strategy & partner workshop and iki workshop (24-26 … · 2018. 5. 11. · strategy &...
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STRATEGY & PARTNER WORKSHOP
AND IKI WORKSHOP (24-26 April 2018)
Report
Version: 04.05.2018
The Strategy & Partner Workshop (24-26 April) convened all Climate Transparency partners and affiliated
experts to discuss Climate Transparency’s 2018 strategy, the concept and indicator set of the Brown to Green
report and communication activities.
The IKI Workshop (26 April) convened all partners involved in Climate Transparency’s IKI project. It discussed IKI
guidelines. The policy paper working groups under IKI had a kick-off session to coordinate their work.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [1] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Content
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... 2
B. WORKSHOP SESSIONS ............................................................................................... 7
1. Overall strategy of Climate Transparency ....................................................................... 7
2. Indicators: Introduction, data availability, climate policy & NDCs ............................... 15
3. Indicators: Adaptation ................................................................................................... 20
4. Indicators: Emissions and decarbonization ................................................................... 23
5. Indicators: Just transition .............................................................................................. 30
6. Impacting the debate – national and international communication ............................ 34
7. Governance of Climate Transparency ........................................................................... 40
8. Indicators: Financing the transition .............................................................................. 47
9. IKI policy papers with peer comparisons ...................................................................... 57
C. ANNEX – PARTICIPANT LIST ..................................................................................... 59
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [2] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
A. Executive Summary All Climate Transparency partners1 and further experts convened on 24-26 April 2018 in Berlin to
discuss Climate Transparency’s strategy for 2018, communication, governance, indicator set of the
Brown to Green Report and the policy papers developed under the IKI project. A detailed presentation
of the discussions per sessions is contained in the document.
The conclusions and agreements by partners of the Strategy & Partner Workshop 2018 per session
as perceived by the Secretariat are:
Overall strategy of Climate Transparency
• There was a broad agreement to the objectives for 2018 – 2020 and objectives for 2018.
However, Climate Transparency will not try to influence the G20 or UNFCCC process, but use
the G20 and the UNFCCC as a hook to stimulate more ambitious national climate action and
international negotiation ambitions.
• The report this year will be published a month before the G20 summit and COP, so it can be
tailored to either event in the national communication. For next year, the Secretariat will make
a proposal for the launch of the report as an updated report is feasible to be produced before
the G20 Summit in Japan in June 2019.
• Climate Transparency partners in different countries have to make additional efforts to tailor
the report to the national context and add policy recommendations etc. when engaging in a
briefing meeting with high level officials to bridge the gap between data and national policy
debates. If considered helpful by the next Steering Committee meeting, a regular exchange
between partners on strategy development for briefing meetings with stakeholders (e.g. G20
sherpas) could be institutionalized.
• Explore how this year’s report could include qualitative case studies illustrating lessons learnt
of some countries to increase peer learning and capacity building for implementation.
• Climate Transparency partners will think about how to make the report more attractive for
countries and stakeholder for whom climate is not a priority.
• Climate Transparency will explore how to include a narrative/describing text in the country
profiles this year (more qualitative explanations and summarizing paragraph at the
beginning).
Indicators: Introduction, data availability, climate policy & NDCs
• Internationally comparable databases, namely Enerdata, CAT, PRIMAP, IEA will be used in the
first place in order to allow for comparability. In case more recent data or more coherent data
from national sources is available, this data will be preferred (= option 1). All partners will
compare their national data with the Enerdata data set as a first step.
1 Jiang Kejun, Energy Research Institute, China, participated via video conference. A list of participants can be found in the Annex.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [3] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• The decision where to use national data and where international databases has to be done
indicator by indicator.
• Partners will have more time than last year to double check data.
• The Secretariat of Climate Transparency will explore the development of a background paper
tackling the issue of data difference in national and international sources and the difficulty to
draw comparisons. This paper could be used to feed into the international debate around the
global stock take.
The policy performance section of the Brown to Green report will include the following
NDCs
• Use the CAT for rating NDC ambition.
• Use the CAT to determine whether the recent policy mix is in line with the country's NDC.
• Add a paragraph to make a qualitative judgment on the NDC, NDC updates and
implementation. In countries where Climate Transparency has no partner this paragraph will
entail the qualitative information on NDCs presented by Climate Watch.
Policies
• Adapt the policy evaluation table to the national circumstances (e.g. only show policies
relevant for the national context) and rate them regarding Paris compatibility. Explore
whether adding a fourth category (categories so far: No policy, policy not Paris compatible,
policy Paris compatible) to differentiate policies that are not Paris compatible.
• Include CCPI policy evaluation to show the overall policy performance.
Expand the time for data review for the partners.
Indicators: Adaptation
• The adaptation working group led by Swati Agarwal will look for more specific indicators on
vulnerability, policies and finance (domestic and international).
• The working group will provide a first draft of indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering
Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-July.
• If there are international data sets with comparable data on adaptation, these will be included
for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where Climate
Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.
• The working group will continue to operate throughout the year for next year’s report.
Indicators: Emissions and decarbonization
• Germanwatch and NewClimate Institute will consider all arguments raised and come up with
a new list of indicators to be discussed.
• Emissions and decarbonization sections will be shown together (not separated as in last year’s
report).
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [4] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Zero-carbon and new renewable energy sources
• Display of fossil fuels, new renewables and zero carbon technologies side by side.
o CCPI evaluation for new RE, simplified rating for fossils and zero-carbon (same as coal
rating last year)
• Attempt to distinguish between sustainable and non-sustainable biomass.
• Review if possible to differentiate between large and small hydro.
Sectoral indicators
• Include new indicators on the forest and agriculture sectors.
• Differentiate between freight and passenger transport.
• Rate countries against G20 average and/or against Paris compatibility.
Share of coal/renewables and energy use per capita
• Energy use and intensity indicators will only be displayed with current level, trend arrow and
rating.
• Explore how to balance the trend rating esp. in developing countries.
In general, partners could add policy assessments to give more background information to the country
scorecards.
Indicators: Just transition
• The just transition working group led by Andrew Marquard will provide a first draft of
indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-
July.
• If there are international data sets with comparable data on just transition, these will be
included for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where
Climate Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.
• The working group will continue to operate throughout the year for next year’s report.
Impacting the debate – national and international communication
• Report will be finalized mid-October and launched 1st/2nd week of November, ideally in all
countries at the same time/day.
• Create a summary of the country data as new frontpage of the country profiles.
• An option could be to create a positive messaging with good policy examples of different
countries to counterbalance the 1.5 IPPC report media messages.
• The Secretariat will put all country partners in touch with the GSCC expert in their country at
beginning of June so that partners can start to develop national communication strategies.
• The Secretariat will form a communication working group together with GSCC and partners.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [5] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Explore common COP event with UNEP Gap Report hosted by Indonesia. Fabby will need a
concept note by June.
• Explore early presentation at World Bank Annual meetings.
Governance of Climate Transparency
• No changes to the governance structure were agreed except:
o Keep separation between Partners and Observers and delete requirement to receive
funding through the Secretariat to bring own funding
o Government cannot be Observers, unless they are funders
o Secretariat Germanwatch & HVGP endorsed
o “Criteria” and “Considerations” for new Partners will be merged (proposal will be
made by Secretariat and presented to the Steering Group in one of the next Calls)
• The governance structure will be reviewed in 2019.
• Overview of budget 2018 will be made available to the Steering Group as soon as it is available.
• The Co-Chairs Alvaro Umaña and Peter Eigen unanimously were re-elected for a 2-year term
(next election in 2020).
Indicators: Financing the transition
• Checklist. Investigate what is possible, including data availability from ECF, the UNEP enquiry
and Green Action Tracker, followed by two paragraph narrative in each country sheet written
by partners.
• Investment attractiveness of RE. Make a decision to include RECAI as Allianz not available but
give space in country sheets to highlight any discrepancies.
• Fossil fuel subsidies. Figure should show absolute values (broken down by production and
consumption). Country partners to provide feedback on the data, as well as guidance on
relevant timeframes for showing trends.
• Carbon revenues. Review I4CE data and methodology, and as with other indicators include the
G20 average benchmark. Present in absolute values on the same scale as FFS.
• Effective carbon rates. Review the OECD methodological approach, as well as treatment of
implicit carbon pricing and sectoral (emissions). Check with the OECD on data updates and
Stern and Stiglitz outputs for benchmarks.
• Green and brown public finance for energy. Obtain OCI data for G20 countries and present
green and brown data (domestic and international), with the G20 average benchmark.
Circulate list of public finance institutions covered by the database, caveat in country sheets.
• International provision of finance. Request access to the UNFCCC international public
provision dataset, seek better understanding of the MDB data we can extract from the OECD
DAC CRS. Propose the alternative sheet in the developing country sheets that can help the
country narrative around international public finance.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [6] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Circulate the method for the removed indicator on emissions of new investments in the power
sector, noting that we have no updated data this year and NewClimate found method
challenges.
IKI policy papers with peer comparisons
• The following policy paper working groups have been established: 1) Energy transition
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), 2) Coal phase out (China, India (?), Indonesia, South Africa) and 3)
Subsidies/finance (India & South Africa (?) – tbd)
• The group coordinator will coordinate regular phone calls of the groups.
• The groups report on their work in every Steering Group Call.
• The groups will present a time line of their work in the Steering Group Call on June 7.
Finally, it was agreed to have a working meeting at COP24, 5 December, 3 pm until dinner.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [7] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
B. Workshop sessions
1. Overall strategy of Climate Transparency Gerd Leipold, Secretariat Climate Transparency, presented the overall strategy of Climate
Transparency for 2018. Fabby Tumiwa, Institute for Essential Service Reform (IESR), Indonesia, Jorge
Villarreal, Iniciativa Climática de México (ICM) and Andrew Marquard, Energy Research Center, South
Africa, responded to the presentation and provided their country perspectives. Based on these inputs,
the workshop participants split up in four break-out groups to further discuss the strategic direction of
Climate Transparency. The main discussion points and agreements are summarized below.
i. Input – Gerd Leipold
Environmental analysis
Political environment
• Talanoa Dialogue likely to appeal for higher ambition without concrete steps. Change in
ambition will only come from national debate.
