Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners, vs.THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

SYLLABUSSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; ART. 335, (par. 1), CIVIL CODE; WORDS USED IN ENUMERATING DISQUALIFIED TO ADOPT; CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. We find, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

2. ID.; A STATUTE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS NEED NOT BE INTERPRETED. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.

3. CIVIL LAW; ADOPTION; OBJECT. Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.

4. ID.; CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CLUB; ADOPTION; HAVING A CHILD, NO LONGER A DISQUALIFICATION TO ADOPT. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.PADILLA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.

Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.Footnotes

* Judge Pascual C. Barab.

1 Rollo, pp. 19-20.

2 Id., p. 8.

3 Id., p. 12.

4 Id., p. 13.

5 Id., p. 14.

6 G.R. No. L-28195, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 499.

7 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd. ed., Section 4502, p. 316.

8 In re Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244.

9 Santos vs. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160.

10 Child and Welfare Code, Art. 28

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3629 March 19, 1951ELISEO SILVA, petitioner, vs.BELEN CABRERA, respondent.

Rivera, Castao, Medina and Lozada and Roman Cruz for petitioner.Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

SYLLABUS

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE MAY BE DELEGATED ONLY TO COMMISSIONER AND TO NO ONE ELSE. Under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such reception of evidence consists in conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon relevancy and competency of the same, ruling petitions and objections that come up in the course of the hearings, and receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings. However, under section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates, any attorney or chief of division of the commission, a clerk of Court of First Instance of the peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses, provided that the same is done under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE PROVISION OF LAW IS CLEAR COMPLIANCE THEREWITH IS ESSENTIAL. Where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law of circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in several municipalities of Batangas province as well as in the City of Lipa. Eliseo Silva andOpulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of public convenience to operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that their service was adequate for the needs of the public, and that public convenience did not require the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera. Instead of the Commission conducting the corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by applicant and oppositors, Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H. Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of witnesses" in this case pursuant to the provisions of section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 known as the Public Act Attorney Aspillera conducted hearings, and received extensive evidence, oral and documentary, the transcript of the stenographic notes taken consisting of 227 pages. Thereafter, the Commission in banc rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, and finding from the evidence that public interests and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the applicant to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City, and that applicant is a Filipino citizen and is financially qualified to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant, the oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat are hereby overruled, and a certificate of public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa is hereby granted to the applicant herein, Belen Cabrera, the said certificate to be subject to the following.

Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:

ERROR I. That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in contested cases; consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to law.

ERROR II. That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the certificate to applicant-respondent Belen Cabrera.

We shall address ourselves to the first assigned error because the determination of the same disposes of this appeal. The legal point raised in this assignment of error was also raised before the Commission. At the beginning of the hearing before Attorney Aspillera, counsel for oppositors, Silva, now petitioner, asked that the hearing be had before one of the Commissioners because it was a contested case. When his petition was overruled, he made it of record that his continuing "with the hearing of this case shall not be understood as a waiver of our objection" (t. s. n., p. 3). It is therefore clear that petitioner is not raising this issue here for the first time.

While petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to take the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, respondent equally claims that said delegation is perfectly proper and legal. It will be remembered that the delegation to receive testimony was made under the provisions of section 32 of the Public Service Act (Com. Act No. 146). Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 32. The Commission may, in any investigation or hearing, by its order in writing, cause the depositions of witnesses residing within or without the Philippines to be taken in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Commission may also, by proper order, commission any of the attorneys of the Commission or chiefs of division to receive evidence, and it may likewise commission any clerk the court of first instance of justice of the Peace of the Philippines to take the testimony of the witnesses any case pending before the Commission where such witnesses reside in places distant from Manila and it would be inconvenient and expensive for them to appear personally before the Commission. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance or justice of the peace so commissioned to designate promptly a date or dates for the taking of such evidence, giving timely notice to the parties, and on such date to proceed to take the evidence, reducing it to writing. After the evidence has been taken, the justice of the peace shall forthwith certify to the correctness of the testimony of the witnesses and forward it to the Commission. It shall be the duty of the respective parties to furnish stenographers for taking and transcribing the testimony taken. In case there was no stenographers available, the testimony shall be taken in long-hand by such person as the justice of the peace may designate. For the convenience of the parties the Commission may also commission any other person to take the evidence in the same manner.

