statutory construction (part 1)

1 | E U N I C E R . T A B I N A S ( A r e l l a n o U n i v e r s i t y S c h o o l o f L a w )

“WHERE THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL

LANGUAGE, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION,

VACILLATION, OR EQUIVOCATION, THERE IS ROOM ONLY FOR

APPLICATION”

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)

FACTS

Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for

original registration of a land title.

During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his

heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad

litem in order to continue the petition.

It was found that the applicant had been in open,

continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land

since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the

applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a

newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law.

The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus,

Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial

hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or

directory.

HELD: It is mandatory.

The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be

done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the

latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial

hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus

indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such

literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory

construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its

context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present

case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory

meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process.

The application for land registration filed by private

respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to

reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall

have been duly complied with.

* CHAPTER 1*

“WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF

INTERPRETATION. IT MUST BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF

WHO MAY BE AFFECTED, EVEN IF THE LAW MAY BE HARSH

OR ERRONEOUS”

OLIVIA AND HERMES PASCUAL VS. ESPERANZA PASCUAL -

BAUTISTA, ET.AL

G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992)

FACTS

Don Andres Pascual died intestate (without a will)


He was survived by Adela Pascual - spouse, 6 children of

Wenceslao Pascual, 7 children of Pedro Pascual both full

brother of the deceased and the petitioners.

Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the

late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of

the deceased Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate

without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,

adopted or spurious children.

Petitioner’s motion and motion for reconsideration

manifesting their hereditary rights was denied by RTC

Pasig and likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the

inheritance of the deceased.

HELD: Petitioners do not fall within the purview of Art. 992 of the

Civil Code.

Being acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,

their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior

marriage when such children where under conception.

Illegitimate children in Art. 992 refer to both natural and

spurious child.

Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “An illegitimate

child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such

children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the

illegitimate child”

* CHAPTER 1*

”THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO

APPLY THE LAW”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAPA

G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)

FACTS

Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms.

He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret

Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas.

He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v.

Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences

of his appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Secret Agent falls among those

authorized to possess firearms.

HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The

law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore

holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a

prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and

ammunitions.

No provision is made for a secret agent.


* CHAPTER 1*

“THE DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY THE LAW

DISREGARDING THEIR FEELING OF SYMPATHY OR PITY FOR

THE ACCUSED”

PEOPLE VS. PATRICIO AMIGO

G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996)

FACTS

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the

Patricio Amigo - Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of

reclusion perpetua.

Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the

trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of

reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19

(1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect

when the offense was committed.

Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987

Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the

death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty

that should have been imposed for the crime of murder

committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion

temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion

temporal.

According to the Accused-Appellant reclusion perpetua is

too cruel or harsh to be his punishment

He pleads for sympathy

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987

Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the

other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death

penalty.

HELD: Courts are not the forum for sympathy “DURA LEX SED

LEX” applies. The only remedy to change or alter the penalty lies

upon the clemency from the executive or through an amendment

of the law to be done by the legislative.

Decision Affirmed.

*CASES - CHAPTER 1*


DIAZ BOOK: CHAPTER 1 - NOTES (EUNICE)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning

and intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by

reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly

provided for in the law.

INTERPRETATION

Process of discovering the true meaning of the language

used.

CONSTRUCTION

Drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are

beyond the direct expression of the text from elements

known and given in the text.

REQUISITES FOR THE COURT TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET

There must be an actual case or controversy

There is ambiguity

HERMENEUTICS

Science or art of construction and interpretation

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS

Systematic body of rules which are recognized as

applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal

writings.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF INTERPRETATION

CLOSE / LITERAL INTERPRETATION adopted if just

reasons connected with the character and formation of the

text induce as to take the words in their narrowest

meaning.

EXTENSIVE / LIBERAL INTERPRETATION adopts a more

comprehensive signification of the words.

EXTRAVAGANT INTERPRETATION substitutes a meaning

evidently beyond the true one. Not genuine interpretation.

FREE / UNRESTRICTED INTERPRETATION proceeds

simply on the general principles of interpretation in good

faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle.

PREDISTINED INTERPRETATION takes place if the

interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes

the text subservient to his preconceived views and desires.

ARTFUL INTERPRETATION the interpreter seeks to give a

meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have

been intended.



BILL

Draft of a proposed law from the time of its introduction in

a legislative body through all the various stages in both

houses.

ACT

Appropriate term for the bill after it has been acted on and

passed by the legislature.

STATUTE

A written will of the legislature solemnly expressed

according to the form necessary to constitute it as the law

of state.

STATUTE LAW

Includes not only the statute but also the judicial

interpretation and application of the enactment.

STEPS: HOW DOES A BILL BECOMES A LAW

1. A member of the house will introduce the proposed bill to

the Secretary of the House/ National Assembly (Secretary -

Calendar the bill for 1st Reading).

