south africa in southern africa : a...
TRANSCRIPT
Siphamandla Zondi
South Africa in Southern Africa:
A PerspectiveA perspective
FES
Peac
e
and Security Series
Imprint:Published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung MozambiqueAvenida Tomás Nduda 1313, Maputo, MozambiqueTel.: +258-21-491231, Fax: +258-21-490286Email: [email protected]©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2012
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Siphamandla Zondi is the Director of the Institute
for Global Dialogue (IGD) and an honorary
professor of Politics and Development Studies at
the University of South Africa. He holds a PhD and
Mphil in African Studies and a BA, BA Hons (cum
laude) and Higher Diploma in Education from the
former University of Durban-Westville (UDW).
He lectured for a part-time basis at UDW and the
University of Johannesburg.
Between 2000 and 2003, he researched SADC
integration, social and sustainable development at
Africa Institute of South Africa. In 2004, he joined
the IGD as leader of the Africa and southern Africa
programme.
He lectures and talks in various fora on foreign
policy, African diplomacy, the governance-
development nexus in Africa, regional integration
and south-south cooperation.
Siphamandla Zondi
South Africa in Southern Africa:
A Perspective
CONTENTS
Introduction 4
South Africa in Africa: Context and Contours 5
South Africa’s Leadership and Regional Power Dynamics 7
South Africa and the Commitment to Regional Stability 10
Southern Africa and South African Foreign Policy in Practice 14
Peacekeeping, Mediation and Reconstruction: South Africa’s Regional Leadership in
Practice 17
South Africa and Peacekeeping 17
Mediation and Peace Negotiations: Case Studies 18
The DRC 19
Zimbabwe 20
Rebuilding post-conflict societies 22
What to Make of the Transition from Mbeki to Zuma? 25
Libya 25
Cote d’Ivoire 26
Implications of Cote d’Ivorie and Libya 27
Synopsis and Prognosis: Where to from Here? 28
Conclusion 31
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
4
Introduction
The focus on Southern Africa and the consolida-
tion of continental African unity and progress con-
stitute key pillars of South Africa’s post-apartheid
foreign policy. The declared interest with regard to
both Africa and Southern Africa is to work towards
better conditions for regional and continental inte-
gration. Key amongst such conditions has been to
ensure an end to all conflicts and to strengthen po-
litical stability. In this regard, it is important to point
to the co-incidence between global transforma-
tions following the fall of the Soviet Union and the
democratic wave on the continent, within which
also South Africa’s defeat of apartheid found its
expression. Afterwords the country was modelled
as an active agent of transformation in Africa as
well as in world affairs, which has also been the ba-
sis of its ambition to become a responsible African
citizen (Lewis 2001:2) and a norm entrepreneur
(Geldenhuys in Carlsnaes and Nel, 2006). Hence,
the young democracy was thrust into the role of
a catalyst for the birth of a new Africa by champi-
oning peace diplomacy and peacekeeping, by re-
building continental and regional institutions, and
by catalyzing its development agenda.
However, although South Africa plays a leading
role in strengthening regional stability, this does
not always translate into a sufficiently robust
leadership which is mainly due to two reasons:
first, the country refuses every temptation to
openly become a regional hegemon; and secondly,
its past experiences with military incursions and
trade blockages made it eternally vigilant against
temptations to throw its weight around. This
paper argues that contestations amongst analysts
about whether South Africa exercises its regional
power robustly or timidly has to do with divergent
interpretations of its power dynamics. For South
Africa to effectively lead the region it needs
more than political will and capability; it needs
acceptance of its leadership by its neighbours
and legitimacy in the eyes of regional citizens.
Yet, not all of these four ingredients of regional
leadership are present in South Africa’s role in the
region. While its commitment to lead stabilization
and development in the region is evident, its
acceptability and legitimacy is in question in some
quarters. This imposes limitations to its relatively
superior hard and soft power currency and hence,
to its active role as a leader.
5
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
South Africa in Africa: Context
and Contours
It is common for writings on this subject to lay
out a context whose main message is that South
Africa’s foreign policy began in 1994 and according
to which the country is new in international affairs.
Therefore, a dominant view describes South Africa’s
leadership ambitions in Africa as either ‘too weak’
or ‘hegemonic’. However, this view is incorrect
for two main reasons: The first is that the analysis
of South Africa’s role in Africa and foreign policy
in general fails to recognize that the governing
African National Congress (ANC) has been an active
player in international relations since the beginning
of the 20th century. It is common knowledge that
at the turn of the last century, educated African
nationalists sought to find institutional platforms
through which to express their aspirations for rights
and voice in South Africa while also formulating
ideas about the international environment. One
of the first foreign policy statements by this elite
would be about South Africa as part of an Africa
that was to rediscover its self-worth, potential,
and future glory. In an article published in the
African Abroad periodical on 5 April 1906, Prixley
ka Seme, one of the future founders of the South
African Native National Congress (SANNC) before
it became the ANC, linked the struggle for freedom
in South Africa to the awakening of Africa. Thus,
the ANC’s paradigm of international relations was
particularly formed pan-Africanist and Afrocentric
in nature.1
The placing of Africa in South African foreign
policy first as well as the deep belief in the capacity
of Africa to redeem itself, consequently have their
roots in the turn of the last century and colours
foreign policy thinking until today. Hence, the
African Renaissance mantra under President Mbeki
was an implementation of the longstanding ANC
1 Pixley ka Isaka Seme, 1906. “The Regeneration of Africa” in The African Abroad, 5 April.
ideology on foreign policy, which was elaborated
in great detail in discussion documents for the
movement’s 1997 national conference.
The second reason is that at the begnning of the 20th century, colonial and apartheid states recognized that South Africa needed to play an active role in Africa. Literature shows that under Jan Smuts, South Africa played an active role in shaping post-war dispensation including the creation of the League of Nations. Both liberal governments and coalitions between conservatives and liberals (Afrikaner nationalists and English liberals) would continue to play an active role in global affairs, though neglecting Africa in general. However, when the struggle for democracy and liberation of blacks (Africans, Indians and Coloureds) intensified, the conservative apartheid state would re-enter the African political geography in pursuit of countering the successful mobilization by movements in exile. The apartheid state’s engagement with Africa and especially with Southern Africa was not limited to military incursions and economic blockades. It would also include ‘dialogue’ with some states in order to win them over as well as secret slush funds in order to buy the support of some African states. According to Sifiso Ndlovu (2006), African countries that warmed up to the apartheid state’s diplomacy of dialogue during the 1970s included Ghana, Lesotho, Gabon, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Upper Volta, Senegal, Togo, and Uganda. Certainly, a group of countries including Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania stood opposed to dialogue with the apartheid regime.2
2 For useful material on this subject, see C. Legum, 1975. Southern Africa: The Secret Diplomacy of Détente, London: Rex Collings; C.Legum, 1976. Vorster’s Gamble for Africa: How the Search for Peace Failed, London: Rex Collings; B. Geldenhuys, 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, Braamfontein: Macmillan; R. Pfister, 2003. ‘Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961–1994’, PhD thesis, Rhodes University; and S. Nolutshungu, 1975. South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
6
Hence, South Africa’s foreign policy engagements
within Africa are not new: whether as part of the
apartheid state’s efforts to manipulate African
countries’ belief in the efficacy of political dialogue
and non-violence or as part of the mobilization
of African countries and peoples in support of
the liberation struggle. Accordingly, Africa plays
an important role in the DNA of the country’s
foreign policy. Mainstream scholarship of post-
apartheid foreign policy and South Africa’s complex
relationship with Africa would benefit from a
greater use of the literature shedding light on the
evolution of the ANC’s diplomacy.3
3 See, for instance, .M. Ndlovu, 2004. ‘ The ANC and the World’, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1960-1970, Vol. 1, Cape Town: Zebra Press. The author is working on a publication reviewing precisely this question of continuities between the ANC’s brand of internationalism, which is generally progressive and pragmatic, and South Africa’s foreign policy.
7
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
South Africa’s Leadership and
Regional Power Dynamics
An important factor in the aforementioned debate
is the contested understanding of the relationship
between South Africa’s power currency and the
nature of its (potential) leadership. Accordingly,
there is no debate on the significance of the
country’s hard and soft power.4
Following up on this, the country possesses a much
larger and diversified economy than its neighbours.
Its modern infrastructure, natural resources base,
industrialization, and integration into the world
economy are significant. South Africa’s superior
economic competitiveness offers an economic
clout and in fact bequeaths significant amounts
of diplomatic capital to South Africa’s leadership
potential (Chauvin and Gaulier, 2002:8).
Economists argue that the higher the economic
growth for South Africa, the more influence it has
and the more it wants to participate, so to maintain
a healthy environment that allows it to prosper.
South Africa produces around $160 billion of
economic output, while the rest of the combined
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
produces around $33 billion. South Africa is also
the largest spender of FDI in SADC states. (Alden &
Soko 2005: 374). Therefore, Landsberg and Kondlo
(2007: 8) suggest that “(i)t can easily be asserted
that the Republic seeks to push this agenda in
order to maintain this advantage. Indeed, there
have already been accusations that South Africa
uses its political role in the continent to advance its
business interests.”
