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ICAO 2012 Safety Register

Edition No. : 0.300 Draft

Edition Issue Date : 18 Jul 2011

Author : Henk KORTEWEG

Reference : STD/SQS/SAM

Copy No. : stamp here

DNM EUROCONTROLDocument Title: Document Reference:

ICAO 2012 safety Register STD/SQS/SAM

Document ControlCopyright Notice

© 2010 European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL).All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of EUROCONTROL.

Approval Table

AUTHORITY DATE SIGNATURE

Author

Henk Korteweg

18 July 2011

Secretary ICAO 2012 FPL TF 18 July 2011

Chairman ICAO 2012 FPL TF 18 July 2011

Document Identification

Full Title: Safety Register

Total Number of Pages: 28

Edition: 0.3000.300 DraftDraft

ii



Distribution

CopyNo/Email

Name/Email Address Role Organisation

0.100 ICAO 2012 TF Implementers ICAO EUR region0.200 ICAO 2012 TF Implementers ICAO EUR region0.300 ICAO 2012 TF Implementers ICAO EUR region

Edition History

Edition No. EditionIssue Date

Author Reason

0.100 06 Dec 2010 H. Korteweg First Draft

0.200 Updated with additional Safety Considerations in area 8, 12, 14, 17 and 19 provided by Skyguide

0.300 18 July 2011 H. Korteweg Updated after ICAO 2012 TF meeting in Paris 9-10 June 2011

0.400

Review Table

Edition No. Review type, scope, depth & focus

Reviewers Date Conclusion

0.100 General review ICAO 2012 TF Dec 2010 Accepted

0.200 ICAO 2012 TF June 2011 Accepted

0.300 TF management Under review

0.400 ICAO 2012 TF Under review


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Table of Contents

1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................1

2 Introduction.........................................................................................................................22.1 Scope..............................................................................................................................2

3 References...........................................................................................................................23.1 Methodology Used..........................................................................................................2

4 Abbreviations......................................................................................................................2

5 Meeting conditions.............................................................................................................3

6 Successes since beginning 2011......................................................................................3

7 Main open issues................................................................................................................37.1 Date of Flight...................................................................................................................37.2 Inconsistent data in operations.......................................................................................47.3 Phraseology....................................................................................................................47.4 69 Characters..................................................................................................................47.5 Performance monitoring..................................................................................................57.6 Awareness and training...................................................................................................57.7 Increased workload.........................................................................................................5

8 Overview of the attached Annexes...................................................................................6

Abbreviations...............................................................................................................................7

All Safety Considerations...........................................................................................................1

DOCUMENT FINAL PAGE.........................................................................................................13


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1 Executive Summary(1) This document provides an update of the ICAO 2012 Safety Register version 0.200.

(2) The document provides an overview of the resolution of safety considerations that affect conceptual design issues and technical implementation issues the latter resulting in a stable UID and URD.

(3) Explicitly this implies that the needed transparency of design of the concept and the central functions at the DNM/CFMU is now to be considered as mature meaning that local/national implementers can commence with their local implementation activities.

(4) This version of the safety register highlights some issues that require attention and expedient action by different stakeholders in order to meet the required implementation date of ICAO 2012.

(5) These issues relate to:

a) Date of Flight (DOF)

b) Inconsistent data in operations

c) Phraseology

d) 69 characters

e) Performance monitoring

f) Awareness and training

g) Increased workload

(6) Annex B of this document contains the full list of Safety Considerations, including those that are intended to support a safe implementation of the ICAO 2012 provisions by the different stakeholders.

Edition: 0.300 Draft 1



(7)

2 Introduction

2.1 Scope(1) The intended audience of this document is all aviaition stakeholders who are affected by the

changes arising from Amendment 1 to ICAO’s Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management, 15th Edition, which affect the format and content of the ICAO flight plan form (hereinafter referred to as “ICAO 2012”). This includes those who will contribute to its safe implementation.

(2) This document provides an update of the ICAO 2012 Safety Register version 0.200.

(3) As the Safety Register is a living document, future updates are expected prior to the ICAO 2012 implementation date. The Safety Register will continue to exist as a possible reference document after the implementation date. It will however no longer be updated as it is considered that the safety Considerations should be resolved prior to implementation.