• Climate and green finance moves mainstream. Those central for climate for whom climate is
not central become more important.
• Argentina G20 Presidency to concentrate (with respect to climate) on
o Infrastructure investment
o Development of climate resilient infrastructure and job creation
o Long-term low emission strategies
o Aligning international finance flows with the NDCs
and long-term strategies
o Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies
o Renewable energy and energy efficiency
• Japan and Saudi Arabia G20 Presidencies 2019 and 2020
o Priorities yet unclear, but likely that climate has lower priority
o Strong role of US (chairs G7 in 2020)
Transparency initiatives for climate
• Initiative for Climate Action (ICAT)
o Provision of tools and support to measure and assess the impacts of national climate
actions
o Implementing partners: UNEP DTU Partnership, Verra and WRI
• Climate Watch (flagship project of NDC partnership)
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [8] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
o Provision of online tool to create customized mitigation and adaptation country data
for policy makers and other stakeholders
o Managed by WRI in cooperation with various partners
• Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement
o Practical exchanges between countries on the transparency rules of the Paris
Agreement
o Launched by South Africa, South Korea and Germany, supported by several partners
• Initiatives focus on capacity building and provide no country rankings and ratings
Overview of climate action assessments
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [9] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Theory of change
Objectives 2018 – 2020
The long-term objectives of Climate Transparency are
• To stimulate the national debate in G20 countries in order to raise ambition in line with the
1.5/2 degree target through providing the most comprehensive, concise and comparable
information about the climate action of G20 countries.
• To add to the ‘ratchet mechanism’ (Facilitative Dialogue 2018, NDC submission 2020, Global
Stocktake 2023) through country comparisons and contrast it with what countries ought to do
for the 1.5/2 degree target.
• Influence the G20 countries to put greater emphasis on climate, take steps to reduce fossil fuel
subsidies and promote low-carbon, climate-resilient finance within the G20 process.
Objectives 2018
Make the Brown to Green Report more attractive and impactful through:
• More recent data
• A move towards NDC assessment
• Better coverage of adaptation and just transition
• More consistency in the report
• List of existing climate assessment (indices and ratings) in the Annex
Explore whether a net carbon price could be defined for inclusion in 2019
Improve communication through:
• Decentralised outreach in partners’ countries
• Using more communication channels and using them more actively
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [10] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
USP of Climate Transparency
Climate Transparency differs from similar initiatives by
• Providing the most comprehensive yet concise overview of climate actions of countries
• Enabling comparisons between countries (including with ratings and ranking) which stimulate
the national debate
• Ensuring a balanced global perspective through its network of partners
• Having the ability to influence the national debate through a national partner network and
through targeted (direct) communication
• Describing brown alongside green and not restricting itself to the green developments
• Not doing its own research, but bringing together the work of others
ii. Input – Fabby Tumiwa
What do policy makers expect from the report?
• How do we stimulate consistent national debate with the report? We had a nice launch with
good high-level participation in Indonesia, but having a debate based on the report is not easy.
It is crucial to put emphasis on continuous national debate beyond launch of report, not only
getting media attention.
• Policy makers in Indonesia always want to see good news, they are the ones that have to
provide answers and input to the questions of our president. They also want to know where
Indonesia stands out in the G20 comparison. Last year’s report showed that Indonesia
commitment on fossil fuel subsidy reforms is unique. Government representatives were proud
of this as the report confirmed that what they were doing was helpful. This provides them with
a confirmation to continue. But we also need to show how they can improve in other areas,
e.g. green bonds, Indonesia has green bond issued this year.
• We have to think about individual ways to link the report to the actual policy discussion in each
country. Last year, the new Indonesian energy minister back slided on renewable energy, so
we could use report to provide counter arguments.
• Government stakeholders in Indonesia had a lot of questions on data. We should try to show
more transparently where the data is coming from.
Communication
• The media attention on the Brown to Green Report was good, but bringing it up in a more
constructive debate is not easy. You have to communicate with the right person at the right
level.
• I had an interview on CNN and the report went to the president’s office. The president included
information of the report in its G20 statement.
• Audience always had questions on the interpretation of data and main messages. We should
make it simpler and include more visualisations.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [11] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• We have to think about an information package that can be used by other NGOs and media.
iii. Input – Jorge Villarreal
• Dual nature of Climate Transparency: Climate Transparency is on the one hand a coalition of
different experts gathering data and making a smart report, but on the other hand with its
national partners, it is also a political group (we make politics!). This strategy document reflects
both, but political component should be reflected in a clearer and transparent way.
• The narrative of the report is closely linked to the G20, but why and how does the G20 matter
nowadays? What is the impact of the G20, why do we want to be linked to G20 and not to
other agendas? E.g. in Mexico, the OECD agenda is more powerful than G20 agenda. Or why
not make a presentation at Davos at World Economic Forum?
• We are focusing on impacting ambition of countries. But country comparisons can be really
helpful to increase the capacity of a country to implement policies by sharing lessons learned.
• How to position climate change in countries with democracy and poverty challenges, where
climate is not a priority on the public agenda?
iv. Input – Andrew Marquard
• G20: So far we used the G20 as a very useful hook and now we engage with the G20 process
itself. But what are our goals here? Do we want to achieve domestic goals through pressures
by the G20 or influence the final G20 statement? How do we spend resources in IKI allocated
on G20 work, e.g. G20 sherpa staff briefing meetings?
• Domestic impact: If we want to raise ambition at the national level, 1) the focus on the release
of report is short sighted and superficial, we need a theory where this change comes from,
what is the effect of showing infographic to stakeholders? A lot of our budget goes to briefing
meetings with high level stakeholders. I am not sure if this is best approach, this needs a
country-driven and more programmatic approach, aiming to connect the very detailed set of
information to actual national processes.
• Theory of change: The impact depicted is too ambitious and simplistic. It also raises questions
about national sovereignty.
• Qualitative information: The report provides an enormous amount of quantitative standalone
information. We should pull out case studies on each country that provide more in-depth
qualitative information.
DISSCUSSION POINTS
Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis
• The Argentinian government is interested in the report and cares about the results. It has reservations on the actuality of the data.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [12] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Japan and Saudi Arabia having the G20 Presidency in 2019/20 are rather likely to talk about adaptation than mitigation. This is why the Argentinian put adaptation high on the agenda to ensure the continuity of climate discussions within the G20.
Anne Olhoff
• I am coordinating the UNEP Gap Report which has a similar mission as the Brown to Green Report. In the last edition we included a chapter on the G20 countries performance and a chapter on NDCs and how to close the gap.
• There would be great opportunities to explore a cooperation and have common outreach activities, e.g. a common event at COP24.
The four break-out groups discussed the following two questions:
• What are the lessons learned from 2017 and how can Climate Transparency improve its work?
• Do you agree with the three objectives of Climate Transparency referring to the national level, G20 and UNFCCC?
Spring group (Rapporteur: Jan Burck, Germanwatch)
• We have to ensure to use the report’s findings more than once a year. This could be done with policy papers under IKI etc.
• Comparability of countries and G20 average is not always so useful. In national contexts sometimes comparisons are not so important. We need to decide indicator by indicator whether we can use national data that is not comparable.
• The G20 as a body does not play a major role in a lot of countries, not good angle for the publication. We have to think about how will this be dealt with in decentralized strategies.
• We will have more impact if we include more recent data.
Summer group (Rapporteur: Jasmin Cantzler, Climate Analytics)
• Partners should be earlier included in the report production than last year, particular in drafting the country profile, not only reviewing it.
• In Mexico, ICM used the report’s findings to advance certain policy proposals in meetings with government officials, the report was often a hook starting the conversation. The inclusion of most recent data and trends are most important to support policy proposals.
• Climate Transparency could provide the raw data of the graphs on the website so that stakeholders can create their own graphs, e.g. with just two countries.
• Climate Transparency should not engage in the Talanoa Dialogue but rather create external pressure by presenting a G20 stocktake in the media.
• It is unclear how Climate Transparency engages in the G20 process and what the objectives are. We will not influence the content of the final communique which would need more technical efforts.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [13] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Autumn group (Rapporteur: Eduardo Ferreira, World Bank)
• When developing the report, we should always keep in mind our stakeholder engagement on the national level.
o Re-emphasize the report will be available again this year
o Start with their priorities and how the report can help
• The narrative of the report could be improved by linking the different sections better. This year the narrative could focus on the NDC ambition cycle. We should not include policy recommendations, which can be added by partners in national contexts.
• Climate Transparency should focus on countries and not the G20 and UNFCCC processes although these processes can serve as a hook to speak with those not central for climate as well (e.g. G20 sherpa staff)
• An advice would be to include more benchmarking practices to be included in report.
Winter group (Rapporteur: Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis, FARN)
• Communication: report too comprehensive to translate it for country/media, there needs to be an effort to tailor the national messaging more to the national context.
• Provide infographics as they are easier to understand.
• Include a narrative/describing text in the country profiles, as only providing the data does sometimes not mean much to stakeholders.
• Include best performances and worst performance of a country at the beginning of the title page of each country profile (good way to start communication).
• This year we should use more time for preparing a communication strategy (international and national) and establish media relations.
Agreements
• There was a broad agreement to the objectives for 2018 – 2020 and objectives for 2018. However, Climate Transparency will not try to influence the G20 or UNFCCC process, but use the G20 and the UNFCCC as a hook to stimulate more ambitious national climate action and international negotiation ambitions.
• The report this year will be published a month before the G20 summit and COP, so it can be tailored to either event in the national communication. For next year, the Secretariat will make a proposal for the launch of the report as an updated report is feasible to be produced before the G20 Summit in Japan in June 2019.
