13. RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA,[1]

In 2004, (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision

plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes

Villa (respondents). The complaint/case was filed in the RTC- Antipolo City.

After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, (Zapanta), court process server,

resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not

acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. This was supported by return of

summons.

Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to

file a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.

8 months after, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default,claiming that on January

27, 2006 they officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. Motion to

Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the ORDER dated May 3, 2005 granting the Motion to Declare

[them] in Default. And they denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign

and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the

allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the documents

By Order of July 17, 2006, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein

respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing

petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted by Order

of February 21, 2007.

  On April 18, 2007, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second

order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not

acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied

respondents Omnibus Motion by Order of May 22, 2007 and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence

for petitioner.

 

Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial courts February 21, 2007 and April 18, 2007 Orders

before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of the defendants/respondents. CA ruled on the ground

that “A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based

on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court”.

Petitioner here filed a motion of reconsideration on the ground that first Motion to Lift the Order of

Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. But still denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents upon filing of the motion constitute a special appearance.

Held: No. SC held that respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special

appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons.  Clearly, they had

submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

 Court discussed that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance:

 (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court   over the person of the defendant  must be   explicitly made , i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner ; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution,

14. G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO,Respondents.

Facts:

In 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. The death certificate of Manuel states "13 July 1995" as the date of death.

As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel.10 In compliance with the verbal order of the court during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the case, respondent submitted the required names and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the trial court .

On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence.However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds:

(1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action;

(2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (

3) that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and

(4) that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.16

5

Trial Court denied the motion on the following grounds: (1) It was filed not within the period required by law. (2) "defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches since respondent failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so.

Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of the respondents. CA reasoned out that RTC should have considered the motion for reconsidered on the following reasons: (1) When the case filed, it is clear that Manuel is already dead. The complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable party, which stands to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the case. (2) As a consequence, the court did not acquired the jurisdiction of defendant. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Court has never acquired the jurisdiction over the defendant Manuel.

Held:

1. No. The Court has never acquired the jurisdiction over the person of Manuel. In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. As a consequence, Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.

Petition granted. Case was directed to TC and proceeded against the wife.

15. G G.R. No. 178193

DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

 16. CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices,Petitioner,

- versus -

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,Respondent.

G.R. No. 168973

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO, andVILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 24, 2011

On October 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property Registration Decree.  Stating that he has in open, continuous, apparent and notorious possession of the land for more than 30 years (2) Tax has been paid.  On the order of RTC, it noted that some of the important records are lacking in the petition:

In an Order[4] dated October 23, 1998, the RTC noted that:

 A perusal of the records of the case shows that the annexes lack the

following copies: a)   two blue print copies of the approved plan;

 b)   two copies of the technical description of the lot sought to be registered;

 c)   two copies of the Surveyors certificate;

 d)  a certificate in quadruplicate of the City Assessor of the assessed value

of the land; 

e)  all original muniments of title in the possession of the applicant which prove ownership of the land;

 f)   two copies of the petition/application.

 Further, the application did not state the number of the lot sought to be

registered, the number of parcels applied for, the improvements found thereon, and indicate whether it claims a portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.

 All these must be alleged in the petition so that the Court will know the

nature of the property. 

The RTC explained that the extra copies submitted by petitioner shall be forwarded by the

RTC Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) in Manila for comment. Only

thereafter would the RTC set the application for hearing.

Petitioner filed its Compliance[5] with the above-mentioned Order, submitting additional

copies of the required documents and clarifying thus:

 1.            The approved plan does not state the number of lot sought to be registered

because it is a public land, thus, only PSU-07-006805 appears on the plan which is being applied for registration;

2.             Only one (1) parcel of land is applied for by petitioners which consist of five thousand four hundred ten (5,410) square meters, more or less;

3.            The City Engineers Building within the City Engineers compound are the only improvement found thereon; and

4.           Petitioners do not claim any portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.

 

The RTC accordingly set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 on April 12, 1999, and

sent notices to the parties.

 

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent,

represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed its opposition contending that

the mayor was not in possession of the land in a concept of an owner for 30 years. However before the

start of hearing, the respondents seek to file a motion to dismiss the LRC case on the ground that the

RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Respondent argued that Section 14(1) of

Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, refers only to

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide clam of ownership. The subject

property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as

explicitly testified to by petitioners own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable. 

 RTC denied the application. For It having been shown by [petitioners] own evidence that the lot subject of the application for original registration is a foreshore land, and therefore not registerable.

Upon appeal, CA reiterated the decision of RTC. Hence, petition.

Issue: Whether the RTC is correct in denying the application on the ground that the subject matter is not a registrable land. Hence, not within the power of RTC to adjudicate.

Held: Yes, the RTC erred in its decision in denying the petition on that ground.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the

allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the

plaintiff's cause of action. 

 The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the

answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely

depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action

pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.

In this case at bar, the issue whether the subject is registrable land is factual issue and must be

disputed and decided upon the commencement of proceeding.

Hence, petition granted. The Case was directed to CFI/RTC for the commencement of LRC case.

17. G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013

THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, Petitioners, v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.

On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is P38,900,000:

On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction

of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan.  The contract price for Phase II is P2,475,345.54.7

On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 covering the following items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle.

Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent.  It asserted that the sums being claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondent’s June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from liability for any cost in connection with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project.

RTC favoured Jodi King. On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment of P67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the respondent. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009 on the ground that the case should have been settled in COA. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA’s primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.