statutory construction part4

8/12/2019 Statutory Construction Part4

1/66


2/66

- A statute must be capable of construction orinterpretation. Otherwise, said statute is

inoperative.

- The court must use every authorized means toascertain the intent of the statute and give itan intelligible meaning.


3/66

Where there is no ambiguity in the words ofthe statute, there is no room for

construction.

Where the law is clear and unambiguous, itmust be taken to mean exactly what is saysand the court has no choice but to see to itthat its mandate be obeyed.


4/66

- A condition sine qua non, before the courtmay construe or interpret a statute, is that

there be doubt or ambiguity in its language.

- The court may not construe or interpret astatute that is clear and free from doubt.

- A statute that is clear and unambiguous is notsusceptible of interpretation or construction.


5/66

- Where the law speaks in clear and categoricallanguage, there is no room for interpretation.

There is only room for application.


6/66

- A condition of admitting two or moremeanings, of being understood in more than

one way, or referring to two or more things atthe same time.


7/66

- A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible ofmore than one interpretation.

- As a result of such ambiguity, doubt is createdas to what the statute means or as towhether it applies to a given situation.

- Construction is the means by which the courtclarifies the doubt to arrive at the true intentof the law.


8/66

- Where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous,the court is warranted in availing itself of all

legitimate aids to construction in order that itcan ascertain the true intent of the statute.


9/66

1.) Intrinsic Aids those which are found in theprinted pages of the statute itself.

2.) Extrinsic Aids - Those extraneous facts andcircumstances outside the printed page ofthe statute itself.


10/66

- Those which may be found in the printed pageof the statute itself.

- Refers to the basic parts of the statutes whichserves as basic guide and aids the court inorder to arrive at the true meaning of thestatute by determining legislative intent.


11/66

- Are those extraneous facts and circumstancesfound outside the printed page of the statute.


12/66


13/66

- Whether to adhere to the language of thestatute or to depart from the same.


14/66


15/66

- Enunciates the adherence to the language ofthe statute itself.

- Otherwise known as the PlainMeaning Rule


16/66

- As a general rule, the intent of the legislatureto be ascertained and thereafter given effect

is the intent expressed in the language of thestatute.

- If a statute is clear, plain and free fromambiguity, it must be given its literal meaningand applied without attemptedinterpretation.


17/66

- When the words and phrases of a statute areclear and unequivocal, their meaning must be

determined from the language employed andthe statute must be taken to mean exactlywhat it says.

- Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget orwhen the language of the law is clear, noexplanation of it is required.


18/66

- The fundamental rule is that legislative intentmust be determined from the language of the

statute itself and must be adhered to eventhough the court is convinced by extraneouscircumstances that the legislature intendedto enact something very different from whatthat which it did enact.


19/66

- To depart from the meaning expressed by thewords of the statute is to alter the same, to

legislate and not to interpret.

- Maledicta est expositio quae corrumpittextum or it is dangerous construction whichis against the text.


20/66

- Such adherence to the language of theStatute is in keeping with the principle of dura

lex sed lex or the law may be harsh but it isstill the law and the principle of hoc quidemperquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta estor itis exceedingly hard but so the law is written.


21/66

- Language is rarely so free from ambiguity asto be incapable of being used in more than

one sense.

- What the legislature had actually in mind isnot sometimes accurately reflected in thelanguage of a statute and its literalinterpretation may render it meaningless,lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.


22/66

- Thus, when this happens resort is had to theprinciple that the spirit of the law controls its

letter.


23/66


24/66

- Interpretation according to the intent or spiritof the law

- Enunciates a departure from the language ofthe statute.


25/66

- The spirit or intention of a statute prevails overthe letter thereof. A thing which is within theintention of the statute is as much within the

statute as if it were within the letter, and a thingwhich is within the letter of the statute is notwithin the statute unless it be within theintention of the lawmaker, and the statute

should be so construed to effectuate its intent orpurpose, advance the remedy and suppress themischief contemplated by the framers.


26/66

- The literal import or meaning of a statutemust yield to its apparent intent, purpose or

spirit.

- Verba intentioni, non e contra debent inservireor words ought to be more subservient to theintent and not the intent to the words.


27/66


28/66

- The key to open the door to what thelegislature intended which is vaguely

expressed in the language of a statute is itspurpose or the reason which induced it toenact the statute.

- If the statue needs construction, the mostdominant in that process is the purpose ofthe act.


29/66

- Statutes should be construed in the light ofthe object to be achieved and the evil or

mischief to be suppressed and they should begiven construction as will advance the object,suppress the mischief and secure the benefitsintended.


30/66

- Where a provision or section of a statute admitsof more than one construction, that constructionwhich gives effect to the evident purpose sought

to be attained by the enactment of the statutemust be followed.

- Courts therefore should not follow the letter of astatute when to do so would depart from thetrue intent of the legislature or would otherwiseyield conclusions inconsistent with the purposeof the act.


31/66

When the reason of the law ceases, the lawitself ceases

- The reason which induced the legislature toenact a law is the heart of the law. As aconsequence, the cessation of the law or itsnullification renders it inoperative.


32/66

- When the reason of the law ceases, the lawitself ceases.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex

ratio legis est animaor the reason of the lawis its soul. Thus, a lifeless law is a dead law.


33/66


34/66

- Courts are not to give a statute meaning thatwould lead to absurdities.

- Consideration: Congress could not haveintended absurd interpretation of the law.


35/66

- If the words of a statute are susceptible of morethan one meaning, the absurdity of the result ofone construction is a strong argument against

the adoption and in favor of such sensibleconstruction as will avoid such result.

Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda estut evitetur inconveniens et absurdumor wherethere is ambiguity, such interpretation as willavoid inconvenience and absurdity is to beadopted.