3 References(1) Relevant and up to date documentation for the implementation can be found via the following

websites;

(2) ICAO Paris office for the documentation held on the ICAO EUR/NAT website regarding the implementation of FPL 2012; http://www.paris.icao.int/documents_open_meetings/subcategory.php?id=113

(3) Eurocontrol One Sky Teams website; https://extranet.eurocontrol.int/http://onesky2.eurocontrol.int/amserver/UI/Login?gw=extranet.eurocontrol.int&org=eurocontrol

3.1 Methodology Used(1) The Safety Scanning methodology has been formally released by the EUROCONTROL Safety

Regulation Commission (SRC) on the 14th of June 2011 as SRC Document 46.

(2) The explanatory and supporting material for the methodology can be retrieved from the SRC website; http://www.eurocontrol.int/src/public/site_preferences/display_library_list_public.html#8.

(3) In addition, version 0.200 of the safety Register also provides some clarification on how the Methodology was used.

4 Abbreviations(1) Annex A of this document provides an overview of the abbreviations used in this document.


http://www.eurocontrol.int/src/public/site_preferences/display_library_list_public.html#8

https://extranet.eurocontrol.int/http:/onesky2.eurocontrol.int/amserver/UI/Login?gw=extranet.eurocontrol.int&org=eurocontrol

https://extranet.eurocontrol.int/http:/onesky2.eurocontrol.int/amserver/UI/Login?gw=extranet.eurocontrol.int&org=eurocontrol

http://www.paris.icao.int/documents_open_meetings/subcategory.php?id=113



5 Meeting conditions(1) The ICAO 2012 TF met in Paris on the 9th and 10th of June 2011. Approximately 70 people

attended the meeting representing ICAO, Eurocontrol, national focal points, ANSPs, national supervisory authorities, manufacturing industry, one airline operator and observers inter alia from the FAA and the European Commission (details available in TF4 minutes).

(2) The results from the Safety Scanning were discussed during the meeting on the 9th.

(3) This report covers amongst others the discussions held during this meeting.

6 Successes since beginning 2011(1) The most recent success is the endorsement, by the EANPG, of the TF recommendation of

“Option 2” (ref. State Letter issued by the EUR/NAT Office of ICAO, serial number EUR/NAT 11-0414.TEC, dated 1 July 2011).

(2) The EANPG acceptance goes together with the released updates of the documents below;

a) User Requirement Document (URD),

b) “CFMU Interface Manual for ICAO 2012” (UID), and

c) EUROCONTROL SPECIFICATION for ATS Data Exchange Presentation (ADEXP)

(3) These decisions and updates close the discussions on the following Safety Considerations;

a) SC-17-05 on the use of “significant point”

b) SC-19-01 on the acceptance of “EUR”

c) SC-19-04 on the use of “significant point”

d) SC-19-07 on the readiness of the translation service

(4) Closure of these safety considerations explicitly implies that the needed transparency of design of the concept and the central functions at the DNM/CFMU can now be considered as mature, meaning that local/national implementers can commence with their local implementation activities to meet the ICAO 2012 deadline.

7 Main open issues(1) The main issues listed below are considered as most relevant for awareness at this time in the

project.

(2) Some of these issues are spread over multiple Safety Considerations and stakeholders. Some references are made in the text to certain Safety Considerations. These references are for illustration purposes and do may not cover all affected Safety Considerations.

7.1 Date of Flight(1) A new Safety Consideration SC-19-08 was raised with respect to the use of Date of Flight

(DOF) notably on the interpretation of DLA messages which imply a delay to the next day. In




Europe, it is recommended only to use CHG messages to indicate delays beyond midnight, as a DLA might be misunderstood.

(2) As discussed during TF4, ICAO accepted an action to seek guidance from HQ. The clarification from ICAO has been received after TF4 that a CHG message is to be used to update DOF. A DLA message is NOT to be used in cases where the delay results in the intended date of flight changing to the next day.

7.2 Inconsistent data in operations(1) During TF4 the issue was raised that there was a possible risk related to the possible

inconsistency between aircraft/crew capability indicated in the flight plan and actual capability of the aircraft/crew. This is not necessarily a new risk, as it is also a possible scenario in today’s operations, however the changes resulting from ICAO 2012 may give more visibility to this particular risk.

(2) Such a risk relates to the fact that ATCOs could expect a certain navigation capability which could result in a planned reduction in separation minima when the lack of actual navigational capability meant that the flight should not be subject to the reduced minimum.

(3) Possible misunderstandings between ATCO and pilot about the capabilities as indicated in the flight plan content on equipment could possibly have an additional negative impact due to a lengthy use of the radio frequency to clarify the actual capabilities. The possibility for this scenario is considered as credible but its expected occurrence is rare.