2. 1st Reading, the bill is read by its number and title ONLY.

3. Speaker will refer the bill to the appropriate committee

The committee assigned will conduct public hearings.

4. Committee will returned the bill to the National Assembly

and calendared it for 2nd Reading.

5. 2nd Reading, the bill will be read in its entirety

6. The bill will be set for open debates (members may

propose amendments)

7. After approval of the bill in the 2nd reading, at least 3

calendar days before its final passage, the bill is printed in

its final form and copies thereof distributed to each of the

members. (Exception: Emergency instances) 8. Calendared for the third and final reading. Title will be read

and the members will vote YES or NO, and will be entered

into the journal. (QUORUM)

9. If NO vote wins, the bill is dead.

If YES vote wins, it will be submitted to the president for

approval. He shall sign it if he approves it or veto the bill

and return it to the house where it originated.

CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IN PASSING A BILL

Every bill passed by the Congress SHALL EMBRACE ONLY

ONE SUBJECT which shall be expresses in the title thereof.

Purposes of this requirement:

To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation

To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature

To fairly apprise the people

The bill shall be passes THREE READINGS on SEPARATE

DAYS.

Every bill passed by the Congress SHALL BE PRESENTED

TO THE PRESIDENT


PARTS OF STATUTE (TPEBRSSE)

TITLE

Heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by

which the act is individually known.

PREAMBLE

Explains the reasons for the bill’s enactment and the

objects sought to be accomplished. (“WHEREAS”)

ENACTING CLAUSE

Declares the bill’s enactment and serves to identify it as an

act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative

authority. (“BE IT ENACTED”)

BODY

Main and operative part of the statute containing its

substantive and even procedural provisions.

REPEALING CLAUSE

Announces the prior statutes or specifies provisions which

have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new

law.

SAVING CLAUSE

Restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save

rights, pending proceedings, penalties etc., from

annihilation which would result from an unrestricted

repeal.

SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

Provides that in the event that one or more provisions are

declared VOID or UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the remaining

provisions shall still be in force.

EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE

Announces the affectivity date of the law.

KINDS OF REPEALING STATUTE

EXPRESS REPEAL

Abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the

enactment of a subsequent statute which declares that the

former law shall be revoked and abrogated.

IMPLIED REPEAL

Happens when a later statute contains provisions so

contrary to or reconcilable with those of the earlier law

that only one of the two statutes can stand in force.

ORDINANCE

Act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its

law-making authority.

TEST OF VALID ORDINANCE IT MUST NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION OR ANY STATUTE

IT MUST NOT BE UNFAIR OR OPPRESSIVE

IT MUST NOT BE PARTIAL OR DISCRIMINATORY

IT MUST NOT PROHIBIT BUT MAY REGULATE TRADE

IT MUST BE GENERAL AND CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC POLICY

IT MUST NOT BE UNREASONABLE


“LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS DETERMINED PRINCIPALLY FROM

THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE”

SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ESTER GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962)

FACTS

A civil case was filed by Petitioner (Socorro Ramirez)

alleging that Private Respondent (Ester Garcia), in a

confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed, insulted

and humiliated her. “contrary to morals, public policy and

good customs”

Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to

support her claim.

The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal.

The respondent filed a criminal case for violation of R.A.

4200 “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and

other Related Violations of Private Communications, and

Other Purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the facts charged against him constituted

an offense.

HELD: Yes. The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized

by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record

such communication by means of a tape recorder.

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party

sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party

other than or different from those involved in the private

communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons

unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the

use of the qualifier "any".

* CHAPTER 3*

“PLAIN MEANING RULE OR VERBA LEGIS”

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO COMMUNICATIONS VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMMISSION AND IMELDA

SALAZAR

G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)

FACTS

Petitioner placed Respondent Imelda Salazar under

preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full

knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air

conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the

company but failed to inform her employer.

Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension

and for other damages.

On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of

the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of

Private Respondent but limited backwages to 2 years and

deleted award for moral damages.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of

discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar.


2. Whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold

Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her

dismissal.

HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is

unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement

and to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the

reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations

between the employer and the employee.

The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is

not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover,

Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar

had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had

direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities.

* CHAPTER 3*

“WHEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT SHOULD BE

GIVEN IN NATURAL MEANING”

FELICITO BASBACIO VS. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)

FACTS

Petitioner filed a claim on RA 7309, which provides for

compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and

imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a

judgment of acquittal.

Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged

with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and

wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus

imprisoned.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner was acquitted

on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-

law was not proven. What was proven was that he was at

the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting

happened and left the place with his son-in-law.

Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to

compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to compensation

pursuant to RA 7309.

HELD: No, he is not. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be

wrongly accused from the very beginning, unjustly convicted

(when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust

judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for

judgment) and imprisoned.

Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was

unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner

was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.

