egyptian democracy and the muslim brotherhood

8/3/2019 Egyptian Democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood

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EpaUInstitute forSecurity Studies

Egpa Dma a

h Mlm Bhh

Rp N 10Nvm 2011

Edited by Ea Bl Ama

Introduction by lva ValContributors: Naha J. Bw, Am Elhak, Ka Kah


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This EUISS publication examines the current context and uture prospects in Egyptahead o the frst round o parliamentary elections due in late November, with spe-cial attention to the role and position o the Muslim Brotherhood. The contributors

examine the various options, opportunities and challenges acing both domestic andexternal actors with regard to the countrys uture and the Muslim Brotherhoodspolitical trajectory.

The editor would like to thank Research Assistant Charlotte Blommestijn or her helpin the preparation o this report.

Institute for Security Studies

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EU Institute for Security Studies 2011. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or

otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies.

ISBN 978-92-9198-180-9

ISSN 1830-9747

QN-AF-11-010-EN-C

doi:10.2815/22223

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Cond-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur.

Graphic design by Hanno Ranck and Metropolis, Lisbon.


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Contents

Ici e: ai i amiia vic 3

va Vacc

I. t Mim B, ci cai a ic i i e:

a ea civ 6

Kiia Kac

Introduction 6

Electoralscenarios 7

Fearingacoldcoup 8

ElectionsandtheEuropeanUnion 11

II. Bii mcac ci Iami?

t ca Mim B i e 13

Am ebaki

Introduction 13

DespoticregimesandpoliticalIslam 14

TheBrotherhood'sjourney 15

Conclusionandpolicyrecommendations 22


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III. Ca B b b i mcaic ? A i vi 24

naa J. BIntroduction 24

ParallelsfromtheWesternpoliticalexperience 25

Canoutsidersplayarole? 26

Cci 28

ea B Ama

Abbreviatios 30

notes o the cotributors 31


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Egyptian Democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood

3

IntroduCtIon egypt: deAlIng

wIth unfAMIlIAr VoICes

va Vacc

The most important issue on the EUs oreign policy agenda right now, it can be ar-gued, is how to contribute to a ully ree, democratic and peaceul Middle East andMediterranean region. In order to respond to this challenge, it is essential or Euro-

pean policy-makers to ormulate a strategy or dealing with new regimes, includinggovernments and political parties with which the EU is not amiliar and which overthe years several EU Member States have regarded with suspicion and even as threats.The all o authoritarian regimes in the southern Mediterranean and the democratictransition process that has ollowed in some countries means that it is essential orthe EU to gain a better understanding o Islamist movements. In particular muchmore attention needs to be paid to how authoritarian and democratic institutionsand processes have shaped and may urther shape these actors political trajectories,and in turn overall prospects or democracy in the region. Given how high the stakesare in Egypt, this is particularly relevant to our understanding o the newly ounded

Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, a creation o the Muslim Brotherhood, the old-est and most inuential Islamic movement in the region.

This dilemma conronting Europe is not new: in 1991, when the Islamic SalvationFront (FIS) won the elections in Algeria, European leaders chose to either at worstsupport or at best close their eyes to the ferce crackdown on the Islamists by themilitary. The dilemma came back to haunt the Europeans ater Hamas emerged vic-torious in the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, considered at the time by theEU monitoring election team as air and ree: European leaders responded to theelectoral result by reusing to recognise the new Hamas-led government

Today, overcoming this dilemma is critical or the ability o the EU to come to termsand engage with the democratic transormations in the Arab world. That the optiono ignoring the Islamist parties is no longer viaible i indeed it ever was has beenunderlined by the victory o the Ennahda Party in Tunisias frst ree elections. Thereis an urgent need or European leaders to make an eort to amiliarise themselveswith political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood and the new party that that move-ment has ounded, and to engage meaningully in the democratic transition process inEgypt and its attendant difculties. The aim o this report is to help in this process.

The Freedom and Justice Party is likely to emerge with a substantial share o the votein the complicated Egyptian electoral process that will start on 28 November. It is


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highly likely that they will be orced to orm a coalition to run the country and needan even larger coalition to drat a new constitution. The question thereore is what

will be the general political orientation o the Freedom and Justice Party ? The Islam-ists themselves do not seem clear about this, conronted as they are or the frst timewith the need to defne their position with regard to a large number o issues that areo a political rather than religious or social nature.Their adaptation to this new situation is proving difcult and painul. But, as AmrElshobaki writes, with the all o the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood hasa real chance o ridding its politics o religious overtones and becoming committedto democracy, the constitution, and citizenry, while retaining a specifc attachmentto Islamic identity and civilisation. In his view, in order to ensure what he calls the

sae integration o the mainstream o Islamic currents in the political process, Egyptneeds to clariy the legal and constitutional ramework by which any political cur-rent, especially the Islamist newcomers, should abide. For Nathan J. Brown whilethe Brotherhoods stances still contain some considerable ambiguity on this ques-tion, their urther participation in a pluralistic order can under the circumstancesthat Elshobaki outlines pin down their commitments to building a society consist-ent with their conception o Islamic values in a manner that does not undermine therights o those with other conceptions o the proper public order. But or this tohappen the frst condition is that the democratic transition in Egypt proceeds, whichmeans that the military will have to agree to relinquish power and set out a clear

timerame or the transition to civilian rule. In that context the Muslim Brotherhoodwill participate in the political process and will be conronted with the democraticvoice o the Egyptian people and with their aspirations aspirations which may chal-lenge a conservative Islamist agenda.

Not only the Europeans are concerned about the conservative agenda o the MuslimBrotherhood, but also a signifcant number o Egyptians liberals, and this may leadto a dangerous polarisation o the political scene in Egypt. Such a polarisation couldendanger the democratic process and legitimise or some the continuation o themilitary in power. As Kristina Kausch writes, Europes excessive ocus on Islamism

diverts attention away rom greater challenges. Currently, the main risk to a con-solidation o Egyptian democracy is not a prospective Islamist takeover, but the in-creasingly tangible possibility that the Egyptian military via the Supreme Councilo the Armed Forces (SCAF) will take advantage o its current position to engineera sustained political role or itsel, including ar-reaching autonomy rom civiliancontrol and protection o its entrenched economic interests. The greatest risk or EUinterests at the moment is not the Brotherhood, but a return o the old regime by theback door. A broad consensus that includes both Liberal and Islamist parties/stakeholders is

essential or the drating o a constitution that will not be dictated by a small ma-jority but that will be representative in reecting the rights and basic interests o all


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Egyptians, that is to say a truly democratic constitution. Although the inuence othe EU on the Muslim Brotherhood is, at this stage, likely to be negligible, the EU

should not discount its own inuence among some liberal sectors o society, andshould crat its policies accordingly. The attitude that the EU displays concerningdemocratic norms, the importance o proound democratic reorm and regardingthe Muslim Brotherhood may prove crucial to the democratic uture o Egypt. I theEU, as a consequence o an eventual victory o the Freedom and Justice Party, wereto ail to recognise the results o elections in Egypt this would be interpreted notjust as opposing the Islamists but as denying the right o the Arabs to choose theirown leaders. The EU would be perceived as still preerring to shore up authoritarianregimes due to its ear o political Islam. Such a course o action would condemn theEUs Mediterranean policy to irrelevance and spell disaster or its relations with the

most important Arab country in the region, and by extension or its relations withothers.


