the anglo-austrian understanding of 1877. (i)

The Anglo-Austrian Understanding of 1877. (I)Author(s): Dwight LeeSource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 10, No. 28 (Jun., 1931), pp. 189-200Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4202634 .

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UNPRINTED DOCUMENTS.

THE ANGLO-AUSTRIAN UNDERSTANDING OF 1877. (I.)

WHEN war broke out between Russia and Turkey in April i877, Lord Beaconsfield, British Prime Minister, at once began casting about for a means of preventing Russia from taking Constantinople and the Straits and dictating her own terms of peace in the Near East. He found his Cabinet unwilling to seize a point in the East to be held as a " material guarantee," for fear that such a step might eventually lead to war. But he did persuade his colleagues to send a warning to Russia concerning the points which Great Britain would regard as of vital interest to herself.

Accordingly in a note of 6 May, addressed to the Russian Ambas- sador, Count Shuvalov, the British Government laid down the limits beyond which it was hoped that the Russo-Turkish war would not go, and within which they were prepared to maintain a policy of neutrality and abstention. The British interests which Russia was called upon to respect were: the Suez Canal, Egypt, Constantinople, the Straits, and the Persian Gulf. Count Shuvalov got leave to return to St. Petersburg in order to present the British point of view to his Government and to bring about, if possible, an understanding between the two countries which would give Russia a free hand in her war with Turkey.

Lord Beaconsfield was not content to await assurances from Russia or rely solely upon her promises for safeguarding the most vital point of British interest : Constantinople and the Straits. He therefore persuaded his colleagues to attempt an understanlding with Austria with the hope of enlisting her support in opposing Russia. While Austria had secretly entered upon her Budapest agreement with Russia before the outbreak of the war, Andrassy was no more willing than Beaconsfield to rely solely upon Russian promises concerning the outcome of the war. Andrassy therefore instructed his Ambassador, Count Beust, not to discourage the overtures which England began to make through the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, in the early days of May. The negotiations which followed lasted from i9 May, when the first formal proposal xvas made, to I4 August, when the final terms of the understanding were settled.

I89



I90 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

The following docuiments, taken with a few exceptions from the Foreign Office files in the Public Record Office, closely parallel and supplement those already published by Dr. R. W. Seton-Wzatson in this journal;' and many of them have been used by Wertheimer in hiis life of Couint Andrassy.2 They are, nevertheless, of sufficient value for students of the Near Eastern question in this period to merit publication in extenso.

DWIGHT LEE.

i. DERBY to BEUST. F.O., I9 May. (F.O. Austria, 9I7.)

M. l'Ambassadeur: It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the time has arrived when in the interest alike of Great Britain and of Austria-Hungary it is desirable that a frank and full understanding should be arrived at between them as to the policy which they shall adopt in certain contingencies.

Her Majesty's Government have taken the earliest opportunity since the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of announcing their deter- mination to maintain a neutral policy as between the two countries engaged in hostilities. Declarations to this effect have been made by them publicly in Parliament and in an even more formal manner by the Proclamation of neutrality lately issued. But while avowing and defend- ing the policy above stated they have from the first made it known that this attitude of acquiescence would not be maintained by them if, as a result of the military operations now in progress, danger to British interests should ensue; and that in such case they reserved their full freedom of action.

One of the events which in making this reserve they have had in view is the possible seizure of Constantinople by a Russian force. The issue of the present campaign cannot be foreseen; but from what is known of the numerical superiority of the Russian armies in Europe, and of the weaknesses and disorganisation of the Turkish troops, it would seem not improbable that the Russian advance may be rapid, and that the Russian commanders may at no very distant date find the capital within their reach. It is equally probable that, once in possession of Constantinople, the feeling of the Russian people, excited by a successful campaign, would make it difficult for the Emperor, however well disposed to fulfil the promises which he has given, to abandon a conquest, the acquisition of which has notoriously been for generations past an object of Russian ambition.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt but that the independence of Constantinople and the freedom of the Straits are objects not less

1 " Unprinted Documents: Russo-British Relations during the Eastern Crisis," Slavonic Review, V (I926-27), 4I3-34.

