Strategic Strategic Extremism: Extremism:

Why Republicans and Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Democrats Divide on

Religious ValueReligious ValueEd Glaeser, Giacomo Ed Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto,Ponzetto,

Jesse ShapiroJesse Shapiro

Social Science Social Science MotivationMotivation

Psychology and Markets– If people are Psychology and Markets– If people are so strongly shaped by framing, so strongly shaped by framing, situation and social influence, then the situation and social influence, then the supply of these things is critical.supply of these things is critical.

This means that embedding This means that embedding psychology into markets is critical– a psychology into markets is critical– a long term agenda.long term agenda.

Politics is a natural place for this (after Politics is a natural place for this (after all voting itself is pretty “irrational”). all voting itself is pretty “irrational”).

Politics and HatredPolitics and Hatred

In past work I have focused on the political In past work I have focused on the political roots of group-level hatred: anti-roots of group-level hatred: anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, anti-Black Americanism, anti-Semitism, anti-Black hatred in the South.hatred in the South.

Central lesson is that hatred is always built Central lesson is that hatred is always built with stories of past and future crimes of the with stories of past and future crimes of the object in question, but political divisions object in question, but political divisions create the incentives to build hatred with create the incentives to build hatred with these stories.these stories.

But what ensures different political divisions. But what ensures different political divisions.

What we mean by What we mean by extremismextremism

We say that parties are extreme when We say that parties are extreme when their stated policies diverge from those their stated policies diverge from those favored by the median voterfavored by the median voter

If the two parties differ on something, If the two parties differ on something, then at least one of them must be then at least one of them must be “extreme”“extreme”

Extremism does not mean passing a Extremism does not mean passing a value judgment on their policiesvalue judgment on their policies

Extremism also is not about polarization Extremism also is not about polarization of the electorate (we agree with Fiorina of the electorate (we agree with Fiorina on this)on this)

A Starting Point: Extremism A Starting Point: Extremism ExistsExists

““We stand proudly for the right of every We stand proudly for the right of every woman to choose, consistent with Roe v. Wade, woman to choose, consistent with Roe v. Wade, and regardless of her ability to pay.” (DNC and regardless of her ability to pay.” (DNC platform, 2004) platform, 2004)

““...The unborn child has a fundamental ...The unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We support a human life amendment infringed. We support a human life amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to unborn Amendment’s protections apply to unborn children.” (RNC Platform, 2004) children.” (RNC Platform, 2004)

• • Controlling for constituents’ tastes, Controlling for constituents’ tastes, Republicans implement different policies than Republicans implement different policies than Democrats (Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2004).Democrats (Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2004).

Much of American Much of American extremism is about values, extremism is about values,

not economicsnot economics ““Under John Kerry and John Edwards, 99 Under John Kerry and John Edwards, 99

percent of American businesses will pay less in percent of American businesses will pay less in taxes than they do today.” (DNC Platform, taxes than they do today.” (DNC Platform, 2004) 2004)

““Small business .... deserve far better treatment Small business .... deserve far better treatment from government than they have received. We from government than they have received. We will provide it through many of the initiatives will provide it through many of the initiatives explained elsewhere in this platform: lower tax explained elsewhere in this platform: lower tax rates, ending the death tax, cutting through red rates, ending the death tax, cutting through red tape...” (RNC Platform, 2004) tape...” (RNC Platform, 2004)

In foreign policy as well, both candidates In foreign policy as well, both candidates espouse strong defence and essentially espouse strong defence and essentially continuing current policies.continuing current policies.

As a result, religion As a result, religion predicts voting habits as predicts voting habits as

much as income much as income 40 percent of people who never attend 40 percent of people who never attend

religious services vote Republican; more than religious services vote Republican; more than 70 percent of people who attend daily vote 70 percent of people who attend daily vote republican. republican.

The impact of income is also large, but The impact of income is also large, but mostly at the extremes. Within the middle of mostly at the extremes. Within the middle of the distribution, there is little link between the distribution, there is little link between income and Republicanism. income and Republicanism.

Across states, there is a remarkable negative Across states, there is a remarkable negative connection between per capita income and connection between per capita income and voting Republican in 2004.voting Republican in 2004.