For purpose of reference we are also reproducing the pertinent portion of section 3 of the same Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, relied upon by the petitioner:

All the powers herein vested upon the Commission shall be considered vested upon any of the Commissioner, acting either individually or jointly as hereinafter provided. The Commissioners shall equitably divide among themselves all pending cases and those that may hereafter be submitted to the Commission, in such manner and from as they determine, and shall proceed to hear and determine the cases assigned to each; Provided, however, That (1) all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and the affirmative vote of at least two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a decision or a non-interlocutory order: And, provided, further, That in cases (1) and (2) the Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners, who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to render its decision. (Underlining is ours)

After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree with the petitioner that the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner in which he received the evidence, was contrary to the provisions of the public Service Act.

The law (sec. 3) is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is authorized to conduct the hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 146 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 178, the Public Service Commission only of a Public Service Commissioner and a deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner acted only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner, and in case of the latter's absence, illness or incapacity, he acted in his stead. The Public Service Commissioner alone heard and disposed of all cases, contested and non-contested. There could therefore be no hearing or decision in banc. The Legislature in promulgating Commonwealth Act 146 evidently believed that one Commissioner, either the Public Service Commissioner or his deputy if properly commissioned, was sufficient to hear and decide even contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates. Under said Commonwealth Act 146 before amendment, particularly section 32 thereof, the Commission besides authorizing the taking of depositions and the testimonies of the witnesses by clerk of courts of first instance and justice of the peace in the provinces, also authorized the reception of evidence by the Commission's attorneys and chiefs of divisions. Then came Republic Act 178 amending sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 146 making the Commission to consist of one Public Service Commissioners and two Associate Public Service Commissioner under the second section, and under section 3, as already seen from the reproduction of said section, requiring that all contested cases involving the fixing of rates, he heard and decided by the three Commissioners in banc although the reception of evidence may be delegated to one of the Commissioners alone. The inference is obvious. In contested cases like present, the Legislature did not wish to entrust the holding of a hearing and the reception of evidence to anyone but the three Commissioners acting in banc or one of them when properly authorized.

It is urged on the part of the respondent that the order of delegation in favor of Atty. Aspillera "was a mere authority `to take the testimony of witnesses in the above-entitled case', which in fact is in the form of a deposition and not a reception of evidence, much less a hearing" (p. 9, brief for respondent), and so does not violate section 3. An examination of the record does not support this contention. What Atty. Aspillera did was to represent the Commission, act as a sort of Commissioner, conduct hearings, receive evidence, oral and documentary, and pass upon petitions and objections as they came up in the course of said hearing. He even addressed questions to the witnesses. He passed upon the competency and admissibility of exhibits and admitted them. In the transcript of the stenographic notes, Atty. Aspillera is repeatedly referred to as the "Commission" and the proceedings had before him on different dates as "hearings". (t. s. n. pp. 1, 3, 52, 62, 86, 90.) After the submission of the evidence Atty. Aspillera declared the "Case submitted". (t. s. n. p. 227.) It is obvious that the evidence received by Atty. Aspillera were not mere depositions or testimonies, and that his actuation that of a mere official like a justice of the peace receiving a deposition under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The role played by Atty. Aspillera was rather that of a Commissioner under Rule 34 wherein he acted as a representative of the Commission that made the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial, either overruling or sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the question was overruled, and then making his findings and report to the body that commissioned him.