4 Adam Habib contends that South Africa’s hegemonic ambitions may not be actively pursued but they are naturally an outcome of its possession of political, military, economic and cultural attributes of hard power unparalleled in Africa. See Habib, A. 2010. ‘South African Foreign Policy: Context and Contours,’ in Zondi, S. and Masters, L. (Eds). The Future of South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change? Pretoria: Institute for Global Dialogue.
Moreover, it has advantages in various areas that
constitute ingredients of its power currency in
regard to the region. For instance, it has a large
and sophisticated security establishment lavished
with relatively better resources. With a military
expenditure of $4,040 million in 2007, it is ranked
the largest one in Africa.5 Besides, it has diplomatic
missions with all its neighbours and many more
other countries on global scale, which helps to
promote its interests on the African continent and
globally.6 Furthermore, its development assistance
equips the country with immense soft power in so
far as by supporting capacity building programmes
in post-conflict countries, it builds a case for its
recognition as a responsible regional enforcer.
Additionally, it is the epicentre of scientific and
educational establishments in the region. It
possesses advanced technology in the areas of
communication and energy as well as a superior
infrastructure.
This superior power currency has been used to
some extent to help end conflicts, consolidate
democracy and governance, accelerate job-
creating and diversify industrialization, boost
intra-regional trade, and attract more inward
investment. Furthermore, it would help to
strengthen the region’s role in a changing global
environment and enable it to negotiate its relations
with others better than is the current case. Besides,
South Africa’s power currency has the potential to
assist Africa in managing the major scramble for
its resources driven by competition between the
BRICS countries and the old western powers.
While this relatively superior power generates
expectations of a more robust and active leadership
5 ‘The Military Balance for 2009.’ Available at www.iiss.org (accessed on 3 July 2011).
6 Henwood, R. 1997. ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems,’ in Solomon, H. (ed.) Fairy-Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In search of a South African Foreign Policy, Midrand: ISS.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
8
for the good of the region, it also generates concerns
and insecurities amongst some of South Africa’s
neighbours and continental rivals. Thus, there is a
tendency of its large business sector to aggressively
expand into the region and to replicate the ills of
global capitalism regarding a blatant exploitation
of labourers and small suppliers of goods as well
as an expropriation of profit back to South Africa.
All of this has generated a lot of concerns within
the region about what Patrick Bond calls ‘sub-
imperialism’ on the part of South Africa.7
Concerning the limitations of its capability, the
question is whether South Africa has done what
it should have done in order to ensure stronger
regional stability and security. This is subject to a
major debate amongst observers and practitioners
alike. On the one hand, there are those who argue
that while the country has contributed significantly
to the stabilization and strengthening of Africa and
Southern Africa, there has been a lack in leadership
ambitions both in economic8 and political terms.9
However, they note the positive impact of the
African Renaissance Agenda in ending conflicts in
countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Comoros, and Zimbabwe.10 They also recognize
the active leadership by South Africa in the reform
of SADC including the creation of a stronger Organ
on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
7 See Bond, P. 2004. “The George Bush of Africa: Pretoria chooses Subimperialism,” Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, 13 July.
8 Games, D. 2004. “The experience of South African firms doing business in Africa: A preliminary survey and analysis”, Business in Africa Report, 1, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
9 Solomon, H. “South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership,’ in Solomon, H. (ed.), Fairy-Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In search of a South African Foreign Policy, Midrand: ISS.
10 Landsberg, C. and Kondlo, K. 2007. ‘South Africa and the ‘African Agenda,’ Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
with the regional programme called the Strategic
Indicative Programme of the Organ (SIPO) as well
as the stabilization of the African Union, and the
championing of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) (Maloka, 2001).
Consequently, the country’s superior hard and
soft power currencies are seen as a major asset
in South Africa’s ability to shape the course of
regional economic or political affairs. However,
some scholars decry what they see as inadequate
leadership, which they ascribe to the negative
ramifications of its leadership role during the
military intervention in Lesotho in the mid-1990s
and the negative feedback to the country’s push
for suspension of Nigeria over the assassination
of Niger Delta activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, during
Mandela’s presidency. It is said that these
experiences forced South Africa to work with key
African countries11 through partnership, or to take
the lead cautiously or quietly such as in Zimbabwe
and the DRC.12
On the other hand, critics lambast South Africa for
playing the role of a mercantilist, fair-godmother,
big brother, and a hegemon.13 While there are
different shades of this argument, the common
refrain is that South Africa excessively pursues its
11 Le Pere, G. and Alden, C. 2009. “South Africa in Africa: bound to lead?” Politikon: South African journal of political studies, 36 (1). pp. 145-169.
12 Sadie, Y. and Schoeman, M. 2000. “Zimbabwe: Lessons for and response from South Africa and the region”, In South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2000/01, SAIIA, pp. 261-262.
13 See Solomon, H. (ed.) Fairy-Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In search of a South African Foreign Policy, Midrand: ISS; Habib, A. “Hegemon or Pivot? Debating South Africa’s role in Africa,” a paper presented at a Centre for Policy Studies Seminar, August 2003;
9
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
economic interests.14 The country’s motivations
are seen negatively and some critics even see an
obsession with fighting imperialism and neo-
colonialism in Africa. Thus, critics worry that South
Africa’s diplomatic responses like the ones to the
Zimbabwean crisis, the crises in Cote d’Ivoire or
Libya in 2011, and its votes against some western
sponsored draft resolutions in the UN Security
Council in 2007-8 have been designed to fight
‘imagined’ imperial designs at the expense of
the human rights agenda in these countries.15
Leftists worry that the country’s hegemonic
ambitions actually would turn the country into a
stooge of the west and would further the agenda
of perpetuating crude capitalism over narrowly
defined democratization.16
The recent controversy over the fielding of South
Africa’s home affairs minister and former foreign
affairs minister, Ms. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in
the elections for the African Union Commission
chairperson in January 2012 has triggered similar
concerns in some African public platforms,
14 See Bond, “The George Bush of Africa.” and Lennie Gentle, “NEPAD and South African Imperialism”, in South African Labour Bulletin, 27 (3), June 2003. pp. 20-22;
15 This view pervades analysis by scholars in the public domain, especially in the print media and it is a view that the media has taken to be the only way of seeing South Africa’s position on major African conflicts where western powers are involved. For an example of this view, see Sadie and Schoeman. “Zimbabwe: Lessons for and response from South Africa and the region,” pp. 261-262.
16 This concern has been expressed frequently in African civil society circles, especially those worried about the western neo-colonial agenda. Views along these lines can be found in blogs and internet sights like African Monitor, Pambazuka news and so forth.
especially in the social media.17 Some have
decried the country’s bolder leadership ambition,
while others have warned that this will divide the
continent. Some believe that the move is timely
because the AU’s central organs are so weak that
it needs the direct influence of powerful states. In
contrast, others suggest that such a move would
only delay the development of independent
institutional capacities at the AU’s centre. As the
debate continues, there is no homogeneous take
on South Africa’s regional leadership amongst
opinion makers and activists alike. Moreover, there
are divergent opinions on the very principles of
regional powers playing custodians to the common
good in Africa, even as the weakness of the AU’s
centre is broadly acknowledged.
17 See, for instance, the views of the ISS in the Voice of America, “South African AU Chair Nomination Raises Eyebrows,’ www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Southern/South-Africa-AU-Vhair-Nomination-Raises-Eyebrows-138122343.html (accessed on 26 January 2012).
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
10
South Africa and the
Commitment to Regional
Stability
South Africa’s willingness to play an active role
in ending conflicts and political crises as well as
in rebuilding post-conflict societies is beyond
question, but it is not without constraints. From
the onset, the Mandela government thought that
helping to stabilize the region was a noble principle
in its own right, and it was also in South Africa’s self-
interest in so far as a stable and developing region
was less likely to flood massive waves of refugees
into the country. The commitment was also about
atoning for the sins of apartheid South Africa that
sought to divide and destabilize Africa in order to
defeat the liberation movements’ solidarity with
independent Africa.
Generally, three major developments in the 1990s influenced South Africa’s leadership role within the region and the continent. First, the end of the Cold War and the concomitant global transformations resulted in a shift of power, namely from a bipolar system marked by competition towards a more multipolar system dominated by a single superpower. These shifts in global power created a space for middle and regional powers that could now play a significant role in international affairs. South Africa under Nelson Mandela then occupied this space by increasing its diplomatic representation throughout the world and by participating in major international forums and conferences. All of this contributed immensely to South Africa’s international stature and raised expectations on the continent. Hence, South Africa was expected to be a responsible African power using its advantages for the benefit of all Africa. For instance, Mandela would take this advantage with some success to push for peace in Burundi and the DRC.18 Thabo Mbeki’s government would then consolidate this
18 See Devon Curtis, “The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African Intervention?”, Global Insight, No. 24, September 2003.
international expansion by championing the idea of partnership amongst key African states around the idea of African Renaissance. In consequence, whereas the Mandela government campaigned for the isolation of Nigeria over the killing of Niger Delta civil rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Mbeki administration sought to influence the situation by building a strategic relationship with Nigeria.19 The same can be said about the attempts to bring stability and democracy to Zimbabwe.