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

never a few times a year a few times a month once a week or more

How often attend religious services

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

under $30,000 $30,000-$74,999 $75,000-$149,999 $150,000 or more

Total family income in 2003

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0-16 percentile 17-33 percentile 34-67 percentile 68-95 percentile 96-100 percentile

Income category

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Never / no religiouspreference

A few times a year Once or tw ice a month Almost every w eek Every w eek

Religious attendance category

Wyoming

Wisconsin

West Virginia

Washington

Virginia

Vermont

Utah

Texas

Tennessee

South Dakota

South Carolina

Rhode Island

PennsylvaniaOregon

Oklahoma

Ohio

North Dakota

North Carolina

New York

New Mexico

New J ersey

New HampshireNevada

Nebraska

Montana

Missouri

Mississippi

MinnesotaMichigan

Massachusetts

Maryland

Maine

Louisiana

KentuckyKansas

Iowa

Indiana

Illinois

Idaho

Hawaii

Georgia

Florida

Delaware

Connecticut

Colorado

California

Arkansas Arizona

Alaska

Alabama

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

0.55

0.6

0.65

0.7

9000 11000 13000 15000 17000 19000 21000

Per capita income in state, 1989

Religious attendance and Religious attendance and voting habits are becoming voting habits are becoming

more correlated more correlated Using probits to predict voting Using probits to predict voting

Republican in the last election, and Republican in the last election, and excluding independents, the impact of excluding independents, the impact of attending once per month or more has attending once per month or more has risen from almost nothing in 1976 to 17 risen from almost nothing in 1976 to 17 percent today. percent today.

The impact of log of income is relatively The impact of log of income is relatively flat over the same time period, rising flat over the same time period, rising slightly between 1968 and 1980 and slightly between 1968 and 1980 and declining slightly between 1980 and declining slightly between 1980 and today.today.

0.0000

0.0200

0.0400

0.0600

0.0800

0.1000

0.1200

0.1400

0.1600

0.1800

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Year

log(income)

church attendance

Our Core QuestionsOur Core Questions

Why is there extremism at all? Why Why is there extremism at all? Why don’t policies converge to those of the don’t policies converge to those of the median voter?median voter?

What determines when parties diverge What determines when parties diverge on economic issues and when parties on economic issues and when parties diverge on social or religious issues?diverge on social or religious issues?

What explains the rising connection What explains the rising connection between religion and Republicanism? between religion and Republicanism?

Breaking the Median Voter Breaking the Median Voter TheoremTheorem

Median voter result (Hotelling, 1929): Median voter result (Hotelling, 1929): politicians move to the center to politicians move to the center to maximize votes maximize votes

In multi-party systems with proportional In multi-party systems with proportional representation, this result does not hold representation, this result does not hold (Cox, 1990) so extremism outside the (Cox, 1990) so extremism outside the U.S. is less of a puzzle.U.S. is less of a puzzle.

The median voter result does not need to The median voter result does not need to hold with multiple issues, but most of hold with multiple issues, but most of these models suggest a multiplicity of these models suggest a multiplicity of equilibria.equilibria.

Breaking the Median Voter Breaking the Median Voter Result in Majoritarian Result in Majoritarian

Systems with One IssueSystems with One Issue The preferences of politicians (Calvert, The preferences of politicians (Calvert,

Alesina)Alesina) The preferences of elites (Fiorina)The preferences of elites (Fiorina) The primary system which provides a two-The primary system which provides a two-

stage process where the first stage favors stage process where the first stage favors insidersinsiders

There is clearly much truth to all of these There is clearly much truth to all of these theories– but we saw extremism before theories– but we saw extremism before primaries were important and history primaries were important and history supports the view that differentiation was supports the view that differentiation was strategic.strategic.

Preferences vs. StrategyPreferences vs. Strategy

One test of whether extremism reflects One test of whether extremism reflects preferences or vote-getting strategy is preferences or vote-getting strategy is to look at rhetoric vs. ex post policies.to look at rhetoric vs. ex post policies.

If extremism reflects strategy then If extremism reflects strategy then rhetoric should be heated, but policy rhetoric should be heated, but policy differences muteddifferences muted

If extremism reflects preferences then If extremism reflects preferences then rhetoric should be muted, but policy rhetoric should be muted, but policy differences extreme. differences extreme.

