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Sabbatical Leave Programme 2014

A Human Rights- and Results-Based Management Approach

to United Nations Development Cooperation at the

Country Level

Name: Teresa Albero

Institution: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Supervised by: UN System Staff College (USSC)/United Nations Development Group's Human Rights Working Group (UNDG-HRWG)

Date: March 2015

© United Nations Sabbatical Leave Programme

The views and recommendations expressed in this report are solely those of the original author and other contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the United Nations, its agencies or its Member States. Textual material may be freely reproduced with proper citation as appropriate.

 

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Table of Contents

PARTI.Introduction

Scopeandmethodology

Conceptsandcomplementarities

PARTII.Potentialtensions

Tension1:Definingthegoalofdevelopmentcooperation

Theinternationallevel:AmissinglayerinUNprogrammingdocuments

Whatinternationalcommitments?MDGsorhumanrights

Tension2:Definingintermediateresults

IsRBMreallyneutral?WhathappenstoRelevantresultswhicharenotSMART?

Tension3:Definingthestrategy

SelectingthepartnersMovingawayfromtheprotection‐promotiondichotomy

Tension4:M&Eormakinginformeddecisions

Conclusions and Recommendations

 

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Executive Summary Results‐basedmanagement(RBM)andthehumanrights‐basedapproach(HRBA)aretwo

programmingprinciplesofUNcommondevelopmentcooperationatthecountrylevel.The

findingsofthisresearchseemtocorroboratetheassumptionthatwhilecomplementary,their

concurrentapplicationcangeneratetensionsthat,ifignored,threatentoreversethehierarchy,

turningRBM,intheoryanenablingtool,intotheultimaterulingprincipleofUNprogramming.

ThepaperexaminesthetoolsandwealthofexperienceaccumulatedbytheUNinimplementing

RBMandtheHRBAinlightofthetensionsidentifiedintheexistingliterature.Firsthanddata

hasbeengatheredthroughsemi‐structuredinterviewswithUNResidentCoordinatorsandan

onlinequestionnairefordevelopmentandhumanrightspractitionersofUnitedNationsCountry

Teams(UNCTs).Whilethesamplesarenotrepresentative,theevidencegatheredisenoughto

drawsomegeneralconclusionsandhelpstoillustratetheargumentsdevelopedinthepaper.

Thediscourseonthecomplementarityofbothprogrammingprincipleshighlightstheroleofthe

HRBAindefiningrelevantcontentandofRBMinensuringaneffectiveprocessforUNcommon

developmentcooperation.Inimplementingtheseprinciples,however,theUNplacesthe

emphasisontheroleofhumanrightsasameans,ratherthanasanend,anditisthe

accountability,ratherthantheeffectivenessperspectiveofRBM,thatprevails.Theroleofthe

HRBAasabroadframeworkforaUNtheoryofchangefordevelopmentcooperationhasnotyet

permeatedUNprogrammingguidelinesanddiscourseoutsidethehumanrightsworld.AnRBM

modelthatemphasizesaccountabilityandexternalreporting,ratherthaneffectivenessand

internallearning,ismorelikelytoleadtotensionswiththeHRBA,asitincreasesthepressure

forattribution,numbersandlow‐hangingfruits.

TheUnitedNationshasdevelopedseparateguidelinesandmethodologiesfortheapplicationof

bothRBMandtheHRBA.InordertofullyimplementtheHRBA,theUNneedstogobeyondthe

separateapproachesthatarecurrentlyemployedandmoveinsteadtowardsacomprehensive

programmingframework:“AHuman‐RightsandResults‐BasedManagementApproachto

UnitedNationsDevelopmentCooperationattheCountryLevel.”Suchaframeworkshould

addressthepotentialtensionstoensurethatRBMremainstheenablingtoolthatitismeantto

beandprogrammingcontributestotheeffectivenessandtherelevanceoftheUNatthecountry

level.

 

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Summaryofrecommendations

1. DeveloponesingleUNProgrammingManualthatprovidesguidanceonthebasisofall

programmingprinciples.

2. EnsuretheHRBA,asthebasicframeworkforatheoryofchangeforUNdevelopment

cooperation,permeatesallUNprogrammingguidelinesanddocuments.Thisimplies

identifyinghumanrightsasconstitutiveofthegoalofdevelopmentcooperationandhaving

bothduty‐bearersandrights‐holdersasthesubjectsoftheoutcomes.

3. Clearlyreflecttheinternationalcommitmentswhichconstitutethemandateofthe

organizationatthetopoftheresultschainoftheUNprogrammingdocuments.Those

internationalcommitmentsshouldnotbelimitedtotherelevantSDGs,butalsoincludethe

relevantinternationalhumanrightsrecommendations,whichcouldthenbemonitoredwith

theUNDAF.

4. ExposethepossibleperverseeffectsofRBMandclearlydelimititsroletoensurenotonly

theeffectiveness,butalsotherelevanceofUNdevelopmentcooperation.

5. EnsureUNprogrammingframeworksprovidethespaceforUNCTstodefineadvocacy

resultsandbetterintegrateadvocacyaspartoftheirstrategiestoattainspecificoutcomes.

6. Weighresourcesusedinfundraisingeffortsagainstthepotentialbenefitsofthosefunds,

recognizingthatsomeofthemosttransformativechangestowhichtheUNmightcontribute

requirefewfinancialresourcesandinsteaddemandadequateexpertiseandaninvestment

oftime.

7. FurtherexplorewaystoworkwithpartnerswhomaybeunabletocomplywithRBM

requirementsbutmighthavetheappropriatemandateorrepresentgroupswithwhichthe

organizationneedstoengagetoachievehumanrightsdevelopmentgoals.

 

 

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PART I. Introduction

Thefieldsofdevelopmentandhumanrightshavetraditionallyevolvedalongparalleltracks.

Afterthetwofieldsfinallymetinthe1990s,thehumanrights‐basedapproach(HRBA)was

forgedasanattempttobringbothworldsclosertogether.Sincethedevelopmentworldfocused

onprogrammingandspoketheresults‐basedmanagement(RBM)language,thehumanrights‐

basedapproachwasessentiallyconceptualizedasaprogrammingtool.WhentheUnited

Nations(UN)tookstepsatthebeginningofthiscenturytoimprovethecoordinationofits

developmentactivitiesatthecountrylevel,itadoptedanewsetofcommonprogrammingtools

andidentifiedboththehumanrights‐basedapproachandresults‐basedmanagementasamong

itsfivecommonprogrammingprinciples.1Threeoftheseprinciples,whichincludethehuman

rights‐basedapproach,genderequalityandenvironmentalsustainability,aredefinedas

“normativeprinciples,”whiletheothertwo,namelyresults‐basedmanagementandcapacity‐

building,aredescribedas“enablingprinciples.”AccordingtotheUNguidelines,allfive

principlesarecomplementaryand“necessaryfortheeffectivenessofUN‐supportedcountry

programming.”2Anincreasingnumberofvoices,however,arehighlightingtensionsinthe

simultaneousapplicationoftheHRBAandRBM,andsomeareevenarguingtheir

incompatibility.

ThispaperexaminesthetoolsgeneratedandthewealthofexperienceaccumulatedbytheUNin

operationalizingboththehumanrights‐basedapproachandresults‐basedmanagementinlight

ofthetensionsidentifiedintheexistingliterature.Althoughthispaperdoesnotfindevidenceof

anunresolvablecontradictionbetweentheHRBAandRBM,itdoesconcludethattheir

concurrentapplicationgeneratestensionsthat,ifignored,threatentoreversethehierarchyand

transformresults‐basedmanagement,whichistheoreticallyanenablingtool,intotheultimate

rulingprincipleofUNprogramming.Therefore,inordertofullyoperationalizetheHRBA,the

UNneedstomovebeyondthecurrentseparatedapproachtowardsacomprehensive

programmingframework:“AHumanRights‐andResults‐BasedManagementApproachto

UnitedNationsDevelopmentCooperationattheCountryLevel.”3Suchaframeworkmust

addressthesepotentialtensionstoensurethatRBMremainstheenablingtoolitismeanttobe

andthatprogrammingcontributestoimprovingtheeffectivenessaswellastherelevanceofthe

UNatthecountrylevel.

                                                            1 UNDG(2007).GuidelinesforUnitedNationsCountryTeamsonPreparingCommonCountryAssessments(CCA)andUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworks(UNDAF). InadditiontoHRBAandRBM,theUNhasidentifiedthreeotherprogrammingprincipleswhicharebeyondthescopeofthispaper,namelycapacity‐building(anenablingprinciple),genderequalityandenvironmentalsustainability(normativeprinciples).

2UNDG(2010).ApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciplestotheUNDAF,GuidanceNote.3Notethatwhileananalysisoftheotherprogrammingprinciplesisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,theultimategoalshouldbetohaveonesingleprogrammingframeworkencompassingallfiveprinciples.

 

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Scopeandmethodology

ThescopeofthispaperisanexplorationoftheinterplaybetweentheHRBAandRBMas

strategicprogrammingprinciplesoftheUnitedNationsCountryTeams(UNCTs),orinother

words,withinthecontextofUNeffortstocoordinateitsdevelopmentactivitiesthroughthe

UnitedNationsDevelopmentGroup(UNDG).Athoroughreviewofthestrategicprogrammingof

thespecificUNentitiesisthereforebeyondthescopeofthisstudy.Moreover,itshouldbenoted

thatthispaperdoesnotseektoprovideacomprehensiveoverviewoftheHRBAorRBM

conceptsandmethodologies,butinsteadprovidesananalysisoftheirinteraction.Consequently,

onlythoseaspectsoftheHRBAandRBMthatarerelevanttothisspecificpurposeare

considered.

Finally,therich,complexandfascinatingdebateregardingwhetherandtowhatextenthuman

rightsanddevelopmentconvergeorcontinueinparalleltracksisbeyondthescopeofthis

study.Referencestoon‐goingdiscussionsinthatareawillonlybemadetotheextentthatthey

providethecontexttobetterunderstandtheinteractionbetweentheHRBAandRBM.

ThereislittletonoliteratureontheinterplaybetweentheHRBAandRBMindevelopment

cooperation.Worthyofmention,however,isthe2012UNICEFglobalevaluationonthe

applicationoftheHRBA4,thewritingsofP.Gready5andtheresearchpublishedbytheLeuven

CentreforGlobalGovernanceStudiesontheintegrationofhumanrightsindevelopment

cooperation.6Whileeachofthesetextsincludesinterestingandexplicitreferencestothe

subject,nonefocusexclusivelyontherelationshipbetweentheHRBAandRBM.Anumberof

humanrightsworkersanddevelopmentpractitionershavecriticizedthenegativeimpactof

RBMontheirrespectivefieldsofwork.Formostoftheseauthors,humanrightsand

developmentstillconstitutetwodistinctiveareasofwork,sotheirtextsdonotspecificallyrefer

totheHRBA.

