s v jamen p gaoseb and joahasel gamaseb. judgm cc 19 - 2010. liebenberg, j 22 feb 2011

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    Reportable

    CASE NO.: CC 19/2010

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA

    HELD AT OSHAKATI

    In the matter between:

    THE STATE

    and

    JAMEN PETRUS GAOSEB

    JOAHASEL GAMASEB

    CORAM: LIEBENBERG, J.

    Heard on: February 14; 15; 18; 2011.

    Delivered on: February 22, 2011.

    JUDGMENT

    LIEBENBERG, J.: [1] The accused, both adult males, stand charged on two

    counts, namely, (1) murder; and (2) housebreaking with intent to rob and robbery,

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    with aggravating circumstances as defined in s 1 of Act 51 of 1977. They pleaded not

    guilty to both charges. In count 1 it is alleged that the accused persons during the

    period 15 16 October 2005 at or near Otavi in the district of Grootfontein,

    unlawfully and intentionally killed Ruth Elfriede Will (hereafter referred to as the

    deceased), an eighty-one year old female. Count 2 refers to the same period and

    place and it is alleged that the accused, unlawfully and intentionally, broke in and

    entered the house of the deceased, with intent to rob, and did unlawfully and

    intentionally force the deceased into submission by physically assaulting her with

    unknown objects on the face and body fracturing her ribs; by tying her hands and feet;

    and smothering her, with intent to steal from her the goods listed in the Annexure. As

    regards the aggravating circumstances present, it is furthermore alleged that

    dangerous weapons were used during or after the commission of the crime, and that

    grievous bodily harm was inflicted to the person of the deceased.

    [2] Mr.Shakumu, instructed by the Directorate: Legal Aid, appeared on behalf of

    both accused, whilst Mr. Lisulo, appeared for the State.

    [3] Both accused filed plea explanations in writing in terms of s 115 of the Criminal

    Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), hereafter referred to as the Act. The same

    plea explanation was tendered by both the accused and because of the extensive

    explanations advanced by both accused; I deem it necessary to quote the statement in

    extenso (spelling/grammatical errors corrected):

    I [the] undersigned

    JAMEN PETRUS GAOSEB

    2

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    Do hereby state as follows:

    1. I am the First Accused before this Honouable [Court] and stand charged on a

    count of murder (referred to as Count 1 on the indictment) and housebreaking

    with intent to rob and robbery with aggravating circumstances (referred to as

    Count 2 on the indictment).

    2. I understand the charges against me and plead not guilty to both counts. The

    basis of my defence are as follows:

    a) On 15 October 2005, [at] around 22h00 and at or near Otavi in the district of

    Grootfontein, [I] went to the house of Ruth Elfriede Will, an elderly woman

    whose age I dont know, but estimate same to be in the region of 81 (the

    deceased herein). I was accompanied by Mr. Johansel Gamaseb, who is the

    second accused in this matter [and] who was also employed by the deceased at

    some point before he resigned. I resigned on a Friday, around 15 October 2005

    while the second accused resigned few months earlier. The farm in issue is farm

    Gaidaus.

    b) On that day of 15 October 2005, which is the day I resigned from the employ of

    the deceased, I decided to break into the house of the deceased at night while she

    is asleep and steal money; although I did not know whether there was money kept

    in the house. I did not carry out the plan on that day.

    c) The next day, which was [the] Saturday of 16 October 2005 and [at] around

    22h00, myself and the second accused went to the house of the deceased, broke

    open a small window and entered the house. She was still asleep. We have not

    switched any lights on.

    d) We continued looking for the money in her cupboards and drawers. We could

    not find anything. We then decided to take items such as clothes and linen, which

    I cannot describe with precision as it was dark, but I can confirm that they meet

    the description of the items contained in Annexure A to the [indictment].

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    When we were about to leave the house, she must have heard us and woke up.

    We feared that she might call the police or scream for help. We decided to tie

    her legs to her arms and also blindfolded her. There was a scuffle but we did not

    beat or, put otherwise, assault her. We ensured that she could breath and left her

    nostrils exposed to air. We only blindfolded her and tightened her mouth. We

    also did not know that by doing so, she might die.

    e) We then left the house and were arrested the next day.

    f) In summary, I admit having caused the death of the deceased but my conduct was

    not intentional. I also admit having broken into the house of the deceased but

    state that, at the time we stole the said items, we did not use any force nor

    demanded anything from the deceased. By the time she woke up, we had already

    completed the said theft.

    FORMAL ADMISSIONS (S 220)

    I FURTHER ADMIT THE FOLLOWING:

    a) That the deceased was [an] 81 years old female who farmed at Gaidaus farm in

    the district of Grootfontein.

    b) That on or about 15 October 2005 I entered into the house of the deceased (Ruth

    Elfriede Will).

    c) That I tied her legs and arms and blindfolded her eyes and [covered] (folded)

    her mouth with a piece of cloth.

    d) That I took some clothes from her house although I cannot describe such items

    with precision.

    e) That she (Ruth Elfriede Will) is deceased although I have no knowledge of the

    cause of her death.

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    Dated at Oshakati on this 14th day of February 2011.02.15

    (Emphasis provided)

    Accused no. 1 was unable to sign the statement and instead, appended his thumb print

    thereto, at the end of the statement.

    [4] The plea explanation filed on behalf of accused no. 2, as regards para 1 and 2(a),

    is identical to that of the first accused, except for the change of names and where

    reference is made to the co-accused. The following appears at para 2 (b) where

    reference is made to the statement of accused no. 1:

    His statement was read to me and I understand the contents thereof. I also confirm

    the truthfulness of the contents as it relates to me and the events that transpired on

    Saturday, 16 October 2005 [at] around 22h00 at the house of the deceased. I

    therefore pray that the contents of his statement under paragraphs (a) to (f) be read

    as if specifically incorporated in my statementmutatis mutandis.

