This article was downloaded by: [University of Regina]On: 31 May 2013, At: 09:41Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Intervention andStatebuildingPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/risb20

(Re)generating PeacekeepingAuthority: The Brahimi ProcessSilke Weinlich aa German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut fürEntwicklungspolitik (DIE)Published online: 02 Jul 2012.

To cite this article: Silke Weinlich (2012): (Re)generating Peacekeeping Authority: The BrahimiProcess, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6:3, 257-277

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.655625

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of anyinstructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

(Re)generating Peacekeeping Authority:The Brahimi Process

Silke Weinlich

Authority is considered to be the main source of agency and influence ofinternational organizations. This article argues that authority is a volatile andcontested good that might be successfully manipulated by internationalorganizations themselves. Drawing on the case of UN peacekeeping reforms atthe beginning of the new century, it identifies three behavioural patterns*adding authority from outside; overacting; mandate stretching*that helpedthe UN Secretariat to regain peacekeeping authority that the organization hadlost at the end of the 1990s.

Keywords peacekeeping; UN reform; international bureaucracy; BrahimiReport; authority

Introduction

At the end of the 1990s, the United Nation’s authority in the field of

peacekeeping was seriously damaged. The tragic peacekeeping failures in

Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia/Srebrenica overshadowed any of the UN’s peace-

keeping successes; the euphoria about a vastly expanded role of the world

organization in peace and security after the end of the cold war had given way to

disillusion. Complex UN Peace operations were discredited and UN member

states turned towards regional organizations. The future of UN peacekeeping was

very much in question (International Peace Academy 2002, p. 18). This changed

in 2000 after the publication of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace

Operations, also known as Brahimi Report after the panel’s chairman. Unlike, for

example, the 1992 Agenda for Peace (United Nations 1992), which continues to

be cherished by academics yet was bogged down in the intergovernmental

process, the Brahimi Report acquired an unusually influential status at the UN.

The Brahimi Report set into motion a reform process that brought the United

Nations back into the peacekeeping game (Tardy 2004, Durch 2006a). Internal

reforms went hand in hand with a renewed commitment by member states and an

increase in the number and scope of UN peace operations. As former Under-

secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno pointed

out in 2002: ‘Without the political momentum given by the Brahimi panel report,

ISSN 1750-2977 print/1750-2985 online/12/030257-21# 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.655625

JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING VOLUME 6 NUMBER 3 (SEPTEMBER 2012)

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

we would never have had the clout to really move things forward’ (Guehenno

2002, p. 490). The Brahimi reform process bolstered the UN’s authority in the

field of peacekeeping and helped to re-engage member states in the peace and

security activities of the UN.In this article I argue that the Brahimi Report was a success story for the UN’s

international bureaucracy, which skilfully orchestrated its efforts to gain member

states’ support for peacekeeping reforms and thus regained peacekeeping

authority that it had lost. After decades of disinterest in international organiza-

tions, the fact that international organizations and their bureaucracies are

important actors in global politics has finally emerged as a consensus in the

current scholarly debate (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008, Biermann and Siebenhuner

2009). However, the debate has not yet settled on the extent of their agency, the

origins of their preferences, and on how exactly international organizations

become influential. The UN usually is not counted among the ‘usual suspects’ of

international organizations discussed in the context of agency and independence

(Bauer and Weinlich 2011). Any evidence of such a role by the UN will hence make

an interesting contribution to the debate. It will demonstrate that even

international organizations with fewer resources and competences and possibly

greater limits to their independence are nevertheless actors to be taken

seriously.For constructivist scholars, authority is the key concept for explaining how

international organizations become influential. Authority is understood as ‘the

ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce

deference from others’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 5). International

organizations possess distinct forms of authority: they are bureaucracies; they

consist of experts; they possess a mandate granted by member states; and they

represent the international community*all this vests them with authority and in

turn makes other actors comply with their judgements. In this article, I argue

that authority should not be considered to be a constant characteristic of

international organizations, but should rather be understood as a volatile and

contested good that might be successfully manipulated by international

organizations themselves. International organizations may lose authority in the

eyes of member states and the public, and they may undertake activities in order

to regain it. By gaining a better understanding of this process, we obtain a better

appreciation of the agency of international organizations.The article is structured as follows. First I will discuss the current literature on

the agency of international organizations and present the concept and use of

authority. Secondly, I will give a short introduction to the state of UN

peacekeeping at the end of the 1990s. Thirdly, building on UN documents,

interview data and conference transcripts, I will investigate the UN Secretariat’s

activities to regain authority in the field of peacekeeping by undertaking an

analysis of the genesis of the Brahimi Report and the subsequent reforms. The

conclusion discusses the consequence of this empirical evidence for the debate

on the agency of international organizations.