2 Eduard von Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, sein Leben und seine Zeit, III, 26-50.



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important to Austria than to England; and which Austria, like England, will not be prepared to forego without an effort. If such be the case, it ought not to be difficult -to come to an understanding according to which common interests shall be defended by previously concerted action.

I had the honour of lately making known to Your Excellency confiden- tially the contents of a note which I have addressed to Count Shuvalov on this among other subjects. The purpose of the present communication is to invite the Government which Your Excellency represents to consider and discuss a plan of joint action in the event above referred to: namely, that of a Russian march on Constantinople. It may be hoped that the contingency in question is not likely to occur, but in matters of such gravity nothing which admits of calculation should be left to chance. It seems to Her Majesty's Government that the naval force of which they can dispose is adequate for the emergency, so far as maritime operations are concerned; but the distance of England from the scene of action and the smallness of the land force available at short notice give peculiar value to the co-operation of a great military Power such as that which Your Excellency represents. I postpone all questions of detail until I learn from Your Excellency whether the Austro-Hungarian Govt. is prepared to enter into confidential negotiations on the basis above stated.

It must not be forgotten that if the action taken is to be effectual definite arrangements cannot long be delayed.

2. BEUST to ANDRASSY. Telegram. London, 24 May. (Austrian Archives, Angleterre, Varia, I877.)

Zu den bis nach Eingang der Antwort ausgesetzen Details geh6rt dass die zu Besetzung von Constantinople bestimmten K. und K. Truppen auf Verlangen durch englische Schiffe von Triest und Pola aus transportirt wiirden.3

3. ANDRAssY to BEUST, Vienna, 29 May. Communicated to the Foreign Office, i June (F.O. I20/536. Translation by the Austrian Embassy) .4

M. le Comte: The English messenger has brought me Your Excel- lency's Report, with the Earl of Derby's note dated I4 May.5 I do not delay to transmit to you at once a reply thereto.

I am very grateful to Lord Derby for the suggestion of an exchange of ideas. We can only expect advantage to arise therefrom.

3 Lord Derby had been instructed by the Cabinet to inform Beust that English ships would carry Austrian troops to Gallipoli or Constantinople. He failed to do so when the note of I9 May was sent. See Lady G. Cecil, Life of Salisbury, II, I40-4I. The F.O. papers contain no mention of this, but this telegram shows that Derby corrected his mistake.

4 This copy is only found among the Embassy papers at the Cambridge Branch of the Record Office.

5 An error. See No. i.



192 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

If I comprehend rightly the action of the British Government up to the outbreak of the present war, as well as the communication which they have made to us, there is no question in the present exchange of opinions of a departure from the course hitherto adopted by them, but of the protection of the interests of both parties.

Had it been thought fit (" sollte ") to stop Russia in the war which she had undertaken, England, like us, was in possession of the means. The Treaty of I5 April, i856, entitled us to protest against the invasion of Turkish territory. Article VIII of the Treaty of 30 March of the same year provided for a mediation between the Porte and Russia.

Neither England, nor France, nor we ourselves, have had recourse to this. The reason, on the one hand, lay in the fact that no one of the Powers wished to intervene to preserve the status quo, as they were not convinced of the possibility of maintaining it; on the other hand, in the knowledge that the fact (" Faktum ") of the war involved no such danger to themselves as not even the dread of a European war should have with- held them from averting; and lastly, that such a danger might first be created by the results of the war, the limitation of which, however, would lie in the power of Europe.

The position which we have now to take up appears to me to follow naturally from the attitude which we observed in tacit agreement with England before the outbreak of the war.

Since, in spite of our having offered the means thereto, we have not kept Russia from war; since we have declared, directly or indirectly, that we were not willing to interfere on behalf of Turkey; since we have made no casus belli of the invasion of Russia, the honesty and candour which we wish to observe in all our relations require that we should not restrain Russia from deciding her quarrel by arms, and eventually overcoming the Porte.

Since, however, on the other hand, the consequences of such a war might produce a state of things affecting our interests as well as those of Europe, we must reserve our whole influence for the final settlement of events.