    The formal admissions made in terms of s 220 are also identical to that of accused

    no.1. Second accused equally appended his thumbprint to the statement.

    [5] After submitting the statements to Court, the Court confirmed with both accused

    whether the contents of the statements were correct; whether it was in accordance

    with their instructions to their counsel; and whether it was their thumbprints appearing

    on the statements, respectively. Both accused confirmed that to be the case.

    [6] The following documents were then handed into evidence by agreement: The

    States Pre-Trial Memorandum and the Reply thereto; minutes of the Pre-Trial

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    Review Conference dated 25 October 2010 between the State and defence counsel;

    three photo plans relating to the crime scene, the autopsy performed on the deceased,

    and the route between the deceaseds farmstead and Saamstaan township, an informal

    settlement in Otavi where the accused were eventually arrested. A sketch plan and

    accompanying key of the layout of the deceaseds house; and, the original record of

    proceedings conducted in the district court, Otavi, including the section 119

    proceedings. A post-mortem examination was conducted on 18 October 2005 by Dr.

    Shangula at the State mortuary, Windhoek and her findings were documented in a

    report, handed into evidence under cover of an affidavit deposed to in terms of s 212

    (4) of the Act. I pause here to observe that Dr. Shangula in the mean time has passed

    away. The content of the documents referred to above, will be discussed hereinafter,

    where relevant.

    [7] In view of the comprehensive plea explanations given by the accused persons

    and accompanying admissions; as well as the documents admitted into evidence by

    agreement, the State called only two witnesses viz. Mr. Wolfgang Falk, the first

    person on the scene, and the deceaseds son, Mr. Klaus Will. For the defence, only

    accused no. 1 gave evidence.

    [8] Mr. Falk, a neighbour to the deceased, testified that on the morning of 16

    October 2005 he received a phone call from another neighbour in connection with a

    report made by one of the workers on the deceaseds farm. He decided to go there

    and upon his arrival, he observed a broken windowpane, giving access to one of the

    rooms (used as a store room), inside the house. As there was no response to his

    calling, he climbed through the broken window and in the main bedroom, which

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    obviously had been ransacked, stumbled upon the deceased lying on the bed with her

    hands and legs tied together. She had something like a stocking (it turned out to be a

    night dress) pulled tightly over her head, completely covering the head. He felt for a

    pulse on the neck but could find none. The body was cold and rigor mortis had set in.

    He tried to contact the police over the fixed phone in the deceaseds house but was

    unable to do so, as the lines were cut. The police did eventually arrive later that same

    morning.

    [9] Mr. Will said that he returned his mother, who was 81 years of age, to the farm

    the previous weekend and whilst there, he personally handed over to first accused, his

    salary. The deceased had been living alone on the farm for about ten years. He said

    he returned to Windhoek on the Sunday (of the previous weekend), leaving his mother

    behind on the farm with accused no.1 and another worker, in the employ of someone

    renting grazing from the deceased. After being informed of his mothers death he

    returned to the farm and found the bedroom in a state of disarray with clothes lying

    around, the wardrobe doors open and the safe forcefully opened. He realised that his

    mothers pistol, linen and some groceries were removed; of which some were

    subsequently recovered; which he later on identified at the police station. Mr. Will

    was not able to give an estimated value of the stolen goods. He elaborated on his

    mothers health at the time and concluded that she was in ill health, suffering from

    high blood pressure and under medication for a heart condition. She had a pacemaker

    implanted some three years prior to her death and regularly had to go to Windhoek for

    a medical check-up. The post-mortem report confirmed that the deceased was having

    a pacemaker of the heart.

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    [10] The State hereafter closed its case and counsel for the defence then brought an

    application in terms of s 174 of the Act. The application was summarily dismissed

    and the accused put on their defence. First accused elected to testify whilst the second

    accused elected to remain silent and had no witnesses to call. I have earlier indicated

    that reasons for the Court ruling would be given in the judgment; however, in the light

    of the comprehensive plea explanation and accompanying admissions made by the

    accused persons, read with the post-mortem report admitted into evidence, I do not

    deem it necessary to deal with the application in any detail. Suffice it to say, that the

    Court was satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out against both the

    accused, on which they had a case to answer. It must be borne in mind that each case

    must be considered on its own merits and circumstances and that the court

    considering the application, has a discretion to acquit the accused at the close of the

    State case (S v Nakale and Others, 2006 (2) NR 455 (HC)).

    [11] The evidence of accused no. 1 amounts to the following: When paid his

    fortnightly salary by the deceased on Friday, 15 October 2005, accused no. 1 was

    dissatisfied because the deceased deducted a loan or an advance on his salary, from

    his monthly pay. He left the same day for Otavi, where he also has a home. There he

    met with his co-accused the next day (16th) and together they decided to return to the

    deceaseds farm where they would steal money from her the money she earlier

    refused to give him. They arrived on the farm at around 22h00 and gained access by

    breaking the windowpane of the store room from where they proceeded to the

    deceaseds bedroom, where they found her asleep. By then he had already cut the

    telephone lines in the lounge with a knife he had on him. They switched on the bed-

    lamp and started looking for money, but as there was none to be found (except for the