Rhetoric vs. RealityRhetoric vs. Reality

In economy policy, reality is more extreme In economy policy, reality is more extreme than rhetoric than rhetoric Little difference in platform language Little difference in platform language But income taxes are 11.2 % of GDP under But income taxes are 11.2 % of GDP under

Democratic president, and 10.0% under Republican Democratic president, and 10.0% under Republican president (t-statistic>4)president (t-statistic>4)

In abortion, rhetoric is more extreme than In abortion, rhetoric is more extreme than realityreality Massive differences in stated (platform) positions Massive differences in stated (platform) positions But 313 abortions per 1000 live births under But 313 abortions per 1000 live births under

Democrats vs. 294 under Republicans (t-statistic<1)Democrats vs. 294 under Republicans (t-statistic<1)

Table 1: Party effects on Table 1: Party effects on policy outcomes, 1970-2000policy outcomes, 1970-2000

(1) (2) White House Abortions per 1000 Income tax as % party live births of GDP

Democrat 312.7 11.22 (n=12) (11.08) (0.2149)

Republican 294.4 10.04 (n=19) (20.81) (0.1285)

Difference 17.25 1.175 (n=31) (23.58) (0.2504)

And another problem with And another problem with preference based theoriespreference based theories

Even if these theories are right, they Even if these theories are right, they give us little ability to explain changes give us little ability to explain changes in extremism over time and spacein extremism over time and space

After all, where do those preferences After all, where do those preferences come from? come from?

One virtue of the strategic extremism One virtue of the strategic extremism view is that it will provide predictions view is that it will provide predictions about when we should see extremism about when we should see extremism and on what topic.and on what topic.

The Two Ingredients for The Two Ingredients for Strategic ExtremismStrategic Extremism

A second margin– voter turnout or A second margin– voter turnout or donations (Downs, 1957)donations (Downs, 1957) Without the second margin, moving Without the second margin, moving

away from the center will always lose away from the center will always lose you votes. you votes.

An asymmetry between your An asymmetry between your supporters and your opponentssupporters and your opponents Without this asymmetry, going extreme Without this asymmetry, going extreme

makes as many enemies as friendsmakes as many enemies as friends

Past Literature on this Past Literature on this QuestionQuestion

Hinich and Ordeshook (1969) evaluate a model Hinich and Ordeshook (1969) evaluate a model with abstention, and find that “if abstentions with abstention, and find that “if abstentions are permitted, if they are assumed to be caused are permitted, if they are assumed to be caused by alienation, and if the density of preferences by alienation, and if the density of preferences is symmetric and unimodal, the mean remains is symmetric and unimodal, the mean remains the dominant strategy.” the dominant strategy.”

Or put another way (Riker, 1973) “if the Or put another way (Riker, 1973) “if the sensitivity of turnout is sufficiently high, if [the sensitivity of turnout is sufficiently high, if [the preference distribution] is bimodal, if citizens preference distribution] is bimodal, if citizens abstain because of alienation and if utility abstain because of alienation and if utility functions are symmetric, then the candidates functions are symmetric, then the candidates adopt divergent strategies.” adopt divergent strategies.”

Voter Turnout and Voter Turnout and ExtremismExtremism

Voters don’t show up if the parties are Voters don’t show up if the parties are too similar and as such, differentiation too similar and as such, differentiation induces the party faithful to show up. induces the party faithful to show up.

Karl Rove is alleged to know this. Karl Rove is alleged to know this. ““But with the prospect of low But with the prospect of low

turnouts, it is the most motivated–and turnouts, it is the most motivated–and militant–elements at the edges of the militant–elements at the edges of the ideological spectrum who will receive ideological spectrum who will receive the most attention.” (David Broder, the most attention.” (David Broder, 1997; cited in Fiorina, 1999). 1997; cited in Fiorina, 1999).

