Scholar Report – Scott MacDonald

LSE Asia Research Centre (ARC) – Thailand Government Scholarship3rd August 2012 – 27th September 2012

s.macdonald@lse.ac.uk

Solar Photovoltaic Energy in Thailand: An assessment of government support mechanisms

Table of Contents:

3 Introduction

4 Energy in Thailand

4 Why Solar PV?

6 Policy mechanisms

6 1. Policies to price environmental costs consistently with social costs

6 2. Command and control measures

7 3. Early stage support mechanisms

7 4. Deployment mechanisms

11 5. Standards and labeling

12 Areas of Difficulty

12 1. Political

12 2. Technological

13 3. Advocacy

13 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

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Introduction1:At first glance Thailand’s solar PV sector seems to be one of the success stories of the region, as a developing country which has been using government support mechanisms to rapidly increase it’s installed capacity above and beyond it’s targets. However, upon closer inspection, all is not quite as it first appears. There is uncertainty over future policy mechanisms, the pioneering domestic firms have been described as ‘victims’ of poorly implemented government policy and the mistakes from previous policy arrangements are making current policy making problematic. Despite these difficulties there are definite opportunities for the future of the industry in Thailand, but only if key obstacles are overcome. Many of the issues affecting the PV industry are also those which plague the economy as a whole, as the country struggles to move from low value manufacturing, taking advantage of cheap immigrant labour, to an innovative and technology based economy2. Furthermore, as is common with developing countries, especially those with the political turbulence of Thailand, efficient policymaking and governance can be difficult.

Renewable energy in Thailand represents the nexus point of many key issues which effect the country not only today but also also in the future. It effects both the natural environment and the lived environment, with co-benefits such as a reduction in air pollution3. It can also have particular benefits for developing countries, in the process of technological catching-up4. As developing countries such as Thailand have less path dependence on fossil fuels, both politically, economically and technologically, there are significant opportunities to be had by investing in alternative energy. Renewable energy technologies such as solar PV could help, if investment is combined with support for indigenous innovation and science and technology, to increase the competitiveness of

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1 This research was made possible through a generous grant by the Royal Thai Embassy in London and with the help of the Asia Research Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Special thanks must go to to Keith Tritton, Kevin Shields, and Ruth Kattumuri in London, and the staff of the Center for Thai Studies and the Energy Research Institute at Chulalongkorn University. This paper is based on interviews conducted over a two month period of field work in Thailand with stakeholders in the PV sector from government, industry, NGOs and academia.

2 Chaminade, C., et al., Measuring systemic problems in National Innovation Systems. An application to Thailand. Res. Policy (2012) p.2 , http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.04.004

3 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Co-benefits of climate policy, PBL Report no. 500116005, February, 2009, p.55

4 Altenburg, Fisher, Pegels, Stamm,. forthcoming, Sustainability-oriented innovation systems: New technological paradigm – new international division of labour? German Development Institute

Thailand’s economy and help the shift away from manufacturing towards higher added value industries.

Energy in Thailand:

Currently Thailand imports 37.5 billion dollars of energy from neighboring countries annually (representing 67% of it’s total energy consumption) 5 . This figure looks to rise as the country continues to increase it’s demand by 3.2% each year. The economic cost of dependence of foreign energy will also likely be exacerbated with rising global energy prices and increased demand from it’s neighboring countries which are also developing at a fast pace. It is likely that a move to renewables could reduce this dependence on costly imported energy.

As of January 2012 there were five government ‘plans’ put in place concerning renewable energy, which over the past five years have had different and often conflicting projections, targets and recommended support mechanisms6. The Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP) 2012-2021 aims for alternative forms of energy supplying 25% of total energy consumption within this7. Within this figure is included provision for an increase in several technologies;, though primarily solar, wind, hydro, bio-energy and bio-fuels.