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I. the MuslIM Brotherhood, post-

eleCtIon sCenArIos And polICy optIonsIn egypt: A europeAn perspeCtIVe

Kiia Kac

Ici

As Egypt prepares or parliamentary elections (due to start on 28 November), consti-tutional reorm and presidential elections (due to take place upon fnalisation o thenew constitution), the domestic tug-o-war over the conditions and modalities o thetransition process is becoming fercer. Many Egyptians perceive the current momen-tum as a once-in-a-lietime opportunity to reset the ground rules or a new politicalorder ater three decades o political stagnation. Naturally, ensuing tensions lead toan ebb and ow o heated disputes over electoral provisions, alliances, transparencyand transitional justice.

In Europe, observers have above all been preoccupied with the question o wheth-er democratic elections in Egypt will lead to a Brotherhood-led government, whatthis would mean or Egypts domestic social policies and, most importantly, how itwould alter current Egyptian oreign policy positions. While these are valid concerns,they distort Europes ocus and attention away rom three essential points. First, anIslamist majority in the coming parliament is likely but not certain, as polls dierconsiderably over the Brotherhoods electoral prospects. Second, Europe must cometo terms with the idea that any democratically elected government in Egypt, Islamistor secular, will be likely to adopt a more assertive oreign policy than the Mubarakregime. And third, Europes excessive ocus on Islamism diverts attention away rom

greater challenges. Currently, the main risk to a consolidation o Egyptian democ-racy is not a prospective Islamist takeover, but the increasingly tangible possibilitythat the Egyptian military via the Supreme Council o the Armed Forces (SCAF) willtake advantage o its current position to engineer a sustained political role or it-sel, including ar-reaching autonomy rom civilian control and protection o its en-trenched economic interests. The greatest risk or EU interests at the moment is notthe Brotherhood, but a return o the old regime by the back door.

The signifcance o this legislative election is enormous. The outcome will determinewho leads Egypt into the post-revolution era, and, even more importantly, who will

rewrite the ground rules o Egypts new political order. The new parliaments frsttask will be to elect a 100-member constituent assembly rom both houses to drat


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a new constitution within six months o the legislative elections. Once fnalised, thedrat constitution will be put to popular reerendum, ollowed by presidential elec-

tions. The whole process, according to the SCAF, is meant to be fnalised beore theend o 2012, but may well be carried over to 2013.

Equally important, the election will also be the frst parliamentary vote o the post-revolutionary Arab Spring. As a potential turning point, the coming elections willdraw the eyes o the world upon Egypt. A clearly rigged election outcome wouldconstitute a major setback to the shared values o the protesters o Tahrir and thedynamics o the Arab Spring, and would likely lead to renewed political turmoil inEgypt and abroad.

In order to increase their electoral chances, the main political parties in Egypt haveormed electoral blocs that will each present a common list. The Brotherhoods po-litical arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, allied itsel early on with 37 other partiesin the Democratic Alliance bloc, which includes both Islamist and secular partiesranging rom the liberal Ghad to the Salafst Noor party (the liberal Wad, Egyptsoldest legal party, has recently let the alliance). A second electoral bloc, and theDemocratic Alliances main competitor, is the Egyptian Bloc, which is composed oliberal, secular-oriented parties, including Mohamed El-Baradeis National Associa-tion or Change. A third bloc spearheaded by the centrist Justice party, the ThirdWay Coalition, recently broke away rom the Democratic Alliance.

eca caiBroadly speaking, possible post-electoral scenarios include the ollowing three.

First, renewed massive protests ahead o the elections against the SCAFs misrulepressure the latter into urther concessions. The electoral ramework is amendedaccordingly and elections are held under genuinely ree and air conditions, allow-ing or genuine political competition. The Brotherhood wins the election with its

electoral bloc and will eventually be required to orm coalitions in order to attain amajority in parliament. Coalition-building would likely usher in moderating dynam-ics and political pragmatism, and orce the Brotherhoods various actions to build astronger internal consensus (probably leading to urther ragmentation).

Second, instead o a Brotherhood win, the large number o swing voters cast a lib-eral vote, making the secular Egyptian bloc the strongest orce. The new governmentaims to put Egypt on a liberal, secular ooting, while also having to accommodate thedemands o the non-secular opposition.

Third, the ruling military uses its current power to shape electoral provisions in away that will secure an electoral outcome avourable to its own narrow interests.


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It attempts to co-opt and strike deals with political opposition orces ahead o theelections. This would probably lead to a reasonable but limited Muslim Brotherhood

showing, ensure a solid and broadly spread secular opposition representation in par-liament, and establish a majority led by military loyalists, mostly ormer regime stal-warts, who would enter parliament via independent candidate lists and vote-rigging.This third scenario, or a mix between the frst and the third, is currently the mostlikely.

The constitutional drating process will be a lengthy negotiation in any o these sce-narios, as all political orces are likely to be involved and a number o contentiousissues including the role o Islam and Islamic jurisprudence in the constitution,saeguards or civilian control over the military, and the protection o the rights o

women and religious minorities are certain to be the subject o controversial de-bates.

I the elections are ree and air, the Brotherhoods electoral chances are hard to quan-tiy. The Brotherhoods Freedom and Justice Party announced it would present can-didates or 50 percent o the seats, aiming to win 30 percent o seats overall, addingthat a number o individuals linked to the Brotherhood would also run as independ-ent candidates. Polls o voting intention dier substantially according to dierentsources, ranging the Brotherhoods prospects rom 12 percent (International PeaceInstitute, March 2011) to 46 percent (Al-Jazeera, July 2011). The most recent poll by

the Danish Institute or Parties and Democracy o August 2011 situated the Brothersat around 31 percent. Polls largely coincide, however, that voter turnout will be excep-tionally high, with a large share o voters still undecided about who to vote or.

fai a c coup

As elections approach and recently ounded political parties are working hard to de-fne their identity and shape their programmes, the Egyptian Islamist current hasexperienced a signifcant ragmentation over the past ew months. While the regime-

sponsored divide between Islamists and secularists has clearly let its marks, increas-ing intra-Islamist ideological cracks are beginning to blur the traditional poles inthe Egyptian political landscape. Internal debates among the Muslim Brotherhoodsvarious actions regarding the way in which overarching religious principles shouldtranslate into a concrete and attractive political programme have led to the splinter-ing o a plethora o new Islamist parties rom the mother organisation. This trendhas considerably diversifed the countrys political spectrum o aith-based politicalparties. Islamists ranging rom radical Salafsts (an Islamist current which deendsan inexible, literal interpretation o the Quran) to moderate traditionalists to rela-tively progressive reormers thus all compete or the avour o Egypts deeply devout

electorate as parties ace the challenge o translating sweeping religious ideology intoconcrete solutions or peoples day-to-day concerns.