Onthehumanrightsside,theliteratureissomewhatlimited,yetthereportoftheInternational

CouncilonHumanRightsPolicyonassessingtheimpactofhumanrightsworkdeservesspecial

mention.7Onthedevelopmentside,theliteratureisextensiveandgrowing.Manydevelopment

practitionersandresearchersarecriticalofRBMandareexposingitslimitationsfor

                                                            4UNICEF(2012).GlobalEvaluationoftheApplicationoftheHumanRights‐BasedApproachtoUNICEFProgramming.5SeeP.GreadyandW.Vandenhole(2012).“HumanRightsandDevelopmentintheNewMillennium:TowardsaTheoryofChange,”London:Routledge.6SeeD.D’Hollander,A.MarxandJ.Wouters(2014).“IntegratingHumanRightsinEUDevelopmentCooperationPolicy:AchievementsandChallenges.”WorkingPaperNo.134.LeuvenCentreforGlobalGovernanceStudies;D.D’Hollander,A.MarxandJ.Wouters(2013).“IntegratingHumanRightsinDevelopmentPolicy:MappingDonorStrategiesAndPractices.”WorkingPaperNo.108.LeuvenCentreforGlobalGovernanceStudies.7ICHRP(2012).“NoPerfectMeasure:RethinkingEvaluationandAssessmentofHumanRightsWork”(Report).

 

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developmentcooperation.AlthoughnotformulatedonthebasisoftheHRBA,thesecritiques

seemespeciallypertinentwhenconsideredfromahumanrightsperspective.Variouscritical

reviewsareofparticularrelevanceforthispaper,includingthoseofJ.Vähämäki,M.Schmidt

andM.Molander,8thewritingsofA.Natsios,9formerheadoftheU.S.AgencyforInternational

Development(USAID)andthoseofRosalindEyben,10formerChiefSocialDevelopmentAdvisor

oftheUnitedKingdom’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID).Acompletelistof

theliteraturereviewedcanbefoundunderthereferenceschapter.

Inadditiontotheabovementionedliterature,Ihavedrawnuponmyownexperiencesgained

duringmorethantwentyyearsofworkwiththeUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHigh

CommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR)asanimportantsourceofinformationforthispaper.

Asaresultofmycareerpath,Ihavenbeeninaprivilegedpositiontoobservetheevolvingand

complexinterplaybetweentheHRBAandRBM.Ontheonehand,asahumanrightsofficer,I

havedevotedasubstantialamountofmyprofessionaltimetopromotingthemainstreamingof

humanrightsintotheworkofUNCTs.11Thishasrequiredmetoconfrontandaddressmanyof

thequestionsandconcernsofUnitedNationsdevelopmentpractitionersseekingtoapplythe

HRBAtotheirwork.Ontheotherhand,inmyroleasOHCHR’splanningofficeroverthelastsix

years,withincreasinglevelsofresponsibility,Ihavebeentaskedwithtransformingahuman

rightsinstitutionintoafullyresults‐basedmanagementorganization.12Hence,itisalsointhis

capacitythatIhavebeenworkingtoaddressthequestionsandconcernsofUnitedNations

humanrightsofficerswhoareattemptingtoapplyRBMtotheirwork.

Thetensionsbetweenthetwoprogrammingprinciplesthathavebeenhighlightedbythe

existingliteratureand/oridentifiedthroughmyownexperiencesconstitutethestartingpoint

ofthisresearch.Morespecifically,theyprovideacriticallensforthereviewofUNcommon

programmingdocuments13andserveasthebasisfortheformulationoftwoinformation

                                                            8J.Vähämäki,M.SchmidtandM.Molander(2011).“Review–Results‐BasedManagementinDevelopmentCooperation.”9A.Natsios(2010).“TheClashofCounter‐BureaucracyandDevelopment.”Washington:CenterforGlobalDevelopment.10R.Eyben(2013).“UncoveringthePoliticsofEvidenceandResults.AFramingPaperforDevelopmentPractitioners.”Publishedonthewebpageof‘TheBigPushForward’(2011).“StuffHappens:’TheRisksofaResultsAgenda,FromPovertytoPower”–OxfamBlog,editedbyDuncanGreen(2010).“HidingRelations:TheIronyof‘Effective’Aid.”EuropeanJournalofDevelopmentResearch,Vol22.11ThisexperienceincludesthedeliveryofnumerousHRBAtrainingsforUNCTs,bothforOHCHRandfortheUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollege,includinginthecontextofUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkretreats;assessingtheHRBAinUruguayasa“OneUN”pilotcountryforAction2;andworkingwiththeUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollegeontherevisionoftheUNDG’sHRBAcommonlearningpackage.12AccordingtothelastJointInspectionUnitreviewofOHCHR:“ManyintervieweesfromtheSecretariat,MemberStatesandoversightbodiesindicatedthatOHCHRhasmadeprogressinrecentyearstowardsimprovingResults‐BasedManagementandincorporatingaresults‐basedapproachintoitspoliciesandworkprocesses.”JointInspectionUnit(2014),ReviewofmanagementandadministrationoftheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,JIU/REP/2014/7.13 AmongtheUNDGpolicydocuments,guidelinesandtrainingpackagesonstrategicprogrammingreviewed,thefollowinghavebeenespeciallyrelevantforthisresearch:theCommonUnderstandingamongUNagenciesontheHumanRights‐BasedApproachtoDevelopmentCooperation(2003);UNDAFGuidelines(2010);theGuidanceNoteontheApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciplestotheUNDAF(2010);theResults‐BasedManagementHandbook(2011);theHumanRights‐BasedApproachCommonLearningPackage(2011);andtheStandardOperatingProceduresforCountriesAdoptingthe“DeliveringasOne”Approach(2014). 

 

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gatheringtools,namelysemi‐structuredinterviewswithUnitedNationsResidentCoordinators

andanonlinequestionnaireforUNCT’sdevelopmentandhumanrightspractitioners.

InconsultationwiththeUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollege(UNSSC)andtheUNDG’sHuman

RightsWorkingGroup(UNDG‐HRWG),atotalof40RCswereselectedasaresultoftheir

knowledgeandexperienceinapplyingbothRBMandtheHRBA,withgeographicdiversitytaken

intoaccount.Ofthe40individualswhowereapproached,13respondedpositivelyandagreed

tobeinginterviewed.Interviewslastedapproximatelyonehourandwereprimarilyconducted

viaSkypeandappliedaqualitativesemi‐structuredinterviewtechnique.Manyofthequestions

wereformulatedinanopenandbroadmannertoprovidespaceformultipleavenuesofenquiry

andtoensureintervieweeshadagreatdealofleewayinrespondingandpursuingtopicsin

accordancewiththeirownexperiences.

TheonlinequestionnairewasdistributedthroughtheUNHumanRightsPolicyNetwork

(HuriTALK)andtheUNCoordinationPracticeNetwork(CPN).Atotalof42UNcolleagues

respondedtothequestionnaire,88percentofwhomhadhadatleast5yearsofprofessional

experiencewiththeUN.Therewasawell‐balancedknowledgeoftheHRBAandRBMamong

respondents,with57percentreportingtheyfeltequallypreparedonbothprinciples,andan

equalpercentage(19percent)whofeltmorepreparedwithoneoftwoprinciples.Allregions

werefairlywellrepresented,withtheexceptionofWesternAfrica.Themajorityofrespondents

heldpositionswiththeRC’sOffice(29percent),UNDP(26percent),OHCHR(18percent)and

UNICEF(13percent).

Annex1includesthelistofquestionsusedforthesemi‐structuredinterviewswithRCsand

Annex2reproducestheresultsoftheonlinequestionnaire.

Asafinalcaveat,itshouldbenotedthatwhilethispaperisfoundedonmorethan20yearsof

professionalexperienceinthisparticularfieldofwork,theresearchwasconductedwithinthe

contextofafourmonthsabbaticalproject,whichclearlylimitedtheextentofthereviewof

existingliterature.Furthermore,theresponsesoftheinterviewswiththeRCsandtheonline

questionnairedonotconstitutearepresentativesampleandthereforecannotbeextrapolated

toUNCTsasawhole.Instead,thefirsthanddatagatheredthroughthesetoolsservestoillustrate

theargumentsoutlined.

 

 

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cooperationemerged.Sincethedevelopmentworldfocusedonprogrammingandspokethe

results‐basedmanagementlanguage,theHRBAwassubsequentlydefinedinprogramming

terms.

ConsensusaroundthecommonUNprogrammingprinciplesfirstemergedin2006duringthe

inter‐agencydiscussionsrelatedtorevisingtheguidelinesforthepreparationoftheUnited

NationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework(UNDAF).The2007guidelinesthatgrewoutof

thosediscussionsidentifiedfiveguidingprinciples,16namelyahumanrights‐basedapproach;

genderequality;environmentalsustainability;results‐basedmanagement;andcapacity

development.

TheHumanRights‐BasedApproach–theUNCommonUnderstanding

Theintegrationofhumanrightsanddevelopmenthastakendifferentshapesatdifferenttimes.

TheOrganisationforEconomicCo‐operationandDevelopment/WorldBankhasundertakena

thoroughreviewandcategorizationofthedifferentapproachestohumanrightsindevelopment

programming.17Accordingtothatcategorization,summarizedonthetablebelow,thehuman

rightsbased‐approachcanbedifferentiatedfromotherformsofintegrationofhumanrights

intodevelopmentbecauseitconsidershumanrightstobemorethanjustameanvalue,butalso

aconstitutivegoalofdevelopment.Inotherwords,fortheHRBA,humanrightsarebothanew

wayofdoingdevelopment(instrumentalapproach)andanewvisionfordevelopment

(normativeapproach).

Figure2.Approachestointegratinghumanrightsanddevelopment

                                                            16 UNDG(2007).“Guidelines.” 

17OECD/WorldBank(2013).IntegratingHumanRightsintoDevelopment.SecondEdition:DonorApproaches,ExperiencesandChallenges.WorldBankPublications.

 

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In2003,UNagenciesmeetinginStamford,ConnecticutinthecontextofwidespreadUNreform,

adoptedacommonunderstandingofthehumanrights‐basedapproachtodevelopment

cooperationandprogramming.TheStamfordAgreementhasthreemainpillars:18

1. “Allprogrammesofdevelopment cooperation,policiesand technicalassistanceshould

further the realization of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of

HumanRightsandotherinternationalhumanrightsinstruments.”

2. “Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal

DeclarationofHumanRightsandotherinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentsguideall

development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the

programmingprocess.”

3. Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty‐

bearers’tomeettheirobligationsand/orof‘rights‐holders’toclaimtheirrights.”

Inshort,contrarytothepurelyinstrumentaldiscourseoftheaideffectivenessagenda,19which

seeshumanrightsascontributingtotheeffectivenessofdevelopmentcooperation,theHRBA

conceiveshumanrightsasbothaconstitutivegoalofdevelopment(Stamford’sfirstandsecond

pillars)andameansofundertakingdevelopmentcooperation(thirdpillar).

Results‐BasedManagement:TheUNdefinition

Theprimarypurposeofresults‐basedmanagementistwofold.Ontheonehand,RBMaimsto

improvetheeffectivenessofprogrammesbyshiftingthefocustowardsdesiredresultsand

gatheringrelevantdatatoinformdecision‐making.Ontheotherhand,thedefinitionofexpected

resultsandthereportingagainstthoseresultsincreasestransparencyandservesasan

importantaccountabilitytool.

