, Tawadros II. 106 He did not
meet Morsi, but had spent four hours with him the day before discussing a
power-sharing plan.107 Morsi however was not interested in consensus. 108
73. With the country at the brink of a civil war, a coalition comprised of a
broad and representative group of political and social leaders directed al-
Sisi, during a meeting with Morsi the following day on 1 July 2013, to
present to the president a 48-hour ultimatum: resolve the crisis or resign
and if you refuse the army would step in to quell the increasingly violent
protests. If the president forced the army’s hand in doing so, the coalition,
with the cooperation and support of the army, would proceed to answer
the call of the Egyptian people by formulating a political ‘road-map’
which would put in place arrangements for new elections to be held as
soon as possible. 109 The message was simple - Morsi had 48 hours to
earnestly and effectively address the peoples’ concerns, or the Egyptian
people would remove him from office.
74. The coalition and roadmap is discussed further in Chapter 3.
106 Kingsley, P., and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in
two years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 107 Kingsley, P., and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in
two years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 108 Kingsley, P., and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in
two years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 109 Carlstrom, G., “Egypt’s President Refuses to Step Down” Aljazeera, 3 July 2013. See also,
Fisher, M. “Here’s the Egyptian military’s full statement warning it may act in 48 hours”, The
Washington Post, 1 July 2013; Egypt protests: army issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it
happened, The Guardian, 1 July 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
36
75. Predictably, Morsi alluded to proposals of improved ‘national dialogue’
but failed to offer any concrete concessions.110 Indeed, the president’s aides
later reported Morsi warning “this before that”, pointing to his neck;
vowing to die before stepping down.111
2.4 The end of the Muslim Brotherhood government
2.4.1 Former close allies of Morsi now supported army intervention
76. Morsi’s government was now on the brink of collapse as his own cabinet
began to turn on him. Following the earlier resignations of members of the
upper house of parliament (Shura), over the next 24 hours six ministers
had resigned, including his military adviser, Sami Enan, who had until
then remained loyal to Morsi.112 Upon his resignation, Enan stated that the
army “would not abandon the will of the people.”113
77. By 2 July 2013 it was clear that Muslim Brotherhood’s time in power was
up.114 Its self-serving policies and actions while in power had been an
unmitigated disaster for Egypt. Economic growth had halved during
Morsi’s presidency115 and over 25% of the population was living below the
110 Carlstrom, G., “Egypt’s President Refuses to Step Down” Al Jazeera, 3 July 2013. 111 Kirkpatrick, D., and El Sheikh, M., “Morsi Spurned Deals, Seeing Military as Tamed” New
York Times, 6 July 2013. 112 "Morsi tells Egypt army to withdraw ultimatum – Middle East", Al Jazeera, 14 August
2013. 113 Carlstrom, G., “Egypt’s President Refuses to Step Down” Aljazeera, 3 July 2013. 114 "FM becomes fifth cabinet official to resign", Egypt Independent, 2 July 2013. 115 Halime, F., “A Year In Office: Morsi’s Economic Mistakes” Rebel Economy, 30 June 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
37
poverty line (see Report 2 for more detail on the impact of the Muslim
Brotherhood rule on Egypt).116 Friedman confirmed this,
“It is difficult to exaggerate how much the economy and law
and order had deteriorated under President Morsi. So many
Egyptians were feeling insecure that there was a run on police
dogs! So many tour guides were out of work that tourists were
warned to avoid the Pyramids because desperate camel drivers
and postcard-sellers would swarm them.”
78. Quoting a poll by the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research, it was
found that “71 percent of Egyptians were unsympathetic with pro-Morsi
protests.”117
79. Morsi’s incompetent and increasingly autocratic rule disaffected many of
his supporters amongst Egypt's poor and middle classes, said Fawaz
Gerges, director of the Middle East Center at the London School of
Economics.
116 “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford
Row, 3 June 2015.; Farid, D., “Egypt’s Economy Over Three Years of Turmoil” Daily News
Egypt, 20 September 2014. See also, Saleh, H., "Egypt’s power crisis worsened by declining
natural gas production", FT.com, 29 May 2013; Kirkpatrick, D., "Short of Money, Egypt Sees
Crisis on Fuel and Food", New York Times, 30 March 2013;
"Diesel fuel crisis adds to Egypt's cocktail of political, economic woes", Fox News, 11 March
2013. 117 Friedman, T. L., “Egypt’s Three Revolutions”, The New York Times, 23 July 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
38
“’That some of the revolutionaries are calling on the army to
return to politics is a testament to how polarized Egypt is a year
after the election of [Morsi],’ Gerges said. ‘Think of the millions
of people who cheered [Morsi] after his election. Think of the
millions of Egyptians who pinned their hopes on [him]. A year
later, now, the millions of Egyptians who cheered for [Morsi]
are saying he must go.’”118
80. The end had come for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Furious
protestors filled the streets, and over 22 million people had signed the
Tamarod’s petition demanding Morsi’s resignation. 119
81. While reiterating his personal desire to keep the military out of politics, al-
Sisi was finally compelled to accept that the army had a responsibility to
respond to the wishes of the Egyptian and take action to quell the
escalating violence.120 The alternative (i.e. the army doing nothing) would
undoubtedly have resulted in the country descending into a violent and
chaotic civil war that would have brought with it a much higher civilian
death toll.121
118 Abdelaziz, S., Sayah, R., and Wedeman, B., “Egypt's military gives Morsy ultimatum”,
CNN, 2 July 2013. 119 "Tahrir Square protesters show President Mursi the 'red card'", Al Arabiya, 30 June 2013. 120 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013. 121 Weymouth, L., “Rare interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi” The Washington
Post, 3 August 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
39
2.5 Agreement to remove Morsi involved a broad and representative
coalition – army did not act unilaterally
82. As mentioned earlier in this chapter and discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3 of this report, the army’s participation in Morsi’s eventual
removal and arrest was part of a wider coalition comprising leading
figures and representatives from across the political, social and religious
spectrum. 122
83. In a televised speech on 3 July 2013,123 al-Sisi announced that the armed
forces could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses.
84. He spoke of a new roadmap for the future, and said that the chief justice of
the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, would be given the
task of “running the country's affairs during the transitional period until
the election of a new president.”124
85. Al-Sisi spoke of his “historic responsibility” in front of a panel of
Egyptians representing what was intended to be “a full spectrum of
Egyptian life” and which formed the core of the coalition that had agreed
122 Kingsley, P., and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two
years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. ; Fisher, M. “Here’s the Egyptian military’s full statement
warning it may act in 48 hours”, The Washington Post, 1 July 2013; Egypt protests: army
issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it happened, The Guardian, 1 July 2013. 123 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013. 124 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
Against the Muslim Brotherhood
40
on the plan of action with the army. Key members included the Coptic
pope, the country's most senior Muslim cleric, and leading secular
politician Mohamed el-Baradei. 125
86. Following al-Sisi's address, both Pope Tawadros II - the head of the Coptic
Church - and leading opposition figure Mohammed el-Baradei, made
short televised speeches about the new roadmap for Egypt's future that
they had agreed with the army. El-Baradei said the roadmap aimed for
“national reconciliation” and represented a fresh start to the January 2011
revolution. 126 Pope Tawadros II added that the roadmap has been drafted
“by…[those]…who seek the interests, first and foremost, of the
country.”127 Opposition leader and former head of the Arab League, Amr
Moussa, expressed similar agreement and optimism, promising that
consultations for a government and reconciliation “will start from now.”128
87. As mentioned previously, the key features of the roadmap are set out in
Chapter 3 below.
88. Al-Sisi justified the army’s involvement in that Morsi had lost his
legitimacy as president as a result of his failure and unwillingness to
125 Kingsley, P., and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two
years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 126 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013. 127 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013. 128 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013.
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address the concerns of the Egyptian people and work with opposition
parties.129 It suspended the constitution and appointed Adly Mansour as
Egypt’s interim president.130 The plan at this stage was simple and had
unanimous support from all members of the coalition - to avoid further
bloodshed and maintain peace and calm until elections could be held and
a new, democratically elected president chosen (see Chapter 3).
89. Al-Sisi’s decision to involve the army in the eleventh hour was widely
supported both domestically and internationally. US Secretary of State
John Kerry supported the army’s action, stating that Egypt’s army was
“restoring democracy.” He stated during a visit to Pakistan,
“The military did not take over… The military was asked to
intervene by millions and millions of people.”131
90. Former Egyptian presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi, supported the
view that al-Sisi remained loyal to Morsi as long as he could, so much so
that he was even considered part of the Morsi regime. 132 He stated in an
interview,
129 “Egyptian army chief explains decision to oust Morsi” The National, 15 July 2013. 130 Mardell, M., “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi” BBC News, 4 July
2013. 131 Weymouth, L., “Rare interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi” The Washington
Post, 3 August 2013. 132 “Egypt's Sabbahi says Sisi 'was once part of Morsi regime”, Middle East Eye, 9 May 2014.
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“Al-Sisi was part of Morsi’s regime and saluted him (as the
defense minister), while I was saying: ‘Down with Morsi’s
legitimacy!’” 133
91. Sabbahi went on to say that the army was not responsible for ousting
Morsi.
“The army cannot move without the people’s order… The
people moved on June 30, and then the army moved afterwards
on July 3.”134
2.6 Closing Remarks
92. This chapter has looked at the circumstances that led to the end of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s brief period in power and the popular movement
that resulted in Morsi’s removal as president. The consequences of his rule
for Egypt were devastating and have been discussed in previous reports.
93. The next chapter traces the specific actions that followed on the 3 July 2013
when Morsi was removed from power and the events that followed.
133 “Egypt's Sabbahi says Sisi 'was once part of Morsi regime”, Middle East Eye, 9 May 2014. 134 “Egypt's Sabbahi says Sisi 'was once part of Morsi regime”, Middle East Eye, 9 May 2014.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
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CHAPTER 3
The Revolution
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3.1 3 July 2013
3.1.1 Introduction
94. Following what was described as the biggest demonstration in the history
of Egypt on 30 June 2013,135 the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement insisted
they would remain in the street until Morsi stepped down. Tamarod
issued a statement on 1 July 2013 giving Morsi until 5 pm on 2 July 2013 to
leave and pave the way for early presidential elections or else it would
bring the crowds back out, march on more palaces and launch “complete
civil disobedience”.136 Tamarod warned that the protests could drag the
country into civil war and called on the military and the police to clearly
state their support for the protesters.137
95. Later on 1 July 2013, on state television, Defence Minister and head of the
army, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi issued a statement, which
set out three important points.
96. First, the statement indicated that the army perceived the deeply divided
nation as a threat to national security, and any intervention would be as a
matter of duty to the nation. Echoing his speech of 23 June 2013 where al-
Sisi had stated that the army would not allow Egypt to enter a “dark 135 Abdelhadi, M., “In Egypt, all eyes are on the army”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 136 “ElBaradei authorized as spokesman for Egypt’s anti-Morsi 30 June Front”, Ahram Online,
2 July 2013. 137 “Egypt protests: army issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it happened”, The Guardian, 1 July
2013. See also “Is the clock ticking for Mursi? Opposition sets deadline for his ouster”, Al
Arabiya News, 1 July 2013.
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tunnel of conflict” and had called on all political factions to reach
consensus,138 al-Sisi said that,
“National security is under threat following the latest
developments.”
97. Second, the statement indicated that the army recognized the mass
protests and petition as the expression of popular democracy, in a system
where there was no effective mechanism to impeach and remove a
president.
98. Al-Sisi supported the “unprecedented” expression of “the will of the
people”, which Morsi had recognised as, “the source of power and
legitimacy” following his election to president a year earlier. 139 He
emphasized that,
“the armed forces will not … go against the democratic thoughts
that emanate from the people of Egypt of their own free will”
and that, “the armed forces feels obligated to embrace the will of
the people.”140
138 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's army to step in if anti-Morsi rallies become violent”, The Guardian,
23 June 2013. 139 “President Morsi’s Speech in Tahrir Square, 29 June 2012”, Ikwanweb, 30 June 2012. See
also “Egypt’s President-elect Mohamed Mursi hails Tahrir crowds” BBC, 29 June 2012. 140 Fisher, M. “Here’s the Egyptian military’s full statement warning it may act in 48 hours”,
The Washington Post, 1 July 2013; "Egypt protests: army issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it
happened", The Guardian, 1 July 2013.
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99. External support for this view comes from U.S. President Obama, who
stressed in a call to Morsi on 1 July 2013 that,
“democracy is about more than elections; it is also about
ensuring that the voices of all Egyptians are heard and
represented by their government, including the many Egyptians
demonstrating throughout the country.”141
100. Third, al-Sisi’s statement emphasized that any decisions would be
taken by a coalition of social and political forces, collaborating in the name
of the will of the people. Al-Sisi said “the armed forces will not be a party
in politics” and that a proposed roadmap for the future, “if the demands
of the people are not realized” within 48 hours, would be overseen,
“in collaboration with all the loyal national factions and
movements, including the youth who were and remain the
spark of the glorious revolution. No one would be ignored.”142
101. Indeed, invitations to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
Party to attend meetings before and after Morsi’s removal were made, but
were declined.143
141 “Readout of the President’s call with President Morsi of Egypt”, The White House, 2 July
2013. 142 Fisher, M. “Here’s the Egyptian military’s full statement warning it may act in 48 hours”,
The Washington Post, 1 July 2013; Egypt protests: army issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it
happened, The Guardian, 1 July 2013.
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102. The events of 3 July 2013 indicate that it became apparent, following
Morsi’s midnight speech, that it would be impossible for political factions
to reach consensus by the ultimatum’s deadline. Moreover, it became clear
that further delay could not lead to a political resolution but risked
increased fighting and possible civil war. As el-Baradei said,
“In my judgment, we could not have waited even one more
week.”144
103. Following the expiration of the ultimatum, al-Sisi made a televised
speech (as mentioned in Chapter 2) reiterating the three points that he had
emphasized on 1 July 2013, that a coalition of social and political forces
had decided, in the name of the popular will, and to avert the threat to
national security, that new presidential elections would be called.
3.1.2 3 July 2013: Morsi’s rejection of the ultimatum
104. President Morsi’s public response to al-Sisi’s ultimatum on behalf of
the Egyptian people came at midnight on 2 – 3 July 2013, after a four-hour
143 “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened”,
The Guardian, 3 July 2013. See also “Freedom and Justice Party: No Military Coup Dialogue”,
FJP Online, 6 July 2013. 144 “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for Uprising”, New York
Times, 4 July 2013.
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long meeting between Morsi and al-Sisi at the Presidential Palace that day,
reportedly discussing a power-sharing plan.145
105. A statement on the official Facebook page of the Office of Assistant to
President for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation released on
3 July 2013 said that the President discussed, “an initiative from an
alliance of parties supporting constitutional legitimacy” with the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Defence. The statement provided that,
“the initiative called for a full change of cabinet, a prime
minister acceptable to all, changing the public prosecutor,
agreement on constitutional amendments, and a reconciliation
commission” and that “all three of them agreed that it presented
an excellent path for Egypt out of its current impasse.”146
106. Morsi refused to resign and call early presidential elections, as called
for by Tamarod’s petition, mass protests, and their ultimatum threatening
civil disobedience.147
107. Morsi’s public response did not relieve the mounting tension on the
street, or the threat of civil war. Instead, his response entrenched it. Morsi
145 Chulov, M. and Kingsley, P. “Egypt: President Morsi defiant as time runs out”, The
Guardian, 3 July 2013. See also Kingsley, P. and Chulov M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in
Egypt's second revolution in two years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 146 Office of the Assistant to the President for Foreign Relations and International
Cooperation, Facebook, 3 July 2013. 147 “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened”,
The Guardian, 3 July 2013.