(4) The large number of new codes that have been identified in the new FPL content could contribute to possible misunderstanding.

(5) This issue has already been referenced in the Safety Register and should be mitigated for through resolution of the relevant Safety Considerations on “competence”, for both ATCO and pilots, and the Safety Considerations that were identified for Airline Operators (AO) e.g. on consistency between flight crew competence and FPL content.

7.3 Phraseology(1) The identified risk for “inconsistent data” in the section above relates directly to the raised

concerns on phraseology for indicating changes to equipment capabilities as defined in the new contents of Item 10 and item 18.

(2) The current ICAO position on this issue is as follows:

Phraseology issue – ICAO advises they do not see a requirement to introduce new phraseology, as existing guidance provides for the use of plain language when required. It is foreseen that the necessity to discuss detailed technical aspects of aircraft capability will be rare. There is existing phraseology to advise of degradation or lack of capability “UNABLE RNP (specify type) (or RNAV) [DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF RAIM or RAIM ALERT)]” “GBAS (or SBAS) UNAVAILABLE” etc (see the PANS ATM, Chapter 12, 12.3.1.13 and 12.3.1.14). If a specific operational requirement were to be elaborated (such as expected rates of equipment failure/degradation), this would be reconsidered.

7.4 69 Characters(1) The issue relates to how to deal with messages that exceed the 69 character line length with

item 10. Should a line feed be inserted, or should extra information be placed somewhere else?




(2) SC-19-03 provides the input from a DNM/CFMU position; “IFPS will provide a line-break to enable the message sending. ANSPs will need to consider how to process this format.”

(3) The current ICAO position on this issue is as follows:Concerns about line length in Item 10 exceeding 69 characters – ICAO foresees that this would be a rare occurrence; however, if the line length were to be exceeded, then the same procedure as used for other Fields (5, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22) should be used. ICAO will determine whether it might be possible to clarify this further through a global mechanism.

7.5 Performance monitoring(1) The issue raised is how to monitor globally any performance improvement resulting from the

2012 FPL?

(2) This issue relates directly to SC-23-04 which raises the issue as well with respect to monitoring arrangements for post-implementation operations.

(3) Due to the decision that there is no fall-back scenario and that the planned implementation date must be adhered to reinforces the need for direct post-operational monitoring. This need has to cater for swift correction to the implementation if needed based on reported occurrences.

(4) There is a direct link to SC-10-01 which implies that ANSP internal occurrence reporting systems should be reviewed and where needed updated to provide input to the overarching performance monitoring activities.

(5) The current ICAO position on this issue is as follows:

(6) Global Performance Measurement of the implementation – this is being coordinated at the ICAO Headquarters level

7.6 Awareness and training(1) Many of the raised Safety Considerations can be resolved through training (competence) and

awareness (structured promotion activities).

(2) Whereas training is the responsibility of the individual organizations, awareness is a broader activity “to get the information known”.

(3) The National Focal Points have an explicit responsibility in the awareness activity, but how can National Focal Points reach all parties within their respective State?

(4) It is recommended that the National Focal Points start raising this issue with either their Ministry of Transport, CAA, national aviation authorities.

(5) How the responsibilities are spread is probably different per State but at least the State authorities should have arrangements in place (even if this means only e.g. mailing lists) to reach all relevant stakeholders within the State.

7.7 Increased workload(1) Although no new hazards were identified due to the implementation of ICAO 2012 it was noted

that the number of “erroneous” flight plans and related messages was likely to increase especially during and shortly after the transition to the new format.

(2) This issue is referred to notably in the Safety Consideration for Safety Planning and competence. All involved stakeholders have their own responsibility to assess through their Edition: 0.300 Draft 5



organization how much extra work could be involved and whether extra resources should be activated and for what timeframe.

8 Overview of the attached Annexes(1) The attached Annexes represent an overview of the totality of Safety Considerations as they

were originally raised in version 0.100 and extended during TF discussions.

(2) For ease of reference; the relevant Excel based safety Register is made available to TF Members. By use of the filter, specific Safety Considerations can be grouped per stakeholder.

(3) Although an individual stakeholder view probably provides the most practical format it is strongly recommended to read the general Annex as well as it provides understanding of the complexity of the change and how it is spread over the Total Network.

(4) The individual stakeholder view can be generated by using the filter in the provided Excel template which contains all Safety Considerations.