Why solar PV?While this study looks at solar PV, it is certain that any energy policy in Thailand would be wise to include investment and support for a variety of technologies. However, there are several reasons why solar PV in particular is suitable to be studied and should be the focus of government support over and above other RE technologies. The first is that Thailand is geographically well suited to solar PV, and less to other technologies such as wind or hydroelectric power8. Thailand has relatively high levels of solar insolation which makes the panels efficient to use. The cost of installation can also be relatively low and

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5 Haema S., Executive Director, Bureau of Energy Research, Presentation at TEC-ii conference

6 13 Sopitsuda Tongsopit, Greacen C.,Thailand’s Renewable Energy Policy: FiTs and Opportunities for International Support, 31 May 2012, http://www.palangthai.org/docs/ThailandFiTtongsopit&greacen.pdf, p.3

7 Department for Renewable Energy Development and Efficiency, Alternative Energy Development Plan 2012-2021, online at http://www.dede.go.th/dede/images/stories/aedp25.pdf (Thai). English translation by Dr Renu Cheokul (April 2012)

8 Kruangam D. et al., Pre-Feasibility Study on Solar Cell Production in Thailand, Technical Digest of the International PVSEC-14, Bangkok, Thailand, 2004, p.465

panels are relatively visually unobtrusive compared to other solutions. For example, if wind power turbines were to be installed in Thailand they would likely have to be installed in the south, in areas of outstanding natural beauty which currently are one of the major draws of Thailand’s tourist industry.

There have also been recent calls for further use of solar energy in remote areas, such as the islands of Koh Samui and Koh Phangan which recently experienced three days of blackouts9. Solar PV is also particularly well suited to leveling the peak loads across the grid. According to one expert interviewed, the peaks in electricity usage often coincide with the use of air conditioning on hot days in households. This also happens to be when solar PV cells are most productive, so can do well at decreasing the burden on the grid at these times. One final reason for looking at the case of solar PV is that in the AEDP, while it is second in absolute terms to biomass, it represents the biggest increase over the next decade proportionally to the amount currently installed. This is matched with active public and industry discussions about the role of solar PV in thailand, with industry groupings such as the Thai Solar Club and Thailand Solar PV Industries Association being active in promoting the technology.

However, there are also some limitations to implementing the technology in thailand which will become relevant as the support mechanisms are examined further. The first of these are localization issues, such as the adaptation of european technology to cope with the extra particulate matter which is present in the urban environment due to air pollution10. Furthermore there are also technological barriers to domestic firms being able to produce the panels at a low cost, exacerbated by rapidly dropping component prices and increased competition from the booming Chinese PV industry to the north.

Policy mechanisms:There are a wide variety of possible policies which can be implemented in order to encourage the development of renewable energy technologies. Altenburg et al.11 classify policy mechanisms into five categories; policies to price environmental goods consistently

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9 Bangkok Post , “Minister: Samui blackout not serious”, 7th December 2012

10 Sanusi, Y .K. 2012. “The Performance of Amorphous Silicon PV System under Harmattan Dust Conditions in a Tropical Area”. Pacific Journal of Science and Technology. 13(1): p175

11 Altenburg, Fisher, Pegels, Stamm,. forthcoming, Sustainability-oriented innovation systems: New technological paradigm – new international division of labour? German Development Institute

with their social costs, command and control measures, early stage support mechanisms, deployment mechanisms and standards and labels. This report will look at each of these five policy types in turn.

1. Policies to price environmental goodsPolicies to price environmental goods consistent with their social costs often are those which impose costs upon traditional ‘dirty’ energy sources in order to encourage the faster adoption of alternatives. This may be done by the imposition of quotas or forms of cap and trade schemes. This is a contentious type of policy, as it can often lead to an increase in the cost of energy for ratepayers. This may be undesirable in developing countries, where increases in the price of energy will cause disproportionate harm to the poorest in society. It also may conflict with economic development goals, both decreasing the competitiveness of domestic firms and discouraging foreign investment. For this reason there are perhaps justifiably few policies in Thailand to increase the price of environmentally damaging goods to encourage investment in renewables. For example, Thailand has no official market for selling or buying carbon credits.

2. Command and control measuresCommand and control measures are limited in Thailand, for example there are no laws requiring utilities to purchase a certain quota of energy from renewable sources. In fact, many of the bureaucratic constraints and regulations put in place harm the industry rather than support it. Many interviewees stressed that there was significant resistance to changing the outdated legislation and regulatory procedures from within the government departments. One interviewee even went as far as to joke that it would be easier to change the national constitution than change the policy of the even one ministry. An apt example of this may be the section of the 1992 Industrial Act regarding the location of ‘power plants’, in this case referring to a relatively small rooftop solar installation12. Since it’s introduction it has been law that no installation of over 3.7kW that sells electricity to the grid can be located within 100m of a school, residential area, temple or government office. This clearly causes problems in obtaining permissions for roof top panels in the dense urban areas where many of the installations would be best suited. The reasoning behind this regulation, dating from a time when Thailand’s solar industry was in it’s very infant stages, is outdated and has been in need of change for the past several years.