258 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

I The Authority of International Organizations and their Bureaucracies

As pointed out in the introduction of this special issue, the agency of

international organizations has long been grossly neglected in the discipline of

international relations. Traditional theories considered international organiza-

tions to be an epiphenomenon of states’ struggle for power and security, or mere

arenas that facilitate member states’ efforts of cooperation (Verbeek 1998).

Although international organizations and their bureaucracies have recently been

receiving more attention, we are only beginning to gain a systematic knowledge

of what their influence is. Many scholars investigating the agency of international

organizations de facto scrutinize international bureaucracies, although they

rarely do so explicitly (Liese and Weinlich 2006, Biermann and Siebenhuner 2009).

This also holds true for the two schools of thought currently engaged in a debate

about how to best theorize and analyse the agency of international organizations:

rationalist principal�agent theory and constructivist socio-institutionalism.Principal�agent theory, inspired by microeconomics, conceptualizes interna-

tional organizations as agents to which member states have delegated authority

linked to specific tasks (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006). The delegation contract

implies some discretion in how the specific task will be fulfilled, since states

profit from a more independent international organization in many ways (Abbott

and Snidal 1998). International organizations, conceptualized as rational self-

seeking actors, will use the delegated authority and discretion to further their

own goals, supposedly to gain more resources, more personnel, and more

competences (Vaubel 2006). In turn, member states will apply preventive and

reactive control mechanisms in order to rein in the renegade agent. According to

principal�agent theory, delegated authority is the sole source of an international

organization’s influence.

Partly in reaction to what they perceived as restrictedness of principal�agent

models, partly in reaction to observed ‘pathological’ behaviour of international

organizations, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999, 2004, 2005) among

others developed a competing approach to theorizing the agency of international

bureaucracies. They challenge the assumption that state-delegated authority is

the only basis for autonomous action and influence of international organizations

and identify various supplemental types to state-delegated authority (Barnett

and Finnemore 2005, pp. 175�181). Authority is based on recognition and

perception by others and does not match the strictly hierarchical relationship

between principals and agents as postulated by rationalist scholars (Pollack

2007). Four types of authority are considered the sources for an international

organization’s ability to become possibly important actor in global politics

(Barnett and Finnemore 2004, pp. 20�27, Bauer 2006).International organizations possess delegated authority. Member states

delegate specific tasks to international organizations; they give them mandates

and put them in charge of planning or implementing policy. International

organizations possess rational� legal authority. This form of authority is

derived from Max Weber’s argument that modernity values general, impersonal

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 259

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

rule-making and the semblance of neutrality, and people are generally willing to

submit to such an authority. Bureaucracies are the embodiment of impersonal,

neutral rule-making. At the heart of nearly every international organization there

is a bureaucracy. Therefore state representatives, governments, the press, and

members of the public are inclined to give credit to an international organiza-

tion’s assessments and policy proposals. International organizations possess

expert authority. People value detailed, specialized knowledge and trust that

those who possess it*experts*are prone to making good recommendations.

International organizations are considered to be staffed with people who are

specialized and trained for their duties and who have gained substantial

experience in the course of their work. Therefore, other actors tend to trust

their ability to find the most appropriate solution for a given problem.

International organizations possess moral authority. They can claim to embody

‘the international community’, to stand for worldwide cherished norms and

values. Any output of international organizations is vested with some legitimacy

because it goes beyond the partial, self-seeking interests that state actors

allegedly pursue.While a direct link between authority and influence is assumed, authority does

not always and automatically translate into influence and power (Barnett and

Finnemore 2004, p. 21). The authority of an international organization depends

on the perception of the organization. According to constructivist premises,

international organizations may gain or lose authority over time; authority may

vary from issue area to issue area or from stakeholder to stakeholder. For

instance, the small secretariat to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal

Protocol is widely perceived as professional, neutral, transparent, and to possess

legal and technical expertise. The secretariat is able to translate this authority

into considerable influence; it is an active player behind the scenes. In contrast,

the secretariat to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification is

perceived by donor states as intransparent, biased towards the interests of

developing countries, and as reaching beyond its mandate, which limits its

potential to shape the implementation of the anti-desertification convention

(Bauer 2006).