Respondent cites the case of Abel G. Flores, applicant vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., oppositor, case No. 27141 of the Public Service Commission wherein the same point of the legality of a delegation to take testimony was involved. The oppositor in that case believing that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making the delegation, brought the case to this Supreme Court under G.R. No. L-1637 but its petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit. From this, respondent infers that even in contested cases the reception of evidence may be delegated to a person other than one of the Commissioners. We have examined that case and we find that the authority given there was not to receive evidence but to take a deposition and that the person delegated was a justice of the peace. We quote a portion of the order of Associate Commissioner Gabriel P. Prieto in that case:

Es verdad que el articulo 3 de la Ley claramente dispone que en los asuntos contenciosos y en que envuelven la fijacion de tarifas la Comision solo puede delegar la recepcion de lads pruebas a cualquiera de sus Comisionados. Pero tambien es cierto, que la deposicion no una delegacion de la recepcion de las pruebas, porque al funcionario que la toma, la ley no le concede las facultades del tribunal que ha ordenado dicha deposicion. En efecto, la Regla 18 de los Reglamentos que regula esta actuacion, no autoriza al funcionario que toma la deposicion para resolver las cuestiones que surgen o se suscitan durante su actuacion; no le faculta para hacer sus conclusiones de hecho o de derecho; ni le permite, siquiera, rendir informe o report de todo lo actuado. Su unica ogligacion es certificar la declaracion tal como ha sido prestada por el deponente. El que toma la deposicion no es como el arbitro o comisionado de que habla la Regla 34 de los Reglamentos, que actua por delegacion y obra en representacion del tribunal que le ha nombrado.

It will readily be noticed from the portion of the order above-quoted that Commissioner Prieto admits that under section 3 as amended, in contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, the Commission may delegate the reception of evidence only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else.

The respondent also calls our attention to the case of Cebu Transit Co. Inc., vs. Jereza, (58 Phil., 760), wherein this court held that the Commission was authorized to designate Commissioners for the purpose of receiving evidence, and that the law did not contain any prohibition. That case is inapplicable for at that time in the year 1933 when the case was decided, Republic Act 178 had not yet been promulgated, said Act having passed only in 1947.

In conclusion, we hold that under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act 178, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such reception of evidence consists in conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon the relevancy and competency of the same, ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the hearings, and receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings. However, under section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates, any attorney of chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a Justice of the Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses, provided that the same is done under provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the authority so given, are in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the proceedings had thereunder to be null and void. Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service Commission so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the Commission in banc of before any of the Commissioners if properly authorized, unless of course, said parties agree at said hearing or hearings to re-submit the evidence already presented and taken down, with such modifications and under such conditions as they may agree upon, including such other evidence which they may wish to present. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

SYLLABUS1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW; WHEN A LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; LICENSE REQUIREMENT; SECRET AGENT NOT EXEMPT; CASE AT BAR. As secret agent is not included in the enumeration in Section 897 of the Revised Administrative Code of persons who are not prohibited in Section 878, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, from possessing "any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition," appellant is not exempt from the requirement of license.

3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN PEOPLE V. MACARANDANG OVERRULED. Reliance of the accused in the case at bar on People v. Macarandang, 106 Phil. 713, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a `peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 897," is misplaced. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

FERNANDO, J.:The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.tThereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.Footnotes1Exhibit 1.

2Exhibit 2.

3Exhibit 3.

4Exhibit 4.

5Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.

6Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.

7Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.

8L-12088, December 23, 1959.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 24116-17 August 22, 1968CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs.MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Tomas P. Matic, Jr. and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for plaintiff-appellant.Fernan, Osmea and Bellaflor for defendants-appellees.

SYLLABUS1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: DISTRAINT AND LEVY; POWER OF MUNICIPAL TREASURER TO SEIZE AND DISTRAINT PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR FAILURE TO PAY TAX WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED, INSTANT CASE. The clear and explicit language of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and distraint any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to tax upon failure "to pay the same at the time required . . . ." There was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into play.

2. ID.; ID.; LAW IS NOT AMENDED BY MERE LETTER OF MUNICIPAL TREASURER. Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend the law. It has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.

3. ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 2305 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IN INSTANT CASE. As correctly held by the lower court "the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code. From the time that plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30, 1962, certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed. If the sale did not take place, as was advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on January 30, 1962, it was due to the requests for deferment made by plaintiff which unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax collector was already well publicized for many months."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; APPEAL; ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL. This being a direct appeal to this Court, plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower court found as established by the evidence, only questions of law being brought to us for review. It is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below.