* CHAPTER 3*


“IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN

THAT EVERY PART BE GIVEN EFFECT”

JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT INC. VS. NLRC AND

ULPIANO L. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)

FACTS

JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000

and posted a cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of

P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules.

When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a

decision rendered by POEA, the NLRC dismissed the

petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as

required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required

appeal bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code,

considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond, as

required by the POEA?

HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear.

A reading of the POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash

and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an

amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect

an appeal from a decision of the POEA.

* CHAPTER 3*

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILS. INC. V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT

G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991)

FACTS

The levy on attachment against the subject properties of

spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on

March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig.

The insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of

Angeles City was commenced more than four months after

the issuance of the said attachment.

Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils.

Contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode

the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment dissolved the

insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though

it commenced four months after said attachment.

HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut

off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in

judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency

proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79.

Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the

court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as

will render the provision thereof operative and effective and

harmonious with each other.

* CHAPTER 3*


“A CONSTRUCTION THAT GIVES TO THE LANGUAGE USED IN A

STATUTE A MEANING THAT DOES NOT ACCOMPLISH THE

PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE STATUTE WAS ENACTED, SHOULD

BE REJECTED”

MANUEL T. DE GUIA VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)

Petitioner Manuel De Guia is an incumbent member of the

Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque

having been elected in January 1988 local election

De Guia prays for reversal of the position of the respodent

Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166,

members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and

Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to

mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and

Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.

HELD: No. paragraph (d) Sec.3 of the RA 7166 refers only to

elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district

cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for

municipalities outside Metro Manila.

The law specifically stated that provinces with only one

legislative district should be divided into two and therefore

should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be

interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow

the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been

no reason for the RA to single out the single district

provinces. The court realized that the language of the law in

this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what

legislature intended is the purpose or reason which

induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory note in the

proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into

two legislative districts is to reduce the number of

candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections.

* CHAPTER 3*

“BETWEEN TWO STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS, THAT

WHICH BETTER SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW SHOULD

PREVAIL”

SPS. SALENILLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS & WILLIAM GUERA

G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)

FACTS

On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was

mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a

loan of P2,500.

For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by

PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private

Respondent.

Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase

the property under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act.

Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified


Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said

property.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioners have the right to repurchase the

property under the said Act.

2. Whether or not the prescription period had already prescribed.

HELD: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs.

The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very

purpose of the Act. Petitioners’ contention would be more in

keeping with the spirit of the law.

With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a

pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the

rules under the transaction would be different. For

foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day

after the expiration of the period of redemption when the

deed of absolute sale was executed. The five year period for

the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet

prescribed.

* CHAPTER 3*

“WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF

CEASES”

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR ET.AL VS. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMERA ET.AL G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991)

FACTS

The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9, l989.

In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed.

During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge.

The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. 2. Whether or not there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. Whether or not there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived.

The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may bereferred to them, so when martial law was lifted.

Petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to

allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Art. 18 of the Articles of War.


* CHAPTER 3*

“DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN A STATUTE IS AS MUCH A PART THEREOF AS THAT WHICH IS EXPRESSED” LYDIA CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL

IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION

G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and

voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation

due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are

qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive

officials and employees of the National Government.

The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to

all regular, temporary, casual and emergency

employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at

least a total of two (2) consecutive years of

government service as of the date of separation…”

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail

of the benefits of the program, filed an application on

January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which,

however, denied the same.

Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission

yielded the same result.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus

employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early

Retirement Law).

HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would

violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the

Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the

benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government

employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said

law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in

deciding this case.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that “No

person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property

without due process of law nor shall any person be denied

the equal protection of the laws.

* CHAPTER 3*

CITY OF MANILA & CITY TREASURER VS. JUDGE AMADOR

GOMEZ OF THE CFI OF MANILA AND ESSO PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)

FACTS

The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949.

It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent.

The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447), which took


effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one

percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent.

With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447, the

municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125,

effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an

additional one-half percent realty tax.

Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the

Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that

the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city

charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila should

reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinance is valid.

HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in

Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s contention

that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the

provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real

property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”.

While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty

tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education

Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real

property tax. The obvious implication is that an additional

one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal

corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the

realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The

fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes

the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior

intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the

realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent of the

questioned ordinance.

* CHAPTER 3*

“THE RULE OF “CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST

CAN OPERATE AND APPLY ONLY IF AND WHEN THE OMISSION

HAS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN

G.R. No. L-14129 (July 31, 1962)

FACTS

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged of violation of

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the province of

Pangasinan.

SECTION 54, ELECTION CODE: “No justice, judge, fiscal.

Treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national,

provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no

classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any

candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any

election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled

thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace

officer”

CFI of Pangasinan ordered the dismissal of the case,

Solicitor General appealed.


ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the

prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

HELD: Yes. Justice of Peace is included in the prohibition of

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

There was no necessity anymore to include justices of the

peace in the enumeration because the legislature had

availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge”.

It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was

intended to comprehend all kinds of judges.

Order of dismissal is set aside. Case remanded for trial on

the merits.

* CHAPTER 3*

“STARE DECISIS. FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT

DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED. MATTERS ALREADY

DECIDED ON THE MERITS CANNOT BE RELITIGATED AGAIN

AND AGAIN”

J.M. TUASON AND CO. INC., ET AL. VS. HON. HERMINIO

MARIANO, MANUELA AQUIAL & SPS. JOSE AND SATURNINA

CORDOVA

G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)

FACTS

Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership

of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383

hectares.

They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously

included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal

and that it was registered in the names of Defendants

Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on

July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land

Registration.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles

derived therefrom be declared void due to certain

irregularities in the land registration proceeding.

The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the

ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case,

improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.

Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in

the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from

the Aquials.

ISSUE: Whether or not OCT No. and the titles derived therefrom

can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and

Cordova

HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was

already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin

vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in

these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of

OCT No. 735.


Considering the principles of Stare Decisis, it becomes

evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot

maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without

eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No.

735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Trial Court directed to dismiss Civil Case No.8943 with

prejudice.

*CASES - CHAPTER 3*


LEGISLATIVE INTENT

For construction purposes does not mean the collection of

the subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices of each and

every member of the legislature, but rather the objective

footprints left on the trail of legislative enactment.

VERBA LEGIS

If the language of the statute is plain and free from

ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite and sensible

meaning which the legislature intended to convey.

CASUS OMISSUS

When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to

several enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any

provision for a case or object which is analogous to those

enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is

therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it

appears that such case or object was omitted by

inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen.

STARE DECISIS

A point of law already established will, generally, be

followed by the same determining court and by all courts of

lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue

is raised. (Settled point)


“WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD

NOT DISTINGUISH. THE RULE, FOUNDED ON LOGIC, IS A

COROLLARY OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT GENERAL WORDS AND

PHRASES OF A STATUTE SHOULD ORDINARILY BE ACCORDED

THEIR NATURAL AND GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE”

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)

FACTS

Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a

collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation.

During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the

properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a

supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond

through Petitioner so the attached properties were

released.

Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against

the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the

writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed

to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon

demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be

ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counter bond issued was valid.

HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5,

Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of

the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory

judgment.

It applies to the payment of any judgment that may be

recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an

execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if

returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter

bond.

The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life

attachment shall be charged with the payment of any

judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a

final and executory judgment but also the execution of a

judgment of pending appeal.

* CHAPTER 4*

“THE RULE IS WELL-RECOGNIZED THAT WHERE THE LAW

DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHALL NOT DISTINGUISH”

JUANITO PILAR VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)

FACTS

On March 2, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of

candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.

He withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result,

Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos


for failure to file his statement of contributions and

expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the

law that the candidate must have entered the political

contest, and should have either won or lost.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner can be held liable for failure to

file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a

“non-candidate”, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy

three days after its filing.

HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has

the obligation to file his statement of contributions and

expenditures.

As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to

whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew

the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to

refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign,

but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of

Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates

who filed their certificate of candidacy”.

* CHAPTER 4*

“IF THE LAW MAKES NO DISTINCTION< NEITHER SHOULD

THE COURT”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE ANTONIO

EVANGELISTA AND GUILDO S. TUGONON

G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)

FACTS

Private Respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and

convicted of frustrated homicide. Sentenced with prision

correccional (CA-Affirmed)

Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. However,

Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isaias Valdehueza

recommended denial of Private respondent’s application

for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence

of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his

application for probation.

Judge Antonio Evangelista set the case for repromulgation.

The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation

and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23,

1993.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Judge committed a grave

abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application

for probation.

HELD: Yes. Private Respondent filed his application for probation

on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus

covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall

be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the

appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the

application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.”

Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied

for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his

conviction; Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the

benefits of probation.


* CHAPTER 4*

“WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY EXCEPTION, COURTS

MAY NOT EXCEPT SOMETHING UNLESS COMPELLING

REASONS EXIST TO JUSTIFY IT”

CECILIO DE VILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)

FACTS

Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing

Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check.

However, he contends that the check was drawn against a

dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not

covered by the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Makati Regional Trial Court has

jurisdiction over the case in question.

HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The

determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the

issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and

therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction

in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction

over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of

a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal

action. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not

covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish

the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the

records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of

the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be

the subject thereof.