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12 Industrial Act, 1992

3. Early stage support mechanismsEarly stage support mechanisms have been shown to be effective in providing support for infant industries, particularly against the pressure of more technologically advanced foreign competitors. This often takes the form of R&D support grants to industry or increased funding to universities and institutes. This has been done in Thailand to some extent, such as with demonstration projects at the National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) or the Energy Park at the Naresuan University School of Renewable Energy Technology. However some interviewees suggested that there was little meaningful commitment to these early stage support mechanisms from the government, and that far more could be done to encourage the building up of much needed technological expertise. While the NSTDA was previously seen as a leader in this sector, some have suggested that it’s role has been decreased in the past few years as priorities have shifted away from research into solar PV technology.

4. Deployment mechanismsAn assessment of the headlines regarding the deployment mechanisms present in Thailand, often mentioning how the set targets have been reached ahead of target, would give any reader the opinion that they have been an overwhelming success. However, upon closer inspection, the reality is that of confusion around the present state of the mechanisms, suddenly announced policy changes and almost two years of silence an inaction from the relevant government bodies. Each of the relevant mechanisms will be examined, of which the Board of Investment incentives and the feed in tariff are the most significant in their impact.

a) Feed in tariffsBefore examining the specific case of Thailand’s experience with FiTs, in the form of the adder tariff, it may be wise to look briefly at the reasoning behind the policy. This will hopefully make it clear why, looking at the case of Thailand, the adder was not as successful as it may have been. The fundamental purpose of a feed in tariff is to offset, by increasing the revenue from selling electricity to the grid, the higher costs of renewable energy compared to non-renewable sources. The ‘ideal’ FiT should therefore be set at a rate that is somewhat reflective of the costs which it is trying to offset, in order to bring the threshold at which the ventures become attractive for investors down. Aside from the price of the FiT there can also be differences in the number of years the tariff will last for, with

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longer contract lengths reducing the risks for potential investors. It is also possible to have additional factors which can increase the level of the FiT, such as the extra incentives for investment in the politically turbulent southern regions in Thailand or the Malaysian incentive to source components domestically.

Type of Renewable Energy

2007rate

2009rate

2010rate

Diesel Replacement

Southern Province

Years supported

BiomassBiomassBiomassBiomassBiomassBiomassBiomass

Installed capacity < 1MW 0.3 0.5 0.5 1 1 7

Installed capacity > 1MW 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 1 7

BiogasBiogasBiogasBiogasBiogasBiogasBiogas

Installed capacity < 1MW 0.3 0.5 0.5 1 1 7

Installed capacity > 1MW 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 1 7

WasteWasteWasteWasteWasteWasteWaste

Landfill and Digestor 2.5 2.5 2.5 1 1 7

Thermal Process 2.5 3.5 3.5 1 1 7

WindWindWindWindWindWindWind

Installed capacity < 50kW 3.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 1.5 10

Installed capacity > 50kW 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 1.5 10

Small/Micro HydroSmall/Micro HydroSmall/Micro HydroSmall/Micro HydroSmall/Micro HydroSmall/Micro HydroSmall/Micro Hydro

50kW < Installed capacity < 200kW 0.4 0.8 0.8 1 1 7

Installed capacity < 50kW 0.8 1.5 1.5 1 1 7

SolarSolarSolarSolarSolarSolarSolar

Any installed capacity 8 8 6.5 1.5 1.5 10

Table 1: Thailand's Adder rates in THB per kWhNote: the current (September 2012) rate remains at 2010 levels.

Thailand was one of the first countries in SE Asia to introduce a form of FiT when it introduced it’s “adder” tariff in 2007. The tariff is a form of “premium-price FiT payment”13 whereby a supplement is paid to power producers on top of the price they receive from utilities. For solar PV the contract is set at 10 years which is, along with wind power, the longest contract length of all RE technologies included within the adder. The diagram above outlines the adder rates for Solar as well as other RE sources for sake of

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13 Cory, Karlynn,et al. 2009. Feed-In Tariff Policy: Design, Implementation, and RPS Policy Interactions. National Renewable Energy Laboratory Technical Report, March 2009

comparison. Of particular note are the extra two subsidies to encourage investment in technologies for diesel replacement and for any projects located in the southernmost provinces.

