secure localizationmews.sv.cmu.edu/teaching/14814/s11/files/survey_041911.pdf · introduction •...
TRANSCRIPT
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Secure Localization
Presented byEric Chen, Frank Mokaya, Yu Seung Kim
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April 19, 2011
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Contents
• Introduction• SeRLoc: Robust Localization for
Wireless Sensor Networks - Frank• Distance Bounding in Noisy
Environments – Yu Seung• Secure Positioning in Wireless
Networks - Eric
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Introduction
• Range-based algorithms– Estimating distance to landmarks
based on various physical properties (e.g., RSS, ToA, TDoA)
– Ex) Distance Bounding Protocol• Range-free algorithms
– Using coarser metrics to place bounds on candidate positions
– Ex) SeRLocwest.cmu.edu
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SeRLoc: Robust Localization for Wireless Sensor Networks
Loukas Lazos and Radha Poovendran ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks 2005
Presented by Frank
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Secure Localization for WSNs• WSNs monitor important vulnerable
systems: buildings, disaster mgmt.– Sensors need to have accurate location info
• Because of hostile environment, WSNs are vulnerable to many threats– Wrong location info can mean a lost life e.g.
in disaster response scenario• In short: We need Secure Localization
– Ensure robust location estimation even in the presence of adversaries
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What threats are you talking about?• External
– Replay Attacks: • worm-hole attack
– Node impersonation attacks:• Sybil attack
• Internal– Other Compromise of network entities
• Sensor and Locator node capture• Not addressed
– Phy layer attacks: Jamming– MAC layer attacks: DoS
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Solution? SeRLoc: SEcure Range-Independent LOCalization
• SeRLOC features– Two- tier network architecture– Range-less location estimation– Decentralized implementation– Robustness against security threats
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Locators (Li): Randomly deployed
Known Location, Orientation
(X1, Y1)
SeRLOC Overview & AssumptionsSensors (Si): Randomly deployed, unknown location r
RLocator range R
Beamwidth θ
θ
Sensor range r
(X2, Y2)
(X3, Y3)
Locator
Sensor
Li : Directional Antennas
Si : Omnidirectional Antennas
©Radha Poovendran Seattle, Washington
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ROILocator Sensor
L1
L4
L3(0, 0)
sL3
What’s the Idea behind SeRLoc?
• Location data gathering:– Each Locator Li transmits
information that defines the sector Seci
• Search Area Identified: – Each Sensor Si defines a
region of interest for its location based on all Locators LHs heard by Si
©Radha Poovendran Seattle, Washington
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SeRLoc – ROI computationGRID Score Table (GST)
Sensor Search Area 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 21 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 22 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 22 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 22 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 3 4 32 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ROI
©Radha Poovendran Seattle, Washington
• Majority vote: Points with highest score in search area define the ROI
• Location set S: S : (xest, yest ) = (1n
xgii=1
n
∑ , 1n
ygii=1
n
∑ )
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Security Mechanisms in SeRLOC1. Encryption: ensures authenticity of locators
– All beacons from locators encrypted with symmetric key K0
– Sensors have symmetric pairwise keys KsLi, with locators Li
– Locators use master Key KLi to derive KsLi using a pseudorandom function h, & unique sensor IDs: KsLi = hKLi(IDs)
– Scalability? Expansion prospects?• Preload sensors with extra keys• Use secret quantity known only to admin. Use this
quantity to load new keys
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Security Mechanisms in SeRLOC2. Locator ID authentication: Ensures malicious
sensors cant inject bogus info into network– Based on efficient collision-resistant one-way hash
chains to provide locator ID authentication– Each locator Li has password PWi derived by use of
hash function e.g. SHA1 s.t. • H(PWi) = H(PWj) if and only if PWi = PWj
– Each sensor preloaded with table of locator IDs and corresponding hash values Hn(PWi): n ->large no.