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    N$4-80 in the safe), they started collecting things from the room like blankets; linen;

    curtains and other stuff he was unable to recall. They broke open a safe in the

    bedroom with a screwdriver (one they brought along), from which they took a small

    pistol and the cash. He said that through all this the deceased did not wake up. This

    only happened as they were about to leave the room, and as she started screaming,

    they used a petty-coat (night dress) which was pulled over her face (and tied on the

    back of the head). He said he made sure that the holes in this garment were

    positioned (over the nose) in such a way that the deceased could still breath. It was

    however pulled tightly over her mouth, preventing her from screaming. Although

    there was a scuffle between them, as the deceased had put up resistance, he denied

    that she was harmed in any way. When asked to explain the bruises visible on the

    deceaseds body as depicted in Exhibit F, photo 8, he said that these could have

    been caused at the time when they tried to hold her hands down, when covering her

    face. Her hands and feet were thereafter tied together with a string of wool. She

    stopped screaming after she was muzzled, and although she was moving her arms

    attempting to free herself, she was unsuccessful. Regarding the position of the

    deceased at the time when they left the room, the accused said that she was lying in

    the same position on the bed, as depicted in photos 4 6 of Exhibit F. In other

    words, she was found dead in the same position than what they had left her in i.e.

    lying on her left side with her head covered, and her hands and legs tied together on

    the front.

    They loaded everything onto two bicycles they had come with and returned to Otavi.

    They were arrested in Otavi the following day after the police tracked them down.

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    [12] In cross-examination it became evident that the accused persons acted with

    common purpose from the planning stages and throughout the commission of the

    crime. This aspect of accused no. 1s evidence supports each accuseds plea

    explanation and was also not challenged by second accused during the trial.

    Accordingly, I find that the accused persons, when deciding to go to the farm of the

    deceased with the intention of committing a crime, and all subsequent acts taken by

    them in achieving their aim, have throughout, acted with common purpose.

    [13] The accused only admitted having stolen from the deceased after tying her up,

    but disputed having had the intention to kill; either in the form ofdolus directus or

    indirectus. It was argued on their behalf that, because the cause of death could not be

    medically determined, that therefore, there was no causal link between their conduct

    and the deceaseds death. This aspect will be discussed in more detail later.

    [14] Both accused, have offered pleas of guilty on the offence of culpable homicide,

    a competent verdict on a charge of murder. By inference, this would imply that they

    have acknowledged that death ensued as a result of their negligence; despite the cause

    of death not being determined during an autopsy performed by Dr. Shangula on the

    deceaseds body. Although the actual cause of death is unknown and not within the

    accused persons knowledge, they were entitled to make this admission because they

    had legal representation. Their legal representative, undoubtedly, would have advised

    them of the consequences when tendering a plea of guilty on a lesser offence and

    making incriminating admissions about facts outside their knowledge; thereby

    accepting and admitting that there is a connection between their actions and the

    ensuing death of their victim. In principle there can be no objection against such

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    practice, as accused persons and legal representatives often admit facts not within

    their personal knowledge: because, for example, they know that the State could prove

    it without difficulty i.e. laboratory results of samples taken.

    [15] Where the State in the present case is not in the position to prove the actual

    cause of death, could the accused (through counsel), lawfully, still have made the

    admissions (pertaining to causation) as they did? I believe they could as long as it is

    supported by evidence based on proved facts. I shall therefore approach the

    admissions made by the accused persons on that point, with full regard to all the

    evidence adduced.

    [16] In view of first accuseds evidence, that during the whole incident no physical

    harm was done to the deceased, except for holding her on her hands whilst tying her

    up, it would, at this juncture, require proper scrutiny of the post-mortem report, in

    order to see what injuries were inflicted (if any), and the nature thereof. Dependent

    on that finding, the Court would be entitled to draw inferences, but only after

    satisfying the two cardinal rules of logic referred to in R v Blom1, namely:

    (1) The inferences sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts.

    If it is not, then the inference cannot be drawn.

    (2) The proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference

    from them save the one to be drawn. If they do not exclude other reasonable

    inferences, then there must be doubt whether the inferences sought to be drawn

    is correct.

    1 1939 AD 188.

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    [17] From the Medico-Legal Post-Mortem Examination report compiled on 18

    October 2005, by the late Dr. Shangula, on the body of Ruth Elfriede Will, the

    following appears:

    The chief post-mortem findings are:-

    Bruises on the chin and jaw margin;

    Bruises of both orbitals;

    Fractured ribs left side of the thoracic cage;

    Body with putrefaction2;

    Atherosclerotic changes of the coronary arteries and aortha;

    Kidneys with glandular surfaces;

    A pace-maker of the heart;

    Flaccid body.

    Cause of death:-

    Undetermined at autopsy;

    Decomposed body.

    [18] Other significant observations made on the body are the following:

    External appearances:- both eye orbitals swollen and red, like a hematoma; three

    bruises on and above the lower jaw, on both sides of the face; swollen lips; marks

    (depressions) on the right wrist; hypostasis3 on the left lateral side; the skin slips off

    2 Decay with a foul smell.3 Settling of fluid in an organ or other part of the body as a result of poor circulation.

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    easily on touch; bruises like bleeding on the frontal and left parietal and temporal

    area; there were no bruise marks on the skin of the neck.

    Internal appearances:- the left thyroid gland showed bruise-like marks; rib fractures

    on left side, T4 T8 fractured; haemorrhage on the posterior surface of the

    oesophagus4; lungs and heart with putrefaction; left coronary only sixty percent

    patent; extensive plaques embedded in the ascendance and peritoneal aspect of the

    aorta; and empty stomach.