Table 1. Repertoire of behaviour for international bureaucracies

Delegated � gives impression of acting at the behest of statesAuthority � avoids impression of abusing discretion

Rational�Legal � gives impression of being neutral and impartialAuthority � gives impression of acting on the basis of general rules, no arbitrary

decisionsExpert � gives impression of possessing expert knowledgeAuthority � uses expert/technical argumentation

Moral � stands above national interestsAuthority � speaks up in name of ‘international community’; etc.

� claims to do the ‘right/good’ thing

260 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

In order to be perceived as possessing one or several of the described types ofauthority, and to be able to translate it into influence, the staff of aninternational organization needs to follow a distinct repertoire of behaviour.

Authority needs to be enacted in order to produce social effects. Not only doactivities per se matter*for instance, whether or not an international

organization is able to perform well. Also the ways and manners in which theseactivities are conducted are crucial for generating authority. As a rule, staff

members need to give the impression that they do not promote their own agendabut rather work at the behest of member states; they must present themselves as

impartial, and technocratic. Table 1 gives a synoptic overview of the types ofauthority and the behaviour that helps to (re)generate it.

While Barnett and Finnemore (2004) provided us with analytical distinctions of

different forms of authority, they did not elaborate on the process of howauthority is (re)generated in social interactions. How does an international

organization win back authority (and possibly influence) after it has lost parts ofit? Does it take recourse to the standard behavioural repertoire; does it engage in

additional behavioural patterns?The subsequent empirical analysis will scrutinize the genesis of the Brahimi

reforms as a case study that promises some answers to the above questions. TheUN suffered blows to all types of authority in the area of peacekeeping at the end

of the 1990s. By 2000�01, the UN again enjoyed more trust and acceptance frommember states, translating into an increase in funding, peacekeeping mandates,and a backing of major internal reforms*indicators for a significant increase in

authority and influence. While there might be other reasons, following theoutlined constructivist premises, we can suspect that the international organiza-

tion itself played a role. There will be an explicit focus on the activities of theUN’s international bureaucracy, that is, the UN Secretariat. The Secretariat will

be treated as a collective actor. The focus here will be on members of theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), including its leadership.

The Secretariat’s leadership, the Secretary-General and his executive office,are explicitly mentioned where necessary.

II The Brahimi Process: (Re)generating Authority

Authority in Crisis*UN Peacekeeping at the End of the 1990s

After the golden days of UN peacekeeping at the beginning of the 1990s, when

the Security Council had issued mandate after mandate and the instrument ofpeace operations was tried out as a remedy in all sorts of new environments, in

the mid-1990s the situation changed. The disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosniaand Herzegovina, and Angola overshadowed the successful peacekeeping

missions upon which the UN’s reputation had been built up over many years.Reports of UN peacekeepers acting as bystanders to ethnic cleansing and

genocide, thereby subverting their own goals of humanitarianism and protection

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 261

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

of human rights, had made many observers question the organization’s legitimacy

(Barnett 2002). In 1996�97, the overall sentiment was that UN peacekeeping was

a model that was ready to be phased out. Undersecretary-General Myiet recalled

that he could not help feeling that he ‘should be the liquidator of peacekeeping

operations’ (International Peace Academy 2002, p. 18). There were clear

indicators for a loss of authority among the various stakeholders, notably

industrialized states that pay for the bulk of peacekeeping bills, and developing

states that contribute most of the troops.1

Western civilian and military decision-makers who had promoted the expan-

sion of the UN’s role in internal conflicts after the end of the cold war had lost

confidence in UN peace operations. Their scepticism towards the ability of the

organization to successfully undertake peace operations translated into concrete

action: member states turned towards regional organizations such as NATO and

the EU for intervention tasks and undertook substantial efforts to strengthen

these organizations for their new efforts (Griffin 1999). Western governments

also scaled down their contributions to UN-led peacekeeping missions, especially

in Africa (Daniel and Caraher 2006). France, the UK, and the United States began

to develop programmes to strengthen African peacekeeping capacities (Berman

2002).Developing countries remained interested in contributing personnel, not least

for the financial and reputation benefits as well as for the military practice

involved. Yet they were increasingly concerned about being treated as ‘hired

help’ (Durch et al. 2003, p. 19), being mostly excluded from peacekeeping

decision-making by an exclusive and secretive UN Security Council dominated by

its permanent members (Boulden 2006). In addition, many troop-contributing

countries were critical of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Between 1992 and 1995, so-called gratis military officers had made up