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Strong Democrat Not very strongDemocrat

Independent, closeto Democrat

Independent(Neither, Noresponse)

Independent, closeto Republican

Not very strongRepublican

Strong Republican

Party identification

Evolution of voter turnout: 1960-2000

0.45

0.47

0.49

0.51

0.53

0.55

0.57

0.59

0.61

0.63

0.65

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Election year

-0.01

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

Never Less thanonce a year

About once ortw ice a year

Several timesa year

About once amonth

2-3 times amonth

Nearly everyw eek

Every w eek Several timesa w eek

Frequency of church attendance

Voter Turnout and Religion: Voter Turnout and Religion:

2000-20042000-2004 Non-Battleground (in 2000) states with Non-Battleground (in 2000) states with

less than 50 percent of the population less than 50 percent of the population attending church monthly have turnout attending church monthly have turnout increase from 56.6% to 61.3% increase from 56.6% to 61.3%

Non-Battleground states with more than Non-Battleground states with more than 50 percent of the population attending 50 percent of the population attending church monthly goes from 53.4 % to 60.1 church monthly goes from 53.4 % to 60.1 % %

Difference-in-difference estimate is Difference-in-difference estimate is significant and is 6.7% vs. 4.7% (one significant and is 6.7% vs. 4.7% (one standard deviation)standard deviation)

Information Asymmetry and Information Asymmetry and Extremism: The ModelExtremism: The Model

Voters have different preferences for a Voters have different preferences for a single policy– right to left.single policy– right to left.

Voters also have costs of voting which Voters also have costs of voting which differ in the population.differ in the population.

The benefit from voting is a function of The benefit from voting is a function of the policies stated by the politicians. the policies stated by the politicians.

Most simply, it is a function of the Most simply, it is a function of the difference of policies between difference of policies between politicians. politicians.

Politicians and PoliciesPoliticians and Policies

Politicians try to maximize their Politicians try to maximize their votes minus their opponents votes. votes minus their opponents votes.

The only thing that politicians do is The only thing that politicians do is choose policies. choose policies.

These policies are heard by both These policies are heard by both political affiliates and non-affiliatespolitical affiliates and non-affiliates

But political affiliates hear them But political affiliates hear them more often.more often.

Voting and PoliciesVoting and Policies

Then people vote– people who have heard Then people vote– people who have heard the policies base voting on what they the policies base voting on what they have heard.have heard.

People who haven’t heard base voting on People who haven’t heard base voting on what they believe (which is correct in this what they believe (which is correct in this model).model).

People who have more extreme views will People who have more extreme views will vote more often. vote more often.

Politicians will still differentiate even if, in Politicians will still differentiate even if, in equilibrium, everyone views are right. equilibrium, everyone views are right.

Results in One Results in One DimensionDimension

A party with some affiliates will adopt a A party with some affiliates will adopt a platform that coincides with the position of platform that coincides with the position of the median voter if and only if there is no the median voter if and only if there is no informational difference between affiliates informational difference between affiliates and non-affiliates or there is no differences and non-affiliates or there is no differences between the ideal policies of the average between the ideal policies of the average affiliate and the average voter. affiliate and the average voter.

If party affiliates are on average better If party affiliates are on average better informed about the party platform and more informed about the party platform and more conservative than non-affiliates, the party will conservative than non-affiliates, the party will adopt a right-wing platform. adopt a right-wing platform.

How Conservative a How Conservative a PlatformPlatform

The degree of extremism increases in the The degree of extremism increases in the informational asymmetry between informational asymmetry between affiliates and non-affiliatesaffiliates and non-affiliates

Extremism increases with the number of Extremism increases with the number of party affiliates (holding their bias party affiliates (holding their bias constant)constant)

Extremism increases with the bias of party Extremism increases with the bias of party affiliates (holding their number constant)affiliates (holding their number constant)

More results on More results on extremismextremism

If right-wing party affiliates include all If right-wing party affiliates include all citizens whose preferences are beyond citizens whose preferences are beyond a point and no others, then extremism is a point and no others, then extremism is increasing in the heterogeneity of increasing in the heterogeneity of voters’ preferences (measured by the voters’ preferences (measured by the mean deviation of their distribution). mean deviation of their distribution).

If there is a group of people who always If there is a group of people who always vote, then the amount of extremism vote, then the amount of extremism declines with the size of this group. declines with the size of this group.