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The emergence o increasing political competition among Islamists is in principle ahealthy and positive process which, i undisturbed by renewed authoritarian repres-

sion, may lead in the longer term to the ormation o a moderate, pragmatic main-stream. Liberal observers hope that, over time, the Brotherhood may undergo a simi-lar election-driven evolution to that o the Turkish Justice and Development Party(AKP), which progressive Islamist currents across the region cite as their source oinspiration. Such hopes must be entertained with much caution and patience, how-ever, as reormers in the Brotherhood are acing strong resistance rom the increas-ingly assertive conservative constituencies, and the current mainstream within theBrotherhood ervently rejects a nominal commitment to any notion o a separationbetween state and religion, as evidenced during Turkish Prime Minister Erdogansrecent visit to Egypt. At the same time, the emergence o Salafst political parties

has worried many observers. The emergence o these groups is not worrying in itsel,however, as long as they remain a controlled minority. The integration o these un-likely democrats into political contestation, it is hoped, will keep them in check andsoon unveil their lack o concrete political solutions.

Europe is ill-advised, however, to ocus all its attention on the non-secular orces oEgypts political spectrum, apparently under the mistaken presumption that secularequals democratic. The Egyptian military, initially hailed or its reusal to use orceagainst protesters during the 25 January revolution, is now eyed by the public withincreasing suspicion and contempt. They owe this reputation largely to a chaotic

ad hoctransition management marked by a lack o transparency, participation andcoherence, and a creeping authoritarian tendency that or many recalls the Mubar-ak era. Democracy activists rightly complain that the SCAF is overstepping its re-sponsibilities by ruling the country, instead o just administering it during a clearlylimited interim period. Decisions regarding the sequencing and modalities o theconstitutional reorm process were largely taken top-down by the SCAF, throwingthe occasional breadcrumb concession to the angry crowds in the street. Egypts newconstitution, i adopted, is likely to lack legitimacy.

It is becoming increasingly clear that ensuring a swit withdrawal o the military lead-

ership rom its current governing tasks will be a central challenge. Some media reportshave been uelling suspicions that the military councils head, Field Marshal Tantawi,although unlikely to seek the presidency himsel, may be attempting to establish ashadow military rule. While the SCAF has been frmly expressing its commitment to aquick return to civilian rule, many o the councils actions appear to signal the oppo-site. These include the councils resistance to cancelling the emergency law, its orceulrepression o political civil society and rejection o oreign unding, bans on peaceulpublic assembly, its rejection o international electoral observation and the right tovote or Egyptians residing abroad, and its long-standing resistance to meaningullychange the electoral law. Most importantly, public remarks by leading generals hinting

that Egypt should ollow the Turkish example in terms o establishing the military asa constitutional saeguard o the democratic order are hardly auspicious.


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Popular calls or the SCAF to commit to a specifc date or stepping down have soar remained unanswered. Debates around the details o the upcoming elections are

becoming fercer as ears persist that the new parliament and president-elect may tryto unduly inuence the content o the constitution. Mismanagement and shrinkinglegitimacy, paired with the deteriorating security situation, have the SCAFs popular-ity hitting new lows every day. Progress on transitional justice a major demand oprotesters has also been slow. Instead, since February, 12,000 civilians have beentried beore military tribunals more than during three decades o Mubarak rule.Impatient revolutionary crowds are calling or a second revolution to oust the SCAFand reclaim the revolution. Egypts democratic gains and outlook are highly ragile,making a swit transition to legitimate, constitutional civilian rule imperative. Theelectoral and constitutional process in particular will need to regain Egyptians trust

through genuine transparency.

The SCAFs recent adoption o new electoral legislation by decree without meaning-ul previous consultation provoked a public outcry among political groups and par-ties, as the SCAF clearly overstepped its powers by decreeing legislation contradictoryto the constitutional amendments approved by reerendum in March. Parties wereunited in their demand that legislative elections should be organised through ullproportional representation, whereas the SCAFs electoral law designated only 50percent o the seats to party lists, and the other 50 percent to individual candidates.Opposition parties assume, with good reason, that individual party lists will avour

ormer National Democratic Party (NDP) members, allowing them to use money andtheir entrenched local patronage networks to get into parliament. An individual listsystem would thereore likely avour a re-entry o ormer regime stalwarts throughthe backdoor. For the same reasons, the opposition demands limits on ormer NDPmembers political activity and right to run as candidates in elections.

As 60 political parties threatened to boycott the elections in reaction to the new elec-toral law, the SCAF partly gave in and invited the 12 major parties to a consultationmeeting, which ended with a joint declaration signed by the majority o the parties.In the declaration, the SCAF committed itsel to increasing the share o seats to be

designated by proportional representation to two thirds, and to limit ormer NDPmembers political role. However, concessions so ar are but promises which theSCAF still needs to deliver on. In particular, the liting o the emergency law remainsjust a matter to be studied, and in spite o the now quite precise timetable or thetransition period, the council remains vague as to when it will defnitely step down.It remains unclear to what degree the SCAFs enhanced consultations with politicalparties and other recent concessions are an expression o genuine democratic com-mitment, or an attempt to gain legitimacy and improve its worsening image in theeyes o the public.


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eci a ea ui

In spite o a number o notable new policy initiatives ollowing the Arab Spring, theEuropean Union and its Member States have yet to make their pledged change oparadigm in the EUs Mediterranean policies a tangible reality. When attempting totranslate the sudden seismic shit in the regions political landscape into a qualita-tive shit in its policies towards the Southern neighbourhood in general, and Egyptin particular, Europeans should take into account a number o considerations.

Political Islam is neither the problem nor the solution

The EU needs to stop looking at the issue o Arab democracy through the eter-

nal prism o political Islam, and ocus more on issues, less on ideologies. In theirapproach towards political Islam, Europeans need to move beyond the counter-productive notion o engagement vs. containment. Years o excluding Islamistsrom political initiatives now risk being replaced by the devotion o excessive atten-tion to Islamist political groups. Both ways o singling out Islamists are mistaken,as the key is not to ocus on specifc groups but to engage all relevant political orc-es on concrete political issues. Political Islam will orm part o new MENA politi-cal landscapes, and possibly governments, whether the EU likes it or not. This willprobably lead to more conservative social policies. In terms o oreign policy, anydemocratically elected government, Islamist or secular, is likely to adopt a more

assertive line on many key issues. At the same time, geopolitical problems in the re-gion are more likely to ow rom social anger i democratic transitions ail, ratherthan rom the inclusion o Islamist parties. EU interests will depend much moreon the success o economic strategies through which social justice is pursued, andon political reorms to establish eective saeguards against any groups abuse opower.

Greater strategic use o EU statements

With regard to the upcoming elections in Egypt, the EU will need to make a qualita-

tive jump in discourse. In the highly sensitive pre-electoral atmosphere in Egypt, di-rect statements or actions regarding the electoral process are likely to be interpretedas illegitimate oreign intervention by both the SCAF and the wider public. EUactions and statements must cautiously stress general values and the requirementso democratic elections. Ater the elections, an unequivocal tone in the EUs reac-tion to any irregularities will be essential to show Arab publics that the EU is indeedon the right side o history. At the same time, it will be o the utmost importancethat any statement careully avoids the impression that the EU is picking avourites.Be it in a more open or in a lower-key manner, the victory o any political orce inEgypts frst democratic election must be publicly acknowledged. This is even more

important as the strategic mistake o the EUs Janus-headed reaction to Hamass2006 electoral win, which was widely perceived in the region as a lack o respect or


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the Palestinian peoples expression o ree will, is still very much present in peoplesmemories. In the upcoming election, the whole region will be watching as the EU

is given a singular opportunity to reverse this impression and to show it has learntrom past mistakes.