AbbreviationsADEXP ATS Data Exchange Presentation AFIL Air-Filed Flight PlanAFTN Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication NetworkAIDC ATS Inter facility Data Communications (ICAO)AIP Aeronautical Information PublicationAMAN Arrival ManagerAO Airline OperatorARO Air Traffic Services Reporting OfficeATCO Air Traffic ControllerATS Air Traffic ServicesCAA Civil Aviation AuthorityCDM Collaborative Decision-MakingCFSP Computerised flight plan service providerCHG Change Message DLA Delay(ed) MessageDMAN Departure ManagerDNM Directorate Network Management (EUROCONTROL)DOF Date of FlightDPR Data PreparationEASA European Aviation Safety AgencyEANPG COG European Air Navigation Planning Group Coordination Group (ICAO)FAA Federal Aviation Authority (USA)FDA Flight Data AssistantFDO Flight data OperatorFDP Flight Data processingFIS Flight Information ServiceFITS ICAO website http://www2.icao.int/en/FITS/Pages/home.aspxFMP Flow Management PositionFMS Flight Management SystemFPL Flight PlanGA General AviationGAT General Air TrafficGBAS Ground Based Augmentation SystemHMI Human Machine InterfaceICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation (UN)IFPS Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System (EUROCONTROL)IFR Instrument Flight RulesMEL Minimum Equipment ListNATSPG North Atlantic Systems Planning Group (ICAO)NSA National Supervisory Authority (EU SES defined)OAT Operational Air TrafficOLDI On-Line Data InterchangePANS ATM Procedures for Air Navigation Services (ICAO)RDP Radar Data ProcessingRNAV Area NavigationRNP Required Navigation Performance


http://www2.icao.int/en/FITS/Pages/home.aspx



RMK Remark (Flight plan item 18 indicator)SBAS Satellite-Based Augmentation SystemSRC Safety Regulation Commission (EUROCONTROL)SMS Safety Management SystemTF ICAO-EUROCONTROL FPL 2012 Task ForceUID User Interface DocumentURD User Requirement DocumentVFR Visual Flight RulesVOR Very High Frequency Omni directional Radio Range




All Safety Considerations Safety Consideration

Safety Consideration Resolution By whom

With By When relevant references

08 Safety Planning

SC-08-01 Possible increase in FPL rejections (at least during transition phase), which may require additional resources to cope.

Assess need for additional staffing availability and ensure staff is in place when needed

Airport Operator

Company Work Planning



ANSP Company Work Planning



DNM Company Work Planning

09 Planning of Safety Achievement

SC-09-01 The creation of “Safety Cases” related to the implementation should be considered subject to possible safety regulatory requirements. Testing and validation prior to implementation seems the most appropriate way to ensure safe implementation given the type of change.

ANSPs to follow the established processes as approved by their competent authority to deal with "safety Management of Changes". Change managers are advised to contact their local Safety Manager in case of unclarity.

ANSP NSA Company SMS

SC-09-02 The creation of “Safety Cases” related to the implementation should be considered subject to possible safety regulatory requirements. Testing and validation prior to implementation

DNM to follow the established processes as approved by their competent authority to deal with "safety Management of Changes". Change managers are advised to contact their local Safety

DNM EASA Company SMS


1



seems the most appropriate way to ensure safe implementation given the type of change.

Manager in case of unclarity.

10 Planning of Safety Assurance

SC-10-01 Internal monitoring mechanisms (e.g. occurrence reporting) should be reviewed especially on equipment level (e.g. recording and playback facilities)

ANSPs to assess internal monitoring systems to ensure that unwanted performance of the possibly affected functions can be properly addressed. Change managers are advised to contact their local Safety Manager in case of unclarity.

ANSP Company SMS

12 Procedures SC-12-01 Temporary procedures should be

considered for the different "switches" in the transition to ICAO 2012

Assess the need for temporary procedures and if so, ensure awareness with relevant stakeholders

FOCAL POINT

DNM National ICAO 2012 deployment plan or awareness activities

ICAO EUR Region Plan for Implementation of Amendment 1 to the 15th edition of the PANS-ATM Document, ‘New FPL Contents for 2012’

SC-12-02 Flight Plan filing procedures in general for all involved actors will need to be reviewed

Review national FPL filling procedures FOCAL POINT

ALL PARTIES

National ICAO 2012 deployment plan or awareness activities

SC-12-03 Letters of Agreement need to be reviewed (neighbour relationship)

Review Letters of Agreement to ensure consistency with respect to flight plan data exchanges