The object of our understanding cannot therefore be that the action of Russia, so far as it is directed to the settlement by arms of the struggle with the Porte, should be opposed; the basis of an understanding lies rather in the answer to the question: What are the consequences of the present war which we can accept, and what are those which we cannot allow?

With this view it is impossible to settle beforehand a programme which shall be equally applicable in all conceivable eventualities of the war.

It must be framed in one way if the Porte, as is possible, is not over- come by force of arms, and retains her European domains; in another way, if the course of events secures for Russia the satisfaction of a vic- torious campaign, but at the same time gives evidence that the elements



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of continued existence are still inherent in the Ottoman Empire; in another way, again, necessarily, if the war leads not only to a military overthrow of Turkey, but also gives a shock to her stability and discloses signs of her inevitable dissolution.

Convinced that a programme which would be useful and practicable in one of these eventualities could not possibly be applied to others, we consider that under present circumstances it is best to settle only upon the general outlines of a programme, and to specify those issues of the war-which, as affecting our interests, we could not accept.

This course is pursued in Lord Derby's letter to Count Shuvalov, and although that document mostly refers to eventualities which appear to us but little likely to arise, yet we do not hesitate hereinafter to specify those of our interests which we are determined to defend against all eventualities of the war.

Although we consider the Treaty of Paris as capable of modification, and would not insist upon its full maintenance, yet we adhere to the fundamental ideas of that Treaty. Consequently, we could not accept:

i. That the exclusive protectorate over the Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula should be conceded to any one Christian Power.

2. That the definitive settlement of the results of the war should take place without the participation of the Guaranteeing Powers, and that the creation into a State (" Constituirung ") of the Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula should be granted (" oktroyirt ") through the action of a single Power.

Furthermore we cannot consent to- 3. An acquisition of territory by Russia on the right bank of the

Danube. 4. The incorporation of Roumania with Russia, or the dependence

of that Principality on the Russian Empire. 5. The erection in the above-named countries of a secundogeniture,

whether Russian or Austro-Hungarian. 6. The occupation by Russia of Constantinople. 7. Finally, no large Slav State should be established at the expense

of the non-Slav elements of the Balkan Peninsula, and in any case the reconstitution should be limited at most to the autonomy of the present provinces under a native Chief.

This is the position we have taken up. It was our view before the war and will unchangeably remain so.

We have not, on the other hand, avoided pointing out to the Russian Government the essence of the points in which our interests might be affected. Her Britannic Majesty's Government is aware that, at the time of the Sumarokov Mission, we rejected the idea of a Russian occupation of Bulgaria as a guarantee for the reforms.

We did this for reasons which, having regard to the private nature of the correspondence between Sovereign and Sovereign, we did not make public, but which, nevertheless, left no doubt as to the view we

N




took of our interests. We expressed the fear that after an occupation of Bulgaria it would be hardly possible for the Russian Government to withdraw their troops, and to hand over the Christians to the Porte, after they had once been emancipated. Neither could we assent to a permanent Russian supremacy over Bulgaria, or, in fact, on the right bank of the Danube.

We have likewise declared that an invasion of Serbia by Russian troops, even if only as a temporary military measure, would be incom- patible with our interests.

In both these cases we have received from the Russian Government assurances in substance satisfactory, and we have also observed nothing in the attitude of Russia to give us reason to suspect that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg contemplates acting without regard to our interests.

For the continuance of this disposition on the part of Russia we possess a double security: firstly, in our confidence in the Emperor Alexander's intentions; secondly, in the circumstance that Russia has, in fact, entered into action with a full knowledge of our interests and of our serious intention to protect them, and has, at the same time, placed herself in a military position which she would certainly have avoided if she had not intended to abstain from injuring the interests of Austria- Hungary.

In presence of this double guarantee it would be acting on our part contrary to all the laws of loyalty, and to all good faith, to enter upon any hostile action towards Russia so long as she by her attitude gives no occasion for it. Should, however-which we cannot suppose-a change occur in the course of events which would make these securities ineffec- tual; should the Russian Government, under the pressure of an internal movement (lit. " current "), or through other unforeseen circumstances cease to be master of its decisions, the question presents itself to us- which must under any circumstances be answered-whether we are determined and ready to stand up for what we have stated to be our interests with the whole strength of the Monarchy, and, if necessary, by force of arms.