    [19] Despite, according to accused no.1, of their intentions not to cause any physical

    harm to the deceased, he conceded that the bruises visible on the deceaseds face as

    depicted in the photo plan, could have been inflicted whilst she was resisting their

    effort to pull the garment over her head and fastening it tightly over her mouth,

    preventing her from screaming. He claims that, besides tying the deceaseds hands

    and feet together, no further harm was done to her. This explanation, however, is

    inconsistent with findings that both eye orbitals were swollen with signs of a

    hematoma; bruises like bleeding on the head; bruise marks on the left thyroid gland;

    and particularly, the fracturing of the ribs. The presence of these injuries is significant

    of an assault perpetrated on the deceased; exceeding the degree of force allegedly

    applied by the accused persons when tying up the deceased. Judging from the

    fractured ribs, it would appear that, at least, moderate force was applied to the upper

    body; and as for the head injuries and bruising of the thyroid gland, this equally points

    at blunt trauma directed at the head and throat, respectively. The exactquantum of

    that force, however, is unknown.

    4 Gullet.

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    [20] It seems highly unlikely that the totality of these injuries would have been

    inflicted during the stage when the deceased was held on her hands whilst being

    blindfolded even in circumstances where she had put up resistance. Hence, it seems

    to me, based on the nature of the injuries observed on the deceaseds body during a

    post-mortem examination, inevitable to come to the conclusion that an assault, during

    which (at least) moderate force was applied to different aspects of the deceaseds

    body, was committed by the two accused persons. When applying the two cardinal

    rules of logic referred to in the Blom case(supra), this is the only reasonable inference

    to draw from the proved facts. I accordingly reject the evidence of accused no. 1 as

    far as it is in conflict with this finding and accordingly find that the accused, acting

    with common purpose, unlawfully assaulted the deceased, inflicting the injuries as

    noted in the post-mortem report.

    [21] I now turn to consider whether there is a causal link (nexus) between the assault

    and subsequent death of the deceased. This is generally referred to as causation. In

    materially defined crimes like murder and culpable homicide, the State must prove

    beyond reasonable doubt that there is a causal link between the accuseds act and the

    prohibited situation i.e. his victims death. The courts have laid down certain broad

    principles regarding the determination of a causal link, and confirmed that two

    requirements must be met: (i) whether there was a factual causation; and (ii) whether

    there was a legal causation (S v Daniels en n Ander)5.

    [22] In order to establish whether an accused persons act is a factual cause of the

    deceaseds death in a specific case, all the relevant facts and circumstances of that

    case must be investigated, and the court must decide, with the aid of its own5 1983 (3) SA 275 (A).

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    knowledge and experience, whether the deceaseds death flowed from the accuseds

    conduct. Once concluded that there is indeed a factual cause of the situation (death),

    it is useful to apply a formula known as condition sine qua non, to check whether the

    conclusion reached, is correct. This formula requires answering the question: what

    would have happened if the accused persons conduct had not taken place; would the

    result (death) nevertheless ensue? It must be remembered that this is a checking

    formula or theory, and not a test. InSnyman: Criminal Law6the learned author says:

    One first decides on the strength of all the facts whether the conduct is the cause of

    Ys death, and only after concluding that it is, does one declare that the conduct was

    a conditio sine qua non of death. One cannot determine whether the conduct is a

    conditio sine qua non of the result before deciding that there is a causal connection.

    [23] It would obviously require thorough investigation to reveal all the facts

    relevant, and through ones (own) knowledge and experience, this would lead one to

    conclude that one situation flows from another.

    [24] When determining, in the present case, whether the actions of the accused

    persons have caused the death of the deceased, regard must be had to the absence of

    medical evidence regarding the cause of death which, as would appear from the post-

    mortem report, was not determinable because of decomposition of the body that had

    set in, prior to the autopsy being performed. Because of this phenomenon (the exact

    cause of death not being determined), Mr. Shakumu argued that, in the circumstances,

    a causal connection could not be made between the actions of the accused persons and

    6 Fourth Edition at 77.

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    the deceaseds death; therefore, the Court cannot convict on either murder or culpable

    homicide.

    [25] I do not agree. Had that been the case it would create the illogical and

    intolerable situation that, where someone kills another and disposes of the body in

    such a manner that it afterwards becomes impossible to determine the exact cause of

    death, then he/she cannot be convicted of murder. Murder is the unlawful and

    intentional causing of the death of another human being irrespective of the manner

    employed, and what the actual cause of death was. A conviction on a charge of

    murder will be secured if the State proves: (a) causing the death (b) of another person

    (c) unlawfully and (d) intentionally.7 In the absence of evidence as to the actual cause

    of death, the court would be required to consider the circumstantial evidence and

    proved facts; from which it may draw inferences in its endeavour of ascertaining, on

    the facts, whether the deceaseds death was a consequence of the accused persons

    actions or not.

    [26] The Court has already concluded hereinbefore that an assault was perpetrated

    on the deceased; and from the wounds it was clear that, besides from covering the

    deceaseds head and tying her hands and feet, force was applied to the upper body.

    What the exact nature and extent of the force was, is unknown; however, it was

    enough to fracture several ribs and cause internal bruising of the throat (thyroid

    gland), haemorrhage on the posterior surface of the gullet, and several bruises on the

    face and head in the temporal area. The tying together of the hands and feet

    prevented the deceased from moving; something confirmed by accused no. 1, who

    said that the deceased, when found dead the following day, was lying in the exact7Snyman (supra) at 421

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    same position than when they had left the previous night. The deceaseds head was

    covered with a nightdress, pulled over her head and tightly fastened over the mouth,

    preventing her from screaming any further. Accused no. 1 testified that it was tightly

    tied over the mouth, but not over the nose, allowing the deceased to breath freely.