Second, the transformation of the African political
geography regarding the collapse of dictatorial
regimes in Africa influenced South Africa’s
leadership role greatly. While almost three quarters
of African countries were forced to adopt pluralist
electoral democracy, albeit with limited depth,
the South African government used these ‘winds
of change’ to champion self-propelled political
and economic reforms in Africa. This included
the building of strong and efficient regional and
continental organisations and a strong push for
peace diplomacy. It would seek to strengthen South
Africa’s regional power attributes through close
partnership with Nigeria under Olusegun Obasanjo
in West Africa, Algeria under Abdelazziz Bouteflika
in North Africa, Tanzania under Benjamin Mkapa
in East Africa, and Mozambique under Joaquim
Chissano in Southern Africa. In consequence, this
helped expedite progress towards NEPAD as a
common economic vision and guiding paradigm
for Africa’s global engagements.
Third, the dramatic birth of South Africa itself
represented a sort of convergence of the two
aforementioned vectors of change. Its democratic
transition fed into the wave of democratization on
the continent and informed its pragmatic response
to global affairs in order to take advantage of a
world in which multilateralism, interdependence,
and alliances had assumed greater importance
than in the pre-1990 period. This would give the
19 Adebayo, A. The Piped Paper of Pretoria, undated paper. No Reference.
11
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
new country political credibility to lead further
democratization in Africa and to represent Africa’s
newly found self-confidence in international affairs.
These changes happened against the backdrop
of the accelerating globalization, which helped
defining the trajectory that the new South Africa
would take in international economic relations and
which is called a mixed economy perspective.20
The strengthening of regional integration then
became the focus on the African Agenda and a
common norm. Hence, a belief that the best
response to challenges presented by globalization
was to consolidate intra-regional trade, economic
cooperation, and common security was adopted.
This gave impetus to the transformation of both
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the
SADC after 1995 - two processes in which South
Africa played an important role.
The combination of these changes helped
transform South Africa into a metaphorical bridge
between the global north and global south: while
it is firmly and consciously rooted in the developing
world, it maintains strong bilateral relations with
the global north. In this sense, South Africa has
some capacity to be a bridge like other middle
powers (Australia, Canada and Japan) that are
geographically located in the developing world
but at the same time are almost fully integrated
into the global north in geo-political terms. Like
Brazil and India, South Africa, on the other hand,
seeks to balance its relations with major powers
of the global north, while it is fully embedded in
the growing global south multilateralism through
NAM, NAASP, IBSA and now BRICS. This is what
has been called bridge-building tendencies in
South Africa’s foreign policy; tendencies that co-
habit with sometimes reformist impulses most
20 See Hirsch, A. 2005. Season of Hope: Economic Reform under Mandela and Mbeki, Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press.
apparent during the Mbeki presidency.21
Nevertheless, the exact role of South Africa in
changing world affairs and African diplomacy is a
subject of dispute. This is partly because scholars
generally disagree on the nature of the correlation
between South Africa’s capability and regional
dynamics that would either constrain or enable its
leadership. There are those for whom South Africa’s
reluctance to optimally use its power is a major
shortcoming. As Adam Habib put it, South Africa’s
leadership “has also demonstrated trepidation
at performing its hegemonic obligations.”22 On
this basis, South Africa is described as a reluctant
hegemon. Others depict exactly the opposite,
warning that South Africa is exhibiting hegemonic
and even sub-imperialist tendencies vis-à-vis
the Southern African region.23 This article seeks
to show that South Africa’s conduct and role is
much more complex than this debate suggests.
Fundamentally, the country has focused on a
multilateralist collective leadership as its paradigm
in African diplomacy which enables to lead from
the front and from behind, depending on the issue
at hand.
Under Nelson Mandela’s presidency, South
Africa’s regional stabilization agenda focused
on peacemaking, mainly in Burundi. But it also
promoted a bold push for democratization,
progressive governance and respect for human
rights. Mandela told the SADC Summit in Blantyre,
Malawi, in 1997 that while “amongst SADC’s basic
principles are respect for the sovereignty of member
states and non-interference in one another’s
internal affairs (…) these considerations cannot
blunt or totally override our common concern for
21 Habib, ‘South African Foreign Policy: Context and Contours’.
22 Habib, “Hegemon or Pivot?”
23 Bond P. and Kapuya T. 2006. ‘Arrogant, disrespectful, aloof and careless – South African companies in Africa’. OSISA Openspace, 1 (4), 16 July.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
12
democracy, human rights and good governance
in all our constituent states.”24 Thus, South Africa
sought for getting a paradigm shift in Southern
Africa regarding the quality of democracy, respect
of human rights, and good governance within
states, while promoting respect for the sovereignty
of states as a basis for peaceful state-to-state
relations. It rejected to use non-interference
principles in order to hide internal undemocratic
tendencies. This would set up Mandela’s
government for tensions with Zimbabwe, Angola,
and Namibia as those countries apparently feared
that South Africa would become an outpost of
western agendas in Africa.
While the balance between peacemaking and
democracy promotion would remain key pillars
of South Africa’s foreign policy under President
Thabo Mbeki, this government would place a
greater emphasis on building resilient institutions
and policy frameworks to give effect to the African
Renaissance. South Africa had realized that its
agenda would not be sustained if it relied on
its own leadership, but that it would need the
establishment of effective institutions and robust
policy frameworks to guide collective action.
For this reason, in the first decade, South Africa
focused strongly on building special relations with
capable states in order to shift the leadership from
South Africa as an individual state to a collective
of five to six states. In this process, it also sought
to re-assure fellow African states that it was truly
committed to the process of repositioning Africa
and that it was not an extension of the subversive
western colonial agenda.
The anti-imperialism flavour in South Africa’s
African Agenda would be associated with the
Mbeki administration because he articulated and
drove the implementation of some key ingredients
24 Quoted in Civicus Submission to the International Consultative Seminar of South African Legislatures 2011. Available at www.parliamant.gov.za.
of an African renewal. It was Nelson Mandela that
had constantly reminded the world of a need to give
Africa space to redeem itself from the shackles of
slavery and colonialism as well as from poverty and
underdevelopment. He proclaimed on one occasion
that “(t)he people of resurgent Africa are perfectly
capable of deciding upon their own future form
of government and discovering themselves dealing
with any dangers which might arise.”25 For him,
one of the disadvantages that Africa had suffered
for a long time was “the denial that its people had
the capacity to bring about change and progress.”
He also once said “We need to exert ourselves
that much more, and break out of the vicious cycle
of dependence imposed on us by the financially
powerful: those in command of immense market
power and those who dare to fashion the world in
their own image.” He decried the “new scramble
for Africa, which like that of the nineteenth century,
plundered the continent’s wealth and left it once
more the poorer.”26 In this sense, independence of
Africa from all external involvement was a critical
part of South Africa’s stabilization agenda for
Africa. Although both Mandela and Mbeki were
no lone rangers, they implemented their common
organisation’s strong commitment to this African
Renaissance as expressed by their policy documents
of 1997 and 2002.
In the mid-1990s, Mandela’s government
championed the rapprochement between the
West and Libya in the belief that this would enable
this key African country to play its role alongside
South Africa in strengthening African integration.
Mandela pursued this against the approval of the
US to which he said, “(h)e (Qadaffi) helped us at a
time when we were all alone, when those who are
now saying we should not come here were helping
25 Cryws-Williams, J.1997. In the Words of Mandela, Johannesburg: Penguin Books, pp. 1-2.
26 Cryws-Williams, J.1997. In the Words of Mandela, Johannesburg: Penguin Books, pp. 1-2.
13
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
our enemies.”27 Indeed, freed up from its tensions
with the West, Libya led the transformation of the
OAU into the AU, an organization that had added
responsibilities for strengthening continental
security architecture, economic integration and
social liberation. Libya would go on to become one
of the major contributors to the AU budget and to
major projects like the AU Audit in 2005 and Union
Government idea in 2007. But it would also fuel
conflict and division on the continent as Muamar
Qadaffi pushed to have his Pan-Africanist ideals
adopted, thus causing friction between Lybia and
other bigger states in Africa.
Lacking the means to sustain solo power projects,
regional powers like South Africa cannot exercise
their relatively superior ability successfully without
the legitimation of the affected countries. In this
sense, regional powers face greater constraints in
exercising their relative power than global powers
do. So far we have sought to demonstrate that
while South Africa possesses an immense capability
to lead regional stabilization and transformation,
this power is not without limits. Chief amongst
constraints is the country’s unwillingness to impose
its will on its weaker neighbours as well as to face
consequences of hegemonic tendencies for the
region and the country’s future role in it. A tradition
of leadership through a collective within the ANC
alliance and experiences of collective leadership
in African solidarity politics during the struggle
helped to frame the conduct of post-apartheid
South Africa in Africa. The ANC’s aversion to the
politics of bullying and the use of violence to solve
political problems is a major factor in South Africa’s
reluctance to lead from the front where the crude
use of its relative power would be necessary.