85 per cent of the logistic and military planning staff and nearly a quarter of

DPKO’s total staffing. Loaned free of charge to the Secretariat in the heyday of

UN peacekeeping, they had supported the UN’s weak planning and other military

structures. They mostly came from industrialized states that could afford to send

officers to New York, particularly the ‘P-3’, i.e. the United States, France, and

the UK (McClure and Orlov 1999). The perception that the Secretariat favoured

Western interests continued even after the practice had been brought to a halt in

1997. In addition, developing countries considered the UN’s engagement and

financial commitment in the Balkans proof of the UN’s double standards in light

of the comparatively minor sums available for managing African conflicts. The

general mistrust towards the UN’s security agenda became even more pro-

nounced after the Kosovo intervention and the Secretary-General’s attempt to

initiate a debate on the rights and wrongs of humanitarian interventions in the

General Assembly (Malone and Hagman 2002).In sum, it is fair to say that the United Nations had suffered a loss of moral and

expert authority in the eyes of the most important peacekeeping stakeholders.

This translated into a loss of delegated authority. Although the overall number of

UN peace operations never went below 12, the number of uniformed personnel in

262 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

the field decreased dramatically, and the Security Council refrained from

authorizing larger or more robust operations between 1995 and 1999 (Durch

2006b, p. 5). Member states were also unwilling to compensate DPKO for the loss

of gratis personnel. Governments were very reluctant to authorize the necessary

resources and approve the new organizational structure proposed by the

Secretariat. Western governments cited financial and efficiency concerns,

Southern governments remained sceptical towards the UN Secretariat’s role in

peacekeeping (McClure and Orlov 1999). And from 1996 on, the largest financial

contributor, the United States of America, had been unilaterally cutting its

assessed contributions from more than 30 per cent to 25 per cent of the UN

peacekeeping budget, thereby accumulating a significant debt (Holt and

Mackinnon 2008, p. 23).In the UN Secretariat, there was an acute awareness of this loss of authority

and possible loss of influence. UN peacekeeping was important to the then

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and members of his executive office, some of

whom had worked with Annan when he was head of DPKO. The downsizing of the

rather thinly staffed DPKO became an even greater problem when the UN was

suddenly mandated with two highly complex peace operations in Kosovo and East

Timor. After NATO had enforced peace in Kosovo without Security Council

authorization (dealing yet another blow to the UN) the Secretary-General was

entrusted with the interim administration of the territory in early 1999 at very

short notice (Dziedzic 2006). This came as a surprise to everyone: ‘no one would

have guessed that the Security Council would soon give the UN Secretariat

another go at managing complex civil�military operations in dangerous and

volatile, not quite post-conflict settings’ (Durch 2006b, p. 28). A few months

later, the UN took up a complex peace operation in East Timor after the UN-led

referendum had exploded into violence.

Arguably, member states did not choose the United Nations because they

suddenly held it in high authority again. Member states had many doubts about

the UN’s capacity to successfully undertake these operations. Yet in both cases

the United Nations was the only organization acceptable to all key players.

Within few months, the total number of troops, police, and civilian personnel

under UN command more than tripled.

There were concerns among Secretariat leadership that this situation could

produce another catastrophe (Traub 2006, p. 119). What had gone fundamentally

wrong in earlier peace operations had been brought out on the table in late 1999.

Under the leadership of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretariat had commissioned two

unusual self-critical reports on the UN’s role*or inaction*in the massacre of

Srebrenica and the genocide in Rwanda (United Nations 1999a, 1999b). These

reports were widely characterized as remarkably frank, clearly attributing

responsibilities to the Secretariat, the Security Council, and member states.

They called problems by their names: inappropriate Security Council mandates,

lack of political will, inadequate resources, together with doctrinal

and institutional misjudgements and shortcomings on the part of the UN itself.

For the UN leadership, the reports, sobering as they were, raised the question

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 263

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

how to improve UN peacekeeping to prevent such tragedies from happeningagain.