    Exactly how this was achieved bearing in mind that it was tight over the mouth

    accused was unable to explain. He also claimed to have taken precautionary measures

    by positioning the nightdress over the deceaseds face, in such a way that airflow was

    not impaired as she could breathe through holes in the night dress. The garment,

    unfortunately, is not before us so that the Court could make its own observations on it.

    [27] I pause here briefly, to consider the evidence of accused no. 1 pertaining to the

    covering of the deceaseds head and that she, according to him, could still freely

    breathe thereafter. The evidence of Mr. Falk was that the garment wasvery tight and

    covered the whole head, which evidence was not challenged. That the whole face was

    covered is evident from photos 4 6 of Exhibit F. Photo 6 depicts a front view of

    the deceased when found with the garment covering her face; from which it is clear

    that there are no holes visible in the garment. It might be that accused no. 1 referred

    to the fabric itself which is unlikely, for he specifically positionedthe holes in such

    a way that the deceased could breathe. For reasons giveninfra, I do not find accused

    no. 1 to have been honest in all aspects of his testimony; and, judging from the

    differences between what he initially said, and what he later on testified, it seems

    inescapable to conclude that his testimony was rather self-serving and not in all

    material respects, the truth.

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    [28] Although one would not be able to say on the facts before the Court that the

    garment was so tightly tied around the head that it completely prevented the deceased

    from breathing; it is, however, clear that it must have caused some degree of

    obstruction in the deceaseds breathing. When considered together with the condition

    of poor health the deceased was in at the time, this could have contributed to her

    eventual death. There is a material difference between the observations made on the

    deceased by each accused, during the time when they were still on the scene.

    According to accused no. 1 she was still alive and trying to free herself; whereas

    second accused, during the s 119 proceedings, told the court that the deceased died

    in our presence and we left her there. When testifying, first accused did not

    challenge the correctness of those proceedings and until shown otherwise on a balance

    of probabilities, an admission is prima facie proof (against its maker). Thus, on

    accused no. 2s version the deceased died soon after she was tied up with her face

    covered. That would be consistent with the (same) lying position the deceased was

    found in the next morning. The proximity between the assault and ensuing death is a

    material factor when deciding factual causation; and from what second accused said,

    death ensued soon after they had put the deceased out of action.

    [29] I have already alluded to the deceaseds advanced age and that she was in ill

    health. Her son described her as a very sickly person, suffering from her heart and

    high blood pressure; which is confirmed by the fact that she had a heart pace-maker

    implanted about three years before her death. In view of her poor health, what are the

    chances that the deceased died of natural causes? That, in my view, would be mere

    speculation, as there is no evidence before the Court to support such allegation and

    the Court cannot base its decisions and findings on conjecture. The fact that the

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    deceased suffered from a heart ailment does not justify a conclusion that therefore,

    she must have died from natural causes.

    [30] When the Court considers the extent of the assault perpetrated on the deceased;

    her advanced age and her being of poor health; that she was securely fastened to such

    an extent that she could not move any of her limbs; that she had fractured ribs and

    was left behind (on first accuseds version) helpless with a garment tightly pulled over

    her head and most probably impairing her breathing; the only reasonable conclusion

    to reach in these circumstances is: that where there is insufficient proof to conclude

    that a single factor had independently caused the deceaseds death i.e. suffocation, the

    influence and effect of each of these factors jointly contributed to, and resulted in

    death.

    [31] I accordingly find that the conduct of the accused, who throughout acted with

    common purpose, have caused the deceaseds death. Thus, when applying the

    formula to this finding, it can be said that their conduct was a condition sine qua non

    of the death of the deceased.

    [32] Once the court determines that there is factual causation that is not the end, as

    the court in its investigation into the existence of a causal link, must still investigate

    legal causation; the application of some criterion which would limit the wide ambit of

    factual causation and the operation of the conditio sine qua non theory. Legal

    causation is described by Snyman (supra) at 79 as follows:

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    it must be clear that the act is not merely a factual, but also a legal cause of the

    situation. This means that the act must qualify as a cause of the forbidden result not

    only to the criteria of natural science or ones ordinary experience, but also to the

    criteria applied by the law. The legal criteria are narrower than those applied to

    determine factual causation; they are based upon normative value judgments or

    policy considerations, on questions such as whether it is reasonable or just to regard

    the act as a cause of the forbidden situation. Only an act which is a factual cause of

    the situation can qualify as a legal cause thereof.

    From the courts point of view it is accepted that a finding of causation rests upon

    both factual and legal causation.8 It had been said that the overriding consideration in

    the determination of legal causation, where an act was found to be a factual cause of

    the prohibited situation (i.e. death), is the demands of fairness and justness. When

    ascertaining what would be a fair and just conclusion, the court may have regard to

    different theories of legal causation, of which the following are the most important

    ones: the individualisation theory9; the theory of adequate causation10; and the

    critetion ofnovus actus interveniens.11

    [33] The Court has already found that there was no single/direct/substantive act

    which resulted in death and which therefore could be singled out as the legal cause. It

    found that there was adequate relationship between the accused persons conduct and

    death of the deceased. The coincidences of different factors were such that death

    could be expected; conduct for which the accused should be held accountable.

    8S v Daniels 1983 (3) SA 275 (A) at 325A, 331C-D; S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) 39-40.9 Where only one single act or condition is singled out as the legal cause.10

    Snyman (supra) at 81 where an act is a legal cause of a situation if, according to human experience,in the normal course of events, the act has the tendency to bring about that type of situation.11 A new intervening event.

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    Furthermore, there is no evidence pointing towards a new intervening event (novus

    actus interveniens).