TheUNDG’sResults‐BasedManagementHandbookof2011definesresults‐basedmanagement

as“amanagementstrategybywhichallactors,contributingdirectlyorindirectlytoachievinga

setofresults,ensurethattheirprocesses,productsandservicescontributetotheachievement

ofdesiredresults(outputs,outcomesandhigherlevelgoalsorimpact).Theactorsinturnuse

informationandevidenceonactualresultstoinformdecisionmakingonthedesign,resourcing

                                                            18UnitedNations(2003).“ReportoftheSecondInter‐AgencyWorkshoponImplementingaHumanRights‐BasedApproachintheContextofUNReform,,Stamford,USA.Inaddition,theStamfordAgreementnotesthatprogrammingshouldbeinformedbytherecommendationsofinternationalhumanrightsbodiesandmechanisms;andfurtherspecifiesthefollowinghumanrightsprinciples:universalityandinalienability;indivisibility;interdependenceandinterrelatedness;non‐discriminationandequality;participationandinclusion;accountabilityandtheruleoflaw. 19 High‐LevelForumsonAidEffectiveness:Rome(2003),Paris(2005),Accra(2008)andBusan(2011).

 

12  

anddeliveryofprogrammesandactivitiesaswellasforaccountabilityandreporting.”20

Theitalicshavebeenaddedtohighlightanimportantelementofthisdefinition.Indeed,

emphasisisplacedontheroleofRBMtoimprovebotheffectivenessthroughlearningand

accountabilitythroughperformancereporting.ThiswasnotthecasewithpreviousUN

programmingdocuments21whichprivilegedtheaccountabilityaspectsofRBMoverthoseof

effectiveness.Theissueisnotinnocuoussince,aswillbefurtherexploredinfollowingchapters,

thereisevidenceoffrictionbetweenthesetwostatedpurposesofRBM.22

ComplementaritiesbetweentheHRBAandRBM

AccordingtotheUNDG“GuidanceNoteontheApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciples,”23the

UNfivecommonprogrammingprinciples,whichincludetheHRBAandRBM,areinterrelated,

complementaryandnecessaryforeffectiveUNprogrammingatthecountrylevel.TheUNDG

GuidanceNotecharacterizestheHRBAasa“normativeprincipleandRBMasan“enabling

principle.”Normativeprinciplesprovide“waystoconnectinternationalnormsandstandards

andagreeddevelopmentgoalstothedevelopmentprocess,”whileRBMisdescribedasa

“meanstomakethenormativeprinciplesoperational,”includingby“helpingtodemonstrate

effectivenessandaccountabilityfortheuseofUNsystemresources.”24TheRBMHandbook

furthernotesthat“[w]hileRBMisamanagementtooltohelpreachadesiredresult;ahuman

rights‐basedapproachisaframeworkthathelpsdefinetheresultsandtheprocessbywhich

resultsareachieved.”25Ingeneralterms,UNprogrammingdocumentspresenttheHRBAas

valuechargedandRBMasaneutraltool.

Thecomplementarityofthetwoapproachesisgenerallydescribedasfollows:theHRBA

providesguidanceonthecontentoftheresults‐thewhat–contributingtotheirrelevance,

whileRBMensuresthatthoseresultsareachieved‐thehow–inaneffectiveway.An

overwhelmingmajorityoftheRCsinterviewedandquestionnairerespondentssharedthis

understanding.Infact,onlytworespondentstothequestionnaireconsideredthetwoprinciples

tobeincompatibleandmostRCsexpressedinitialsurpriseatthesuggestion.

                                                            20UNDG(2011).Results‐BasedManagementHandbook.21See,forexample,theUNDG‐Results‐BasedManagementTerminology(2003).22 SeeJ.Vähämäkietal.“Results‐BasedManagementinDevelopmentCooperation.” 

23 UNDG(2010).“ApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciples.” 

24Ibid.UNDG(2010).EnablingprinciplesarebasedontheTriennialComprehensivePolicyReviews(TCPR)oftheUNsystem,theoutcomeofthe2005WorldSummitandtheaideffectivenessagenda(2005ParisDeclaration;2008DohaDeclarationonFinancingforDevelopment;2008AccraAgendaforAction;and2011BusanPartnershipforEffectiveDevelopmentCooperation)withtheirfocusonnationalownershipandaccountability.25UNDG(2011).“Handbook 

 

 

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14  

Part II. Potential tensions

Aspreviouslystated,theoverwhelmingmajorityofUNstaffconsultedthroughthisresearch

notedthattheyconsiderthehumanrights‐basedapproachandresults‐basedmanagementtobe

complementaryframeworks.Wearethereforefarfromtheresultsofacademicresearchwhich

haveidentifieda“rights‐andresults‐basedframework”as“acontradictioninterms”or

suggestedthatRBMisa“spoilerratherthanafacilitationofchange,”inparticularwithregards

tohumanrights.26However,whileagreeingwiththeircomplimentarynature,halfofthe

respondentstothequestionnaireacknowledgedtheexistenceoftensionsbetweenthetwo

approachesandapproximately43percentnotedthatRBMneedstoberefinedtobetterserve

theHRBA.

AmongRCs,therecognitionoftensionsbetweenthetwoapproacheswaslessevident.Many

expressedsurprisewhenconfrontedwiththequestion.TheprevalentdiscoursewasthatRBM

shouldnotgoverntheimplementationoftheHRBAandthattensionscouldonlyexistiftheUN

“didnothavetherightpeopleinplace.”SinceRCswereself‐reportingandwereselectedonthe

basisoftheirknowledgeoftheHRBAandRBM,apositivebiastowardsacommitmenttothe

organization’smandatewastobeexpected.Nevertheless,itbecameclearduringtheinterviews

thateven“havingtherightpeople”withthe“rightcommitments”totheorganization’smandate

mightnotbeenoughwhenstaffarepressuredbyspecificUNorganizationsanddonorstoapply

asimplisticandquantitativeversionoftheRBMapproach.Furthermore,theinterviews

demonstratedtheimportanceofprovidingclearguidelines,incentivesandaccountability

mechanismstoensurethattheapplicationofthesetwoapproachesisnotlefttothediscretion

ofindividuals.

HRBAasabroadframeworkfortheUNtheoryofchangefordevelopmentcooperation

TheHRBAconstitutesabroadframeworkfortheUN’stheoryofchangefordevelopment

cooperation.Thistheoryofchange,whichisbasedontheUN’scommonunderstandingofan

agreedUNcommonprogrammingprinciple,hasnotyetpermeatedtheUN’sprogramming

guidelines,manualsanddiscourseoutsidethehumanrightsworld.Thefollowingslides,which

showtheUNchainofresults,exemplifythisstatement.Figure4reproducesaslidefromthe

updatedversionoftheUNDGcommonlearningpackageonaHRBA27andFigure5istakenfrom

theUNDGHandbookonResults‐BasedManagement.28BothwerepublishedbyUNDGin2011.

                                                            26W.Vandenhole,“OvercomingthePromotion‐ProtectionDichotomy,HumanRights‐BasedApproachestoDevelopmentandOrganizationalChangewithintheUNatCountryLevel,”inP.GreadyandW.Vandenhole(2012),HumanRightsandDevelopmentintheNewMillennium:TowardsaTheoryofChange,Routledge. 27UNDG(2011).“UpdatedUNInter‐AgencyCommonLearningPackageonaHumanRights‐BasedApproachtoProgramming.”SeealsoOHCHR’sTheoryofChangein“OHCHR’sManagementPlan2014‐2017.” 28 UNDG(2011).“RBMHandbook.” 

 

15  

OnlytheUNDGcommonlearningpackagetranslatestheStamfordagreementontheHRBAinto

achainofresults.

TheresultschainoftheUNRBMHandbook(Figure4),places“changesinconditions”atthe

leveloftheimpact/goalratherthan“changesintherealizationofhumanrights”or“changesin

thequalityoflife”whichwouldhaveatleastsituatedthepersonatthecentreofdevelopment.

Theintermediateresult,otherwiseknownas“outcome,”isdefinedasa“changeincapacityand

performanceoftheprimaryduty‐bearer.”Thereferenceto“duty‐bearers”showsanattemptto

applythelanguageoftheHRBAandtocontextualizetheRBMmanualwithinthecontextofthe

UN’swork.Yet,thereisnoreferencetothe“capacitiesofrights‐holders”,clearlymentioned

withtheduty‐bearersasfundamentalactorsinthethirdpillaroftheStamfordagreement.

TheseomissionsfromtheRBMHandbookarenotaccidental.TheHandbookisratherreflecting

andreinforcingtwoimportantgapsintheimplementationoftheHRBAbyUNCTs.

ThefollowingpageswillhighlightthetensionsbetweentheHRBAandRBMinrelationtothe

keyelementsofatheoryofchange,thatis,intermsofthedefinitionof:1)thegoaltobe

pursued;2)theintermediateresultsthatareneededtoachievethatgoal;and3)thepartners

andtypesofinterventionsthatareessentialtoachievingthoseintermediateresults.

 

 

Fig

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16 

 

17  

 

TENSION1:DEFININGTHEGOALOFDEVELOPMENTCOOPERATION

Theinternationallevel:amissinglayerinUNprogrammingdocuments

ThetopofthetheoryofchangeisdefinedbytheUNcommonunderstandingontheHRBAasthe

“realizationofhumanrightsaslaiddownintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsand

otherinternationalhumanrightsinstruments.”TheUNprogrammingguidelinesand

documents,however,placenationaldevelopmentprioritiesatthetopoftheresultschain,

definetherolesofUNCTsintermsoftheirsupporttogovernmentstoimplementthosenational

prioritiesandprimarilyestablishtheaccountabilityofUNCTsvis‐à‐visnationalgovernments.

ThereseemstobealayerofresultsthatismissingfromtheUnitedNationsprogramming

documentsatthecountrylevel:theinternationalcommitments,amongthemhumanrights,

whichareatthecoreofthemandateoftheorganization.

Oneelementthatalldevelopmentschoolshaveincommonistherecognitionoftheimportance

ofnationalownershipasasounddevelopmentprinciple.Nationalownershiphasbeenstrongly

emphasizedintheTriennialComprehensivePolicyReviews(TCPR)oftheUNsystemandinthe

aideffectivenessagenda,includingthroughtheParisDeclaration(2005),theAccraAgendafor

ActionandtheDohaDeclarationonFinancingforDevelopment(2008)andtheBusan

PartnershipforEffectiveDevelopmentCooperation(2011).Infact,theemphasisofthese

processesontheimportanceofRBMhasbroughttheconceptsofRBMandnationalownership

closertogether.

Similarly,theHRBA’semphasisonparticipationandaccountabilityplacessignificant

importanceonnationalownershipindevelopmentprocesses.FromtheHRBAperspective,

however,nationalownershipcanneverprevailoverinternationalhumanrightsstandardsorbe

usedasanexcusetorelinquishresponsibilitiestoimplementtheUN’sinternationalmandate.

UNprogrammingguidelinesandtoolsarefarfromclearinthisregardanddepictan

organizationthatappearstohavenoparticularagendaandisabletosupportgovernmentswith

whateverdevelopmentprioritiestheydeemmostappropriate.Andyet,theUNhasanagenda

thatisdefinedbytheinternationalcommunityandformsthebasisofitsmandate.Failureto

makethatroleevidentnotonlymakestheimplementationoftheHRBAdifficult,ithasthe

potentialtocompromisetheworkoftheUNforfuturegenerations.AsoneResident

Coordinatorputit,“itisimportantthatcivilsocietyactorsunderstandthatwecansaynotoa

governmentifwhatitisrequestedofusdoesnotfitwithintheUNparameters.”Thispointmay

seemobvioustomany,butthefactthatsuchanimportantaspectoftheUNworkisnotclearly

statedonitsprincipalprogrammatictoolsraisesseriousconcerns.