Regenerating Authority: The Brahimi Process

How did the UN bureaucracy react to the loss of authority and the sense offoreboding of even greater calamities? What did it do in order to make member

states sign up to UN peacekeeping again and thereby reinforce the UN’s authorityin this area? As the day-to-day interactions with states were insufficient to

initiate the changes deemed necessary, the international bureaucracy took adifferent approach. In the following section, I discuss three behavioural patternsthat seem to have had a positive impact on peacekeeping reforms and helped

(re)generate the UN’s authority: adding authority from outside of the organiza-tion, overacting, and mandate stretching.

Pattern I: Adding authority from outside

Obtain a mandate from heads of states and government. Faced with the

dilemma of authority loss coupled with increased peacekeeping demands,the Secretariat’s executive office chose to take advantage of the attentionalready generated by the two critical reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda.

While Annan seems to have authorized the initial investigations rather reluc-tantly, he was determined to learn from the resulting criticisms (Traub 2006,

p. 112).The question of how to follow up on the reports coincided with the Millennium

Summit, a high-profile summit of heads of states and governments to take placein September 2000. Already in 1997, the newly elected Secretary-General had

recommended a summit as part of his reform package and had convinced therather reluctant UN membership to support this initiative (Ruggie 2003, p. 306,n. 17). The once in 1,000 years event was to ‘open up political space for key

issues that have not made enough progress’ (Hulme 2007, p. 25). The flagshipproject for the development agenda, the Millennium Development Goals, had

been identified relatively early in the preparation process.The Secretariat’s leadership wanted a similar project in the area of peace and

security and chose peacekeeping reforms. To have the highest-ranking nationalofficials consider and decide upon peacekeeping reforms was intended to

produce additional momentum for change. In September 2000, a record numberof heads of state and governments assembled in New York. They gave the

Secretariat a mandate that was hoped to help overcome the procrastinating andpoliticized dynamics which often overshadow substantial debates in many of theUN’s main organs.2

Borrow authority from a panel of experts. In order to develop the

summit’s economic and social priorities, the Secretariat’s leadership had chosen

264 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

to produce an in-house study which would serve as a decision-making template.

This option was also discussed regarding the report on peacekeeping reforms.

In the end the Secretariat’s leadership settled for commissioning a report from a

panel of independent experts. The Secretary-General’s executive office chose a

group of independent actors which would increase the perception of neutrality of

the expected recommendations. It was hoped that the panel’s independence,

real or symbolic, would also help to overcome reform resistance from within

the Secretariat and the wider UN system. The panel’s chairman and its

composition were carefully selected. Lakdhar Brahimi was at that time Under-

Secretary-General for Special Assignments in support of the Secretary-General’s

preventive and peacemaking efforts. His anti-colonial background, his key

positions in the Arab League and the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) as well

as his reputation as an extremely skilful mediator and diplomatic heavy-weight

made him the perfect candidate. The other panel members all had extensive

personal experience in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and humani-

tarian assistance, and covered various stakeholder groups and geographic

constituencies.3 The panel not only possessed a high degree of neutrality that

a UN team might have been perceived to be wanting, given the Secretariat’s

reputation at that time. It also incorporated expert authority that the Secretariat

was allegedly lacking. When the report came out, the Secretary-General was able

to welcome it and thus add his moral authority to recommendations that the

international bureaucracy itself had commissioned and had been kept informed

about during the writing process.In order to ensure the panel’s independence, it received wide terms of

references covering the UN’s full range of peace and security activities.4 No

specifications were made with regard to the report other than that it should

contain implementable recommendations. The Secretariat, however, set

the tone by asking for a report on ‘peace operations’*a term that was (and

continues to be) controversial among the southern majority in the UN’s Special

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34).5 While capitalizing as much as

possible on having a panel that comprised relevant stakeholders, the Secretariat

leadership also made sure that its priorities and views were adequately brought

into the process. Brahimi was close to the UN’s senior leadership, and his special

assistant and team of writers were deeply familiar not only with the challenges of

multifunctional peace operations but also with the dynamics of the Secretariat

and the larger UN. William Durch, an American based at the Henry L. Stimson

Center, came from outside of the Secretariat and had followed peacekeeping

(and other security issues) closely from a Washington perspective. Salman Ahmed

was one of the two authors of the outstanding yet uncomfortable Srebrenica

report, and a system insider. The Brahimi team was completed by two

Washington-based staff members who contributed to the report’s sections on

information technology issues and transitional administration (Durch et al. 2003,

n. 6). Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette and Kofi Annan’s chief of staff,