• Climate Transparency partners in different countries have to make additional efforts to tailor the report to the national context and add policy recommendations etc. when engaging in a briefing meeting with high level officials to bridge the gap between data and national policy debates. If considered helpful by the next Steering Committee meeting, a regular exchange between partners on strategy development for briefing meetings with stakeholders (e.g. G20 sherpas) could be institutionalized.
• Explore how this year’s report could include qualitative case studies illustrating lessons learnt of some countries to increase peer learning and capacity building for implementation.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [14] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Climate Transparency partners will think about how to make the report more attractive for countries and stakeholder for whom climate is not a priority.
• Climate Transparency will include a narrative/describing text in the country profiles this year (more qualitative explanations and summarizing paragraph at the beginning).
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [15] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
2. Indicators: Introduction, data availability, climate policy & NDCs In this session, Jan Burck, Germanwatch and Niklas Höhne, NewClimate Institute, Germany 1)
introduced the suggested major changes for this year’s Brown to Green Report, 2) laid out the options
to integrate more recent data and 3) proposed a structure for the climate policy section of this year’s
report including an NDC assessment.
Cyril Cassisa, Enerdata, introduced the work of Enerdata.
i. Introduction
The Brown to Green Report is the most comprehensive yet concise of its kind.
To keep it concise, the 2018 report should make a careful selection of indicators based on the
following criteria:
• The leading question of the report could be: “How well is the country doing in its transition
towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy in line with the Paris Agreement?)”
• Showing recent changes and answering whether there is a shift from brown to green
• Reflecting a global perspective
Major changes for this year’s report suggested are:
• Including more recent data in all sections, particularly in the emissions and decarbonisation
section, if there is consistency with the national data of partners (to be checked)
• Country profiles, where the first page gives a coherent and concise overview of a country`s
performance
• Adding new indicators covering just transition and adaptation (depending on the results of the
working groups)
• Revising the narrative and indicator selection of the finance section to include indicators on 1)
financial policies, 2) fiscal policies and 3) public finance based on the discussions Climate
Transparency conducted with finance stakeholders in London in 2017
• Including a more detailed assessment of countries` NDCs in the policy performance section
• Greater consistency and alignment between the country profiles and the summary report
ii. Data availability and Enerdata
In the past, the Brown to Green Report has used PRIMAP, CAT and IEA data for most of its indicators.
Those sources have different publication dates and would be able to provide e.g. GHG data for 2015
as well as renewable and energy use data for 2016. Without a different source, the report will show
2015 data for some of its most important indicators.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [16] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
To increase the actuality of the report, contact with Enerdata, a French for-profit data company, has
been established. Enerdata signaled that it could provide Energy Use and CO2, sectoral and RE data
covering 2017. The consistency and comparability of the Enerdata data with national data is yet to be
checked by Centro Clima, ERC, ERI, FARN, ICM, IESR and TERI for their countries.
Partners also wished that more country databases should be used in the report to increase the usability
of the report in the national debates. This would mean that sometimes it would not be possible to
calculate G20 averages or to make direct country comparisons. The decision where to use national
data and where international databases – or both next to each other - has to be done indicator by
indicator.
DISCUSSION POINTS
Gabriel Blanco
• Has the EDGAR database been considered? Jan Burck: Yes, the EDGAR database is
included in PRIMAP.
William Wills
• For Brazil, the Enerdata information is consistently 23-27% higher than the national data
from 1990 to 2016.
Andrew Marquard
• Almost all the data from big international data comes normally from national datasets. We
could produce a quick guide that navigates through different data sources on a country by
country basis to show what are the best sources and why.
Jorge Villarreal
• The report is used to support the policy proposals of national partners. National and
international data should therefore be coherent and up-to-date. One could visualize how
the different data sources come together.
Bert Metz
• Is recent data more important than comparable data? We could use the latest national
data and harmonize it. William Will: I support this idea.
Eduardo Ferreira
• It is more important to have comparable data than recent data. The first step would be to
agree on the principle (data has to be comparable).
Gabriel Blanco
• Being transparent suggests to have everything on the table: National and international
datasets likewise. Then, the government can decide which data to take.
Gerd Leipold
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [17] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Harmonizing data sounds good but the harmonization of all the data will be undoable for
Climate Transparency. Comparisons are central for the mission of Climate Transparency.
• Putting various sources of information next to each other is counterproductive because it
then can be argued that we don’t have a coherent message.
Andrew Marquard
• Most G20 countries have communicated quite recent data but there is still a gap of
around four years. The most pragmatic approach might be to develop a policy brief about
transparency (how did we deal with data, how did we generate the data etc.) would be
appropriate to check where the discrepancies between international and national data
come from.
Niklas Höhne
• He sums up that there are four options:
1) Start with a common dataset and check whether there is country agreement (only
show either national or international data)
2) Use national data by default and add exceptions for international data when
needed.
3) Starting with national greenhouse gas inventories and harmonize (not doable
under Climate Transparency)
4) Put everything on the table (This could be too confusing)
AGREEMENTS
• Internationally comparable databases, namely Enerdata, CAT, PRIMAP, IEA will be used in
the first place in order to allow for comparability. In case more recent data or more coherent
data from national sources is available, this data will be preferred (= option 1). All partners
will compare their national data with the Enerdata data set as a first step.
• The decision where to use national data and where international databases has to be done
indicator by indicator.
• Partners will have more time than last year to double check data.
• The Secretariat of Climate Transparency will explore the development of a background
paper tackling the issue of data difference in national and international sources and the
difficulty to draw comparisons. This paper could be used to feed into the international
debate around the global stock take.
iii. Climate policies & NDCs
Previous indicators:
• Policy rating table: rating whether existing policies are in line with Paris Agreement
• Climate Change Performance Index expert’s policy evaluation
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [18] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Compatibility of climate targets with a 1.5°C/2°C scenario (Climate Action Tracker)
• Being on track to meet the NDC (Climate Action Tracker)
Suggested improvements:
• Policy rating table: Using the same methodology as last year? Or integrating a fourth category
on implementation?
• It is suggested that this section includes a NDC assessment, which will require a special
narrative. The assessment will focus on comparing the ambition of NDCs (shown by the Climate
Action Tracker and the Climate Change Performance Index) with current policy visualized by
the policy rating table. The most important element of the assessment is to show whether
current policy is in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.
Data sources: CCPI, RISE, CAT
DISCUSSION POINTS
Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis
• Adaptation should be included in the NDC assessment as well.
• CAT alone does not necessarily reflect changes made to NDCs that do not affect the
emissions target. The Brown to Green Report should also reflect on the policy changes
made within revised NDCs.
Gabriel Blanco
• We should evaluate NDC goals vis a vis their respective implementation for each country
and make clear that the policy table shows the Paris compatibility and not the NDC
implementation.
• The policy for a certain NDC needs to be evaluated. The NDC goals highly depend on their contexts.
Andrew Marquard
• Climate Transparency is doing two things at once: the compatibility with the Paris Agreement (CAT) and general climate policy assessment (CCPI). Additionally, the new element would be to assess the NDC implementation. The question is what is effectively an economy-wide mitigation target? There are many different targets. It is important to make clear how to get to the one that is used by CAT in order to asses this one.
Cyril Cassisa
• For policy implementation, this specification is very useful. Concerning the categories, it is
important that in case there are more categories, the colours need to stay the same ones
so that the progress of different countries can be shown over the years.
Jorge Villarreal
• There could be three pillars:
o The CAT report (NDC assessment)
o The CCPI report (general assessment of the climate change policy but not the
implementation)
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [19] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
o Own evaluation (assessment of NDC implementation)
-> Do these proposals allow us to make an assessment of the implementation or not? We need to be careful not to mingle these three narratives and clearly distinguish between them.
Swati Agarwal
• Mitigation, adaptation and capacities (all three elements) need to be included in the NDC
assessment.
• Most targets are highly dependent on technology and finance. It is useful to integrate this
as well.
Fabby Tumiwa
• How will Climate Transparency deal with a case as Indonesia that does not have an official
2050 emissions reduction/coal phase-out target set by the government? There is a trend
visible but no official target (which might create problems for the policy table).
• To whom belong the emissions from foreign countries? What is the boundary?
Eduardo Ferreira
• What is the objective of this section and whom are you targeting? I understood the focus
here is NDC, so I would not drop NDC assessment and its NDC implementation.
AGREEMENTS
The policy performance section of the Brown to Green report will include the following
NDCs
• Use the CAT for rating NDC ambition.
• Use the CAT to determine whether the recent policy mix is in line with the country's NDC.
• Add a paragraph to make a qualitative judgment on the NDC, NDC updates and implementation. In countries where Climate Transparency has no partner this paragraph will entail the qualitative information on NDCs presented by Climate Watch.
Policies
• Adapt the policy evaluation table to the national circumstances (e.g. only show policies relevant for the national context) and rate them regarding Paris compatibility. Explore whether adding a fourth category (categories so far: No policy, policy not Paris compatible, policy Paris compatible) to differentiate policies that are not Paris compatible.
• Include CCPI policy evaluation to show the overall policy performance.
Expand the time for data review for the partners.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [20] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
3. Indicators: Adaptation Swati Agarwal, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India, gave a presentation and led the
discussions on including adaptation indicators in the 2018 Brown to Green Report.
Why an adaptation focus in the Brown to Green Report?
