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Strategic Security Future for Indo-Asia-Pacific Region Australia; The European Tiger Zorba Parer

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Page 1: Startegic futures

Strategic Security Future for Indo-Asia-Pacific Region

Australia; The European TigerZorba Parer

Page 2: Startegic futures

Defining the Region

• A China centric view of the region is forming around clear data indicating a growth in all elements of Chinese national power

• Indo-Asia-Pacific as a hemispherical system• Indo-Asia-Pacific maritime region• The Indian Ocean maritime region• The Pacific Ocean maritime region• Mainland Asia

Page 3: Startegic futures

Sub-Regions• Asia

– North, East, South, West• Indian Ocean

– SLOC to Africa, Middle East, Mediterranean, Europe, Asia and littoral regions• Pacific Ocean

– SLOC to South America, North America, Siberia, Asia, and Pacific Littoral States

• Oceania– Passage between Indian and Pacific oceans.– SLOC to Australian east coast and New Zealand

• This is a region dominated by maritime geography, and transport economics.

Page 4: Startegic futures

Exceptionalism• Quadrella of exceptional States– USA; Global hegemonic power, balancing costs of maintaining

the Global Commons, with ability to influence State to State relations.

– China; Communist Billion Citizen State, seeking to rise pacifically.

– India; Most populous democracy, seeking to ensure continued Indian Ocean dominance, and influence within the Asia land mass.

– Japan; forced demilitarisation, economic power projection, civil institutions with monopoly on use of force within Japanese jurisdiction.

Page 5: Startegic futures

Articles Reviewed

• Cooperation from Strength The United States, China and the South China Sea– January 2012, Edited by Patrick M. Cronin– Contributors, Patrick M Cronin, Peter A Dutton, M Taylor

Fravel, James R Holmes, Robert D Kaplan, Will Rogers, and Ian Storey

• Power and Choice; Asian Security Futures– Rory Medcalf

• International Relations of Asia (2008)– Chapter 15 by Ralph A Cossa

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International Relations of Asia

• No settled pattern of order in Asia. All the major powers are in processes of transition.

• Rise of China as single most significant contributor to regional change in Asian power structures.

• India rising, but not as quickly as China.• Need for domestic structural reforms and uncertainties

about how best to assert a more active international and regional role are evident in Japan.

• Russia trying to reassert its Asia presence.• Continued reliance on US military dominance.

Page 7: Startegic futures

International Relations of Asia• Growing Chinese pre-eminence• Japan seeking to ‘normalise’ as a nation• India looking east, seeking a more active role in Asia-Pacific• ASEAN; increasingly institutionalised, driving regional cooperation• Near term security issues

– Korean Peninsula tensions– China-Taiwan tensions

• Continued importance of existing USA-Bilateral security arrangements

• Geopolitical Considerations• Regional geographical considerations

Page 8: Startegic futures

International Relations of Asia

• Pathways to the Future; Two Scenarios– Continuation of current order, moderated by USA primacy

• Dependent on massive military commitments to the region• At risk of a declining USA economy• Increased US involvement in regional multilateralism

– Multipolar system, with sub-regional hegemens dominating the Indo-Asia-Pacific region• A weakening US • Chinese band wagoning by US allied states• Concert of powers possible (US, China, India, and Russia)• Coalitions attempting to form a balance of powers.

Page 9: Startegic futures

Cooperation from StrengthChapter I – Executive Summary

• Main thesis - Cooperative Primacy– Increased US Naval presence, contingent upon a

healthy US Economy. – A new web of US security partnerships– Peace and security assurance in the South China Sea– Increased US economic engagement in the Region– Increased focus on US-China relations, supporting

rules based system of cooperation and dispute resolution

Page 10: Startegic futures

Cooperation from StrengthChapter I – Executive Summary

• History as a record of Chinese geostrategic centrality in Asia

• 150 Years of political upheaval after Millennia of Chinese rule

• Chinese claims over South China Sea can be understood as a Greater Caribbean moment– Constructivism anyone?

• Leading Asian arms modernisation• Hemispherical economic dependencies– Could China survive without Japan?

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter I – Executive Summary

• Nations surrounding China, economically engaged and hedging USA as an offshore balancer– US Chinese conflict not a favourable option for risk

averse minor nations: Australia, NZ, Papua, Indonesia. Produces bias against any China-US conflict.

– [Z} Australian Defence Budget as an indicator• Submarines as the ultimate maritime presence• Aerial surveillance and the age drones• Air lift and emergency response

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter I – Executive Summary

• China rebuffs attempts to move the South China Sea disputes from regional to global forums

• Great power behaviour evident in Chinese moves to bilateral agreements, versus multilateral engagement– Does USA movement to multilateral engagement signal a

abdication of their Great Power status?– Limits of Realism in an Institutionalised power structure?

• UNCLOS and other Customary International Laws tend to limit Great Power influence.– Theoretical tangent: Is this an example of a self destructive

tendency in Great Power behaviour? Self enforcing natural laws?

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter II - Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the competition over Maritime Rights

• Multiple state claimants over territory is a feature of geostrategic reality in the south China sea.