Our answer on this point is decidedly, Yes. This is the unreserved statement of our position. Nor do we delay

at once communicating as frankly our views with respect to those points which England has declared that she must protect.

Of the interests which the letter to Count Shuvalov sets forth, we can, in regard to two-namely, the freedom of the passage through the Suez Canal, and the maintenance of the status quo in the Persian Gulf-express the assurance, without awaiting any knowledge of the Russian reply, that Russia, under present circumstances, does not, and cannot, contemplate any alteration in this respect.

The precautions (" Cautelen ") respecting the possession of Constan- tinople and the passage of the Dardanelles come, therefore, alone under consideration.



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We have taken up a position towards Russia in regard to the first question, and had no occasion to touch upon the latter. As, however, the free passage of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus for Russian shipping is identical with the surrender of Constantinople, the two questions appear to us to be but one.

We are, in fact, of the opinion to which Lord Derby gives expression in his note of the igth of May, that these points interest us also in a high degree. We cannot, however, refrain from making a special remark as to the view which we take of this interest.

That Russia should neither command Constantinople nor the Dar- danelles is to us of great importance, but we can only contemplate this question in connection with all the important interests which we have defined above. If we should be obliged to concede that the principle of the Treaty of I856, by which no single Power should exercise a Protec- torate over the Balkan Peninsula, must be given up in favour of Russia; if we allow the creation into a State (" Constituirung") of these populations to take place through Russian influence, without our co-operation; if we should permit Russia to incorporate Roumania, to take Bulgaria, or any district on the right bank of the Danube, under its direct rule or secundogeniture, the question whether Constantinople were actually in the possession of Russia or not would be a matter of very secondary importance to Austria-Hungary. If we pointed out to Russia that a Russian occupation of Constantinople could not be permitted, it was because of the conviction that the Power in possession of Constantinople must, in the natural course of events, command Bulgaria and other districts of the Balkans, just as the State which holds Bulgaria and the districts beyond must inevitably obtain possession of Constantinople.

We accordingly consider all the interests which require protection in the East as bound up together, and are of opinion that no one of them can be given up without sacrificing the other.

This conviction determines the exchange of ideas to which the communication of the Earl of Derby has given rise. If his Lordship shares the views of the Imperial and Royal Government, the natural solidarity of our interests stands out prominently of itself, and there remains for a further exchange of ideas the question of coming to an understanding as to the means by which these interests can be most surely protected, if possible without endangering the peace of Europe.

Your Excellency is authorised to communicate these remarks to Lord Derby upon the understanding that he agrees to keep our overtures secret, and should he desire it you may leave a copy with him.

4. DERBY to BEUST. Draft. F.O., 2 June. (F.O. Austria, 9I7.)

I have the honour to inform Y.E. that I have laid before my colleagues in Cabinet the note from Count Andrassy which you were good enough to communicate to me yesterday and that my colleagues agree with me in thinking that it contains a frank, clear and satisfactory statement of

N 2



i96 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

the views of the Austro-Hungarian Govt. as to their position with regard to the possible effects upon the interests of the Einpire as well as upon those of Europe, of the consequences of the war between Russia and Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government concur with Count Andrassy that the natural harmony of the interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary is self-evident and they are prepared for the further exchange of ideas which H.E. invites as to the means by which those common interests can be most securely protected. (Initialed) B.D.