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claimed that any attempt to force him from power would spark violent
conflict between Islamists and their opponents and proclaimed,
“if the price of protecting legitimacy is my blood, I’m willing to
pay it.”148
108. On 3 July 2013, Ayman Ali, a spokesman for Morsi reiterated Morsi’s
response to the ultimatum, stating that Morsi believed it was better to,
“die standing like a tree” and “defend the democratic system”
than to resign.149
3.1.3 3 July 2013: Response to Morsi’s rejection of the ultimatum
109. Morsi’s midnight speech was immediately interpreted by many on
social media as a coded message to Muslim Brotherhood activists to
unleash war on their fellow Egyptians, “enemies of the true faith” and
thus as incitement to violence. 150
110. Mohamed el-Baradei, leader of the opposition Dustour (constitution)
Party and representative of the opposition umbrella group the National
Salvation Front, took a similar view. He appealed for military intervention
148 “Morsi Defies Egypt Army’s Ultimatum to Bend to Protest”, New York Times, 2 July 2013. 149 “Mursi thinks better to “die standing like tree” – aide”, Reuters, 3 July 2013. 150 Abdelhadi, M., “In Egypt, all eyes are on the army,” The Guardian, 3 July 2013.
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to save Egyptian lives, saying Morsi’s speech showed that he had “lost his
mind” and “incited bloodshed of Egyptians.”151
111. Mahmoud Badr, one of the founders of Tamarod also called for,
“the army to intervene to prevent the bloodshed of the Egyptian
people.” 152
112. The statement by Gehad el-Haddad, the official spokesman of the
Muslim Brotherhood movement appeared to support such fears. He said
that his supporters were willing to become martyrs to defend Morsi,
“There is only one thing we can do: we will stand in between
the tanks and the president.”153
113. Prior to the mass protests of 30 June 2013, Al Azhar had warned in a
statement of potential “civil war.154
114. Mohamed el-Beltagy, a senior Muslim Brotherhood leader had
declared that, “seeking martyrdom,” was the only choice to stop “the coup
151 “ElBaradei party asks army to save Egyptians from 'mad' Morsi”, Reuters, 3 July 2013. See
also, Perry, T. and Fick, M. “Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi, Army Chiefs Prepare For
Showdown Hours Ahead Of Ultimatum”, The World Post, 3 July 2013. 152 Perry, T. and Fick, M. “Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi, Army Chiefs Prepare For
Showdown Hours Ahead Of Ultimatum”, The World Post, 3 July 2013. 153 Perry, T. and Fick, M. “Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi, Army Chiefs Prepare For
Showdown Hours Ahead Of Ultimatum”, The World Post, 3 July 2013. 154 Kirkpatrick, D., “Egypt, Its Streets a Tinderbox, Braces for a Spark”, New York Times, 29
June 2013.
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of June 30.”155 Pro-Morsi protesters had been chanting, “[w]e will sacrifice
our lives for our religion”156 and members of the Muslim Brotherhood
were reported to have marched in the streets carrying death shrouds.157
115. Thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members, many armed with clubs
and helmets, had been camped in front of Raba’a al-Adaweya Mosque in
anticipation of a battle to defend Morsi. 158 On 3 July 2013 men with
helmets and shields were manning the entrance to the Muslim
Brotherhood sit-in in front of Raba’a al-Adaweya Mosque.159
116. Street battles had occurred between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi
supporters, causing injuries and deaths. For example, on 2 July 2013
fighting near Cairo University was described as “literal war”,160 with at
least 18 people reported to have been killed and more than 300 injured.161
On 3 July 2013, tanks and soldiers were deployed to separate the pro- and
anti-Morsi protesters, in anticipation of further unrest.162
155 Kirkpatrick, D., “Depth of Discontent Threatens Muslim Brotherhood and Its Leader”,
New York Times, 2 July 2013. 156 Kirkpatrick, D.“By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster”, New York Times, 30 June
2013. 157 Kirkpatrick, D., “Depth of Discontent Threatens Muslim Brotherhood and Its Leader”,
New York Times, 2 July 2013. 158 Kirkpatrick, D., “Egypt, Its Streets a Tinderbox, Braces for a Spark”, New York Times, 29
June 2013. See also Kirkpatrick, D.“By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster”, New
York Times, 30 June 2013 and Putz, U., “Egypt Putsch: End of the Road for Muslim
Brotherhood”, Speigel Online International, 4 July 2013. 159 “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened”,
The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 160 “Egypt: Deadly Clashes at Cairo University”, Human Rights Watch, 5 July 2013. See also,
“July 2 Updates on Egypt’s Political Crisis,” New York Times, 2 July 2013. 161 “Updates on the Toppling of Morsi”, New York Times, 3 July 2013. 162 Bowen, J., @BowenBBC, Twitter, 3 July 2013.
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117. On 3 July 2013, following 3 days of mass protests, Tamarod had called
for protesters to march to the Republican Guard Palace, where Morsi was
believed to be staying, at 4 pm - the deadline of the military ultimatum for
political resolution, to demand Morsi’s arrest on charges of inciting a civil
war.163 Hundreds of thousands of anti-Morsi protesters also gathered in
Tahrir Square, the Ittihadiya Palace and the Ministry of Defence prior to
the expiry of the ultimatum.164 Protests were reported in Alexandria, Kafr
El-Sheikh, Tanta, Menoufiya, Domiat, Sharqiya, and Mansoura.165
3.1.4 3 July 2013: Army Response to Morsi’s rejection of the ultimatum
118. Three hours after Morsi’s speech, the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces posted its response on its official Facebook page. The post entitled,
“The Final Hours” made it clear that the army would support the people.
It said,
“We swear to God that we will sacrifice even our blood for
Egypt and its people, to defend them against any terrorist,
163 Lucus, S., “Middle East, July 3: Egypt — The Military Removes President Morsi”, EA
WorldView, 3 July 2013. See also ““The time of victory has come”: Tamarod”, Daily News
Egypt, 3 July 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/03/the-time-of-victory-has-
come-tamarod/, “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it
happened”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013, @tamarrod, Twitter, 3 July 2013 164 “Hundreds of thousands flock to Tahrir to hear army statement” Egypt Independent, 3
July 2013. See also, “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over
Egypt presidency”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 165 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013.
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radical or fool.”166
119. During al-Sisi’s announcement after the expiry of the ultimatum, he
explained that it was Morsi’s speech that had convinced a coalition of
political, national, religious, and youth forces and the army of the need to
act to end “the state of conflict and division.” There had been “hope that
national accord would be achieved to delineate a roadmap” but Morsi’s
speech had, “failed to meet the overall demands of the people.” 167
3.1.5 3 July 2013: Last minute negotiations
120. On 3 July 2013, al-Sisi met with: Mohamed el-Baradei; representative
for the National Salvation Front and the April 6 Youth Movement;
representatives of the “Tamarod” (Rebel) campaign; members of the Salafi
Nour party and the head of the Coptic Church; Pope Tawadros II, and
Sheik Ahmed El-Tayeb, head of Al-Azhar.168 The Muslim Brotherhood’s
Freedom and Justice Party was invited to attend, but refused to send a
delegation, stating, “we have a President and that is it.”169
121. As the deadline set for Morsi to meet Tamarod’s demands to resign
and call new presidential elections or face complete civil disobedience
166 Admin official page of the Higher Military Council, Facebook, 3 July 2013. See also “Egypt
army says ready to die in “final hours””, Reuters, 2 July 2013. 167 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013. 168 Mackey, R., Stack, L. and El Naggar, M., “Updates on the Toppling of Morsi”, New York
Times, 3 July 2013. 169 “Muslim Brotherhood party refuses to meet Egypt army chief”, Reuters, 3 July 2013. See
also, “Egypt’s Morsi offers consensus government,” Al Jazeera, 3 July 2013.
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approached, the Egyptian military spokesman confirmed that the General
Command was holding meetings with “religious, national, political and
youth figures” and said a statement would be released as soon as the talks
ended.170
122. On 7 July 2013, Mahmoud Badr, one of the leaders of the Tamarod
movement, said that he had rejected a suggestion by al-Sisi that Morsi
should call a referendum on his continued rule telling him that, “Millions
of people were demonstrating for the recall of the president, not for a
referendum.”
123. Badr recalled that he had said, “I tell you, sir, you may be the general
commander of the Egyptian army but the Egyptian people are your
supreme commander, and they are immediately ordering you to side with
their will and call an early presidential election” and that al-Sisi had given
in.171
124. Morsi released a statement on the Facebook account of his official
spokesman, reiterating his position that, “violating constitutional
legitimacy threatens democratic practice,” that “legitimacy is the sole
guarantor of stability and resistance to violence and unlawful means,” and
that “Egyptians have their say at the ballot box.” He said it would be
biased to listen to one side, and proposed that the President form a
170 Egypt Military Spokesman, Facebook, 3 July 2013. 171 “Mahmoud Badr, Tamarod Protest Leader, ‘Owns The Streets’ In Egypt,” The World Post,
7 July 2013.
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coalition to oversee the parliamentary elections and an independent
commission to propose constitutional amendments.172
125. A spokesman for President Morsi released a statement on the Facebook
page of the Office of Assistant to President for Foreign Relations and
International Cooperation condemning the political opposition for
refusing to participate in discussions called for by the President “since
January and again in the last couple of weeks” and for “inviting the
military to become the custodians of government in Egypt.” 173
126. The statement warned that, “there will be considerable bloodshed,”
and said that to move those gathered to support democracy and the
Presidency, “there will have to be violence.” It threatened worldwide
catastrophic ramifications for the message that, “will resonate through the
Muslim world loud and clear: democracy is not for Muslims.”174
127. Two hours after the expiry of the deadline, it was reported that the
deadline had been extended in an effort to reach consensus and to prevent
further violence and to guarantee the president's safety.175
172 Egypt Presidential Spokesman, Facebook, 3 July 2013. 173 Office of the Assistant to the President for Foreign Relations and International
Cooperation, Facebook, 3 July 2013. 174 Office of the Assistant to the President for Foreign Relations and International
Cooperation, Facebook, 3 July 2013. 175 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013.
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128. Shortly after, military armoured vehicles were deployed close to Cairo
University in Giza, along the Nile Bridge connecting Giza and Cairo, in
Tahrir Square, at the Ittihadiya presidential palace, and at the Raba’a Al-
Adawiya Mosque, where rallies were being staged, and the Central
Security Forces were present at Tahrir Square and key state institutions.176
129. Travel bans were reportedly imposed on Morsi, Mohammed Badie and
Khairat al-Shater over their involvement in prison escapes in 2011.177 The
official spokesman of the armed forces, Colonel Ahmed Ali, said on his
facebook page, “Our army is seeking to secure all Egyptians, regardless of
their affiliations.”178
3.1.6 3 July 2013: Al-Sisi’s speech
130. On the evening of 3 July 2013, several hours after the army’s ultimatum
to President Morsi to solve the political crisis had passed without
agreement, a coalition led by Defence Minister and chief of the armed
forces, Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi announced the agreed
future roadmap,
“containing initial measures which ensures the construction of a
strong and coherent Egyptian society which does not exclude 176 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 177 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 178 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013.
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any of its members and trends, and which ends the state of
conflict and division.”179
131. Al-Sisi emphasized that the roadmap had been agreed during a
meeting with, “some figures representing political, national, religious, and
youth forces without excluding any party.” 180 As discussed above, the
Freedom and Justice Party had refused to attend.
132. To demonstrate the collaborative nature of the roadmap, during the
televised address to the Egyptian nation, al-Sisi was accompanied by
Ahmed al-Tayyeb, the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Pope Tawadros II of
Egypt's Coptic Church, Mohamed el-Baradei, representative of the 30 June
Coalition and the National Salvation Front, Younes Makhyoun, chairman
of the Salafi Al-Nour party and crucial partner in the Muslim
Brotherhood’s November 2012 Constitution,181 and Mahmoud Badr and
Mohamed Abdel Aziz, representatives from the Tamarod campaign.182
133. During the speech, al-Sisi reiterated that the armed forces were, are
and would remain, “distant from political action.” The Egyptian people
had called on the army “to come to their support” and to protect “the
demands of their revolution” rather than “to assume power.” In
179 Kingsley, P. and Chulov M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two
years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 180 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013. 181 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Salafist al-Nour party wields new influence on post-Morsi coalition”,
The Guardian, 7 July 2013. 182 Weaver, M. and McCarthy, T., “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes
President Morsi – as it happened”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013.
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responding to this call, the armed forces have invoked their, “patriotic,
and not political, role.”183
134. He emphasized that the armed forces had gone to,
“tremendous efforts over the past few months…to contain the
domestic situation and conduct national reconciliation
comprising all the political forces, including the presidential
institution.” 184
135. Al-Sisi recalled that in November 2012, the armed forces had called for
a national dialogue to which all the national and political forces had
responded, but that had been rejected by the presidency at the last
moment. He referred to subsequent calls and initiatives put forward by
the armed forces, including domestic and foreign strategic assessments
addressing the most pivotal challenges and dangers facing the homeland
on the economic, security, political, and social levels and on, “how to
confront the challenges and dangers in order to end the current crisis.” He
mentioned the meeting between the General Command of the Armed
Forces and the President of the Republic on 22 June 2013, where the armed
forces had rejected the harming of the state's national and religious
institutions and attempts to intimidate or threaten the Egyptian people. 185
183 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013. 184 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013. 185 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013.
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136. Al-Sisi said that there had been, “hope that national accord would be
achieved to delineate a roadmap and to give the people a sense of trust
and reassurance, in addition to stability, in a way that secures their hopes
and aspirations”186 but that, “the speech which the president made before
the expiry of the 48-hour deadline failed to meet the overall demands of
the people.”187 As a result it had been necessary for a coalition of political,
national, religious and youth forces and the army to agree a roadmap to
end “the state of conflict and division.”
137. Al-Sisi announced that the roadmap would include:
i. temporary suspension of the constitution;
ii. empowering the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court to
run the country until a new president is elected via early
presidential elections;
iii. forming a new technocratic government;
iv. asking the Supreme Constitutional Court to hasten passing the
parliamentary elections law, currently under review, to allow
for parliamentary elections;
v. forming a committee to amend controversial articles of the
temporarily suspended constitution;
vi. laying down a media code of ethics to guarantee the media’s
professionalism;
vii. forming a committee to foster “national reconciliation”;
186 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013. 187 “Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi statement”, BBC News, 4 July 2013.
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viii. taking immediate steps to include youth in decision making
circles.188
138. Al-Sisi concluded by calling on the Egyptian people to remain peaceful
and avoid violence, and warned that in cooperation with the Ministry of
the Interior, and in accordance with the law, they would stand firmly and
decisively against any act deviating from peacefulness.189
139. After the announcement the grand sheikh of Egypt's Al-Azhar Ahmed
el-Tayeb, Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II and leading opposition
figure Mohamed el-Baradei and leading representative of Tamarod,
Mahmoud Badr made brief supportive statements. Galal Morra, Secretary
General of the Salafi Nour party also broadcast a statement supporting the
roadmap.
140. Ahmed el-Tayeb said, “We hope that the opposing sides can come
together and mend fences.” 190
141. Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawdros II, who had tweeted his support for
“the Egyptian people recovering their stolen revolution” on 2 July 2013,191
blessed al-Sisi’s announcement, saying, “[t]his roadmap has been drafted
188 “Egypt military unveils transitional roadmap”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 189 “Transcript: Egypt's army statement”, Al Jazeera, 3 July 2013. 190 Lucas, S., Middle East, July 3: Egypt — The Military Removes President Morsi, EA World
View, 3 July 2013. See also, “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President
Morsi – as it happened”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 191 “Pope Tawadros II Tweets Support For Protestors In Egypt”, Huffington Post, 2 July 2013.