FERNANDO, J.:In two separate actions, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of the distraint and thereafter the sale at public auction by the principal defendant-appellee, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960, municipal license tax for 1961 as well as the penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00. The lower court rendered a joint decision sustaining the validity of the action taken by defendant-appellee Municipality of Naga. The case is now before us on appeal. We affirm.

According to the appealed decision: "From all the evidence, mostly documentary, adduced during the hearing the following facts have been established. The efforts of the defendant Treasurer to collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Series of 1959 on cement factories located within the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time and again. The demands made on the taxpayer ... have not been entirely successful. Finally, the defendant Treasurer decided on June 26, 1961 to avail of the Civil remedies provided for under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days from receipt thereof within which to settle the account, computed as follows ...: Deficiency Municipal License Tax for 1960 P80,250.00; Municipal License Tax for 1961 P90,000.00; and 20% Penalty P34,050.00, stating in exasperation, "This is our last recourse as we had exhausted all efforts for an amicable solution of our problem." "1It was further shown: "On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was "distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total amount of P204,300.00" ... This notice was received by the acting officer in charge of the plaintiff's plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his own admission. At first, he was not in accord with the said letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for time to study the same, but in the afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint ..." 2As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn "signed the receipt for goods, articles or effects seized under authority of Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certifying that he has constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu Portland Cement Company at its plant at Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that "the said articles or goods will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction of the account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total amount of P204,300.00 due the Municipality of Naga Province of Cebu" ..."3The lower court likewise found as a fact that on the same day, July 6, 1961, the municipal treasurer posted the notice of sale to the effect that pursuant to the provisions of Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code, he would sell at public auction for cash to the highest bidder at the main entrance of the municipal building of the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines on the 27th day of July, 1961, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the property seized and distrained or levied upon from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and penalties in the amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be sold was 100,000 bags of Apo cement.4 No sale, as thus announced, was held on July 27, 1961. It was likewise stated in the appealed decision that there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: "1. The auction sale took place on January 30, 1962, ..."5In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company upholds the view that the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement as well as the sale at public auction thereafter made ran counter to the law. As earlier noted, we do not see it that way.

1. On the validity of the distraint In the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits as illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made on July 6, 1961. Its contention is premised on the fact that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26, 1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it was given a period of 10 days from receipt within which it could pay, failure to do so being the occasion for the distraint of its property. It is now alleged that the 10-day period of grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.

It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law. According to the Revised Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon the failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint."6The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required ..." There was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into play.1wph1.tWhatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend the law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. That was what occurred in this case.72. On the validity of the auction sale The validity of the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 is challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly committed by the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until January 16, 1962 that it was notified that the public auction sale was to take place on January 29, 1962. It is its view that under the Revised Administrative Code8 the sale of the distrained property cannot take place "less than twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property [distrained] ... and the publication or posting of such notice."

Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by the lower court in the appealed decision. Thus: "With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice, it is believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code. From the time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30, 1962, certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed. If the sale did not take place, as advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on January 30, 1962, it was due to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax collector was already well-publicized for many months."9 The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be disputed. Under the circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries conviction.

The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on January 29, 1962, as stated in the notice of sale, but on the next day, January 30, 1962. According to plaintiff-appellant: "On this score alone, the sale ..., was illegal as it was not made on the time stated in the notice." 10There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the lower court is otherwise. Thus: "On January 16, 1962, the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would cause the readvertisement for sale at public auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement which were under constructive distraint ... On January 19, 1962, the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale, which fixed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 A.M., as the date of sale, posting the said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the interested parties in the previous notice, ... Ultimately, the bidding was conducted on that day, January 30, 1962, with the representatives of the Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer present. Only two bidders submitted sealed bids. After the bidding, the defendant-treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning bidder, ..." 11This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower court found as established by the evidence, only questions of law being brought to us for review. It is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below. 12WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated 23, 1964, is affirmed in toto. With costs against plaintiff-appellant.1wph1.tConcepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.Footnotes1Decision of July 23, 1964 of the lower court, Record on Appeal, pp. 166- 167.