36/66

- Statutes must be construed in such a way asto give effect to the intention of the

legislature, and so as to give a sensiblemeaning to the language of the statute andthus avoid nonsensical or absurd results,departing to the extent unavoidable from the

literal language of the statute.


37/66


38/66

Presumption: The legislature, in enacting alaw, did not intend to work a hardship or anoppressive result, a possible abuse of

authority or act of oppression, arming oneperson with a weapon to impose hardship onanother.

Eaest accipienda interpretaio quae vitio caretor that interpretation is to be adopted whichis free from evil or injustice.


39/66

- There is a valid presumption that undesirableconsequences were never intended by a

legislative measure, and that a constructionof which a statute is fairly susceptible isfavored, which will avoid all objectionable,mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and

injurious consequences.


40/66


41/66

- It is a well-established rule of statutoryconstruction that where great inconvenience

will result, or great public interest will beendangered or sacrificed, or great mischiefdone, from a particular construction of astatute, such construction is to be avoided.


42/66


43/66

- In case of doubt in the interpretation orapplication of a law, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended and justice toprevail.

- In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is

perceived to tip the scales which the courtbelieves will best promote the public welfarein its probable operation shall be favored.


44/66


45/66

- Where the literal import of the language ofthe statute shows that words have been

omitted that should have been in the statutein order to carry out its intent and spirit,clearly ascertainable from the context, thecourt may supply the omission to make the

statute conform to the obvious intent of thelegislature or to prevent the act from beingabsurd.


46/66

- The said rule is in keeping with the principlethat what is within the spirit of law is as much

a part of it as what is written pursuant towhich an apparent omission in aninterpretation purely literal of the languageused may be remedied by adhering to its

avowed objective and intent.


47/66

- The court, in order to carry out the obviousintent of the legislature, may correct clerical

errors, mistakes or misprints which, ifuncorrected, would render the statutemeaningless, empty or nonsensical or woulddefeat or impair its intended operation, so

long as the meaning intended is apparent onthe face of the whole enactment and nospecific provision is abrogated.


48/66

- To correct the error or mistake is to preventthe nullification of the statute and give it a

meaning and purpose.

- It is the duty of the court to give a statute asensible construction, one that will effectuate

legislative intent and avoid injustice orabsurdity. It is therefore the courtsduty to


49/66

arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, itshould not adopt an arbitrary rule under

which it must be held without variance orshadow of turning that the legislatureintended to make a typographical error, theresult of which be to make nonsense of the

act, and not to carry out the legislativescheme but to destroy it.


50/66

Qualification: What the courts may correct toreflect the real and apparent intention of thelegislature are only those which are clearly

clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissionsand misprints. Courts may not, in the guise ofconstruction, correct what they think is due tooversight as shown by an examination ofextraneous circumstances, where the statute is

clear and to correct it would be to change themeaning of the law, or specific provision will beabrogated.


51/66

Rule: Where a word, phrase or clause in astatute is devoid of meaning in relation to the

context or intent of the statute, or where itsuggests a meaning that nullifies the statuteor renders it without sense, the word, phraseor clause may be rejected as a surplusage and

entirely ignored.


52/66

- Surplusage does not vitiate a statute.

Surplusagium non noceat

utileper inutile non viaturor the useful is notvitiated by the non-useful


53/66

- While the general rule is that every effortshould be made to give some meaning to

every part of the statute, this rule does notimpose upon the courts an imperativeobligation to give every redundant word orphrase a special significance.


54/66

- A possible interpretation of a word or phrasewhich tends to defeat the whole purpose of

the law is to be rejected, when the use ofsuch word or phrase may fairly and properlybe treated as a mere reiteration or repetitionof other language in the statute.


55/66

Rule: Court should not and cannot always bebound by the phraseology or literal meaning of astatute. They may at times disregard loose or

obscure words in order to arrive at the realmeaning and spirit of the statute.

- Neither does false description precludeconstruction nor vitiate the meaning of the

statute which is otherwise clear. (Falsademonstratio non nocet, cum de corporeconstat)


56/66

Rule: Every rule is not without an exception

Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haecexceptio, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque where anything is granted generally, thisexception is implied.


57/66


58/66

Rule: When the context of a statute so indicate,words in plural include the singular and viceversa.

- A plural word in statute may thus apply to asingular person or thing, just as a singular

word may embrace two or more persons.


59/66

Rule: In construing a statute, the masculine,but not the feminine includes all genders,unless the context in which the word is usedin the statute indicates otherwise.


60/66


61/66

- No statute can be enacted that can provide allthe details involved in the application. Thereis always an omission that may not meet aparticular situation. What is thought, at thetime of enactment, to be an all-embracinglegislation may be inadequate to proved for

the unfolding events of the future. These so-called gaps in the law develop as the law isenforced.


62/66

- One of the rules of statutory constructionused to fill in the gap is the doctrine ofnecessary implication.


63/66

What is implied in a statute is as much a partthereof as that which is expressed.

- Every statue is understood, by implication, tocontain all such provisions as may be necessaryto effectuate its object and purpose, or to makeeffective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction

which it grants, including all such collateral andsubsidiary consequences as may be fairly andlogically inferred from its terms.


64/66

In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minusthe greater includes the lesser.


65/66

Rule: Where there is a right, there is a remedyfor violation thereof. (ubi jus, ibi remedium)

- The fact that the statute is silent as to theremedy is implied from such right.


66/66

Jurisdiction to hear and decide cases isconferred by law.

- The grant of jurisdiction to try action carrieswith it all necessary and incidental powers toemploy all writs, processes and other means

to make the courtsjurisdiction effective.

statutory construction part4

Documents