Put pressure on the SCAF

Throughout the transitional period, the EU and its Member States must actively seekto engage the SCAF in private in order to have them commit to a concrete transi-tional timetable, including detailed provisions regarding the date and modalities ohanding over power to the new civilian government. Again, this will require strongdiplomatic skills as the SCAF is currently very sensitive to such attempts.

Do not be araid to openly defne and pursue EU interests in the MENA

The EUs policy response to transitions in Egypt and elsewhere in the region needsto move away rom ad hocmanagement o crises as they arise and attempting to re-suscitate moribund bureaucratic initiatives. Ten months into the Arab Spring, theEU has yet to start drawing up a comprehensive strategic policy response, a larger vi-sion, rom which to work its way back to adapting existing policy rameworks. Sucha larger strategy will need to defne EU strategic interests, determine how Europeanswould like to see Euro-Mediterranean relations evolving in the long term, and above

all, radically reposition the EU in terms o changing regional geopolitics.


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II. BuIldIng deMoCrACy or ConfrontIng

the IslAMIsts?the CAse of the MuslIM Brotherhood In egypt

Am ebaki

Ici

When it comes to Egypt's civil legacy and republican system, the Muslim Brother-hood has historically been an outsider. The relations between the Brotherhood andthe political authorities have traditionally been complex. Since Hasan al-Bannaounded the movement in Egypt in 1928, the group has been embroiled in a strugglewith the authorities that has uctuated in intensity but continued to be a constanteature o the political scene. The movement is the most important religious politi-cal group in the Arab world and one that garnered 88 seats in the Egyptian parlia-ment in the 2005 elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood spent its ormative years outside the regime, the state, andthe national movement, and was oten at odds with all three, also remaining outsidethe Egyptian national movement in the 1930s and 1940s. It was in conict with theregime during the era o national liberation in the 1950s and 1960s. Periods o calmhave ollowed periods o conrontation, periods o respite have ollowed violence. Themovement's members, viewed as oes o the political system, have been subjected tosuspicion and repression by the authorities, stereotyped and misrepresented, in partthrough the excesses o the security services and in part due to the Brotherhoodsown strategic ailures. It is a struggle that has been a salient eature o the countryspolitical landscape or most o the twentieth century and to this day.

The Brotherhood now has a chance to be part o the uture. The ormation o a legiti-mate political party afliated with the group, the Freedom and Justice Party, is a big stepor it and or Egyptian politics. The state should accept the right o the Muslim Brother-hood to operate legally and compete or power, and the group should in turn upholdthe legal and constitutional rules o the Egyptian state. It is crucial to distinguish be-tween the doctrinal and intellectual legacy o the Muslim Brotherhood and that o the

jihadistgroups espousing violence. Integration into the political scene can only be avail-able or peaceul Islamist currents, regardless o their political doctrine.

The chapter argues that peaceul and durable integration o the Brotherhood intoa viable Egyptian democratic ramework presents challenges but is essential. In the


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ollowing sections, the author frst examines the importance o the relationship be-tween regimes, institutional rameworks and Islamist currents, outlining the Broth-

erhoods historical journey and evolving positions regarding politics and democracy.The author then goes on to examine the impact o this year's developments on therequirements or, and challenges surrounding, successul integration o the Broth-erhood into a unctioning Egyptian democracy. The chapter concludes with policyrecommendations or the EU.

dic im a iica Iam

Unless we understand Islamist movements it will be hard to tackle reorm issues in

the Arab world. Some have voiced the view that political reorm is too risky becauseit may bring Islamists to power, at which point the latter may proceed to wreck thevery process o democratisation. This view is part o an arsenal o arguments all serv-ing to hold back political and democratic reorm in the Arab world. Proponents osuch arguments rom the previous authoritarian regime usually reject any orm ooreign intervention in Egypt's internal aairs, urge the country to hang on to itscultural and political identity, and portray democracy as a risky business. Those whowarned, beore the 25 January Revolution, o the Islamists wrecking democracy usu-ally varied their arguments according to who is listening. Speaking to the domesticaudience, they would stress the need to stand up to oreign intervention. Addressing

oreign audiences, they would dwell on the alleged perils to stability posed by theIslamic current and plead or help in keeping political Islam at bay. However, botharguments are meaningless since while the Egyptian regime accepts the monitoringo elections in Sudan, when it comes to Egypt it considers such monitoring as oreignintererence. At the same time, the absence o a state defned by the rule o law anddurable institutions is the real danger to democracy and to stability.

The history o all political ideas and movements cannot be understood in isolationrom their social and political context, or text and context oten interact. It is di-fcult, or instance, to separate the European communist ideas popular in the 1960s

rom the liberal context o Western Europe, which has spawned social democraticmovements that are now part and parcel o the political scene. Looking back, onemay say that the historical journey o the Muslim Brotherhood is intertwined withthat o Egyptian regimes. The Brotherhood was created during the monarchy, undera semi-liberal regime. It underwent a traumatic clash with the Nasserist regime, andmany o its members suered the indignities o incarceration. The group elt morecomortable under President Sadat, and members generally stayed out o politicsduring his presidency, while Sadat reed members rom prison early in his presidencybeore imprisoning them near the end o his rule. They were in two minds aboutPresident Mubarak, who tried to keep the group at a distance rather than crush it

completely. The current situation in Egypt is extraordinary in that the authorities aretaking a neutral stand on the Muslim Brotherhood and other political groups.


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The question that must be posed in connection with Islamist groups and especiallythe Muslim Brotherhood, as the largest such group in Egypt and the Arab world,

pertains to democratic reorm. Does this Islamist current suer rom intrinsic awsthat impede its participation in democratic processes? In other words, are the prob-lems hindering its integration in a process o democratisation inherent in its dis-course and the religious doctrines it espouses? And to what extent is the problemdue to the nature o the political context in which it unctions? Could a democraticcontext lead to the restructuring o the Islamist discourse so as to make it compat-ible with democracy?

It is essential, ollowing the Spring o Arab revolutions, to develop a new attitudetoward Islamist currents. First o all, we must acknowledge the need to integrate

these currents into democratic political rameworks. In Egypt, this process startedwith the creation o the Muslim Brotherhood-afliated Freedom and Justice Party.We must also establish legal procedures and political guarantees that guard againstany political current, Islamist or otherwise, revoking democracy.

The dilemma is not unique in the region. It is difcult to speak o the Islamist cur-rents without commenting on the nature o the state that anchors and organisesthe democratic process. As shall be shown below in relation to Egypt, one o theconditions or the sae integration o Islamist currents in the democratic process ishaving state institutions which are durable and capable o setting the tone or the

democratic process. This condition has been met in the case o Turkey but is absentin Palestine, Aghanistan, Iraq, and to some extent Pakistan. Turkey exemplifes alargely successul and peaceul integration o Islamist currents, while the latter coun-tries are examples o ailure. In the case o Palestine or example, Hamas remainsoutside the legacy o Palestinian national liberation embodied by the PLO, requiringintegration intellectually and politically.