2Ibid, pp. 167-168.

3Ibid, pp. 169-170.

4Ibid, pp. 170-171.

5Ibid, p. 172.

6Section 2304, Act No. 2711 as amended.

7Cf. Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504 (1913); People v. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. v. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968.

8"See. 2305. Proceedings subsequent to seizure. The officer levying the distraint shall make or cause to be made an account of the goods or effects distrained, a copy of which signed by himself shall be left either with the owner or person from whose possession such goods or effects were taken, or at the dwelling or place of business of such person and with some one of suitable age and discretion, to which list shall be added a statement of the sum demanded and note of the time and place of sale; and the said officer shall forthwith cause a notification to be exhibited in not less than two public places in the municipality where the distraint was made, specifying the time and place of sale and the articles distrained. The time of sale shall not be less than twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property as above specified and the publication or posting of such notice. One place for the posting of such notice shall be at the office of the mayor of the municipality in which the property is distrained. At the time and place fixed in such notice the said officer shall sell the goods, or effects, so distrained, at public auction, to the highest bidder for cash..." .

9Decision of the lower court, Record on Appeal, p. 180.

10Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 37.

11Decision of July 23, 1964 of the lower court, p. 175.

12Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., L-21749, September 29, 1967. See also Perez v. Araneta, L-18414, July 15, 1968 and the cases cited therein.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26712-16 December 27, 1969UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTERS, BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA, BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, COMMISSION OF ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, petitioners, vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

Sedfrey A. Ordoez for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor

SYLLABUS1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION; NO AUTHORITY TO CONDONE PENALTIES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioners posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.

2. ID.; ID.; PREMIUMS; PENALTY FOR LATE PAYMENT; REASON; GOOD OR BAD FAITH OF EMPLOYER, IRRELEVANT. The prescribed penalty for late payment of the contributions due is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take lightly the States exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republics declared policy "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and to provide protection to employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by force of law.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION; NO AUTHORITY TO CONDONE PENALTIES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS; SECTION 4 OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. Nowhere from the powers enumerated in Section 4 of the Social Security Act may it be shown that the Social Security Commission is granted expressly or by implications the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Social Security Act.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNDS PAID HELD IN TRUST BY SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION. The funds contributed to the Social Security System by compulsion of law have already been held by Us to be "funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government." Being a mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties, that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an express or specific authority therefor.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT OF LAW INVOLVED. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent Commissions refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for otherwise, we would be sanctioning the Commissions reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGED CONDONATION TO OTHERS; NO BASIS. The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the Court, and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such condonations would be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases. Nevertheless, assuming such conclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed Order of September 22, 1966 makes of record that since its Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, which it reiterated in another resolution dated August 18, 1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand, pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation, that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO ESTOPPEL ON SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION. Granting that the Social Security Commission had erred in the past in granting condonations of penalties without legal authority, the Court has held time and again that "it is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."cralaw virtua1aw library

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PETITION FOR CONDONATION OF PENALTIES. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by petitioners in their second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as, in fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum. The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties does not mean, as petitioners contend, that the commission was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss their petition on the same legal ground. The Commissions action has thus paved the way for a final ruling of the Court on the matter.

Buenaventura J. Guerrero for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:In this appeal from an order of the Social Security Commission, we uphold the Commission's Order dismissing the petition before it, on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act1 vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the Social Security Act.

The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964 separate petitions with respondent Commission, contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious missionary work in the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners. After several hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from further contesting said coverage, manifesting that they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its program of social amelioration, with which they are in complete accord. They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount of P69,446.42 for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963.

In support of their request for condonation, petitioners alleged that they had labored under the impression that as international organizations, they were not subject to coverage under the Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by certain Social Security System officials, they paid to the System in October, 1963, the total amount of P81,341.80, representing their back premiums for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963. They further claimed that the penalties assessed against them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent Commission which in the past allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties.