 

18  

AUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkresultsmatrixwhichhasatitstopthe

nationaldevelopmentprioritiessendsthewrongmessagetoUNstaff,governmentsand

populationsatlarge.AUNDAF,whichplacesrelevantinternationalcommitmentsatthetopof

itsresultsmatrix,wouldhelptoclarifytoGovernmentstheUN’srole,asapartner,butwithin

thecontextofanagreedinternationalagenda.ItwouldalsohelptoexplaintheroleoftheUNto

localpopulations,notjustasanallyofgovernments,butalsoasanobjectiveguardianof

internationallyagreedstandards.Finally,itwouldhelpUNstafftobetterunderstandtheirroles

andwhatisexpectedofthem.SeveraloftheinterviewedRCsemphasizedtheimportanceof

hiringstaffmemberswhoarenot“value‐neutral,”butarecommittedtothemandatesofthe

organization.Itisdifficulttoaskthisofstaffmembersiftheprogrammingguidelinesdonot

clearlyoutlinethemandatetheyaresupposedtohelpimplement.

ItmustbenotedthatthereisavastdifferencebetweendefiningtheroleofUNCTsas

“supportinggovernmentstoimplementtheirnationaldevelopmentpriorities,”and“supporting

governmentsintheimplementationoftheinternationalcommitmentsatthecountrylevel.”As

depictedinFigure6below,thedifferencebetweenthetwostatementsisextremelyimportant

fromtheHRBAperspective.

Figure6.TheRoleofUnitedNationsCountryTeams.

AsFigure6shows,ensuringthattheinternationalcommitmentsarevisibleatthetopoftheUN

commoncountryprogrammeswouldevidencetoall:

1. ThattherecouldbenationaldevelopmentprioritieswhichtheUNshouldnotsupport

becausetheyarecontrarytointernationalagreedstandardsandcommitments.Thisisa

International commitments

National priorities

Not a UN priority and maybe NOT UN’s role at allUN has a role to  

stretch this boundary

Possible priority

 

19  

fundamentalprincipleoftheHRBAwhichstatesthathumanrightsstandardsand

principlesshouldguideUNprogrammingatallstages.TherecentUnitedNationsDue

DiligencePolicyandtheRightsUpFrontInitiativeindicatethatinthehumanrights

context,overstatingisessential.

2. ThattheUNhasanimportantroletoplayinengaginggovernmentsinadiscussionon

therealizationofinternationallyagreedstandardsandcommitmentsatthenational

level,independentlyofwhetherornotthosecommitmentshavebeenidentifiedasa

prioritybythecurrentgovernmentofaspecificcountry.

DespitetheimportantstepstakenbytheUNsystemtosecurethepositionofhumanrightsasa

centralpillarofitswork,thisfactdoesnotcomeacrossclearlyintheUNDAFguidelines.For

instance,thefirstparagraphoftheguidelinesregardingtheselectionofoutcomesreads:“[a]fter

reviewingallnationaldevelopmentpriorities,andthenagreeingonwhichnational

developmentprioritiesareappropriateforUNaction,theUNCT,inconsultationwithall

relevantstakeholders,mustagreeonasetofoutcomestosupporteachnationaldevelopment

priority.”

Inaddition,theRBMHandbookcontinuallyreferstotheneedto“balance(s)thepursuitof

internationalnormsandstandardswiththeachievementofnationaldevelopmentpriorities.”Is

“balance”reallytheappropriateverbhere?AccordingtothedefinitionoftheOxforddictionary,

thiswouldmean“offsettingthevalueof”internationalnormswiththeachievementofnational

developmentprioritiesor“equallingtheeffectorimportance”ofboth.Balancingthepursuitof

internationalnormsandstandardswiththeachievementofnationaldevelopmentpriorities

seemstoplacethemandateoftheorganizationandthecriteriaforeffectivenessonthesame

levelofimportance.

BoththeHRBAandRBMemphasizetheroleofaccountabilityindevelopmentcooperation,but

accountabilitytowhomandaccordingtowhatstandards?Whenrespondentstothe

questionnairewereaskedtoorganizetheaccountabilitiesofUNCTsinorderofimportance,the

responseswereequallydistributedbetweenaprioritizationofrights‐holders(40percent),

nationalgovernments(31percent)andtheorganization(governingbodies,UNDG)(30per

cent).SimilarresponsesweregivenbytheinterviewedResidentCoordinators.

TheRBMHandbookclearlystatesthatUNCTs“areaccountabletogovernmentsforoverall

contributiontothenationaldevelopmentobjectives”(page4).Inthiscontext,accountabilityis

understoodasaneffectiveandefficientuseofresources.Theconceptofaccountabilityas

 

20  

definedintheUNcommonunderstanding,however,referstoStatesandotherduty‐bearersas

“answerablefortheobservanceofhumanrights.”ItcouldbearguedthattheUnitedNationsis

thepersonificationofthecollectivesubjectintheUnitedNationsCharter(“wethepeoples”)and

thattheinternationalagreementsarethemanifestationofitsvoice.TheHRBAtodevelopment

requiresfirstandutmostaclearcommitmentandaccountabilitytowardsthatcollectivesubject.

TheUnitedNationsisfirstandforemostaccountabletothatinternationalsubject(“wethe

peoples”)andmustholdStatesresponsiblefortheirinternationalcommitments.

Whatinternationalcommitments?MDGsorHumanRights?

Asshownabove,UNprogrammingdocumentsplacenationaldevelopmentprioritiesatthetop

oftheresultschainanddonotclearlyreflecttheinternationalcommitmentswhichconstitute

themandateoftheorganization.Havingthosecommitmentsreflectedintheresultsmatrixof

UNcountryprogrammeswouldindeedbefundamentaltofosteringtheapplicationoftheHRBA,

butitmaynotbeenough.Itisonethingtosaythatasaninternationalorganizationwithan

internationalmandate,UNcommonprogrammingatthecountrylevelshouldplacetheagreed

internationalcommitmentsatthetopofitsresultschain.Itisyetanotherthingtoassertthat

thoseinternationalcommitmentsmustbehumanrightsnorms.WhiletheHRBAestablishesthe

furtheringofhumanrightsasagoalforallUNdevelopmentprogammes,theonedominant

agendaforUNdevelopmentactorsistheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs),orthe

SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),astheywillbecalledinthepost‐2015world.

DespitetheclearstatementthatcameoutofStamford,theideathathumanrightsarea

constitutivegoaloftheUnitedNationsdevelopmentframeworkisfarfromgenerallyaccepted.

TheinterviewswithResidentCoordinatorsrevealedthepervasivepersistenceoftheconceptual

divisionbetweenthedevelopmentandhumanrightsworlds.Humanrightsworkcontinuesto

beseenasaparallelfield,identifiedwithacertainsetofrights,namelycivilandpoliticalrights,

andacertaintypeofintervention,namely,namingandshaming.EvenifallRCsagreedthat

humanrightsconstituteanimportantpartoftheworkoftheUN,severalquestionedifUNCTs,

which“needtofocusonthedevelopmentwork,”werethebestsuitedtodealwithhumanrights

issues.

ThefactthattheHRBAisdefinedasbothameansandanendhasunquestionablycontributedto

theconfusion.ThecurrentUNDAFguidelinesdonotclearlydistinguishbetweentheenabling

andnormativeprinciples.“TheCountryTeamsarerequiredtoapplythefiveprogramming

 

21  

principles…Together,theseprogrammingprinciplesconstituteastartingpointandguidefor

thecountryanalysis,aswellasforallstagesoftheUNDAF...”29

TheUNDGRBMHandbookpresentstheachievementofMDGsamongthepossibleimpactof

countryprogrammes,whiletheprogrammingprinciples,includingtheHRBA,aredescribedas

meansfortheachievementoftheMDGs.ThisisalsothewayitisrepresentedontheUNDAF

guidelineswhichnote:“[u]singRBM,theUNCTensuresthatitsresourcescontributetoalogical

chainofresultsthatincreaseincomplexityandambitionhigherupthelogicalchainfrom

outputstooutcomesandthenimpacts,whichareMD/MDG‐relatednationalpriorities.”30

Duringaninterview,oneoftheRCswhohadrepeatedlyassertedandgivenexamplesofhis

commitmenttotheHRBAstated,“Iamcurrentlytryingtoensurethatthenationaldevelopment

planreflectsthedraftSDGs,butwhatdoIdonowwithhumanrights?”Alessonlearnedfrom

therecentexperienceofMDGsisthattheseareglobaltargetswhichneedtobecontextualized

anddisaggregatedforeachspecificcountry.TheUNcommonunderstandingontheHRBAstates

thattherecommendationsoftheinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentsshouldinformthe

programmingofUNCTs.Theserecommendationsprovideanessentialstartingpointfor

contextualizingtheMDGs,butifthisisnotobvioustoacommittedRC,theircentralityneedsto

befurtheremphasizedandrelevantquestionsandanswersneedtobeincludedintheUNDAF

preparationguidelines.

TheUNCTofGuatemalaisputtinginplaceasystemwhichcouldbecomeagoodpracticeinthis

regard.TheirsystemensuresthelinkageofeachUNDAFoutcome,andevenlowerlevelsof

results,withtherelevantSDGaswellaswiththespecificrecommendationsofinternational

humanrightsinstruments.Thisnotonlyensuresthevisibilityoftheinternationallevel,butalso

entailsthatthemonitoringoftheUNDAFincludesthemonitoringoftheimplementationofthe

recommendationsissuedbytheinternationalhumanrightsmechanisms.Suchasystemcould

additionallyfacilitatethereportingoftheUNCTandthegovernmenttothosemechanisms.A

similarsystemisalreadyinplaceatOHCHR.Theclassificationoftherecommendationsofthe

internationalhumanrightsmechanismsinaccordancewiththeSDGscouldfurtherfacilitatethis

task.ThiscouldbedonethroughtheUniversalHumanRightsIndex,anonlinedatabase

providingeasyaccesstocountry‐specifichumanrightsinformationemanatingfromthe

internationalhumanrightsmechanisms.

                                                            29 Interestingly,the2004UNDAFguidelines,whichdidnotyetrecognizetheHRBAasaprincipleperse,clearlystated:“[f]ortheUnitedNationssystem,thismeansthatcooperationprogrammesfocusontherealizationoftherightsofallcitizens,andthathumanrightsprinciplesareappliedincooperationprogrammes.” 30 UNDG(2010).“UNDAFGuidelines.”

 

22  

TENSION2:DEFININGINTERMEDIATERESULTS

IsRBMreallyneutral?