27 Crwys-Williams, In the Words, p. 56.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
14
Southern Africa and South
African Foreign Policy in
Practice
A key priority of the South African government since
1994 is the consolidation of regional integration
in Southern Africa through the strengthening of
SADC institutions, the improvement of SADC’s
financial position and the development of a
common policy agenda that goes beyond mere
declarations of principles. This commitment to
stronger multilateralism within Africa is in part
an outcome of lessons that the governing party
learned from the support it enjoyed in the OAU
and the Frontline States platform in Southern
Africa.28 The focus on strengthening the SADC
is based on the belief that regional stability and
economic development can only happen through
the harmonization and integration of the SADC’s
member security and political policies, so to create
an interdependent region.
A pre-1994 ANC discussion document on
international relations suggested that it was in
post-apartheid South Africa’s interest to ensure
a stable and prosperous region because it would
provide a market for its business and stem the flow
of economic migrants southwards. With regard to
the role of South Africa in regional stabilization,
the document said that “(t)he construction of a
new regional order will be a collective endeavour
of all the free peoples of Southern Africa and
cannot be imposed either by extra-regional forces
or any self-appointed ‘regional power’ (…) a
democratic South Africa should therefore explicitly
renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region. It
should resist all pressure to become the ‘regional
power’ at the expense of the rest of the sub-
continent; instead it should seek to create a new
28 Zondi, Siphamandla. The African National Congress’s International Solidarity and South African Foreign Policy,’ a paper presented at Centre for African Studies, University of Free State, 27 July 2011.
form of economic interaction in Southern Africa
based on the principles of mutual benefit and
interdependence.”29
In its Strategic Plan for 2010-2013, South Africa’s
Department of International Relations and
Cooperation (DIRCO), suggests that the SADC
strategy rests on three pillars, namely restoring,
strengthening, and maintaining the political unity
and cohesion within SADC; deepening regional
economic integration; and intensifying regional
infrastructure development. South Africa’s task
is depicted as building conditions for a collective
leadership. As a result it would focus merely on
building political cohesion, promoting the idea
of deeper economic integration, encouraging
intensive infrastructure development, and working
with other states to ensure political stability in the
region. The country would see its role as one of
implementing a collective agenda and thus, acting
on behalf of the region. From the establishment
of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Cooperation and decisions on the regional brigade,
to the early warning system and mediation efforts
in countries like Comoros, Zimbabwe, and more
recently in Madagascar, it would see its role as
strengthening the regional security agenda. Thus,
South Africa would feel comfortable to use its
power to implement a SADC mandate in Zimbabwe
and Madagascar, but, on the contrary, would not
initiate any campaigns in problematic areas such as
Swaziland.
After several years of institutional reviews and
audits, the extraordinary SADC Summit of 2002
approved the proposed recommendations for
far-reaching changes in SADC’s institutional
framework and the structure for executing its 1992
mandate. Once the decision was taken, South
Africa would second senior government officials
29 ANC Working Group on International Affairs, Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa, in Mills, p. 227.
15
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
to ensure the energetic implementation of those
changes. Thus, it worked through its officials to
strengthen the capacity of the SADC Secretariat
to coordinate the implementation of SADC’s policy
positions quicker than was the case through the
abolition of the 21 sector co-coordinating units
and commissions located in twelve of its member
countries, replacing them with four clusters in the
SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana. The idea
of a troika of leaders taking a lead in pushing for
accelerated implementation of SADC’s agenda was
the country’s answer to calls for stronger regional
role and it saw this as being about strengthening
cooperative leadership. On this basis, significant
countries could share the responsibility for leading
the SADC agenda - the first troika was composed
of Mozambique, the new chair; Zimbabwe, the
outgoing chair; and Tanzania, the incoming chair,
while South Africa managed the implementation
of the reform agenda inside the SADC secretariat.
The push for the security protocol and the
promotion of collective defence pacts were
also meant to create an environment for shared
leadership responsibilities. Mutual defence pacts
are a tricky business as they build confidence
between members, while they also potentially
threaten neighbouring outsiders, and thus,
can be potentially destabilizing in so far as this
contributes to bloc-building and arms-racing. A
push to have the SADC defence pact translate into
effective ‘immediate collective action’ in the face
of an external attack on a member state with one
that says that, ‘each state party shall participate
in such collective action in any manner it deems
appropriate’30.
30 Cawthra, G. and Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. 2004. ‘Regional Renaissance? Security in a Globalized World: The Southern African Development Community. Available at :http://mocambique.fes-international.de/downloads/Security%20Southern%20Africa.pdf
The move towards collective security enabled the
region to successfully resolve its own conflicts and
disputes, although this is still work in progress.
The region’s security architecture is still unable
to take full responsibility for open conflict; it still
requires significant assistance from continental and
international agencies. Part of the problem is that
the nature of conflict in the region has transformed
from inter-state to intra-state violence, requiring
adjustments to the regional security architecture.
This was to be achieved through the implementation
of SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ for
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO)
from 2001. On close examination, the region’s
Security Protocol, in particular Article 1c, 3c and
11, suggests a strong shift towards a common
security policy paradigm, which is demonstrated
by the following quote: “The Organ shall seek
to manage and resolve inter- and intra-state
conflict by peaceful means’ and ‘where peaceful
means of resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, the
chairperson acting on the advice of the ministerial
committee may recommend to the summit that
enforcement action be taken against one or more
of the disputant parties.”
The SIPO seeks to identify strategies and
activities to achieve these objectives to concretize
security cooperation. It is particularly useful
in that it recognizes the importance of non-
traditional security threats like political crises and
undemocratic tendencies in the region, poverty
and environmental degradation alongside factors
like armed conflict, proliferation of small arms,
weak intelligence architecture, and inadequate
policing in security thinking.
The energy that South Africa showed during
the drafting of the plan suggests an intention to
embed collective security as a practice in Southern
Africa. No wonder that it covers areas like the
clearing of landmines, stemming the proliferation
of small arms, fighting the trafficking of humans
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
16
and drugs, and boosting public policing. In sum,
South Africa played a critical role in SADC’s security
agenda. It is no coincidence that the country’s own
Defence Review of 1996 made exactly the same
points about regional security.
The security plan is conscious of the potential of
conflict that arises from environment changes and
a lack of development. This is the reason why SADC
introduced a development programme called
the Regional Indicative Strategic Development
Plan (RISDP) at the same time. The plan gives
expression to the fight poverty by boosting human
and social development. It mirrors the Millenium
Development Goals (MDG) and contains time-
bound targets to guide the implementation of a
common development agenda in each member
state. Additionally, it provides space for civil society
to participate in shaping this development.31 Thus,
RISDP is seen as a crucial impetus for successful
post-conflict reconstruction and development in
countries that excite instability in the region such
as Angola, Comoros, DRC, Madagascar, and
Zimbabwe.
31 Zondi, S. ‘The SADC development plan and how it interfaces with the citizens of the region,’ Critical Dialogue, 3 (1), 2007, pp. 47-52.
17
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
Peacekeeping, Mediation
and Reconstruction: South
Africa’s Regional Leadership in
Practice
South Africa’s stabilization agenda has three key
pillars: mediation, post-conflict development and
peacekeeping. The country has invested a lot of
resources, energy and time in providing assistance
to countries of the region in all three areas. It has
followed the ANC document’s warning that the
country should resist the temptation to become a
regional hegemon. In this regard, it has not worked
jointly with other states, but has been careful to
receive its mandate from the collective leadership of
SADC through Summit resolutions or SADC Organ
decisions. It has also ensured that it coordinates
with the SADC secretariat as an official executing
agency in order to be understood as acting on the
instructions of the region rather than on its own
volition.
Peace diplomacy can be defined as the facilitation
or promotion of political dialogue between
belligerents that leads to a comprehensive political
settlement. Commonly, it includes elements like
power-sharing, transitional justice mechanisms
and national dialogue on economic issues. This
is the doctrine that South Africa has championed
with some success in various parts of Africa and
Southern Africa during the past decade and a half.32
South Africa has led the painstaking processes of
mediation of conflicts in Burundi, Comoros, Cote
d’Ivoire, DRC, and Zimbabwe, while it has also
been indirectly involved in Madagascar and Sudan.
Since 1994 the overriding concern has been to
affirm Africa’s capacity to solve its own problems
32 This is the key message of the Africa section of The Presidency, Towards a Fifteen Year Review: a Synthesis Report, October 2008.
and which is the central message of the African
Renaissance vision and South Africa’s Africa
strategy. This commitment is born out of the
concern that in the post-Cold War period former
colonial powers have been involved in perpetuating
conflict and instability and that they often mediated
conflicts in a manner that benefited them, thus
creating conditions for incomplete peace. As the
governing ANC’s discussion document entitled
Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African
Foreign Policy of 1995 put it: “At the core of this
African Agenda should be the entrenchment of
stable democracies, dislocating neo-colonialism,
sustainable development and an end to superpower
scramble for Africa.”33
South Africa and Peacekeeping
For South Africa, peacekeeping in Southern and
Central Africa is directly linked with its national
security and economic interests.34 In 1995, President
Mbeki noted that there are expectations from
Africa that South Africa should make a significant
contribution towards peace and development on
the continent. In 2009, President Zuma elaborated
at the 10th anniversary of South African
peacekeeping in Africa that “South Africa cannot
survive in isolation, as its economic development
and security is linked to the continent’s stability.
South Africa brings about peace in the continent
and creates an environment that is conducive to
reconstruction and development resulting in faster
economic development. ”35
33 ANC, Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy, undated, at www.anc.org.za/docs (accessed on 3 August 2003).
