Taiwan’s Options for Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Rick Fisher, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center

For the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, October 6, 2015

Summary

Threat Developments:

• Missile and air threat developments feed overall PLA objectives to achieve invasion of Taiwan and deterrence/defeat of potential United States assistance.

• New PLA SRBMs and MRBMs offer potential for multiplying missile threat to Taiwan.

• PLA air forces could include up to 1,500+ 4th generation combat aircraft by 2020.

• PLA SAM threat will soon include 400km range S-400, followed by PLA analogues.

• UCAV threat to Taiwan just starting to get underway.

Options for Taiwan:

• Make air-missile defense attack PLA strategy by contributing to anti-invasion defense while reversing cost ratios.

• Missile-based IADS must quickly include energy weapons like rail guns.

• Small cheap loitering missiles can contribute to IADS and anti-invasion defense.

• Smart artillery can contribute to anti- invasion and air defense.

• Washington must accelerate development of new SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs plus build up tactical nuclear posture to deter PLA, counter PLA’s A2AD.

• Conclusion: If there is determination and resources, the U.S. has the means to enable Taiwan’s missile-air defenses to contribute decisively to deterring PLA invasion ambitions.

First PLA Priority: Building the Capacity for Invasion of Taiwan

• Preparing for the potential to force “unification” with Taiwan remains the first strategic requirement for the PLA.

• In 2013 and 2014 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense warned that the PLA “could be capable of invading Taiwan by 2020.”

• For nearly a decade Taiwanese sources have maintained that countering invasion is the “center of gravity” for their strategy.

• Acknowledging that such an invasion would require unprecedented levels of mass, transport, coordination, surprise and luck, it is clear the PLA is building toward such an objective.

• Ground trends: 2nd Gen armor for Army and Marine Amphib units; Meager formal amphib lift potentially supplemented by hundreds of large “civil” RoRo ferry and RoRo barge transports. With civil lift, the PLA may be able to take 8 to 12 Divisions to Taiwan.

• Missile trends: 1,000 to 1,200 SRBMs potential for being multiplied by several times with new missile systems.

• Air trends: 1,500 or more 4th gen combat aircraft by 2020, increasingly armed with varied families of PGMs.

• Anti-Access trends: 2nd Gen PLA-A2AD emerging: DF-26 ASBM; Robust SAT and HALE UAV targeting; multiple ASAT systems; Global power projection enables multiple “counter-pivots” against U.S.

• Bottom Line: Taiwan requires decisive “mass” that reverses cost-ratios in its favor; weapons capable of countering threats in multiple domains.

Missile Threat Trends

• Taiwan’s MND says there are about 1,600 PLA missiles targeting Taiwan.

• The 2010 DoD China report, last to do so, describes SRBMs as follows:

CASC DF-15 (CSS-6) is listed-- Launchers: 90-110; Missiles: 350-400, or less than 4 missiles per launcher.

CASIC DF-11A (CSS-7) is listed—Launchers: 120-140; Missiles: 700-750, or more than 5 missiles per launcher.

• At the 2015 IDEX show a Chinese official stated the PLA was going to purchase the CASC A-300 300km MLR/SRBM.

4x A-200s are marketed as paired with one 300+km range M-20 SRBM, per TEL, usually called the M-20 system.

If the PLA buys CASC’s new M-20, it will likely also by the CASIC’s BP-12A, paired with the 4x SY-400 MLR/SRBM.

• If these are new gen SRBMs, taking the max 2010 number for launchers, 250 x 5 = 1,250 missiles + 3x reloads = 5,000 missiles. Cost grow to $2 million per TEL + missiles ?

• We know that DF-21 units employ reloads. In 2015 we see a new CASC TEL that may carry two MRBMs. If this is a CASC system, then we can expect a new CASIC system to succeed the DF-21. Will this too carry 2x MRBMs ?

• 800km to 1,000km range DF-16 MRBM entering service. Longer range, higher speed to counter Taiwan BMD systems.

• Also possible that PLA Army artillery rocket units will start acquiring 280km range Norinco AR3 precision-guided artillery rocket.

Air Threat Trends

• In 2014 Asian government sources report PLA may have about 1,500 4th gen combat aircraft by 2020.

• Production shifting to 4+ gen fighters w/ AESA radar, Chengdu J-10B and Shenyang J-16 and J-11D.

• 5th gen Chengdu J-20 could reach low-level production by 2017-2018; 5th gen Shenyang FC-31 by 2020 ?

• Turbofan tech turning corner; WS-10 now in 4x versions; new 9-ton medium thrust engine in aerial testing.

• 5th gen PL-10 short-range AAM reaching service entry; potential, according to reports, 400km (?) range PL-15 in testing.

• Five Chinese companies making families of precision-guided munitions: Luoyang; CASC; CASIC; Norinco; South Industries.

• One 2013 private assessment has the PLA basing in Jinan and Nanjing MRs: 10 Battalions of 200km range Almaz-Antey S-300PMU-2 and 3 Battalions of 150km range HQ-9 4th gen SAMs.

• PLA to purchase 400km range Almaz-Antey S-400.

How To Improve Deterrence On the Taiwan Strait

• Taiwan requires “mass” or way to generate a numerical superiority.

• But Taiwan also requires a reversal in “cost ratios” in which Defense becomes cheaper than Offense.

• Taiwan also requires far greater Strategic Depth, which can be obtained by superior information.