ANSP DNM Company LoAs and working procedures

Relate experiences back to ICAO 2012 TF for sharing with others

SC-12-04 FDO assistants for manual correction/ introduction of FPL

Review procedures for staff involved in creation and correction of FPL data

ANSP Company working procedures

SC-12-05 FPL will be stored up to 5 days in advance, which is currently not the case for GA, which implies new procedures

Review of GA FPL filing procedures taking into account 5 day in advance storage

FOCAL POINT

GA National ICAO 2012 deployment plan or awareness activities

SC-12-06 GA filers of the FPL need to be more aware where to send the FPL

Review of GA FPL filing procedures with respect to addressing

FOCAL POINT

GA National ICAO 2012 deployment plan or awareness activities

SC-12-07 Some additional IFPS procedures will be required

Assess impact on IFPS working procedures

DNM Company working procedures

SC-12-08 Procedures for ATCOs coming from new FPL information. Indications in

Assess impact on ATCO working procedures related to FPL content and

ANSP Company working procedures


2



the FPL that affect the actions of ATCOs require consideration (e.g. AFIL)

where necessary amend content

SC-12-09 Procedures for ATCOs coming from new FPL information. Indications in the FPL that affect the actions of ATCOs require consideration (e.g. AFIL)

Assess impact on pilot working procedures related to FPL content and where necessary amend content

AO FOCAL POINT


Company working procedures

SC-12-10 Procedures for ATCOs coming from new FPL information. Indications in the FPL that affect the actions of ATCOs require consideration (e.g. AFIL)

Assess impact on pilot working procedures related to FPL content and where necessary amend content

GA FOCAL POINT


SC-12-11 Procedures for creation and release of Aeronautical Information require review

Review the procedures and processes related to the creation, amendment and release of Aeronautical Information to assess possible impact.

FOCAL POINT

DNM Interfaces/documents related to AIP

SC-12-12 AOs to consider procedures to ensure consistency with FPL information and actual equipment availability on board

Review company procedures with respect to consistency of FPL information with equipment availability on board

AO Company working procedures

SC-12-13 AOs to consider procedures to ensure consistency with FPL information and actual crew certification on board

Review company procedures with respect to consistency of FPL information with crew certification


SC-12-14 AIPs should be reviewed as some FPL filing procedures are also described in them.

Review AIPs on content with respect to FPL filing procedures

FOCAL POINT

AIP

13 Operating environment

SC-13-01 Traffic mix is a safety-related consideration for the Implementation of ICAO 2012. ICAO 2012 Discussions currently focus on IFR/GATT impact on ICAO 2012 implementation for, IFR/VFR and GAT/OAT should be considered from a FPL filer and FPL processing perspective.

Assess the need for additional guidance material and awareness for the benefit non IFR/GAT FPL filers.

ICAO DNM and FOCAL POINTS



3



14 Competence SC-14-01 FDA (Flight Data Assistants) may

require training or as a minimum awareness information

Assess the need for training and where needed prepare and provide training. This includes that one ANSPs may receive FPL from different sources than IFPS. ANSP staff will have to decide which FPL actually should be fed into the system (collective addresses need to be considered in the detailed analysis).

ANSP Company training and working procedures

SC-14-02 ATCOs may require training or as a minimum awareness information (e.g. the meaning of newly visible abbreviations)

Assess the need for training and where needed prepare and provide training. This includes that one ANSPs may receive FPL from different sources than IFPS. ANSP staff will have to decide which FPL actually should be fed into the system (collective addresses need to be considered in the detailed analysis)


SC-14-03 Pilots may require training or as a minimum awareness information (e.g. the meaning of newly visible abbreviations)

Assess the need for training and where needed prepare and provide training.

AO Company training and working procedures

SC-14-04 Flight Service centre (FIS, VFR support to pilots) may require training or as a minimum awareness information



SC-14-05 IFPS may require training or as a minimum awareness information

Assess the need for training and where needed prepare and provide.

DNM Company training and working procedures

SC-14-06 System manufacturers may require training or as a minimum awareness information (with respect to content of the change)


System Manufacturers

Company training and working procedures

SC-14-07 Dispatchers may require training or as a minimum awareness information


AO Company training and working procedures

SC-14-08 maintainers of environmental data may require training or as a minimum awareness information


ANSP DNM Company training and working procedures

SC-14-09 ARO staff may require training or as a minimum awareness information


Airport Operator


SC-14-10 ATCOs may require training or as a Assess the need for training and where ANSP Company training and working procedures


4



minimum awareness information for new phraseology

needed prepare and provide training.