34 Cilliers, J and Malan, M. 1996. ‘A Regional Peacekeeping Role for South Africa : Pressures, Problems and Prognosis’, African Security Review, 5 (3), pp. 1-11.
35 ‘South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Africa,’ at www.rosalux.co.za/wp.../1297156628_21_1_1_9_pub_upload.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2009).
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
18
Following years of destabilization by the apartheid
state, the new South Africa has heavily involved
itself on this basis in initiatives aimed at political
stabilization of the region. There is only one case of
pro-active military intervention, and that was on 22
September 1998 when 600 South African troops
entered the Lesotho territory as part of the SADC-
mandated Operation Boleas to stop an imminent
coup in that country. They were later joined by
200 troops from Botswana. Although the anti-war
instinct in South African society raised alarm about
the “invasion” of Lesotho, the operation helped
avert a complete breakdown of law and order in
the country, which would possibly hurt regional
stability and South Africa’s economic interests,
especially concerning Lesotho’s water resources.
After this operation, South Africa has avoided
exercising a military option in resolving political
crises in the region. It rather preferred finding
negotiated political settlements and only
dispatched troops when there is peace to be
secured.36 For instance, when the AU decided
to impose sanctions, travel freeze and a naval
blockade on the Comoran island of Anjuouan in
June-November 2007, South Africa pushed for
avoidance of a full military intervention. It led the
mediation process until in March 2008 when the
AU forces intervened militarily in what was called
‘Operation Democracy’ backing the Comoran
government forces to reverse the secession of the
island from the archipelago. However, South Africa
argued for a political solution right to the end.37
Following the signing of the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in August
2000, South Africa was then among the first
countries to deploy peacekeeping forces in 2003.
Nevertheless, it was amongst the first countries to
36 Le Pere, G. and Alden, C. 2009. South Africa in Africa: bound to lead? Politikon: South African journal of political studies, 36 (1). pp. 145-169.
37 Tom Nevin, “The Strangest invasion in history?” in May 2008 issue of African Business magazine
send peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of
Congo in 2001.
On top of ensuring internal stability, South African
peacekeepers have been involved in reconstruction
and development of infrastructure and security
sector reform initiatives. In this regard, its
technological expertise, especially in the fields of
fixed wing and helicopter air transport, medical
evacuation and treatment of operations casualties,
field engineering, and the bridging of obstacles
have been used in peacekeeping operations. Since
2000, the country has been a major contributor of
troops to United Nations (UN) and AU peacekeeping
missions with troops, police and military observers
in Burundi, DRC, Sudan, and Nepal. South Africa
has been active in support of the 5000-strong
African missions, thus helping to protect fragile
peace transitions on the continent.38
Over the years, South Africa’s defence policy has
evolved around a doctrine that supports peace
missions as a key responsibility of the country’s
military. South Africa’s leadership status in the AU
and SADC is linked with its contribution to relative
regional stability because of Pretoria’s increasing
engagement in African peacekeeping and peaceful
conflict resolution (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007).
Mediation and Peace Negotiations:
Case Studies
The following case studies demonstrate the
complexities of South Africa’s peace diplomacy in
Africa and its outcomes. The idea is not to describe
in full detail interventions undertaken, but to
highlight some of the key features of the strategy
employed and how this impacted on the evolution
of stability in each case. This is not to suggest that
38 The Department of Foreign Affairs Annual Reports show that South Africa’s troop contribution rose from 123 in 1999 to 4860 in 2008. The countries that benefitted most were Burundi, the DRC, Eritrea-Ethiopia border, Liberia and Sudan.
19
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
countries in which this strategy was employed
were passive participants in a chiefly South African
intervention, but to point out to how South Africa
contributed to multifarious peace processes. These
case studies should be understood against the
particular geo-strategic context in which they took
place. In summary, this is a period in which the UN
had taken a strong interest in supporting regional
solutions to conflicts in the world. Furthermore,
it is a period in which multipolarity had reduced
the capacity of superpowers to force their way on
others, and in which Africa had gained confidence
in its ability to solve its own problems. These
conditions were propitious for the kind of strategy
South Africa employed.
The DRC
The ousting of Mobutu Sese Seko by the Allied
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaire (ADFL) led by Laurent Kabila in 1997 was a
culmination of decades of war launched by rebels
based in neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. Their
success in 1997 was made possible by the fact that
the government of Zaire under Mobutu had been
severely weakened by the post-Cold War strategic
environment where superpowers could no longer
support African governments just because they
shared ideological orientation or to check-mate
each other. The regime got more and more isolated
in an Africa that had become particularly opposed
to dictatorships. The government itself failed to
redeem its time by adjusting to changed conditions
including the fact that rebels were receiving
support.
The end of the Mobutu government led to a new
cycle of violence by various rebels based in the
east of the country, ostensibly with the backing
of the same neighbouring countries that had
supported Kabila’s march to power. The Kabila-led
forces had split into two opposing camps with the
Banyamulenge fighting an ethnic battle against
nationalists under Kabila who was now the head
of state. The conflict deepened with the invasion
of the DRC by Uganda and Rwanda in August
1998, precipitating a counter-invasion by Angola,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and later, Chad and
Sudan also sent troops in support of Kabila.
It would be on the sidelines of the inauguration
of President Thabo Mbeki in Pretoria in June 1999
that a serious process of negotiating a ceasefire
and a peaceful settlement would begin. This
difficult negotiation process under SADC’s watch
took place in Lusaka, first amongst state parties
and secondly between Congolese belligerents.
The then reached Lusaka Accords provided for an
inter-Congolese dialogue to resolve all political
problems. Sir Ketumile Masire of Gaborone was
the appointed facilitator of this process.39 South
Africa virtually took over the facilitation of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue that finally took place in Sun
City, South Africa, from February to April 2002. The
Dialogue produced an agreement signed by about
70% of the 360 delegates in attendance. South
Africa also convened and chaired the subsequent
dialogue held in Pretoria to bring on board the
disgruntled remainder of parties.40 According to
Ajulu (2008), South Africa threw its political weight
to get international donors and financial incentives
to expedite the process of bringing the parties to
the negotiating table.
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue at Sun City took 52
days and cost the South African taxpayer some R37
million. The reason for the choice of a protracted
process of negotiations was that South Africa
wanted the parties to find political agreement on
all issues that had been put on the table rather than
rushing into incomplete or exclusive agreements.
39 Claude Kabemba and Roger Kibasomba, The Democratic Republic of Congo: A Diagnosis of the Prospect for Peace. Issue No 27, October 2003.
40 See M, Baregu’s input into IGD, The DRC: Challenges and Prospects, 2006.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
20
They had mediators on hand to help the parties
overcome every area of disagreement. After the
signing of the Inclusive Political Agreement in
Pretoria in December 2002, South Africa would be
heavily involved in supporting its implementation,
especially in ensuring the stability of the 24-month
transitional government leading to a democratic
election, and which actually took place much
later in 2006. Subsequently, South Africa has
continued to help by pushing for increased
commercial investments; keeping its peacekeepers
on the ground; and ensuring that the international
community remained involved. At times, South
Africa has been accused of placing its economic
interests above political goals of peace and
democracy.
Zimbabwe
SADC appointed President Thabo Mbeki of
South Africa as its principal facilitator of political
discussions between the governing Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-
PF) and the two factions of the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). This followed years of
conflict between the two parties with the former
using its control of the state apparatus to suppress
and weaken the latter. From its birth in 1999, the
MDC undertook mobilization campaigns to effect
democratic change by winning elections away from
the long-standing governing party. In contrast, the
ZANU-PF saw it as part of a western-backed regime
change to stop the complete decolonization
of Zimbabwe through forced redistribution of
land owned by white farmers. It supported land
grabs by groups led by former war veterans
disgruntled about the impact of the compromises
made at Lancaster House during negotiations for
independence.
The conflict that escalated after the defeat of the
ZANU-PF sponsored constitutional reform in 2001
would worsen with every electioneering period,
suggesting a systematic strategy of using brute
violence to maintain ZANU-PF’s control of the
state. Africa’s response to these developments
between 2001 and 2006 was to search for political
solutions through behind-the-scenes efforts of
former Mozambican president, Joachim Chissano,
former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo,
and various chairmen of the African Union. Nigeria
and South Africa persuaded the Commonwealth
to also back a political solution at the time when
western nations, especially the UK, were building a
case for a more robust, and possibly interventionist
approach comprising isolation, embargoes,
sanctions, and so forth.
When the Zimbabwean police descended on a MDC-
convened prayer meeting in March 2007, leaving
many including the MDC president badly beaten
and bleeding in front of international television
cameras, SADC was forced to intervene. Following
its leaders’ consultations within the region and on
an international level, SADC convened a special
Summit to the Zimbabwean situation. The summit
expressed unhappiness about the turn of events
and decided to mandate South Africa to facilitate
an urgent round of political talks aimed at finding
a lasting solution to the fundamental problem of
governance in Zimbabwe. However, the facilitation
would have to overcome a number of challenges,
not least of which was a deep mistrust between
the parties. The MDC had serious concerns about
the credibility of South Africa given the close
relationship among liberation movements that
governed key Southern African countries including
South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Right from the onset, South Africa took a lead
in the push for a diplomatic rather than an
interventionist / forceful approach. This put it at
loggerheads with Western powers that wanted the
crisis in Zimbabwe to end quickly and decisively.