An Alternative ModelAn Alternative Model Riker and Ordeshook: if people don’t care Riker and Ordeshook: if people don’t care

about the difference between policies, but about the difference between policies, but rather they really care about the policy of rather they really care about the policy of their candidate and not about the other, then their candidate and not about the other, then extremism happens as well if preferences are extremism happens as well if preferences are not unimodalnot unimodal

But this doesn’t seem true (anti-Bush But this doesn’t seem true (anti-Bush sentiment in the last election)sentiment in the last election)

And preferences are not unimodel (Fiorina)And preferences are not unimodel (Fiorina) It also predicts that moderates will vote more It also predicts that moderates will vote more

than extremists when politicians are moderate than extremists when politicians are moderate (untrue). (untrue).

Two DimensionsTwo Dimensions

Now imagine that politicians have Now imagine that politicians have policies along two dimensions: religion policies along two dimensions: religion and economics.and economics.

Voting is determined by costs of voting Voting is determined by costs of voting and preferences. People with extreme and preferences. People with extreme preferences vote more than people with preferences vote more than people with moderate preferences along either moderate preferences along either dimension. dimension.

This will provide the incentive to go to This will provide the incentive to go to extremes. extremes.

Core ResultsCore Results

Multiple Equilibria will often exist.Multiple Equilibria will often exist. A party with a positive measure of A party with a positive measure of

affiliates will adopt a platform that affiliates will adopt a platform that coincides with the position of the median coincides with the position of the median voter if and only if there is no voter if and only if there is no informational difference between informational difference between affiliates and non-affiliates or if there is affiliates and non-affiliates or if there is no difference between the ideal policies no difference between the ideal policies of the average affiliate and the average of the average affiliate and the average voter along either policy dimension. voter along either policy dimension.

More results in two More results in two dimensionsdimensions

If party affiliates are on average better If party affiliates are on average better informed about the party platform and informed about the party platform and more conservative than non-affiliates more conservative than non-affiliates along both dimensions, then the party along both dimensions, then the party will choose a platform that is right-wing will choose a platform that is right-wing along both dimension. along both dimension.

The party’s extremism along either The party’s extremism along either dimension increases with informational dimension increases with informational asymmetry (think about new asymmetry (think about new technologies).technologies).

Two Dimensions, Two Dimensions, ContinuedContinued

Extremism will increase as the Extremism will increase as the number of party affiliates increases number of party affiliates increases (keeping their average ideal policy (keeping their average ideal policy constant), or their average constant), or their average conservatism increases (keeping conservatism increases (keeping their number constant).their number constant).

But what forms the number and But what forms the number and nature of affiliates (more on that nature of affiliates (more on that later). later).

On what issue will On what issue will parties divide? parties divide?

The party platform will be more extreme The party platform will be more extreme on the issue where the average on the issue where the average preference of affiliates is more different preference of affiliates is more different from the median-voter position.from the median-voter position.

If all voters for whom t + a > 0 are party If all voters for whom t + a > 0 are party affiliates, then a monotonic increase in affiliates, then a monotonic increase in the heterogeneity of voters’ preferences the heterogeneity of voters’ preferences on one issue increases extremism on on one issue increases extremism on that issue and reduces it on the other. that issue and reduces it on the other.

Preference Heterogeneity Preference Heterogeneity and Extremismand Extremism

One potential reason for increasing One potential reason for increasing political divisions over religion is political divisions over religion is that heterogeneity of religious that heterogeneity of religious beliefs has risen (but what about beliefs has risen (but what about Fiorina on Culture Wars).Fiorina on Culture Wars).

But what about increasing economic But what about increasing economic inequality within the U.S.?inequality within the U.S.?

Understanding party Understanding party affiliation: Exogenous social affiliation: Exogenous social

groups groups Previously, we took affiliation as given, Previously, we took affiliation as given,

now we try to understand it.now we try to understand it. In the paper, we allow voters to choose In the paper, we allow voters to choose

affiliations. affiliations. In this section we assume that there In this section we assume that there

are pre-existing social groups (defined are pre-existing social groups (defined along one of two policy dimensions) along one of two policy dimensions) and assume that each group is and assume that each group is allocated to one party.allocated to one party.

This might come from a bidding war. This might come from a bidding war.

Exogenous social groups, Exogenous social groups, continued continued

We refer to the group defined on We refer to the group defined on attribute a (religion oriented attribute a (religion oriented policies) as the church and the policies) as the church and the group defined on attribute t (the group defined on attribute t (the economic attribute) as the union. economic attribute) as the union.