• US maritime predominance necessary.• US Neutrality in Regional Dynamics• Chinese Maritime realities• ASEAN and Littoral Regions• Conflict avoidance to balance policy for US foreign

diplomacy

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter III - Treaties

• History of Chinese sovereign claim. • Chinese claims not supported by UNCLOS• Maritime Resources

– Important fishing grounds– Crude oil– Natural Gas

• Sea Lane Security• Chinese policy of reassurance, and bilateral agreements

between claimants– Engagement through ASEAN in multilateral appeasement,

reversed after unpromising start

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter III - Treaties

• China insists on bilateral approach– No substantive agreements have been reached via bilateral

approaches• Other claimants prefer multilateral approach to

balance Chinese influence• Failure of the 2002 DoC; further talks• China will continue blocking moves for arbitration and

3rd party intervention• China will continue asserting effective control over the

South China Sea in pursuit of it’s sovereign claims

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter IV -Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea

• China asserting interests in ways which threaten the normative global maritime commons

• China seeking to Shape CIL through State behaviour

• Challenges to established positions of UNCLOS• Three pillars of Modern Globalisation– Open, Market based access to resources and trade– International Institutions fostering stability– Stability in the Global Commons

Page 17: Startegic futures

Cooperation from StrengthChapter IV -Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea

• Managing the Maritime commons• Right of access to the high seas– Enshrined in UN Charter

• Constabulary role of Navies• Multiple forms of State maritime jurisdiction• Chinese anti-access policy towards SCS• Regional Baselines– Boundaries at or near the shoreline between a coastal

state’s fully sovereign territory and the maritime zones that extend seaward.

Page 18: Startegic futures

Cooperation from StrengthChapter IV -Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea

• China is seeking to change the rules and norms that define maritime rights

• US and allies should act against this change• US should ratify UNCLOS– Great power – multilateral dilemma?

Page 19: Startegic futures

Cooperation from StrengthChapter V – The Role of Natural Resources in the South China Sea

• Natural Resources– Energy– Fisheries– Minerals

• The Challenge of Climate Change• Dynamic interaction between Land and Maritime

resources• Promoting regional stability– Alternative Fuels– Adaptive technologies

Page 20: Startegic futures

Cooperation from StrengthChapter VI – Rough Waters for Coalition Building

• US Maritime Strategy– Good order at sea– Three Principles:

• Preserving freedom of the Seas• Ensuring uninterrupted flow of shipping• Facilitating ready movement of goods and people access across US

frontiers

• Current Maritime cooperation in SCS– US assistance programs– CARAT and SEACAT

• Challenges to Maritime coalition building

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter VI – Rough Waters for Coalition Building

• 500 years with a global maritime hegemon– Portugal – Holland – England – USA

• Multinational trusteeship (Multipolarity) would be a new phenomenon

• Dual nature of Navies makes it difficult to distinguish between Competitive and Cooperative State behaviours

• The China Factor– Chinese policy assertions of indisputable sovereignty over SCS

islands and waters– Failure of DOC– Reactions to CARAT

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Cooperation from StrengthChapter VI – Rough Waters for Coalition Building

• Globalised economy relies of free flow of goods

• Southeast Asian states have territorial claims at stake

• Beijing view of vital interest against coalitions• Washing should work bilaterally to uphold

maritime security

Page 23: Startegic futures

Power and ChoiceFutures

• Future 1: US Primacy• Future 2: An Asian Balance of Powers• Future 3: Concert of Powers• Future 4: Chinese Primacy• Shocks

Page 24: Startegic futures

Zorba’s Thoughts• Commitments made under ASEAN agree to pacific

resolution of disputes. – Arbitration offices provided.– Disputes agreed through offsets in resolutions.– Costs of providing courts as a common good.– Dams as an example of transnational water disputes.

• Domestic constructivism– Uncertainties arising from domestic politics– Model Theories.

• Chinese Maritime presence– http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/

Page 25: Startegic futures

Zorba Thoughts

• Secondary Effects - Cooperative Primacy– Answer to increased traffic through Chinese waters, the

enforcement agency grew. – This has led China to effect control of East and South China

Seas.• Nuclear capabilities on Hainan Island lead to a South China Sea

predominance.• China continues to assert rights in these matters. • Arbitration as an answer? Not likely, international laws currently

favour the Chinese opposition. China has a negative bias in acceding to any international arbitration.

• Assertions of Exceptionalism.

Page 26: Startegic futures

Vietnam - Maritime Movements

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Vietnam - Maritime Movements

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Taiwan - Maritime Movements

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Taiwan – 8hrs Later

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East China Sea- Maritime Movements

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Korean Peninsula

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Japan – Maritime Movements

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Japan – Maritime Movements

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Dutch – Maritime Movements

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Major Strategic Factors

• US military dominance• Chinese resource demands• Japanese economic power• Indian resource demands• Multiple minor to medium sized nations

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Middle and Small states

• State Survival• Maintaining Sovereignty• Balancing Great Powers• Engagement through Multilateralism