Influence on Non-G20 countries
Balanced reflection on Mitigation and Adaptation
Growing significance given future COPs
Address issue of equity
Enhance Assessments of global impacts
Provide information on national actions
Ideas and suggestions
Development of Adaptation Metrics
Indicators to Measure Status and Progress
These could be used to analyze and compare adaptation across G20 countries
There are some possible entry points
And also challenges and opportunities
Possible entry points
• Exposure & vulnerability
o Indicators to measure risks (eg. http://www.emdat.be/ )
o E.g. Frequency of extreme events, number of deaths due to heat wave, crop loss
(monetary) due to weather extremes, fresh water shortages (no. of days where
supply was less than required), loss (human life, infrastructure and economy) due to
floods like Chennai 2015, Mumbai 2005, climate risk disclosure by companies
• Sectorial assessment & needs
o Indicators to measure adaptation finance (eg. https://www.adaptation-
fund.org/apply-funding/implementing-entities/national-implementing-entity/ ,
https://www.greenclimate.fund/home)
o Eg. National institutional set up for operationalizing adaptation activities, number of
adaptation projects (per sector) financed and commissioned through global
adaptation fund
• Policies – INDC – National Action Plans
o Indicators to measure adaptation policies (Eg. http://climate-
adapt.eea.europa.eu/countries-regions/countries/germany)
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [21] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
o Eg. Domestic adaptation fund, funds for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), presence of
Adaptation Plans in INDC, crop insurance coverage, climate smart agriculture
policies, coverage of climate services
Challenges and opportunities
• Adaptation remains a local affair – household, community, city
• Thus, adaptation needs and deficit are also local
• Therefore, the challenge remains
o to measure the adaptation needs accurately on the ground – because they are
dynamic, and contextual
o to have comparable indicators across countries.
• Though adaptation needs are local they can be aggregated at the national level to get a holistic
view
• Therefore, in a top-down scenario, the responsibility to fill adaptation deficit overlaps with
national development priorities
• Thus, adaptation also requires a policy and top down focus
• This is the approach we adopt in Brown-to-Green report
DISCUSSION POINTS
Jan Burck
• The ND gain index could be used under the section exposure & vulnerability?
Andrew Marquard
• The Em-Dat database shows potential threats, while the ND gain index is backward looking
Anne Olhoff
• I coordinate also the UNEP adaptation gap report – progress and gap measurement
(comes out before COP this year)
• What do you want with the adaptation component in comparison to mitigation? How far
is a country away from 100% emergency coverage?
• Be aware that covering adaptation requires at least as much knowledge and resources as
dealing with mitigation.
• Link the narrative to the global stock take and global adaptation goal. This will offer
opportunities to escape from local boundaries.
• You could also include vulnerability risks and financing and costs of adaptation.
Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis
• There are a lot of interlinkages with the policy section. Do we have an adaptation section
or include it overall in the report?
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [22] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Bert Metz
• Look also whether development policies/banks do invest in climate-resilient infrastructure
or not (consider the “brown” element of adaptation).
Hannah Schindler
• A framework for climate-resilient infrastructure development and investment will be
provided in the upcoming OECD/ILO study that the Argentinian G20 Presidency
commissioned.
Andrew Marquard
• I suggest looking at the following three categories: 1) Vulnerability, 2) Plans, policy and
programs, 3) Finance
Sarah D’haen
• One could also track the science base of NAPs, NAPs are often established without a
scientific base for expected impacts, it is now often developed afterwards
• We could also include the co-benefits of mitigation/adaptation.
Jiang Kejun
• What is meant by adaptation policy? In China, we only have measures to respond to
disasters and no national adaptation policy.
Swati Agarwal
• Yes, it is the same in India. I suggest that we will not distinguish between the two in our
report.
Agreements
• The adaptation working group led by Swati Agarwal will look for more specific indicators on vulnerability, policies and finance (domestic and international).
• The working group will provide a first draft of indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-July.
• If there are international data sets with comparable data on adaptation, these will be included for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where Climate Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.
• The working group will continue to operate throughout the year for next year’s report.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [23] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
4. Indicators: Emissions and decarbonization Jan Burck, Germanwatch, and Niklas Höhne, NewClimate Institute, Germany, made a proposal on the
indicator set for the emissions and decarbonization session in this year’s Brown to Green Report.
Alexander Jung, Agora Vehrkehrswende, presented the study „Towards Decarbonising Transport – A
G20 Stocktake on Sectoral Ambition” published together with GIZ in 2017 and to be update in 2018.
i. Emissions
Previous indicators:
• GHG emissions development graph
• CCPI GHG rating
Suggested improvements:
• This category will stay largely untouched, yet the presentation of the graph might vary if
Enerdata information is used as they only provide data for CO2 emissions from fuel
combustion and no LULUCF or GHG data
Data sources: PRIMAP, CCPI, Enerdata (?)
ii. Decarbonization
A detailed listing of the decarbonization indicators including year and source can be found in the
attached excel document on the indicators for the Brown to Green Report 2018.
Suggested improvements:
• This section will stay largely untouched. It is possible that depending on data availability some
tweaks are made to the indicator selection. The presentation or arrangement of the selected
indicators may also be changed in minor ways.
• Use a zero-carbon benchmark
• Include decarbonisation indicators related to agriculture and land use
Data sources: CAT, CCPI, IEA, PRIMAP, Worldbank, Enerdata (?)
iii. G20 Publication Agora Verkehrswende
The report “Towards Decarbonizing Transport – A G20 Stocktake on Sectoral Ambition” can be
downloaded here.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [24] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [25] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
DISCUSSION POINTS
Zero-carbon and new renewables energy sources
William Wills
• I agree with the three pillars solution (fossils, sustainable RE, zero-carbon). However, we
should find a more diplomatic name for “sustainable RE”. -> “new renewables”.
Gabriel Blanco
• Can biofuel/biomass be classified as sustainable energy or not? How do we define large
hydro?
Jan Burck
• Traditional biomass is excluded from the zero-carbon figure.
• There is no database for large hydro alone.
• We have to decide whether to include hydro and new biomass in new renewables.
William Wills
• How does ENERDATA deal with the biomass issue? Jan Burck: They do differentiate
between traditional and non-traditional biomass, but this does not display the amount of
sustainable biomass.
Gabriel Blanco
• In Argentina, there is data available for single dams. So, the differentiation between large
and small hydro is possible. We could also use the definition of large hydro of the CDM
Executive Board.
Fabby Tumiwa
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [26] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• There are varying definitions according to the countries. E.g. in Indonesia, data does not
differentiate between the different types of hydro and is defined rather broadly.
• How does ENERDATA handles the separation of hydro and the rest of RE? Jan Burck: They
display it in the same way as IEA, so no separation.
Jorge Villarreal
• After the energy reform in Mexico, “hydro” is not separated into large, middle, micro
anymore.
Sectoral decarbonization indicators
Alexander Jung
• It would be valuable to distinguish between freight and passenger transport. Jan Burck:
IEA distinguishes between the two transport types so, ENERDATA probably does that too.
Charlene Watson
• The sectors that are used in decarbonisation section are different sectors than the ones
that are shown in the emissions section. This is a change of narrative.
• Presenting coal and renewables next to each other might be a presentational problem as
they use different scales.
• Regarding the forest sector, the cover compared to 1990 is not very meaningful by itself. It
would be beneficial to include carbon density by hectare of forest cover.
Jan Burck
• The emissions graph is taken from CAT. We will make some suggestions concerning the
section split (emissions and decarbonisation). Moreover, by putting the two sections
(emissions and decarbonisation) together, some elements can be dropped because they
are doubled, and information becomes redundant.
• Regarding the forest sector, for some countries, the country profiles need to be specialized
more on forests even though forest data is often very inaccurate. Brazil and some other
countries have got data though.
William Wills
• I am not sure whether 1990 is fitting for a baseline for the forest coverage. The size of the
forest in comparison to the size of the country should be considered.
• The agriculture emissions intensity (livestock, grain etc.) could be shown in a pie chart – or
domestic consumption and export) could be tackled.
Swati Agawal
• We could consider the national plans for forestry.
Bert Metz
• The comparison of the indicators with the Paris benchmark instead of the G20 average
could be helpful. For emissions, this comparison is done normally.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [27] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Gerd Leipold
• From the 2016 to the 2017 report, we shifted from CO2 emissions to GHG emissions. Thus,
we lost the Paris compatible benchmark. Would it be possible to reintroduce this
benchmark by using ENERDATA information?
Niklas Höhne
• It will be checked what data is available and then, Jan will make a design proposal for the
emissions graph (thereby discussing the sectoral split of emissions).
A few partners met during the break and suggest the inclusion of the following indicators on
forestry and agriculture:
Share of coal/renewables and energy use per capita
William Wills
• Regarding the share of coal, there is a certain inconsistency: In the graph, it is compared to
the G20 average whereas in the rating, it is compared to Paris compatibility.
Jan Burck
• There must have been a misunderstanding: the ratings are based on country comparisons,
not on Paris compatibility.
William Wills
• Countries with very high share of weather-depended RE might need to build some fossil
fuels, which results in a bad rating in the trend.
Andrew Marquard
• So, Climate Transparency chooses what countries should do in order to reach
decarbonisation. There are also other country-specific ways that are not mirrored by the
graph. So, there is a tension between the overarching global view of what countries are
doing and how they should perform and the national perspective. The Paris agreement
Sector New indicator Database Comments
Forest • Hectars/year deforested
• (hectars/year deforested)/hectar of forest
FAO “State of the World’s Forests”
• Country specific drivers (differentiation between agriculture and deforestation)
• Take trends into consideration
Agriculture • emissions/ capita from consumption
• emissions/ capita from production
CAT • To be researched
• Take trends into consideration
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [28] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
allows countries to decide their own pathways. There is no easy solution, but it is an issue
to look at.
Swati Agarwal
• Most of the developing countries would be rated “brown” if the starting point is not
defined well. This could have a de-motivational effect.
Jorge Villarreal
• What is still missing in the country profiles is a policy assessment/context (How to provide
a comprehensive view of what is really happening in the countries). He raises the question
whether Climate Transparency can add policy assessments/context as an additional
document part of the Brown to Green Report Package that countries can distribute with
the country profile.
Niklas Clement
• Which elements should we show in the coal and fossil fuel graph without overloading it?
Jan Burck
• Probably, only the G20 average for fossil fuel will be displayed. The ratings need to be
revisited.
Andrew Marquard
• We could include fossil fuel production as an indicator as it could be useful to add the
supply side.
• The RE graph could be shown as a bar graph which shows sustainable RE and large hydro
separately.
• We should check which indicators in the decarbonization section are relevant for which
country.
William Wills
• The energy use CCPI rating has the same problem, it is unfair for developing countries
where energy use is increasing for developmental reasons.