If the union is defined by economics If the union is defined by economics and the church by social valuesand the church by social values

And if one party has the church and And if one party has the church and the other the union thenthe other the union then

Results with ExogenousResults with Exogenous Social Groups Social Groups

The party with the union will be extreme on The party with the union will be extreme on economics, and moderate on social issueseconomics, and moderate on social issues

The party with the church will be extreme The party with the church will be extreme on social issues and moderate on economicson social issues and moderate on economics

The church party extremism is maximized The church party extremism is maximized for some size of the church that is less for some size of the church that is less than .5 (.4-.5)than .5 (.4-.5)

The amount of extremism is non-monotonic The amount of extremism is non-monotonic in group size.in group size.

The Intuition of that The Intuition of that ResultResult

If no one is in the group, then there is no If no one is in the group, then there is no incentive to cater to that group.incentive to cater to that group.

If everyone is in the group, then the ability to If everyone is in the group, then the ability to speak privately to that group also has no speak privately to that group also has no impact.impact.

The group matters most when it is The group matters most when it is intermediate in size.intermediate in size.

This doesn’t mean that as religion declines, This doesn’t mean that as religion declines, parties will generally become more religious.parties will generally become more religious.

But it does suggest that religious divides will But it does suggest that religious divides will be bigger.be bigger.

Political polarization across countries: Democracies

Venezuela

United States

Ukraine

Turkey

Switzerland

Sweden

Spain

South Africa Norway

Lithuania

LatviaJ apan

India

GermanyFinland

Estonia

Colombia AustraliaArmenia

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25

Eff ect of income on right-wing orientation

Religion and politics around the world

Bosnia And Herzegovina

Croatia

MontenegroColombia

Bangladesh

Dominican Republic

Azerbaijan

Armenia

GeorgiaMoldova

Philippines

Ghana

Uruguay

Venezuela Peru

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Turkey

Taiwan

Bulgaria

Slovenia

India

Belarus

Chile

Nigeria

BrazilPuerto Rico

Switzerland

Poland

Korea, Rep.

Finland

Argentina

SwedenNorway

Australia South Africa

Mexico

J apan

United States

Spain

Germany

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Share attending at least monthly

Diffe

renc

e in

right

-win

g or

ienta

tion

betw

een

mon

thly

and

non-

mon

thly

atte

nder

s

Religiosity and politics: Democracies

ArmeniaAustralia Colombia

Estonia

FinlandGermany

India

J apan Latvia

Lithuania

Norway

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

Ukraine

United States

Venezuela

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8

Share attending church at least once per month

United States

United Kingdom

Switzerland

SwedenSpain

Portugal

NorwayNetherlands

J apan

Italy

Germany

France

Finland

DenmarkCanada

Belgium

Austria

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Trade union density, 1994

Table 2: Cross-country Table 2: Cross-country determinants of right-wing determinants of right-wing

orientation orientation Dependent variable: Respondent's identification with the political right (standardized) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Importance of God 0.1639 in life (standardized) (0.0149)

Importance of God × 0.7965 0.7748 0.8321 0.5876 1.1488 Share monthly (0.1933) (0.3305) (0.1761) (0.1722) (0.3028)

Importance of God × -0.8876 -0.8138 -0.7673 -0.5921 -1.5635 (Share monthly)² (0.2140) (0.4103) (0.1923) (0.1941) (0.3255)

Importance of God × 1.3176 SD(religious beliefs) (0.4395)

Importance of God × 0.0364 SD(social liberalism) (0.0077)

Imp. of God × wave? NO YES YES YES YES YES

Imp. of God × country?