Table 2: The four stages of the FiT in Thailand

It may be possible to categorize the evolution of the adder into four distinct phases, dependent on both the changes in the industry and the policies concerning the adder, as shown in the table above. The first phase was from 2007 to 2008, where streamlined policy mechanisms encouraged investment into the sector, but was constrained by the relatively high component costs. The application process was primarily designed for installations below 1MW, but since 2006 had been applied for applications of any size.14 The second phase was the “solar gold rush” , lasting from from 2008 to mid 2009. At this time the combination of lowering component prices, streamlined application process and poor co-ordination between the utilities accepting applications makers caused a dramatic increase in the number of Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) applications. The third phase is that of increased regulation, lasting from August 2009 to June 2010. This phase is

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14 Sopitsuda Tongsopit, Greacen C.,Thailand’s Renewable Energy Policy: FiTs and Opportunities for International Support, 31 May 2012, http://www.palangthai.org/docs/ThailandFiTtongsopit&greacen.pdf, p.12

• Streamlined approval process, using previous RE guidelines.• High component costs• Low levels of interest from investors

Small scale

2007 to2008

Gold rush

2008 toJuly 2009

• Streamlined approval process, using previous RE guidelines.• Little coordination between utilities approving projects.• Lack of concrete targets.• Declining price of PV modules making the 8THB rate more attractive.• High levels of interest from investors

Regulation

August 2009to June 2010

• Bid bond introduced of 200THB/kW for installations over 100kW• Methods introduced to make it more difficult to resell PPAs

Confusion

June 2010to present

• Frequent rule changing with little public participation.• Previously transparent process replaced by a new Managing Committee

with no clear rules on which PPAs will be accepted.• Adder rate cut from 8THB to 6.5THB.• Scrutiny of applications, but with no timeline or transparency.

marked by attempts by policy makers to introduce a bid bond of 200THB per kW to try and discourage the reselling of PPAs. The final phase lasts from June 2010 to present, and can be best summarized as ‘confusion’, with the previously flawed but transparent application process replaced with a centralized but less transparent managing committee and a cut in the adder rate. The While the desire to reform the process of signing PPAs is good, there are no mechanisms for scrutiny of the new committee, causing concerns about wether the process is fair and independent of business interests. As will be discussed further, this stage is seen by many in the industry as a rut which is proving difficult to emerge out of, with the industry in a state of limbo pending the governments relaunch of the FiT as a fixed-price mechanism to replace the adder.

b) Board of Investment incentivesThe Thai Board of Investment has committed to promoting Alternative Energy and Energy Efficiency as key technologies, with both solar power plants and solar cell manufacturers eligible15. The scheme allows import duty exemptions for machinery, 8 year corporate income tax exemptions with no cap, additional 50% reduction in corporate income tax for 5 years (year 9 to year 13), deduction of infrastructure construction costs and a double deduction of public utility costs. There are also additional incentives for investments in Zone 3, including 58 less developed provinces. Several interviewees highlighted that these investment incentives were some of the most effective mechanisms encouraging deployment of solar PV technology.

c) Revolving fundThe revolving fund amounts to around 7,000 million THB and an equal contribution from commercial banks. The fund is channeled through 13 banks to help finance all renewable energy technologies. The loans have a fixed interest rate of ≤4% for the loan period of 7 years.

d) ESCO venture capital fundThe Energy Conservation Promotion (ESCO) Fund is distributed through two managers, the Energy for Environment Foundation and the Foundation of the Thailand Energy Conservation Center. These two managers support ESCO and the SME investors in schemes under 50 million THB per project. The benefits range from a loan at a 4% interest

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15 Thai Solar Club,Thailand Solar PV Status Report 2011, December 2011, http://www.nstda.or.th/eng/index.php/news/events/item/download/59

rate, venture capital with the ESCO and SME investment as well as for activities such as equipment leasing, technical, or CDM support. The size of the fund is around 1,000 million THB. Several interviewees suggested that while this was an effective method for encouraging investment in previous years, it is now less relevant compared to the FiT and the BOI incentives.

5. Standards and labelsCurrently this is one area where Thailand is lacking, with interview respondents mentioning that the lack of rigorous standards is harming the industry. Presently the standards are voluntary and have considerable variability. For example, in government procurement each agency or ministry must specify its own solar PV standards. Furthermore this makes exporting components to other ASEAN countries difficult, and will only be likely exacerbated by the upcoming ASEAN Electrical and Electronic Mutual Recognition Arrangement, where the requirements are likely to be matched to IEC standards. Testing facilities are provided within universities and government agencies, such as the Electrical and Electronics Products Testing Center (PTEC) which was founded in 1998 through cooperation between the NSTDA and King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Lardkrabang. As well as providing a range of electrical and electronics product testing PTEC also provides PV Standard testing (IEC 61646 and IEC 61245) and on site PV installation testing and maintenance.