Iqbal Riza, became unofficial, ex officio members of the panel. The Secretary-

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 265

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

General gave his views yet also promised that he would implement the panel’s

recommendations (Durch 2001, p. 153).While far from being uncritical of the UN Secretariat’s organizational culture

and aspects of its performance, the final report gave strong support to the

Secretariat on various levels. Not only did it recommend that the Secretary-

General request the General Assembly to grant emergency funding for additional

personnel, the report also argued for a general, substantial increase in resources

for support of peacekeeping operations at Headquarters. It urged ‘the Secretary-

General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements

in full’ (United Nations 2000a, § 197). Moreover, the report bolstered the

Secretariat’s authority towards the UN Security Council by asking it not to comply

with the latter’s preferences for best-case scenarios and low costs (United

Nations 2000a, § 59). It enhanced the Secretariat’s standing vis-a-vis some of the

troop-contributing countries by shaming the practice of sending under-equipped

soldiers and recommending standard inspection procedures (United Nations

2000a, §§ 108�110, 117). The panel also provided recommendations to

strengthen the Secretary-General’s spending and administrative authority as

well as his political authority in the area of prevention.6

In sum, the Secretariat’s leadership bolstered the UN’s weakened peace-

keeping authority by adding authority from this outside panel of experts. The

Secretariat manoeuvred member states into having heads of states and

government grant the UN a mandate for reform that could not be ignored. In

addition, the Secretariat borrowed authority from a panel of eminent experts

whose recommendations would not easily fall prey to allegations of bias. While

the choice not to produce an in-house study came at the cost of some loss of

control, the Secretariat’s leadership still remained closely involved in the panel

process. The final report, while also critical towards the Secretariat, named

states as culprits for many flaws and thereby restored some of the Secretariat’s

authority and strengthened it for future interactions with states.

Adding authority from outside can be considered a departure from standard,

routine behaviour. Nevertheless, the pattern builds on existing rational� legal and

moral authority: the Secretariat and its leadership can claim to take extra-

ordinary steps in order to better assist member states to cooperate in the light of

pressing global challenges.

Pattern II: Overacting

Produce excitement and ownership. The writing process was first andforemost driven from New York by Brahimi and his team. The panel itself came

together three times, twice in New York and once in Geneva. Brahimi solicited the

panel member’s priorities early in the process. Panel members then took a back

seat and mostly commented, including on the two draft versions of the report

presented to them. The timeframe for producing the report was very short, five and

a half months altogether. During the first four month period of researching and

266 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

writing, the team sought as much input from the various peacekeeping stake-

holders (member states, UN Headquarters, field missions, and UN agencies) as

possible (Brahimi 2001, p. 36). The Brahimi team conducted more than

200 interviews which were crucial for the report’s focus. In New York and in

Geneva, members of the UN Secretariat and of UN agencies such as the World Food

Programme, UN Volunteers, and UNICEF, were interviewed. The writing team also

asked every single UN Peace Operation for written input on the three best and the

worst working issues, and they visited the United Nations mission in Kosovo.7 The

short timeframe did not allow for many consultations outside of New York, but some

discussions with the research community took place.

Brahimi was in constant touch with member states at the senior, ambassadorial

level, especially with those of the Security Council’s permanent members, but

also with key states in General Assembly’s C-34. He invited member states to

submit written recommendations to the panel, and frequently met with

permanent representatives, exchanged thoughts and also shared draft versions

of the report. His team, especially Salman Ahmed, was engaged in the same

business at the working level. He profited from good relations with key members

of the C-34 who were asked to host small working lunches where six to eight

representatives at a time could discuss the reform proposals. Brahimi and Ahmed

also attended the informal Security Council weekend retreat on 2�3 June 2000, a

relative new form of meeting introduced by Secretary-General Annan in the

previous year. Although this get-together of Security Council ambassadors with

the Secretary-General and senior Secretariat staff was not solely dedicated to

peacekeeping, the Brahimi Report was an important agenda item.The exchange with the UN Secretariat was less open than with member states.

While the Brahimi team spent much time listening to the implementers of peace

operations at all levels of the hierarchy, only selected staff members of the

Secretariat were kept abreast of the draft. However, channels of communication

with key points in the Secretariat, including the Secretary-General, his chief of

staff and the Deputy Secretary-General, were used all the time*in both

directions. The ownership of the panellists was ensured in the panel’s meetings.