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by honourable people who seek the interests, first and foremost, of the
country”,192 and that “all [had] gathered under the Egyptian flag.” 193
142. Mohamed el-Baradei said, “I hope that this plan will be a starting point
for a new beginning for the January 25 revolution”194 and called for “social
justice for every single Egyptian.”195 He said the Egyptian streets had paid
a high price for a hopeful political future.196
143. Mahmoud Badr called, “for all political parties to come and start a
dialogue [… ] we don’t want to exclude anyone.”197
144. Galal Morra, Secretary General of the Salafi Al-Nour party said, in a
television interview that, “we took this position and we took these
decision only so we stop the bloodshed of our people.”198
192 “Egypt crisis: Army ousts President Mohammed Morsi”, BBC News, 4 July 2013. 193 Lucas, S., Middle East, July 3: Egypt — The Military Removes President Morsi, EA World
View, 3 July 2013. See also, “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President
Morsi – as it happened”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 194 “Egypt military unveils transitional roadmap”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 195 “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened”,
The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 196 “Egypt military unveils transitional roadmap”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. See also
Weaver, M. and McCarthy, T., “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President
Morsi – as it happened”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 197 Zeese, K., “Egyptian Revolution Phase II, Morsi Out, Transition Government In,” Popular
Resistance, 3 July 2013. 198 “Egyptians react to Morsi's removal”, Al Jazeera, 3 July 2013.
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3.1.7 Coalition Roadmap
145. Prior to al-Sisi’s announcement of the coalition roadmap for a
transitional period in Egypt following Morsi’s departure on 3 July 2013,
details of roadmaps proposed by Tamarod, the army had been released,
alongside roadmaps from the Strong Egypt Party,199 the April 6 Youth
Movement,200 the Revolutionary Socialists,201 the Alliance of Revolutionary
Forces,202 the Salafi Al-Nour Party and the Salafist Call.203
146. The differences between the roadmap reportedly proposed by the
army and the roadmap that al-Sisi announced on the evening of 3 July
2013 further evidences the collaboration, negotiations and consultations
that occurred between Tamarod, the National Salvation Front, the Salafi
Al-Nour party and the army in the presence of the grand sheikh of the Al-
Azhar and the Coptic Pope during the day of 3 July 2013.
147. Tamarod had initially announced details of a transitional roadmap on
10 June 2013 that proposed, “during the transitional period, the chairman
199 Mourad, M., “A host of roadmaps: Opposition, Islamists & Army propose ways out of
Egypt crisis”, AhramOnline, 2 July 2013. 200 Mourad, M., “A host of roadmaps: Opposition, Islamists & Army propose ways out of
Egypt crisis”, AhramOnline, 2 July 2013. See also “Egypt’s April 6 announces 6-step election
road map,” AhramOnline, 2 July 2013. 201 Mourad, M., “A host of roadmaps: Opposition, Islamists & Army propose ways out of
Egypt crisis”, AhramOnline, 2 July 2013. 202 El-Dabh, B. “Revolutionary group proposes transitional roadmap” Daily News Egypt, 4
June 2013 accessed at: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/04/revolutionary-group-
proposes-transitional-roadmap/ 203 Mourad, M., “A host of roadmaps: Opposition, Islamists & Army propose ways out of
Egypt crisis”, AhramOnline, 2 July 2013.
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of the Supreme Constitutional Court would become acting president and a
coalition cabinet would be formed to include all the national political
movements.”204 Further details were announced on 26 June 2013205 and the
National Salvation Front had endorsed it.206
148. On 3 July 2013, Tamarod published its roadmap via its Twitter account.
It called for: (i) a new temporary president and prime minister, the
election of a constitutional council within 30 days (ii) a new constitution to
be drafted within 90 days; (iii) a referendum on the constitution within 15
days of its drafting; and (iv) presidential elections within 60 days of an
agreed constitution.207 It said that it rejected other roadmaps being put
forward.208
149. The army’s roadmap was said to plan to: (i) suspend the constitution;
(ii) dissolve the parliament; (iii) install a interim council comprised of
civilian from different political groups and technocrats to run the country
until an amended constitution was drafted; (iv) hold new presidential
204 Taha, R., “Tamarod proposes transitional roadmap” Daily News Egypt, 10 June 2013,
accessed at: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/10/tamarod-proposes-transitional-
roadmap/ 205 El Gundy, Z. “Tamarod launches 30 June Front, proposes post-Morsi roadmap”, Ahram
Online, 26 June 2013. 206 Mourad, M., “A host of roadmaps: Opposition, Islamists & Army propose ways out of
Egypt crisis”, AhramOnline, 2 July 2013. 207 “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened”,
The Guardian, 3 July 2013 208 “Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened”,
The Guardian, 3 July 2013. See also “Egypt army plan would scrap constitution, parliament:
Reuters”, Ahram Online, 2 July 2013.
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elections and parliamentary elections once strict conditions for selecting
candidates were in force.209
150. The Salafist Watan Party’s national reconciliation initiative, which was
supported by 9 political parties and 12 Islamist-leaning movements,
including the Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya’s
Building and Development Party had also been released, 210 and was
reportedly discussed in the meeting between Morsi, al-Sisi and Prime
Minister Qandil on 2 July 2013. 211 The initiative proposed forming a
national unity government, a popular committee for transparency of
elections and a body for constitutional amendments.
151. The roadmap that al-Sisi announced on the evening of 3 July 2013, with
the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court to be empowered to run the
country, indicates the importance of the meetings on 3 July 2013 in
deciding the course of events, after the negotiations with Morsi had not
only failed, but he had made an uncompromising and what was perceived
to be a threatening speech. In particular, the roadmap indicates the
influence of Tamarod’s refusal to accept a solution other than Morsi’s
resignation and new presidential elections.
209 “Egypt army plan would scrap constitution, parliament: Reuters”, Ahram Online, 2 July
2013. 210 Mourad, M., “A host of roadmaps: Opposition, Islamists & Army propose ways out of
Egypt crisis”, AhramOnline, 2 July 2013. 211 Mackey, R., Stack, L. and El Naggar, M., “Updates on the Toppling of Morsi”, New York
Times, 3 July 2013.
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3.1.8 3 July 2013: Legitimacy
152. During Morsi’s speech at midnight on 2 July 2013 he repeated the word
“legitimacy” a large number of times.212 Morsi had originally promised on
29 June 2012 to respect, “the will of the people” which he regarded to be,
“the source of power and legitimacy,” that “grants and withdraws power”
and that “no authority is over or above this power.”213 However, during
his speech on 2 July 2013, Morsi linked legitimacy with the presidential
elections and the constitution. He did not acknowledge the size of the
protests on the streets and warned that “legitimacy” was the only
guarantee “to ensure there will be no violence.”214
153. Morsi’s claim to “legitimacy” as head of state should be further
challenged as he had overstepped the bounds of his authority and
unconstitutionally placed himself above the law. Morsi had sworn, in his
oath of office, to “preserve the republican order and to respect the
constitution and law, and completely care for the people’s interest.”215
However, Morsi had taken upon himself both executive and legislative
powers, and had declared that his decisions were not subject to judicial
review, even when their constitutionality was in doubt.
154. El-Baradei explained further,
212 Mackey, R., “July 2 Updates on Egypt’s Political Crisis”, New York Times, 2 July 2013. 213 “President Morsi’s Speech in Tahrir Square, 29 June 2012”, Ikwanweb, 30 June 2012. 214 Mackey, R., “July 2 Updates on Egypt’s Political Crisis”, New York Times, 2 July 2013. 215 “Egypt's new president Mohammed Morsi takes oath of office”, The Telegraph, 30 June
2012.
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“We didn’t have a parliament. We only had a president who
may have been elected democratically but who governed
autocratically and violated the spirit of democracy. Morsi had
targeted the judiciary, pressured the media and hollowed out
rights for women and religious minorities. He abused his office
to put his Muslim Brothers in key positions. He stepped on all
universal values. And he drove his country into economic
ruin.”216
155. This view was echoed in a statement by the United States House of
Representatives Foreign Relations Committee on Egypt released in
response to on-going events in Egypt,
“What the Brotherhood neglected to understand is that
democracy means more than simply holding elections. Real
democracy requires inclusiveness, compromise, respect for
human and minority rights, and a commitment to the rule of
law.”217
156. However, although a head of state can usually be impeached for
treason and other serious criminal offences and for breaching the
constitution, there was no mechanism in place by which Morsi could be
216 “Interview with El-Baradei: This was not a coup”, De Spiegel, 8 July 2013. 217 “Statement By The House Foreign Relations Committee On Egypt”, Huffington Post, 5 July
2013.
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constitutionally removed. As el-Baradei said, “We did not have a recall
process. People ask[ed] for the recall process with their feet in Tahrir
Square.” 218
157. In November 2012, at the time of the controversial constitutional
decree, Egypt's Constitutional Court had reportedly considered the
possibility of impeaching Morsi for violating his oath and undermining
the country's constitutional foundations as the constitution had been
suspended in March 2011, and the new constitution was still being
debated. 219
158. In July 2013, Article 152 of the 2012 constitution provided for an
impeachment process following the commission of a felony or treason. A
President of the Republic could be removed from office following a
motion supported by two thirds of the members of the House of
Representatives and a subsequent trial before a special court.220 However,
a House of Representatives had not been elected. The Supreme
Constitutional Court had dissolved the People’s Assembly prior to Morsi’s
election on the grounds that the parliamentary election law was
unconstitutional.221
218 Kirkpatrick, D. “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for
Uprising”, New York Times, 4 July 2013. 219 “Egypt's Constitutional Court looking to impeach Morsi – reports”, RT, 22 November 2012. 220 “Egypt’s draft constitution translated,” Egypt Independent, 2 December 2012. 221 Aziz, S., “Egypt’s Impeachment Alternative”, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 31 October 2013.
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159. In the absence of an impeachment procedure, legitimacy could only be
reclaimed by popular democracy in the street, demanding new
presidential elections or calling for the military to depose the president. As
Bassiouni has said,
“revolutions are the ultimate resort to achieve by means of
popular protests and sometimes by force what a lawful,
constitutional and legal process failed to achieve.” 222
160. El-Baradei explained, during an interview on 8 July 2013,
“we had no other choice […] [m]ore than 20 million people took
to the streets because the situation was no longer acceptable.
Without Morsi's removal from office, we would have been
headed toward a fascist state, or there would have been a civil
war.”223
161. Between 2 and 3 July 2013, when it became apparent that Morsi would
not step down voluntarily, as called for by the millions supporting the
Tamarod campaign, a coalition led by the army intervened in support of
the popular demand that Morsi be deposed. 224 As Amira Nowaira,
Professor at Alexandria University, wrote,
222 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013. 223 “Interview with El-Baradei: This was not a coup”, De Spiegel, 8 July 2013. 224 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013.
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“Without the presence of those millions on the streets and the
determination to get rid of Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim
Brotherhood, the military would certainly not have intervened. The
army acted on a clear popular mandate, as was the case with the
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.”225
3.1.9 3 July 2013: Morsi after al-Sisi’s speech
162. Immediately following al-Sisi’s announcement, Morsi attempted to
assert his authority in a response posted on Facebook, in which he labelled
the announcement a “military coup” and “call[ed] on the entire
population… to abide by the constitution and the laws” and “to avoid
shedding blood.”226
163. Responses were also posted on Twitter, and YouTube, although both
were subsequently removed,227 and an audio was played over loudspeaker
to his supporters rallying in the Nasr City neighbourhood. Morsi stressed
his “legitimacy” and that there was “no alternative to legitimacy.”
225 Nowaira, A., “This is not a coup, but the will of Egypt's people” The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 226 President Morsi, Facebook, 3 July 2013. 227 Mackey, R., Stack, L. and El Naggar, M., “Updates on the Toppling of Morsi”, New York
Times, 3 July 2013. See also “Deleted Video Message from Mohamed Morsi”, YouTube, 3 July
2013.
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164. Shortly after Morsi was removed from power, arrest warrants were
issued for other senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood.228 Saad El-
Katatni, head of the Freedom and Justice Party and Rashad Bayoumi,
group's deputy supreme guide were arrested.229 There were reports that
Mohamed Badie, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood had also been
arrested, 230 but it later emerged that these reports were inaccurate, and on
5 July 2013 he addressed a rally in Nasr City saying, “We will sacrifice
ourselves, our souls and our blood for President Morsi.”231
165. El-Baradei said that he had been reassured that there had been no
arbitrary arrests and that the numbers of arrests had been greatly
exaggerated. 232 He said that Egypt was deeply divided and national
reconciliation was required, and that he hoped the Muslim Brotherhood
would participate in the next round of talks. “Being a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood is no crime.” 233
228 Kingsley, P. and Chulov, M.,“Egypt's military arrest Muslim Brotherhood supreme
leader”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 229 “Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Arrested”, Daily News Egypt, 4 July 2013, accessed
at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/04/muslim-brotherhood-supreme-guide-arrested/ 230 Kingsley, P. and Chulov, M., “Morsi supporters prepare to defend themselves as tide turns
in Egypt” The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 231 @Ikhwanweb, Twitter, 4 July 2013. See also “Egypt’s ‘day of rejection’ - Friday 5 July as it
happened,” The Guardian, 5 July 2013. 232 “Interview with Egyptian Politician ElBaradei: ‘This Was Not a Coup’”, De Speigel, 8 July
2013. 233 “Interview with Egyptian Politician ElBaradei: ‘This Was Not a Coup’”, De Speigel, 8 July
2013.
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3.1.10 3 July 2013: Media
166. Shortly after the military statement announcing the end of Morsi’s
presidency the Muslim Brotherhood-owned television channel Misr 25
went off air along with several other Islamist-run channels, including the
Hafez and Al-Nas.234
167. During al-Sisi’s announcement he had called on the Egyptian people to
remain peaceful and avoid violence, and warned that in cooperation with
the Ministry of the Interior, and in accordance with the law, they would
stand firmly and decisively against any act deviating from peacefulness.235
168. During the 30 June 2013 mass protests, the channels had been opposed
to anti-government demonstrations, and to the ultimatum announced by
the armed forces to “political entities” to end the division in the country.
The channels repeatedly hosted high profile Islamic preachers who used
religious rhetoric to denounce the protests and support Morsi.236
169. El-Baradei explained,
“The Islamist tv stations were closed because they were
fomenting unrest with their fatwas.” 237 The Islamist satellite
234 “Islamic TV channels off air, police arrest crews”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 235 “Transcript: Egypt's army statement”, Al Jazeera, 3 July 2013. 236 “Egypt's military shuts down news channels”, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2013. 237 “Interview with Egyptian Politician ElBaradei: “This Was Not a Coup””, Spiegel Online, 8
July 2013.
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networks that were shut down “have been calling for vengeance
and murder and incitement to kill, so they have to shut them
down for a while.” In some raided stations “there were
weapons.”238 “The security people obviously are worried – there
was an earthquake and we have to make sure that the tremors
are predicted and controlled.” 239 “They are taking some
precautionary measures to avoid violence.”240
170. This explanation was echoed by Khaled Dawoud, spokesman for the
National Salvation Front, who said that, “these are exceptional
circumstances” and that they were “trying to incite supporters to go and
fight.” 241
3.1.11 3 July 2013: Responses to al-Sisi’s announcement
171. Al-Sisi’s announcement was met with massive celebrations in Tahrir
Square and the Ittihadiya presidential palace, with fireworks, flag waving,
horns blasting and dancing.242
238 Kirkpatrick, D. “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for
Uprising”, The New York Times, 4 July 2013. 239 “Interview with Egyptian Politician ElBaradei: “This Was Not a Coup””, Spiegel Online, 8
July 2013. 240 Kirkpatrick, D. “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for
Uprising”, New York Times, 4 July 2013. 241 “Egypt's military shuts down news channels”, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2013. 242 Kingsley, P. and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two
years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013.
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172. The April 6 Youth Movement said, “Today the demands of the people
have been met...the statement of the armed forces coincided with the
demands of the people, and the proposal of the political forces and that of
April 6, which it had put forward in July.” It called on people to maintain
peacefulness and avoid any bloodshed or incitement.243
173. The Interior Ministry released a statement saying that the roadmap
fulfils, “the people’s will and their interests” and stressed that the police
stand by the armed forces in efforts to achieve the country’s security and
stability.244
174. Tamarod reiterated the army’s warning against any possible killing of
civilians saying that anyone caught involved would stand trial and would
be held accountable by the people.245
175. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood website, Ikhwan Online,
denounced the announcement as a, “conspiracy against legitimacy, a
military coup that wastes popular will and brings Egypt back to
243 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 244 Kingsley, P. and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two
years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2013. See also “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of
constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 245 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013.