Results‐basedmanagementisgenerallydescribedasaneutralframeworkofferingaprocess

andastructuretoachieveresultsbyproviding,amongotherthings,objectiveinformationfor

decision‐making.AsdefinedintheGuidanceNoteontheApplicationoftheProgramming

Principles,“RBMdoesnotprescribethesubstanceofresults,overwhichtheotherfour

principleswillhavegreaterinfluence.”31Differentdevelopmentschoolshavestartedtoquestion

thisneutrality,arguingthatthepolitics,thetoolsand/ortheactualapplicationofRBMaffects

thecontentandthenatureofthedevelopmentresultsprioritized.

Accordingtothe2010GuidelinesforUNCTstopreparetheirUNDAFs,UNCTsshouldprioritize

thoseoutcomesthat“[a]respecific,realisticallyachievableandmeasurable,sothattheUNis

accountablefortheirachievements.”32Somedevelopmentpractitionersarguethat,by

prioritizingresultswhichareSpecific,Measurable,AttainableandTime‐bound,(usingthe

famousSMARTacronym),wemightbeprioritizingresultswhicharenotRelevant,orfromthe

HRBApointofview,rights‐based.TheseauthorsarguethatthestrictapplicationofRBMcan

leadtodecisionswhichwouldbecontrarytogooddevelopmentpractices,leadingorganizations

toprioritizeresultswhichcanbeeasilydeliveredinashorttimeframeandcanbeeasily

quantified,butattheexpensesofthosekeytransformationalchangesthatdevelopment

cooperationshouldbeaimingfor,thetypeofchangesthataHRBAtodevelopmentwouldlikely

prioritizeandwhichrequiretimetoshow.

MorethanhalfofthoseansweringthequestionnaireindicatedthatRBMaffectsUNCT’sresults

andthatpriorityisoftengiventothoseprogrammesthatareeasiertomeasureandcanbe

deliveredwithinashorttimeframe.ManyoftheRCsinterviewedspontaneouslydescribedRBM

asaneutraltoolthatdoesnotaffecttheUNCTspriorities.Duringthecourseoftheinterviews,

however,manyrevealedthattheyareunderincreasinginternalandexternalpressurefor

informationonRBM‐related“resultswhichcanbeattributedandcounted”andseveralprovided

examplesofhowhumanrightsresultshadbeende‐prioritizedasaconsequenceofthis

pressure.OneRCprovidedanexampleinwhichthepressuretodeliveraconcreteresult,

namelythepassingofalaw,tookprecedenceovertheneedtofurtheradvocateforcertain

changesortoensuretheappropriateparticipationofstakeholders. 

SeveralRCsalsoindirectlyreportedontheimpactofRBMontheformulationoftheUNCTs

                                                            31UNDG(2010).“ApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciples.”32UNDG(2010).”UNDAFGuidelines.” 

 

23  

prioritiesasaresultofpressurefromdonors.Inaveryinterestingandwell‐illustratedpaper,A.

Natsios,formerheadofUSAID,arguesthatfundingfordemocracyandgovernanceprogrammes

hasdecreasedbecause“developmentofficersfocusonwhattheycanmeasure”33inorderto

complywiththedemandsofwhathecallsthe“counter‐bureaucracies.”34Indeed,RCs

highlightedalackoffundingasoneofthemainobstaclestoUNCTprioritization.OneRC

reportedthatimportanthumanrightsoutcomesoutlinedintheirUNDAFcouldnotbe

implementedduetoaninabilitytosecureresources,whileanothersimilarlynotedthatan

absenceofresourcesmadeitimpossibletoputinplaceprogrammestoaddressgapstheyhad

identifiedthroughavulnerabilityatlas.Theseexamplesseemtoconfirmthefearswithinthe

humanrightssectorthatthe‘valueformoney’evaluationsconductedbydonorsare

increasinglydrivingresourcestowards‘whatismeasureable’insteadof‘whatmatters.’35

ThefocusonRBM’saccountabilityperspectivemightnotbehelping

OneofRBM’sprimarypracticalchallengeslaysinthetradeoffsbetweenthetwousesofresults

information,namelyaccountabilityandmanagement.36Thetwoperspectivesaretosomeextent

directedtowarddifferenttypesofdataorresults.AnRBMmodelthatemphasizesaccountability

andexternalreportingratherthaneffectivenessandinternallearningwouldseemmorelikely

togeneratetensionwiththeHRBA,asitincreasesthepressureforattribution,numbersand

low‐hangingfruits.

Bynomeansshouldthisbereadasanattempttodiminishtheimportanceofaccountability.In

reality,itcouldbearguedthatmanagementimprovementandaccountabilityaretwosidesof

thesamecoin,butwhiletheformeremphasizestheaccountabilitytowardsrights‐holders

(learning),thelatteremphasizesaccountabilitytointermediaries,thatis,thedonors

(reporting).

IfthereissomethingthatcharacterizestheoriginsofRBM,itistheemphasisonlearning.As

earlyasthe1950s,PeterDruckernotedthatwhenmanagersanalyzeasituationandactonthe

basisofresults,theyaresignificantlymoresuccessfulthanwhentheymakedecisionsbasedon

budgetsandoperationprogrammes.Theprogrammeapproachesdevelopedinthelate1960s,

1970sand1980s,includingtheLogicalFrameworkApproach,emphasizedtheimplementation

ofactivitiesaccordingtoaplannedschedule,aswellasfinancial,planningandcostaccounting.

                                                            33 Natsios,A.(2010). 

34 "Arelativelydurablegovernmentagencywhoseprincipalmissionistomonitor,criticize,andimprovetheperformanceofother

governmentagencies…throughasetofbudgeting,oversight,accountability,andmeasurementsystems.“W.T.Gormley(1996).Counter‐Counter‐bureaucraciesinTheoryandPractice.Administration&Society,28(3),276. 35 ICHRP(2012). 

36 SeeFlint,M.(2003),EasierSaidThanDone:AReviewofResults‐BasedManagementinMultilateralDevelopmentInstitutions.Herefordshire:MichaelFlint&Partners;andBinnendijk,A.(2000),“Results‐BasedManagementintheDevelopmentCooperationAgencies:AReviewofExperience.”DACWorkingPartyonAidEvaluation. 

 

24  

AsdescribedbyJ.Vähämäki,“RBMrepresentsareturntothenotionsofDruckerandhis

insistenceonsuccessfulresultorientationasamind‐setandaperspectiveonmanagement,

ratherthanaprecisesetofinstructions.”37Paradoxically,anRBMaccountabilitymodelcan

easilydefeatthepurposethatRBMwasmeanttofulfilandcaninsteadcauseorganizationsto

countandattributefundsandactivitiesinsteadofresults.

TheUN’sprioritizationofaccountabilityvis‐a‐vismanagementimprovementinthe

implementationofRBMisnotnew.Asindicatedina2008RBMevaluation:“[o]verall,the

literaturedemonstratesthatmostorganizationsaresucceedingtoinstitutionalizeRBP(results‐

basedplanning),andthattheyaremovingquicklytowardsresults‐basedreporting.But

agenciesarehavingamoredifficulttimewiththeuseofresultsinformationformanagement

decision‐makingatcountrylevel.”38AstudyoftheUnitedNationsEvaluationGroupontherole

ofevaluationinRBM39foundthatRBMhasnotdevelopedintoamanagementtool,butis

perceivedbymanagementandprogrammemanagersasatechnicalreportingexercise.While

the2010UNDAFguidelinesaretryingtomovetheorganizationtowardsthe“managementfor

results”model,whichusesinformationgatheredfordecision‐makingandlearning,40much

moreneedstobedonetocounterbalancetheexternalpressure.

AmajorityoftherespondentstotheonlinequestionnairenotedthattheUNadoptedRBM

mainlytoimprovetheeffectivenessofitswork.Whenaskedabouttheactualcontributionof

RBMtotheUN’swork,however,amajorityofrespondentsinsteadreferredtoimproved

accountability.Infact,70percentand60percentoftherespondentsstressedthatnotenough

timeisallocatedforlearningandevaluation,respectively,while40percentstatedthatthetime

devotedtoreportingisexcessive.

Duringtheinterviews,manyRCsalsoconfirmedtheyhadexperiencedpressuretoreporton

“results”thatcanbequantifiedandattributed.AsdescribedbyoneoftheRCs,thereisacurrent

push“tomovedowntheladderofresultstowardsmorequantifiable,tangible,verifiableand

short‐termresults,”reflectinganongoing“debatebetweenthepoliticians,pushingforverifiable

results,andthedevelopmentauthoritiesandpractitionerswhichinsistonkeepingthematthe

outcomelevel.”Theissuehasbecomemorecomplicatedasitappearsthatpoliticiansseemtobe

winningthebattle.AccordingtoA.Natsios,thetensionbetween“accountabilityandcontrol

versusgooddevelopmentpracticehasnowbeenskewedtosuchadegreeintheU.S.aidsystem

                                                            37J.Vähämäki,etal,(2011).“Review.”38OIOS(2008).ReviewofResults‐basedManagementattheUN.Washington,DC:OIOS.39UNEG(2007).TheRoleofEvaluationinResults‐BasedManagement.40SeeUNDG(2010).HowtoPrepareanUNDAF:GuidelinesforUNCTs,andUNDG(2014).StandardOperatingProceduresforCountriesAdoptingthe“DeliveringAsOne”Approach.40Natsios,A.(2010).TheClashofCounter‐BureaucracyandDevelopment.Washington:CenterforGlobalDevelopment. 

 

25  

(andintheWorldBank)thattheimbalancethreatensprogrammeintegrity.”41

InthewordsofanotherRC,“Iammoreoftenrequestedfinancialinformationandinformation

ondeliverablesthanaboutresults.”Furthermore,asseveralRCshighlighted,theallocationof

resourcesisoftenbasedonpurelyfinancialdata,suchasexpendituresratesorthemeetingof

fundraisingtargets.Andyet,theyargue,someofthemosttransformativeoutcomestowhich

UNCTshavecontributedrequirelittlefinancial,butlong‐term,investments.Interestingly,one

RCnotedthatthemosttransformativechangetowhichtheUNCThadcontributedinthe

country‐thepassingofatransparencylaw‐wasinvisibleforthesuccessiveUNCT

programmes.

UNguidelinesreflectthefactthatthecomplexnatureofdevelopmentmakesitimpossibleto

attributetheachievementofoutcomestoonesinglespecificactor.However,inthecontextof

financialcompetitionforlimitedresources,developmentagenciesareincreasingthepressure

forresultsthatcanbeattributed(“valueformoney”).RCsreportedthepushfromtheirown

agenciestoreportonresultsthatcouldbeclearlyattributedtothem.Thiskindofdemandis

shiftingthefocusfromreportsonresults(outcomesandoutputs)toreportsonactivitiesand

expenditures,whicharemucheasiertoattribute.

Inadditiontotheproblemofattribution,whichisacerbatedinthecaseofhumanrightsresults,

claiminghumanrightsresultscanbepoliticallysensitiveandproblematic.Whiledonorsmight

wanttobeabletoattributeahumanrightsresulttoaspecificUNprogrammewhichtheyhave

funded,nationalgovernmentsareunlikelytowanttoseetheirUNcounterpartsclaimingthese

resultsasaconsequenceoftheirwork.AgoodexampleofthisistheHumanRights

ProgrammeoftheUNSecretary‐General’sStrategicFramework.42TheFramework

primarilyincludesindicatorsofactivities,ratherthanindicatorsofoutputsandoutcomes

(calledexpectedaccomplishments),duetothereluctanceofMemberStatestoacceptoutcome

indicatorswhichtheyoftenseeasinfringementsontheirnationalsovereignty.