Assuming that Egypt will be able to put together the kind o institutional structurenormally associated with democracy, it would be helpul here to examine the MuslimBrotherhood's evolution and position on democracy, so we may anticipate the di-

fculties attending the democratic integration o the movement.

t B' j

The founding members

Since Hasan al-Banna and his colleagues created the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismail-ia in 1928, the group has become one o the biggest political organisations in theArab world. It has survived so ar due to its ability to vary its tactics according to

circumstances, lying low sometimes and pushing the envelope at others. The move-ments organisational skills allowed it to stay relevant both in monarchical and in


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republican times. Some people wonder how the Muslim Brotherhood managed tostay cohesive and maintain its organisational structure. Others are amazed that Mus-

lim Brotherhood members are capable o staying together despite their considerableintellectual and age dierences.

Hasan al-Banna, defned his organisation in very loose terms, describing it as a newspirit rather than a welare society, political party or single-issue organisation. Al-Banna rejected political parties, mostly because o his impatience with the squab-bling among pre-1952 parties. In his view, Islam as the religion o unity in everything,calling or cooperation across humanity, does not approve or condone partisanship.

The ounding members o the Muslim Brotherhood mostly believed in peaceul

propagation o Islam and rejected violence. But this did not prevent the presence oother strands that occasionally engaged in violence, such as the Special Outft o the1930s and 1940s. The movements resolve to put together a broad-based and diverseorganisation was not coincidental, nor was it motivated solely by the desire to attractthe largest number o members and supporters. In act, the groups composition wasin harmony with its special brand o political awareness.

The Muslim Brotherhoods ounders envisioned a complex structure or their group,with multiple levels each having its own programme or religious and doctrinal indoc-trination. This sets it apart rom other political organisations and religious groups.

The multi-tiered structure, encompassing general members, associate brothers andactive brothers, also allowed or multi-layered recruitment. The Muslim Brotherhoodmay seem homogenous to outsiders, but within it there are many distinct strands andchannels allowing each member to play his organisational role in a specifc ashion.

The rise of the political brothers

The world has changed since 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood has undergone manychanges in the past three decades, during which time it maintained the essence o themission stated by its ounder, especially with regard to blending religious and po-

litical matters and asserting the broad spectrum o the movements mission, whichcovers all social, spiritual, political and cultural aspects o lie. The assumption hereis that Islam is an all-inclusive religion capable o leading its ollowers into a genuinerenaissance. So while in time, the Muslim Brotherhood accepted the multi-party sys-tem and declared its belie in democracy as a means o managing the rivalry amongvarious political orces, it remained a frm believer in combining religious preachingand political action.

As o the early 1980s, the now political brothers made a strong appearance in tradeunions and the parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood felded candidates in the 1984

and 1987 elections and did rather well. Members also succeeded, through democraticmeans, in taking control o more than one proessional union in the 1980s. In the


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early 2000s, they were prominently represented in the Lawyers Syndicate, and two otheir members took leading posts in the Journalists Syndicate. The Muslim Brother-

hood secured 17 seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections and 88 seats in the 2005elections. Throughout this period, the movement was haunted by the need to recon-cile its interpretation o holy texts with the requisites o social and political reality.Members ran or parliament more than once in alliance with other parties. In 1984,they orged an alliance with their historical nemesis, the Wad Party. In 1987, theywere at the centre o what was generally called the Islamist Alliance. They ran as in-dependents in the 2000, 2005 and 2010 elections.

In time, Muslim Brotherhood unctionaries acquired new skills through their politi-cal and publicised alliances with other political parties. They became adept at orm-

ing ronts and grew amiliar with the concept o sovereignty or the people. Theyeven came up with a civil political programme, although one that was loosely wordedand kept asserting the authoritativeness o Islamic tenets. In all, they have acquirednew experience that has inuenced their political discourse and their public state-ments. What we have now, as a result, is a Muslim Brotherhood which diers sub-stantially rom the one that existed under the monarchy, President Nasser and Presi-dent Sadat. The Brotherhood has engaged in debate within its ranks and with societyat large, tackling intellectual dierences and grappling with generational malaise.

The Muslim Brotherhood o the 1980s did not completely subscribe to democratic

concepts and political pluralism, even though its members generally accepted themethods and practices o democracy. Nor did it give up the linkage between religiousand political premises. There is no doubt, however that politics, in its practical andpeaceul sense, occupies a central place in the thinking o the Muslim Brotherhood.This was not true under the monarchy, when the movement ocused mainly on socialactivities and the propagation o religious and moral uprightness. It may saely besaid that the relative weight o politics in the thinking o the Muslim Brotherhoodhas grown steadily over the past three decades.

Still, the main problem acing the movement is the overlap between the holy and the

mundane. This overlap makes it hard or outsiders to view it as a completely politicalgroup. Many members have joined the group solely on the premise that it is a piousgroup made up o good people who are devoutly committed to the values and tenetso Islam, and have no particular political input to oer. I the Muslim Brotherhoodwere to rise above this mixing o the religious and the political, then this would her-ald a new phase in the movements development. What we are witnessing currentlyis that the movement is moving partially in this direction but still has a long way togo. The frst sign o this separation between politics and religion is the ormation oa political party, ollowing the 25 January Revolution, that is seeking political powerthrough peaceul means and playing by the rules o democracy. This is certainly a ar

cry rom the Muslim Brotherhoods past as a group that aims to promote religiously-based morality while at the same time practising politics.


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Beore 25 January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood argued that its reluctance to ac-quire a clear and well-dierentiated political identity (such as being transormed

rom a group into a political party) was due to it being barred rom politics. Thisargument seems to imply there is no point in separating religious and mundanematters when you are not allowed to engage in politics anyway. For the Brother-hood, the close intertwining o the religious and the political has been a deencemechanism, allowing the group to portray any repressive acts against it as an as-sault on Islam, or an assault on religious Muslims and God-earing people. It isa tactic that brought the Muslim Brotherhood a measure o sympathy among asection o the public.

With the all o the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood has a real chance o

ridding its politics o religious overtones and becoming committed to democracy, theconstitution and citizenry, while retaining a specifc attachment to Islamic identityand civilisation.

Formation of the Freedom and Justice Party and Brotherhood thinking on democracy

For the frst time ever, the Muslim Brotherhood has ormed a political party thatis theoretically separate rom the group, although it remains part o it in practicalterms. The Brotherhood has chosen the party leaders rom among the members o itstop-level Guidance Council. The party succeeded in opening ofces across the prov-

inces. The ounders o the party number around 9,100 and include Copts and about30 percent non-Brotherhood members. Yet while the Freedom and Justice Party has(or the time being) set the limit o party afliation o non-Muslim Brotherhoodmembers at 30 percent, the Brotherhood has declared that Brotherhood membersjoining other parties will be expelled and has expelled dozens o its young activistson that basis.

There are nevertheless several questions and challenges surrounding the MuslimBrotherhoods thinking on democracy. These problems have to do with whether thegroups belie in democracy is confned to the methods and lineaments o democracy,

or example the parliament and elections; or i this belie also extends to the culturaland political values o democracy. Furthermore, is the Muslim Brotherhoods beliein the methods o democracy a frst step towards embracing democratic values, or atleast the basic principles o democracy? In other words, would the movement regarddemocracy as a Western product to be rejected or as a worthy legacy o humanity,one that every nation and culture is entitled to enrich and build upon?