* CHAPTER 4*

“GENERAL TERMS MAY BE RESTRICTED BY SPECIFIC WORDS,

WITH THE RESULT THAT THE GENERAL LANGUAGE WHICH

INDICATES THE STATUTE’S OBJECT AND PURPOSE. THE RULE

IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO CASES WHEREIN, EXCEPT FOR ONE

GENERAL TERM, ALL THE ITEMS IN AN ENUMERATION

BELONG TO OR FALL UNDER ONE SPECIFIC CLASS”

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PEDRO JIMENEZ

G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)

FACTS

Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet

preparations and household remedies.

Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors”

is among those Petitioner imports.

For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central Bank of

the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign

exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation

and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax

Law.

Under such law, it was also provided that:


“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost,

transportation and/or other charges incident to the

importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and

flavors shall be refunded to any importer making

application therefore.”

The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special

excise tax

ISSUE: Whether or not the imports of “dental cream stabilizers

and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption

under the Exchange Tax Law.

HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following

argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall

under one specific class, namely:

food products, books supplies/ materials and medical

supplies. The “stabilizers and flavors” the petitions refer to

are items which must fall under the category of food

products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it

is not a food product and therefore not subject to

exemption.

Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund:

RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above.

Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that

might fall under food products, the following which were

included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin

concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law

must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and

categorizations posited by the respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. EUTROPIO

MIGRINIO AND TROADIO TECSON

G.R. No. 89483 (August 30, 1990)

FACTS

Acting on information received, which indicated the

acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the

Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to

submit his explanation or comment, together with his

supporting evidence.

Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to

produce his supporting evidence, despite several

postponements, because they were allegedly in the custody

of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft

Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the

unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP

personnel, both retired and in active service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Private Respondent may be investigated

and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation

of RA 3019 and 1379.

HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term

“subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys

a close association or relation with former President Marcos

and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative,

and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business

associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2.


* CHAPTER 4*

“RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS MERELY A TOOL OF STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION RESORTED TO WHEN LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS

UNCERTAIN”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES

G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980)

FACTS

The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes

squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands.

The lower court denied the motion and ruled that

agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of

Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its

preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture.

The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the

Supreme Court, thus bringing the case at hand.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands

HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower

court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands

because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to

squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal

constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.”

But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage

of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the

decree is unmistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem

Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is

resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.”

* CHAPTER 4*

“THE FAMILIAR RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS”

MISAEL VERA VS. HON. SERAFIN CUEVAS, INSTITUTE OF

EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., AND CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY

PHILIPPINES INC., AND MILK INDUSTRIES, INC.

G.R. Nos. L-33693-94 (May 31, 1979)

FACTS

Commissioner of Internal Revenue is requiring the

plaintiffs-private respondents to withdraw from the market

all of their filled milk products which do not bear the

inscription required by Sec. 169 of the tax code within 15

days from receipt of the order.

Section 169 – Inscription to be placed in SKIMMED MILK

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 169 of the tax code applies to filled

milk

HELD: No. Skimmed milk is different from filled milk.

Skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which fatty

part has been removed. Filled milk on the other hand, is any

milk, whether or not condensed, to which had been added


or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or

oil other than milk fat.

It cannot be readily or safely assumed that Section 169

applies both to skimmed milk or filled milk.

* CHAPTER 4*

“THE EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING, ACT OR

CONSEQUENCE EXCLUDES ALL OTHERS” EXPRESSIO UNIUS

EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 147749 (June 22, 2006)

FACTS

SPMC domestic corporation engaged in the business of

milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and

other allied products.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and ordered

SPMC to pay P8,182,182.85 representing the deficiency

miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax.

SPMC opposed the assessments but the commissioner

denied its protest

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3%

miller’s tax.

HELD: Court of Tax Appeals correctly ruled that SMCP’s sale of

crude coconut oil of UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s tax.

Sec. 168 of the 1987 Tax Code provides: Percentage tax

upon proprietors operators of rope factories, sugar central

and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and

desiccated coconut factories shall pay a tax equivalent to

three percent (3%)

* CHAPTER 4*

“WHERE A PARTICULAR WORD IS EQUALLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF

VARIOUS MEANINGS, ITS CORRECT CONSTRUCTION MAY BE

MADE SPECIFIC BY CONSIDERING THE COMPANY OF TERMS IN

WHICH IT IS FOUND OR WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED”

DRA. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA VS. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER

G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)

FACTS

The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint

with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the

violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the

preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were

employees of the national center for mental health.

The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid

by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is

contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987


Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the

Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of

Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension

of officials and employees facing administrative

investigation conducted by his office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to

preventively suspend government officials working in other

offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the

investigation of administrative complaints.

HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the

employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or

preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to

“suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties

in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the

Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials

and employees facing administrative charges.

This statute is procedural and may arise in order to

facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed

against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a

punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative

investigation.

* CHAPTER 4*

“NEGATIVE WORDS AND PHRASES REGARDED AS

MANDATORY WHILE THOSE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE ARE MERE

DIRECTORY”

MANOLO P. FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988)

FACTS

Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation,

issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy

Nadera.

Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said

checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP

22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and

the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a

memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts.

He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the

Appellate Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of

the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by

the Petitioner or his counsel.

HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of

Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, “No

agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial

conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless

reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. Because of

the word “shall”, in its language, the rule is mandatory.

Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as

mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely


directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the

counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally

construed in favor of the accused.

* CHAPTER 4*

“USE OF WORD ‘MAY’ IN THE STATUTE GENERALLY

CONNOTES A PERMISSIBLE THING WHILE THE WORD ‘SHALL’

IS IMPERATIVE”

PURITA BERSABAL VS. HON. JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR

G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)

FACTS

Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the

Petitioner.

The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner

and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating

that “… counsels for both parties are given 30 days from

receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda

in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the

court.”

After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit

memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of

submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken

during the hearing of the case which was granted by the

court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing

the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the

submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere failure of an Appellant to submit

the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss

the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.

HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal

on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum.

The law provides that “Courts shall decide cases on the basis of the

evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: Provided,

parties may submit memoranda if so requested. It cannot be

interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is

optional.

* CHAPTER 4*

JENETTE MARIE CRISOLOGO VS. GLOBE TELECOM AND CESAR

MAUREAL

G.R. No. 167631 (December 16, 2005)

FACTS

Jenette Crisologo was an employee of Globe Telecom

Petitioner was promoted as Director of Corporate Affairs

and Regulatory matters.

She separated from the company.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and

reinstatement at the National Labor Relations Commission.


Respondent company filed an action for the recovery of the

executive car issued to Ms. Crisologo and other company’s

possessions.

ISSUE: Whether or not despite the wrong remedy resorted by the

appellant, such as a petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme

Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals.

HELD: It is on score that the court is inclined to concur with

petitioner’s argfument that even the remedy resorted was wrong,

the Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under rule 56,

Section 6 paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Motion for reconsideration granted, Petition reinstated,

Case referred to Court of Appeals.

* CHAPTER 4*

“THE WORD ‘MUST’ IN A STATUTE LIKE ‘SHALL’ IS NOT

ALWAYS IMPERATIVE AND MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH AN

EXERCISE OF DISCRETION”

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH)

ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)

FACTS

The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc.

(LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance

and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’

organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its

corporate bylaws.

Later, it was discovered that there were two other

organizations within the subdivision: the North and South

Associations.

Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI

that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of

non-submission of its by-laws as required by the

Corporation Code.

This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association.

LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from

Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner

association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently

affirmed the said decision.

Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-

laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in

its automatic dissolution.

HELD: No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve

a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word “must” in

a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an

exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be

considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the

legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”.


“A ‘WEEK’ MEANS A PERIOD OF SEVEN CONSECUTIVE DAYS

WITHOUT REGARD TO THE DAY OF THE WEEK ON WHICH IT

BEGINS”

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993)

FACTS

To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent

mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank.

For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank

extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won

the highest bidder at the auction sale.

A final deed of sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry

of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold

the said lots to a third party.

The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties

were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969

issues of the newspaper Daily Record”.

The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates

April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday, respectively.

Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction

sale shall be “published once a week for at least three

consecutive weeks”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner bank complied with the

requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial

foreclosure of mortgages.

HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent

as to the definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta,

the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time

consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee

bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication.

* CHAPTER 4*

ALU-TUCP VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS

AND NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994)

FACTS

Petitioners were employed by the National Steel

Corporation for their five year expansion program.

The workers contend that they should be considered

regular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC

and NLRC ruled.

ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for

more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the

business, and that would have been more than enough to

consider them as regular employees.

Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the

Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners should be considered regular

employees.


HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since

Petitioners were considered project employees, this provision

does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have been

working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are

automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired

as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that

“project” is done, their services will no longer be needed.)

* CHAPTER 4*

THE TERM ‘INSULATING OIL’ COMES WITHIN THE MEANING

OF THE TERM ‘INSULATOR’ AND QUALIFIES THE MANILA

ELECTRIC COMPANY FOR TAX EXEMPTION”

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. MANILA ELECTRIC

COMPANY AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS

G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977)

FACTS

RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare

parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes

of whatever nature.

Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt

from taxes.

ISSUE: Whether or not insulating oil is an insulator making

Respondent exempt from paying its taxes.

HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme

Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials

Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out that

insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there

is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing

is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on

exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be

construed stictissimi juris.

* CHAPTER 4*

“SK ELECTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A ‘REGULAR

ELECTION’ FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL UNDER SEC. 74 OF THE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991”

DANILO E. PARAS VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the

incumbent Punong Barangay.

The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s

opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall

take place within one year from the date of the official’s

assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a

regular local election.

Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on

the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.


ISSUE: Whether or not the SK election is a local election.

HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with

reference to its context, and it must be considered together and

kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74

is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term,

as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the

letter of a law, determines its construction.

In interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include

SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will

never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In

interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the

legislature intended to enact an effective law. An

interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or

provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,

inoperative or nugatory.

* CASES - CHAPTER 4*


EJUSDEM GENERIS

General rule of statutory construction that where the

general words follow an enumeration of persons or things,

by words of a particular or specific meaning, such general

words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but

are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the

same general kind or class.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

Express mention and Implied exclusion. General rule of

statutory construction (to be applied under proper

conditions and with important limitations) that the express

mention of one person, thing, or consequence is

tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

Associated Words. When a word used in a statute is

ambiguous or vague, its meaning may be made clear and

specific by considering the company in which it is found

and the meaning of the terms which are associated with

them.

AND

Conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the

idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the

first.

OR

Disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to

give a choice of among two or more things.

PROVISO

Clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which

or which is either to except something from the enacting

clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude

some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extent.


ARIS (PHIL.) INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991) FACTS

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. HELD: Yes on both counts.

The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the contested provision “is then police legislation”. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character.

* CHAPTER 5*

“ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL

UNTIL OR UNLESS OTHERWISE RULED BY THE COURT”

HON. ALFREDO S. LIM VS. FELIPE G. PACQUING

G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

FACTS

Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the

authority to regulate Jai-Alai from local governments to the

Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065

authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated

Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI.

Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all

powers and authority of local governments to grant

franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of

gambling.

Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly

repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and cancels the

franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement

Corporation.

In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and

Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which

expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to

operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the franchise granted by the City of Manila to

ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local

governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai.

2. Whether or not the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is

violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the

Constitution.


HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City

of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And

E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license

and permit. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771

was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not

violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the

said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local

governments without exceptions.

* CHAPTER 5*

“IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR

APPLICATION OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE

LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO

PREVAIL”

KAREN SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)

FACTS

An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay

for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a

notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from

the American’s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank

responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central

Bank, which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be

exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process

of any court.

Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such

is the law and stood firm on the policy.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960

and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made

applicable to a foreigner.

HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is

to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted

during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments

were minimal. As, some time has already passed since the crisis

that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered

from the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is

unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of

the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice

would be undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of

doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is

presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to

prevail.

* CHAPTER 5*

“A LAW SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED SO AS TO CAUSE AN

INJUSTICE”

CARLOS & CASIMIRA ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT AND TECLE PADUA

G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)

FACTS


Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel

of land registered in the name of their deceased parents.

Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue

of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said

sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They

subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built

a semi-concrete house.

One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to

redeem the area sold.

The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time

had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from

notice of the sales.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a valid notice.

2. Whether or not Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted

correctly.

HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual

knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is

unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the

erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088

of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the

Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice,

despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for

redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to

ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and

to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-

day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were

undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was

given to them.

* CHAPTER 5*

“IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS REPEAL, A SUBSEQUENT

LAW CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPEALING A PRIOR LAW

UNLESS AN IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCY AND

REPUGNANCY EXISTS IN THE TERMS OF THE NEW AND OLD

LAWS”

ACHILLES BERCES VS. SEC. TEOFISTO GUINGONA JR., ET. AL.

G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995)

FACTS

Petitioner filed two administrative cases against

Respondent mayor of Tiwi, Albay for 1) abuse of authority;

and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan.

Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly,

suspended in both cases.

Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President

and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the

LGC.

The Office of the President stayed execution, citing Sec. 68

of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to

Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a

mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a

decision from becoming final and executory.


Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed

by RA 7160.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18.

HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6,

A.O. No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on

executive orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any

repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. In the absence

of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as

repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and

repugnancy exists between the two. There is none in this case. The

first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent

a decision from becoming final or executory.” It gives discretion to

reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term “shall” may be read

mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the

entire provision where it is found.

* CHAPTER 5*

ANTONIO A. MECANO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)

FACTS

Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission

on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his

claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised

Administrative Code (RAC), as amended.

Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis

from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he

incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total

amount of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the

reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue

that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative

Code of 1987.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioner can claim from the COA.

2. Whether or not Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the

Administrative Code of 1987.

HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not

petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec.

699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section

although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative

Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and the Court

considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court

finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second

sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921,

expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this

Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec.

699 of the RAC , whose benefits are administered by the system

(SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”

* CHAPTER 5*


DANILO E. PARAS VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

(LAST CASE – CHAPTER 4)

* CHAPTER 5*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989) FACTS

Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964.

Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964.

On August 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It protested the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due, claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. Whether or not Respondent is entitled to a refund. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the sum belonged to Respondent

and the government had the obligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.

Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960, whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged.

It is well established that to interpret words of the statute

in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

* CHAPTER 5*

“PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES

WERE NEVER INTENDED BY A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE”

CESARIO URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)

FACTS

Petitioner was charged before the Office of the

Ombudsman.