On 8 June Shuvalov returned to London from St. Petersburg with the Russian reply to Lord Derby's note of 6 May. Russia promised to respect British interests in Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Persian Gulf without reservation. She repeated her assurances concerning Constantinople, affirming that its acquisition was not a part of the Tsar's plans. Its fate and the question of the Straits were to be settled by the Powers. But Russia refused to limit her objectives in the war by promising not to enter Constantinople and argued that England and the other neutral Powers should free her from the necessity for approaching the city by pressing the Porte to make peace before the war came to that extremity. The terms upon which Russia declared herself ready to make peace before crossing the Balkans were briefly: Bulgaria to be erected into an autonomolus vassal province extending to the Balkans; the Christian provinces south of the Balkans and elsewhere to be guaranteed a regular administration; Serbia and Montenegro to have extensions of territory; Roumania's future to be regulated bv a general agreement; Russia to receive compensation for war costs by the restitu- tion of that part of Bessarabia given up in i856 and the acquisition of Batum; and Roumania to receive compensation for Bessarabia in the Dobrodgea. If Austria wanted compensation, Russia would not oppose it in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Turkey refused these terms the war was to continue. On 14 June, Shuvalov slightly altered the statement about Bulgaria declaring that the parts north and south of the Balkans should be united into a single province.6

5. BEUST to ANDRASSY, Private Letter, London, ii June. (This document is taken from a copy made for the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office; Austrian Archives: England, Varia, I, Polit. Archiv VIII/i7o.)

Je viens de voir Earl of Beaconsfield et d'avoir avec lui un long entre- tien, dont je m'empresse de transmettre 'a Votre Excellence succinctement

6 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. No. I952 (I878), documents Nos. i and 6; Slavonic Review, V, 426-27.



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les details. Mon interlocuteur commenga par me dire qu'il tenait 'a me parler afin de s'aboucher une fois directement avec moi sur la situation qui lui deplait et sur le veritable caractere de nos rapports reciproques auxquels il attachait la plus haute importance. Votre Excellence me permettra de le faire parler 'a la premiere personne:

" Je Vous parle en confidence et d'ami 'a ami. Bienque ma position de Premier Ministre me donne le droit de me mettre en rapport direct avec les Ambassadeurs, je ne voudrais pas faire ombrage 'a Lord Derby que j'ai en haute estime, mais que je sais etre quelquefois plus reserve qu'il ne le faut. Je crains de ne pas nous voir aller au dela de phrases, tandis qu'il s'agit de savoir si nous pouvons et devons faire les affaires ensemble. Je regrette de devoir Vous dire que nous avons chez Vous un homme qui nous est parfaitement inutile et qui ne nous apprend rien. Notre entente avec l'Autriche-Hongrie est pour moi la question qui prime toutes les autres, mais chaque fois que je l'aborde dans le Conseil je me heurte contre les doutes sur l'existence d'une parfaite liberte d'action de Votre part. Si une fois je suis su'r que le Comte Andrassy veut s'engager avec nous par une action quelconque, je Vous promets que je dispose du Conseil et qu'il n'y aura plus la moindre difficulte dans notre chemin."- So weit Beaconsfield. Ich machte ihm bemerklich, dass aus der engli- schen Replik im Zusammenhang mit der diesseitigen Antwortsnote die Uebereinstimmung sich in der Art herausstelle, wie ich sie im Telegramme von 9. als von Lord Derby aufgefasst dargelegt habe, namlich dass beide Regierungen zu einer Verstandigung fiber gemeinsame Action dann zu gelangen haben wiirden, wenn Russland die von ihm ertheilte Zusage nicht halten oder zu halten in die Unm6glichkeit versetzt werden sollte. Folgendes Entgegnung Beaconsfield's: " Ich weiss nicht, wie hoch Sie die Zusage wegen Respectiren Ihrer sieben Punkte anschlagen; was uns betrifft, so verm65gen wir solche in der von Graf Schuvalow zuriuck- gebrachten Depesche nicht zu erkennen-Phrasen und wieder Phrasen. Wenn, heisst es, England neutral bleibt. Wo aber hort die Neutralitat auf ? Alles elastisch. Und es bedarf nur der Anstiftung irgend eines tiurkischen Actes, damit Russland sich seiner Verbindlichkeit enthoben erachte. Ich weiss das entschiedene Ja in der Depesche Graf Andrassy's zu wiurdigen, aber wenn einmal vollendete Thatsachen vorliegen, wenn ein Friedensschluss erfolgt oder nur im Zuge sein sollte, dann wird es sehr schwer sein, anders als mit Worten dazwischenzutreten. Da muss fruiher gehandelt werden und ich will Ihnen meine Meinung daruiber offen sagen. Ich rede weder vom Krieg gegen Russland noch von gemeinsamer Sprache in Petersburg. Wir miissen aber dariuber einig sein, dass Russland den Balkan nicht uiberschreiten darf. Wenn es die Donau iuberschritten und, was ja leicht moglich ware, einen die Ehre salvirenden Erfolg gehabt hat, dann muissen wir zusammen auf Friedensschluss dringen, der natiurlich nicht ohne unser Zuthun geschlossen werden diirfte.