    [34] Therefore, I am satisfied that the conduct of the accused persons on the night in

    question, is both the factual and legal cause of the death of the deceased in this case,

    and that there is a causal link between their conduct and the deceaseds death. I

    accordingly so find.

    [35] Having found that the accused have caused the death of another human being it

    remains to be considered whether their conduct was unlawful and intentional. There

    can be no doubt that their actions were unlawful. To constitute murder it had to be

    proved that the accused acted with intent either in the form ofdolus directus or

    dolus eventualis or, whether they lacked intent and caused the deceaseds death

    negligently; an instance in which they would only be guilty of culpable homicide.

    [36] Mr.Lisulo, for the State, argued that on the facts, the Court should find that the

    accused acted with direct intent (dolus directus) when assaulting the deceased;

    alternatively, that they foresaw the consequences of their conduct and stood reckless

    thereto (dolus eventualis). Mr.Shakumu, on the other hand, argued that the accused

    should only be convicted of assault. His submission was based on the assumption that

    the State failed to establish a causal link between their conduct and the death of the

    deceased. With causation duly established, this argument is without merit.

    [37] It was submitted on behalf of the accused persons that they did not act with

    direct intent; because, if they had the intention of murdering the deceased there and

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    then, they could easily have strangled or killed her in another manner but instead,

    they decided to tie her up. There seems to be merit in this argument and there is

    nothing evident from the manner in which they committed the assault on the deceased

    that they had acted with direct intent to kill.

    [38] Did the accused, however, when they so acted, and without that being their

    main aim, subjectively foresee the possibility that, from their conduct towards the

    deceased in order to achieve stealing from her, death may ensue; and reconciled

    themselves with this possibility? Here the test is purely subjective and the Court must

    determine what the states of mind of the accused were at the time when they

    perpetrated the assault on the deceased.

    [39] In this regard Ackermann, AJA inS v Van Wyk12stated:

    The State is, from the nature of things, seldom able to offer direct evidence of the

    accuseds state of mind at the time of assaulting the deceased and must therefore rely

    on inferences to be drawn from the circumstances of the assault (including its nature

    and duration), the nature of any weapons used and the nature, position and extent of

    the injuries inflicted. These must in turn be weighed up against any other

    circumstances (such as the consumption of drugs or alcohol) which may indicate that

    the accused did not foresee the consequences of his actions. This does not involve

    any piecemeal assessment or process of reasoning. All the relevant facts which bear

    on the accuseds state of mind and intention must be cumulatively assessed and a

    conclusion reached as to whether an inference beyond reasonable doubt can be

    drawn from these facts that the accused actually considered it a reasonable

    12 1992 (1) SACR 147 (Nm) at 161d-g

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    possibility that the deceased could die from the assault but, reckless as to such fatal

    possibility, embarked on or persisted with the assault. (Emphasis provided)

    [40] From accused no. 1s testimony it is clear that he indeed foresaw that death may

    ensue when he pulled the garment over the deceaseds head; and therefore positioned

    the holes in the garment in such a way over the nose, to ensure that the deceased

    could still breathe. However, as stated earlier herein, there were no visible holes in

    the garment and therefore, the alleged precautionary measures taken, are simply not

    true; it rather has the appearance of an afterthought. The manner in which the

    garment was found tightly pulled over the head also contradicts accuseds version that

    it was loosely across the nose. It seems highly unlikely that the garment as he

    claimed was taut across the mouth but not across the nose, immediately above. It is

    neither evident from the photos; nor has the accused satisfactorily explained

    otherwise.

    [41] There is a material difference between the initial reasons advanced by the

    accused persons as to why the deceased was tied up with her head covered, and the

    testimony of accused no. 1. To the magistrate both materially gave the same

    explanation i.e. that they tied the deceased in order to steal from her. This

    explanation is also consistent with what is stated in their reply to the States Plea-trial

    Memorandum namely, that the deceased was first tied up before they took the goods.

    Accused no. 1 gave conflicting versions when asked to explain why the deceaseds

    head was covered, by first saying that it was so that she could notrecognise him;

    however, afterwards he said that the deceased would have been able to recognise him

    (when she woke up) because the bed-lamp was on. On inquiring as to the reason for

    covering her face only afterhe was probably identified by the deceased, he said that

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    he did not want her to see him again, when taking the stolen items. There is simply

    no logic in this explanation, which is also contradictory to the plea explanation given

    at the beginning of the trial when they said that they were unable to describe the items

    they tookas it was dark. It would have made sense had they first put the deceased out

    of action and covered her face in darkness, preventing her from identifying them,

    before starting their search for money. That, however, would imply that the

    deceaseds head was covered in circumstances where it was notpossible to make the

    observations on the fabric pulled over the deceaseds head; neither to position it over

    the nose as described by first accused.

    [42] It was furthermore accused no. 1s evidence that they switched on the light

    when they entered the bedroom, whereafter they searched for money; broke open the

    safe and took the items without waking the deceased. It was only upon leaving the

    room that she woke up and they then decided to tie her up. I find this explanation

    highly improbable because, judging from the state the room was found in the next

    morning, with drawers and items lying around on the floor after being rummaged, as

    depicted on the photos, I am not convinced that all this took place in absolute silence

    and without waking the deceased especially where they had to forcefully open the

    safe, standing in the same room. In the circumstances, it would rather appear that, in

    order to achieve this, they first had to tie up the deceased and cover her head as

    admitted when giving their pleas in terms of s 119 before rummaging the room.