This disagreement came to the head during the
Commonwealth Summit of 2002 where the
21
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
suspension of Zimbabwe and a series of tough
actions were hotly debated. South Africa led SADC
and AU in pushing for a diplomatic approach to
the Zimbabwean crisis, fearing that a robustly
interventionist approach could harden the positions
of internal belligerents and lead to even harsher
political suppression, and ultimately, precipitate a
complete internal meltdown. At the same time,
western nations intensified their own responses
including public condemnation, imposition of
sanctions and international isolation of the ZANU-
PF government. The SADC decision of April 2007
was a victory for South Africa’s position in the
Zimbabwean situation at a time when the region
rising more and more concerns about the wisdom
of the diplomatic approach.
The South African approach to the facilitated
political discussions was to allow both sides to
suggest Agenda items in which a large number
of items were put forward. Then, a process of
consolidation and prioritization of items for
discussion followed. On this basis, the parties were
forced to find each other, make compromises and
focus on the agenda even before the negotiations.
The actual negotiations of each item took place
in secret locations in various parts of Southern
Africa overseen by President Thabo Mbeki and
his team of facilitators. It would be three months
before there were a number of significant areas of
agreement between the parties, leading to a set of
constitutional amendments passed by parliament
through a vote by both parties. However, it would
take several more months of tough and relentless
negotiations before a comprehensive agreement
even was reached and publicly signed on 17
September 2008. The Global Political Agreement
included agreements on constitutional reform,
security reform, power-sharing, economic reform,
social justice and reconciliation, and legal reforms.
On this basis, an inclusive government was
established in which President Mugabe retained his
positions with less power and Morgan Tsvangarai
became the Prime Minister.
While the inclusive government has been dogged
by many troubles and remains shaky, it heralded a
period of improved political and economic stability.
This sent a signal to the international community
that Zimbabwean parties are able to work together
in rebuilding their country. Even the EU and the US
began political engagements with the ZANU-PF-
led government for the first time in many years.
Thus, the South African approach was somewhat
vindicated. Yet, the lack of western support, the
violations of some terms of agreement, and the
countless discords within the government suggest
that its approach only works optimally to the
extent that the parties are willing to implement
their agreements fully.
There is very little difference in the manner in
which President Zuma handles the facilitation
process from how President Mbeki did. Like Mbeki,
Zuma is focused on getting the conflict parties to
resolve the problems that each side identifies as
legitimate issues of concern. There is an intense
interaction with the parties to the conflict. Zuma
makes sure that the SADC chair and the Organ
are fully informed about progress in implementing
the regional body’s instructions to the conflicting
parties. On one such occasion early in 2011, the
mediator reported on why the Global Political
Agreement was not being fully implemented,
pointing fingers at the ZANU-PF and President
Mugabe, and thus causing his supporters to
condemn South Africa for meddling in Zimbabwe’s
internal matters instead of mediating.41 They went
to the point of suggesting that South Africa had
become an extension of a western imperial agenda
to stop land distribution in South Africa by showing
41 See, for instance, a comment and readers comments in ‘Tinkering SA overhauls Zimbabwe’ at http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view+article&id=7635:tinkering-sa-overhauling-zim&catid=39:opinion&itemid=132 (accessed 31 June 2011).
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
22
that the Zimbabwe process failed. Some even
labelled Zuma as a disaster-prone leader.42 The
following Livingstone Summit of the Organ and
the Sandton Summit of SADC demonstrated that
South Africa’s strategic use of its power will have a
catalytic effect when the country uses its influence
in a collective platform like SADC summits. The
difficult relations between governments governed
by former liberation movements complicate South
Africa’s regional leadership, both leading from the
front and from behind.43
Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies
Referring to the period of 1994 to 2004, the South
African government’s Ten Year Review report makes
the point that the provision of aid to countries in
dire need, especially those coming out of conflict,
has been a key focus of South Africa’s foreign
policy.44 To this end, the International Cooperation
Fund was established in 2001 as a disbursement
mechanisms to finance reconstruction and
development projects, especially in Southern
Africa. It repealed the apartheid era Economic Co-
operation Promotion Loan Fund Act (Act No. 68 of
1968), which the apartheid South Africa had used
to drum up political support from pliable African
states like Malawi, Zaire and Cote d’Ivoire through
the provision of soft loans and grants for the
construction of infrastructure and for emergency
42 For a week the government owned Herald newspaper and ZBC radios reported statements by unknown sources that singled out South Africa for misleading its neighbours to take the decision to add SADC observers directly in negotiations and to criticize weak implementation of the political agreement. See, for instance, “Jacob Zuma”, Herald, 10 April 2011.
43 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. 2011. Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe, SAIIA Occasional Paper No 92, September 2011.
44 The Presidency, Ten Year Review, p. 69.
assistance. It was seen as an instrument for dividing
the region in order to weaken the exiled liberation
movements by isolating them from African states.
Establishing the African Renaissance Fund, the Act
indicates that the goal was to enable the government
to proactively fund cooperation between South
Africa and other countries, especially in Africa.
Amongst objectives to be achieved through this,
the Act expressly mentions the prevention and
resolution of conflict; promotion of democracy
and good governance; support for socio-economic
development and integration, human resource
development, and humanitarian assistance.
The Act envisaged that the Fund would provide
support for the work towards the vision of African
Renaissance in which the principle of African self-
reliance or solutions for African problems was seen
as central. In a statement introducing the Act on
22 January 2002, the government said it did not
want to create an impression that there would be
unlimited resources to fund deserving projects, but
“serious consideration will be given to initiatives
that would ‘make a difference’ in the Southern
African region and on the Continent.”45 This is
the clearest statement of connection between the
development assistance through the Fund and
the ambition of South Africa to help transform
the region through high-impact interventions.
The resources set aside through appropriation by
parliament on a yearly basis provided the muscles
that South Africa needed to enhance its role in the
stabilization of the continent.
The Fund would be used to buttress peace processes
by supporting post-conflict reconstruction efforts,
especially with regard to peacekeeping, institution-
building and on-going political dialogue. The
45 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Establishment of the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund,’ 22 January 2001 at www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/profiles/arfund.htm (accessed 4 July 2006).
23
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
government statement on this said that “(i)n order
to achieve the social and economic regeneration
and development of the Continent, the pre-
eminent issue of poverty alleviation, through
sustained people-centred development, must be
vigorously pursued, so as to provide an improved
quality of life for all Africa and her people. The
engine for poverty alleviation and people-centred
development is the economy. ”46
Therefore, the government saw it as fundamentally
important to provide support for economic growth
through diversification of African economies that
had been found to struggle because of narrow
production structures. In this view, an area of focus
was to boost agricultural production especially
commercial agriculture and agro-business in
Southern Africa with countries like Zambia
benefiting from this. But the statement also made
the point that, “(h)owever, there are two further
pre-requisites for the success of social and economic
regeneration. These are security and stability. There
can be little sustainable development and growth
in conditions of instability and conflict.”
On this basis, these pre-requisites would receive
significant attention in the management of the
fund, in particular during Mbeki’s presidency. These
interventions would include the funding of media-
tion processes with the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
in Sun City, South Africa, being the most important
realized. The Fund was used to fund the meeting
of over 300 delegates for a period of three months
at the cost of R37 million. Moreover, the Fund sup-
ported peacekeeping missions with the most im-
portant being the ones in the DRC and Burundi
from 2004 to 2008. It also contributed to humani-
tarian assistance where humanitarian crises were
seen as detrimental to the economic Renaissance
of Africa or Southern Africa. In this regard, the
assistance to Mozambique during the devastative
46 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Establishment of the African Renaissance.’
floods of 2000 was the most important one.
There was an intention to use the Fund to redefine
the relationship between Africa and other parts of
the world, particularly the developed world. While
the Fund’s resources were relatively insignificant
to displace donor funding in the region, it was an
important political statement about Africa taking
care of its own distressed nations. It would also
encourage triangular cooperation between major
donors regarding post-conflict situations as part
of the strategy of aligning donor assistance with
the vision of African Renaissance. The statement
introducing the Fund indicated that it would
become a conduit through which major donors
could support the African Renaissance initiatives,
meaning South Africa’s own Africa Agenda, would
disburse their funds. The statement said, “(i)t is
vital that Africa and the South develop a common
agenda and then, in a coordinated fashion,
secure the support of the developed world for the
achievement of the goals of this agenda.”47
To illustrate this strategic orientation and South
Africa’s influence in the approach to post-conflict
reconstruction in the region, we describe a few
highlights in the Fund’s decade of existence.
According to the annual report of the then
Department of Foreign Affairs for the 2007/08
financial year, the Fund spent over R368 million on
such initiatives with regard to the strengthening of
South Africa’s bilateral relations with beneficiary
countries; promotion of democracy and good
governance; resolution of conflict; enhancing
socio-economic development, humanitarian
assistance, and human capital development.48
R278 million were spent on support for the DRC
stabilization project. According to the report, the
47 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Establishment of the African Renaissance.’