Thefocusonactivities,outputsandfinancialreportingisnottheoriginalpurposeofRBM,

however,thistendencyseemstobeunfoldingundertheRBMumbrella,asreportedbyseveral

reviewsofdevelopmentagencies.Asreportedbyoneindividualinterviewedduringarecent

reviewoftheCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency,“we’vehadtospendhoursgoing

throughwithCIDAofficialsiftheworkdayinMalawishouldbe7.5hoursor7.75hoursand

whatshouldgoonthetimesheet.Tomethat’ssupplymanagement.It’senormouslytime

consuminganditmakesnodifferencetothelivesof[ourbeneficiaries]andruralcommunities

                                                            41Natsios,A.(2010).42SeeA/C.3/67/L.73*andA/69/16.

 

26  

atall.Ifindthatthisnittygrittyfocusonlittlethingslikecountingminutesandinputs,although

CIDAsaysitsinterestisinresults,theoppositeisthecase.Theyareinputobsessedanddetail

accountingobsessed…”43

TheroleoftheUNinmiddle‐incomecountries,whichhavenowbecomeamajorityofStates,is

underdebate.Inthecontextofthesedebates,theUNshouldassessthecostopportunityof

pursuingfundraisingeffortswhichmightdivertitslimitedtimeandresourcesfromtheareas

whereithasacomparativeadvantageandspecificmandate,ascouldbethecaseofhuman

rights.

WhathappenswithRelevantresultswhicharenotSMART?

Humanrightsofficersarguethatacrucialpartofthehumanrightsworkiskeepingthe“flame

burning,”particularlyduringthe“rainyseasons”whenitisclearthatresultsareunlikelyand

whilewaitingfortherightmomentforthe“fire”tospread.Thisisindeedamajorroleofthe

internationalhumanrightsprogramme,whichprovidestheumbrellaortheshelterunder

which,duringdifficultperiods,nationalhumanrightsinitiativescanhibernateandgrow.

WhenconfrontedwithRBM,humanrightsofficersfrequentlyarguethatUNinterventionscan

bejustifiedinessentialareaswheretheorganizationhasacomparativeadvantage,duetoits

mandateandinternationalcommitments,evenifitisdifficultfortheUNtodeliveraresultat

theoutcomelevelwithintheprogrammingcycle.Forexample,aspecificgroupmightbesubject

tostructuralandsystematicdiscriminationandexposedtocertainvulnerabilities,makingita

criticalhumanrightsissuewhichmustbeaddressedtofosterdevelopmentofthecounty.But

thesituationofthisgrouporitsmereexistencemightbeignoredordeniedbythegovernment.

ThesituationmightbehighlightedthroughtheHRBAassessmentoftheUNCT,yetwillnotbe

includedintheUNDAFifitisunlikelythattheUNcouldcontributetoanymajorbreakthroughs

attheoutcomelevelwithinthelimitedtimeframeofaprogrammingcycle.

Tothesearguments,RBMexperts,includingmanyoftheRCsinterviewed,wouldrespondthatit

shouldalwaysbepossibletodefinerealisticintermediateresults.ItendtoagreewithRBMand

developmentpractitionersthat“workingfortherightcause”isnotenoughandthatinordernot

toloseperspectiveandensurethatprogressisreallybeingmade,theUNmustbeabletodefine

thechangesitispursuing“bymaintainingtheburningflame.”

                                                            43Nazarko,N.(2014).“TheHandthatFeeds:NGOs’changingrelationshipwiththeCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyundertheCompetitiveFundingMechanism.”Thesissubmitted.SchoolofInternationalDevelopmentandGlobalStudies.FacultyofSocialSciences.UniversityofOttawa. 

 

27  

Inordertopracticallyaddresstheseconcerns,twotypesofintermediateresultscanbe

envisagedfordifficultareaswhereinstitutional,legislativeorbehaviouralchangesareunlikely

toberealizedwithinthetimeframeofaUNprogrammingcycle:

1. “Theincreasedinvolvement/awarenessofcivilsocietyactorsontheissue”,thatis

outcomeshavingrightsholdersasthesubject;and/or

2. “Theincreasedrecognitionoftheproblembythegovernmentortheinclusionofthe

issueonthepoliticaldebate/agenda,”thatis,outcomesresultingfromadvocacy

work.

However,aswillbeexplainedinmoredetailbelow,itisunlikelythatcurrentUNCT’s

programmingdocumentsintegratethesekindsof“intermediate”results.

a. Thecapacitiesofduty‐bearers,butalsorights‐holders!

ThethirdpillaroftheUNcommonunderstandingontheHRBAstatesthatdevelopment

cooperationshouldcontributetoenhancingthecapacitiesof“duty‐bearers”tomeettheir

obligationsandof“rights‐holders”toclaimtheirrights.InRBMandprogrammingterms,thisis

adescriptionoftheintermediateresultstowhichtheUNprogrammesshouldcontributein

ordertopursuethedesiredgoal.Theemphasisonresultsfrombothtypesofactorsisoneofthe

contributionsoftheHRBA,asitforcesdevelopmentpractitionerstofocusonbothsidesofthe

coin.InthewordsofoneoftheinterviewedRCs,“[w]hileRBMissomethingweuseonadaily

basis,theHRBAissomethingwedoattheanalysisstageandthenforget.”Indeed,different

reviewsdemonstratethattheHRBAhasinfluencedthewayUNCTsundertaketheircountry

analyses,includingbyidentifyingthosethatareespeciallyvulnerableorsufferdiscriminationin

relationtoaspecificissue(rights‐holders)andthosethathavearesponsibilitytodosomething

aboutit(theduty‐bearers),andbyanalyzingexistinggapsthatareimpedingtheabilityofsome

toclaimtheirrightsandofotherstofulfiltheirobligations.Itwouldseem,however,that

translatingtheseassessmentsintoconcreteoutcomesintheUNCTprogrammeshasproved

muchmoredifficult.

ArecentrevisionoftheUNDAFsbytheUNDG’sHumanRightsWorkingGroupshowedthat“[a]

strongemphasisis(also)oftenplacedwithinthisoutcomeareaonsupportingthecapacityof

duty‐bearers,throughsupporttoparliamentarians,thejudiciaryandnationalandlocal

governmentalinstitutionstobetterpromoteandprotecthumanrights.However,onlyafew

UNDAFssimultaneouslyaddressthecapacityofrights‐holderstoclaimtheirrights.”

 

28  

WhydosofewUNDAFsincludeoutcomesaimedatincreasingthecapacityofrights‐holdersto

claimtheirrights?OnepossibleexplanationisthattheUNDAFsaresignedbynational

governmentsandsomegovernmentsarereluctanttoseeanincreaseinthecapacityofrights‐

holderstoclaimtheirrightsasapriorityobjectiveofUNprogrammes.Althoughquestioningthe

importanceofnationalownershipasacriterionforeffectivedevelopmentcooperationis

beyondthescopeofthisstudy,itisworthnotingthatastrongemphasisonthatcriterion,and

thenarrowinterpretationof“nationalownership”as“governmentownership,”couldbe

hinderingtheUN’simplementationofoneofthemostcharacteristicaspectsoftheHRBA.

AnotherreasonforthatUNDAFoutcomesdonotidentifyrights‐holdersasprimaryactorsmight

bebecausetheMDGs,whichhavehadamajorinfluenceontheUNDAFs,failedtocapturethe

civilandpoliticalrightsaspectsofdevelopment.Ifthisistrue,thedraftSustainable

DevelopmentGoals,whichincludeagoalongovernanceandparticipation,couldopenupnew

opportunitiesforUNCTstoincludeoutcomesrelatingtorights‐holders.

Forthattohappen,however,itiscrucialthattheexistingprogrammingguidelinesclearly

reflecttheimportanceofbothduty‐bearersandrights‐holdersasoutcomesubjects.Thisisnot

currentlythecase.TheresultschainoftheUNDG’sRBMHandbookreproducedinFigure5

definesoutcomesas“changesinthecapacityandperformanceofduty‐bearers,”withno

referencemadetorights‐holders.Interestinglyenough,theHandbookreproducesthecommon

understandingoftheHRBA,withreferencestoright‐holdersandduty‐bearers,butonlyfor

informationpurposes.Thereisnoreferencetorights‐holdersunderchapter6oftheUNDAF

guidelines,whichoutlinesthestepsthatUNCTsneedtotaketopreparetheUNDAF.44Insteadof

usingtheprogrammingprinciplestoprovideguidanceforthepreparationoftheUNDAF,the

guidanceisprovidedinRBMterms,whiletheotherprogrammingprinciplesarelistedoneafter

another,primarilyforinformationpurposes,enablingauthorstopickandchooseastheywish.

Thedifficultiesinreflectingtheresultsofadvocacy

IfitisraretoseeUNDAFoutcomeswhichidentifyrights‐holdersasasubject,itisevenmore

unlikelytofindUNDAFoutcomesthatreflecttheintendedresultofadvocacywork.Theseare

resultswhichcorrespondtoprioritygapsthathavebeenidentifiedbytheinternationalhuman

rightsmechanismsandtheassessmentsofUNCTs,butarenotanationalpriority.Aspreviously

stated,advocacyworkcanandshouldbetranslatedintoresults‐basedlanguageinorderto

enabletheUNtodevelopclearstrategies,monitorprogressandlearnfromtheexperience.Such

resultscouldbephrasedinsuchtermsas“[t]herighttoreproductivehealthispartofthe

politicaldebateinthecontextoftheupcomingelections;”or“[t]henegativeconsequencesof

                                                            44Paradoxically,theonlyreferencetorights‐holdersintheUNDAFguidelinesisunderthecapacity‐developmentprinciple. 

 

29  

traditionalharmfulpracticesarementionedinpublicmedia;”or“[t]heGovernmentdiscusses

withotherstakeholdersthesituationofminoritygroupY,”agroupwhoseexistencehadbeen

previouslydenied.ThereiscurrentlynoplaceinUNprogrammedocuments,however,toreflect

thesekindsofresults.HowthencanUNCTsbeheldfullyaccountablefortheirroleintranslating

theinternationalcommitmentsatthecountrylevel?AsoneRCexpressedit,“thereareenough

checksandbalancesregardingtheaccountabilityoftheorganizationvisavisitsmission,but

therearenotenoughchecksandbalancesregardingtheaccountabilityoftheUNCTsvisavis

governmentsandthissituationcandeteriorateiffundsincreasinglycomefromgovernments,as

thefirstaccountabilityistothosethatpaythebill.”

Theresultsofadvocacyworkaredifficulttoreportonandalmostimpossibletoattribute.But

theseareresultswhichcanbehighlytransformativeandanareainwhichtheUNcouldhavea

majorcomparativeadvantage.InthewordsofoneRC,“competitionforfundshindersall

attemptsoftheUNtoworkasOne.Moneyspoilsitall.IfthereisoneareainwhichtheOneUN

couldreallymakeadifferenceiswherefundingisnotthatimportant,thatiswheretheUNtries

tomovetheagendafurther.”