NO NO NO NO NO YES

Share monthly that 0.4487 0.4760 0.5423 0.4961 0.3674 maximizes extremism (0.0228) (0.0579) (0.0537) (0.0386) (0.0549)

Sample All All Democracies

All All All

N 111883 111883 67813 109930 110122 111883

Table 3: Cross-country Table 3: Cross-country determinants of right-wing determinants of right-wing

party preference party preference Dependent variable: Respondent's preferred party is right-wing (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Importance of God 0.0637 in life (standardized) (0.0082)

Importance of God × 0.4073 0.4306 0.2653 0.9780 Share monthly (0.1328) (0.1255) (0.1158) (0.1747)

Importance of God × -0.4774 -0.4071 -0.2709 -1.0868 (Share monthly)² (0.1453) (0.1415) (0.1301) (0.1515)

Importance of God × 0.6913 SD(religious beliefs) (0.3111)

Importance of God × 0.0250 SD(social liberalism) (0.0040)

Imp. of God × wave? NO YES YES YES YES

Imp. of God × country? NO NO NO NO YES

Share monthly attendance 0.4266 0.5288 0.4896 0.4500 that maximizes extremism (0.0309) (0.0747) (0.0536) (0.0369)

N 86904 86904 85971 85348 86904

Cross-country resultsCross-country results

Robust to controlling for basic Robust to controlling for basic country characteristicscountry characteristics

Robust to country fixed effectsRobust to country fixed effects Robust to controls for heterogeneity Robust to controls for heterogeneity

in preferencesin preferences Reliably significant. Reliably significant.

Religiosity and politics: US states

Wisconsin

Washington

VirginiaTexas

Tennessee

South Dakota

South Carolina

Pennsylvania

Oregon

Oklahoma

Ohio

New York

North Carolina

Mississippi

Missouri

Minnesota

Michigan

Louisiana

Indiana

Illinois

Iowa

Georgia

Florida

Colorado

California

Arizona

AlabamaAlaska

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7

Percent monthly churchgoers

Table 4: Church attendance Table 4: Church attendance and the role of religion in and the role of religion in

voting (GSS)voting (GSS)Dependent variable: Did respondent vote for Republican candidate in last presidential election? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Attend church at least once a 0.0999 month (0.0127)

Share in state-election attending 0.3196 0.1780 0.2116 0.4173 at least once a month (0.0480) (0.1194) (0.1772) (0.1326)

Attend at least once a month × -0.4214 -0.2698 -0.2279 Share attending monthly (0.1169) (0.1393) (0.2087)

Attend at least once a month × 0.5804 SD(religious beliefs) (0.2552)

Church attendance frequency × -0.0799 Share attending monthly (0.0215)

Attend monthly × election? NO YES YES YES YES

Attend monthly × state? NO NO NO YES NO

N 16641 16641 16066 16641 16641

Table 5: Church attendance Table 5: Church attendance and the role of religion in and the role of religion in

voting (NES)voting (NES)Dependent variable: Did respondent vote for Republican candidate in last presidential election? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Attend church at least once a 0.1237 month (0.0115)

Share in state-election attending 0.4829 0.4112 0.5026 0.6890 at least once a month (0.1383) (0.1598) (0.1426) (0.1911)

Attend at least once a month × -0.3419 -0.2841 -0.3820 Share attending monthly (0.1464) (0.1336) (0.1756)

Attend at least once a month × 0.7506 SD(religious beliefs) (0.4381)

Church attendance frequency × -0.1303 Share attending monthly (0.0508)

Attend monthly × election? NO YES YES YES YES

Attend monthly × state? NO NO NO YES NO

N 8882 8882 7046 8882 8882

Table 6: Explaining time Table 6: Explaining time trends in the determinants trends in the determinants

of votingof voting

(1) (2) (3) Election Share attending Effect of monthly attendance year church monthly on voting Republican Estimated Predicted

1972 50.9% 0.0909 0.0909

2000 47.2% 0.1231 0.1068

Change -3.8% 0.0322 0.0159

Cross-State ResultsCross-State Results

Robust to basic state chacteristicsRobust to basic state chacteristics Robust to state fixed effects using Robust to state fixed effects using

NES (loses significance with the NES (loses significance with the GSS)GSS)

Robust to controls for heterogeneity Robust to controls for heterogeneity of opinion about religion or politics of opinion about religion or politics

The Increase in The Increase in Religious ExtremismReligious Extremism

Using cross-state estimates of the Using cross-state estimates of the connection between religiosity and connection between religiosity and extremismextremism

The decline in attendance between The decline in attendance between 1968 and today can explain about ½ 1968 and today can explain about ½ of the increase in the connection of the increase in the connection between religiosity and between religiosity and Republicanism over the same period. Republicanism over the same period.