There has been discussion that the current standards, of aiming to provide solar panels with a 20-25 year life span, is unsuitable for Thailand. This is first because of the relative inexperience of the industry in making affordable and reliable panels, compared to the high quality competitors in developed nations and low cost competitors in China. Second, the climactic conditions in Thailand make the long lifespan of panels unlikely. The same panels designed for moderate climates of Europe and the USA are unlikely to be able to withstand the hot and polluted climate of Thailand. Both of these reasons may also be why roof-top installations are uninsurable, making the projects more risky for investors. This has lead some to suggest that Thailand could adopt an alternative standard, one which expects a 10-15 year life span for panels. This would allow production costs to be lowered to compete with international competitors, however this may be an unwise move considering the rate at which the cost of panels made to the higher specification are decreasing. It may also make exporting panels difficult if they fail to comply with standards.

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Areas of difficulty:1) PoliticalThe first political problem is the image of the solar PV industry in the minds of the public and the government. The ‘gold rush’ period created the image that solar PV is receiving unjustified amounts of government resources, particularly when there are other pressing causes such as flood protection. There are also questions raised about how much benefit the ‘gold rush’ period actually did for Thailand, considering the components were designed and manufactured abroad and often foreign companies were the ones receiving the subsidies. This seems to make any strong political support for solar PV difficult, and may have contributed to the two year silence from policy makers.

There is also a second political problem arising from what should be done with the thousands of MegaWatts of unconstructed PPAs signed under the adder model, which contractually oblige the government to subsidize electricity at an unsustainable rate. This also creates the difficulty that only the ‘old’ players, those who were the first to sign PPA agreements, have access to the market. This creates resentment from new players who may want to enter the market but are unable to sign new PPAs. The Ministry of Energy seems keen to get rid of those who have undeveloped PPAs though seems unsure how this should be done without loosing the trust of those who signed the agreements in good faith. When so much of these government support schemes are about alleviating the risk of investment, the government revoking a PPA after less than 5 years may send worrying messages to the industry. Several interviewees from government suggested that there is a lack of communication between those who make government policy and those who are in charge of implementing it. This may explain why there have been such difficulties in recognizing the ways in which the current policy is flawed.

2) Technological problemsThe second type of problem faced by the PV sector are technological problems, that the local industry is unable to compete with the quality of components from Germany or the USA or the price of components from China. This then in turn creates a political problem as mentioned above, that subsidies are benefiting foreign companies more than Thai ones. Government plans stress the need for moving to more profitable upstream areas but there seems to be little to this other than words. The pioneering manufacturing firms seem to have have had limited success in moving up the value chain, particularly with some high profile firms still recovering from the 2011 floods.

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3) Advocacy problemsThe final problem affecting the sector seems to be that there is no clear voice advocating for PV development, and no clear consensus among the key players about what type of policy should be implemented. There are two bodies advocating for policy change, but both are unable to provide an adequate voice. The first is the Thai Photovoltaic Industries Association, which as the name suggests represents the players from industry, mostly in favour of developing rooftop PV. Second is the Thai Solar Club, hosted by the NSTDA but with only a loose and informal organizational structure. Perhaps because of the difficulty stemming from having two bodies with different policy recommendations and comprised of two sets of stakeholders, advocacy may be difficult. If there were to be one central forum at which government policy makers and industry could be regularly brought together it may be easier for consensus to emerge regarding what future policy should be.

Conclusion and policy recommendations:It is clearly difficult, with the wide range of policy instruments being used and the many different interested government bodies, to sum up the many challenges facing Thailand’s PV sector in this relatively short paper. Despite this hopefully it will be possible to suggest some policy recommendations which may alleviate some of the problems mentioned above.

1) Support the development of domestic PV firms.The domestic industry, without strong government support, will never be able to succeed against foreign competitors. Having more technically competitive domestic firms would alleviate some of the political problems stemming from the view that subsidies are only benefiting foreign firms. There are competing mechanisms by which this can be achieved, some of which have been shown to be more effective than others. One relatively uncontroversial method would follow the Malaysian model and include an incentive in the rate of the FiT for projects using domestically sourced components. A Less soft mechanism could be a local content requirement for new projects, as has seen some success in encouraging the growth of the wind turbine sector in China. The alternative to this approach is to focus support for downstream installation companies, which can take advantage of cheaply imported components. However, this second policy may fail to alleviate some of the political concerns that the components and high value manufacturing is still being done by foreign firms.