SC-14-11 Pilots may require training or as a minimum awareness information for new phraseology


AO and GA


SC-14-12 Airspace Designers may require training or as a minimum awareness information (taking into account new information e.g. for procedural design)


ANSP DNM Company training and working procedures

SC-14-13 Aircraft capability requirements are now available on a much more detailed level. The understanding of this "newly available" information could increase the competence requirements on staff as more understanding may be needed.

Assess the impact of having more aircraft capability information in the FPL on competence requirements on staff. If needed; prepare and provide training or awareness.

ALL National ICAO 2012 deployment plan or awareness activities and/or Company training and working procedures

SC-14-14 Not all "flight-plan-filers" will be able in time to file in accordance to the new FPL formats. This includes people that provide FPL to ANSPs will provide information in accordance with the new formats.

Ensure that all "flight-plan-filers" are effectively informed in time about the new flight plan formats and provide guidance where needed.

FOCAL POINT

ICAO and Member States (e.g. NSA depending on the state)


15 Human-machine interaction

SC-15-01 The HMIs at CFMU may require changes.

Assess if there is an impact and if so initiate the change. This assessment should include possible impact on ergonomics or working environment. This assessment should also include the possible impact on task complexity (especially during the transition).

DNM Company change management

SC-15-02 The HMIs provided by CFSPs may Assess if there is an impact and if so CFSP System Company change management


5



require changes. initiate the change. This assessment should include possible impact on ergonomics or working environment. This assessment should also include the possible impact on task complexity (especially during the transition).

manufacturers

SC-15-03 The HMIs for ATCO may require changes.


ANSP Company change management

SC-15-04 The HMIs for FDA may require changes.


ANSP Company change management

SC-15-05 The HMIs at Flight plan working positions at Flight Planning services, possibly on electronic flight pack may require changes.


AO Company change management

SC-15-06 The HMIs for Electronic flight plans may require changes.


ALL Company change management

SC-15-07 The HMIs at the FMS may require changes.

Assess if there is an impact and if so initiate the change. This assessment should include possible impact on ergonomics or working environment. This

AO System manufacturers

Company change management


6



assessment should also include the possible impact on task complexity (especially during the transition).

Communication SC-17-01 The interaction between pilots and

ATCOs in operations may be affected.

Assess the impact of the change possibly in relation to additional phraseology (e.g. for AFIL)

ICAO – ICAO advises they do not see a requirement to introduce new phraseology, as existing guidance provides for the use of plain language when required. It is foreseen that the necessity to discuss detailed technical aspects of aircraft capability will be rare. There is existing phraseology to advise of degradation or lack of capability “UNABLE RNP (specify type) (or RNAV) [DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF RAIM or RAIM ALERT)]” “GBAS (or SBAS) UNAVAILABLE” etc (see the PANS ATM, Chapter 12, 12.3.1.13 and 12.3.1.14). If a specific operational requirement were to be elaborated (such as expected rates of equipment failure/degradation), this would be reconsidered.

SC-17-02 The interaction between ATCOs and FDAs in day to day operations may change

Assess the impact and ensure that the communication between ATCOs and FDAs is effectively addressed.


SC-17-03 The interaction between FMP staff and CFMU helpdesk (procedure based) may change

Assess the impact and where needed update the procedures

DNM ANSP CFMU/FMP procedures

SC-17-04 The interaction between pilots and Aerodrome of Departures may change

Assess the impact of the change possibly in relation to additional phraseology

ICAO – ICAO advises they do not see a requirement to introduce new phraseology, as existing guidance provides for the use of plain language when required. It is foreseen that the necessity to discuss detailed technical aspects of aircraft capability will be rare. There is existing phraseology to advise of degradation or


7



lack of capability “UNABLE RNP (specify type) (or RNAV) [DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF RAIM or RAIM ALERT)]” “GBAS (or SBAS) UNAVAILABLE” etc (see the PANS ATM, Chapter 12, 12.3.1.13 and 12.3.1.14). If a specific operational requirement were to be elaborated (such as expected rates of equipment failure/degradation), this would be reconsidered.