He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the

complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s

messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal

matters.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the

logbook as “Oscar Perez.” Petitioner’s real identity was

eventually discovered by the employees of the

Ombudsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of

C.A. No. 142.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the petitioner were

among the evils sought to be remedied by C.A. No. 142

HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in

the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be

remedied. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where

the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity.

Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed

strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused.

*CASES - CHAPTER 5*


PRESUMPTION

The Courts will presume that it was the intention of the

legislature to enact a valid, sensible and just law, and one

should change the prior law no further than may be

necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in

question.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of

a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

Interpret and apply the law independently of, but in

consonance with, justice.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS

Legislature should be presumed to have known the existing

laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting

statutes.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart its

enactments such a meaning as will render them operative

and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or

defeating them.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will

give effect to the legislative intention so as to avoid an

unjust or absurd conclusion.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.


“SUBTITLE OF THE STATUTE AS INTRINSIC AID IN

DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT”

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA AND LORNA PEDROSA G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997) FACTS

On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed.

RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: No. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply

means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.

If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

*CHAPTER 6*

“THE INTENT OF THE LAW AS CULLED FROM ITS PREAMBLE

AND FROM THE SITUATION, CIRCUMSTANCES AND

CONDITIONS IT SOUGHT TO REMEDY, MUST BE ENFORCED”

FLORENCIO EUGENIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN

DRILON AND PROSPERO PALMIANO

G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)

FACTS

Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from

Petitioner, two lots.

Private respondent suspended payment of his

amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property.

Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo

and the title was registered under their name.

Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and

reconveyance of the lot to him.


Applying P.D. 957 “ The Subdivision and Condominium

Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements

Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the

development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase

contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the

payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the

spouses.

Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D.

957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect

and that non-development does not justify the non-

payment of the amortizations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary acted with grave

abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given

retroactive effect.

HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave

abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as

to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in

1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its

entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable

intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”

*CHAPTER 6*

“PREAMBLE USED AS A GUIDE IN DETREMINING THE INTENT

OF THE LAWMAKER” – PEOPLE VS. ECHAVEZ (Chapter 4)


INTRINSIC AIDS

Those aids within the statute. Resorted only if there is

ambiguity in the statute.

SAMPLE OF INTRINSIC AIDS

Title

Preamble

Context or Body of the Statute

Chapter & Section headings

Punctuation

Interpretation Clause

“IT IS A WELL-ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WHERE A

STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE


PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS THOSE

EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE

MEANING OF THE STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS

ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL

AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE”

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC. G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975) FACTS

Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive

such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws.

Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.

Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may

take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394.

*CHAPTER 7*

“CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON A

STATUTE BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS CHARGED WITH

IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE

STATUTES SHOULD BE GIVEN CONTROLLING WEIGHT<

UNLESS SUCH INTERPRETATION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS”

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU)

VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)

FACTS

Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions

(NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive


bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming

Mills, Company, Inc.

Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429

PAFLU 414

Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted)

Abstained 4

Total Ballots 864

(Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.)

Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered

as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered

that the ruling in the previous case was based on the

Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the

present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at

bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent acted with grave abuse of

discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as

in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the

Philippines vs. CIR.

HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by

Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case

has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Rules

and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been

already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing

power in the case at bar.

*CHAPTER 7*

“INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON

THE FLOOR DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT LEGISLATIVE

INTENT”

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. INC., VS. HON. PEDRO

GIMENEZ

G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)

FACTS

Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic

resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying

on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating

that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform

margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.

However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit

and approved the said refunds upon the ground that

Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and

formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2,

par. 18 of RA 2609.

The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin

established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed

upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the

following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of

plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the

exclusive use of end-users.”

ISSUE: Whether r not “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by

law from the payment of the margin fee.


HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609

refers to the finished product as expressed by the National

Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate

from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used

in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the

law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the

Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and

“formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin

fee.

*CHAPTER 7*

KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)

FACTS

Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v.

Guingona.

The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing

to sue but did not dismiss the case.

Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct

charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in

collaboration or joint venture with any other party because

of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the

preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA

1169 as amended by BP 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter (RA 1169, as amended)

the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of

association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line

lottery.

HELD: No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not

only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be

in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking

authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the PCSO is

prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in

sweepstakes, races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is

prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration, association or

joint venture” with others or “by itself.”

*CASES - CHAPTER 7*


EXTRINSIC AIDS

Existing aids from outside sources. Resorted after

exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and still there

remain some ambiguity in the statute.

SAMPLE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS

History of the enactment of statutes

Opinions and rulings of government officials

Actual proceedings of the legislative body

Reports and recommendations of legislative committees

Public policy

Judicial construction

Construction by the

statutory construction (part 1)

Documents