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despotism.” It announced that, “millions in many squares have started a
sit-in in support of legitimacy.”246
176. Violence was reported in Marsa Matrouh, Kafr El-Sheikh and Assiut.247
3.2 Transitional Government
177. On 4 July 2013, Adly Mansour was declared temporary President
pursuant to the collective agreement of the attendants of the emergency
meeting of 3 July 2013,248 and in accordance with Part 5, Chapter 1, Article
84 of the 1971 Constitution.249 The 2012 Constitution had been suspended
by the collective agreement on 3 July 2013,250 and there had been issues as
to its legitimacy. Despite being approved in a public referendum in
December 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court had ruled its drafting
committee unconstitutional on 6 February 2013.
178. On his appointment Adly Mansour sent a message of reconciliation to
the Muslim Brotherhood and spoke of the need for inclusivity and
246 “Middle East, July 3: Egypt – The Military Removes President Morsi.”, EA WorldView, 3
July 2013. See also “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over
Egypt presidency”, Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 247 “Live updates: Morsi ousted; head of constitutional court to take over Egypt presidency”,
Ahram Online, 3 July 2013. 248 NCHR, Findings of the Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National
Commission on events concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. 249 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013. 250 NCHR, Findings of the Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National
Commission on events concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014.
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integration, 251 aims that were reflected both in his appointments and in his
Constitutional Declaration on 8 July 2013.
179. In Adly Mansour’s first speech he described Tamarod as, “an
embodiment of [the nation’s] hopes and ambitions. It was never a
movement seeking to realize special demands or personal interests.”252
Moreover, during his first interview he explained that all parties would
need to mobilize to build the nation. The Muslim Brotherhood is “invited
to integrate into this nation and be a part of it […] [i]f they answer the call
they will be welcomed.”253
180. As el-Baradei said in an interview on 4 July 2013, the coalition were,
“sending a message of reconciliation and an inclusive approach […] [t]he
Muslim Brotherhood should be welcomed back to participate in
parliamentary elections and the political process.”254
181. However, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party
rejected Adly Mansour’s overtures and called for continued protests until
Morsi was restored.
251 Kirkpatrick, D. “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for
Uprising”, New York Times, 4 July 2013. 252 Hendawi, H., “Adly Mansour Sworn In As Egypt's Interim President,” Associated Press, 4
July 2013. See also El Shafey, M., “Egypt: Adly Mansour sworn in as interim president”,
Asharq Al-Awsat, 4 July 2013. 253 “Egypt’s new president: my task is ‘very onerous’ – video”, Channel 4 News, 4 July 2013. 254 Kirkpatrick, D. “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for
Uprising”, New York Times, 4 July 2013.
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182. In terms of Adly Mansour’s appointments, compromises to achieve
inclusivity and integration are most obviously demonstrated by
negotiations with the members of the coalition over el-Baradei’s
appointment. Initial reports indicated that el-Baradei would be appointed
Prime Minister, but due to objections that he was too secular by the
Salafist Nour party, that appointment was delayed, 255 and Hazem al-
Biblawi was eventually appointed as Prime Minister by the Temporary
President on 9 July 2013. 256 El-Baradei was appointed temporary Vice
President for Foreign Relations, and sworn in on 14 July 2013 by order of
the temporary President.257
183. A further attempt at integration was made by Prime Minister Hazem
al-Biblawi who said he could offer cabinet posts to the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. However, the Freedom and
Justice Party rejected the offer.258
184. On 5 July 2013 Adly Mansour issued a Constitutional Declaration
dissolving the Shura Council 259 and on 8 July 2013 he issued a
Constitutional Declaration which set out the system of State during the
255 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Salafist al-Nour party wields new influence on post-Morsi coalition”,
The Guardian, 7 July 2013. 256 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013. 257 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013. 258 “Egypt Morsi: US seeks end to ex-president's detention,” BBC News, 12 July 2013. 259 “Constitutional Declaration, 5 July 2013”, State Information Service.
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transitional period and a timeline for amending the 2012 constitution and
conducting elections.260
185. The principles contained within the thirty-three articles suggest the
coalition that announced Morsi’s departure was involved in its drafting,
and indicate an inclusive approach.
186. Article 2, for example, reiterated the justification for Morsi’s removal,
stating that, “sovereignty is for the people, and the people practice this
sovereignty and protect it. The people are the source of all authorities.”
187. Article 1 appears to be influenced by the Salafists concerns,
emphasising the importance of the Sunni canons. It expanded the 1971
constitution, amended in 1980 that stated, “the principles of Islamic sharia
are the primary source of legislation” to “the principles of Islamic Sharia,
which include its overall evidences and jurisprudence rules and
established sources in the Sunni canons, is the main source of legislation.”
188. The army’s concerns also appear to be addressed. Article 21 confirms
the armed forces are owned by the people and are the sole protector of the
nation, and Article 23 does not define the President as Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, unlike Article 146 of the 2012
constitution.
260 “Constitutional Declaration, 8 July 2013”, State Information Service.
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189. The constitution also attempts to address concerns of the liberals.
Article 4 declares all citizens equal under the law regardless of “origin,
type, language, religion, or creed,” Article 6 states that no citizen may be
“arrested, searched, detained, or restricted in movement or freedom”
except the case of being caught red-handed or with a warrant from a judge
or the state prosecutor. Article 8 protected the freedom of the press,
removing the 2012 Constitution’s “Parliamentary Press Committee” that
would have been given the right to monitor the press and regulate which
organisations can and cannot publish.
190. The Constitutional Declaration’s timetable for the country’s
normalisation suggests it was intended to show that democracy was in the
making and that the military was not interested in seizing the reins of
power. 261
191. The timetable stated that within 15 days from the issuance of the
Declaration, a technocratic committee would be appointed to draft
amendments to the suspended Constitution of 2012 and to draw upon the
Constitution of 1971. The text would be submitted within 30 days to a 50-
member committee comprised of representatives from different segments
of society, for discussion and amendment. A public referendum would
take place within 30 days of the completion of their work. 15 days after the
referendum, parliamentary (legislative) elections would be announced
and would take within 2 months. One week after the inaugural session of
261 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013.
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the new parliament takes place there would be a call for the presidential
elections.262
3.3 Closing remarks
192. The events of 3 July 2013 indicate that a coalition of political and social
forces and the army collaborated to remove Morsi, in the name of the
popular will, once it became apparent that it would be impossible for
political factions to reach consensus by the deadline imposed by the
ultimatum, and that further delay risked increased fighting and possible
civil war.263
193. However, despite the temporary President Adly Mansour’s immediate
overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in building the
nation, 264 the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the offer 265 and committed
themselves to bringing about Morsi’s return,266 a strategy which became
increasingly more desperate and saw increasingly violent clashes on the
streets.
262 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 20, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 17 July 2013. See also “Egypt unrest: Interim leader outlines election
timetable”, BBC News, 9 July 2013. 263 “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for Uprising”, New York
Times, 4 July 2013. 264 “Egypt’s new president says Brotherhood ‘part of nation’: report”, Reuters, 4 July 2013. 265 @Ikhwanweb, Twitter, 4 July 2013. 266 Chulov, M. & Kingsley, P., “Egypt prepares for backlash as Morsi allies reject new regime,”
The Guardian, 4 July 2013.
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CHAPTER 4
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Response
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4.1 Introduction
194. On 21 June 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood called for its supporters to
organise mass protests as part of pre-emptive measures to counter
demonstrations against President Mohamed Morsi.
195. Following the ousting of President Morsi on 3 July 2013, these protests
culminated in mass sit-ins held at al-Nadha Square and Rabaa al-Adawiya
Square (hereinafter “Rabaa Square”).
196. With pro-Morsi protesters refusing to negotiate or disperse, Egypt saw
violent clashes erupt on a daily basis. By 26 July 2013 it was estimated that
violent confrontations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the security
forces had resulted in an estimated 250 deaths and 2800 injuries.267
197. By 14 August 2013, the police force had received thousands of
complaints from local residents in Cairo, reporting the alleged commission
of serious crimes by pro-Morsi protesters, including murder, torture and
kidnapping.
198. Lasting over forty days, the mass sit-ins at the two camps became a
direct and legitimate threat to the security of Egypt. As Egyptian
authorities exercised all efforts to secure peaceful resolution to the
267 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 21, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 2 August 2013. See also “Factbox: 189 killed in post-30 June violence”,
Egypt Independent, 23 July 2013.
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protests, it became clear that the security forces would need to disperse
the camps.
199. This dispersal took place on 14 August 2013, and resulted in the death
of hundreds. The context of this dispersal is set out below.
4.2 Provocation of security forces
4.2.1 Inciting violence
200. For many Egyptians, the ousting of President Morsi and the
installation of an interim government, represented a new page in Egypt
with many abandoning the streets on 3 July 2013.268
201. However, for the Muslim Brotherhood, their rhetoric for violence and
attacks against the “enemies of Islam” escalated,269 with enemies being
made of all groups that did not agree with the Muslim Brotherhood.270
202. Immediately following the appointment of interim President Adly
Mansour on 4 July 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood convened a meeting at
Rabaa Adawiya mosque for the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy,
268 Serageldin, I., “Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution – Part II: On Violence and the Path Ahead”,
Ismail Serageldin, 27 July 2013. 269 Serageldin, I., “Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution – Part II: On Violence and the Path Ahead”,
Ismail Serageldin, 27 July 2013. 270 Serageldin, I., “Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution – Part II: On Violence and the Path Ahead”,
Ismail Serageldin, 27 July 2013.
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a coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhood.271 This was followed by a
press-conference, in which the Muslim Brotherhood-led coalition called
for a day of nationwide protests, which it dubbed as the “Friday of
Rage”.272
203. The protests were scheduled to take place the following day on 5 July
2013, to reject the appointment of an interim government and removal of
Mohamed Morsi. 273
204. At the time, Gehad al-Haddad, a spokesperson for the Muslim
Brotherhood, stated that the mass rally was, “to take all peaceful steps
necessary to bring down this coup.”274 Moreover, Ahmed Ahref, Media
spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood, stated that the group was fully
committed to peaceful demonstrations and restraint and would not be
drawn into violence.275
205. Both statements were part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s initial attempts
to maintain a level of plausible deniability, claiming that it had no control
271 “Islamist alliance maintains Morsi is Egypt's legitimate president”, Ahram Online, 4 July
2013. 272 “Gallery: ‘Friday of Rage’ protests in Egypt”, Global News, 5 July 2013. See also Kingsley,
P. and Chulov, M., “Morsi supporters prepare to defend themselves as tide turns in Egypt”
The Guardian, 4 July 2013. See also “Egypt Islamists call for “Friday of rejection” against
coup”, Reuters, 4 July 2013, @Ikhwanweb, Twitter, 4 July 2013. 273 “Islamist alliance maintains Morsi is Egypt's legitimate president”, Ahram Online, 4 July
2013. 274 Chulov, M. & Kingsley, P., “Egypt prepares for backlash as Morsi allies reject new regime,”
The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 275 “Ahmed Aref: Muslim Brotherhood Committed to Peaceful Protest, Self-Restraint”, FJP
online, 4 July 2013. See also, @Ikhwanweb, Twitter, 4 July 2013.
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over the “anticoup” offshoots that organized violent attacks against the
security forces.276
206. However, its efforts to do so were soon in vain and by the following
day, it was clear that senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood were
engaging in speeches inciting violence and jihad against the armed
forces.277
207. For example, at the time of the call for the “Friday of Rage”, Mohamed
el-Beltagy stated that Morsi's overthrow would push groups to violent
resistance, though not his own, to violent resistance.278 However, on the
day itself, 5 July 2013, another senior Muslim Brotherhood member,
Mohamed Badie, told the rally outside Rabaa Square that the Muslim
Brotherhood would “sacrifice ourselves, our souls and our blood, for
president Morsi.”279 Furthermore, by 8 July 2013, el-Beltagy had threatened
that the violence and state of emergency in Sinai would not end until
Morsi was returned.280
276 Trager, E. and Shalabi, M., “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Gets a Facelift”, Foreign Policy,
20 May 2015. 277 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in Events”, 11 March
2014. 278 “Egypt ‘coup’ will push some groups to violence, says Brotherhood’s Beltagy”, Ahram
Online, 4 July 2013. 279 Stainburn, S., “Egypt: Mohammed Badie urges crowd to sacrifice ‘our souls and our
blood’ for Morsi”, Global Post, 5 July 2013. 280 “Leader of Brotherhood Beltagy on events in Sinai as response to military coup which
would end as soon as Morsi returned”, Al-Nahr TV, uploaded on YouTube on 8 July 2013.
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208. Moreover, Morsi’s speeches on 2 and 3 July 2013 had threatened
violent conflict in the event of an attempt to remove him. He had said, “if
the price of protecting legitimacy is my blood, I’m willing to pay it”281 and
that he was prepared to, “die standing like a tree.”282
209. Similarly, one of Morsi’s spokesmen had warned that there would be
considerable bloodshed,283 whilst Mohamed el-Beltagy, amongst others,
had said, “seeking martyrdom” was the only choice.284
210. As stages were erected in al-Nadha Square and Rabaa Square, other
senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood took to publically invoking a
promise of martyrdom in return for fighting for the return of Morsi and
urging pro-Morsi supporters to remain in the camps at all costs.285 These
members included, inter alia, Esam al-Arian, Mohamed Badie, as well as
high-profile Islamic militants such as Asem Abdul Maged. 286
211. The speeches were broadcasted over loud speakers throughout both
camps. 287 Moreover, pro-Morsi supporters took to disseminating the
281 Kirkpatrick, D. and Hubbard, B., “Morsi Defies Egypt Army’s Ultimatum to Bend to
Protest”, New York Times, 2 July 2013. 282 Perry, T., “Mursi thinks better to “die standing like tree” – aide”, Reuters, 3 July 2013. 283 Kingsley, P. and Chulov, M., “Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two
years”, The Guardian, 4 July 2014. 284 Kirkpatrick, D. & Fahim, K., “Depths of Discontent threaten Muslim Brotherhood and Its
Leader”, New York Times, 2 July 2013. 285 “Pro-Morsi Wahhabis Vow to Suicide Bomb Everyone Opposed to Them & to Set
Christians on Fire”, uploaded on YouTube on 4 July 2013. 286 “Jama'a al-Islamiya leader: We will fight to defend Morsy”, Egypt Independent, 11 July
2013. 287 Klein, G., “Cairo Islamist camp angers residents”, Your Middle East, 21 July 2013.
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speeches on Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored media stations in an effort to
rally its members.288 For example, on 8 July 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood
issued the following statement on its Facebook page:
“(The Freedom and Justice Party) call[ed] on the great Egyptian
people to rise up against those who want to steal their
revolution with tanks and armoured vehicles, even over the
dead bodies of the people.”289
212. The calls for violence continued throughout July 2013 and up until the
dispersal of the two camps on 14 August 2013.
213. For the Muslim Brotherhood, the calls for an uprising would
necessarily lead to chaos and instability in the nation and thereby restore
political power to the group.290
214. Consequently, the calls for violence coincided with various attacks
made against military and police personnel and infrastructure.
288 Serageldin, I., “Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution – Part II: On Violence and the Path Ahead”,
Ismail Serageldin, 27 July 2013. 289 “Muslim Brotherhood calls for uprising after Cairo ‘massacre’”, Channel 4 News, 8 July
2013. 290 Booth, W. et al., “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood calls for ‘uprising’ after troops shoot
protesters”, Washington Post, 8 July 2013. Booth, W. et al., “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
calls for ‘uprising’ after troops shoot protesters”, Washington Post, 8 July 2013.