– Each beacon from Li includes hash value Hn-j(Pwi)– Jth rec’d beacon verified if
• H(Hn-j+1(PWi)) = Hn-j(PWi)– After verification hash counter incremented so as
to process only one beacon from Li per time
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Threat Analysis• Wormhole attack (WH): messages at one end
of link tunneled and replayed at a target destination point
L1 L3
L2 L4 L6
L5
Wormhole link
• Attacker records beacons at 2 and replays them at 1 through wormhole
• Sensor at 1 misled to believe it can hear L1-L6
1
2
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(WH) Detection and Defense• Single Message/sector per locator
property– all sector beacons tx’d simultaneously– Same but fresh hash used for auth.– As a result sensor accepts one msg/ Li– Hearing >1 sector from a locator means
that attack is underway– Multipath, imperfect sectorization
effects treated as attack
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(WH) Detection and Defense• Communication Range constraint
property– Sensor cannot hear two locators Li, Lj :
{LHs} more than 2R apart. R is range of transmission of each locator
– Violation means attack is underway
Ai
Aj
Wormhole link
2R
Li LjR
R
RLL ji 2≤−
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Threat Analysis• Sybil attack (SA): adversary fabricates legit
node IDs or impersonates multiple network entities. Essentially, globally shared key K0 compromised
• Once K0breached, attacker can:– Insert bogus location info into the network – attach an already published hash value from a
locator not heard by the sensor under attack, and encrypt it with the compromised K0
– Impersonate a higher number of locators than LHs and compromise majority voting scheme
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Detection and Defense• Specify a threshold Lmax as the
maximum allowable number of locators heard by each sensor
• If a sensor hears more than Lmax locators, it assumes attack – Select Lmax so P(|LHs| ≥ Lmax) is low
and P(|LHs| > Lmax /2) is high• Sensor binds to Closest Locator using
Closest Locator Algorithm (CLA) to determine its position
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Distance Bounding in Noisy Environments
Dave Singelee and Bart PreneelESAS ’07
Presented by Yu Seung
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Proximity Based Authentication
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Distance Bounding Protocols
• Determining an upper bound on the distance between V and P
• Distance sources– RSS, AoA, ToF– Attacker can mislead the signal
strength by using directional antenna
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Attacks Against DBP
• Mafia fraud attacks (a.k.a. relay attacks)– An intruder close to V can identify itself to V as P
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• Terrorist fraud attacks– Collaboration between P and intruder
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Design Principles of secure DBP
• P has to identify itself (ex. shared secret key)• To prevent mafia fraud attacks, DBP should
have a challenge-response protocol– the challenge should be unpredictable and the
response should depend on the challenge• To prevent terrorist fraud attacks,
– Using private (or symmetric key)– Using trusted hardware
• Communication process should be minimized
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DBP by Brands and Chaum
• Proposed in EUROCRYPT ‘93
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Start of rapid bit exchange
End of rapid bit exchange
verify commit
verify sign(m)
}1,0{ℜ∈im }1,0{ℜ∈iα
P V)||( 1 kmmcommit
iα
iβiii m⊕← αβ
)()_( 1 msigncommitopenkkm βαβα |||| 11 ←
kkm βαβα |||| 11 ←
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MAD by Capkun et al.
• Mutual authentication protocol using DBP
• Both parties estimate an upper bound on the distance between themselves
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RFID Protocol by Hancke and Kuhn
• Proposed in SecureComm 2005• Designed to cope with bit errors during
the fast bit exchanges• Useful in noisy environments such as RFID• For given the security parameter x and the
n fast bit exchanges, DBP succeeds if at least (n-x) of the responses are correct
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RFID Protocol (cont.)
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Noise Resilient MAD
• Combining the strengths of MAD and RFID– Mutual entity authentication– Resilient to bit errors during the exchange
• Exchanging all challenges and responses again on a slower channel with error correction with MAD too costly
• Instead, extends k bits to n bits based on ECC in initial phase and exchanges n bits
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Noise Resilient MAD (cont.)
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Performance Analysis
• An attacker has a major advantage when bit errors due to noise can appear
• Resilient MAD shows slightly lower FR ratio than Hancke and Kuhn’s DBP
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Performance Analysis (cont.)
• Resilient MAD shows significantly lower FA ratio than Hancke and Kuhn’s DBP
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Performance Analysis (cont.)
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Secure Positioning in Wireless Networks
Srdjan Capkun and Jean-Pierre HubauxIEEE JSAC 2006
Presented by Eric
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Attack model
• External attackers and Internal attackers (compromised nodes)
• Node centric – asks public base stations for position
• Infrastructure centric - Infrastructure computes the location based on their mutual communication
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Attacks - GPS
• GPS satellite simulators can spoof radio signals
• Civilian GPS receivers will accept the strongest signal
• This type of attack can be prevented, if we can authenticate the satellite (but we can’t)
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Attack – Ultrasound positioning
• Ultrasound positioning systems measure the time of flight of ultrasound signals to determine a node’s location
• Vulnerabilities:- Wormhole attack- Replay attack
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Attack – Radio Positioning
• Use received signal strength to infer the distance from transmitter
• Vulnerabilities:– Compromised node can reply with
fake signal strength– Replay attack
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Verifiable Multilateration
• VM is a secure localization technique that is related to the following techniques
• Distance bounding techniques upper bounds the distance of one device to another (compromised) device
• Authenticated ranging protocols enable two honest and trusted parties to measure their mutual distance in an authenticated manner
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Verifiable Multilateration
• Step 1: verifiers v1...vn perform distance bounding to u
• Step 2: computes the estimated distance (x, y) with the results from step 1
• Step 3:– d test: is (x,y) within the measurement error?– Point in triangle test: does (x,y) fall in a
triangle formed by at least one triplet of verifiers?
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Cooperative positioning
• Deploying a large number of landmarks is difficult
• SPINE- Sensor nodes can be used to locate each other using a cooperative technique based on VM
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Conclusion
• Range-free algorithm (SeRLoc)– Distributed algorithm– Sector antennas are required
• Range-based algorithm (Distance Bounding Protocols)
– Prevention of distance reduction– Hardware to support high precision is required– High synchronization among nodes is required
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Questions?
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©Radha Poovendran
SeRLoc - Security mechanisms•Message Encryption: Messages encrypted with a symmetric key K0.•Beacon Format:
Locator’s coordinates Slopes of the sector
ID authentication
Shared symmetric key
Li : { (Xi, Yi) || (θi,1, θi,2) || (Hn-j(PWi)), j } K0
• Every sensor stores the values Hn(PWi) for all the locators.
• A sensor can authenticate all locators that are within its range
PWi H0(Pwi)H H1(Pwi) Hn(Pwi)H H H
one-way hash functionHash chain
Synchronization var