Verweigert Russland den Frieden und iuberschreitet es den Balkan, dann miissen wir materielle Garantien fiur A ufrechthaltung der Veryraige uns



i98 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

selbst nehmen, darunter verstehe ich, dass wir unsere Flotte schicken und einen Punkt wie Gallipoli besetzen, um die Meerenge zu beherrschen, wahrend Sie in die Fuirstenthtimer einriikken (worunter auf Befragen Rumanien zu verstehen, jedoch mit dem Anheimgeben, nach eigenem Ermessen Serbien zu besetzen)."

So weit Beaconsfield: Je lui fis remarquer une fois de plus que le passage des Balcans avait

une autre portee pour l'Angleterre que pour nous et que la Russie vic- torieuse s'arretant en de9a des Balcans, nos interets se trouvaient autant et peut-etre plus encore menaces qu'a la suite d'une occupation de Con- stantinople. I1 me repliqua qu'il etait bien entendu que l'Angleterre acceptait sans reserve nos sept points, et s'en rendait solidaire si nous arrivions a nous entendre. I1 ajouta que les rapports de Mr. Layard le rassuraient, que le Sultan etait un homme d'une sante delicate mais intelligent et ne ferait pas la paix sans consulter l'Angleterre. N'ayant pas de courrier 'a ma disposition d'ici 'a la semaine prochaine et craignant que l'envoi d'une des personnes appartenant 'a l'Ambassade ne serait remarque, je me decide 'a ecrire en chiffres.

I1 ne me reste qu'a ajouter deux mots 'a ce recit. Dans mes repliques je n'ai anticipe en rien sur les decisions de mon Gouvernement et je n'ai pas dit un mot qui efut pu donner lieu 'a l'espoir d'un accueil favorable, mais je crois de mon devoir d'exprimer comme ma conviction que dans le cas oiu les vues de Votre Excellence s'accorderaient avec celles que je viens de Lui faire connaitre, Mr. Disraeli serait en effet, comme il le dit, parfaitement en mestire de les faires adopter par le Conseil des Ministres et d'en assurer la mise en pratique. Dans le meme cas il suffira que Votre Excellence veuille m'en informer pour que je provoque de la part de Lord Derby une proposition analogue. En attendant, j'e6viterai dans mes conversations avec celui-ci toute allusion a ce que je viens de rap- porter.

Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter que je n'ai provoque en aucune facon cette entrevue que Earl of Beaconsfield m'a spontanement demandee. 6. BUCHANAN to DERBY. Tel. Vienna, ii June (received I2 June.

F.O. Austria, 902.)

Andrassy was much gratified at the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern- ment on his statement of his views, "but he did not seem quite confident that they concur in his opinion as to solidarity of the territorial question in the Balkan Peninsula with that of Const'ple and he will ask for further explanations from Count Beust on this point previous to expressing his views as to the eventual means which may be necessary for protecting the common interests of the two countries. .

7. DERBY to BEUST. Memorandum. I3 June. (F.O. Austria, 893.) Are the Austrian Government willing to accept the fact of a Russian

occupation of Constantinople, or would they in case of need, join with that of England to prevent such occupation taking place?



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Russia has given no promise that she will not occupy Const.-she declines to do so. Do the Austrian Govt. think it safe that she sh[oul]d go there, relying on her promises that she will not stay?

8. DERBY to BUCHANAN. Draft Tel. F.O., I5 June, 5.30 p.m. (F.O. Austria, 893.)

(In regard to Buchanan's telegram of the iith, No. 6 above, and a conversation on the I3th with Beust.)