48 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Annual Report, 2007/08 Financial Year.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
24
purpose was to contribute to the establishment
and the growth of an institutional framework
constituting a legitimate and democratic
government to prevent conflict in the run up to
a general election. This included key sectors of
government, parliament and other oversight
institutions including auditing functions. The
Department of Defence provided an additional
R7.5 million towards security sector reform in order
to strengthen security in this fragile SADC member
state. The hope was also that South Africa would
reinforce its diplomatic relations with the DRC, thus
enabling the country to benefit from its stabilization
efforts irrespective of whether economic interests
determined its strategy towards the DRC in the first
place.
R26 million were used to assist in the reconstruction
of the economy of Seychelles after a major
Tsunami. The focus was on stimulating investment
in the rebuilding of the essential infrastructure and
linkages between economic centres. While there
were opportunities for South Africa’s big business,
the motivation was to cement its leadership role
in the region by taking up SADC’s challenge on its
own.
25
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
What to Make of the
Transition from Mbeki to
Zuma?
There is no significant difference between how
Mbeki and Zuma have approached South Africa’s
role in the region, although there are some
differences in style. Whereas Mbeki was portrayed
as a diplomat and philosopher, Zuma is projected
as a populist to focus on fixing domestic problems.
Many expected that South Africa’s foreign policy
and its commitment to the African Agenda would
wane. It is hard to sustain the argument that there
is a significant difference in foreign policy between
the Mbeki and Zuma era, not only because they
both have been carefully guided by the ANC
policy decisions on international relations, but also
because they served together in the top leadership
of the ANC and government for a long time. Yet,
there have been differences of emphasis, nuances
and depth in the interpretation of foreign policy.
There are better opportunities for analyzing this
than major foreign policy decisions that Zuma
took, which Mbeki is known to have had views
on the same developments. We will briefly analyse
the Zuma government’s responses to the crises
in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya of 2011 and what it
demonstrates about continuity and change in
South Africa’s stabilization agenda.
Libya
South Africa’s vote in favour of the Western-inspired
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing
the Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya
to protect civilians against the suppressive state
forces also surprised many keen observers of South
Africa’s foreign policy who were worried about the
West’s illicit intentions on Libya, while it gratified
those opposed to South Africa’s voting with China
and Russia. The Libyan government had responded
harshly to an uprising in Benghazi using military
weapons to hurt and kill many. The assurance by
South Africa and Nigeria that the AU’s position is in
favour of a negotiated political solution and against
any military intervention had been integrated into
the text of the resolution. However, it did little to
allay the fears that these African countries had
acted naively in voting for the resolution that
authorized “all means necessary” to be used in
establishing a no-fly zone.
As it turned out, South Africa had completely
misread the sub-text of the resolution. A day after
the resolution, its initiators, France and the US,
would hand over the task of enforcing a no-fly zone
over Libya to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), which has no jurisdiction over Africa. Thus
a de facto military intervention was undertaken
without the deployment of ground forces but they
would go even further than this. France would drop
arms in mountains near the rebel stronghold in the
west of Libya, while the US and UK would provide
so-called military advisors who happened to be
soldiers. This helped to tilt the balance of forces in
favour of the rebels, leading to the toppling of the
regime. Muamar Qadaffi would later be executed
by rebels and Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of
State, would hail this as a victory.
When South Africa realized its errors in misreading
the resolution, it somersaulted and started
campaigning against the NATO and explained
that it did not authorize regime change in Libya.
Indeed, regime change and ground forces were not
expressly provided in the resolution, but they were
not expressly excluded either. In fact, the phrase “all
means necessary” overrode whatever exclusions
might have applied to the implementation of
the resolution. This suggested poor judgment
on the part of the South African government.
This also suggested that under Zuma, the Africa
policy had veered towards political expediency
where this meant using voting positions in the UN
Security Council to build relations with the west in
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
26
atonement for the controversies of its dissent from
western positions during its first stint in the Council
in 2007-8. This means that the principles that had
helped South Africa to pursue its Africa Agenda,
consistently were comprised for bridge building in
global affairs.
Cote d’Ivoire
Again, South Africa voted in favour of France-
initiated UN Security Council Resolution 1975
on 30 March 2011 condemning post-election
violence and Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to concede
electoral defeat, and calling for enforcement of
sanctions against him and his associates as well
as supporting the AU’s demand that he should
step down. It went further to demand that state
institutions should henceforth pay homage to the
new president, Allasane Ouattara. The resolution
integrated the AU position on the need for a
political solution as opposed to a military one. But
then again, in Article 6, the resolution authorized
the UN mission (UNOCI) to Cote d’Ivoire, which
comprised humanitarian and peacekeeping
elements to use “all means necessary to protect
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
within its capability and its areas of deployment,
including to prevent the use of heavy weapons
against the civilian population.” It then demanded
that all parties should cooperate with the actions
of UNOCI.
The resolution’s expressed support for political
solutions, including the efforts of the AU’s
committee of presidents and by this also President
Zuma, has been rendered by the strong provisions
giving UNOCI powers to use “all means necessary”
to protect civilians including from heavy weapons
it deems are being against the population.
South Africa again failed to read between the
lines concerning the implications of this for the
respective political solution. UNOCI worked closely
and usually through French forces stationed in
Cote d’Ivoire to discharge its peacekeeping duties.
It was always going to naturally defer the French
forces to discharge the duty to stop the use of
heavy weapons against civilians. The definition of
threat against civilians and which civilians will be
protected in a virtual civil war was left to UNOCI
and by default to France to decide.
Indeed, the resolution was used to enable France
to provide logistical and military support to the
anti-Gbagbo side in order to strengthen the hand
of northern-based rebels to march down to the
capital, Abidjan, killing with impunity thousands
of Gbagbo supported on its way. When the rebels
were still unable to dislodge the Gbagbo-aligned
Ivorian army, which lost its air force fleet some
years ago because of bombs by the French air
force, French military helicopters openly attacked
the Ivorian army’s positions and Gbagbo’s house,
forcing both to surrender. After about a month
of heavy fighting, Gbagbo and his family were
arrested on 13 April 2011 in full view of France
24 TV crews in a humiliating style. Later that year,
he was handed over to the International Criminal
Court for crimes against humanity.
Cote d’Ivoire headed for elections before the
parties to the conflict had fully implemented the
Ouagadougou Agreement of March 2007, which
was built on the foundations laid by South Africa’s
mediation earlier. As its foreign affairs minister put
it, the election results were seen by South Africa as
‘inconclusive’ in view of the dispute on who won
and by how much because the results released by
the electoral body differed from those certified
by the UN. South Africa had a direct interest in
ensuring that peace diplomacy prevailed as it
was concerned about a military solution, which it
predictably opposed. However, Nigeria was fully
committed to ensuring a military solution to resolve
this impasse in favour of Ouattara much against the
AU Peace and Security Council decisions to which
ECOWAS had handed over the task of responding
27
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
to the conflict after failing to find a willing leader of
its preferred military intervention. It and ECOWAS
were worried that South Africa was undermining
their pro-interventionist stance.
South Africa’s weak bilateral relations with Nigeria,
Senegal and other major African countries meant
that its influence on the options in Cote d’Ivoire
could not be taken up by West Africa, which saw
South Africa as interfering in its backyard. It is
reported by sources that Nigeria even threatened
to interfere in Madagascar and the DRC if South
Africa did not stay out of Cote d’Ivoire, its domain
of influence.49 The intense conflict between South
Africa and Nigeria, both non-permanent members
of the Security Council at the time, reflected
badly on both countries’ commitment to a strong
African Agenda and posed serious challenges for
South Africa’s Africa policy. At the time of writing,
there were indications that the situation was being
remedied in any way. This may become an indelible
mark on the Zuma presidency’s foreign policy and
its Africa dimension for years to come.
Implications of Cote d’Ivorie and
Libya
The two case studies demonstrate a few dilemmas
for South Africa’s Africa policy. The first is the
old challenge relating to how the country should
exercise its leadership on the continent. Relatively
weak bilateral relations with Nigeria as a big
African state responsible for leadership in West
Africa undermined the African Agenda. Secondly,
South Africa’s UN Security Council votes on both
cases may have diminished its standing in the eyes
of all but Nigeria with whom it voted similarly in
the Council. Therefore, there is fear and suspicion
that South Africa’s political expediency or so-
called pragmatic voting patterns will sacrifice the
49 Personal communication with two AU officials on the AU Peace and Security Council discussions on Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, 17-18 November 2011, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
principles on which its alliances with countries
like Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Kenya, and Tanzania are based. This is not to
say that all of these countries fully shared the
commitment to political solutions to African
problems, to strengthen the regional capacity to
resolve conflicts, and to non-interference by non-
African powers in African conflicts. However, these
principles do unite them on African crises in general
- except where one of them is directly affected.
Another dilemma relates to the alignment of South
Africa’s global strategy, which increasingly seems
to reflect a return to Mandela’s tricky balancing
between active pursuit of an Africa Agenda and
bridge building between the north and south.