    [43] When assessing the contradictions and improbabilities in the evidence of

    accused no. 1, as regards their conduct once inside the house and the sequence of

    events which took place thereafter, the inescapable conclusion that one reaches is, that

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    first accused did not speak the truth and deliberately tried to mislead the Court by

    fabricating evidence, whereby he attempted to prevent the Court from establishing the

    truth. This Court must therefore be cautious in its evaluation of his evidence and little

    weight (if any) should be given thereto where uncorroborated and in conflict with

    reasonable inferences this Court is capable of drawing from the proved facts.

    [44] Besides tying up the deceased and covering her face, she was also assaulted. I

    have already dealt with the extent of the injuries inflicted during the assault supra and

    there is no need to repeat what was stated earlier herein. From the injuries sustained,

    the broken ribs appear to have been the most serious injury; and a factor to be taken

    into account when adjudging whether the possibility of death ensuing, was foreseen

    by the accused persons. Another crucial factor is the age and accompanying

    vulnerability of the deceased. Both the accused persons had worked for the deceased

    and therefore would have been familiar with her circumstances. Notwithstanding, it

    cannot be said that therefore, they also knew about her medical condition. However,

    it is common knowledge that with aging, the human body becomes weaker and there

    is no reason to believe that a different situation prevailed in the present case. The

    deceased was eighty-one years of age and moreover sickly. Whereas both the accused

    had been in her employment, either at the time of the incident, or shortly before, they

    must have made their own observations on the strengths of the deceased and her

    vulnerability. There can be little doubt that the deceased was at a vulnerable stage of

    her life and in all probability, prone to readily succumb, in circumstances which may

    not necessarily pose a threat to a younger and healthy person. This is a factor the

    accused persons, subjectively, must have appreciated.

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    [45] Against this backdrop, the deceased was tied up with a garment tightly tied

    around her head and left behind alone, incapable of freeing herself from the

    uncomfortable position she was in. By leaving the deceased injured and helpless (on

    first accuseds version), this definitely posed a risk to her life. By tying her up and

    cutting the telephone lines, the accused effectively preventing the deceased from

    obtaining assistance after the assault if she at all was capable thereof and thus

    increased the risk of death. InS v Chimbamba and Another13 at 808H-809A the

    following was said:

    Applying general principles, there can be no doubt at all that the crime of murder is

    committed if a person in need of assistance is intentionally prevented from obtaining

    it and in the result dies, or dies earlier than he or she would otherwise have done.

    This, however, is a quite separate and distinct basis of liability from that relied upon

    in the indictment and no amendment of the indictment was applied for at any stage in

    the proceedings. It is unthinkable that an accused person should be found guilty of

    murder on a basis which has never been raised. (Emphasis provided)

    In casu, it was not alleged by the State in the indictment that the murder, for which

    the accused persons stand charged, is (also) based on the fact that the accused persons

    prevented the deceased from obtaining assistance. The reason, I believe, lies therein

    that the time of death is unknown and that second accused in his s 119 plea

    explanation said that the deceased died whilst they were still inside the room. In this

    regard the present facts although otherwise very similar to the Chimbamba case,

    differ materially and do not assist the State.

    13 1977 (4) SA (R.AD)

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    [46] In view of what is stated above, can it be said that both accused who have

    acted in concert throughout foresaw that death may reasonably ensue? Putting it

    differently, did the accused persons subjectively appreciate that there is a reasonable

    possibility that death will ensue? There can be little doubt that the accused manifested

    a reckless indifference as to the well-being of the deceased. When cumulatively

    assessing all relevant facts, which bear on the accused persons states of mind and

    their intention when entering the deceaseds house and the subsequent assault

    perpetrated on her, the question must be answered in the affirmative. They indeed

    foresaw the reasonable possibility of death ensuing and associated themselves with

    that possibility. Accordingly, both accused stand to be convicted of murder with

    intent, in the form ofdolus eventualis.

    [47] I turn to consider the charge in count 2, namely, housebreaking with intent to

    rob and robbery. It is common cause that the accused persons unlawfully gained

    access into the house by breaking a window with intent to commit a crime. They

    knew that the deceased was at home and must have foreseen that there was a

    reasonable possibility of her putting up resistance when becoming aware of their

    presence. This is something they must have appreciated prior to their departure to the

    farm. That they anticipated resistance seems to be fortified by their decision to cut the

    telephone lines even before entering the bedroom. The anticipated resistance may

    also explain why they carried a knife with them. Despite accused no. 1s testimony

    that they only intended stealing, the Court is satisfied that they went to the deceaseds

    farm with the foresight that they may reasonably encounter resistance, but associated

    themselves with such possibility and proceeded entering the house on that basis.

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    That, on the basis ofdolus eventualis, constitutes the crime of housebreaking with

    intent to rob.

    [48] It is common cause that the deceased was forced into submission and her

    property stolen. This Court, for reasons set out hereinbefore, already found first

    accuseds evidence that they had only tied up the complainant aftertaking the stolen

    items, as highly improbable and as such, unreliable.

    [49] The definition of the crime of robbery as defined bySnyman (supra) at 506 is:

    (T)heft of property by unlawfully and intentionally using

    (a) violence to take the property from somebody else or

    (b) threats of violence to induce the possessor of the property to submit to

    the taking of the property.

    [50] I shall briefly discuss the arguments advanced by Mr.Shakumu as to why, in his

    view, robbery was not committed.

    Firstly, that although bruises are visible on the deceaseds face, it cannot, in the

    absence of expert evidence be found that these came as a result by the application of

    force by the accused persons. With this argument sight is clearly lost of first

    accuseds explanation of the facial injuries, namely, that they could have been caused

    when they held the deceased on her hands and tried to cover her face. The required

    violence may be slight and the mere holding of her hands, in these circumstances, was

    sufficient to constitute an assault on a charge of robbery; more so where serious

    injuries, such as broken ribs, were inflicted.