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4.2.2 Attacks against security forces
215. In the knowledge that the international media was focused on Egypt,
pro-Morsi protesters attempted to goad the security forces into action,
thereby causing further chaos and destruction across the country.291
216. Their efforts began with organized protests planned to coincide with
anti-Morsi supporters.292 Once military or police presence was secured,
pro-Morsi protesters launched vicious attacks against security forces.293
217. These attacks occurred as an immediate response to the appointment
of the interim government. For example, on 4 July 2013, pro-Morsi
supporters were seen carrying improvised clubs and shields as they guard
the main entrances to Rabaa Square, 294 with piled stones for use as
weapons nearby. 295 As protesters marched through the streets in
Damanhour and in Beni Suef, some protesters were reported to have
stormed the governorate building.296 Similarly, on the same day, pro-Morsi
291 “The world is watching Egypt”, DW News, 4 July 2013. 292 El-Deeb, S., “Egypt military warns against violent protests”, AP, 18 July 2013. 293 “Egypt promises action against pro-Morsi protesters as death toll climbs”, AP, 28 July
2013. 294 Chulov, M. & Kingsley, P., “Egypt prepares for backlash as Morsi allies reject new regime,”
The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 295 Kingsley, P. and Chulov, M., “Morsi supporters prepare to defend themselves as tide turns
in Egypt” The Guardian, 4 July 2013. 296 “Thousands call for Morsi's return to power in Beni Suef, Beheira”, Ahram Online, 4 July
2013. See also, Stack, L. & el-Naggar, M., “Latest Updates on Egypt’s Transition”, New York
Times, 4 July 2013.
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supporters were reported to have attacked soldiers near Cairo
University.297
218. On 5 July 2013, following the call for the “Friday of Rage”, rival rallies
took place across Egypt. In Cairo, pro-Morsi protesters rallied outside
Rabaa Mosque, as well as near Al-Azhar, on Salah Salem and on Sixth of
October Bridge.298 Rallies were reported in Alminya and Alexandria.299 On
that same day, around thousands of pro-Morsi protesters demonstrated
outside the Republican Guard Headquarters.300
219. As they approached the Republican Guard Headquarters, pro-Morsi
protesters were verbally warned not to cross the road in front of the
building. 301 Ignoring this warning, pro-Morsi supporters congregated
outside the headquarters of the Republican Guard and began to tear
fences down,302 vowing to remain there until Morsi was re-instated.303
297 Stack, L. & el-Naggar, M., “Latest Updates on Egypt’s Transition”, New York Times, 4 July
2013. 298 “Egypt’s ‘day of rejection’ - Friday 5 July as it happened,” The Guardian, 5 July 2013. 299 “Egypt’s ‘day of rejection’ - Friday 5 July as it happened,” The Guardian, 5 July 2013. 300 “Pro-Mursi protesters killed as interim president dissolves Shura Council”, Asharq al-
Awsat, 5 July 2013. 301 “Pro-Morsi protest in Egypt: LIVE UPDATES & VIDEO”, Sputnik News, 5 July 2013. 302 “Armed Forces released video of events at Republican Guard”, Akbar Al-Youm TV,
uploaded on YouTube on 8 July 2013. 303 Case No. 9134/2013 Misdemeanour, Misr al-Gadida/Heliopolis police station. See also,
“Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at Al
Bawabh News, 14 August 2014.
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220. This resulted in violent clashes between pro-Morsi protesters and
security forces, 304 with five reported fatalities. 305 An army spokesman
confirmed only blank rounds and tear gas were used by the army.306
221. That same day on 5 July 2013, pro-Morsi protesters marched across the
6th October Bridge to try to enter Tahrir Square, where anti-Morsi
protesters were holding mass rallies. 307 Chaotic street battles broke out,
with combatants using rocks, sticks, fireworks and Molotov cocktails, until
armoured vehicles with riot police officers were deployed to restore
order.308
222. Within days of the storming of the Republican Guard Headquarters, on
8 July 2013, violence again broke out around the Republican Guard
Headquarters. Armed groups began to attack the perimeters around the
Republican Guard Headquarters, with military and police targeted by live
ammunition.309
304 “Aerial shots of events at the Republican Guard and the involvement of Muslim
Brotherhood”, Al- Bilad, uploaded on YouTube on 8 July 2013. 305 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. 306 “Army did not fire on pro-Mursi protesters – spokesman”, Reuters, 5 July 2013. 307 Hubbard, B., “Mayhem in Cairo as Morsi Backers Fight for Return”, The New York Times,
5 July 2013. 308 Hubbard, B., “Mayhem in Cairo as Morsi Backers Fight for Return”, The New York Times,
5 July 2013. 309 Owen, P. and McCarthy, T., “Egypt: 51 Morsi supporters killed in shooting at Republican
Guard compound – as it happened”, The Guardian, 8 July 2013. See also “At Least 51 Killed
in Egypt as Tensions Soar”, VOA News, 8 July 2013.
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223. At the same time, pro-Morsi protesters started to climb up the
buildings nearby and throw stones, Molotov cocktails, bombs and heavy
objects, with reports of shots fired from the rooftops at the military
compound.310 The clashes left at least 54 people dead, including 3 members
of the security forces.311
224. On 24 July 2013, pro-Morsi protesters were responsible for an
explosion outside a police building in Mansoura, killing one police
conscript and injuring 19 officers.312 This was followed by violent clashes
between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi supporters on 26 July 2013 across Cairo
and Alexandria. 313 As the army sought to restore order and disperse
crowds with the use of tear gas,314 it was itself subject to attack from pro-
Morsi supporters.315
225. By 30 July 2013, similar attacks against security forces had erupted
across Egypt. Buoyed by the swell of protestors at the camps, clashes
310 Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission on
Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, December 2014. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa
and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 311 “Egypt: 51 Morsi supporters killed in shooting at Republican Guard compound – as it
happened”, The Guardian, 8 July 2013. 312 “Egyptian general calls for millions to protest against ‘terrorism’,” The Guardian, 24 July
2013. 313 Siddique, H. and Quinn, B., “Egypt: Deaths as rival rallies clash - As it happened”, The
Guardian, 26 July 2013. 314 “Clashes, helicopters, tear gas as tens of thousands take to streets of Egypt”, RT, 26 July
2013. See also, el-Deeb, S., “Two killed in Egypt as supporters and opponents of ousted
president clash in Alexandria”, National Post, 26 July 2013. 315 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Al Nasr Road
Events”.
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broke out in Ismailia on 30 July 2013, with 17 people injured.316 Another
attack in Rafah, North Sinai, on 30 July 2013, led to the death of 22-year-
old Army conscript Mohamed Mahmoud Ali, killed by a shot to the head.
The attack left eight others injured.317
226. These attacks were not one-off events but rather part of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s schematic plan targeting military and police structures. The
Ministry of Interior had already announced that it had intercepted phone
calls from leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had
instructed their supporters to stage attacks on police stations.318
227. In total, 317 police officers were killed by pro-Morsi protestors from
the start of the sit-ins. 319 Indeed, immediately following the dispersal of
the sit-ins on 14 August 2013, heavily armed Muslim Brotherhood
protestors stormed a police station in Kerdasa, torturing and killing 14
police officers.320
228. The calls for violence were not only launched to target security forces.
Hate speeches advocating for sectarian violence were rife amongst pro-
316 “Pro and anti-Mursi clashes leave 17 injured in Ismailiya”, Aswat Masriya, 30 July 2013. 317 “More Bodies Found Near Raba’a al-Adaweya | Leaders of Wasat Party Arrested”, Tahrir
Institute for Middle East Policy, 29 July 2013. 318 “State of Emergency declared in Egypt to Foil NATO-Backed Subversion”, NSNBC, 14
August 2013. 319 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 25. See also, “Report on events
of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August
2014. 320 “Egypt refers 188 to court over Kerdasa police killings”, Ahram Online, 13 February 2014.
See also “Muslim Brotherhood massacre in Kerdasa Police Station”, CNN, 15 August 2014.
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Morsi protests.321 As the protests swelled in Cairo, Christian sects saw a
spike in the number of retaliatory attacks on over eighty churches across
the country.322 As a result of such speeches, over 52 churches in Cairo were
subject to arson attacks with 12 other churches looted.323 There was also a
rise in kidnappings of Coptic Christians with over 140 reported
kidnappings between 2011 and 2013.324
4.3 Conditions at al-Nahda Square and Rabaa Square prior to 14 August
2013
4.3.1 Disruption to local residents
229. As discussed above, following the ousting of Mohamed Morsi on 3 July
2013, Muslim Brotherhood supporters descended upon al-Nahda Square
and Rabaa Square.
230. Early on, the Muslim Brotherhood had announced their plans to move
pro-Morsi protests into provocative spaces such as Tahrir Square, a square
synonymous with public demonstrations in Egyptian history.325 However,
finding resistance in Tahrir Square, the organization settled on Rabaa
Square and al-Nadha Square.
321 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Rabaa massacre: one year on”, The Guardian, 16 August 2014. 322 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Rabaa massacre: one year on”, The Guardian, 16 August 2014. 323 “Fire at Evangelical church in Bani Mazaar”, Al-Balad, uploaded on YouTube on 18
August 2013. 324 “Egypt 2014 International Religious Freedom Report”, US State Department, 2014, p. 8. 325 Awad, M. and Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood admits it has been negotiating
with army”, The Guardian, 14 July 2013.
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231. The two squares were by no means a second-rate choice. Indeed both
locations were chosen specifically in light of their centralized locality in
Cairo. In particular, Rabaa Square occupied a central location in Nasr City,
the largest district in Cairo.326
232. Following mass calls to join the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations,
the camps at al-Nahda Square and Rabaa Square fast became the focal
point of an orchestrated mass sit-in.
233. By the third week, the crowds at Rabaa Square had reached thousands,
“swelling to tens of thousands when the Brotherhood calls special days
like Friday's ‘day of marching on.’” 327 Many of the area's temporary
residents were bused in to Rabaa Square from provinces outside Cairo,
receiving payment to occupy the squares.328
234. The disruptive effect on local residents was immense with many
describing the significant effect on their livelihood. 329 As the sit-ins
continued, pro-Morsi protesters began to occupy the squares on a twenty-
326 Dahir, A., “Rabaa al-Adawiyah: Images From the Square Before the Bloody Crackdown in
Egypt”, Sahan Journal, 16 August 2013. 327 Fick, M., “Gathering thousands, Egypt's Brotherhood shows passion and power”, Reuters,
12 July 2013. 328 Klein, G., “Cairo Islamist camp angers residents”, Your Middle East, 21 July 2013. 329 Klein, G., “Cairo Islamist camp angers residents”, Your Middle East, 21 July 2013 and
Eltantawi, S., “Day Eight in Cairo: On the Ethics of Waiting for a Massacre”, Contemplative
Yurt, 1 August 2013. See also Statement of the reported incidents that occurred in Rab’a,
Public Prosecution - East Cairo Plenary Prosecution – First Nasr City Area Prosecution, 2013,
also translated in English.
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four hour basis and soon enough, new infrastructures began to develop
within the camps.330
235. In particular, local residents complained of the imposition of new
checkpoints put in place by the Muslim Brotherhood protestors, and to
which the local residents were subject to.331 This subjected many residents
to unwarranted threats and intimidation in their own neighbourhood,
with many seeking temporary refuge elsewhere in the city.332
236. Other residents complained of the constant noise disruption and
blockages of main roads, which occurred for weeks on end. 333 In
particular, protesters were seen tearing up the concrete pavements in
order to create roadblocks.334
330 Klein, G., “Cairo Islamist camp angers residents”, Your Middle East, 21 July 2013. 331 Klein, G., “Cairo Islamist camp angers residents”, Your Middle East, 21 July 2013. 332 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Republican Guard
House Events”. 333 Statement of the reported incidents that occurred in Rab’a, Public Prosecution - East Cairo
Plenary Prosecution – First Nasr City Area Prosecution, 2013, also translated in English. 334 “Pro-Morsy protesters place barriers on Nasr road”, Egypt Independent, 28 July 2013.
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Pro-Morsi supporters placed concrete blocks and stones in front of the memorial
service and Al-Azhar University gate
237. This resulted in huge traffic delays for local residents, with one
resident describing the harrowing impact this had on his elderly father’s
trip to the hospital to seek chemotherapy treatment. 335 Moreover,
ambulances seeking to assist local residents were hampered in their duties
by Muslim Brotherhood protestors.336
238. As new infrastructures and road blockages were erected, many of the
squares’ residents feared the Muslim Brotherhood protestors would
become a permanent fixture.337
335 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Rabaa massacre: one year on”, The Guardian, 16 August 2014 and
Eltantawi, S., “Day Eight in Cairo: On the Ethics of Waiting for a Massacre”, Contemplative
Yurt, 1 August 2013. 336 Statement of the reported incidents that occurred in Rab’a, Public Prosecution - East Cairo
Plenary Prosecution – First Nasr City Area Prosecution, 2013, also translated in English. 337 Klein, G., “Cairo Islamist camp angers residents”, Your Middle East, 21 July 2013.
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4.3.2 Violence in the camps
239. The conditions at Rabaa Square and al-Nadha Square amounted to
more than just a nuisance. For ordinary Egyptians living in Cairo, the
camp at Rabaa Square, which blocked off major thoroughfares, had
become increasingly intimidating and disruptive as daily activities and
trips became impossible to carry out.338
240. The sit-ins fast became a flash-point for bloody confrontations and
violence,339 with local residents even forming an “SOS organization” to
document the criminal acts of destruction and terror perpetrated by pro-
Morsi supporters at Rabaa Square.340
241. During the forty-day sit-in at the camps, local residents filed hundreds
of complaints in relation to criminal activity committed by the Muslim
Brotherhood protestors.341 The wide-range of crimes reported including,
inter alia: (i) harassment;342 (ii) theft;343 (iii) destruction of public property;344
338 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Rabaa massacre: one year on”, The Guardian, 16 August 2014. 339 Fahim, K. and Gladstone, R., “Egypt Vows to End Sit-Ins by Supporters of Deposed
President”, New York Times, 31 July 2013. See also Statement of the reported incidents that
occurred in Rab’a, Public Prosecution - East Cairo Plenary Prosecution – First Nasr City Area
Prosecution, 2013, also translated in English. 340 Official facebook page for SOS Organisation Rabaa. 341 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, p.9. See also, “Report on events of
Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August
2014. 342 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014.
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(iv) arson; 345 (v) possession of weapons; 346 (vi) kidnapping; 347 and (vii)
murder and attempted murder.348
242. Moreover, complaints reporting allegations of torture 349were prolific,
with protesters seemingly torturing anyone they suspected of being “an
agent or security personnel”, or anyone who expressed their displeasure
at the continued existence of the camps.350
343 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 344 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 345 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 346 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 347 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. and Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Rabaa massacre: one
year on”, The Guardian, 16 August 2014. 348 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014 and Guirguis, D., “Brotherhood Violence,
Overshadowed”, Middle East Institute, 8 August 2013. 349 “Report on the events at Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at
Albawabh News, 14 August 2014. 350 El-Behairy, N., “Ministry of Interior and army coordinating to disperse Rabaa protesters”,
Daily News Egypt, 27 July 2013 accessed at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/27/ministry-of-interior-and-army-coordinating-to-
disperse-rabaa-protesters/
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243. For example, on 29 July 2013, an official security source stated that 11
dead bodies were found near the Rabaa Square sit-in with signs of
torture.351 Another ten people claimed to have been tortured in the sit-in
camp after being accused of being “infiltrators.”352
244. On 3 August 2013, Abdel Atty, a local resident in Nasr City, reported
that he had been tied up in a tent, blindfolded and bundled into a car by
pro-Morsi supporters at Rabaa Square, merely because he expressed
discontent at their presence.353
245. At al-Nahda Square, several journalists, amongst others, complained of
torture and mistreatment whilst attempting to cover reports on the
camp.354 Amnesty International also issued a report with testimonies from
local residents indicating that they were captured, beaten, given electric
shocks or stabbed by pro-Morsi protestors close to both rallies.355
351 “Eleven tortured bodies found near Islamists sit-in – source”, Aswat Masriya, 29 July 2013. 352 “More Bodies Found Near Raba’a al-Adaweya | Leaders of Wasat Party Arrested”, Tahrir
Institute for Middle East Policy, 29 July 2013. 353 “Fresh allegations of torture at pro-Morsy rallies”, Egypt Independent, 3 August 2013. 354 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Nadha Sit-in
Events”. See also Guirguis, D., “Brotherhood Violence, Overshadowed”, Middle East
Institute, 8 August 2013. 355 “Fresh allegations of torture at pro-Morsy rallies”, Egypt Independent, 3 August 2013.
