reviewer nat res law

7/28/2019 Reviewer Nat Res Law

1/25

Environment and Natural Resources

ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and

wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the

people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the under-

privileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and

agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which

are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises

against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum

opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective

organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of

potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned bythe State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The

exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of

the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or

production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of

whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,

renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of

water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive

economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as

cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and

lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial

assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral

oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic

growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and

use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within

thirty days from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national

parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which

they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private

corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a

period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one

thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or

acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.


2/25


Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the

requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain

which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and

national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks

shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for

such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and

programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their

economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in

determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common

good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations,

shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to

promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to

individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by

law.

Section 9. The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the

President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and

local government units, recommend to Congress, and implement continuing integrated and coordinated

programs and policies for national development.

Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall function as the

independent planning agency of the government.

Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national

interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per

centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,

certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and

operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall

give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in

accordance with its national goals and priorities.

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall

be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of

the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise,

certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any

such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or


3/25


repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in

public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public

utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing

officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.

Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally

produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and

arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists,

entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all

fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer

for the national benefit.

The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by

law.

Section 15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives asinstruments for social justice and economic development.

Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation

of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special

charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the

emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any

privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries

and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to beoperated by the Government.

Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No

combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose

governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of

whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities

as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and

credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be

provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions.

Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines operating under existing laws, shall

function as the central monetary authority.

Section 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary

authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to

the public.

Section 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be considered inimical to

the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law.


4/25


Preliminary Cases:

Republic v. Pagadian

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the DENR, executed an Industrial Forest Management

Agreement (IFMA), with Pagadian City Timber, for the former to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forestarea covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of

Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-

sharing scheme. The Pagadians required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) was

approved by the DENR. But, the Subanen Tribe complained that respondents failed to implement the CDMP,

disrespected their rights as indigenous people and employed armed men. This prompted DENR to issue an

order creating a regional team to evaluate and assess the IFMA. The DENR requested for a representative of

Pagadian to appear before them, upon compliance with which, a conference was held between the parties and

they found inventoried various equipment, seedlings, infrastructures, etc. and found that the area covered was

beyond that stipulated in the IFMA. An evaluation team was dispatched to the area concerned for inspection and

assessment, in the presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. In

the conduct of the same, the team found that the mango seedlings are not satisfactory and they had failed to

develop the area. Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and the IFMA holder

where the tentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented to the

body. On the basis of their findings, the team required Pagadian to explain why they failed to comply with the

CDMP. But, because of the influx of more complaints from the locals, DENR issued notice of cancellation to

Pagadian because of their failure to comply with the agreement. This was objected to by respondent and appeal

was made to the Office of the President. The order of cancellation was affirmed by the OP, but was reversed by

the CA.

Issues: W/N the IFMA is a privilege granted by the State, which may be revoked without violating the non-

impairment clause.

Held: Yes. The IFMA is a timber license, and as such, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked in the

present case. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can

hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not

vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products

therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national

interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agree with the Office

of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it are not absolute. All Filipino

citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under Section 16,[29] Article II of

the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment,

particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the

State.The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primarygovernment agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the

country's environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of

the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law

in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future

generations of Filipinos." Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and

common interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory power of the State, in this case through the

DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are

strictly and faithfully complied with. The CA decision is reversed and set aside, and the decision of the Office of

the President is reinstated.


5/25


DENR et al VS. YAP et alG.R. No. 167707October 8, 2008

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,

among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the

administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA

Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap,

Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on

their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their

predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in

Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and

paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing

Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone,

it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to havethe lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay

Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public

forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as

amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3 -

82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised

Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,

whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and

PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In

2004, the appellate court affirmed in totothe RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was

similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly

agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an

original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the

Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continuedpossession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in

Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.


6/25


Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior

to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.

Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines apublic forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been

the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest

purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,

are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its

effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification

modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with

one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064

of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these

grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State

ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such

as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of

Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the

government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and

disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or

claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification

was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of

Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and

disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and

disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or

both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064.