Andrew Marquard
• For developing countries, a certain amount of energy use is necessary in order to reach a
good HDI rating. TPES is a misleading indicator because it does not show anything about
decarbonisation efforts. There are differences in winter heating need depending on the
weather conditions of the respective country or the energy intensity of the economy (e.g.
Australia that specializes in energy intensive industries). So, looking at the primary energy
use is not benefitting at all.
Bert Metz
• It might be helpful to include emissions on a “consumption base” not only on a “supply
base”.
Franziska Marten
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [29] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Energy use per capita is included to portray the energy efficiency on a macro basis. Energy
use is therefore completed by energy intensity indicators. This is part of a more holistic
picture of the CCPI.
Andrew Marquard
• Primary energy is not a good measure for energy efficiency as countries can e.g. simply
switch to renewables and improve their performance without increasing their efficiency.
AGREEMENTS
• Germanwatch and NewClimate Institute will consider all arguments raised and come up with a new list of indicators to be discussed.
• Emissions and decarbonization sections will be shown together (not separated as in last year’s report).
Zero-carbon and new renewable energy sources
• Display of fossil fuels, new renewables and zero carbon technologies side by side.
o CCPI evaluation for new RE, simplified rating for fossils and zero-carbon (same as coal rating last year)
• Attempt to distinguish between sustainable and non-sustainable biomass.
• Review if possible to differentiate between large and small hydro.
Sectoral indicators
• Include new indicators on the forest and agriculture sectors.
• Differentiate between freight and passenger transport.
• Rate countries against G20 average and/or against Paris compatibility.
Share of coal/renewables and energy use per capita
• Energy use and intensity indicators will only be displayed with current level, trend arrow and rating.
• Explore how to balance the trend rating esp. in developing countries.
In general, partners could add policy assessments to give more background information to the country scorecards.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [30] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
5. Indicators: Just transition Andrew Marquard, Energy Research Center (ERC), South Africa, gave a presentation and lead the
discussions on the possibility to develop just transition indicators for the 2018 Brown to Green Report.
Why indicators on just transition?
• The fossil fuels industry (plus other emissions-generating industries) are still the basis for the
global energy industry (and others).
• Millions of livelihoods are tied to it almost everywhere – a rapid transition would lead to
massive job losses in these sectors (even if there is no net job losses / the green economy
creates more jobs).
• This is a major concern for unions / governments, so a just transition is a priority because:
o Equity / fairness – rapid shifts out of fossil fuels will lead to sever economic impacts of
some often-marginal communities.
o strategic – accommodating the concerns of unions and governments etc. re the just
transition will facilitate more rapid retirement of fossil fuel infrastructure.
Approaches
• Lots of experience based on where transitions out of coal have taken place previously (not
necessarily for climate reasons)
• Just transition is a topic in the UNFCCC process:
o Response measures are discussed for more or less a decade
o It is built into the preamble of the Paris Agreement
• Aspects:
o Procedural / process – existence of policies, programmes, national/regional/local
processes, budget allocation
o Substantive – programmes on a firm/local/regional/national level
• Broad vs narrow focus – either on specific instances / firms or a broader development-based
strategy.
Key issues/questions/complexities
• What makes a transition ‘just’? What is the scope of assessment?
• How to differentiate already existing policies (social welfare, industrial policy, existing mine
closures) from ‘just transition’ policies?
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [31] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• How to measure/identify policies given the large differences in political cultures? (for example,
social safety nets for retrenched workers in social democratic contexts vs other contexts with
more/less state involvement?).
• Content vs process (procedural vs substantive).
• Who is counted? Workers, communities, asset holders, state-owned enterprises as needing
transition support?
• Only a transition from fossil fuels or more broadly (for instance, deforestation-related
industries/sectors)?
Inclusion in the Brown to Green Report – ideas
1. Option: A single indicator in the “climate policy performance” section, under the “policy
evaluation” subsection, which rates countries on the extent to which they have “just
transition” policies in place.
2. Option: A new, stand-alone section of the report (i.e. half a page or more) devoted to the
just transition, which contained a more detailed set of semi-structured information on just
transition policies, programmes and issues in each G20 country, which could include the
following, which would also require some of the issues above to be clarified:
a. Does the just transition form part of the national climate policy framework?
b. Are there dedicated just transition programmes, with allocated budgets?
c. Are there national / regional / local just transition processes in place or planned?
d. Are there any useful case studies? (national/regional/local) worth reporting on?
3. Option: A new-stand-alone section of the report which would address not only just
transition issues but also developmental / social issues surrounding the transition to a low-
carbon economy
Could also include figures on employment etc. – jobs vulnerability to decarbonization
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [32] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
DISCUSSION POINTS
Andrzej Ancygier
• The lost jobs have to be compensated by other jobs. This is worse for some regions where there is nothing else. We have to unpack just transition.
Gerd Leipold
• We have to be careful that we do not identify job losses with climate change. In most cases, job losses are due to changes in technology and economy.
Jorge Villarreal
• I agree. We should not only speak about jobs, but also about social inclusion and poverty
eradication. In Mexico, policies on renewables have to enable social
inclusion/participation.
• We could look for example at energy poverty indicators (1/3 of households in Mexico live
in energy poverty).
Fabby Tumiwa
• We could start with a simple indicator: Number of people working in the coal sector/fossil
fuel sector, look at contribution of the sector to GDP. Indonesia is worried that revenues
are getting lost from coal sector.
Jesse Burton
• We could do this, but the problem is that that the share of jobs in the fossil fuel sector is
not so high in many countries. However, governments are afraid to destroy whole
communities.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [33] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis
• We have to put things into perspective, also number of green jobs created by IRENA
sounds not much.
• In Argentina there are no specific policies on just transition, we should look at policies in
general including just transition elements.
Hannah Schindler
• We could also consider fiscal policies. Often an argument against carbon pricing is that it
has adverse social effects, but one could look at how revenues for carbon pricing are
redistributed for developmental concerns (e.g. health, education) by the government.
Similarly, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can include just transition elements – e.g. in
Indonesia there is a compensation for poor households.
Leah Worrall
• ODI has a report based on OECD data that shows revenue distribution.
William Wills
• I agree with Jorge that maybe including social and development concerns would be best
way.
• We should also look at job mobility among sectors and among regions of the world.
Bert Metz
• Getting to a single indicator at this point of time seems difficult. We could start with
qualitative discussion, maybe there is not a good story to tell for all G20 countries, for
partners it might be doable, if agreement is reached what to cover.
• In the UNEP Gap report 2017 there is a chapter on coal phase out for main coal countries,
this material could be used.
• Third option is most difficult one, to do it well would be very demanding, I would suggest
doing a more limited version, e.g. second option.
Gerd Leipold
• The suggested typology (graph) might reinforce argument that job losses are due to
climate change
AGREEMENTS
• The just transition working group led by Andrew Marquard will provide a first draft of indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-July.
• If there are international data sets with comparable data on just transition, these will be included for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where Climate Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.
• The working group will continue to operate throughout the year for next year’s report.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [34] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
6. Impacting the debate – national and international communication Hannah Schindler, Secretariat of Climate Transparency, provided input on Climate Transparency’s
communication strategy including target groups, channels and lessons learnt from last year. Ragnhild
Pieper, Global Strategic Communication Council (GSCC), introduced their work and shared advice on
media work when launching an international report.
i. Input Climate Transparency communication
Target audiences
1. Stakeholders involved in the national climate policy process (NDC revision, development of
long-term strategies etc.)
a. Environment ministries, energy ministries, finance ministries and other involved
ministries
b. Think tanks and experts
c. NGOs
d. Finance and business sector
e. Media
2. Climate Negotiators
3. G20 policy-makers, stakeholders and finance experts
f. G20 sherpas and their team
g. Ministries involved in the preparation of the G20 process (eg. Finance and
economy ministries of G20 countries)
h. T20 (group of think tanks), B20 (group of business leaders)
and C20 (group of civil society)
i. Actors from civil society, the academic world and media that report on the G20
process (finance media and big daily newspapers)
Channels of communication
1. Media work
• International and national (county specific) press releases
• Journalist briefings
• Aim 2018: 600 media articles worldwide
Improvements in 2018
• Approach media a month before G20 Summit and COP24
• Closer collaboration with communication partners, e.g. World Bank, internationally
• Strengthening communication efforts nationally
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [35] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Reach out to finance/economic media and big daily newspapers
• Explore specific press release on finance
2. Online communication
• Launch webinar: Webcasting it in social media like Twitter, Youtube.
• Social media: Twitter and facebook posts by all partners on launch of report and other
national IKI activities
• Website: All knowledge products will be published on Climate Transparency website and
partner websites
Improvements in 2018
• Conduct online launch both for experts and journalists
• Increased social media awareness not only at time of report launch
• Strategy to align partner communication (e.g. retweeting by partners)
• New elements such as videos and infographics
3. Direct communication
• Workshops on policy papers with peer comparisons
• Personal briefing meetings with key stakeholders
• Personal letters/mails to key stakeholders
Improvements in 2018
• Workshops focus on specific sub topic of Brown to Green report relevant to the national
debate
• Workshop and briefing meetings address key stakeholders outside the climate community
(e.g. G20 Sherpa staff, finance ministries)
• Developing of target group specific briefing documents that select relevant data and
messages of the report
Communicators
• All Climate Transparency partners (national releases)
• International Secretariat of Climate Transparency (international release)
• Global Strategic Communication Council (support in some G20 countries)
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [36] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• World Bank
• ClimateWorks
Launch of the report
Suggested launch day 5 November (report finalized mid-October)
• Suggestion to have one international webinar for experts and one for journalists on 5 Nov.
• International launch is at same time as Argentinian launch/press briefing (e.g. 11 am in Buenos
Aires, 4 pm Berlin)
• Press briefings and launch events in China, Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South
Africa are ideally at the same day or a day after depending on time differences
• A video with main international messages for national launchs will be provided
ii. Input GSCC media work – lessons learned
Spread across eighteen countries and six continents, the GSCC is a network of expert political
communicators with the common objective of leveraging the action required to steer the world to a
low-carbon pathway.