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246. As a result of these violent outbursts, local residents viewed the mass
sit-ins as an incubator for further extreme acts of violence, with many
describing them as no more than a “group of terrorists and fascists.”356
247. Faced with the increased threat to the security of its citizens and the
nation, the interim government was compelled to intervene.
4.4 Initial attempts to clear the camps using peaceful means
248. As the local residents struggled to go about their daily lives, their
tolerance of the camps began to wane. By the beginning of August 2013, it
became clear that the camps could no longer exist and that the continued
protests needed to end. The question was therefore whether the Muslim
Brotherhood would voluntarily agree to disband the camps in exchange
for political concessions.357
249. Given the alarming nature of the situation, the interim government had
from the outset, begun to engage in negotiations with various political
factions, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in an attempt to secure a
peaceful resolution.358
356 Kingsley, P., “Alaa al-Aswany on why he had to support Egypt's military crackdown”, The
Guardian, 29 October 2013. 357 Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Rabaa massacre: one year on”, The Guardian, 16 August 2014. 358 Awad, M. and Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood admits it has been negotiating
with army”, The Guardian, 14 July 2013 and “Cairo crackdown follows failed negotiation”, Al
Jazeera, 14 August 2013.
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250. On 4 July 2013, Adly Mansour, on being sworn in as temporary
President, immediately made overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood,
providing,
“The Muslim Brotherhood group is part of this people and are
invited to participate in building the nation as nobody will be
excluded, and if they responded to the invitation, they will be
welcomed.”359
251. However, the Muslim Brotherhood responded, “unequivocally
reject[ing] the military coup against the elected President and the popular
will, and “refuse[d] to deal with the usurper regime.”360
252. Despite this cursory response and in the wake of the violent clashes on
8 July 2013, the information available reveals that the interim government
remained steadfast in its position to establish a viable political road map in
Egypt. 361 As confirmed by Gamal Heshmat, an official in the Muslim
Brotherhood's political wing, a key demand of the interim government
was that the Muslim Brotherhood cleared the camps so that further
political concessions could be made.362
359 “Egypt’s new president says Brotherhood ‘part of nation’: report”, Reuters, 4 July 2013. 360 @Ikhwanweb, Twitter, 4 July 2013. See also, Abouzeid, R., “The Muslim Brotherhood’s
Post-Coup World”, New Yorker, 4 July 2013. 361 “Egypt: 51 Morsi supporters killed in shooting at Republican Guard compound – as it
happened”, The Guardian, 8 July 2013. See also, “Constitutional Declaration of July 8, 2013 “,
WIPO. 362 Awad, M. and Kingsley, P., “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood admits it has been negotiating
with army”, The Guardian, 14 July 2013.
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253. The efforts of the interim government to secure peace remained
unabated in the face of violent attacks against its security forces. On 24
July 2013, following an explosion outside a police station in Mansoura,
President Mansour continued to call for reconciliation talks with all
sides.363 Despite these efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood refused to attend,
pledging instead to maintain a disruptive street presence unless Morsi was
reinstalled as president.364
254. The Muslim Brotherhood’s refusal to cooperate did not mark the end
of the interim government’s efforts to restore peace and security amidst
the streets of Egypt.
255. On 5 July 2013, the military had already posted a statement on
Facebook, urging Egyptians not to heed any “invitations to gloat or seek
revenge.”365 Whilst it supported the right to peaceful protest the army
warned that violence and civil disobedience acts including the blocking of
roads would harm social peace, adding:366
“Freedom of expression is a right that everyone is entitled to,
[but] ‘unnecessary’ and ‘excessive’ exercise of this right may,
363 “Egyptian general calls for millions to protest against ‘terrorism’,” The Guardian, 24 July
2013. 364 “Egypt's army chief calls for show of support from citizens”, The Guardian, 24 July 2013. 365 Statement of official military spokesman, official facebook page of military spokesman, 4
July 2013. 366 Egypt: army insist they will allow ‘peaceful protest’ as supporters of President Mohamed
Morsi plan rallies, The Telegraph, 5 July 2013.
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“represent a threat to social peace and national interest and will
negatively impact security and economic performance of our
precious Egypt.”367
256. Affirming this position, interim President Mansour issued a public
statement in which he stated that the government, “cannot accept security
disorder, cutting roads and bridges, attacking public buildings. The state
has to impose order by all force and decisiveness.”368 In turn, the Minister
of Interior, Mohammed Ibrahim, said local residents had complained
about the sit-in protest by Morsi supporters at the Rabaa al-Adawiya
mosque in Cairo and that it would be “brought to an end soon and in a
legal manner” and had called on protesters “to come to their senses and
go home”.369
257. On 24 July 2013, the National Defence Council convened to discuss the
threat to the nation’s security following internal developments. It
subsequently issued a decision recognizing the need to protect the right to
freedom of expression whilst also protecting the security of the nation.370
367 Stack, L. & el-Naggar, M., “Latest Updates on Egypt’s Transition”, New York Times, 4 July
2013. See also Armed Forces Facebook page, 4 July 2013. 368 “At least 72 killed at pro-Morsi Cairo rallies”, Relief Web updates, 28 July 2013. 369 “Egypt crisis: Huge rival rallies as Morsi is accused”, BBC News, 27 July 2013. See also “At
least 72 killed at pro-Morsi Cairo rallies”, Relief Web updates, 28 July 2013. 370 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”.
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258. On 27 July 2013, the Egyptian Minister of Interior, issued a press
statement announcing “the police and the army were working in
coordination to discuss a suitable day for dispersing the two pro-Morsi sit-
ins, which hold tens of thousands of protesters.”371 In particular, he urged
the Muslim Brotherhood to stop its incitement of violence, to reopen
blocked roads, and to stop the killing and torture of “suspected spies”.372
259. Following the issuance of the press statement, the Minister of Interior
further convened a meeting with various civil society actors with a view to
discuss methods of peacefully ending the protests whilst in the knowledge
that some protesters were armed.373
260. Following the efforts of the Minister of Interior, armed forces arranged
for military aircrafts to drop flyers over the two camps on 29 July 2013,
stating, “[t]he recent events reveal that the country is being pushed into
chaos without regard to murder, violence or halting the means to normal
living, which is a matter the army is trying to prevent.”374
261. The army appealed to protesters not to be pushed into violence or
vandalism and urged pro-Morsi supporters to help the army maintain
371 “Pro-Morsi rallies no longer acceptable: Egyptian cabinet”, Ahram Online, 31 July 2013. 372 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”. 373 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”. 374 “Army throws flyers at pro-Mursi protesters”, Aswat Masriya, 30 July 2013.
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their security.375 The army's flyer called on everyone to cooperate and
respond to its instructions for the stability of the country.376
Army flyer thrown at protesters supporting deposed President Mohamed Mursi in
Rabaa al-Adawiya on Monday, July 29, 2013
262. On 31 July 2013, the office of the Public Prosecutor issued a decision in
which he called for police to take all legally required action to disperse
crowds at the camps and to investigate perpetrators of crimes alleged to
have been committed in the camps.377
263. In an attempt to further coerce protesters to leave the camps, on 31 July
2013, Egypt’s cabinet issued a warning that it would take “all legal
375 “Army throws flyers at pro-Mursi protesters”, Aswat Masriya, 30 July 2013. 376 “Army throws flyers at pro-Mursi protesters”, Aswat Masriya, 30 July 2013. 377 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”.
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measures necessary to confront acts of terrorism and road-blocking” and
announced that it “in preservation of the country’s highest interest”, it had
“delegated the interior ministry to proceed with all legal measures to
confront acts of terrorism and road-blocking.”378
264. Tasked with this responsibility, the following day, the Minister of
Interior urged protesters to return home, again guaranteeing safe passage,
including free transportation to the provinces, for all pro-Morsi supporters
in the hope that this would be an efficient and peaceful means to end the
camps.379
265. He repeated the same guarantee on 3 August 2013, wherein he again
undertook to provide safe and free passage out of the camp.380 At the same
time, this guarantee was widely disseminated in various media outlets
and a copy of the Minister’s statement was dropped over the camps by
helicopter.381
266. On 7 August 2013, the Minister of Interior again convened a press
conference in which he stated that he was tasked with dispersing camps
378 “Pro-Morsi rallies no longer acceptable: Egyptian cabinet”, Ahram Online, 31 July 2013 and
Fahim, K. and Gladstone, R., “Egypt Vows to End Sit-Ins by Supporters of Deposed
President”, New York Times, 31 July 2013. 379 Al-Atrush, S., “Egypt offers safe passage to Mursi supporters”, Arab News, 1 August 2013. 380 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”. 381 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”.
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and his intention to provide yet another opportunity for protesters to
voluntarily leave.382
267. Despite the efforts of the Minister of Interior and warnings from the
Cabinet, pro-Morsi supporters continued to ignore all such order.
268. By 13 August 2013, it became clear that security forces would need to
enter the camps the following day in order to secure clearance.
269. Faced with this task, the Minister of Interior embarked on a last ditch
attempt to ensure that pro-Morsi supporters would leave without
incident.
270. First, he met with several representatives from human rights groups to
invite them to observe the scheduled dispersal in order to guarantee that
international standards would be observed.383
271. Second, he once again ordered the military to disperse leaflets warning
the pro-Morsi supporters to clear the camp with immediate effective.384
382 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Statement of
National Defence Council, 24 July 2013”. 383 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 10. 384 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 10.
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272. Third, he intentionally leaked the date and time of the dispersal to
various media outlets in the hope that the occupants of the camps would
leave before the scheduled time for dispersal.385
273. Finally, the Minister of Interior addressed the media and declared that
no weapons would be used against the protesters. He provided that only
tear gas would be used in order to disperse the crowds and that above all,
he wanted to avoid bloodshed.386
274. The Minister of Interior had exhausted all reasonable efforts to
encourage the protesters to return home.
4.5 Barricading the camps
275. Whilst Egyptian ministers strived to give fair and appropriate warning
to pro-Morsi supporters, the protestors were becoming more resilient,
arming themselves and fortifying the camps.387
276. Protestors at Rabaa Square were reported to have built three concrete
waist-high barriers, using sandbags, truck tyres and bricks.388 They were
385 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 14. 386 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. 387 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. See also “Morsi backers fortify Cairo
camps”, Evening Standard, 12 August 2013. 388 Batrway, A. and Michael, M., “Pro-Morsi sit-ins gain strength, prompt Egypt to postpone
dispersal to avoid bloodshed”, News1130, 11 August 2013.
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also seen pulling up the concrete streets in order to build fortifications
across major roads, including across the 12 lanes of Nasr Road leading into
to Rabaa Square.389 Local residents recall the area resembling a war zone,
complete with trenches and tanks.390
Pro-Morsi protesters place barriers on Nasr road, 28 July 2013
277. The fortifications were not built as a sole means of protection. Rather,
they were used to conceal a web of criminal activity. Behind the fortified
walls, footage revealed crates of homemade weapons and armed caches
stored by the Muslim Brotherhood in and around the squares.391
389 “Pro-Morsy protesters place barriers on Nasr road”, Egypt Independent, 28 July 2013. 390 Eltantawi, S., “Day Eight in Cairo: On the Ethics of Waiting for a Massacre”,
Contemplative Yurt, 1 August 2013. 391 El-Rashidi, Y., “Scenes from a Crackdown: What Really Happened in Cairo?”, NYR Daily,
11 September 2013. See also Police No. 12681 of 2013 report of the Giza Investigation General
Directorate, 15 August 2013. (link to dvd7 doc entitled nadha1 of batch received on 26
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
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278. Residents reported their gas supplies being siphoned off by protestors
and used in the creation of ‘Molotov cocktails’.392
279. Armed protestors were subsequently able to use the stored weapons in
gun openings built into the barricades,393 using them to launch offensives
against the police and local residences.394
Sand berms in front of Cairo University, with openings for shooting, 31 July 2013
October 2015); and “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior,
available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 392 “’Rabaa’ residents criticise pro-Morsi sit-in”, Ahram Online, 26 July 2013, uploaded on
YouTube on 26 July 2013. 393 “Sand berms in front of Cairo University, with openings for shooting”, Youm 7, 31 July
2013, uploaded on YouTube on 31 July 2013. See also, “Aerial shots to break up Rabaa Square
sit in and Morsi supporters firing on police”, Akhbar Al-Youm TV, uploaded on Youtube on
14 August 2013. 394 “Attack on police and destruction of property by members of the Brotherhood”, Hossam
Eldin Ali, uploaded on 27 July 2013.
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280. Indeed, following the dispersal of the camps on 14 August 2013, police
reportedly found hundreds of weapons including, inter alia, rifles,
machine guns and semi-automatic shotguns as well as homemade
weapons such slingshots and metal blades.395
4.6 Overview of the dispersal
281. Although much has been reported about the dispersal of the camps at
Rabaa Square and al-Nadha Square, there are a number of contradictory
accounts.
282. As a result, the following is intended to provide a brief overview of the
events on 14 August 2013 at the camps.
4.6.1 Rabaa Square dispersal
283. Whilst eyewitness accounts vary on details, it is widely reported that at
06:30 security services arrived at the Rabaa camp,396 using loud speakers to
call on protesters to leave the camps via clearly designated routes. For the
395 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, annex entitled “Memorandum
signed by Major General Tarek el-Gebily, CEO of Criminal Evidences, Minister of Interior,
Division of Public Security, General Administration of Inspecting Criminal Evidence, 26
August 2013”, pp. 16 to 21. See also, “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian
Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. and “Rabaa Square
protestor heavy weapons”, ERTU TV, uploaded on YouTube 5 September 2013. 396 “Report on events at Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at
AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014.
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camp at Rabaa Square the exit was located via both the Nasr Street exit
and the el-Manasa exit.397
284. In particular, as shown in the following footage of Rabaa Square,
security forces noted that the dispersal was taking place by decree and in
full view of the media and international observers and thereby warned
against use of violence against security forces.398 Implementation orders
provided to the security forces, as well as the size of those participating in
the dispersal, were also published to ensure transparency of the
operation.399
285. As protestors ignored the warnings, security forces employed tear
gas, 400 as well water canons and from fire engines to disperse the
crowds.401
286. Armed with long-range acoustic devices, water and gas vehicles, police
forces began to spray the camp with tear gas.402 It is at this point that
397 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 10. See also “TV channel: More
than 20 bodies found below Rabaa Square's platform”, Aswat Masriya, 14 August 2013. See
also, “Rabaa al-Adaweya and Nahda Square sit-ins”, Cairo Post, 5 October 2013. 398 “Muslim Brotherhood Crimes –Egypt”, Al-Watan at 02:12 to 02:43 uploaded on YouTube
on 20 August 2013. 399 “Report on events at Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at
AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 400 “As It happened: Egypt Camps Stormed”, BBC News, 17 August 2013. 401 Case No. 15899/2013, Report of the Nasr City First Police Station entitled “Dispersal of
Rab’a Square and relevant reports”, 2013, also translated in English. 402 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014 page 10. See also Case No.