This vacillation between idealism and pragmatism
works when the country commands support on
both fronts, but not when mutual suspicions are
high both in Africa and between the west and
Africans. The new power struggles involving the
re-emerging world powers like China and Russia,
on the one hand, and the old world powers, on the
other, represent changed dynamics, which make
the balancing act rather difficult. The repercussions
for this, be it in favour of the west or of the new
south, are simply dire for a country whose domestic
constituency is split to fixed positions either for or
against western agendas.
Another dilemma for the Zuma government is to
maintain an independent foreign policy even as it
champions stronger economic relations with both
the global north and BRICS countries at a time
when they have both become more assertive on
the African continent. Such independence lies in
the balance between principles and values of South
Africa’s own foreign policy rather than in merely
sitting on the proverbial fence between the west
and the rising global south. Though, this point
requires a separate paper to be fully developed.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
28
Synopsis and Prognosis: Where to
from Here?
Thus, South Africa has helped to promote a
coordinated action to tackle common security
problems at global and regional levels. South
Africa has also helped to reinforce international
institutions, rules, norms and conventions to
promote greater equity in international relations
in the hope that this creates a climate for its
push for strong regional and continental security
architecture. By convening forums for dialogue,
it has strengthened multilateral co-operation and
peaceful resolutions of conflict. South Africa’s faith
in the ethical foundations of multilateralism and
effective global governance might be misplaced
and its energies too dispersed, so as to dilute its
overall impact as a system reformer.
The main drivers of South Africa’s role in the
region are unlikely to change in the medium term,
suggesting that the tendencies that are described
above are likely to persist. This does not rule out
change in emphasis and style of leadership. The
main drivers of the kind of regional leadership
South Africa exercises include the following:
• Relative economic size and hunger for
markets: South Africa’s commitment to
regional stability and prosperity is tied to its
deep economic interests in the region. The 350
million population in the region falls within the
country’s economic sphere of interests and a
large part of it has not been fully utilized. With
South Africa trying to intensify its economic
diplomacy in relation to Africa in the coming
years, the increased regional power will bring
new responsibilities with regard to the ensuring
of a stable and growing region.
• The region and South Africa’s international
ambitions: Influence over the region is an
important source of soft power currency that
enables South Africa to ‘punch above its
weight’ in international affairs. Its ability to
project itself as responsible for the entire region
compensates for its relatively small population
and size of economy. The recognition it has
been given in the BRICS, G20, G8 Outreach
and other global platforms can be directly
linked to its regional power status. In order
to maintain and strengthen this international
prestige, South Africa will have to take even
more efforts in leading regional stabilization
and development.
• Fear of contagion and spill-over: Aware of
the fact that its relative stability and prosperity
attracts refugees and economic migrants,
South Africa sees it as fundamental to its
national security and development to stabilize
the region in order to avoid a situation where
it is flooded by migrants and refugees of
neighbouring countries. Secondly, just as
South Africa rides on the perception that it is
a regional power, it fears the risk that regional
instability would be construed as South Africa’s
instability. The media reports regarding the
attacks on the Togolese team in Angola in
2009, which was projected as violence that
took place in South Africa, is a case in point.
• The power of memory and the liberation
struggle: The governing elite in South Africa
and the African National Congress, which
is likely to remain in power for at least the
next decade, benefited from support by OAU
member states and SADC countries during the
struggle. The moral obligation to plough back
in the region will remain strong and encourage
South Africa to take a keen interest in leading
positive change in the region.
This suggests that South Africa’s cautious but
dedicated leadership in the region is likely to
29
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
continue and even consolidate. This continuity will
express itself in a continued attempt to lead through
a collective of states in finding political solutions
to all African crises. Of course, individual South
African governments interpret this in different
ways, leading to different leadership styles. The
emerging willingness to conduct political solutions
as in the case of Zimbabwe at the Livingstone
Summit of SADC or Swaziland, signals an imminent
change of leadership style towards a willingness to
use its regional power more robustly in order to
enforce regional decisions on peace diplomacy.
The areas of change are likely to be in more
forthright pursuit of economic interests due to
pressure from domestic constituencies for South
Africa to show the dividends of its commitment to
consolidating the African Agenda. The partnerships
that are formed will also continue to change. Under
Mandela, Mozambique and Botswana were key
partners for SA’s stabilization agenda; while under
Mbeki, it was Mozambique and Tanzania. Since
Jacob Zuma came to power, it seems that Angola
and Mozambique are considered co-drivers of its
regional agenda.
While South Africa consciously avoids a type of
regional leadership that unsettles its neighbours’
like apartheid South Africa did in the 1980s, it
instead focuses on its energy to promote negotiated
settlements and to protect those by contributing
soldiers and military equipment under the auspices
of the AU and the UN. It is aware of its soft power
capacity, namely the power to persuade countries
in the region to follow its agenda in the region.
Hence, it is not necessary for it to exercise its power
aggressively. However, the decision to nominate its
Home Affairs Minister and former Foreign Affairs
Minister under Mbeki, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, for the post of AU Commission chairperson
in January 2012 signals a willingness to actively use
its relatively superior power currency to influence
the centre of continental governance directly -
irrespective of whether this is correct or not.
Looking to the future, South Africa should seek
to nuance and improve its ability to balance
this reluctance with its responsibility to lead. In
that balance, we propose the following as key
considerations:
• South Africa should push for a stronger and a
more efficient SADC architecture with central
organs that are able to implement the decisions
of the body, especially on governance and
security. This is about encouraging regional
countries, especially the bigger powers like
Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This is
to cede elements of their sovereignty to the
central organs to enable them to act without
having to defer to the ministerial and heads of
state meetings on even routine activities. To do
so effectively, South Africa should voluntarily
subject itself to scrutiny by the SADC central
organs on its implementation of the regional
agenda and be compliant in order to encourage
exemplary behaviour by its regional partner
states.
• South Africa should be willing to ensure that
its nationals, especially senior professionals,
are employed at the senior level in SADC both
to boost the capacity of the SADC institutions
including the command structures of the
Stand-By Force and to enable them to push for
a progressive regional stabilization agenda.
• South Africa should push for the establishment
of a mediation capacity in the region supported
by large SADC states with manpower and
resources to boost the region’s ability to respond
to opportunities for peacemaking in areas of
crisis. This involves formalizing structures to
support SADC’s envoys, so to enable them to
act decisively without permanent recourse to
all 15 member-states of SADC at every point.
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
30
• South Africa should fully establish its SADC
National Committee to deepen internal
coherence in its linkage with SADC as provided
for in the RISDP. This committee provides a
platform for various stakeholders to align their
strategies and operations in respect of the
SADC agenda, a coherence that would enhance
South Africa’s overall regional leadership in
SADC. The committee should comprise of
key government departments concerned
with elements of international affairs, civil
society, business with a regional outlook, and
parliament. The failure of South Africa to build
a functional and effective National Committee
is partly due to its weak coherence of policy
regarding regional stability.
Conclusion
Through the SADC, South Africa has been able
to implement its own foreign policy initiatives of
the African Agenda. South Africa’s involvement in
SADC allows the country to strategically promote
its foreign policy objectives of consolidating the
African Agenda as well as of strengthening political
and economic integration in Southern Africa. For
the moment and in the foreseeable future, South
Africa’s immediate Africa policy is focused on
Southern Africa. Due to its superior technology,
economic resources, location, and military power,
South Africa retained a predominant position in
comparison to regional neighbours.
A challenge to South Africa’s Africa Agenda
is that it remains constrained in its capacity to
robustly pursue this foreign policy. Limitations
include insufficient finances and human resources,
inadequate institutional capacity, persistent (mis)
conceptions about South Africa’s ambitions on the
continent and poor appreciation of the complexities
of the landscape, evidenced by its tendency to
export its model of negotiated transition.
31
South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective
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FES Peace and Security Series No. 8
About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series
The lack of security is one of the key impediments to development and democracy in Africa. The existence of protracted violent conflicts as well as a lack of accountability of the security sector in many countries are challenging cooperation in the field of security policy. The emerging African Peace and Security Architecture provides the institutional framework to promote peace and security.
As a political foundation committed to the values of social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims at strengthening the interface between democracy and security policy. FES therefore facilitates political dialogue on security threats and
their national, regional and continental responses. The FES Africa Peace and Security Series aims to contribute to this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely accessible.
The series is being published by the FES Africa Security Policy Network, namely:• FES Addis Ababa (FES Regional Security
Policy Project Eastern Africa, African Union Cooperation)
•FESMaputo(FESRegionalSecurityPolicyProjectSouthern Africa),
• FESAbuja (FESRegionalSecurityPolicyProjectWest Africa)
The study at hand is part of a series of three studies that investigate how regional powers in West-, East-, and South Africa are shaping the process of integration and institutionalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). While regional solutions to global challenges are becoming more important, the regional powers are not putting enough efforts into shaping regional solutions. Also the respective countries are not supporting the integration of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to the same extent. To tackle global challenges, regional and even continental approaches are crucial to
formulate African positions. Also the regional powers will play an increasing role in conflict resolution mechanisms in their respective regions. Therefore, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung issued three studies (South-, West-, and East Africa) to assess experiences of regional powers in Africa and their current capacities and capabilities to advance those processes. These studies shall enrich the necessary policy debate on how to further strengthen regional and continental security architectures in Africa.
About this study