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    Secondly, that the crime of robbery required a form of resistance on the part of the

    victim against the taking of the property, and in casu, there is no evidence that the

    accused made demands that the deceased should release the property and that she

    resisted. In other words, the violence did not precede the taking. This argument is

    based on the evidence of first accused. With respect, I find this contention stupefying.

    There was no need for the accused persons to make any demands as they eliminated

    any possible intervention on the deceaseds part by tying her up, even before she

    could do anything; and, as already stated, she hadput up resistance! The accused

    tried to create the impression and that is what was argued that the crime of theft

    was already completed when they turned back to tie up the deceased. At that stage

    they were carrying the loot and were still inside the same room from where they took

    it. In order to tie her up, they certainly had to put it down and only carried it outside

    aftertying up the deceased. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely that the groceries

    they admitted having taken, was part of the loot found in the bedroom. Thus, some

    items must have been taken from elsewhere in the house on their way out something

    accused no. 1 was not willing to admit and unable to explain. Why would that not

    constitute robbery, one may ask?

    [51] It should be noted that the general rule that the violence must precede the

    taking, must be qualified, and in this regard the learned authorSnyman14 (supra)

    states:

    (R)obbery may in certain circumstances be committed even though the violence

    follows the completion of the theft. This will be the case if, having regard to the time

    and place of Xs act, there is such a close link between the theft and the violence that

    14 p 508.

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    they may be regarded as connecting components of one and the same action. Thus in

    Yolelo15X was found in possession of Ys property before he could leave Ys house.

    Xs ensuing assault on Y was regarded as so closely connected with the process of

    taking the property that X was convicted of robbery.

    [52] I find counsels approach artificial and without merit. The accused persons

    entered the house with the intention of robbing the deceased and thereafter used

    violence to overcome any resistance from her side. Even on the version of the

    accused which the Court found to be improbable the taking of the goods and the

    ensuing assault are so closely connected, that it satisfies the definition of robbery.

    The Court is accordingly satisfied that the offence of housebreaking with intent to rob

    and robbery was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

    [53] Second accused opted to remain silent, which was his Constitutional right;

    however, his decision is not without consequence.

    In S v Katari,16Maritz, J (as he then was) made the following remarks, which seem

    worthwhile restating:

    It is trite that an accused cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself (art

    12(1)(f) of the Namibian Constitution) and has the right to be presumed innocent

    until proven guilty according to law (art 12(1)(d) of the Constitution). The

    entrenchment of those rights does not mean that an accused's election to remain

    silent in the face of incriminating evidence against him is without consequence in the

    overall assessment of the evidence by the court. In Osman and Another v Attorney-

    15 1981 (1) SA 1002 (A).16 2006 (1) NR 205 (HC) at 209I-210D

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    General, Transvaal1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC) (1998 (2) SACR 493 at 501b-d) Madala

    J said the following in this regard (at 1232E-G):

    '[22] Our legal system is an adversarial one. Once the prosecution has

    produced evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, an accused who

    fails to produce evidence to rebut that case is at risk. The failure to testify

    does not relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove guilt beyond reasonable

    doubt. An accused, however, always runs the risk that absent any rebuttal,

    the prosecution's case may be sufficient to prove the elements of the offence.

    The fact that an accused has to make such an election is not a breach of the

    right to silence. If the right to silence were to be so interpreted, it would

    destroy the fundamental nature of our adversarial system of criminal

    justice.'

    And further at 210F-G:

    When the State has established a prima facie case against an accused which

    remains uncontradicted, the court may, unless the accused's silence is reasonably

    explicable on other grounds, in appropriate circumstances conclude that the prima

    facie evidence has become conclusive of his or her guilt (see S v Scholtz 1996 (2)

    SACR 40 (NC)).

    See also: Schwikkard, Van der Merwe: Principles of Evidence, Second Ed. at 30 9(p

    510 513.

    [54] In casu, second accuseds failure to respond to the self-incriminating

    admissions made in the s 119 proceedings; his plea explanation at the start of the trial

    and the admissions contained therein; as well as the undisputed evidence of the first

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    accused, in my view, sufficiently constitutes prima facie evidence, justifying a

    conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to convict him on both charges.

    [55] Aggravating circumstances, as defined in s 1 of the Act, in relation to-

    (a) any offence, whether under the common law or a statutory provision, of

    housebreaking or attempted housebreaking with intent to commit an offence,

    means-

    (i) the possession of a dangerous weapon ;or

    (ii) the commission of an assault or a threat to commit an assault, by the

    offender or an accomplice on the occasion when the offence is

    committed, whether before or during or after the commission of the

    offence;

    (b) robbery or attempted robbery, means-

    (i) the wielding of a fire-arm or any other dangerous weapon;

    (ii) the infliction of grievous bodily harm; or

    (iii) a threat to inflict grievous bodily harm,

    by the offender or an accomplice on the occasion when the offence is

    committed, whether before or during or after the commission of the

    offence; (Emphasis provided)

    From the above quoted definition it is abundantly clear that in respect of count 2, the crime

    was committed with aggravating circumstances, as defined in the Act. I accordingly so find.

    [56] In the result, the Courts verdict is:

    1. Count 1 Murder : Both accused: Guilty

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    2. Count 2 Housebreaking with intent to rob and robbery (with

    aggravating circumstances): Both accused: Guilty

    ____________________________

    LIEBENBERG, J

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    ON BEHALF OF BOTH ACCUSED

    Instructed by: Directorate: Lega

    ON BEHALF OF THE STATE M

    Instructed by: Office of the Prosecutor-General

    34