This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

NOTES:

1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided

at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,

timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable

cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act

No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department,

through the President, the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable,

mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the

classification of lands of the public domain.

2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value

for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge

that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to

presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the

contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land

must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be

settled by the proof in each particular case


7/25


Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain

into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of

wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.The discussion in Heirs of

Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because

loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually

be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to

be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other

trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of

its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and

until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of

the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification

of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while

the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine

the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been

replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automaticallyconverted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation

of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster

from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this

mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not

necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take

steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for

original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or

to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in

the House of Representatives.

MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila BayG.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

FACTS:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners,for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete

plan of action for the purpose.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable

standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENRs Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that

water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform

content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200

MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90.


8/25


The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants]

resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine

life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to

restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent provisions of the

Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning

in general. They also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can becompelled by mandamus.

The CA sustained RTCs decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks outside of their

basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality

and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of

specific pollution incidents;

(2) Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in nature and can

be compelled by mandamus.

Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated to put up an

adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative

garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not

only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature

and can be compelled by mandamus.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would

yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform

certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the clean up, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the

Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. So, their functions being ministerial

in nature can be compelled by mandamus.

I. Regalian Doctrine Definition

Regalian Doctrine

All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces

of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources

are owned by the State.1

Basic in the law of natural resources is Jura Regalia or Regalian doctrine. Enshrined in the

Constitution, it simply means that all natural resources are owned by the State.

The case of Secretary of DENR, et. al. vs. Yap, et. al. G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008 explicitly

discusses this doctrine, to wit:

1Sec. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/#_ftn3


9/25


The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the

source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The

doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the

State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the

public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is

possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public

lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in

the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,

ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The

Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,

which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by

grant, belong to the public domain.

(Cases)

Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935(Land Titles and Deeds Native Title)

Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners

for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the

land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state.

Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles.

Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.

The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has

been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same

way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public l and.

There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a

claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an

exception to the theory of jura regalia.

Lee Hong Kok vs. DavidG.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUMOnly the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.

FACTS:
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/lee-hong-kok-vs-david.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/lee-hong-kok-vs-david.html


10/25


This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous

salesapplication. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance

of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David.

During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD:

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not

done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for

the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared asowners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.

The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the

law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside,

the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the

government.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of

sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The

use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In suchcapacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their

disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CAG.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS:

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two

parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on theground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable.

CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not land is alienable
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/sunbeam-convenience-foods-inc-vs-ca.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/sunbeam-convenience-foods-inc-vs-ca.html


11/25


HELD:

The SC affirmed.

Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of

the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable ordisposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the

confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an

official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public

domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the

property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER Co. INC.,ETC.

146 SCRA 509

DATE: December 29, 1986

FACTS:

The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision

of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of

five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the

indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This

was accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.

Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public alienable lands

in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively.

RULING:

HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Govt, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the

court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be

prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the

necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public

domain and was therefore classified as private property at the moment of the sale through the continuous and

unchallenged possession of the bona fide right to ownership from Meralcos predecessors -interest. There being

no law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court thus overturned the decision.


12/25


HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the Infiels since time immemorial

was effectively deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale,

ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in the

1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was held to be valid.

NO. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it purchased the land from the

Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private

corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied.

Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon CityG.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995

Regalian Doctrine

Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff

Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception

FACTS:

Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT.

Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired by

Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the

crime.

Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of

the Free Patent and the OCT.

Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest

land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already

alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139,

an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to

belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private

ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such classification,

the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and

ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/republic-vs-register-of-deeds-of-quezon.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/republic-vs-register-of-deeds-of-quezon.html


13/25


exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority

to do so.

Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the

presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.

In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome saidpresumption and to support his claim.

Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility

of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who

procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -- an intentional omission of fact

required by law.

Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the

unclassified forest lands.

II. Ownership, Use and enjoyment of natural resources

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of

potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by

the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The

exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of

the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or

production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of

whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,

renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of

water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive

economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as

cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and

lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial

assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral

oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic

growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and

use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within

thirty days from its execution.



Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the

national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least


14/25


sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may

prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation

and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall

give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and inaccordance with its national goals and priorities.

Cases:

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC. G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

Facts:

PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an

IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully

refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with

all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, asamended, into an IFMA. The cause of

action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the

government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into

an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue:

Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the

government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)

Held:

NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the

non-impairment clause is edifying.

We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property

or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No lawimpairing the

obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner,

be construed as a contractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its

concession areas. Such an interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP

of the sovereign power to control andsupervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural

resources in the area.

*Patr imony a wealth from t he ancestors transf erred to its success ors. Heri tage

National Patrimony


15/25


The concept ofnational patrimony refers to the store ofwealthor accumulated reserves of anational

economy. In addition to monetary reserves and other financial holdings, the concept's scope also encompasses

a nation's non-monetary wealth or reserves, such as its national monuments, cuisine, and artistic heritage.

National patrimony is related tobut not synonymous withthe concepts ofnational essence and national

heritage. National patrimony more strongly reflects a nation's assets (physical, intellectual, monetary, etc.) than

a spirit of cultural unity, although the assets themselves may indeed embody or contribute to such a unifyingspirit.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the

privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided

to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila

Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:

petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or

15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel

operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the

necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching

bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong

Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the

Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument

which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of

Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the

full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6

Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business

of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel

business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national

economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of

Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest

bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role asan authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning

of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the

Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and

protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel

Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts

and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wealthhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wealthhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wealthhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_economyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_economyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_economyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_economyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_economyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_economyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wealth


16/25


The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares

of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner

Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987

Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further

guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be

preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within

the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also

reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of

foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino

and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights,

privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner

is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding

and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

III. Lands of Public Domain

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national

parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which

they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private

corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a

period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one

thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or

acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the

requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain

which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Public dominion Not subject of the commerce of man; it cannot be attached; cannot acquire thru prescription

a) ownership by the State in that the Statehas control and administration; orb) ownership by the public in general.Public dominion Not subject of the commerce of man; it cannot be attached; cannot acquire thru

prescription

Three Kinds Of Property Of PublicDominion:

1) For public use roads, canals for use by everyone

2) For public service government buildings and vehicles for use by authorized persons

3) For the development of national wealth natural resources.


17/25


Patrimonial Property of the State:

- Private property owned by the State- Owned in a private capacity- Can be sued/claim/dispose

In converting public dominion into patrimonial property, there must be a law/ordinance passed by the

legislators.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs.FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR., FELIZA SREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR,

LANDS and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of LEGASPI CITYG.R. No. 130906, February 11, 1999

FACTS:

On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuantto Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and furthersubdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein petition in the name of

private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare theTransfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on the ground that thesubject land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigationconducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director ofLands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be"definitely outside of the foreshore area."

Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazarfiled their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperialand Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court isbinding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in rem and thegovernment itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and activeparticipant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to

dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that thejudgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition toquiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsiderationfor lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD: Yes.

At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is apart of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It wasdefined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of thetides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and, is alternatively wetand dry according to the flow of the tide."

The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director oflands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approvedby the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is that the subjecthas been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no


18/25


application, however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, theDENR Secretary.

There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in thepresent case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCTNo.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner, onthe other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed that the

land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land."The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature ofthe land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the premise of anyconclusive classification of the land involved.

The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts areforeshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third andfourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional circumstanceimpressed with public interest and must then be given due course.

Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds. Petitioner also alleged thatit has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will result to theprejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the Government would lose its opportunity to recoverwhat it believes to be non-registerable lands of the public domain.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what constitutes good andsufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. It has the power to relax orsuspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrants or when thepurpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all whether the landssubject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing theprocedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief. PetitionerRepublics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in the Courtsdiscretion must be given due course.

PALOMO v. CAG.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

FACTS:

Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he

ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two

months before his death in April 1937.

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo

filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of

Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.

Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced

by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protectionand administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest

Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and,

therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable

under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real

estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8,

1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the

parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.


19/25


ISSUE:

Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:

The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title

cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forestland cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,

cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and

alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the

public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed

to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in

introducing improvements on the lots.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME

114 SCRA 799

DATE: June 29, 1982

FACTS:

The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal

from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the

3rd of July 1947, the original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation

of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently

filed an appeal with the following contentions:

The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years

had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional

prohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable.

It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino

citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply for a judicial confirmation of an

imperfect/incomplete title.

Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.

Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is contingent on the judicial

confirmation of title.

RULING:


20/25


NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified from

applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14

of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except by

lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and citizens of the Philippines are

allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA.

NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the

necessary condition of possession by the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2)

the judicial confirmation of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with the decision, but

accepted that a conversion indeed took place.

HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J. Abad Santos and J. De Castro,

concurred accordingly. J. Teehankee dissented and traced the line of jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to

Herico which maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectively happens by the operation of law, ipso jure,

as soon as it can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for the confirmation of the

grant have been met. According to his reasoning, upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions, the

confirmation of an imperfect title is only a formality.

Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)

G.R. No. 73002December 29, 1986

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and

AcerInfiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of

the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or

disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the

Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/05/jurisprudence-gr-no-73002-december-29.htmlhttp://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/05/jurisprudence-gr-no-73002-december-29.htmlhttp://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/05/jurisprudence-gr-no-73002-december-29.html


21/25


YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not

necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an

application therefore is sufficient it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private

property, at least by presumption the application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not

affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued

upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by

the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient

and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded

that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in

excess of 1,024 hectares

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and

programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their

economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in

determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

IV. Private Lands

"Private land" refers to any land belonging to any private person which includes alienable and disposable landbeing claimed by a holder, claimant, or occupant who has already acquired a vested right thereto under thelaw, although the corresponding certificate or evidence of title or patent has not been actually issued.



CASES:

Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December 20, 1994(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought the said

land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the administration of the

same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondents husband. Petitioner on the other hand

claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a

deed of sale.

Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.


22/25


Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether individuals

or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private

lands.

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public

domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of

the public domain.

Register of Deeds of Rizal vs Ung Siu Si Temple 97 PHIL 58 (1955)

FACTS:The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for a record a deed of donation executed indue form by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a land in Caloocan, Rizal in favor of an unregistered religiousorganization Ung Siu Si Temple; operating through all three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donationwas duly accepted by Yu Juan, a Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting inrepresentation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.

The refusal of the Register if Deed was elevated in the Court of First Instance of Manila which upheld the actionof the Register of Deeds saying:

It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whosedeaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so holdthat in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limitingthe acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty percentum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271,and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed ofdonation in question should not be admitted for admitted for registration.Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealedto this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and

permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:

SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whetherincorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to holdland in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitableinstitutions.

SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trusteesfor the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)

and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution [Art.III, Sec. 1(7)].

ISSUES:WON a deed of donation a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trusteesand administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.

RULING:The Court upheld the decision of the CFI of Manila.

The Court held that in view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of ActNo. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in sofar as incompatible therewith. In providing that,


23/25


Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assignedexcept to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domainin the Philippines,

the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such saving found insections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resourcesto "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of

the Philippines).

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape theConstitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixtyper centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agriculturalland or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demandsthat in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive theopening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country. We cannot ignore the historical fact thatcomplaints against land holdings of that kind were among the factors that sparked the revolution of 1896.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed byArticle III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure isindispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not worshipthe Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.

The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION VS. LUI SHE

1967 SEPTEMBER 12

FACTS:

Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land inManila.

The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant.

Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, having a monthly rental of P2,620.

On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other

heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was

left with no other relative to live with, but she was taken cared of by Wong.

"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on

November 15, 1957, a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and

another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the

right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. Ten days later (November 25),

the contract was amended so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of

Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360.

On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000,

payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option was conditioned on his obtaining

Philippine citizenship,a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.


24/25


25/25


But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the

Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it became clear that

the arrangement was a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divested himself in stages not only of

the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to

dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It was just as if today the

possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the

rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this was just exactly what the partiesin this case did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was

reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the

Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.

The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts was ordered

returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

reviewer nat res law

Documents