SC-17-05 The use of "significant point" is not clear to all.

clarify where needed or identify where the description is

ICAO DONE CLOSED: See e.g. URD.The following modification to Field 15 description has been proposed by ICAO:

"Bearing and distance from a reference point:

The identification of the reference point, followed by the bearing from the point in the form of 3 figures giving degrees magnetic, followed by the distance from the point in the form of 3 figures expressing nautical miles. In areas of high latitude where it is determined by the appropriate authority that reference to degrees magnetic is impractical, degrees true may be used. Make up the correct number of figures, where necessary, by insertion of zeros — e.g. a point 180° magnetic at a distance of 40 nautical miles from VOR “DUB” should be expressed as DUB180040

SC-17-06 Increased and changed communication is expected between CFMU helpdesk all possible FPL filers when IFPS starts rejecting FPL in old format

Assess the possible impact and prepare if deemed needed

DNM Company work planning

SC-17-07 The interaction may change between flight planning/dispatch and flight crew

Assess the possible impact and consider communication process. This relates to



8



and/or "crewing" management because of changed need for consistency in the cockpit versus the FPL

SC-12-12

SC-17-08 The inclusion of FPL communication into the CFMU e-helpdesk may be affected by this change.

Assess the possible impact and if needed include in the e-helpdesk development

DNM e-helpdesk specification

18 Reliability SC-18-01 Reliability of the output could be at

stake during the transition periodAgree on clear management arrangements for the transition period

ALL

SC-18-02 Post-transition, aircraft equipment failure/maintenance regimes may lead to inconsistencies between FPL information and aircraft capabilities (see also 12. Procedures).

Assess possible impact and establish or update processes and procedures to ensure consistency between aircraft capabilities and FPL content.

AO Aircraft system manufacturers

Company working procedures

19 Transparency SC-19-01 Will other regions accept EUR in their

FPL (ICAO/EUR usage)?Clarify the use of EUR in the FPL ICAO DONE CLOSED:

See EANPG decision and related e-mail of Andrew Hill on the 7th of July 2011 (including update to the URD).

SC-19-02 What will the length of field 10a or 10b be (needed for e.g. HMI)?

Provide clarification on the format of filed 10a or 10b

DNM See minutes TF4, 9-10 June 2011.See CFMU 2012 REQUIREMENTS (URD) V1.3 and ICAO response via FITS: "The new provisions envisaged to be performance-based as much as possible and tried not to establish limitations in terms of numbers of characters and left this definition to implementation according to the needs. The requirement is to have a coordinated and harmonized implementation"

SC-19-03 Could field 10 could contain more than the AFTN 69 characters?

Provide clarification on the maximum of AFTN 69 characters for field 10.

ANSP See minutes of TF4 meeting.IFPS will provide a line-break to enable the message sending. ANSPs will need to consider how to process this format.

SC-19-04 Use of "Significant Point" is still unclear to some?

same as SC-17-05 ICAO DONE CLOSED: Significant point has not been changed in notion except with the inclusion of distance and bearing (to be included in awareness


9



package). SC-19-05 Technical design planning to be

considered at ANSP and others. It is considered in general as “not ready” at this point in time.

Initiate technical design processes for implementation

ANSP ALL PARTIES

Company work planning

SC-19-06 Is additional Phraseology needed? Assess the need for additional phraseology; same as SC-17-01 and SC-17-04

ICAO

SC-19-07 Is the CFMU translation service ready?

CFMU translation service is ready for deployment and specification is available.

DNM DONE CLOSED:CFMU 2012 REQUIREMENTS (URD) V1.3

SC-19-08 there are possible misunderstandings about the true DOF/ after a succession of DLA or CHG messages

To seek guidance from HQ on interpretation of DLA messages which imply a delay to the next day? In Europe, it is recommended only to use CHG messages to indicate delays beyond midnight, as a DLA might be misunderstood.

ICAO open for National

Action on ICAO; Ref Minutes TF4 of 9-10 June 2011ICAO has provided a clarification on this issue. If the intended date of flight changes due to a delay or a series of delays then a CHG message is required to change the DOF. An important reminder is that all of the information in Item 18 needs to be included in Field 22 of the CHG message, not just the updated DOF.

20 Redundancy SC-20-01 No fall-back scenario is considered at

the transition point (151112), i.e. there is no Global recovery plan.

Consider the need for a fall-back scenario or for a global recovery plan.AOs want a "clear" switch.Translation function is a means for redundancy. Not to make switch 2 is an option if there is global delay or issues.

ICAO ALL PARTIES

Due to the highly system- and interface-specific nature of the implementation, it is not possible to develop a global fall back scenario. ICAO also has stated “We are planning for success. If some sort of a fall back framework is developed, there is concern that this will lead some stakeholders to believe that it may be possible to avoid planning for a global implementation.”