On May 25, 1966, respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security Commission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance, to which petitioners filed their opposition of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its reply thereto of June 22, 1966.

Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966. At the hearing, petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument. Upon petition of the System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would be deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum, and respondent System filed its memorandum on August 4, 1966.

On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition, as follows:

Considering all of the foregoing, this Commission finds, and so holds, that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it cannot legally do so. The policy enunciated in Commission Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, cited by the parties, in their respective pleadings, has been reiterated in Commission Resolution No. 878, dated August 18, 1966, wherein the Commission adopting the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation of the Social Security Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondent System, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, the amount of P69,446.42 representing the penalties payable by them, broken down as follows:

United Christian Missionary SocietyP5,253.53

Board of Mission of the Evangelical United Brothers Church7,891.74

United Church Board for World Ministers12,353.75

Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations33,019.36

Board of Foreign Mission of the Reformed Church in America10,928.04

TOTAL

P 69,446.42

Upon failure of the petitioners to comply with this Order within the period specified herein, a warrant shall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the property of the petitioners as may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability of the petitioners to the System.

This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this question of first impression as to whether or not respondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances.

We find no error in the Commission's action.

1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioners' posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.

The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security Act peremptorily provides that:

SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding sections shall be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. "Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid . . .2No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law's mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to the System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's declared policy "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."3 In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by force of law.

2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent Commission's power of direction and control over the system, as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does have the authority to condone the penalty for late payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to "perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act." The law does not bear out this contention. Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the Commission. Nowhere from said powers of the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act.

3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us to be "funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government."4 Being a mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties, that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an express or specific authority therefor.

4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.

5. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted condonation of penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the Commission with grave abuse of discretion in not having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting condonation of penalties. They invoke more compelling considerations of equity in their cases, in that they are non-profit religious organizations who minister to the spiritual needs of the Filipino people, and that their delay in the payment of their premiums was not of a contumacious or deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well-founded belief that the Social Security Act did not apply to their missionaries.

The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the Court, and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such condonations would be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases. Nevertheless, assuming such conclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed Order of September 22, 1966 makes of record that since its Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, which it reiterated in another resolution dated August 18, 1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand, pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation, that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."

6. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal position. Granting that it had erred in the past in granting condonation of penalties without legal authority, the Court has held time and again that "it is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."5 Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately violate the law may be conceded, and was borne out by their later withdrawal in May, 1966 of their original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their social security coverage. The point, however, is that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability of the Social Security Act to them, in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus incurred the 3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment. The proper procedure would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability therefor, thereby preventing the penalty from attaching. This would have been the prudent course, considering that the Act provides in Section 22 (b) thereof that the premiums which the employer refuses or neglects to pay may be collected by the System in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code, and that at the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting their coverage, the Court had already ruled in effect against their contest three years earlier, when it held in Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission6 that the legislature had clearly intended to include charitable and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as petitioners, within the scope and coverage of the Social Security Act.

7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by petitioners in their second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum. The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties does not mean, as petitioners contend, that the Commission was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss their petition on the same legal ground.7 The Commission's action has thus paved the way for a final ruling of the Court on the matter.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes1 Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.

2 Emphasis supplied.

3 Section 2, Social Security Act; Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10 (January 20, 1961).

4 Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission, fn 3.

5 E. Rodriguez, Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 28 SCRA 1119, 1130 and cases cited (July 31, 1969).

6 Fn 3.

7 The case referred to is Social Security System, appellee vs. Woodwork Inc., appellant, CA-G.R. No. 36668-R. The Court of Appeals therein upheld the Commission's ruling in its decision of October 20, 1969, pursuant to its decisions in two other appealed cases, Luzsteveco vs. SSC, CA-G.R. No. 38425-R, June 30, 1969 and Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. vs. SSS, CA-GR No. 39250-R, August 14, 1969, although it remanded the records of the case to the SSS to give the appellant an opportunity to go over the assessment schedules for the purpose only of determining the exact amount of penalties due.