ThecurrentCommunicatingasOneagendacouldprovetobeawindowofopportunity.Within

thiscontext,UNCTscouldbeaskedtodefine“advocacyresults.”Theideawouldnotbeto

developnewconstrainingandworkintensivemandatorytoolsorprocesses,butrathertocreate

thespaceforUNCTsandtheUNasawholetoidentifykeyadvocacyresults.Theidentificationof

“advocacyresults,”definedinaccordancewiththerecommendationsissuedbytheinternational

humanrightsmechanisms,wouldenabletheorganization,bothwithinandoutsidethecountry,

toworktowardsacommonpurpose.AlmostallRCsreferredtothedifficultiesthateventhe

mostcommittedRCsfaceincarryingoutthistypeofadvocacyroleandmanycalledforamore

integratedUNstrategythatwouldhelpUNCTstofeelthebackingandsupportofthe

organizationasawhole.Indeed,aslongasthegoaldefinedintheUNcommonunderstandingof

theHRBA‐therealizationofhumanrights‐issharedacrossthewholeorganization,strategies

androlescanvaryfromcountrytocountry.

 

30  

TENSION3:DEFININGTHESTRATEGY

Selectingthepartners

ConcernshavebeenraisedthattheapplicationofRBMcouldbehavinganinfluenceonthe

selectionoftheactorswithwhichdevelopmentcooperationengage.Beingabletoprepare

projectproposalsthatapplyRBMconceptsandlogichasbecomeapreconditionoffunding.In

addition,undertheRBMumbrella,developmentcooperationagencieshaveestablished

sophisticatedsystemstoensureaccountabilityandanappropriateuseofresourcesbypartners.

Thesesystemsareusuallysensitivetoeconomiesofscale.Forexample,transactioncoststend

tobestandardinmechanismsthatareusedtoallocategrants,sothelargerthegrantthemore

cost‐effectivetheprocessis.TheproblemisthatnotallorganizationsspeaktheRBMjargon,

havethecapacitytocomplywiththecontrolproceduresinplaceorareabletomanageand

spendlargesumsofmoneywithinashortperiodoftime.

Thefirst‐handinformationgatheredthroughthisresearch,however,doesnotbackupsomeof

theseassumptions.ThemajorityofthequestionnairerespondentsandtheinterviewedRCsdo

notthinkthatRBMisaffectingthetypeofactorswithwhichtheUNengagesindevelopment

cooperation.OnlyacoupleoftheRCsspokeofapossibleperverseeffectwith“atrade‐off

betweenthosepartnerscapableofpreparinggoodprogrammesvisavisthosethathavethe

rightcompetenciesand/ormandate.”

Despitethelittleevidencefoundthatthisisaproblem,remainingawareofthepossibleeffects

ofRBMintheselectionofpartnersisthebestwaytoavoidproblems.Thisisespecially

importantfromtheHRBAperspective,ashumanrightsorganizationsarelesslikelytospeakthe

RBMjargon.Furthermore,onewouldexpectlocalorganizationsrepresentingdiscriminated

groupsandthosewhoaremostvulnerabletoexperiencemoredifficultiesinmanaginglarge

grantsorincomplyingwithsophisticatedaccountabilitysystemsandreportingrequirements.

OneRCacknowledgedtheyhadtodevelopagrantsystemoutsidetheUNDAFinordertowork

withthosepartnersthat”theUNshouldbereallyworkingwith,thosesmallorganizationswhich

aremakingadifference.”Furtherresearchmightbeneededtolookintothisissuetodetermine

ifthereisarealneedtoputinplacealternativesystemstoenabletheUNtoengagewiththese

kindsofpartners.

 

31  

Movingawayfromtheprotection‐promotiondichotomy

RBMaimstoensurethatprogrammedinterventionsleadtothedesiredchangesorresults.

“Outputs”areakeylinkintheresultschainthatconstitutestheRBMstrategytoachievethose

desiredresults.AsdefinedintheUNRBMHandbook,outputsare“changesinskillsorabilities

andcapacitiesofindividualsorinstitutions,ortheavailabilityofnewproductsandservicesthat

resultfromthecompletionofactivities.”Thedefinitionputstheemphasisoncapacitychanges,

whichtherebybecomesthebackboneofUNdevelopmentprogrammesatthecountrylevel.

Indeed,capacity‐developmentisatthecoreoftheaideffectivenessagendaandtraditional

developmentwork.45Yet,asW.Vandenholeargues,empiricalevidencedoesnotcorroboratethe

assumptionthatonlycapacity‐buildinganddialogue,ratherthanshamingandnaming,worksto

bringaboutoperationalchange.AccordingtoVandenhole,thepromotion‐protectiondichotomy

reflectsthetraditionaldivisionoflabourand“maywellbeafundamentalobstacleto

organizationalchange,asthecorrespondingdefinitionstendtolockupthehumanrightsand

developmentactorsintheirtraditionalroles.”46WhileRBMinitselfwouldsupportanytypeof

interventioncontributingtothedesiredresult,thechainofresultsthathasbeendeveloped

undertheRBMumbrellamakesitdifficulttothinkintermsotherthanthoseofcapacity‐

development.

AllRCsinterviewedassertedthecentralityofhumanrightsfortheUN’swork.Manyofthem

alsoaddedthathavinghumanrightsatthecoreoftheorganization’smandatedoesnot

necessarilyentailthat“allUNstaffshouldnowbecomehumanrightsworkers.”WhentheRCs

referredtohumanrightsinthatcontext,theyseemedtobereferringtoaparticularconception

ofhumanrights:asetofrights,namelycivilandpoliticalrightsandatypeofwork,namely

advocacy.Toagreatextent,thediscourseofUNdevelopmentpractitionerscontinuesto

characterizedevelopmentasthecarrotandhumanrightsasthestick.

Andyet,theHRBAaimsatbringingthesetwoworldsclosertogether.TheHRBAtodevelopment

supposesthatthewholespectrumofrights‐civil,economic,politicalandsocialrights–isan

integralpartofthedevelopmentgoal.Inaddition,theHRBAtodevelopmentpresumesthatthe

broadspectrumofinterventionsavailabletoUNstaff,includingawareness‐raising,advisory

services,advocacy,capacity‐building,monitoringandreporting,isusedinthepursuitofthat

goal.

Infact,itisperhapsduetotheirruptionofRBMinthehumanrightsfieldandtheinceptionof

theHRBAthatmosthumanrightsorganizationsunderstandtheneedtoexpandtheirstrategies                                                            45 NotethattogetherwithRBMandtheHRBA,theUNhasidentified”capacity‐development”asanotherofitsfiveprogrammingprinciples. 46W.Vandenhole(2012).OvercomingthePromotion‐ProtectionDichotomy.

 

32  

beyondnaming,shamingandmonitoring.Evenifhumanrightsworkerstraditionallybelieved

thatworkingforthe“rightcause”wasenough,mosthumanrightsorganizationshavenow

movedbeyondthislogicandarequestioningtheirstrategiesinlightofthechangestheyintend

tobringabout.47

ManyoftheRCsinterviewedarguedforaclearerdivisionofwork,withUNactorsoutsidethe

country,preferablyOHCHR,takingtheleadandhavingthemainresponsibilityforsensitiveand

potentiallycontroversialhumanrightsissues/interventionswhichcouldendangerUN

cooperationwiththenationalgovernmentinquestion.Indeed,whileclearlycommittedto

humanrights,RCsexpressedacertainleveloffrustrationwiththeapparentlackof

understandingbyUNHeadquartersaboutthedifficultandcomplextasksassignedtothem.In

thewordsofoneRC,“Ihavealwaysbeenahumanrightschampion,butonlywhenIgotheredid

Irealizehowdifficultthetaskis.”Theinterviewsrevealedademandforanorganizational

strategythatwouldenabletheinstitutiontofulfillitshumanrightsmandate,whilelettingthem

playtheroletheythinktheyarebettersuitedfor,thatofconfidence‐buildingandengagement

withnationalauthorities.

ThroughtheOneUNandtheHumanRightsUpFrontinitiatives,thesystemisslowlymoving

towardsacommoncountrystrategybyhelpingtodefinetherolestobeplayedbyeachactorin

everycontextinordertopursuetheHRBAtodevelopment.Itwouldbedifficult,however,to

imaginethoserolesdefinedpurelyalongtheclassicalhumanrights‐developmentdivide.Inthe

long‐term,noorganization,notevenapurelyhumanrights‐basedorganizationsuchasOHCHR,

cansurvivebyusingonlythestick.Inthelong‐term,noUNCTwillbeabletomaintainits

legitimacyandcredibilityifitisperceivedasonlyusingthecarrotandhavingtorelinquishits

mandate.

                                                            47 AccordingtoOHCHR’sTheoryofChange:“OHCHRsupportsstandard‐setting;monitorsandreportsonhumanrights;provides

advisoryservicesandimplementstechnicalcooperationprogrammesincollaborationwitharangeofstakeholdersatthenationallevel;andundertakesglobalandnational‐leveladvocacytopromoteadoptionofandadherencetohumanrightsnormsandstandards.OHCHRseekstoensurethattheseelementscomplementandreinforceeachotherinpursuingtherealizationofitsmandate.” 

 

33  

TENSION4:M&EORMAKINGINFORMEDDECISIONSManywillarguethatitisonlywhenmanagementusesthedatacollectedthroughRBM

processestoinformitsdecisionsthatRBMcanproveitsrealvalue.Paradoxically,oneofthe

mostperverseeffectsthatRBMcanhaveinrelationtotheHRBAisitsuseasatoolto

“objectively”informdecisionsrelatedtotheallocationofresources.Datagatheredand

aggregatedthroughRBMprocessesconstitutesimportantinformationfordecision‐making,but

onlyiftakenwithextremecautionandasfoodforthoughtforthediscussionofdevelopment

andhumanrightspractitionerswithasolidunderstandingofthespecificcontext.Successesare

asimportantasfailuresforlearning,buttheuseofdataextractedfromM&Efortheallocation

ofresourcesislimitingreportingonresultstoreportingonsuccesses.

Recentresearchshowsatendencyofcertaindevelopmentagenciestomoveawayfromthe

mosttransformativeandlong‐termprojectsonthebasisofRBMargumentsorinformation

gatheredunderanRBMumbrella.Referencehasalreadybeenmadeinthispapertothestudyof

A.Natsios,formerheadofUSAID,inwhichhearguesthatfundingfordemocracyand

governanceprogrammeshasdecreasedduetothetendencyof“developmentofficers[to]focus

onwhattheycanmeasure.”48Anotheroft‐quotedexampleisthedecisionofDFIDtodissolvethe

“CivilSocietyFund”duetoitsinabilitytoshow“valueformoney.”Otherresearchershavefound

similarfindingsregardingtheCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency49andtheSwedishdevelopmentcooperation.50

Inhispaper,Natsioswarnsagainstthedangerofleavingdecisionsregardingdevelopment

programmesinthehandsofcounter‐bureaucraciesorprogrammemanagers.UNstaffmembers

seemtosharehisconcerns.Morethanhalfofthosewhoansweredthequestionnairenotedthat

UNCTshavetoomanyprogrammemanagersandnotenoughsubstantiveofficers.Whenasked

aboutthecompetenciesofidealUNCTsinthenearfuture,RCsmentionedsolidsubstantive

expertise,soundpoliticaljudgementandacommitmenttothevaluesoftheorganization.None

ofthemspontaneouslyreferredtoprogrammemanagement.