GSCC communicators in G20 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, The Republic of Korea, Russia, UK, USA
How GSCC works
• The GSCC functions like an unbranded strategic communications consultancy
• Amplifies ideas and research of supported partners
• ‘Plays the spaces’ – to add to the work of others and not duplicate it
• Making sure that journalists in each geography and internationally are aware of the latest
stories and reports that confirm the need for a low-carbon transition or provide solutions on
how to accelerate this transition
• Direct pitches to journalists, organising and disseminating op-eds, setting up media briefings
and editorial board meetings, identifying, mobilizing and amplifying new voices that are
missing from the debate
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [37] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Best practice: Launch of the Lancet Countdown
• Broad range of communications materials
• Sending whole media package under embargo 5 days before the launch with nationally
tailored pitches
• Mobilisation of national spokespeople and external voices from diverse sectors supporting and
validating the report findings (op-eds, tweets etc.), e.g. Patricia Espinosa, Christina Figurers
Brown to Green Report 2017 – Lessons learned on media work
1. Messaging
• Start early to condense diverse and complex findings into compelling messages
• Punchy, less balanced PR and quotes
• League tables / country rankings
• Embed narrative in ongoing policy context
• Highlight relevance of the report for the international climate process
2. Materials
• New (or latest) country specific data
• Translations of key findings/executive summary
• Streamline PR (key findings)
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [38] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Q&A, talking points and media training for spokespeople
• Work with key influencers & opinion formers, get strong voices to validate report
3. Organisation & Timing
• Share complete and final materials early
• Facilitate early contact between Climate Transparency partners and GSCC desks, set
up joint conference call(s) and a platform to share documents
• Earlier publication due to high competition for media coverage in the week of the
G20 summit (and COP24!) Keep drumbeat until G20 and COP24.
• Online media launch (in 2 time zones with different speakers) with recording to share
DISCUSSION POINTS
The participants split up in three groups to discuss the date and format of the launch of the report this year:
Group 1:
• 1st or 2nd week of November would be good – Tuesday Wednesday, Thursday better than Monday or Friday for media and events
• A decentralized strategy is needed to allow for different entry points.
• Think about tying the launch to any other meetings/events
Group 2:
• Partners agree with a launch at the beginning of November (e.g. in Mexico this will be a good timing to address the new administration)
• The World Bank Annual Meetings convening the finance ministers will take place on 12 October in Indonesia. If the Indonesian government is pushing for a short slot to present part (e.g. finance section) of the Brown to Green report, this would be a great opportunity.
Group 3:
• The teaser campaign could already start in September (e.g. a lot of good opportunities in India) and a two pager on the report would be valuable for that.
• The launch date of 5 November is not suitable for India (holiday) and thus the second week of November would be preferred.
• We should aim for a decentralized launch offering opportunities for several different launch dates following central global media launch in countries (allowing country partners to define perfect hooks).
Messaging of report
Charlene Watson
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [39] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• The media might interpret the findings of the 1.5 IPCC report as very negative. It may be
good to send out a positive story afterwards. We could respond to this report, that
probably will speak about the urgency of action.
Ragnhild Pieper
• I agree. It is good to send positive message afterwards.
Bert Metz
• Aligned with the message of the IPCC report, we could show that countries are not doing what they have promised to do.
Gerd Leipold
• With 2017 data, we can show positive change over last years, that will not be included in the IPCC report.
Jan Burck
• Recent trends in emissions are unfortunately not positive at the moment.
Andrew Marquard
• There are a lot of things happening in terms of policy development and green finance, report shows this and we have to build on this. We could draw up positive examples of each countries, not in terms of actual emission outcomes, but policies.
AGREEMENTS
• Report will be finalized mid-October and launched 1st/2nd week of November, ideally in all countries at the same time/day.
• Create a summary of the country data as new frontpage of the country profiles.
• An option could be to create a positive messaging with good policy examples of different countries to counterbalance the 1.5 IPPC report media messages.
• The Secretariat will put all country partners in touch with the GSCC expert in their country at beginning of June so that partners can start to develop national communication strategies.
• The Secretariat will form a communication working group together with GSCC and partners.
• Explore common COP event with UNEP Gap Report hosted by Indonesia. Fabby will need a concept note by June.
• Explore early presentation at World Bank Annual meetings.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [40] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
7. Governance of Climate Transparency The main purpose of the session was to review the governance of Climate Transparency as adopted
during the Partners and Strategy Meeting in 2017.
Sebastian Wegner, Secretariat Climate Transparency, presented the existing governance structure.
i. Climate Transparency as an Open Partnership
• Is open to new partners
• Does not advocate specific policies beyond a commitment to speed up the transition to a low-
carbon economy (however, it does not limit partners in advocating policies)
• Is committed to a scientific approach (incl. being transparent about results and how they were
arrived at)
• Seeks to provide an international service for coordination, collection and provision of relevant
data of climate action and strives for ownership of content and communication of partners in
G20 countries.
• Invites for a partnership on an equal footing for content as well as communication
contributions; the last one also based on preferences, capacities and available resources
• Enlists the cooperation of partner institutions; the responsibility for the reports of Climate
Transparency lies with the contributing expert authors
Objectives of the governance structure are:
• Equal representation of all partners
• Fair and geographically diverse representation
• Fast and effective decision making
• Trust between the partners
ii. Partners and observers
Partners
• make substantive contributions to the analysis and communication of information based on
receiving funding through Climate Transparency (typically through Secretariat).
• take part in the decision making
Climate Transparency strives for a geographical balance of partners
Observers
• contribute to the discussions, the content and the communication of Climate Transparency,
but do not receive funding through the Secretariat of Climate Transparency.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [41] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• are not part of the decision making but invited to express views and opinions on specific issues.
Climate Transparency strives for a wide network of Observers. Funders are invited to join the group of
Observers.
iii. Considerations and criteria for new partners
Considerations for new partners (as agreed in Steering Group Call #2 2017):
• Active contribution: Partners are actively development of the Brown to Green Report and/or
its outreach activities.
• Expertise: Partners have a relevant expertise for the development of the Brown to Green
Report (e.g. mitigation, adaptation, finance) and/or outreach activities (e.g. communication,
policy analysis)
• Geographical distribution: Climate Transparency strives for a diverse geographical distribution
of partners.
• Multi-functional perspective: Climate Transparency strives for the integration of perspectives
from all relevant stakeholders within the partnership. Governments and intergovernmental
organisations are invited to contribute as observers.
• Ability to influence debate: Partners have a high standing and well-established networks to
crucial target groups of Climate Transparency to be able to influence the debate in their
country contributing to the or their sphere (e.g. finance world).
Criteria for new partners (as agreed in Steering Group Call #2 2017):
1. Needed expertise: The new Partner adds specific expertise needed in the further development
of the report and its outreach activities (e.g. adaptation, finance).
2. Additional G20 countries: The new partner is preferably located in a G20 country that is not
represented yet in the current partnership.
3. Adding to the multi-functional perspective: The new partner widens the stakeholder
perspective of the partnership, while at the same time is open to the development of a credible
comparable assessment.
4. Own funding: The new partner has preferably own or additional funds or is willing to raise the
latter to become part of Climate Transparency.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [42] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
iv. The four bodies
The co-chairs
The Steering Group
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [43] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
The Secretariat
The Working Groups
The current working groups are:
1. Adaptation: Lead – Swati Agarwal
2. Just Transition: Lead – Andrew Marquard
3. Report: Lead – Jan Burck
4. Communication: Lead – Gerd Leipold
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [44] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
DISCUSSION POINTS
• It was discussed which role governments should take. Most of the participants were in favor of not having governments as Observers unless they were funders. Nevertheless, participants were strongly in favor of engaging with governments to discuss the Brown to Green Report.
It was explained that NewClimate Institute wished to step down from its role as one of the organisations serving as international Secretariat of Climate Transparency. It was underlined, that this is mainly concerning the production of the Brown to Green Report. This role will be taken by Germanwatch again (they were responsible for the production of the first report in 2015). This change will not have an impact on NewClimate Institute’s engagement as Partner of Climate Transparency.
AGREEMENTS
• No changes to the governance structure were agreed except:
o Keep separation between Partners and Observers and delete requirement to receive funding through the Secretariat to bring own funding
o Government cannot be Observers, unless they are funders
o Secretariat Germanwatch & HVGP endorsed
o “Criteria” and “Considerations” for new Partners will be merged (proposal will be made by Secretariat and presented to the Steering Group in one of the next Calls)
• The governance structure will be reviewed in 2019.
v. Summary of activities and financials 2017
Main activities:
• Brown to Green Report 2017 with improved indicator set by 13 organizations
• International launch webinar and national launch events in 5 G20 countries
• Brown to Green Forum in Berlin
• Finance Workshop in London and Finance paper
• International media work and national media work in 8 G20 countries
• Personal briefings and letters to high level government representatives
→ Ca. 500 media articles
→ Direct communication with ca. 400 key stakeholders
→ 17,542 website visits in launch month
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [45] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
DISCUSSION POINTS
none
AGREEMENTS
• Overview of budget 2018 will be made available to the Steering Group as soon as it is available.
Election of Co-Chairs
The following election procedure was used:
• Nominations:
Nominations should be send till 20.00 CEST, Friday, 20 April 2018 to info@climate-
transparency.org
• Presentation of candidates:
Candidates can present themselves at the beginning of the Governance session of the
Strategy and Partners Meeting – candidates not present can be presented by their
nominator. Nominees need to have agreed to serve as Chair before election.
• Eligible to vote
The Partners of Climate Transparency are eligible to vote for the Co-Chairs.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [46] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• At present the following organisations are Partners:
Centro Clima, Climate Analytics, ERC, ERI, FARN, Germanwatch, HVGP, IDDRI, IESR, Initiativa
Climatica de Mexico, NewClimate Institute, ODI, TERI
• Election:
Election by simple majority. If requested a secret ballot will be hold.