From the perspective of “Global fall back plan” the issue should be considered “closed”.

From the perspective of “local” fall-back plans” this needs to be part of the individual implementation planning. It


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appears logical to include testing as a strong mitigation for this risk, as testing well ahead of the implementation will reveal (hopefully) weaknesses or incompatibilities in time to fix them.

21 Interdependence

SC-21-01 Decision support tools may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on Decision support tools

ANSP system manufacturers

Company system specifications

SC-21-02 Safety Nets may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on Safety Nets ANSP system manufacturers


SC-21-03 Interface with CFMU systems (rejection of incorrectly filed FPL by the IFPS) may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on interface with CFMU systems (rejection of incorrectly filed FPL by the IFPS)

DNM DONE CLOSED:Test plan can be executed in line with:CFMU 2012 REQUIREMENTS (URD) V1.3; CFMU INTERFACE MANUAL FOR ICAO 2012 V1.2

SC-21-04 Mixture of FPL formats may occur during the transition phase

Assess possible impact on Mixture of FPL formats that may occur during the transitions phase

ANSP The implementation guidance issued by ICAO in February 2009 (State Letter AN 13/2.1-09/09) explained that the mixture of PRESENT and NEW formats was one of the considerations guiding the choice of transition date. This is a highly system-specific issue that can only be assessed at the system level.

SC-21-05 Interface between FDP/HMI and RDP (depends on local design) may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on interface between FDP/HMI and RDP (depends on local design)

ANSP Company system specifications

SC-21-06 OLDI may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on OLDI DNM ALL PARTIES

OLDI specifications

SC-21-07 DMAN-AMAN tools may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on DMAN-AMAN ANSP system manufacturers


SC-21-08 AO FPL software may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on AO FPL software

AO Company system specifications

SC-21-09 AO electronic flight packs may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on AO electronic flight packs


SC-21-10 Aircraft maintenance Systems (e.g. Assess possible impact on Aircraft AO Company system specifications


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MEL) may be affected by the FPL changes

maintenance Systems (e.g. MEL)

SC-21-11 Stand Allocation and Management systems may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on Stand Allocation and Management systems

Airport Operator


SC-21-12 CDM systems may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on CDM systems Airport Operator

AO & ANSP


SC-21-13 AIDC (oceanic interface, similar to OLDI) may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on AIDC (oceanic interface, similar to OLDI)

NATSPG

SC-21-14 Data preparation systems (DPR/Data preparation; environmental data, matrices for local translation etc.) may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on Data preparation systems (DPR/Data preparation; environmental data, matrices for local translation etc.)

ANSP

SC-21-15 Military systems may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on Military systems

FOCAL POINT


SC-21-16 Simulators may be affected by the FPL changes

Assess possible impact on simulators ALL Company system specifications

23 Integrity SC-23-01 There is a possible dilution of

information, inside the translation function (from field 10 to Field 18) which makes it more difficult to withdraw the information.

Translation from New, which contains more detailed indications, to Old will loose some of the data provided

DNM The specifications require the New indications to be included within RMK/ of the Old format thus no loss of data.

SC-23-02 Harmful output can be a possibility if the integrity of the input (i.e. the new format FPL) is not consistently applied.

Minimize the possibility of harmful output by putting emphasis on integrity of the input by ensuring competency safety Considerations are met or e.g. syntax algorithms are included in FPL systems.

ALL Company training and working procedures

SC-23-03 As a principle; message checking systems may lose output due to integrity of the input.

Assess the impact on message checking systems and same as SC-23-02

ALL Company system specifications

SC-23-04 Monitoring arrangements on the integrity of the input and the output of changes of ICAO 2012 on the Network Performance should be discussed and agreed upon (implementation monitoring)

Discuss performance monitoring arrangements

ICAO ALL PARTIES

24 maintainability


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SC-24-01 Systems may require continuous maintenance systems to support prolonged processing of old-format FPL post 2012 and identification of ANSPs that have not made the transition.

Investigate the possible impact on system maintenance in case systems have to support prolonged processing of old-format FPL post 2012 and identification of ANSPs that have not made the transition.

ANSP

SC-24-02 The simultaneous multi-system change may bring new risks that are yet unknown and will need to be further looked at - Note: logical modelling related to interdependence may provide more information

Investigate the possible impact or new risks resulting from this simultaneous multi-system change.

ALL

SC-24-03 New error types may be the result of this change which will determine the possibility for fixes

Investigate the possible new error types ALL


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