• Can Taiwan assemble new “asymmetric” systems that provide the “mass” needed to blunt the PLA’s missile and invasion threats, forcing it to reevaluate its invasion ambitions?

• Washington requires many new capabilities in order to defeat new PLA capabilities, and thus deter Beijing.

• Some of these capabilities are also required by Taiwan and other U.S. allies.

• Washington should consider allowing Taiwanese investments in certain weapons programs in order to realize efficiencies and to speed development.

Achieving “Mass” and Reversing Cost-Ratios: Railguns

Taiwan’s inventory of anti-missile and air-defense SAMs, though necessary, are an expensive way to counter PLA missiles: @$3 million per PAC 3 vs. about $1 million for a DF-15/DF-11 SRBM. You may also need two ATBMs per SRBM.

Railguns offer one way to begin to give Taiwan “mass” of numbers and to reverse the cost-ratio in its favor.

75 railguns firing at 6 to 10 rounds per minute can launch 450 to 750 “missiles” each minute. But each round can carry 100 or more “shotgun” pellets, meaning in a minute, you can loft 45,000 to 75,000 projectiles at Mach 5 to Mach 7.

Pellet clouds would be useful in countering increasingly maneuverable PLA SRBMs.

Early test railgun range: 100 miles; objective railgun range for 2020s: 220 miles.

A railgun projectile costs about $30,000. Three 750 round volleys might cost about as much as a new F-16.

Railguns are cross-domain weapon systems. They can perform anti-missile, anti-air, anti-ship and ground-attack missions.

Status: First BAE-Boeing railguns may not enter U.S. service until early 2020s; smaller General Atomic railgun needs customers/investors.

Defense in Multiple Domains: Smart Artillery Shells

Smart artillery shells that are under development offer the prospect for turning Taiwan’s 600 155mm artillery systems into potent anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons at substantial savings.

In April 2014 Lockheed introduced a candidate for a new U.S. Navy smart shell competition. The Lockheed shell has a range of 120km (75 miles) and equipped with a seeker, can hit a moving ship, even a slow moving aircraft like a fighter or a helicopter. Status: Lockheed reports that this 5-inch shell is now in advanced testing, a full flight test is expected soon.

In September 2015 Raytheon reported that it had flight tested its 127mm Excalibur N5, a naval version of its in-production 155mm Excalibur 1b smart artillery shell. Range: @100km. Raytheon says it is developing a dual-mode seeker for N5 which could potentially give it a moving anti-ship and anti-aircraft capabilities.

BAE Systems is developing its Hypervelocity Projectile (HVP), a sharply shaped 155 or 127 artillery shell that can achieve near Mach 5 speed. Range: 93km from Mk 45 naval gun; 80km from 155 arty. BAE says it is considering precision guidance systems for these shells.

Reversing Cost Ratios, Multi-Domain: Small Loitering Missiles

Small loitering missiles provide another option for cost-effective jamming or precision strike against ships and land targets (SAMs/SRBMs).

Raytheon MALD: 900km range, loitering capability; 1 hour endurance; 0.9 to 0.6 Mach speed; weight, less than 300 lbs; jammer, EW, ISR, kinetic payload options; cost, less than $350,000 (based on recent USAF contract data)

Status: over 1,000 jammer versions produced for USAF, but the HAMMER concept has seen no further development.

Boeing JABMM: 150km range supersonic speed and 100km range subsonic speed versions; early objective anti-ship and anti-aircraft.

Status: concept introduced in 2012, not clear there has been subsequent development.

New Air Combat Options

• A modern and effective Air Force will be essential for deterring China. But how to afford a next-gen Air Force?

• It would be amazing if Taiwan could join the “F-35 Alliance” but can it afford to do so?

• If new fighters are unaffordable, the U.S. should make an immediate offer of upgraded used F-16s to ensure nearterm adequate numbers of fighters.

• The US and Taiwan should co-develop a new lightweight and affordable fighter built around the General Electric F414 or F414EPE turbofan. Such a new fighter could possibly exploit a design offered for the USAF T-X program. The U.S. requires an inexpensive fighter for export and possibly for advanced training requirements.

• The US should also offer technology to assist Taiwan’s development of stealthy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs).

The U.S. Contribution to Taiwan’s Air and Missile Defense

• Deterrence on the Taiwan Strait has always relied on China’s understanding that superior U.S. force could defeat their attacks against Taiwan.

• China has for decades sought to develop the means to counter possible U.S. defense of Taiwan. This is now resulting in the beginning of a 2nd Generation of “Anti-Access” weapons like the 4,000km range DF-26 SSM/ASBM, long range targeting by new ISR satellite constellations and long-range UAVs like the Shenyang Divine Eagle, and new ASAT systems derived from the LM-11, LM-6 and Kuaizhousmall satellite launchers.

• To counter these PLA capabilities and restore a “balance,” the U.S. should begin producing new families of SRBM, MRBM and IRBMs—with ASBM and ASAT capabilities. There should also be a U.S. move to higher orbit IRS satellites with new near-space and high supersonic speed UAVs, while rapidly developing active and passive space defenses.

• To exploit a superior strategic position along China’s periphery, the U.S. should forge active ISR cooperation between Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India and include Taiwan. The Huntington Ingalls “Arsenal Ship” concept can allow the U.S. to perform this mission alone if needed.

• There should be a crash U.S. program to develop an ultra long range AAM. Raytheon introduced a concept LRAAM in 2010.

• PLA may have up to 500 tactical nuclear weapons; it is time for the U.S. reintroduce this capability to all services.