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2) Announce a competitive FiT in a timely manner, with a transparent and timetabled application process.

There has already been two years of waiting since the last policy was introduced as a stop-gap measure, with the government announcing that it was moving from the ‘adder’ to a fixed price tariff, but not announcing when or in what form. Current plans for the FiT look to include an extra incentive for roof-top installations which would help to offset some of the extra costs faced by investors and would be delineated by size. However it is unlikely that a revised FiT, even if set at the correct rate, could be effective if it isn’t coupled with administrative reforms in how the PPAs are awarded. This is a much more difficult task, as currently the centralized model is widely seen as being unaccountable and untransparent in the way that PPAs are awarded. The reform of laws such as the 1992 Industry Act should also be done with haste.

3) Explore alternative funding arrangements which avoid placing the burden onto rate payers, such as a tax credit system.

The current FiT system is funded by passing the costs onto consumers as a component of the variable part the rate. This means that a high FiT increases the cost of electricity for consumers, which is both politically and economically undesirable. This means that the cost of the subsidy needs to be kept low, at 2% of energy bills which is small compared to other countries such as 15% in Germany. Some have suggested that an alternative method of funding could be explored such as making solar installations tax deductible, through the Ministry of Finance. For example, under this system a 3kW plant costing 450,000 baht to install and an FiT (at 3.8 hours of electricity per day and an adder rate of 8 baht) bringing in an annual profit of 33,288 baht every year and would (excluding other methods of financing) be turning a profit only after 13 years. However, if the initial investment were to be counted, over five years and assuming a 30% tax rate, as tax deductible this figure could be reduced to 9 years. The ability to recoup any investment made in a shorter time would signal to investors that the opportunity is more worthwhile, and should increase the total amount of investment. There are also opportunities here for

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new and innovative financing models such as solar leasing, bulk purchasing or municipal financing.16

Bibliography:• Altenburg, Fisher, Pegels, Stamm,. forthcoming, Sustainability-oriented innovation systems: New

technological paradigm – new international division of labour? German Development Institute

• Bangkok Post , “Minister: Samui blackout not serious”, 7th December 2012

• Cory, Karlynn,et al. 2009. Feed-In Tariff Policy: Design, Implementation, and RPS Policy Interactions. National Renewable Energy Laboratory Technical Report, March 2009

• Department for Renewable Energy Development and Efficiency, Alternative Energy Development Plan 2012-2021, online at http://www.dede.go.th/dede/images/stories/aedp25.pdf (Thai). English translation by Dr Renu Cheokul (April 2012)

• Haema S., Executive Director, Bureau of Energy Research, Presentation at TEC-ii conference

• Kruangam D. et al., Pre-Feasibility Study on Solar Cell Production in Thailand, Technical Digest of the International PVSEC-14, Bangkok, Thailand, 2004

• Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Co-benefits of climate policy, PBL Report no. 500116005, February, 2009

• Sanusi, Y .K. 2012. “The Performance of Amorphous Silicon PV System under Harmattan Dust Conditions in a Tropical Area”. Pacific Journal of Science and Technology. 13(1)

• Sopitsuda Tongsopit, Greacen C.,Thailand’s Renewable Energy Policy: FiTs and Opportunities for International Support, 31 May 2012, http://www.palangthai.org/docs/ThailandFiTtongsopit&greacen.pdf

• Sopitsuda Tongsopit, Development of Thailand’s PV Roadmap, Presentation at the Seminar on Renewable Energy Technology implementation in Thailand Experience transfer from Europe, http://goo.gl/6e0wi, 5th October 2012

• Thai Solar Club,Thailand Solar PV Status Report 2011, December 2011, http://www.nstda.or.th/eng/index.php/news/events/item/download/59

Cover Photo: • Lop Buri Solar Park in Thailand, Published November 14, 2012 in Conergy To Build Two Solar Parks In

Thailand With Combined Capacity Of 21 MW, Clean Technica, accessed December 1st 2012 at http://goo.gl/QRr6M

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16 Sopitsuda Tongsopit, Development of Thailand’s PV Roadmap, Presentation at the Seminar on Renewable Energy Technology implementation in Thailand Experience transfer from Europe, http://goo.gl/6e0wi, 5th October 2012