Inthecontextofstrongcompetitionforlimitedfunds,oneRCnotedwithsadnessthetendency

ofUNstaffofbecomingdeskilledduetotheneedtodevotetheirtimetopreparefundraising

proposalsorreportonthem.ThisisparticularlyworrisomeinacontextinwhichtheUNismore

                                                            48 Natsios,A.(2010). 

49 See Nazarko,N.(2014).“TheHandthatFeeds:NGOs’ChangingRelationshipwiththeCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyundertheCompetitiveFundingMechanism.”Thesissubmitted.SchoolofInternationalDevelopmentandGlobalStudies.FacultyofSocialSciences.UniversityofOttawa.50 Samuelsson,A.(2013).“ManagingAidRelationshipsintheContextofResults‐BasedManagement:ACaseStudyofSupporttoCivilSocietywithinSwedishDevelopmentCooperation.”Adissertationsubmittedinpartialfulfillmentforthedegree:MasterinHumanRightsPracticeSchoolofGlobalStudies,UniversityofGothenburg,SchoolofBusinessandSocialSciences,RoehamptonUniversity,DepartmentofArchaeologyandSocialAnthropology,UniversityofTromsø. 

 

34  

frequentlyworkinginmiddle‐incomecountries,whichaswasnotedbytheRCsthemselves,are

increasinglyexigentaboutthekindofsupporttheyexpectfromtheUN.Whatisatstakeisthe

typeoforganizationtheUNwantstobecome:whetheritwantstopursuethefundraisingrace

andmeasureitssuccessintermsofthefundsmanaged‐anareawhereitisalreadyclearly

disadvantagedvisavisotheractors‐orwhetheritchoosestopreserveitscomparative

advantagebyimprovingitspursuitofandfocusonitsinternationalmandates.Theorganization

shouldnothesitatetoquestioniftheUNDAFisthebesttypeofdocumenttodefineandpresent

theUNcommonprogrammeinmiddle‐incomecountries.SomeoftheRCsinterviewedwere

incrediblybluntinthisregard:“itisdefinitelynotintheUNDAFthatonefindstherealUN

prioritiesinthecountry.”

Contrarytowhatitisnormallyargued,closingaprogrammeonthebasisofdatagathered

againstasetofdefinedindicatorstomeasuretheachievementofaparticularresultmightbe

moreirrationalthanrational.Ifindicatorsarenotshowingprogress,furtherassessmentsmight

beneededandadiscussionmightneedtotakeplacetounderstandwhatishappening.The

indicatorsmightnotbethemostrelevant;prevalencecouldhavebeengiventowhatcanbe

countedinsteadofwhatisimportant.Evaluationsshowsuccessescanrarelybelimitedtothe

kindofresultscapturedbytheindicatorsincorporatedinthedesignofaprogramme.The

indicatorsmighthavebeenassessedatthewrongtimefortheprogramme.AsNatsiosargues,

transformativeprogrammeshavinganimpactongovernancestructureshavea“lageffect,”that

is,theirresultsareonlymeasurableyearsaftertheclosingoftheprogramme.Finally,alackof

progresscouldrevealtheneedtoadjustthestrategy,withoutnecessarilyhavingtoquestionthe

relevanceoftheprogramme.

Sshort‐termsuccessesmighthidelong‐termfailures.Failuresandsuccessesneedtobeseenin

lightofthewidermissionoftheorganizationandnotonlyonthebasisofindividualprojectsor

programmes.Properlystudyingandlearningfromthefailuresofoneprojectsorprogrammes

cancontributetooverallimprovements.Onedoesnotexpecttoseeagovernmentdrastically

cutitsbudgetoneducationasaresultofverypooracademicresults.Itwouldinsteadbe

anticipatedthatanassessmentofthesituationwouldbeundertakentotrytounderstandwhat

ishappening,followedbyachangeofstrategywhichcouldincludeanincreaseintheallocated

resources.Andyet,thisiswhatseemstobehappeninginkeyareasofdevelopment,namely

thosewhicharecrucialfromtheperspectiveoftheHRBA.

 

35  

Conclusions and Recommendations

Results‐basedmanagementandthehumanrights‐basedapproacharetwooftheUN

programmingprinciplesfordevelopmentcooperation.Thefindingsofthisresearchseemto

corroboratetheassumptionthatwhilecomplementary,theconcurrentapplicationofthesetwo

principlescangeneratetensionsthat,ifignored,threatentoreversethehierarchy,turningRBM,

intheoryanenablingtool,intotheactual“master.”Whiletheevidenceislimitedandthe

samplesarenotrepresentative,thesefindingscouldserveasthebasisforfutureresearchand

provideenoughinformationtodrawsomepreliminaryconclusionsandoutlinesome

recommendations.

Thediscourseonthecomplementarityofbothprogrammingprincipleshighlightstheroleofthe

HRBAindefiningrelevantcontentandtheroleofRBMinensuringaneffectiveprocessfor

developmentcooperation.WhentheUNoperationalizestheseprinciples,however,itistherole

ofhumanrightsasameans,ratherthanasanend,andtheaccountability,ratherthanthe

effectivenessperspectiveofRBM,thatprevail.AnRBMmodelthatemphasizesaccountability

andexternalreportingratherthaneffectivenessandinternallearningismorelikelytoenter

intotensionwiththeHRBA,asitincreasesthepressureforattribution,numbersandlow‐

hangingfruits.TheroleoftheHRBAasabroadframeworkforaUNtheoryofchangefor

developmentcooperationhasnotyetpermeatedUNprogrammingguidelinesordiscourse

outsidethehumanrightsworld.

TheUnitedNationshasdevelopedseparateguidelinesandmethodologiesfortheapplicationof

RBMandtheHRBA.Atearlierstages,thisprobablyenabledtheHRBAtogrowandestablish

itselfasaconsolidatedmethodology.NowitistimefortheUNtomovebeyondthispiecemeal

approachtowardsa“humanrightsandresults‐basedmanagement”programmaticframework,a

newbusinessmodelwhichcorrespondstothenewdevelopment‐humanrightsconceptual

framework.RatherthanahandbookonRBMandguidelinesandtrainingpackagesforthe

implementationoftheHRBA,whatisneededisaUNProgrammingManual,informedbyRBM,

theHRBAandotherprogrammaticprinciples.Continuingtoidentifythespecificaddedvalueof

eachoftheseapproachesmightbeinterestingforacademicpurposes,butitisirrelevantfor

practitioners,whosimplyneedclearguidancethatcanbeeasilytranslatedintoaction.What

couldbethevalueofhavingthedifferentprogrammingprinciplescompetefortheownershipof

conceptssuchasparticipationorgenderequity?

ThecurrentmultiplicationofmethodologiesthatneedtobeknownandappliedbyUNstaff

complicatesandhinderstheirimplementation,mostlikelyattheexpenseoftheHRBA.A

 

36  

majorityofUNstaffthatrespondedtothequestionnairedevelopedforthisresearchstatedthat

whileexistingincentivestoapplyRBMareadequate(67percent)orevenexcessive(7per

cent),incentivestoapplytheHRBAareinadequate(70percent).RBMguidelinesarethemain

reference.Possibletensionsbetweenthetwoprogrammingprinciplesarelikelytoberesolved

bygivingpreferencetoRBMconcepts.Furthermore,separatemanualsandguidelinesforthe

twoprogrammingprinciplesareonlylikelytoperpetuatemisconceptionsand

misunderstandingsbetweenthedevelopmentandhumanrightsworlds.

Summaryofrecommendations

1. DeveloponesingleUNProgrammingManualthatprovidesguidanceonthebasisofall

programmingprinciples.

2. EnsuretheHRBA,asthebasicframeworkforatheoryofchangeforUNdevelopment

cooperation,permeatesallUNprogrammingguidelinesanddocuments.Thisimplies

identifyinghumanrightsasconstitutiveofthegoalofdevelopmentcooperationand

havingbothduty‐bearersandrights‐holdersasthesubjectsoftheoutcomes.

3. Clearlyreflecttheinternationalcommitmentswhichconstitutethemandateofthe

organizationatthetopoftheresultschainoftheUNprogrammingdocuments.Those

internationalcommitmentsshouldnotbelimitedtotherelevantSDGs,butalsoinclude

therelevantinternationalhumanrightsrecommendations,whichcouldthenbe

monitoredwiththeUNDAF.

4. ExposethepossibleperverseeffectsofRBMandclearlydelimititsroleoensureits

effectivenessandtherelevanceofUNdevelopmentcooperation.

5. EnsureUNprogrammingframeworksprovidethespaceforUNCTstodefineadvocacy

resultsandbetterintegrateadvocacyaspartoftheirstrategiestoattainspecific

outcomes.

6. Weighresourcesusedinfundraisingeffortsagainstthepotentialbenefitsofthosefunds,

recognizingthatsomeofthemosttransformativechangestowhichtheUNmight

contributerequirefewfinancialresourcesandinsteaddemandadequateexpertiseand

aninvestmentoftime.

7. FurtherexplorewaystoworkwithpartnerswhichmaybeunabletocomplywithRBM

requirementsbutmighthavetheappropriatemandateorrepresentgroupswithwhich

theorganizationneedstoengagetoachievehumanrightsdevelopmentgoals.

 

37  

Annex 1

Semi‐structuredInterviewforResidentCoordinators

1. Pleaseexplainbrieflytheextenttowhichyouhavebeenexposedtoresultsbasedmanagement(RBM)andthehumanrightsbasedapproach(HRBA),bothintermsoftrainingandapplication.(Doyoufeelequallypreparedtoimplementbothofthem?)

2. Basedonyourexperience,whathasbeenRBM’smaincontribution(s)totheworkoftheUNatthecountrylevel?AndHRBAmaincontribution(s)?Couldyouprovideexamples?

3. Basedonyourexperience,whatarethebasicelementsonthebasisofwhichUNCTsandUNpresencesatthecountrylevelmakedecisionsonpriorities?

4. Inyouropinion,towhomistheUNCTaccountable?

5. HowdoyouthinkRBMandHRBAcomplementeachother?

6. HastheUNCTexperiencedtensionsintryingtoapplybothprinciples?SituationsinwhichRBMandtheHRBAseemedtoprovidecontradictingguidance?Pleaseprovideexamples.

7. TowhatextentareUNCTsmakinguseoftherecommendationsofinternationalhumanrightsmechanisms?(i.e.,framing,shaping,monitoring,advocacy…).Whataretheincentivesand/ortheobstacles?Pleaseprovideexamples.

8. ThinkingoftheevolvingroleoftheUNatthecountrylevel:whatwouldtheprofessionalsofanidealUNCTlooklike(intermsofcompetencies,knowledge,skills…)?Howdothoseidealizedcompetenciescomparetothecurrentsituation?

 

38  

Annex2

OnlinesurveyforUNHumanRightsPolicy(HuriTALK)andUNCoordinationPractice(CPN)networks

(SeePowerPointslidesattached)

 

39  

References

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D’Hollander,David;Marx,AxelandWouters,Jan(2014).“IntegratingHumanRightsinEUDevelopmentCooperationPolicy:AchievementsandChallenges.”WorkingPaperNo.134.LeuvenCentreforGlobalGovernanceStudies.

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