On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood has a exible intellectual and politicalmindset. This has allowed it to embrace a general view o Islam that allows its mem-bers to get engaged in politics i they so choose, but also to act as benevolent propaga-

tors o piety, preach in mosques, become parliamentarians, turn Suf, espouse revolu-tion and so on. Muslim Brotherhood leaders have included both conservative fgures


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such as al-Hodeibi, who worked as a judge, and radical individuals, such as SayyedQotb. The diversity in the group's attitudes reects diversity across the historical

eras and various regimes it has experienced or witnessed. This makes it the only po-litical group in Egypt that has had frst-hand experience o both the country's mo-narchical and republican phases.

On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood still believes in a grand, all-encom-passing Islamic doctrine. In concrete reality, holy texts may not help much in po-litical situations. This is why there is a need or a restructuring o the MuslimBrotherhood in terms o organisation and discourse. It should both oster a moredemocratic organisational structure that accepts criticism, especially rom youngpeople, and be more open to new and dierent ideas. The group must come to

accept that intellectual commitment and religiously-based indoctrination maymake good people but will not necessarily lead to a modern and democratic po-litical system. In other words, it is important or the Freedom and Justice Party tocome to the realisation that the values and principles o democracy are supreme inthis time and age. With the all o the authoritarian Mubarak regime, the MuslimBrotherhood has a historic opportunity to open up by adopting a pragmatic andexible vision that can read the real socio-political needs o society and achievethem ree o rigid doctrinal lenses. Only by doing so can the Muslim Brotherhoodembrace a realistic view o the international environment and the global balanceo power.

This frst challenge is closely related to a second one concerning the role o ideals ingovernment. The Muslim Brotherhood has always been in opposition, never in pow-er. And the ideals o austerity and religious piety, as advocated by Hasan al-Banna,are easier to maintain while in opposition. These values oer less insight into howto run a country or how to appreciate regional and international challenges. Whenit comes to running a country, the checks and balances o modern governments aremore important than the piety and personal integrity o the leaders.

A urther related problem is constituted by the Muslim Brotherhoods and other

Islamist groups' tendency to elaborate on global and American conspiracies againstIslam, Muslims and Islamist movements. Conspiracy claims are o little help in han-dling intricate international situations. To argue that Hamas is in a fx because othe blockade and that the inhabitants o Gaza are suering because o external dou-ble standards is only a hal-truth that ignores the rigidity o Hamass discourse andpositions and serves to avoid the real task o understanding international and re-gional complexities. The kind o questions Islamist movements should start askingthemselves include those concerning how they can successully navigate a biasedinternational scene and how moderate Islamist movements, particularly the MuslimBrotherhood, can become part o the international system, inuencing it and learn-

ing rom it.


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The Egyptian Constitution, democracy and integration of the Muslim Brotherhood

I Egypt successully manages its transition to democracy, this would boost thechances o the sae integration o the Muslim Brotherhood in a durable and demo-cratic polity. Considerations related to the doctrinal belies o the Muslim Brother-hood may not prove as great o an impediment as some think.

Over the past ew months, there has been an escalation in political polarisation, asmany civil groups initially demanded the abolition o the constitution beore chang-ing their mind or ear that the Islamists may end up writing the new constitution.Following the proposed time plan, which was agreed on in the reerendum that washeld in March 2011, the Egyptian people would frst vote in parliamentary elections

to elect parliamentarians who would select the constitution assembly or commit-tee that will drat the constitution, ater which the people would elect a president.However, no clear time rame was set or this schedule, something which all politicalorces are demanding now.

The most important thing to notice here is that i the Islamists were to secure themajority in the coming parliament, they may be in a position to elect the committeewhich will write the constitution. Although civil orces had been oten critical o theSupreme Council o the Armed Forces (SCAF), which conducted thousands o mili-tary trials, reused to set a clear agenda or the transition o power to civilians, and

was reluctant to dismantle the old regime, these same civil groups asked the SCAF toput together a set o supra-constitutional principles. They also asked the SCAF to setrules or the selection o the committee which would write the constitution.

There is a divide between two political positions and orientations in Egypt. On theone hand, there is a majority which maintains that you can change regimes with-out having to dismantle the institutional oundations o the state, which has beenhistorically true in various instances o regime changes over the past hal a century,including Eastern Europe, Latin America, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and In-donesia, with Iran being the only exception. On the other hand, there is a minority

which is intent on dismantling the Egyptian state in the hope o accelerating change,but oten ends up helping the counter-revolutionary cause.

In act, the true meaning o change is not in changing people, but in changing (orbeginning to change) the system within which these people unction. In other words,change happens when the state apparatus begins to operate dierently rom beore.Genuine institutional reorm is a condition or democratisation.

The main task concerning the sae integration by which we mean a process o in-tegration that will not endanger democracy o the Islamist current has to do with

commitment to the legal and constitutional rules by which the Egyptian state hasunctioned or many decades, and at least since the 1923 constitution. These con-


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stitutional and legal rules had adopted a civic code that constitutes a tradition orthe Egyptian state. Thus, this set o rules must not be treated as outmoded as many

constitutional law experts have disastrously argued. This civic code should not be de-stroyed when discarding the Mubarak regime since it is a part o the states long tra-ditions inherited rom its legal and constitutional ramework since 1923. We shoulddierentiate between the undesirable vestiges o the undemocratic regime and theindispensable state ramework.

We must not orget that any political current coming rom outside the existing po-litical system, as was the case with the revolutionary communist currents in Europe,should not be allowed to write a new constitution. Nor should we countenance thedismantling o the traditions o the state. In act, the civic legal and constitutional

ramework should be seen as a guarantee or the successul integration o new cur-rents into the political process, as they help newcomers abide by democratic rules.This is what happened when Islamist currents entered the political arena in Turkey;and they have so ar become part and parcel o the secular democratic system. I any-thing, these Islamist currents enriched democracy with new concepts that broughtit closer to what the late Abdel Wahab El-Messiri used to callpartial secularism, whichdoes not exclude religion rom the public sphere, but only separates it and distancesit rom politics.1

It is true that Mubaraks Egypt was despotic and barred the opposition rom real par-

ticipation, unlike the case in Turkey where democracy, however incomplete, providedpolitical opponents with considerable scope o manoeuvre within a certain legal andconstitutional ramework. For all these reasons, we need to maintain and combinethe countrys constitution with the undamental rules o modern democracy.

In the absence o such rules, many o the secular civil groups have developed a mount-ing phobia with regard to the Islamists, thus reviving an exclusivist secular discourse.The secular discourse views the Islamist current as inherently awed and incapableo democracy, not as one that reacts to the surrounding social and political circum-stances. This discourse also casts doubt on whether the Islamists are capable, in a

democratic context, o reinventing themselves and conorming with the new rules.Yet building democracy, and cementing its rules and institutions, is a condition orthe successul integration o the Muslim Brotherhood into Egyptian politics. Con-versely, the dismantling o Egypt's constitutional legacy, coupled with institutionalweakness, which Egypt is currently experiencing, would make it hard to integrate theIslamists.

The legacy o the 25 January Revolution has already given the Islamists a taste othe uture. Take or example the secular-Islamist coexistence seen in Tahrir Squareand the extraordinary unity and cooperation among the revolutionary youth dur-

1. For further information, see: Abdel Wahab El-Messiri, Partial and complete laicism [El elmaneya el gozeya wela elmaneya elkamela] (Cairo: Dar El-Sherouk, 2002).