• Each partner has two votes: Centro Clima, Climate Analytics, ERC, ERI, FARN, Germanwatch,
HVGP, IDDRI, IESR, Initiativa Climatica de Mexico, NewClimate Institute, ODI, TERI
• The two candidates with most votes will serve as co-chairs 2018-2020
• Simple majority needs to be satisfied
DISCUSSION POINTS
The only nominations received by the Secretariat were Alvaro Umaña and Peter Eigen.
AGREEMENTS
• The Co-Chairs Alvaro Umaña and Peter Eigen unanimously were re-elected for a 2-year term (next election in 2020).
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [47] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
8. Indicators: Financing the transition Charlene Watson and Leah Worrall, Overseas Development Institute, UK, and Hannah Schindler,
Secretariat of Climate Transparency presented a proposal for a new narrative and related indicator set
for the section “financing the transition” in the 2018 Brown to Green Report. Clément Métivier,
Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE), France, introduced their newly published figures on carbon
pricing revenues in 2017.
Narrative
The finance narrative will be shaped around two core premises:
To shift from brown to green finance, G20 governments, central banks and financial authorities
have at their disposal tools from three categories: 1) financial policies and regulations, 2) fiscal
policy levers and 3) public finance. A transition requires the application of a combination of
tools in each category. Together, these sets of tools support increased private green finance
(see Figure 1). The finance chapter of the Brown to Green Report will be structured according
to these three categories, with indicators measuring country performance in each category.
While there has been progress worldwide in mobilising green finance, current brown (or high
carbon, climate-risk inducing) finance substantially outweighs the green. The focus of
transitioning to a low carbon, climate-resilient economy must be on shifting away from brown
finance and not only on mobilising further green finance. The indicators are, as far as possible,
intending to capture both brown and green finance.
Figure 1: How governments can shape the transition from brown to green finance
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [48] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Overview of suggested indicators 2018
2 Dependent on additional funds 3 Not contacted yet, dependent on additional funds
Indicator Source New indicator
Research needed2
Potential data provider for (new) indicators3
Financial policy and regulation
1. Narrative of policies for greening the financial system and (re)directing finance (country sheets only)
Desk research and studies by UNEP Inquiry, ECF etc.
x x UNEP Inquiry, ECF, I4CE
2. Investment attractiveness for renewable energy RECAI 2018
Fiscal policy levers
3. Effective carbon rates OECD 2017; 2018
4. Carbon revenues World Bank x x World Bank, I4CE
5. Fossil fuel subsides OECD 2017 and IEA 2017
Public finance
6. Brown and green public energy finance OCI, 2017 x OCI
7. International public finance provision (Multilateral climate funds and bilateral finance)
OECD, 2017; CFU, 2017; UNFCCC, 2017
x x UNFCCC, ODI, OECD
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [49] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Proposed indicators to remove in 2018
• Green bonds outstanding per country as a percentage of the overall debt securities market
for that country
• Emissions of new investments in the power sector
• Pledge to the Green Climate Fund
• Future international climate finance commitments
i. Financial policy and regulation
Checklist
1. Overall national finance strategy
2. Disclosure policies of climate-related information
✓ Corporations
✓ Asset owners and asset managers
3. Policies (re)directing finance
✓ Support of development of green bond markets
✓ Climate-related credit policies and lending requirements for banks
✓ Climate-related investment requirements of public funds and development finance
institutions
Investment attractiveness for RE
Indicator Description Data Challenges
Investment
attractiveness
for renewable
energy
Depiction of the two indices to show which
countries rank high/low according to both.
Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness
Index (RECAI)
Macro indicators (e.g. economic stability),
energy needs (e.g. security and supply),
enabling environment, project delivery (e.g.
infrastructure), and technology potential
RECAI, Ernst & Young,
2018
(Allianz 2018 not
available in the
report period)
RECAI ranks 40
countries not G20
focussed
Various criteria
looked at here rather
belong to the
“Climate policy
performance” chapter
of the Brown to
Green report
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [50] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
ii. Fiscal policies
Fossil fuel subsidies
Indicator Description Data Challenges
Fossil fuel
subsidies
Fossil fuel subsidies
that currently act as
a ‘negative carbon
price’ by continuing
to support specific
sectors and uses of
fossil fuels.
Fossil fuel subsidies (including
tax breaks and budgetary
support) from the latest OECD
subsidy inventory (OECD 2016
data updated in 2017).
Figures could be expressed as
an absolute amount and relative
to the G20 average
To have a complete data set
for G20 countries OECD and
IEA data need to be
combined, making
comparison more difficult as
OECD and IEA use different
methodologies for the
transport sector.
Fossil fuel subsidies (USD millions) 2016 data: OECD inventory (on production and consumption subsidies) does
not contain data for Argentina and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, numbers for these are based on the from the IEA
database, which uses a different methodology for calculating subsidies, called the ‘price-gap’ approach
(accounting only for consumption subsidies) (e.g. comparing the price of energy to a ‘reference’ price that takes
into account the full costs)
Carbon revenues
Indicator Description Data Challenges
Carbon revenues
The revenues generated by
carbon prices presented in
absolute value and compared
to the G20 average.
I4CE It is not comprehensive, e.g. it doesn’t
capture or compare against fossil fuel
revenues.
There is no layer that explores the
earmarking, or not, of these revenues.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [51] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Global Carbon Account 2018: https://www.i4ce.org/download/global-carbon-account-2018/
Effective carbon rates
Indicator Description Data Challenges
Effective carbon
rates
The total carbon price
applying to CO2
emissions from energy
use (carbon price,
other taxes and price of
tradeable emission
permits).
OECD data on
effective carbon
rates (OECD,
2017/8)
It does not provide an understanding of the
actual effectiveness of carbon pricing on the
ground.
Not all sector emissions are covered and the
effective carbon rate does not take into
account support measures for fossil fuel use
that may affect energy prices, and which also
act as a negative carbon price.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [52] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
iii. Public finance
Green and brown public finance for energy
Indicator Description Data Challenges
Green versus
brown public
energy finance
Government support for
energy projects via public
finance institutions (national
development banks and other
development finance
institutions, overseas aid
agencies, export credit
agencies and key multilateral
development banks)
‘Brown’ refers to fossil fuel
energy projects, including coal,
oil, gas and fossil fuel-based
power generation/
transmission.
‘Green’ refers to clean energy
projects, such as solar, wind,
tidal and geothermal.
The data is from
Oil Change
International
(OCI, 2017).
Data is available
for the years
2013-2016.
The indicator is focussed on energy
infrastructure and omits other
infrastructure, transport, agriculture
(and resilience).
Nuclear and large hydro (>10MW)
projects are classified as a third ‘grey’
category in the OCI database (given
their overall environmental impact is
not as straightforward as projects
classified as green).
There is double counting with
international provision of mitigation
finance as both measure MDB
spending (particularly green).
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [53] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
International provision of finance
Indicator Description Data Challenges
International
public finance
provision
Captures the absolute amount
and theme (adaptation,
mitigation and cross-cutting)
of:
- Contributions
through the major
multilateral climate
funds
- Bilateral climate
finance contributions
Presented as an absolute
amount and compared to a
G20 developed country
average and a G20 developing
country average
OECD
Development
Assistance
Committee
Creditor
Reporting
System (OECD
DAC CRS, 2017),
Climate Funds
Update, UNFCCC
It does not consider the ’brown’
spending in bilateral aid or MDB
spending and may have overlaps with
the net public finance for energy
projects indicator.
Attributing MDB spending to
countries is politically sensitive.
DISCUSSION POINTS
Financial policy and regulation.
Checklist. Discussion points raised include:
• Whether to include development-related strategy with climate implications, as well as more direct climate strategy.
• The need for country nuance, e.g. in the presence of banking regulations to promote sustainable finance in Indonesia, but it not being mandatory until 2020, and the need to isolate the quality, enforcement and timelines of country regulations.
• Need to reduce any overlap with existing policy section.
• Need to balance the need to avoid ‘new research’ in line with the Climate Transparency strategy.
• Possible approach: approach ECF to see if there is an indicator on disclosure we can use followed by two paragraph narrative in each country sheet written by partners where possible and others where not.
Investment attractiveness for RE. Discussion points raised include:
• Allianz data is not going to be updated in time to meet our report deadline.
• RECAI is also not necessarily comprehensive, as countries are included depending on rating (e.g. Indonesia’s latest data is for early 2016).
• RECAI indicators are developed by Ernst & Young are not transparent and should be avoided (i.e. a E&Y study in Mexico was funded by the steel industry and argued that RE are not competitive).
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [54] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Fiscal policies
Fossil fuel subsidies. Discussion points raised include:
• Different methodologies are adopted by IEA and OECD. This can result in e.g. IEA-methodology overestimations in developing countries reliant on consumption subsidies. However, most recent evidence suggests consumption subsidies can be just as high in developed country.
• Argentina is not included in the OECD database, but FARN is releasing data in the coming weeks and we can use this to supplement the (production) data in the country profile.
• In Argentina, fossil fuel consumption subsidies are a socially sensitive issue and country nuances, such as this, can be represented in the country profiles.
• Where using GDP pro rata, use PPP, which will be fairer and may produce different results. Another alternative is to present it in per capita terms and to also use a G20 average.
• Another option is to present the data per tonne of emissions, alongside carbon revenues but not clear if this can be achieved given complexity of emissions.
• At the country level, there is a need to demonstrate timeline trends in fossil fuel subsidies.
• There is a need to recognise the different tax approaches in different regions (e.g. lower energy taxation in the US than the EU), which will affect calculations of tax breaks. Include this with the figure or in a footnote.
• Use the qualitative information in country studies to address political sensitivities.
Carbon revenues. Discussion points raised include:
• Useful to show what is included in carbon taxation, e.g. Mexico and Argentina exclude gas taxation (where gas will be the major power source in the coming years).