15899/2013, Report of the Nasr City First Police Station entitled “Dispersal of Rab’a Square
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gunfire is reported to have broken out from within the camp and
reportedly, from a building nearby where sixty snipers were subsequently
arrested.403
287. Within 30 minutes of their arrival, police reported that two police
officers had been shot resulting in one fatality, 404 as other unarmed
protestors were caught in the cross-fire between the police and snipers.405
Subsequently, matters quickly escalated at the camp with police and pro-
Morsi supporters both engaging in violent clashes.406
4.6.2 Al-Nadha Square dispersal
288. On 14 August 2013, security forces, including police and military
personnel, arrived at the camp al-Nadha Square shortly before 06:00.407
and relevant reports”, 2013, also translated in English and “Report on events of Rabaa and
Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 403 Recordings of special forces during Rabaa sit-in dispersal, Al-Watan, 14 August 2013,
uploaded on YouTube on 18 August 2013. 404 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 10. See also, “Report on events
of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August
2014. 405 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. 406 El-Rashidi, Y., “Scenes from a Crackdown: What Really Happened in Cairo?”, NYR Daily,
11 September 2013. For a list of injuries sustained by security forces see “Report on events of
Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at AlBawabh News, 14 August
2014. 407 “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at
AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014.
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Immediately upon arrival, security officers announced a call for
evacuation of the square.408
289. As with the dispersal at Rabaa Square, designated exits were clearly
announced to all protestors,409 with the identified safe exit located at al-
Gama’a Square towards Giza Square.410
290. Whilst some protesters began to leave, by 06:20 shots were being fired
at police officers from within the camps.411 Subsequently, various tents
were set alight.412
291. As part of this chaos, police officers were then fired at from snipers
located within the nearby Faculty of Engineering building. 413 Security
forces subsequently exchanged shots as violence descended throughout
the square.414
408 El-Rashidi, Y., “Scenes from a Crackdown: What Really Happened in Cairo?”, NYR Daily,
11 September 2013. 409 “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at
AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 410 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 17. 411 “Report on events of Rabaa and Nadha”, Egyptian Ministry of Interior, available at
AlBawabh News, 14 August 2014. 412 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 17. 413 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 17. 414 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 17.
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292. The attack on police forces on 14 August 2013 was clearly pre-
arranged. As protestors gathered and stored weapons in the camps for
days on end, the opportunity to attack police officers presented itself.
Indeed, following the clashes on 14 August 2013, at least 200 pro-Morsi
protesters at al-Nadha Square and Rabaa Square were arrested for
possession of weapons.415
4.7 Use of force by security forces
293. As detailed above, the interim government had embarked on various
efforts to clear the camps and prevent confrontation between security
forces and the protesters. As pro-Morsi supporters defiantly flooded into
the two camps, it prompted police to postpone plans to move into the
squares as officials feared the possibility of causalities.416
294. However, as conditions in and around the camps invariably worsened
and the threat to security heightened, it became apparent that police
authorities would need to enter the camp in order to end the continued
stand-off.
415 Gayathri, A., “Egypt Security Forces Start Clearing Pro-Morsi Sit-Ins In Cairo; Casualties
Reported”, International Business Times, 14 August 2013 and el-Rashidi, Y., “Scenes from a
Crackdown: What Really Happened in Cairo?”, NYR Daily, 11 September 2013. 416 Batrway, A. and Michael, M., “Pro-Morsi sit-ins gain strength, prompt Egypt to postpone
dispersal to avoid bloodshed”, News1130, 11 August 2013.
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295. As a result of the dispersal efforts on 14 August 2013, the Ministry of
Health reported 632 casualties,417 including 8 police officers.418
296. With any major operation between armed protesters and security
forces, where causalities are inevitable, investigations into the cause of
casualties is standard.
297. On 21 December 2013, interim President Mansour issued a decree for
the establishment of an independent fact finding mission to be headed by
Dr. Fouad Abdel-Moneim Riad, 419 a former judge at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. As part of its mandate, the
Independent National Commission was tasked with investigating events,
which occurred in connection with the ousting of former President
Morsi.420
298. The mission published its findings on 11 March 2014, although it
identified the Muslim Brotherhood’s refusal to cooperate with the
mission,421 and that, despite its best efforts to contact various members of
417 Taha, R., “NCHR releases full report on Rabaa sit-in dispersal”, Daily News Egypt, 17
March 2014 accessed at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/03/17/nchr-releases-full-report-rabaa-sit-dispersal/ 418 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 12. 419 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. See also “Interior Ministry presents
evidence of Rabea dispersal to June 30 fact-finding committee”, Mada Masr, 21 August 2014. 420 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. 421 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. See also EIPR’s commentary on the
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the Muslim Brotherhood, including prominent figures Dr. Mohamed Ali
Bishr and Khairat Shater, it refused to engage with the mission.422
4.8 Conclusion
299. The Muslim Brotherhood’s response to the ousting of President Morsi
was a calculated manoeuvre. By engaging in acts of violence and civil
disobedience the Muslim Brotherhood sought to achieve two goals as part
of its overall plan to restore its grip on power in Egypt.
300. First, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to provoke violent clashes with
the security forces as part of a deliberate strategy to enhance their
martyrdom status, and to increase international attention and secure
worldwide sympathy and support.423
301. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to use violence as a means to
disrupt the social and economic fabric in Egypt, in the hope that it would
regain power amidst the chaos created.424
presidential decree number 698/2013 creating “a national independent fact-finding
commission to gather information and evidence for the events that accompanied the June
30th, 2013 revolution and its repercussion.” EIPR, 22 January 2014. 422 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014. 423 Bassiouni, M. C., “Egypt Update No. 21, Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution
of 25 January 2011”, 2 August 2013. 424 NCHR, Findings of Fact-finding Report issued by the Independent National Commission
on Events Concurrent with 30 June 2013, 11 March 2014, page 11.
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302. To an extent, the Muslim Brotherhood was successful in achieving
these two goals. It was able to create havoc and chaos throughout Egypt so
much so, that by 26 July 2013, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians staged
mass protests in support of an intervention from the army to restore peace
and security in the country.425
303. By 14 August 2013, it became clear that the security forces and interim
government had little choice but to restore security and order in Cairo by
dispersing the camps. In doing so, it demonstrably took all necessary steps
to ensure that any planned dispersal would be the most effective method
to avoid bloodshed. In contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that during
these plans for dispersal, an order for the use of force against protesters
was issued.
425 Siddique, H. and Quinn, M., “Egypt: Deaths as rival rallies clash - As it happened”, The
Guardian, 26 July 2013.
Report 3: The Egyptian Revolution
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CHAPTER 5
Comparison with other conflicts
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5.1 Introduction
304. As discussed in Chapter 4, Cairo residents were both intimidated and
angry at the presence of the protesters in Rabaa Square and al-Nahda
Square. Following the barricade of the camps, there was a swell of support
for the army to intervene and restore order.426
305. Moreover, the army was increasingly preoccupied with dealing with
the outbreak of terrorist attacks in Sinai and the prolific presence of Ansar
Bait al-Maqdis.427 At the same time, the army faced criticism from various
human rights groups for failing to protect religious minorities.428
306. For many, Egypt was now at a cross-road in which it could succumb to
extreme Islamist groups such as Da’esh (ISIS) who had a strong-hold in
neighbouring Libya and beyond.429
307. An understanding of the regional landscape at the time provides an
insight into the climate of fear in which average Egyptians saw themselves
and the pressing need for military intervention.
426 Fahim, K. and el-Sheikh, M., “Fierce and Swift Raids on Islamists Bring Sirens, Gunfire,
Then Screams”, New York Times, 14 August 2013. 427 See Chapter 2 above. See also "The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford Row, 3 June 2015. 428 Goodenough, P., “Human Rights Groups Criticize Islamists for Inciting New Violence
Against Egypt’s Christians”, CNS News, 8 August 2013. 429 Eljarh, M., “A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Libyan Stronghold”, Foreign Policy, 1 April
2015.
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5.2 Understanding Egypt in the Context of Libya and Syria
308. Egypt, Libya and Syria have traditionally held historical relations. This
is best exemplified by the Constitution of the Federation of Arab
Republics, agreed to by all three nations in 1971 in recognition of the
shared “common Arab fate”.430 Although the constitution did not enjoy
longevity, it does indicate the need for an understanding of the common
challenges faced by all three states in the regional and international
arenas.431
309. The 2011 Revolution in Egypt took place during a period in which
multiple countries in the Arab region witnessed large popular protests
calling for reform. In limited cases these protests were successful, such as
in the ousting of President Ben Ali in Tunisia.
310. However, for the most part, the so-called Arab Spring was far from a
success and, in particular for Libya and Syria, resulted in drawn out
bloody conflicts, which continue to this day.
311. The developments in 2012 and 2013 in Egypt must be understood in
the context of the tragic trajectories of the conflicts in Libya and Syria.
430 The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR), Middle East Journal Vol. 25,
No. 4 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 523-529. 431 “Egypt and Syria”, State Information Service, 9 January 2013.
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5.3 The Early Developments of the Conflicts in Libya and Syria
5.3.1 The Early Development of the Conflict in Libya
312. Mass uprisings in Libya began on 15 February 2011 in the city of
Benghazi,432 when anti-government protests evolved into violent attacks
on government buildings and security officials, which then turned into
full civil war.
313. The demonstrations had allegedly begun following the arrest of a
lawyer representing the relatives of prisoners killed in 1996 in the Abu
Salim Prison. 433 Reminiscent of the language adopted by pro-Morsi
supporters on 4 July 2013, the Libyan opposition protesters called for a
‘day of rage’,434 which was characterised by reports of the lynching of
security officials and the torching of municipal buildings.435 Subsequently,
senior Libyan government officials conceded that ‘protestors’ had seized
control of military bases, weapons, and tanks.436
314. The fact that the insurrection sprung up in eastern Libya was no
coincidence. As leaked cables from the US Embassy in Tripoli document,
432 “Libya profile – Timeline”, BBC News, 16 June 2015. 433 Black, I., “Libya cracks down on protesters after violent clashes in Benghazi”, The
Guardian, 17 February 2011. 434 Black, I., “Libya’s day of rage met by bullets and loyalists”, The Guardian, 17 February
2011. 435 Owen, P., et al., “Violence in Bahrain and Libya – Friday 18 February”, The Guardian
(Arab and Middle East unrest, News blog), 18 February 2011. 436 “Libya protests – as they happened”, The Guardian (Middle East and North Africa News
Blog), 20 February 2011.
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eastern Libya was “a locus of extremist activity” over which Libyan
government security services had little control.437 The cable details the
mass participation of eastern Libyans in insurgency operations in Libya
and Iraq.
315. The surge of Libyan recruits travelling to Iraq in 2007 and 2008 to fight
the US Occupation has been attributed to the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG).438 The LIFG was founded by veterans (‘mujahideen’) of the
war in Afghanistan, 439 and created to fight an ultimately unsuccessful
guerrilla insurgency in the 1990s against the Libyan government.440 In a
programme overseen by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, 441 hundreds of LIFG
militants were rehabilitated and released from prison in 2008,442 2009 and
2010 after renouncing political violence and a commitment not to resume
extremist activities.443
316. However in February 2011, in a widely anticipated move, 444 the
released former LIFG members created the Islamic Movement for Change,
437 WikiLeaks Cable, “08TRIPOLI120, EXTREMISM IN EASTERN LIBYA”, US Embassy in
Tripoli, 15 February 2008. 438 Felter, J. & Fishman, B., “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq, a First Look at the SInjar
Records”, Harmony Project – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2007. 439 AKI, “Libya: Scores of prisoners released from jail”, Adnkronos, 9 April 2008. 440 WikiLeaks Cable, “08TRIPOLI430, DIE HARD IN DERNA”, US Embassy in Tripoli, 2 June
2008. 441 Wikileaks Cable, “09TRIPOLI148, LATEST ROUND OF TALKS WITH IMPRISONED LIFG
MEMBERS”, US Embassy in Tripoli, 22 January 2009. 442 WikiLeaks Cable, “09TRIPOLI1030, LIBYA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM”,
US Embassy in Tripoli, 22 December 2009. 443 Sarrar, S., “Ex-Islamists walk free from Libyan jail”, Reuters, 1 September 2010. 444 “Factbox: Key political risks to watch in Libya”, Reuters, 18 february 2011 and Stewart, S.,
“Jihadist Opportunities in Libya”, STRATFOR, 24 February 2011.
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which joined the insurrection and called for international military
intervention.445
317. The insurrection, with support from Qatar and NATO following
Security Council Resolution 1973,446 turned into a bloody civil war which
destroyed the Libyan state and left the country riddled with militias and
terrorists.447 The former head of the LIFG,448 Abdelhakim Belhadj, became
the commander of the Tripoli Military Council following the fall of Tripoli,
and has reportedly joined ISIS in Libya and is leading its forces.449
318. Notably, it is reported that the conflict – and the consequent death and
destruction – could have been avoided if the Libyan military had been
allowed to execute its offensive in February 2011, 450 which had been
mislabelled as an impending massacre.451
319. To date, Libya is considered to be a failed state, with weapons pouring
out and extremists tumbling in. 452 ISIS and other jihadi groups have
emerged and taken control over various cities in Libya, including Sirte
445 Black, I., “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – from al-Qaida to the Arab Spring”, The
Guardian, 5 September 2011. 446 UN Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011. 447 Kuperman, A., “Obama’s Libya Debacle”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015. 448 “Libya’s Election: The Right Direction”, The Economist, 30 June 2012. 449 Shideler, K., “U.S. backed rebel reportedly leads Islamic State in Libya”, The Washington
Times, 3 March 2015. 450 Kuperman, A., “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya
Campaign”, International Security, Summer 2013. 451 Roberts, H., “Who said Gaddafi had to go?”, London Review of Books, 17 November 2011. 452 Cafiero, G. and Wagner, D., “Four Years After Gaddafi, Libya Is a Failed State”, Foreign
Policy In Focus, 6 April 2015.
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which holds 80 percent of Libya's recoverable oil reserves.453 A further fifty
percent of territory in Libya is controlled by various militia groups,
including Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militant group.454
BBC depiction of Libya’s rival power bases455
5.3.2 The Early Development of the Conflict in Syria
320. The conflict in Syria began in January 2011 in the southern city of
Daraa when anti-government protestors clashed with police,456 claiming
the lives of seven police and four protestors.457 By March 2011, the protests
453 "Will ISIS’s foothold in Libya stay a ‘transit station’ or expand?”, RT, 1 April 2015. 454 “Libya's Islamist Militias Claim Control of Tripoli”, 24 August 2014. See also Irshaid, F.,
“Profile: Libya's Ansar al-Sharia”, BBC News, 13 June 2014. 455 Jawad, R., “Libya death sentences cast long shadow over rule of law”, BBC News, 12
August 2015. 456 “Thousands march in southern Syrian town”, Ya Libnan, 21 March 2011. 457 Kahn, G., “Syria: Seven Police Killed, Buildings Torched in Protests”, Israel National News,
21 March 2011.
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grew both in Daraa and across the country,458 government buildings were
torched, 459 and masked gunmen were filmed firing on police and
protestors.460461 As a result, the Syrian government expanded the use of
deadly force to break up the protests.462
321. Shortly after, opposition groups – including the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood463 – called for the ousting of President al-Assad,464 and later
for military intervention to accomplish this. 465 In addition to masked
gunmen at protests, the Syrian military was now also engaged in large-
scale battles with rebels, resulting in hundreds of casualties.466
322. However, the presence of non-State armed groups in Syria, including
radical Islamists groups, had long pre-dated the 2011 protests.
323. Confidential cables from the US Embassy in Damascus reveal a range
of incidents:
458 Oweis, K. & Al-Khalidi, S., “Pro-democracy protests sweep Syria, 22 killed”, Reuters, 8
April 2011. 459 Al-Khalidi, S., “Syria protestors torch party outpost, smash statue”, Reuters, 8 April 2011. 460 Karouny, M., “Syria TV airs footage of gunmen shooting in Deraa”, Reuters, 8 April 2011. 461 Heinrich, M., “AT least 10 killed in Deraa – Syria hospital source”, Reuters, 8 April 2011. 462 “In Syria, Crackdown After Protests”, The New York Times, 18 March 2011. 463 Malas, N., “Brotherhood Raises Syria Profile”, The Wall Street Journal, 17 May 2011. 464 Sly, L., “Syrian opposition calls for ouster of Assad”, The Washington Post, 2 June 2011. 465 Cameron-Moore, S., “Syrians would accept Turkish intervention: Brotherhood leader”,
Reuters, 17 November 2011. 466 Karouny, M., “Syria to send in army after 120 troops killed”, Reuters, 6 June 2011.
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i. Shoot-outs between security forces and an armed group
associated with al-Qai’da in southern Syria, near Daraa, in
2005;467
ii. Bombings of a Syrian government facility by Fatah al-Islam in
2008;468
iii. Dismissals of Sheikhs from positions in charitable Islamic
groups on suspicion of terrorist funding;469
iv. Syria was considered the entry point for “nearly 90% of
foreign terrorists (many of which transited through Egypt to
get to Syria470) in Iraq” in 2007,471 and was the operating base
for the Abu Ghadiya network that orchestrated the flow of
fighters, money, and weapons into Iraq;472
v. Uprisings of Islamists extremist prisoners inside Seidnaya
prison in 2008;473
vi. Cooperation between the Syrian and Iraqi governments on
addressing the cross-border problems of (Sunni) armed
extremists in 2009.474
467 WikiLeaks Cable, “05DAMASCUS6423, TWO MORE SHOOT-OUTS BETWEEN ARMED
ELEMENTS AND”, US Embassy in Damascus, 12 December 2005. 468 WikiLeaks Cable, “08DAMASCUS814, SARG LAUNCHES NEW PR CAMPAIGN
AGAINST ISLAMIC”, US Embassy in Damascus, 17 November 2008. 469 WikiLeaks Cable, “08DAMASCUS883, SARG DISMISSES SHEIKHS FROM LEADERSHIP
POSITION”, US Embassy in Damascus, 12 December 2005. 470 Felter, J. & Fishman, B., “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq, a First Look at the SInjar
Records”, Harmony Project – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2007 471 WikiLeaks Cable, “08DAMASCUS908, SYRIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON
TERRORISM”, US Embassy in Damascus, 29 December 2008. 472 Landay, J. & Youssef, N., “CIA led mystery Syria raid that killed terrorist leader”,
McClatchy DC, 27 October 2008. 473 WikiLeaks Cable, “08DAMASCUS885, VIOLENCE AND FIRE ERUPT AGAIN AT
SEIDNAYA/SAYDNADA”, US Embassy in Damascus, 15 December 2008.
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324. Once the protests in Syria had turned into an armed conflict, Syrian
rebels were in direct contact with apparent Islamist victors in Libya.475
Within months both foreign fighters476 – including members of al-Qai’da -
and weapons were flowing from Libya to Syria, using the established
transnational links (the so called ‘rat line’477) between Islamist extremists.478
325. Like Libya, Syria remains in conflict acting as a battleground for ISIS
militants.479 In June 2014, former UN Convoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi,
predicted that Syria would become a failed state and that the conflict
would "blow up" and spread beyond Syria's borders.480
5.4 Spill over into Egypt
326. Given the existence of transnational networks of Islamist extremist
fighters, the developments in Libya and Syria warranted a legitimate fear
of spill over of fighters and weapons into Egypt.
474 Wikileaks Cable, “09DAMASCUS218, SYRIAN DELEGATION’S MISSION TO
BAGHDAD”, US Embassy in Damascus, 23 March 2009. 475 Sherlock, R., “Leading Libyan Islamist met Free Syrian Army opposition group”, The
Telegraph, 27 November 2011. 476 Kelley, M., “Al-Qaeda Jihadists Are The Best Fighters Among The Syria Rebels”, Business
Insider, 31 July 2012. 477 Hersh, S., “The Red Line and the Rat Line”, London Review of Books, 17 April 2014. 478 Kelley, M., “How US Ambassador Chris Stevens May Have Been Linked to Jihadist Rebels
in Syria”, Business Insider, 19 October 2012. 479 “Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps”, BBC News, 9 December 2015. 480 “Ex UN envoy predicts Syria will be 'failed state'”, BBC News, 8 June 2014.
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327. For example, even in the so-called success state of the Arab Spring,
Tunisia has had to deal with its own share of difficulties as a result of the
conflicts in Libya and Syria. For example, reports have shown that
militants returning home from the conflict in Syria have attempted to
blow-up various tourist hotspots. 481 The Tunisian government has further
dismantled a recruiting cell sending fighters to Libya.482
328. By comparison, concerns regarding the movement of arms and
militants are further compounded in Egypt, by the fact that it shares a
1,115km long border with Libya. 483 This is a porous border whereby
militant groups can easily transport weapons and fighters across from
Libya into Egypt.484
329. The threat of a spill over from Libya and Syria to Egypt was very much
real in 2013 and onwards. As a result of the power vacuum and excess of
arms on the streets of Libya, many weapons have been funnelled to
terrorist organisations in Sinai.485 For instance, in early 2014, a surface-to-
air missile obtained from Libya was used by militants to bring down an
Egyptian military helicopter in Sinai.486
481 Markey, P. & Amara, T., “Insight – Tunisia Islamists seek jihad in Syria with one eye on
home”, Reuters, 18 November 2013. 482 Reuters, “Tunisia dismantles jihadi recruiting cell for Libya’, Swiss Info, 17 March 2015. 483 “The World Factbook. Africa: Egypt”, Central Intelligence Agency. 484 Elmenshawy, M., “Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations”, Middle East
Institute, 21 March 2014. 485 Elmenshawy, M., “Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations”, Middle East
Institute, 21 March 2014. 486 Elmenshawy, M., “Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations”, Middle East
Institute, 21 March 2014.
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330. Egyptian security reports have also indicated that a number of jihadists
and extremists involved in violence in Cairo were caught trying to escape
to Libya.487 Furthermore, Muhammed Jamal, leader of the UN-designated
terrorist group Muhammad Jamal Network, was arrested in Egypt having
established jihadist training camps in Libya.488
331. Similarly, as of December 2013, between 100 and 500 Egyptians had
reportedly travelled to Syria to join militant groups including ISIS and Al-
Nusra Front,489 with many arrested on terrorist charges upon their return
to Egypt.490
332. As a result, Egypt has undertaken a number of measures to secure
stability within its borders. This has included various initiatives to assist
Libya to control its borders and efforts to establish an international fund
tasked with the collection and storage of weapons in Libya in coordination
with the UN and Libya. 491 With regard to Syria, it has implemented
various policies to restrict the movement of Syrians into Egypt.492
487 Aman, A., “Egypt, Libya at odds over border control”, Al-Monitor, 11 March 2014. 488 “Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) al-Qa’ida in Egypt Jamal Network”, Global Security.
See also Hassan, A., “One of us: the militant Egypt’s army fears the most”., Reuters, 16
October 2015. 489 “ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western
Europeans”, ICSR, 17 December 2013. 490 “Egypt says arrested Nusra member returning from Syria”, World Bulletin, 21 December
2014. 491 Elmenshawy, M., “Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations”, Middle East
Institute, 21 March 2014. 492 Sievers, M., “Questions About Egypt's Syria Policy”, Washington Institute, 12 January
2015. See also, Hadid, D., “Egypt puts travel restrictions on Syrians”, CNS News, 9 July 2013.
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5.5 Conclusion
333. The conflicts in Syria and Libya have proven to be a security nightmare
across the globe.493 Moreover, it has cost both countries billions in profit
and revenue, with unprecedented increase in unemployment levels.494 For
over four years, Egypt has not had to look far to be reminded of the
precarious nature of peace and the impending growth of terrorist activity.
334. At the time of the second revolution in 2013, Egyptians were
increasingly discontent with Morsi’s handling of the moribund economy,
fuel and food shortages, and lack of political opportunity.495
335. Initially the army was reluctant to intervene and as of at least May
2013, failed to show any willingness to steer the country.496 However, as
described in this report, the discontent quickly manifested itself into a
demand for the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government
followed by violent clashes throughout the nation.
493 See for example, “Foreign militants of ISIL endanger world peace, security: UN chief”,
PressTV, 30 May 2015. See also, “Islamic State 'planning to use Libya as gateway to Europe'”,
The Telegraph, 17 February 2015. 494 Al-Zayat, M., “Inter-Arab relations after the revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Syria”, Al-
Arabiya, 19 May 2013. 495 Trager, E., “Egypt’s Summer of Discontent”, Washington Institute, 28 May 2013. See also
"The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012 – 2013”, 9 Bedford Row,
3 June 2015. 496 Trager, E., “Egypt’s Summer of Discontent”, Washington Institute, 28 May 2013.
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336. Reminded of the ill-fortune befallen in Syria, and in particular, Libya, it
was clear that order had to be restored in a country which is twice the size
of its neighbour and to prevent the onslaught of bloody civil war and
terrorist insurgency.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
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6.1 The Impasse and People’s Revolution of 2013
337. Events in Egypt between late 2012 and the first half of 2013 plunged
the country into an economic, political and social crisis.
338. The ever-growing discontent with the Morsi and his Muslim
Brotherhood government brought Egyptians back onto the streets as they
had during the Revolution in 2011. In 2011 it was Mubarak who felt the ire
of the disillusioned and frustrated masses. In June 2013, it was Morsi’s
turn.
339. In his refusal to compromise, Morsi worsened the crisis bringing about
emergence of the Tamarod movement with the goal to bring about new
presidential elections and relieve the country of an economic mess and the
government’s unpopular policy of blanket Islamification across all aspects
of Egyptian life.
340. The demonstration that followed on 30 June 2013 has been described as
the biggest in the history of Egypt.497 Tamarod issued a statement on 1 July
2013 giving Morsi until 5 pm on 2 July to leave and pave the way for early
presidential elections, failing which it would bring the crowds back out,
march on more palaces and launch a campaign of “complete civil
disobedience”.498
497 Abdelhadi, M., “In Egypt, all eyes are on the army”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013. 498 “ElBaradei authorized as spokesman for Egypt’s anti-Morsi 30 June Front”, Ahram Online,
2 July 2013.
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341. Tamarod warned that the protests could drag the country into civil war
and called on the military and the police to clearly state their support for
the protesters.499 In response, Defence Minister al-Sisi, acting as part of a
broad coalition (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3) issued a statement, calling
on all political factions to reach consensus and that a proposed roadmap
for the future, “if the demands of the people are not realized” within 48
hours, would be implemented.
342. The response of Morsi to both the mass demonstrations and the army’s
ultimatum was a midnight speech which was immediately interpreted by
many as a coded message to Muslim Brotherhood activists to ‘unleash
war’ on their fellow Egyptians as “enemies of the true faith” and thus as
incitement to violence. 500
343. On the evening of 3 July 2013, several hours after the coalition’s
ultimatum to Morsi to solve the political crisis had passed without
agreement, al-Sisi announced the agreed roadmap to end “the state of
conflict and division”, the establishment of an interim government and
clearing the way for new elections as soon as possible.
344. Thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members, many armed with clubs
and helmets, had been camped in front of Raba’a al-Adaweya Mosque in
499 Egypt protests: army issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it happened, The Guardian, 1 July 2013.
See also “Is the clock ticking for Mursi? Opposition sets deadline for his ouster”, Al Arabiya
News, 1 July 2013. 500 Chulov, M. and Kingsley, P. “Egypt: President Morsi defiant as time runs out”, The
Guardian, 3 July 2013.
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anticipation of a battle to defend Morsi. 501 Street battles had occurred
between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi,502 and on 3 July 2013 tanks and soldiers
were deployed to separate the pro- and anti-Morsi protesters, in
anticipation of further unrest.503
345. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report, the events leading up
to 3 July 2013 reflect that an impromptu coalition of political and social
forces and the army collaborated to meet the demands of the Egyptian
people to remove Morsi once it became apparent that, despite efforts, the
Muslim Brotherhood government would not concede any power, and that
further delay risked increased fighting and possible civil war.504
6.2 Transition from Revolution to Stability
346. On the evening of 3 July 2013, the coalition, led by Defence Minister al-
Sisi, announced the agreed roadmap to end “the state of conflict and
division” and detailing the transition to new elections (see Chapter 3).
347. On 4 July 2013 Adli Mansour, the head of the Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt, was sworn in as interim president.
501 Kirkpatrick, D., “Egypt, Its Streets a Tinderbox, Braces for a Spark”, New York Times, 29
June 2013. See also Kirkpatrick, D.“By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster”, New
York Times, 30 June 2013 and Putz, U., “Egypt Putsch: End of the Road for Muslim
Brotherhood”, Speigel Online International, 4 July 2013. 502 “Brotherhood firing weapons at people between cars”, Al-Dostor News, uploaded on
YouTube on 2 July 2013. 503 Bowen, J., @BowenBBC, Twitter, 3 July 2013. 504 “Prominent Egyptian Liberal Says He Sought West’s Support for Uprising”, New York
Times, 4 July 2013.
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348. On 8 July 2013 interim President Mansour issued a constitutional
declaration consisting of 33 articles, detailing the ‘roadmap’ to ensure an
orderly transition to a new, elected government. 505 The constitutional
declaration detailed the process by which a referendum on an amended
constitution as well as parliamentary and presidential elections would
take place.
349. The amended constitution was subsequently approved by 98.1% of
voters in a referendum in January 2014. 506 Those international actors
monitoring the referendum confirmed the official results were legitimate
and resulted from fair and transparent elections.507
350. In the presidential elections of May 2014, Defence Minister and former
army chief al-Sisi won in a landslide, receiving 96.9% of the votes with a
47.5% turnout.508
505 “Interim president issues constitutional declaration for transitional period”, Egyptian State
Information Service, 8 July 2013. 506 Reuters, “Egyptians overwhelmingly back constitution – official results”, Aswat Masriya,
18 January 2014. 507 Democracy International, “Egypt Constitutional Referendum Observation Report”, April
2014. 508 “Presidential Elections Monitoring – Egypt Votes 2014 – Official Results”, The Tahrir
Institute for Middle East Policy. Last accessed on 14 July 2015.
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6.3 Restoring Security and Order in the Streets of Cairo
351. While for most Egyptians, the ousting of Morsi and the roadmap for
new elections represented a new chapter for Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood escalated their calls for violence and attacks against the
“enemies of Islam”,509 with enemies being made of all groups that did not
agree with the Muslim Brotherhood.510
352. The Muslim Brotherhood chose the stage for their fight for the return
of Morsi in central Cairo, through mass sit-ins held at al-Nahda Square
and Rabaa al-Adawiya Square (hereinafter “Rabaa Square”).
353. As the mass sit-ins continued throughout July and into August, the
two camps became a direct threat to the safety of the local residents in
Cairo specifically and the security of Egypt generally.
354. Chapter 4 made clear the numerous attempts by Egyptian authorities
to use all efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the protests. However, it
became obvious that the security forces would need to disperse the camps
to prevent further violence and restore a measure of normalcy and calm to
the nation, which had effectively been paralysed by the sit-ins.
509 Serageldin, I., “Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution – Part II: On Violence and the Path Ahead”,
Ismail Serageldin, 27 July 2013. 510 Serageldin, I., “Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution – Part II: On Violence and the Path Ahead”,
Ismail Serageldin, 27 July 2013.
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355. In the legitimate attempts to disperse the camps the security services
demonstrably took all necessary steps to ensure that any planned
dispersal would be the most effective method to avoid bloodshed.
Importantly, this report highlights the fact that there is no evidence,
despite reports to the contrary, to suggest that in effecting the plans for
dispersal there was an underlying plan or strategy to use deadly force
against protesters.
356. What happened in mid-August 2013 was chaotic. It involved many
protestors who were armed and aggressive. There were casualties and
mistakes were made during the chaos that ensued. And those responsible,
on both sides, must be held to account for any unlawful or
disproportionate use of force.
357. There was however no indication of any design or plan to use force
until such became necessary for the security of civilians and even then the
planned action was measured and restrained. Chapters 3 and 4 highlight
the fact that safe exit passages were created for protestors to leave
peacefully after negotiations failed.
358. In taking the actions that it did – participating in the removal of Morsi
and dispersing the camps in Cairo – the security services played their role
in protecting Egypt against the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood – a
threat which carried with it a promise of violence and possible civil war.