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ing the 18 days o struggle against the Mubarak regime. It was this cooperationthat enticed a group o Muslim Brotherhood youths to split rom the Muslim

Brotherhood and orm a separate party called the Egyptian Current. The latterparty has a clear democratic vision and believes in peaceul politics. I this caseis compared with that o Salaf currents which had never taken part in electionsbeore and which have already ormed political parties without revising their oldviews or clariying their views on democracy, it can easily be seen that the MuslimBrotherhood has clearly evolved, especially in the atermath o the revolution. Themovement has or the frst time ormed a political party, which, i Egypt succeedsin strengthening its institutions by reorming the security sector, the judiciary andthe bureaucracy, may lead to the groups ull integration into a political processwhile building rather than undermining democracy. Eventually, the Freedom and

Justice Party may distance itsel rom the Muslim Brotherhood and begin to or-mulate its own policies.

Cci a ic cmmai

To summarise, there is no inherent reason or the Brotherhood to ail to embracedemocracy. But democracy will present the movement with new challenges, whichit cannot meet unless it works in a democratic environment and within durable in-stitutions which, in Egypts case, are still taking shape. Over the past six months, a

real opportunity has emerged or the sae integration o a major section o Islamiccurrents. But success will depend on the countrys ability to build democracy frst.The feld needs to be levelled beore the game starts. The country needs to frst clariythe legal and constitutional ramework by which any political current, especially theIslamist newcomers, should abide.

We can conclude with some recommendations or the EU regarding its policies to-wards Egypt on the cusp o unprecedented and historic elections:

Demonstrate clarity and consistency on Egyptian democracy

At the ofcial level, the EU should clearly support democracy and democratic tran-sition in Egypt. Its previous perceived double-standards towards democracy in theMiddle East must end. Europe has to understand that it must deal with those Islam-ists that are now a part o the political spectrum.

Support eective electoral monitoring

The EU should exercise pressure on the Egyptian authorities regarding the imple-mentation o election monitoring in Egypt to acilitate ree and air elections. I those

pressures ail to yield results, Egyptian civil society organisations will require the sup-port o their European counterparts to undertake the monitoring eectively.


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Share European expertise and experience, especially with new actors

European expertise in terms o the reorm o state institutions is relevant and sig-nifcant or Egypt. Europe should also give special attention and support to the newactors on the ground such as the new trade unions and new political parties. Coop-eration in terms o exchange o expertise and experience will be extremely useul.


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III. CAn the Brotherhood Be Brought Into

the deMoCrAtIC tent? An outsIders VIew

naa J. B

Ici

For many years, external analysts and political activists in Egypt have debated the ex-

tent o the Muslim Brotherhoods commitment to democracy. Since its re-emergencein the 1970s and 1980s, the Brotherhood has become increasingly political in its o-cus and increasingly adept at electoral politics. O course, its development has hardlybeen linear it was shut out o the 2010 parliament and indeed showed an inclina-tion in the last years o the Mubarak regime to turn gently away rom politics in an e-ort to protect the organisation and its myriad activities (many o which remain non-political) rom the regimes wrath. The orced departure o President Hosni Mubarakin February 2011 and the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections inviteus to return to the question o the Brotherhoods credentials as a democratic actor.

Amr Elshobaki asks us to turn our attention in a dierent direction: rather thanocus so much attention on the Brotherhoods (lack o) democratic credentials, hedirects our gaze to the Egyptian political system. He is right to do so. Elshobakicertainly pays attention to the Brotherhoods history, ideology and structure. Buthis starting point is not the movements belies but the Egyptian political system:he is insistent that we pay ar greater attention to the rules under which the Broth-erhood operates, since these shape the movements behaviour and ideas. To ask ora ully democratic movement to emerge in a non-democratic setting is to demandthat it show an ability to accept rules that are not yet written, much less enorced.Elshobaki expresses a hopeul but ar rom nave view about the prospects or in-

tegrating the Brotherhood as a normal political actor. Keenly aware o the pitallsand obstacles, he rightly insists that the process requires not simply the evolutiono the Brotherhood but more importantly the creation o a stable democratic sys-tem or Egypt.

To be sure, the stakes are very high in Egypt, both or Egyptians and those who dealwith them. And in many ways, the policy positions o Islamists pose a special chal-lenge. In internal matters, Islamists might be expert (and increasingly sincere) demo-cratic actors, but they are not liberal ones. When they speak o reedom and justice(as the Brotherhoods new party does), that reedom is primarily political (and not

broadly social and cultural) and the view o justice is drawn rom religious sources.In matters o oreign policy, Islamists question many aspects o Egypts oreign and


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security policy over the past generation; an Egypt that is inuenced by Islamist policyprescriptions might be ar less o a partner or the Western alliance than the country

was under both Presidents Sadat and Mubarak.

In this regard we need to be rank: it is rarely the Islamists democratic credentialsthat cause deep concern; it is their policy positions and the ear that those posi-tions are actually deeply popular and thereore not likely to be abandoned in thepractice o democratic politics. The Brotherhood is likely to be at best a headache orWestern governments to deal with. Can its gradual incorporation into the Egyptianpolitical system make it only a headache and not a threat to Western interests?

Elshobaki leads us to think that such an outcome is quite possible by oering us a

calm and reasoned understanding o the transition process in Egypt. His views arethose o a close observer o the Brotherhood and a participant (on the non-Islamistside o the political spectrum) in Egypts dynamic political scene today. Is there any-thing in the European and American experience that can help us understand thepossibilities or democratic evolution in Egypt? And is there anything that externalactors can do to acilitate the process?

paa m w iica ic

With regard to understanding the political dynamics, both Europeans and Ameri-cans can draw on their own experience to understand a key element o the situationin Egypt. Europeans can recognise the complexities o drawing diverse ideologicalmovements into an uncertain democratic process. Indeed, many governing partieson the continent today trace their origins to ideological movements that, even whenthey were willing to accommodate themselves to democratic politics, were oten arrom liberal: Christian democrats and social democrats, among others, representedbroad social movements that seemed to challenge the tenets o the existing socialand political order and to do so at times through the ballot box.

The European experience with such movements suggests that the sort o democraticincorporation that Elshobaki endorses is quite possible but it is likely to be a pro-tracted process and success is not inevitable. It was really only in the post-war orderthat the ull integration o such orces on the let and the right occurred as theymade the transition rom being broad social movements at odds with much o theprevailing order to electoral political parties.

The US experience can oer us something a bit dierent: a reminder that not alldemocratic actors have to be ully secular in order to be responsible political actors.In the US, the lack o an established church hardly means the absence o religion

rom the public sphere. Just the opposite is the case, in act: US political leadersare expected by many, i not most, voters to show religious aith; religious themes


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(admittedly sometimes o a general or merely sentimental nature) are a regular parto public (and even political) lie; and secularism is understood to be a posture o

ofcial neutrality toward any specifc creed or sect rather than a separation o thereligious and political realms.

Islamist movements in the Arab world mean many things when advocating a greaterrole or Islam in public lie, and some o the things they advocate could exclude mem-bers o society whose right to participate as ull citizens should not be questionedin a modern state. But we also need to remind ourselves that it is not religion per seor even its public role that is at issue; it is only an understanding and application oreligious teachings that imposes exclusion on some members o society. While theBrotherhoods stances still contain some considerable ambiguity on this question,

their urther participation in a pluralistic order can under the circumstances thatElshobaki outlines pin down their commitments to building a society consistentwith their conception o Islamic values in a manner that does not undermine therights o those with other conceptions o the proper public order.