• The I4CE data includes information on which fuel types and which sectors are included. It includes only explicit carbon pricing schemes (i.e. carbon taxes and emission trading schemes), but excludes implicit carbon pricing mechanisms (e.g. taxation on fuels).
• Implicit carbon pricing approaches are equally important, e.g. India prices electricity efficiency to promote renewable energy and is working to convert that into an effective carbon rate.
• Possible overlap with effective carbon rates that includes implicit and explicit carbon pricing.
Effective carbon rates. Discussion points raised include:
• There is a need to compare the I4CE methodology on carbon revenues with the OECD methodology on effective carbon rates, as there is potential overlap here.
• See the recent Stern and Stiglitz paper on required carbon pricing as a benchmark taking into account country differences.
• The data was last updated in 2012 and the country landscapes have changed significantly since then. But the data should still be included. Note: the OECD will be releasing some new data this year (in 2018) and we are seeking clarification on when.
• As noted in the fossil fuel subsidies discussion: one option is to present the fossil fuel subsidies data per tonne of emissions, alongside carbon revenues, to determine ‘net’ positive and negative carbon rates.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [55] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Public finance
Green and brown public finance for energy. Discussion points raised include:
• The Oil Change International (OCI – Talk is Cheap) dataset was updated in July 2017. It includes small hydropower (<10 MW) and large hydropower (>10 MW).
• The Argentina estimate is too low, which may be due to tenders and projects in development that are only partially publicly funded.
• The Mexico estimate is also too low, given significant spending on fossil fuel generation.
• The Indonesia estimate is also seemingly too low.
• Argentina and Mexico partners can support with data gathering for Argentina and Mexico, where transparency on public finance may be particularly low. This might also apply to Russia and Turkey. (Note: share the Argentina and Mexico OCI data with partners for feedback.)
• The OCI database excludes transport financing and international private finance for power, as well as pension funds.
• There is a need to explore whether MDB data is included, e.g. where they provide loans that governments will need to pay back.
• Cross-check the OCI data with ClimateScope data on renewable energy investments.
• There is a need to circulate information on which public finance institutions are covered by the OCI dataset.
International provision of finance. Discussion points raised include:
• There is a need to benchmark climate finance contributions and not present by GDP.
• Exclude the ‘blank page’ in the country studies and instead use for the development of the country narrative, e.g. the climate finance needs in developing countries, and e.g. GCF funding to Mexico would help to scale up RE deployment. (Note: this will need to be checked with the designer).
• There is a need to adopt strict definitions on bilateral climate finance, e.g. Japan classifies certain super-critical coal-fired power plants as climate financing.
• Note that multilateral climate financing captures only financing into multilateral funds.
• There is a need for a strong disclaimer on what is included in the UNFCCC Secretariat data.
• The UNFCCC update with 2015-2016 data will exist at the end of May but not clear when it will be published, seeking clarity.
• Development bank financing will be missing from this picture and so we seek to understand if we can get at this through the OECD.
General discussion. Discussion points raised include:
• The need to link more closely to the NDCs, as well as ‘financing needs for NDCs’ (though the latter may only be available for few countries e.g. India and South Africa)
• Should the scope be increased to look more closely at private financing. Data is available for other private finance indicators, but this has been excluded due to strategic focus on G20 country governments. Estimates are available to capture private financing (e.g. OECD, IMF) but they diverge significantly.
• Problematic inclusion of green bonds data, e.g. doesn’t distinguish between sovereign and non-sovereign bonds, and types of bonds, as well as differing data availability across countries. (Note: the UNFCCC biannual assessment and Climate Policy Initiative’s climate finance landscape do not include green bonds).
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [56] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Carbon disclosure is important, e.g. countries reporting on issuance of green bonds.
• Emissions of new investments in the power sector could be included in the decarbonization section. But, IDDRI is not updating the (2016) data used in the 2017 B2G report. Note: to circulate the methodology to the consortium for feedback.
• Treatment of China and other countries that provide international public finance.
• There is a need to talk about timelines for the finance section (e.g. final indicators by mid-June, possibility of organising a workshop/webinar on financing in next few months).
• Focus on the international datasets, then supplement this data with additional country-level data.
AGREEMENTS
• Checklist. Investigate what is possible, including data availability from ECF, the UNEP enquiry and Green Action Tracker, followed by two paragraph narrative in each country sheet written by partners.
• Investment attractiveness of RE. Make a decision to include RECAI as Allianz not available but give space in country sheets to highlight any discrepancies.
• Fossil fuel subsidies. Figure should show absolute values (broken down by production and consumption). Country partners to provide feedback on the data, as well as guidance on relevant timeframes for showing trends.
• Carbon revenues. Review I4CE data and methodology, and as with other indicators include the G20 average benchmark. Present in absolute values on the same scale as FFS.
• Effective carbon rates. Review the OECD methodological approach, as well as treatment of implicit carbon pricing and sectoral (emissions). Check with the OECD on data updates and Stern and Stiglitz outputs for benchmarks.
• Green and brown public finance for energy. Obtain OCI data for G20 countries and present green and brown data (domestic and international), with the G20 average benchmark. Circulate list of public finance institutions covered by the database, caveat in country sheets.
• International provision of finance. Request access to the UNFCCC international public provision dataset, seek better understanding of the MDB data we can extract from the OECD DAC CRS. Propose the alternative sheet in the developing country sheets that can help the country narrative around international public finance.
• Circulate the method for the removed indicator on emissions of new investments in the power sector, noting that we have no updated data this year and NewClimate found method challenges.
Additional note: it will be problematic to present fossil fuel subsidies and carbon revenues per tonne of emissions. This is a result of various methodological obstacles: the fossil fuel subsidy data is for 2016, whilst the carbon revenues data is for 2017; emissions data, by sector, is not readily available for years 2016 and 2017 (e.g. WRI’s CAIT database where the latest data is for 2014); determining the relative weighting of sectors on a country-by-country basis is problematic; fossil fuel subsidies can be highly targeted (e.g. support can be limited to public buses/taxis/etc.) and this financing cannot be generalised to entire sectors (e.g. the transport sector as a whole); etc.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [57] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
9. IKI policy papers with peer comparisons Hannah Schindler, Secretariat of Climate Transparency, introduced the concept of the policy papers
with peer comparisons. Partners established two working groups and conducted a first working session
within the groups to coordinate their work this year.
IKI policy papers with peer comparisons
• Centro Clima, ERC, ERI, FARN, ICM, IESR and TERI develop each one policy paper with peer
comparisons in 2018 (new paper in 2019)
• Establishing groups of e.g. 2-4 partners/countries with regional and/or thematic comparison
(spotlight on one topic of B2G report)
• Criteria for policy paper:
o Paper should move forward national debate
o Inclusion of data/graph(s) from B2G report plus qualitative analysis of context and
policies
o Focus on country comparisons and peer learning through good-practice examples
o One work product per group which will be published in each partner’s country of the
group tailored to the national context and with country-specific messages on first page
(ca. 10 pages, depending on question and number of group members)
• Review and data support by NewClimate, Germanwatch, ODI and HVGP
DISCUSSION POINTS
Group 1: Energy transition (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico)
• Jorge will coordinate the work of the group.
• The paper will address: 1) Technical economic component: State of the art of RE,
economic barriers (stranded assets and fossil fuel subsidies) and 2) Social and politics
component: corruption, weak democracy etc. that influence how electricity/energy
systems are working.
• Brazil might focus on economic aspects, while Argentina and Mexico might focus on social
aspects.
• Group plans to work on the paper during the next four months.
Group 2: Coal phase out (China, Indonesia, India (?), South Africa)
• A group coordinator is yet to be determined.
• The paper will compare the different contexts of the countries, policy options to phase out
coal and their implications (just transition).
• A specific angle is yet to be discussed.
• The group will have its first call on 22 May at 10 am CET.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [58] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
• Andrew and Swati will meet in Bonn to discuss possibility of an additional, third, policy
paper working group comparing financial aspects (e.g. fossil fuel subsidies) in South Africa
and India. Swati has the feeling that work on coal in India would not have an additional
value as there are already a lot of coal phase out studies.
AGREEMENTS
• The following policy paper working groups have been established: 1) Energy transition (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), 2) Coal phase out (China, India (?), Indonesia, South Africa) and 3) Subsidies/finance (India & South Africa (?) – tbd)
• The group coordinator will coordinate regular phone calls of the groups.
• The groups report on their work in every Steering Group Call.
• The groups will present a time line of their work in the Steering Group Call on June 7.
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [59] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
C. Annex – Participant list
Name Organisation
Swati Agarwal The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI)
Andrzej Ancygier Climate Analytics
Gabriel Blanco Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN)
Jan Burck Germanwatch
Jesse Burton Energy Research Centre (ERC)
Jasmin Cantzler Climate Analytics
Cyril Cassisa Enerdata
Niklas Clement Germanwatch
Holger Dalkmann Agora Verkehrswende
Sarah D'haen Climate Analytics
Peter Eigen HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform
Eduardo Ferreira World Bank
Carolin Grasi Germanwatch
Niklas Höhne NewClimate Institute
Alexander Jung Agora Verkehrswende
Jiang Kejun Energy Research Institute (ERI)
Gerd Leipold HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform
Andrew Marquard Energy Research Centre (ERC)
Franziska Marten Germanwatch
Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis
Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN)
Surabi Menon ClimateWorks Foundation
Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [60] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org
Clément Métivier I4CE Institute for Climate Economics
Bert Metz European Climate Foundation
Yesi Mariyam Nasrul Institute for Essential Service Reform (IESR)
Anne Olhoff Technical University of Denmark
Ragnhild Pieper Global Strategic Communication Council
Hannah Schindler HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform
Fabby Tumiwa Institute for Essential Service Reform (IESR)
Jorge Villarreal Padilla Iniciativa Climatica de Mexico (ICM)
Charlene Watson Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Sebastian Wegner HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform
William Wills CentroClima
Leah Worrall Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Luis Zamarioli Climate Analytics
Aleksandra Zebrowska HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform