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ReintegratingAfghan Insurgents

Seth G. Jones

Prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

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Jones, Seth G., 1972-Reintegrating Aghan insurgents / Seth G. Jones.

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he research described in this report was prepared or the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. he research was conducted within the RAND National Deense ResearchInstitute, a ederally unded research and development center sponsored by the Oice o the Secretary o Deense, the Joint Sta, the Uniied Combatant Commands, the Navy,

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iii

Preface

Tis paper is intended to be a short, policy-relevant assessment on reintegration in Aghanistan.Tis research was sponsored by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity and conducted

within the Intelligence Policy Center o the RAND National Deense Research Institute, aederally unded research and development center sponsored by the Ofce o the Secretary o Deense, the Joint Sta, the Unied Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, thedeense agencies, and the deense Intelligence Community.

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v

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Figures and able . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

CHAPER ONE

Factors Tat Enable Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Perception o Winning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Coercion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Addressing Grievances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CHAPER WO

Reintegration Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Proactive Eorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Holding and Security Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Incentives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Engagement o ribal and Other Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Inormation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Active Use o Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

CHAPER HREE

Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23



vii

Figures and Table

Figures

1. Where Do Locals Get Teir Inormation?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52. Reintegration Process Used in Helmand, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Table

1. Example o Reintegration Cases, 2001–2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2



ix

Summary

Successul counterinsurgency requires getting insurgents to switch sides. Former insurgentsprovide an invaluable source o inormation on their previous colleagues, sow discord, and ulti-mately cause momentum to shit toward counterinsurgent orces. Tis brie analysis examinesreintegrating aliban and other insurgents into their local communities in Aghanistan andoutlines steps to acilitate the reintegration process.

Reintegration reers to operational and tactical eorts to assimilate low to mid-level insur-gents and leaders peaceully into their local communities.1 It is generally distinguished rom

reconciliation, which involves high-level, strategic, and political dialogue with senior leaders o major insurgent groups—such as the aliban, Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’sHezb-i-Islami (HIG)—to terminate their armed resistance against the Aghan government.2 As U.S. Secretary o Deense Robert Gates explained: “With respect to reintegration, this isreally about getting the oot soldiers to decide that they don’t want to be a part o the alibanany more.”3 Some Aghan government documents use slightly dierent denitions o reinte-gration and reconciliation.4

Tis assessment asks two questions: What actors increase the likelihood o reintegratingghters? What are the key options or ghters as they consider reintegration? It reaches severalconclusions:

• At least three actors appear to raise the probability o reintegration: (a) increasing theperception that Aghan and Coalition orces are winning the war, especially at the locallevel; (b) utilizing coercion against insurgents, including targeted raids to kill or captureinsurgent leaders; and (c) addressing key grievances, such as tribal or sub-tribal conicts,employment, security, or governance ailures.

• Based on an analysis o 36 reintegration cases in Aghanistan since 2001, in 36 percent o the cases insurgents reintegrated because they believed the aliban or other groups werelosing the war (at least in their local areas); in 33 percent o the cases coercion was a criti-cal actor; and in 71 percent o the cases insurgents reintegrated because o grievances.

• Reintegration should not be a reactive process in which Aghan and International Secu-rity Assistance Force (ISAF) ofcials merely respond to individuals or groups that contact

them. Instead, proactive eorts can be conducted that identiy individuals as avorablecandidates or reintegration. For example, proactive assessments can be conducted thatidentiy individuals, villages, and even larger entities (such as clans or sub-tribes) as avor-able candidates or reintegration.

• Although reintegration requires Aghan government leadership, the central government issometimes poorly synchronized with local ofcials. actical units cannot always wait orthe central government to act in a timely manner. Consequently, eective reintegration



x Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents

may require tactical units to cooperate with local ofcials; provincial and district gover-nors; tribal and community leaders; and National Directorate o Security (NDS), AghanNational Police (ANP), and Aghan National Army (ANA) ofcials.

• Past reintegration cases suggest there are a range o helpul procedures once a ghter—orgroup o ghters—considers reintegration:

– Screening o candidates . Conduct in-depth questioning, contact human sources, ana-lyze databases, and gather biometric and other relevant data. Aghan and ISAF unitsshould be aware that insurgents may use reintegration as a way to attack ISAF or Aghan orces, collect intelligence, or stall operations. – Holding and security procedures . Establish holding procedures i necessary. Detentionshould be used as a last resort and, in some instances, may be counterproductive i ittriggers a backlash rom local communities. Detainees should be treated airly, keptsae, and not be punished i they are willing to talk.

– Incentives . Consider a range o nancial and other assistance or potential candidates,including resettlement aid and security protection. Aghan programs that support along-term solution, such as employment or education, can be particularly helpul.

– Engaging tribal and other local leaders . Operate through legitimate local institutions,including jirgas and shuras (local councils), to help resettle reintegrated personnel intovillages. Reintegration may only be successul when tribal and other local leaders areinvolved, supported by the Aghan government and ISAF units, and prepared to staketheir prestige to help reintegrate ormer combatants.

– Inormation operations . Disseminate inormation that reintegration is a viable option tothe local population and neutralize insurgent propaganda. Reintegrated personnel canhelp create opportunities by demonstrating to insurgents the benets o switching tothe government side.

– Active use o reintegrated individuals . Consider utilizing individuals in a range o ways where easible: to collect intelligence, to participate in local deense orces, to act as

scouts, and to accept positions in the Aghan government.

Tis analysis adopts a straightorward methodology: It examines 36 reintegration casesin Aghanistan since 2001, including explanations o why insurgents opted to reintegrate.5 able 1 in Chapter One presents the cases; the lessons learned rom the cases are integratedthroughout the document. However, any study o reintegration has methodological and ana-lytical pitalls. Tere is no complete data set o reintegration cases, and many cases are notregularly reported—or compiled—by Aghan or ISAF ofcials. In addition, it is not alwaysclear why insurgents reintegrate. Some discussions are clandestine and occur with Aghan orother intelligence agencies, and insurgents may publicly or privately misrepresent their reasonsor reintegration. Nevertheless, the initial dataset in this document is a major step orward that

provides a critical lens with which to examine reintegration.Tis paper is divided into three parts. First, it presents actors that have contributed toreintegration in Aghanistan and other counterinsurgencies. Second, it outlines operational andtactical steps to take when insurgents consider reintegration. Tird, it oers a brie conclusion.



1

CHAPTER ONE

Factors That Enable Reintegration 1

Over the past several decades o warare in Aghanistan, low-, mid-, and even senior-level ght-ers have regularly changed sides. Indeed, reintegration is an integral part o Aghan culture.Te concept o truce is encompassed in the Pashto word tiga, which means “placing the stone.”Te word symbolizes the process o utilizing a respected elder or peacemaker to mediate a dis-pute among disagreeing parties.1

Tere are at least three types o reintegration: noncompliance, inorming, and switching

sides. Noncompliance involves such actions as evading taxes rom insurgents and eeing rominsurgent-controlled areas. While it is the most benign orm o deection, it can trigger cas-cades o more-serious deections i grievances with insurgents signicantly increase. Govern-ment ofcials can exploit noncompliance by identiying the individuals involved and provid-ing rewards to those willing to play a more substantive role. Inorming is the act o supplyinginormation about one side to its rival. While inorming is a orm o deection, it diers romswitching sides because it is usually a private act that requires secrecy. Reasons or inormingmay reect political preerences, expectations o personal gain, private grudges, blackmail, orsurvival considerations. Switching sides involves ormally breaking with insurgent groups andassimilating into local communities.2

Switching sides is the ocus o this study, and it has been common across insurgencies. In

China, many Communists joined the Nationalist side, especially ater losing out in actionalconicts. Tey were the rebels’ worst enemy, one study concluded, “or they knew the guer-rillas’ ways and were thirsty or revenge.” In Vietnam, the Vietcong considered deection tobe one o their greatest problems. But collaborators were harshly punished. When the Viet-cong regained control over a village that had joined the government, they sometimes seizedthe headman and his amily, disemboweled his wie in ront o him, hacked o his children’sarms and legs, and then emasculated him. In Oman, military setbacks and containment o the Popular Front or the Liberation o Oman ollowed steadily increasing desertions duringthe 1970s. In Tailand, there were a series o reintegration cases among Tai insurgents in the1980s ollowing a return to civilian rule and an amnesty program. Indeed, reintegration hasbeen a pivotal component o successul counterinsurgencies and has signicantly weakenedinsurgent groups.

able 1 provides a list o 36 reintegration cases in Aghanistan since 2001. At leastthree actors appear to raise the probability o reintegration: (a) increasing the perceptiono winning at the national level and especially at the local level, (b) utilizing coercion, and

Te author would like to thank those who reviewed earlier drats o this paper: Michael Semple, a ellow at Har-vard’s Carr Center or Human Rights Policy, and RAND colleagues Olga Oliker and Barbara Sude.



2 Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents

Table 1Example of Reintegration Cases, 2001–2010

Name Year Former Designation Location Reasons for Reintegration

Mullah SyedAbdullah

2007 Militarycommander

Ghor Coercion: Intimidated after his commander,Mullah Abdul Jalil, was killed

Mullah

Abdullah

2010 Military

commander

Helmand Coercion and grievances: Captured by ISAF forces

and offered assistanceNoor Ahmad 2010 Military

commanderHelmand Coercion and grievances: Intimidated by Afghan

and ISAF forces and offered assistance

Sayed Ahmad 2009 Militarycommander

Kapisa Grievances: Some of his grievances addressed;offered employment in ANP

Mullah AbdulSalam Akhund

2007 Governor Helmand Grievances and perception of war: Developedgrievances with the Taliban; also appeared toview the war as turning against Taliban

MullahAminullah


Helmand Coercion and grievances: Captured by ISAF forcesand offered assistance to address grievances

Suleiman Amiri 2010 Militarycommander

Herat Grievances: Some of his grievances addressed;promised a job in ANP

MohammadAnwar


Helmand Grievances: Developed a range of grievanceswith local Taliban

Abdul WahidRais Baghrani


Helmand Grievances: Developed some grievances withthe Taliban, including their support of al Qa’ida;offered support from President Karzai

MullahBahauddin


Badghis Grievances: Unhappy with the Talibanharassment of local civilians and other Talibanpractices

Mullah Ebrahim 2006 Militarycommander

Kandahar Grievances: Offered support from Afghangovernment and held grievances against Taliban

Habibullah Fauzi 2005 First secretary,Islamabadembassy

Ghazni Grievances and perception of war: Assessedthat Taliban would lose; increasingly developedgrievances with Taliban

Mullah AbdulGhayas


Ghor Coercion: Intimidated after his commander,Mullah Abdul Jalil, was killed

Haji Syed HazratGul 2006 Militarycommander Konar Grievances: Local tribal leaders and Afghangovernment vowed to address key grievances;developed grievances with local insurgents

Musa Hotak 2002 Deputy minister,planning

Maidan Perception of war: Assessed that Taliban waslosing the war

Malem Jan 2005 Militarycommander

Kapisa Grievances and perception of war: Developedgrievances with local Haqqani leaders andconcluded that ISAF forces would ultimately win

Haji Kaduz 2009 Militarycommander

Helmand Grievances: Developed grievances with localTaliban; ISAF and Afghan forces offered himemployment with ANP

Mullah AbdulSamad Khaksar

2001 Deputy minister,interior

Kandahar Perception of war: Concluded that Taliban lostthe war

Abdullah Khan 2009 Militarycommander

Helmand Grievances: Developed grievances with localTaliban

Naeem Kuchi 2005 Militarycommander

Logar Coercion and grievances: Captured by U.S. forcesand agreed to support Afghan government;some of his grievances addressed

MullahMohammad Isa


Badghis Grievances: Unhappy with the Talibanharassment of local civilians and other Talibanpractices

Abdul HakeemMunib

2001 Deputyminister,public works

Paktia Perception of war: Concluded that the Talibanwas losing the war




(c) addressing grievances. Tese actors are not mutually exclusive, and Aghan and ISAF unitscan utilize several o them at the same time to increase reintegration prospects. Following arekey conclusions:

• In 36 percent o the cases, insurgents reintegrated because they believed the aliban orother groups were losing the war, at least in a specic area.• In 33 percent o the cases, coercion was a critical actor in reintegration.• In 71 percent o the cases, insurgents reintegrated because o grievances. Aghan and

ISAF units addressed key grievances or eectively exploited grievances that had suracedamong insurgents.

Table 1—Continued

Name Year Former Designation Location Reasons for Reintegration

Mullah Naqib 2001 Alikozai triballeader

Kandahar Perception of war: Concluded that theTaliban was losing the war

Tor Jan Pirzai 2001 Militarycommander

Helmand Perception of war: Concluded that theTaliban was losing the war

Mullah Rahim 2008 Militarycommander

Helmand Coercion: Concerned that he would be killedby U.S. forces, especially after the targetedkilling of several colleagues

Mawlvi ArsalaRahmani

2005 Ministerof highereducation

Paktika Grievances and perception of war: Concludedthat Taliban would lose war, and increasinglydeveloped grievances with Taliban

Mullah AbdulSalam Rocketi


Zabul Perception of war: Concluded that theTaliban was losing the war

Mawlawi AbdolSamad


Badghis Perception of war and grievances: Promisedsupport; may also have been believed theTaliban was losing in Herat and Badghis

RahmatullahSangaryar


Uruzgan Coercion and grievances: Promised assistanceby Afghan government following captureand detention in Guantanamo Bay

MawlawiShafiollah


Zabul Grievances: Offered a range of incentives toreintegrate, including amnesty

MawlawiAhmad Shah


Helmand Coercion and perception of war: Intimidatedby ISAF and Afghan forces; may also haveconcluded that Taliban was losing in his area

MullahSolaiman


Herat Coercion and grievances: Concerned abouthis safety after being coerced by ISAF forces;also promised employment

Abdul Wahab 2009 Militarycommander

Herat Coercion: Wanted protection against U.S.raids

RahmatullahWahidyar

2005 Deputyminister,martyrs

Paktia Perception of war and grievances: Concludedthat Taliban would lose war and increasinglydeveloped grievances with Taliban

Sayed Wali 2009 Military

commander

Herat Coercion and grievances: Targeted by ISAF

forces; promised employment opportunities

MullahMohammadZaher


Kandahar Grievances: Promised assistance by Afghangovernment to address key grievances

NOTE: Part of this list was generated by Michael Semple, in Reconciliation in Afghanistan, pp. 95–96. Some

individuals on the list, such as Tor Jan Pirzai, reintegrated after the overthrow of the Taliban regime buteventually defected to the insurgency.




All three actors—perception o winning, coercion, and grievances—require an eectivecommunications strategy that reintegration is a viable option. Te target audiences can includeinsurgents and local communities.

Perception of WinningOne o the most signicant reasons that ghters and their supporters reintegrate is the percep-tion o who is winning the war. As used here, “winning” is a relative concept and reers to theside that is able to control or inuence more territory in a given area. Control or inuence o territory indicates that one group obtains the collaboration o civilians, rather than its adver-sary; destroys all or most o its adversary’s cells; and prevents adversaries rom entering or oper-ating with eectiveness. It may do so by co-opting locals or through intimidation.

Winning is important at both the local and national levels. Perceptions o winning thelocal war (such as in a specic village or district) appears to be particularly critical becausepower and politics are local in Aghanistan.9 Indeed, reintegration can occur i the aliban or

other insurgents begin to lose in a specic district or group o villages—even i it is unclear who is winning the overall war. Te perception o winning is partly psychological because ithinges on local perceptions. But it requires changes on the battleeld. Insurgencies typically conclude with a military victory or one side, not a negotiated peace settlement. O the roughly 55 wars ought or control o a central government (as opposed to secession or regional auton-omy) since 1955, 75 percent ended with a clear victory or one side. Te government ultimately crushed the rebels in at least 40 percent o the 55 cases, while the rebels won control o thecenter in 35 percent. Power-sharing agreements that divide up control o a central governmentamong the combatants have been ar less common.10

Te operational and tactical goal should be to help trigger a situation in which momen-tum against the aliban becomes difcult to stop and in which reintegration becomes a viable

alternative. Tis can be termed a “tip” or “cascade.”11

ips oten occur because people’s choicesabout their actions are based on what they think others are likely to do.12 Aghan and ISAFunits can impact the likelihood o a tip by eectively clearing and holding areas, as well asconducting inormation operations, which are discussed in more detail later in the assessment.Tese steps can happen simultaneously. Te goal should be to help create the perception that Aghan and Coalition orces are winning the war, at least in specic areas.13

In 2010, or example, some low-level aliban in the Marjeh area, such as Ammand Ullah,expressed an interest in reintegration during Operation Moshtarak because o perceptionsthat the aliban were losing. More importantly, successul operations in central and southernHelmand by Aghan orces and U.S. Marines led to the reintegration o several individuals in2010, including Mullah Abdullah, Noor Ahmad, Mullah Aminullah, and Mawlawi Ahmad

Shah.14

In late 2007, Mullah Abdul Salam Akhund, an inuential Alizai tribal leader rom thePirzai sub-tribe, reintegrated in Helmand. Troughout 2006 and 2007, Coalition orces andthe aliban had engaged in heavy ghting in Musa Qalah. Mullah Salam appeared to havea range o grievances with the aliban, including unhappiness that some local aliban haddeveloped close links to oreign ghters.15 However, he also appeared to believe that the war was turning against the aliban in Musa Qalah, as Coalition orces began to capture a grow-ing number o villages in the district, including Khyajehbad.




In considering inormation operations, which reer to technological and other actionsused to inuence others, messages should utilize the primary communication mediums wherevillagers get their inormation. Tis oten varies rom village to village. In past Aghan rein-tegration cases, examples have included radio, shura or jirga leaders (who distribute inorma-tion to their constituents), and mullahs (who distribute inormation during Friday prayers and

through other venues). Eorts such as mullah engagement programs, which reach out to localmullahs, may be useul in encouraging reintegration. Indeed, polling data indicates that localsget inormation on what is happening in their community rom a range o sources: riends(23 percent), neighbors and other villagers (21 percent), village chies and community leaders(17 percent), mullahs (13 percent), international radio stations (9 percent), and local Aghanradio stations (7 percent). However, these percentages vary considerably across Aghanistan.Figure 1 highlights the ndings o the polls across Aghanistan.

One o the best illustrations o the tipping model mentioned above is the all o the alibanregime in 2001, which triggered substantial reintegration. Te mobilization o ajiks, Uzbeks,Hazaras, and ultimately Pashtun communities in October and November 2001 caused a tip asmomentum against the aliban became too signicant to overcome.18 Barely a month ater the

bombing campaign started, a series o cities ell to U.S. and Aghan orces—Mazar-e-Shari on November 10, aloqan and Bamiyan on November 11, and Herat on November 11—untilKabul ell on November 13. All these cases involved the reintegration o aliban ghters. 19

One o the most successul cases o reintegration during that period was Mullah AbdulSalam, who was nicknamed “Rocketi” or his skill in handling rocket-propelled grenades.20 Inaddition, Alikozai tribal leader Mullah Naqib, who had helped the aliban conquer Kanda-har City in 1994, supported U.S. eorts in Kandahar and was pivotal to the aliban collapse

Figure 1Where Do Locals Get Their Information?

SOURCE: Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul: AsiaFoundation, 2009), p. 171.RAND OP327-1

Question: If you wanted to find out about something important happening in your community,

who, outside of your family, would you want telling you about it?

Friend

Neighbors/villagers

Village chief/community leader

Mullah

International radio stations(such as BBC, Azadi, or Ashna)

Local Afghan radio stations

Co-workers

Worker at community centers(school, health center, etc.)

ShopkeepersDon’t know




in southern Aghanistan.21 Te change o perception required battleeld victories, which rstoccurred in northern Aghanistan. Tese 2001 reintegration cases also illustrate the impor-tance o patronage. Insurgents are sometimes more likely to reintegrate i there is someone onthe inside whom they trust and to help take care o them. Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi hadbeen a commander o Pir Ahmad Gailani during the jihad and relied on the involvement o

Gailani, among others, to reintegrate in 2001.22

In the 1990s, the aliban also capitalized on the perception o winning to reintegratelocal ghters. Beginning in 1994 in Kandahar Province, aliban units reintegrated some localnetworks through bribery and others through promises o power-sharing, such as the Aliko-zai, who agreed to ally with the aliban and hand over the city o Kandahar. When the al-iban ailed to co-opt groups along the Kandahar-Kabul highway, such as Commander Saleh’smilitia, aliban orces deeated them on the battleeld.23 Te combination o negotiationsand battleeld successes had a domino eect, and a growing number o local groups subse-quently deected. Te perception o winning increased the aliban’s reintegration prospects when they expanded beyond the south in 1995. In Helmand Province, a range o local power-brokers deected to the aliban, such as Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani in Baghran District, Hajji

Mullah Hamdullah and other Ishaqzai leaders in Sangin, and Mullah Habibullah Noorzai inGarmsir.24 In eastern Aghanistan, the aliban co-opted a range o Pashtun tribes, sub-tribes,and local powerbrokers. Te large Suleimankhel tribe in Paktika assisted the aliban take-overo the province’s capital, Sharan, ater hearing they had conquered Ghazni.25

Applying the tipping model to Aghanistan has an important caveat. ribes, sub-tribes,clans, qawms (social groups), and other entities can be temporarily co-opted—or coerced—butusually only or nite periods o time. As Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan dem-onstrated during the Musahiban dynasty, there are several actors that can lengthen the timethat local communities can be co-opted or coerced. Tey include benets rom the centralgovernment, such as nancial aid, and a competent army that crushes revolts. As anthropolo-gist Tomas Bareld noted, “While the central government had been eective in expanding

its power into the countryside, its goals were limited to encapsulating local political structuresin order to prevent them rom causing trouble.” Tis was especially true o Pashtuns, whomthe central government made a particular eort to co-opt: “Pashtuns along the Durand Linereceived special treatment and benets via the Ministry o ribal Aairs,” such as land, money,or an exemption rom conscription into the military.26

Coercion

A second actor that appears to increase the probability o reintegration is the specic, targeteduse o violence—or threat o violence—to coerce ghters to reintegrate. Te goal should be

to instill a ear o being killed or captured. Coercion is dierent rom the previous actor, aperception o winning, because it involves impacting an individual’s survival. Coercion is notnecessarily about winning or losing a war, but about staying alive.

Te eective use o coercion requires understanding the organizational structure o insur-gent groups. Te military ormation o aliban in many areas is called a mahaz , or ront. Itoten includes roughly 20 ghters who are grouped around a single charismatic leader, thoughmahaz numbers can vary. A commander’s ghters are called his andiwal, or comrades. Teirties may come rom blood relations or a common village, clan, qawm, tribe, or other iden-




tication. Based on this structure, the targeted killing or capture o a mahaz commandercan increase the probability o reintegrating his andiwal i they are successully intimidated.Indeed, the loss o a mahaz commander may be a trigger to initiate engagements.

One o the most illustrative cases was the targeted killing o Ghulam Yahya Akbari duringOperation Wild Mustang in 2009. His network had established a relationship with the al-

iban and was involved in assassinating public ofcials, smuggling weapons, attacking Coali-tion orces, and kidnapping or ransom. In October 2009, Aghan and U.S. orces killedGhulam Yahya in Herat, and nearly 100 o his andiwal surrendered to the Aghan governmentand agreed to reintegrate. Te immediate cause o reintegration appeared to be coercion.Ghulam Yahya’s ollowers believed they aced a decision point: Reintegrate with the govern-ment or risk being killed. Tere are a number o other cases.

In November 2009, Mullah Solaiman and 56 o his men reintegrated in Herat Province.Tey were promised positions in the Aghan National Army or Aghan National Police, partly since Solaiman had previously served in the Aghan Border Police. During the ceremony tocelebrate the return o Solaiman and his men, he gave a speech explaining that he returnedater threats rom ISAF orces. In 2009, Abdul Wahab, a aliban commander in the Pusht-

e-Zargon district o Herat, wanted protection rom U.S. raids when he decided to reintegratein November 2009. In 2008, aliban commander Mullah Rahim reintegrated in HelmandProvince, partly out o concern that he would eventually be killed by Coalition orces. Hesurrendered ater the targeted killing o several o his colleagues, including Mullah Sheikhand Mullah Sadiqullah. In 2007, several aliban commanders in Ghor Province, includ-ing Mullah Abdul Ghayas and Mullah Syed Abdullah, reintegrated ater their commander,Mullah Abdul Jalil, was killed.

Tese cases illustrate that precision targeting o individuals, including mahaz command-ers with their andiwal, can coerce some insurgents to reintegrate. But this action needs to beollowed by concerted eorts to reach out to the andiwal, leverage local communities, and useeective inormation operations.

Addressing Grievances

A third actor that appears to increase the probability o reintegration is addressing grievances.Tis can be in one o two ways. Aghan and ISAF units can provide assistance to an insurgentand address his key grievances, or they can eectively exploit grievances and inghting amonginsurgents. One major issue is rivalry. I an individual’s rival becomes a government ofcialor insurgent leader, he oten joins the opposition. In addition, personal saety is almost alwaysa key grievance. Virtually every reintegration negotiation since 2001 required ensuring saety or the individual, since there are numerous cases where the aliban and other insurgents have

assassinated reintegrated ghters.During insurgencies, the most immediate reason that a disgruntled individual joins agroup is to increase his options or attaining such goals as companionship, sel-denition,reinorcement o shared belies, and security. In Aghanistan, there are multiple reasons why individuals join—or support—the aliban and other insurgent groups. Key reasons include:tribe, sub-tribe, clan, and qawm afliation, especially with groups that have been alienated by the Aghan government; money; employment; a desire or power; grievances against NAOor Aghan orces because o civilian casualties; grievances against the Aghan government




because o corruption or other governance ailures; or a combination o the above. In somecases, ANP or NDS personnel have mistreated individuals, compounding grievances againstthe government. A study that interviewed 42 aliban in Kandahar Province, or example,ound that a major grievance was tribal: “Te aliban have exploited the resulting anger among. . . Pashtun tribes, many o whom nd themselves on the wrong side o disputes over money,

land, opium, or water.”36

Addressing these grievances can increase the probability o reintegration. In March 2010,approximately 50 HIG ghters in Baghlan Province reintegrated ater the Aghan governmentprovided assistance, including medical aid. Tey had been involved in an escalating conict with local aliban over control o territory and taxes on local armers, especially since alibanghters apparently moved into villages that HIG commanders had controlled.38 Several al-iban ghters reintegrated in Badghis Province, such as Mullah Bahauddin in 2010 and MullahMuhammad Isa in 2009, partly because they were unhappy with the aliban’s harassment o local civilians and other aliban practices.39

In August 2009, Sayed Ahmad, a aliban commander in Kapisa Province, and severalo his ghters surrendered to Aghan government ofcials in exchange or employment in the

ANP. In 2005, Malem Jan, a member o the Saberi tribe and a commander in Khowst Prov-ince with links to the Haqqani network, reintegrated along with our others because o localgrievances with Haqqani leaders and the belie that ISAF orces would win.40 Also in 2005, Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani, an inuential Alizai tribal leader rom the Khalozai sub-tribein northern Helmand, joined the government. He appeared to have a range o motivations,including disillusionment with the aliban’s relationship with al Qa’ida. “In the beginning[the aliban] stood or peace and stability,” he noted. “But then later there was a lot o oreignintererence and we tried a lot to persuade them to come over to the right way.”41

While ameliorating grievances can increase the probability o reintegration, a ailure toaddress grievances can trigger deection to the aliban and other insurgent groups. In 2008, Abdul Rahman Jan—a key Noorzai leader, ormer police chie, and ally o ormer governor

Sher Mohammad Akhunzada—joined the aliban in Helmand Province. It was partly anact o actional politics, including an attempt to undermine the latest Helmand governor,Mohammad Gulab Mangal. His poppy elds were targeted or eradication by the Aghangovernment’s Poppy Eradication Force, with support rom the U.S. government. He was alsocoerced by local aliban commanders who had carried out an eective campaign in Nad Ali.Consequently, he helped acilitate the August 2008 desertion o Nad Ali Aghan NationalPolice rom their posts, which aided the aliban in their oensive against Lashkar Gah.42

One o the most illustrative cases was the tenure o Sher Mohammad Akhunzada, an Alizai tribal leader rom the Hassanzai sub-tribe, who served as governor o Helmand Provincerom 2001 to 2005. He developed a reputation or brutality, corruption, and the marginaliza-tion o important swaths o Helmand’s population. Signicant components o the Noorzai,

Ishaqzai, and Barakzai tribes, as well as several sub-tribes o the Alizai (including the Khalo-zai sub-tribe), deected to the aliban because o Sher Mohammad Akhunzada’s governancepractices. In areas such as Musa Qalah, the aliban established a range o otaqs (commandcenters) and recruited locals who had become disaected with Sher Mohammad Akhunzada.Examples included the ollowing:

• Mullah Ghaur, who joined the aliban ater he was harassed by the Aghan NationalPolice and his vehicles were stolen




• Hajji Abdul Bari, who joined ater he was allegedly tortured by Sher Mohammad Akhunzada’s ghters

• Maulana Syed Gul, who joined when individuals rom Sher Mohammad Akhunzada’smilitia apparently stole his weapons and vehicles

• Mullah Matin, who joined ater repeated harassment by Sher Mohammad Akhunzada’s

ghters• Mullah Sai, who joined ater several o his in-laws were murdered, possibly by individu-als loyal to Sher Mohammad Akhunzada.

Eective Aghan governance can ameliorate some o these grievances and undermine thetemptation to deect to the aliban. Te initial challenge in addressing grievances has to do with intelligence, since it is necessary to understand why an individual or group is consideringreintegration. All insurgents will take money. But what is their primary grievance? In sum, sev-eral interrelated actors appear to increase the probability o reintegration, and they have directimplications or Aghan and ISAF operations in the eld. Tey include creating a perceptiono winning by successully clearing and holding territory, as well as conducting psychological

operations; utilizing targeted violence—or the threat o violence—to coerce ghters and theirnetworks to reintegrate; and addressing key grievances.



11

CHAPTER TWO

Reintegration Procedures

Tere are several options or ISAF and Aghan orces once ghters consider reintegration, someo which require immediate decisions. Reintegration should ideally be led by the Aghan gov-ernment, as well as managed by local communities and their leaders. Te goal must be to acili-tate the Aghan government’s ability to reintegrate ormer combatants. However, the weaknesso the central government in rural areas makes reintegration challenging in some cases, andit is sometimes poorly synchronized with local ofcials. actical units cannot always wait or

the central government to act in a timely manner. Consequently, eective reintegration may require tactical units to cooperate with local ofcials; provincial and district governors; tribaland community leaders; and NDS, ANP, and ANA ofcials.

In 2010, the Aghan government approved the Aghanistan Peace and Reintegration Pro-gram to “encourage aliban ghters and leaders, previously sided with armed opposition andextremist groups, to renounce violence and join a constructive process o reintegration to ben-et rom a chance at peace and sustained governance and economic development.”1 In addi-tion, ISAF created a Force Reintegration Cell to help acilitate the delivery o policy, resources,and capabilities in support o reintegration. ISAF Joint Command had the responsibility tooperationalize reintegration and to help synchronize eorts rom the Aghan government,ISAF, United Nations Development Program, and other entities. However, the operational and

tactical capabilities o these organizations are limited, and ISAF units on the ground may acereintegration opportunities that require an immediate response.

In general, reintegration eorts should be centered on the “three Ds”: dene, dialogue,and desist. Dene means examining the reasons that insurgents are ghting, the nature o theindividual or group, and their grievances. Dialogue includes keeping communication open with reintegration candidates. Desist has to do with encouraging potential candidates to stopghting, cease support to insurgents, stop criminal activity, and demonstrate a commitmentto the reintegration process.2 Past reintegration cases suggest a range o useul procedures oncea ghter—or group o ghters—considers reintegration. Figure 2 highlights the reintegrationprocess used by British and American orces in some parts o Helmand Province.

A central tenet o reintegration is community mobilization, ocusing especially oncommunities that wish to reject insurgent groups.3 Tese communities must be supported andoered alternative options to the insurgency. Several steps are critical or the reintegration pro-cess, although reintegration procedures need to remain exible, since Aghanistan has distinc-tive regional, ethnic, tribal, qawm, and village structures.4 Tere is signicant overlap amongthese steps, and many o them need to happen at the same time rather than sequentially. Tesesteps include the ollowing:




• proactive eorts• screening o candidates

• holding and security procedures• incentives• engagement o tribal and other local leaders• inormation operations• active use o reintegrated individuals.

Proactive Efforts

Reintegration should not be a reactive process in which ISAF orces merely respond to individ-uals or groups that contact them. Instead, proactive intelligence assessments can be conducted

within the area o operations that identiy individuals, villages, and even larger entities (such asclans or sub-tribes) as avorable or unavorable candidates or reintegration. Local communitiesand insurgents should be inormed that insurgents have an opportunity to turn in their armsand reintegrate into their local communities.

Aghan and ISAF units can get this message out through radio broadcasts, leaets, andmeetings with local leaders, such as village elders, mullahs, and other community leaders. Pro-vincial and district governors can play a critical role. Tere are several examples o governorsproactively launching local initiatives to reintegrate combatants. For example, the Musa Qalah

Figure 2Reintegration Process Used in Helmand, 2010

SOURCE: Author correspondence with British soldier in Helmand Province, May 10, 2010.NOTES: GIRoA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; PRT = Provincial Reconstruction Team.RAND OP327-2

ISAF/PRT support investigations

Informalinformation

Informalinformation

Detain

ISAF/PRT

PRT

ReintegrationCommittee

NDSDistrict

ReintegrationCommittee

Contact made withGIRoA/ISAF either inperson or throughintermediaries.Information gatheredand disseminated.

GIRoA lead investigation GIRoAdecision

District reintegrationprocess and monitoring

Suitable forreconciliation

Requiresfurther

development

Insurgentwishes to

reintegrate

DistrictReintegrationCommission

Approved forreintegration

ReintegratesDistrict

ReintegrationCommission

Biometricstaken

Recommendation

Recommendation

Kabul

Provincial(GIRoA)

ReintegrationCommission



Reintegration Procedures 13

Accord in 2006, which gave control o the district center to the local tribal jirga, began as agovernor’s initiative and was signed by the governor o Helmand and the district’s tribal elders. Asadullah Khalid, the ormer Kandahar governor, tasked individuals to penetrate insurgentnetworks and approached some o the aliban commanders to encourage reintegration. Gov-ernors in other provinces—Zabul, Paktia, and Konar—have conducted their own diplomacy

with insurgent networks and encouraged reintegration, in some cases eectively.5

In preparation or reintegration opportunities, it would be helpul or Aghan andISAF ofcials—with the Aghan government in the lead—to establish local agreements withregional, provincial, district, and village leaders. Key issues include

• methods or inorming counterpart(s) o initial contact with insurgents• methods or reintegration within local communities (including protection arrangements

and approach to community leaders)• employment opportunities available• weapons turn-in or accounting procedures• biometrics collection procedures

• detention procedures• a monitoring plan beore, during, and ater reintegration• a public inormation plan, with the Aghan government ideally in the lead.

Screening

One o the most signicant challenges is identiying ghters and learning how serious they areabout reintegration. Tis requires conducting in-depth questioning, contacting human sourcesto veriy inormation, analyzing databases and intelligence reporting, and gathering biomet-ric and other relevant data. Key questions include the ollowing: What is the status o theghter—e.g., oot soldier or commander? What are his major grievances and motivations orpursuing reintegration? Gathering this inormation makes it important to structure debrieng,vetting, and processing systems to acilitate extraction o intelligence rom individuals.

One o the most signicant goals should be to reintegrate the network—not just an indi-vidual. In addition, units must be careul to protect the identity o individuals seeking to rein-tegrate since they may become targets by the aliban and other insurgent groups. It is normalor a commander to be in contact with the other side or a long time beore being prepared tomove into open reintegration. During the period o semi-covert contact, one o the main objec-tives should be to identiy other commanders who can come on board to generate a criticalmass. But ISAF units should be concerned about identiying spies who are using reintegrationas a means to aid insurgent groups. Tere are several ways insurgents might utilize the reinte-

gration process or their benet.First, reintegration candidates may seek to attack ISAF or Aghan orces. Feigning aninterest in reintegration allows insurgents direct access to Aghan or Coalition soldiers andbases. For example, Fazel Rabi, ater going through the United Nations–sponsored Disarma-ment, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, joined the aliban and becamean active commander in Wardak and Logar Provinces beore he was killed in 2008.6 Te al-iban, Haqqani network, and other insurgent groups have repeatedly attempted to inltrate the




Aghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Reintegration oers insurgents ace-to-ace access with ISAF and Aghan government ofcials.

Second, insurgents may want to collect inormation on the Aghan government andCoalition orces, which they can pass back to the aliban and other groups. In August andSeptember 2007, a HIG commander in northeastern Aghanistan directed our o his ghters

to reintegrate as a ruse to gain access to Aghan and Coalition orces.7

Te possibility o utiliz-ing reintegration to attack or collect inormation on Aghan and Coalition orces suggests theneed to careully vet candidates beore meeting them, as well as considering other options suchas meeting them at sae houses rather than on bases.

Tird, insurgents may want to undermine or stall Aghan and Coalition operations. In1983 and 1984, or instance, Ahmed Shah Massoud reached a ceasere agreement with Sovietorces in the Panjshir valley, which included the possibility o reintegration. Te agreementgave Soviet convoys sae passage to Kabul and allowed Soviet orces to ocus on other muja-hideen groups. But it also allowed Massoud to expand his inuence in the Panjshir, buy time,and rest and rearm his orces.8

In some cases, individuals with little or no involvement in the insurgency may try to

reintegrate to receive nancial or other benets. Small‐scale UN surveys suggested that up to80 percent o participants in the DDR program were not regular combatants; in some areas,up to 50 per cent o those who reintegrated were not genuine ghters.9 In 2010 in ShindandDistrict, Herat Province, roughly 800 local nationals expressed interest in reintegrating withthe Aghanistan government. Presidential advisor Mohammed Massom Stanekzai and othersenior Aghan ofcials met with representatives rom the group, reerred to as the “Shindand800.” Yet a range o Aghan, U.S., and UN assessments indicated that ew, i any, o the can-didates were connected to the insurgency.10 Regardless o the incentives, candidates need to bescreened. Many types o data are collected and entered into such databases as the CombinedInormation Data Network Exchange (CIDNE).

In some cases, such as with cell phones, ISAF units may want to issue reintegration candi-

dates cell phones and ensure they are monitored. Local ofcials—such as NDS operatives, the ANSF, and provincial and district governors—may be helpul in collecting or veriying someo this inormation. Tey can also begin building consensus within communities or reinte-gration o the individual or group into society, including screening and veriying inormation with locals. Intelligence is also critical in the later stages o the reintegration process to moni-tor reintegrated personnel and ensure they do not return to the insurgency or provide useulinormation to the aliban and other groups.

Holding and Security Procedures

An understanding must be reached regarding holding procedures between ISAF and Aghangovernment agencies (including Aghan National Army, Aghan National Police, and NationalDirectorate o Security). Detention should be used as a last resort and, in some instances, may be counterproductive i it triggers a backlash rom local communities. But i necessary, detain-ees should be treated airly, kept sae, and not be punished i they are willing to talk.

I a candidate or reintegration displays the potential or operational or intelligence valueand requires urther questioning, there must be holding options available. A large group o perhaps a dozen or more ghters may require back-up rom ANSF or other Coalition orces.




Several issues need to be addressed in weighing detention procedures. Are individuals currently on the Joint Prioritized Eects List (JPEL)? How malignant is the individual? In some cases,the benets o working with someone who has signicant American and Aghan governmentblood on his hands or is a senior-level drug trafcker may be outweighed by the costs, but willrequire a case-by-case assessment and coordination with the Aghan government. Reintegra-

tion candidates who are on the JPEL need to be properly vetted and their names should beorwarded to the regional command and the target support cell to coordinate reintegrationprocedures.

One o the most signicant barriers to reintegration is a ear o punishment. Tis canbe either a perception that an individual will be placed into a detention acility and tortured,or, perhaps more importantly, ear o retribution rom insurgents who view the individualas a collaborator. Tese issues must be addressed. In 2007, British and Aghan governmentorces oered protection to Mullah Salam ater he reintegrated. Te Aghan government pro-vided him security, logistical support, economic assistance, and a case ofcer to manage theseissues.12 Mullah Salam survived several assassination attempts by the aliban who stigmatizedhim as a collaborator. Te same was true or Haji Kaduz, a Barakzai leader in Helmand who

reintegrated in 2009 and survived several assassination attempts.13

Tere are numerous instances in which insurgents assassinated individuals, partly as adeterrent to those considering reintegration. In November 2009, two members o the NawaCommunity Council—Mohammad Anwar and Abdullah Khan—were assassinated inHelmand Province ater they reintegrated. Other members o the Nawa Community Council,including Mir Wali Khan, were also killed as part o a broader aliban intimidation cam-paign.14 In 2006, Mullah Abdul Samad Khaksar, who served as deputy minister o the interiorunder the aliban government, was assassinated near his home in Kandahar City.15 He had letthe aliban and publicly spoken out against them, noting that “i armed aliban go to the vil-lages, the people cannot resist personally, but I think they don’t support them.”16

In some cases, it may be necessary to oer commanders a reintegration option that moves

them out o their area or a period o time. Tis could include placement in a madrassa or, insome cases, joining the police or an appropriate local deense orce to ensure protection.

Incentives

Financial and other incentives—such as resettlement assistance, security, or cash or inorma-tion leading to successul counterinsurgency operations—have long been an important entice-ment in reintegration programs. As the Aghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program high-lighted, “the ex-combatants, and their amilies where necessary, will receive immediate security and humanitarian and social assistance, based on needs assessments.”17 Programs that support

a long-term sustainable solution, such as employment or education, are particularly helpul.Tey should not be a quick x that allows the individual to rejoin the insurgency once theincentives end.

Tere are a range o incentives that ISAF orces can provide to reintegration candidates.Tey may be able to use money rom the Commanders Emergency Response Fund (CERP) toprovide work or reintegrated ghters, as well as others in the community they are settled into.Larger CERP projects can be used or longer-term projects or programs that support Aghangovernment and ISAF security objectives. In Baghlan Province in March 2010, or example,




the Aghan government provided medical care rom mobile hospitals to potential candidates.18 In April 2006, Aghan ofcials provided amnesty to reintegrated ghters such as MawlawiShaollah, a commander in Zabul Province.19 Te Aghan government has oered a rangeo other incentives—including amnesty—to reintegrate.20 Beginning in 2005, the Aghangovernment’s main eort to reintegrate and reconcile insurgents was through the Proceayee

ahqeem Solha (PS), or Strengthening Peace Program, headed by Proessor SibghatullahMojaddedi. By 2007, it claimed to have overseen the reintegration o 4,634 ormer combatants.Te program provided some incentives, including residence at a commission-run guest housein Kabul and a small nancial incentive or participation in the program.21

In addition to CERP, other types o assistance can be leveraged, such as the Depart-ment o Deense Rewards Program. Tis program pays rewards to individuals or providinginormation or nonlethal assistance that is benecial to armed orces operations or activitiesconducted outside the United States against international terrorists or the protection o U.S.military armed orces. Tere are, however, some limitations. For instance, ISAF orces cannotoer candidates amnesty or immunity rom Aghan government prosecution. Nor should they cede political authority or territorial control to insurgents, especially in the absence o a direct

Aghan government role in the reintegration process. Tere may also be legal limitations toproviding some unding, such as CERP, directly to insurgents to get them to stop ghting.Tere are a range o negative lessons rom past reintegration cases. Incentives can back-

re i promises are unullled, and individuals may consider returning to the aliban or otherinsurgent groups. In 2010, Suleiman Amiri reintegrated in Herat Province under the impres-sion that he would get a job in the Aghan National Police, but had become disillusioned by little progress. “I I have no choice, I have to become a alib.”22

In 2009, a low-level insurgent leader in Wardak Province approached Aghan security orces with an oer to quit ghting i the government would relocate him, his 50 ghters, andtheir amilies (approximately 400 people) to Kabul, since they no longer elt sae rom the al-iban. Te government’s response, however, was to turn the oer down: “Tank you—let’s keep

talking to each other, but we can’t resettle you.”23

Also in 2009, aliban commander Sayed Wali reintegrated in Herat Province and was promised employment, along with his supporters.By 2010, however, he had not secured employment, and he and his ghters returned to insur-gent and illicit activity.24 In November 2009, Mullah Solaiman and 56 o his men reintegratedin Herat and promised positions in the ANA or ANP. However, Solaiman and many o hissupporters returned to illicit activity by 2010 when their jobs did not materialize.

In addition, the aliban and other insurgent groups have oten lured Aghan governmentofcials with incentives and encouraged them to deect, indicating that providing incentivesin some areas should be viewed as competition with insurgents. Grievances over pay can causedeection to the aliban. In February 2010, or instance, roughly two dozen ANP deectedto the aliban in Wardak Province, in part over a dispute about pay. aliban in the vicin-

ity apparently oered the police a better deal.25

Tese aliban advances can be mitigated by helping local government ofcials develop counterproposals, such as helping resolve paymentdisputes.

In general, the ailure to deliver on promises can be catastrophic or reintegration eorts.Recidivism has been a common problem in Aghanistan, especially since ghters who do notsecure employment requently return to the insurgency or illicit activity.




Engagement of Tribal and Other Leaders

Eective reintegration requires operating through legitimate local institutions. Reintegrationis likely to be successul only when tribal and other local leaders are involved, supported by the Aghan government and ISAF units, and prepared to stake their prestige on working with thegovernment to establish administrative and security arrangements.

In a range o Pashtun areas, where the bulk o the insurgency is occurring, Pashtunwali shapes daily lie through such concepts as badal (revenge), melmastia (hospitality), ghayrat (honor), and nanawati (orgiveness). Tese concepts and mechanisms have signicant impli-cations or the reintegration process. Pashtunwali is an oral tradition that consists o generalprinciples and practices (tsali ) applied to specic cases. Jirgas and shuras are instrumental ordecisionmaking, and tend to be used interchangeably to signiy temporary or permanent coun-cils.26 Unlike ormal criminal codes, under which individuals who have been ound guilty pay nes to the government or are imprisoned, Pashtun customary law primarily seeks compen-sation based on social reconciliation. Community members are the primary act-nders anddecisionmakers, although respected outsiders may be used as well. Te key unctions o arbitra-tion and judgment are usually ullled by the local jirga or shura. Tese bodies, or example,can demand that the wrongdoer apologize publicly to the victim and make a payment orsharm (shame). Reintegration eorts need to work closely with legitimate local institutions,including village and district shuras and jirgas . In cases where shuras or jirgas are not unction-ing, ISAF and Aghan units still need to identiy key legitimate powerbrokers. An individualseeking to reintegrate may rst have to seek orgiveness or his prior actions beore negotiationsover compensation can begin. Pashtunwali justice demands the compensation o loss. In cases where a reintegration candidate may rejoin a specic village, ISAF and Aghan governmentofcials will likely have to broker a series o shuras between the individual and local leaders, who must decide how they want to proceed. Since power and politics in rural areas are local,supporting this process is critical to the reintegration eort. Indeed, long-term reintegration isvirtually impossible without local support. In order to be welcomed back to their communities,reintegration candidates will likely have to take several additional steps:

• Stop ghting the Aghan government and Coalition orces.• Admit their mistakes to the shura and community.• Cut their ties to the aliban and other insurgents, and pledge no uture involvement.• Repay or any damages, based on negotiations with local communities.

ribal and other community leaders have played a key role in several reintegration eorts.In 2006, or instance, local tribal leaders in Konar Province brokered the reintegration o insurgents, such as Haji Syed Hazrat Gul, and promised to protect them. 28

Information Operations

Inormation operations are critical to eective reintegration. As a proactive measure, Aghanand ISAF units can acknowledge that reintegration is a viable option during meetings withtribal and other community leaders. Leveraging the local population is critical. Te idea o reintegration is sometimes most appealing i candidates are not orced to participate in—or




even openly support—the Aghan government. In many Pashtun areas, there is some ani-mosity toward the central government and a strong desire or local autonomy, including orsel-protection. Where appropriate, Aghan and ISAF units can also highlight successul cases where insurgents have reintegrated, using ace-to-ace meetings with locals, whisper cam-paigns, mullahs, radio announcements, and other orms o communication.

In November 2006, or example, HIG commander Mawlawi Abdol Samad delivered apublic message over radio and television ater reintegrating with approximately two dozen o his orces: “During the aliban regime, I was acting as head o the provincial court in BadghisProvince,” Abdol Samad noted. “Ater hearing about the peace commission, I decided to handover all these weapons and I eel there is no need or these weapons as there is a legal govern-ment in place.”29 In July 2006, Aghan government ofcials organized a press conerence orMullah Mohammad Zaher, a aliban commander rom Kandahar who reintegrated.30 And in2005, Alizai tribal leader Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani denounced the aliban in public, argu-ing that they undermined peace and stability.31

However, there can be extraordinary risks with such public statements, since they may increase the likelihood that the individual will be targeted by the aliban or other insurgent

groups. In some cases, a reintegrated insurgent may want to live a normal lie and not wantto make public statements repudiating his ormer colleagues. Naeem Kuchi, a ormer alibanofcial and leader o the Ahmadzai tribe, was arrested and sent to Guantanamo. Ater hisrelease, however, he was allowed to return quietly to his tribal position where he helped withother reintegration eorts.32 In other cases, public broadcasts conducted in other provinces ordistricts may mitigate the likelihood o retribution.

Aghan and ISAF units can also conduct inormation campaigns directed at insurgents,using mass communication tailored to the ways insurgents receive their news. Te goal shouldbe to increase awareness o reintegration options and encourage reintegration. In some cases,amily members can be leveraged to make direct appeals to individual insurgents. In addition,providing good treatment can trigger additional opportunities once the treatment becomes

known among insurgents. Tere are some misconceptions among aliban and other insurgentsabout reintegration. Many expect harsh treatment i they reintegrate and anticipate abuses o the Qur’an.33 Some expect to endure lectures on Christianity and Western concepts o govern-ment and society.34

In some cases, reintegration candidates have indeed been treated harshly by Aghan orCoalition orces. In December 2001, or instance, the Haqqani amily sent a delegation o Zadran tribal elders to meet with Aghan ofcials about reintegration. Te convoy was bombedand the eort was aborted. In addition, Hajji Ibrahim, the brother o Jalaluddin Haqqani, trav-eled to Kabul to discuss reintegration and briey served with the Aghan government. He wassubsequently seized by ISAF orces and spent two years in the Bagram Teater InternmentFacility beore being released. In another case, or Jan Pirzai reintegrated ater the collapse o

the aliban regime and worked as a tailor in the Musa Qalah bazaar. But he was later arrestedand apparently beaten on the orders o Amir Mohammad, who was a district administrator atthe time. When he was nally released, or Jan rejoined the aliban as one o its most activecommanders.35 In 2002, the aliban’s oreign minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, voluntarily let the aliban. But he was taken into custody by U.S. orces and spent three years in prisonbeore being released. Te aliban eventually killed his brother in Quetta and publicly notedthat Mutawakil “does not represent our will.”36




Tese cases need to be eectively countered at the tactical and operational levels withrecent successul examples—and advertised through eective inormation operations. Duringthe reintegration process, there is a critical need to neutralize aliban and other insurgent pro-paganda. Tis may include insurgent eorts to highlight shortalls in reintegration and to dis-credit the program and the Aghan government’s ability to support it. Te ailure o past pro-

grams—such as DDR and the Disarmament o Illegally Armed Groups—to provide promisedland and jobs to candidates has reinorced skepticism among some Aghans that reintegrationcould pay o. Messages should serve several purposes:

• Demonstrate that the Aghan government and Coalition orces are not their enemy, andthat insurgents who lay down their arms will be accepted and treated with respect.

• Drive a wedge between insurgent leaders and their rank-and-le.• Convince rank-and-le insurgents that better alternatives exist. Tose who continue

ghting will be killed or captured.

Tose who have reintegrated can help create opportunities by demonstrating to insur-gents the benets o an end to ghting and the weakness o support among the insurgency’smembers. In Vietnam, or instance, the South Vietnamese developed the Chieu Hoi Programto encourage reintegration by the Viet Cong and their supporters. Reintegration was urgedthrough a psychological campaign, usually leaets delivered by artillery shell, material droppedover enemy-controlled areas by aircrat, or messages broadcast over areas o South Vietnam.37

Active Use of Personnel

Successul reintegration programs weaken an insurgency by reducing its support base and by eectively using ormer combatants. While the primary role o reintegration is to stop insur-gents rom ghting the Aghan government and ISAF orces, reintegrated ghters can be valu-able sources o inormation on the insurgency. Tey can be used in a range o ways.

First, they can be used or intelligence collection. Examples include providing valuableinormation on the identity and location o insurgents, patterns o lie, broader insurgent networks, sources o unding and support, and the weaknesses that can be exploited. However,using reintegrated ghters or intelligence or other purposes must be done with extraordinary caution. Reintegration candidates may seek to attack ISAF or Aghan orces, collect inorma-tion and pass it back to insurgents as double agents or stall Aghan and Coalition military operations.

Second, individuals can participate in local deense orces that protect communities andcounter insurgent activities. Te Aghan government and U.S. Special Operations Forcesestablished the Village Stability Operations program in 2009 and the Aghan Local Policeprogram in 2010, which helped local villagers provide security, development, and governanceto their villages.38 Tese programs have been helpul in reintegrating insurgents. During theinsurgency in Oman rom 1962 to 1975, or example, reintegrated Dhoar tribesmen partici-pated in frqats , irregular units that deended their communities rom rebels. Te governmentprovided a cash incentive to rebels who surrendered, with a bonus i they brought their weap-ons. Te surrendered rebels ormed frqat units, trained by teams rom the British Special AirService.39 In Malaya, the British and Malayan authorities developed the Special Operations




Volunteer Force (SOVF), which existed rom 1952 until the end o the emergency in 1960.ypically, an SOVF platoon would operate near villages where disaected Chinese lived andconduct operations to induce urther deections.40

Tird, reintegrated ghters can be used as scouts to provide inormation on the locationand movement o insurgents. In Vietnam in 1966, the U.S. Marine Corps created the Kit

Carson Scouts. Tey were used to identiy Viet Cong guerrillas among the civilian populationand to provide narrative descriptions o how the Viet Cong moved and interacted with civil-ians. In addition, the scouts helped identiy booby traps, caves, tunnels, and caches o enemy weapons, and were also used or conducting tactical interrogations beore newly detained pris-oners were sent to the rear.41 In Colombia, the government employed individuals as scoutsbecause o their amiliarity with the local terrain and ability to identiy insurgents.42

Fourth, reintegrated personnel can be given government positions at the district, provin-cial, or national levels. When Mullah Salam reintegrated in late 2007, the Aghan governmentappointed him district governor o Musa Qalah. Haji Kaduz, a Barakzai rom Helmand whoreintegrated in 2009, was brought into the Aghan National Police.

Fith, individuals can be used or a range o lower-prole tasks:

• Returning home and maintaining a regular liaison with local leaders and the government• Ceasing attacks in their areas o responsibility • Allowing schools to remain open• Encouraging nongovernmental organizations to enter their areas and helping ensure their

security • Reporting on insurgent activity and movement in their area.



21

CHAPTER THREE

Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up

Amilar Cabral, a nationalist leader rom Guinea-Bissau, once noted that an insurgency is like atrain journey. At every stop, some people get on and others get o.1 Aghan and ISAF units thatengage in reintegration need to be cognizant o the tremendous difculties involved. Reinte-gration is inherently controversial because it requires working with individuals who have beenghting—and perhaps killing—Aghan and Coalition orces. In some cases, these challengescan be mitigated by reintegrating insurgents in out-o-area locations where the reintegration

candidates have not committed any crimes or been involved in tribal euds. As past insurgen-cies demonstrate, however, reintegration is a necessary part o successul counterinsurgency.

Te unpopularity o insurgent groups in Aghanistan suggests that reintegration is aviable option. More importantly, reintegration can acilitate mobilization o the local popu-lation against insurgents and begin to change local perceptions that momentum is shitingagainst insurgent groups. Ultimately, however, eective reintegration cannot be separated romreconciliation with insurgent leaders. Over the long run, attempting to reintegrate mid- andlower-level insurgents—while reusing to consider reconciling leaders—may undermine rein-tegration eorts by increasing caution among insurgents.

Tere are numerous negative reintegration lessons in Aghanistan. Te Aghan govern-ment’s PS program, or example, had minimal success in reintegration and reconciliation.

Aghanistan’s National Security Council was also involved in reintegration and reconciliationbut with mixed success. Insurgents could reintegrate by approaching a representative at a pro-vincial ofce or contacting the headquarters. Yet the program ailed to acilitate mobilizationo the local population against insurgents or to change local perceptions that momentum wasshiting against insurgent groups. Te commission struggled even to maintain the quality o itsbasic reception services. Tere were persistent complaints o poor living conditions and inad-equate, low-quality ood at the program’s guest house. Although this may seem a minor matter,numerous aliban-associated gures have commented that a shoddy reception undermines thecondence that is undamental to any real reintegration.2

But there are also positive lessons. As this study ound in examining 36 cases, at least threeactors appear to raise the probability o reintegration: increasing the perception that Aghanand Coalition orces are winning the war, especially at the local level; utilizing coercion againstinsurgents; and addressing key grievances. Although reintegration requires Aghan govern-ment leadership, the central government is sometimes ill prepared and poorly synchronized with district and provincial ofcials. Consequently, reintegration requires a bottom-up strategy as well as a top-down one. Tis includes coordination between ISAF units and provincial anddistrict ofcials; tribal and other community leaders; and NDS, ANP, and ANA ofcials. ac-tical units cannot always wait or the central government to act in a timely manner.



23

Notes

Summary

1 Memorandum rom General Stanley McChrystal, Subject: Initial Guidance on Reintegration, R:\1800-F-RIC\Initial Guidance, HQ ISAF/USFOR-A, October 25, 2009.

2 Te prex “re” (which means “again”) in reintegration may be something o a misnomer, since it may be therst time some insurgents switch sides.

3 Secretary o Deense Robert Gates, Hearing o the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Aghani-

stan: Assessing the Road Ahead, December 3, 2009.4 Islamic Republic o Aghanistan, Aghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) (Kabul, Aghanistan:National Security Council, D&R Commission, 2010).

5 On comparative case studies, see, or example, Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods or Students o Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 49–88; and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies andTeory Development: Te Method o Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplo-macy: New Approaches in History, Teory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43–68.

Chapter One

1 See, or example, Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Aghanistan (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute

o Peace, 2009), p. 13.

2 Stathis N. Kalyvas, Te Logic o Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006),pp. 105–106.

3 Gregor Benton, Mountain Fire: Te Red Army’s Tree-Year War in South China, 1934–1938 (Berkeley: Uni-versity o Caliornia Press, 1992), p. 475.

4 Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds o Prey: Te CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (Annapolis,Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 250–251.

5 Robert Tompson, Deeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 25.

6 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and errorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, D.C.: PotomacBooks, 2005), pp. 115–116.

7 Ashley J. ellis, Reconciling with the aliban: oward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Aghanistan (Washing-ton, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment or International Peace, 2009), pp. 15–20.

8 On control o territory, see Kalyvas, Te Logic o Violence in Civil War , pp. 210–245.

9 Roger rinquier, Modern Warare: A French View o Counterinsurgency (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2006),p. 6.

10 James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign Aairs , Vol. 86, No. 2, March–April 2007, p. 8.




11 Tomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: Norton, 1978); imur Kuran, “New Outo Never: Te Role o Surprise in the East European Revolution o 1989,” World Politics , Vol. 44, No. 1, 1991,pp. 7–48.

12 David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: Te Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 21–24.

13

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warare: Teory and Practice (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Hailer Publishing, 2005),p. 123.

14 Author interviews in Helmand, May 2010.

15 Courage Services, ribal Dynamics in Aghanistan: A Resource or Analysts (Washington, D.C., 2008).

16 See, or example, U.S. Department o Deense, Inormation Operations, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington,D.C., February 2006).

17 See, or example, Asia Foundation, Aghanistan in 2009: A Survey o the Aghan People (Kabul, 2009), p. 171.

18 On the all o the aliban regime see Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account o How the CIA Spear-headed the War on error in Aghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); Stephen Biddle, Aghanistan and the Future o Warare: Implications or Army and Deense Policy (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College StrategicStudies Institute, November 2002); Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: Te Attack on Bin Laden

and Al Qa’ ida (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005); and Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon andSchuster, 2002).

19 See Biddle, Aghanistan and the Future o Warare .

20 Semple, Reconciliation in Aghanistan, p. 41.

21 Karl Forsberg, Te aliban’s Campaign or Kandahar (Washington, D.C.: Institute or the Study o War,2009), p. 17.

22 I thank Michael Semple or making this point.

23 Abdul Salam Zaee, My Lie with the aliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

24 Antonio Giustozzi, Empires o Mud: Wars and Warlords in Aghanistan (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2009).25 Tomas Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: Te Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” in AntonioGiustozzi, ed., Decoding the New aliban: Insights rom the Aghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press,2009), pp. 57–88.

26 Tomas Bareld, Aghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,2010); Louis Dupree, Aghanistan (New York: Oxord University Press, 1997), p. 221.

27 Tomas Schelling, Arms and Inuence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).

28 om Coghlan, “Te aliban in Helmand: An Oral History,” in Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the New aliban,p. 143.

29 Antonio Giustozzi, “Te aliban’s Marches: Herat, Farah, Baghdis, and Ghor,” in Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the New aliban, p. 219.

30 Sean D. Naylor, “Allies urn Aghan Insurgents into Partners,” Army imes , October 31, 2009; JoshuaPartlow, “aliban Deectors Accept U.S. Approach but Wait or Promises to Be Kept,” Washington Post ,February 26, 2010, p. A1.

31 Author interview with Aghan and ISAF ofcials in Herat, August 2010.

32 Partlow, “aliban Deectors Accept U.S. Approach but Wait or Promises to Be Kept.”



Notes 25

33 “aliban Number 1 Surrenders in Fear,” Daily Mail (London), July 23, 2008; Jeremy Page and ZahidHussain, “Arrest o aliban Chie Hailed as a Breakthrough,” imes (London), July 24, 2008; Kim Sengupta,“aliban Factions May Be Using British Forces to Assassinate Rival Commanders,” Independent (London), July 25, 2008.

34 “aliban Commanders Surrender; Medics Go Missing,” Pajhwok Aghan News , June 14, 2007.

35

O’Neill, Insurgency and errorism, p. 121; ed Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1970).

36 Graeme Smith, “What Kandahar’s aliban Say,” in Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the New aliban, p. 197.

37 U.S. Department o Deense, Report on Progress oward Security and Stability in Aghanistan: Reportto Congress in accordance with section 1230 o the National Deense Authorization Act or Fiscal Year 2008(Public Law 110-181), as amended (Washington, D.C., 2010), p. 130.

38 Habib Rahman Sherzai, “120 HIA Men Surrender in Baghlan,” Pahjwok Aghan News , March 7, 2010;Omaid Khpalwak, “50 Dead in aliban-HIA Clash,” Pahjwok Aghan News , March 7, 2010. Also see LauraKing, “Aghan Militant Hekmatyar Packs a Surprise,” Los Angeles imes , March 31, 2010; “aliban Clashes

with Rival Aghan Militants Kill 60,” BBC, March 7, 2010; and im McGirk, “A Civil War Among Aghani-stan’s Insurgents?” ime , March 8, 2010.

39

See, or example, Abdul Lati Ayubi, “Commander Among Seven Fighters Join Government,” Pajhwok Aghan News , September 26, 2009; and “aliban Commander Joins Government,” Pajhwok Aghan News , Sep-tember 15, 2009.

40 “Key aliban Commander Surrenders to U.S. in Khowst Province,” Aghan Islamic Press , April 24, 2005.

41 Courage Services, ribal Dynamics in Aghanistan, p. 27.

42 om Coghlan, “Weak Government Allows aleban to Prosper in Aghanistan,” imes (London),September 29, 2008.

43 On the deections caused by Sher Mohammad Akhunzada’s tenure as governor, see Jerey A. Dressler, Secur-ing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy (Washington, D.C.: Institute or the Study o War,2009), pp. 5–7.

Chapter Two

1 Islamic Republic o Aghanistan, Aghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), p. 3.

2 Memorandum rom General Stanley McChrystal, Subject: Initial Guidance on Reintegration.

3 On using reintegration to help mobilize the population, see Islamic Republic o Aghanistan, AghanistanPeace and Reintegration Program (APRP ), pp. 10, 23.

4 See, or example, Bareld, Aghanistan: A Cultural and Political History ; Dupree, Aghanistan.


6 Mohammad Osman ariq Elias, “Te Resurgence o the aliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak,” in Giustozzi,

ed., Decoding the New aliban, p. 53.7 Author interview with ofcials o the Proceayee ahqeem Solha in Konar, September 2009.

8 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Aghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), pp. 139–140.

9 Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration o Ex‐combatants (DDR) in Aghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities (London: Crisis States Research Centre Working




Paper, June 2006); Christian Dennys, Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament? Te Eect o Disarma-ment in Aghanistan (Kabul: Japan Aghan NGO Network, 2005).

10 Author interview with UN, Aghan, and ISAF ofcials, June 2010.

11 Insurgents should not be expected to sign documents in English. Te reintegration procedures should be cul-turally appropriate, especially i they are locally improvised.


13 Author interview with Barakzai elders in Helmand, December 2009.

14 ony Perry, “Marine’s Success in Aghanistan Has a History,” Los Angeles imes , December 31, 2009.

15 “Former aliban Ofcial Mullah Khaksar Killed in Southeast Aghanistan,” Aghan Islamic Press , January 14,2006.

16 Michaela Cancela-Kieer, “aliban Increasingly Marginal, Aghans Say,” Agence France Presse , October 5,2004.

17 Islamic Republic o Aghanistan, Aghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), p. 8.

18 Fahim Faiez, “Aghan Militants Battle aliban, Deect to Government,” Associated Press , March 7, 2010.

19 “aliban Commander Surrenders in South Aghanistan,” BBC, April 3, 2006.

20 “wo op Members o the Ousted aliban Regime Surrender in Aghanistan,” Agence France Presse , April 21, 2005; “Key Former aliban Commander Surrenders, Tree Militants Seized,” Agence France Press , April 1, 2005.


22 Partlow, “aliban Deectors Accept U.S. Approach but Wait or Promises to Be Kept.”

23 Naylor, “Allies urn Aghan Insurgents into Partners.”

24 Author interview with Aghan and ISAF ofcials in Herat, August 2010.

25 Rod Nordland, “25 Aghan Police May Have Joined aliban,” New York imes , February 18, 2010.

26 See, or example, ribal Liaison Ofce, Good Governance in ribal Areas Kandahar Research Project: ResearchReport (Kabul, 2005).

27 Tomas Bareld, “Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Aghanistan,” Maine Law Review ,Vol. 60, No. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 347–373. Also see, or example, Fredrik Barth, “Pathan Identity and ItsMaintenance,” in Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: Te Social Organization o Culture Dierence (Boston: Litt le, Brown, 1969).

28 “18 aliban, Hekmatyar Loyalists Surrender in Kunar,” Pahjwok Aghan News , February 18, 2006; “Seventy Former Aghan Commanders Renounce Armed Resistance,” BBC, February 22, 2006.

29 “Former Hezb-e-Islami Commander Joins Peace Process in Aghanistan,” BBC, November 16, 2006; “woSenior aliban Commanders Surrender in Western Aghanistan,” BBC, November 16, 2006.

30

“aliban Commander Joins Government Side in Aghan Kandahar Province,” BBC, July 15, 2006.31 Courage Services, ribal Dynamics in Aghanistan, p. 26.

32 Courage Services, ribal Dynamics in Aghanistan, p. 85.

33 Matt Waldman, Golden Surrender? Te Risks, Challenges, and Implications o Reintegration in Aghanistan (Kabul: Aghanistan Analysts Network, 2010).

34 Zaee, My Lie with the aliban.



Notes 27


36 Zaee, My Lie with the aliban; ribal Analysis Center, Mizh der beitabora khalq yi: Pashtun ReconciliationPrograms (Williamsburg, Va., 2008), pp. 6–7.

37 J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Tomson, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: Te Special Case o Chieu Hoi (Santa Monica, Cali.: RAND Corporation, RM-4830-2-ISA/ARPA, May 1966, available at www.rand.

org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4830-2.html ); Konrad Kellen, Conversations with Enemy Soldiers inLate 1968/Early 1969: A Study o Motivation and Morale (Santa Monica, Cali.: RAND Corporation,RM-6131-1-ISA/ARPA, September 1970, available at www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM6131-1.html); J. A. Koch, Te Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963–1971 (Santa Monica, Cali.: RAND Corpo-ration, R-1172-ARPA, January 1973, available at www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R1172.html).

38 See, or example, Seth G. Jones, “It akes the Villages: Bringing Change rom Below in Aghanistan,” For-eign Aairs , Vol. 89, No. 3, May–June 2010, pp. 120–127; and “Community Deense in Aghanistan,” Joint Forces Quarterly , No. 57, April 2010, pp. 9–15.

39 Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockli, 1960); Calvin H. Allen and W. LynnRigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970–1996 (New York: Routledge, 2000); Major-General ony Jeapes, SAS Secret War (London: Greenhill Books, 2005).

40 Edgar O’Ballance, Malaya: Te Communist Insurgent War, 1948–60 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966).

41 William V. Cowan, “Kit Carson Scouts,” Marine Corps Gazette , Vol. 53, No. 10, October 1969, pp. 30–32;al ovy, “From Foe to Friend: Te Kit Carson Scout Program in the Vietnam War,” Armed Forces and Society ,Vol. 33, No. 1, 2006, pp. 78–93.

42 Dennis M. Rempe, Te Past as Prologue? A History o U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958–1966 (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002).

43 William Finnegan, A Complicated War: Te Harrowing o Mozambique (Berkeley: University o CaliorniaPress, 1992), p. 133.

44 ellis, Reconciling with the aliban; Semple, Reconciliation in Aghanistan, pp. 54–57.

Chapter Three

1 Finnegan, A Complicated War , p. 133.

2 ellis, Reconciling with the aliban; Semple, Reconciliation in Aghanistan, pp. 54–57.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4830-2.html


http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM6131-1



http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R1172.html



http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R1172.html



reintegrating afghan insurgents

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