Ca i a a ?

Is there anything that Western actors can do to acilitate this process? Yes, but onlyi they remind themselves that Egypts evolution is likely to be gradual; that this is

a supremely inward-looking moment in a society in which external advice and guid-ance is not always received as well-intentioned; and that there is a real history (whichlocal political actors are unlikely to orget) o Western states valuing the services oauthoritarian rulers over the liberal and democratic principles that they oten seethemselves as upholding at home.

In such a context, it might be possible or outside actors to shape some o the politi-cal dynamics in Egypt but it will be impossible to dictate any outcome. Certain guide-lines can assist Western policymakers in playing a helpul role:

Resist the urge to play winners and losers

Western concerns about the Brotherhood are real, but the concerns are with thepolicy positions that the Brotherhood takes, not with the movement itsel. Andthose positions (especially those on oreign and security policy) are oten alsoadopted by other political actors, even those deemed secular and liberal. An eortto back one political orce and to treat another as a pariah is not only likely to beutile; it might also raise internal tensions and encourage liberal and secular politi-cal orces to all back on perceived Western support rather than undertake the hardwork o political organising, party building and popular mobilisation among their

ellow citizens.


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Stress human rights and universal values

The Egyptian revolution was about many things, but at its core was a demand on thepart o ordinary Egyptians to have their human rights recognised. Political discoursein Egypt today still tilts in avour o those who make claims that political author-ity has to respect the rights o the people. While the Brotherhood itsel has a morerestrictive view o human rights than some other actors, its dedication to politicalrights seems to be sincere and to stem rom bitter experience. This is an opportunemoment to make clear that Egyptians who demand that political authorities andparty leaders show their ealty to protecting human rights do so with the support othe international community.

Act multilaterally

No external actor and certainly not the United States is regarded as purely altru-istic in Egypt today. And unlike the 1989 transitions in the ormer Soviet bloc, thereis no prospect o joining the EU to help guide and motivate the Egyptian transition.But coordinated eorts among international actors to communicate emerging inter-national standards in critical matters elections and constitution writing to namebut two will still carry some weight with Egyptians anxious to show each other andthe world that they are ull participants in an international community based on thevalues that they have come to hold dear.


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ConClusIon

ea B Ama

The citizens o Egypt are preparing or historic elections, due to begin later thismonth. In a period o considerable uncertainty over the actual and potential tra-jectories o post-Mubarak Egypt, the EUISS has invited three experts to share theirinsights, analysis and recommendations on Egyptian democracy and the MuslimBrotherhood with EU policymakers. Hailing rom Egypt, the EU and US, the authors

hold up three dierent prisms through which we can better understand develop-ments in Egypt and the policy implications or the EU and US. Madrid-based Kris-tina Kausch provides us with a succinct guide to the pre-electoral political landscape,electoral scenarios, cold coup risks, and EU policy implications. She draws atten-tion to the signifcant risks posed to EU interests by an electoral and constitutionalcharade that would undermine Egypts democratic prospects and invite urther tur-moil. Cairo-based Amr Elshobaki presents a short overview o the Muslim Brother-hoods historical evolution, and a survey o the current constitutional, institutionaland ideological challenges acing Egypt. In light o this analysis o the Brotherhoodsjourney and his survey o the evolving political ramework, he advocates the careul

and sustained integration o the Muslim Brotherhood into a democratic polity as adifcult but essential process. Washington DC-based Nathan J. Brown discusses thepolicy implications o these fndings or Europeans and Americans wishing to playa constructive role in Egypt's transition, underlining potentially instructive paral-lels in Western political experience, and inviting outside policymakers to be rank,patient and consistent.

In addition to the rich ood or thought to be derived rom reading their conciseanalyses, each chapter concludes with clear-cut policy recommendations, ten in all.Kristina Kausch recommends that the EU move beyond a counter-productive ocus

on political Islam and Islamist ideology in its approach to potential and emergingArab democracies, to ocus instead on policy issues, all relevant actors and the impor-tance to EU interests o successul democratic transitions and economic strategies.The EU should make greater strategic use o its statements, put pressure on the SCAFand move away rom ad hoc crisis management towards a comprehensive strategy.Amr Elshobaki calls on the EU to demonstrate clarity and consistency on the ques-tion o Egyptian democracy and put an end to perceived double standards towardsdemocracy in the Middle East. He recommends the sustained support o eectiveelectoral monitoring and the sharing o European expertise and experience, in partic-ular with newly emerging Egyptian political actors. Nathan J. Brown cautions against

outsiders playing winners and losers by variously supporting and excluding dierentpolitical actors, pointing to the dangers o such tactics raising internal tensions and


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undermining liberal and secular orces in Egypt. He recommends that external ac-tors should act multilaterally to communicate emerging international standards o

governance, including with regard to holding elections and constitution-writing, aswell as place sustained emphasis on human rights and universal values.

In sum, the report underlines the scale o the signifcant and inescapable choicesacing Egyptians, Europeans and other actors at present. It invites us to look moreclosely at developments on the ground, their historical background and the riskso a stillborn democratic transition in Egypt. Together the authors advise caution,although not in the sense o inaction, indecision or ambivalence. All concur that itis imperative that European leaders do not miss the historic opportunity at handto support a genuine democratic transition through reasoned, timely and strategic

policies.


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Annexes

Abbreviations

AKP Justice and Development Party

MENA Middle East and North Arica

NDP National Democratic PartyPLO Palestine Liberation Organisation

SCAF Supreme Council o the Armed Forces


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Notes on the contributors

Nathan J. Brown is a proessor o political science and international aairs at GeorgeWashington University, and a distinguished scholar and author o the orthcom-ing When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics. He is also a Non-

resident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment or International Peace.

Esra Bulut Aymat is a Senior Research Fellow at the EUISS, where she works onpolitics and conict in, and EU policy towards, the Eastern Mediterranean. Her re-search interests include conict resolution, the politics o religion and nationalism,trans-state politics, and Turkish oreign policy and politics. Her recent publicationsinclude Chaillot Paper no. 124, European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conict(EUISS, December 2010).

Amr Elshobaki is the President o the Arab Forum or Alternatives (Cairo). He is

also a researcher at the Al-Ahram Centre or Political and Strategic Studies. He has adaily column in the widely-read independent Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm.He has recently published a study entitledLes Frres Musulmans des Origines nos Jours(Karthala Press, 2009), and has also published many studies in Arabic, French andEnglish on the Egyptian and Arab political systems and political Islam.

Kristina Kausch is a senior researcher and research coordinator at FRIDE, whereshe oversees FRIDE's work on the Middle East and North Arica. She specialised inpolitical reorm and democratic institution-building, including through her workor the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Bertelsmann Foundation, be-

ore joining FRIDE in 2004.

lvaro de Vasconcelos has been Director o the EU Institute or Security Studiessince May 2007. Prior to this, he headed the Institute o Strategic and Internation-al Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon, o which he is a co-ounder, rom 1981 to 2007, romwhere he launched several networks including the Euro-Latin American Forum andEuroMeSCo. He has a particular interest in global governance, European integrationand Mediterranean issues. He is editor o The Arab democratic wave: How the EU can

seize the moment(EUISS Report no. 9, March 2011).


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