H.E. did not ask for any further explanations on the point mentioned by Ct. Andrassy, namely, the connection of the question of exclusive Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula with that of the occupation or possession of Constantinople by Russia.

Should Count Andrfassy revert to the subject, you may state that H.M.'s Govt. agree in the general principles laid down in H.E.'s Despatch.

9. BUCHANAN to DERBY. Tel. Vienna, I5 June, 6 p.m. (F.O. Austria, 902.)

(Andr'assy, since he could not receive Buchanan at the Foreign Office, called upon him at the Embassy and said that Novikov had communicated to him the Russian terms of peace which appeared to be almost the same as those communicated to Great Britain.)

He is of opinion that the terms would not be accepted by the Porte except under extreme pressure, but he thinks they might be made the basis of a transaction and he hopes therefore that Her Majesty's Govern- ment will not express a decided opinion against them until they receive a statement which he is preparing of his views in writing, and in which an answer will be given to a question he said Your Lordship had addressed to Count Beust as to whether Austria considered that Russia should be trusted to occupy Constantinople provisionally.

I then said that personally I doubted more than ever the power of the Russian Government to maintain a promise on that subject, as Slav pressure appeared already to have led the proposed terms of peace to be modified by a declaration that the whole of Bulgaria, doubtless with the limits proposed by General Ignatyev at Constantinople, must be included in the autonomous state to be created, and I recited to him Your Lord- ship's telegram of yesterday, acquainting me with this change in the Russian proposals. He said the Russian Ambassador here has not yet made any allusion to such a change which would, of course, increase the difficulty of an eventual arrangement-he would, however, express his opinion on it in the Despatch he is preparing, as with a view to England and Austria coming to a satisfactory understanding with each other, he thinks it inadvisable to state their views imperfectly by telegraph on so important and complicated a subject, whereas his opinions on each point which has been raised will be given clearly in his Despatch, which he will communicate to me when it is ready for transmission to London.

He could not, however, say how soon he would be able to do so.




He does not understand why there is no reference to the Dardanelles in the Russian proposals.

IO. ANDRASSY to BEUST. Copy of telegram communicated to Lord Derby, i6 June. (F.O. Austria, 893.)

Strictement Confidentiel. Notre confiance dans la stricte execution des promesses russes n'est

point absolue. Nous communiquerons au Gouvermement anglais d'une maniere parfaitement claire par quels moyens selon nous les interets reciproques peuvent etre sauvegardes en toute circonstance, mais il est difficile de donner une assurance positive en reponse a une question speciale.

ii. Memorandum of Conversation between DERBY and BEUST at the Foreign Office, I9 June, in Lord Derby's hand. (F.O. Austria, 893.)

In a conf[idential] conv[ersatio]n wh. I held this day with the Austrian Amb[assador], I pressed upon him earnestly the importance of some action being taken by his Govt. with a view of preventing terms of peace being imposed on the Porte wh. wd. be permanently injurious to Austrian interests. I reminded him that according to the latest version of the Russ. scheme, a semi-independent Bulgarian State-wh. as a matter of fact wd. be a Russian dependency-was meant to extend for a consid[er- able] dist[ance] south of the Balkans-that the line of defence wd. in cons[equence] cease to exist-that all the Turkish fortresses within the territory thus set apart were to be destroyed & therefore that the road to Const. wd. be open & unguarded whenever a Russian army was ordered to march there. It was impossible that such a proposal could be favour- ably viewed by Austria. It might be that Ct. Andrassy relied on the oppos[itio]n of other Powers, but without in any way committing the Govt, of wh. I was a member, I did not hesitate to express it as my per- sonal op[inio]n that England wd. be reluctant to enter into a second Crimean War without an ally. An Austrian refusal to cooperate might therefore very probably lead to, & justify, inaction on our part: whereas if the two countries acted together, there was not only no doubt of success, but no danger of war, since Russia wd. not provoke the hostility of two leading Powers, while already engaged in hostilities.

Count Beust appeared to acquiesce in this view, and promised to report wh[at] I had said.

D.