At the third and last meeting, Brahimi pushed hard for producing a consensus

document that all panel members could support and that would significantly

increase the report’s leverage. Although there were differences in opinion, e.g.

with regard to recommending a standing UN army or not, the process of

discussing the draft report line by line until three in the morning led to the

approval of every single panellist.

The extensive consultations that accompanied the writing process had several

effects. On the one hand, they helped the report’s authors to understand the real

problems underlying UN peacekeeping. On the other hand, the purpose of

engaging with so many people was to create excitement about the project as well

as a feeling of ownership of those involved (Brahimi 2001, pp. 34�37, Durch

2004). People at all levels were asked for their views and could feed their

concerns into the process of producing the report. The activities of panel

members at the national level complemented this endeavour. The manner in

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 267

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

which Brahimi and the writing team acted corresponds very well with the

behavioural repertoire for staff of international organizations, although the

extent of consultation exceeded what an international bureaucracy is able to do

under normal circumstances: the Brahimi team gave the impression of acting at

the behest of states and yet at the same time they stood above national

interests; they invoked their independence, and they demonstrated peace-

keeping as well as peacebuilding expertise. In all likelihood, the team was more

successful than a comparable UN team would have been. Preparing such a report

as part of its regular duties of servicing the intergovernmental process,

Secretariat members would presumably have been faced with complaints about

selectivity or bias, and their room for manoeuvre would have been more

restricted.

Provide building blocks for consensus and a pro-reform coalition.Although it was the first time that such a comprehensive analysis had been

carried out in the UN system, commentators and practitioners agree that the

panel’s report did not contain revolutionary novelties (e.g. Gray 2001, p. 268).

While some of the recommendations certainly were innovative, many of them did

not fundamentally differ from what had already been covered in ‘lessons

learned’ reports, reports of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on

Peacekeeping Operations, other reports of the Secretary-General, or in-house

studies such as the report submitted by Under-Secretary-General Goulding

(Goulding 1997). The report’s central message was that member states had to

re-engage in UN peacekeeping:

Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significantinstitutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations willnot be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasksthat Member States assign to it in the coming months and years. (United Nations2000a, §1)

The message was more drastic than what members of the Secretariat had been

arguing in the UN’s political and financial bodies in 1999�2000, although the

essence was the same.Still, critics blamed the Brahimi panel for producing a technical report that

shied away from the ‘real’ political questions (Brahimi 2001, Malone 2001, p. 55,

Bellamy and Williams 2004). Indeed, in a way, this was a strategy used by the

Brahimi team in order to increase the likelihood of follow-up action. The Brahimi

team had attempted to produce a report that could be welcomed by all

stakeholders. The extensive consultations had helped them acquire a profound

understanding of contentious issues that would invoke automatic and possibly

fatal opposition (Durch 2004, p. 4). For instance, the option to institutionalize

the Security Council’s consultations with troop contributors*resisted by its

permanent members, demanded by contributing countries*was mentioned in

the report’s executive summary and in the analysis part; it was not taken up as

one of the key recommendations. Another strategy to cope with sensitive,

268 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

possibly controversial issues was to ‘bury’ them in the more ephemeral parts ofthe report. In addition to the 57 explicit recommendations, the report containedmany more, many of which also were acted upon in the subsequent years (Durch

et al. 2003, Appendix B). Some issues were so explosive that the Brahimi teamdecided not to touch them for fear of diverting attention from any other

concerns and killing the reform momentum. Security Council reform andapportionment of assessment scales for the peacekeeping budget were formally

declared to be outside of the panel’s mandate (United Nations 2000a, § 278). Thereport also omitted any direct reference to arrearages in the payments or to the

issue of gratis personnel. The highly controversial issue of humanitarianintervention was likewise avoided, and conflict prevention was only lightlytouched upon. Other recommendations deemed necessary but yet unrealizable

were also left out.In sum, the Brahimi team tried to create conditions conducive for overall

peacekeeping reforms by using various strategies. While safeguarding theindependence of the panel, they gave key peacekeeping stakeholders the

opportunity to present their ideas and concerns and created an atmosphere ofexpectation and urgency. They selectively applied their knowledge about red

lines and strongly held demands to the drafts of the report in order to create adocument that everyone could at least partly support. Of course, the Brahimi

team cannot be equated with the UN Secretariat. Indeed, it is noteworthy thatthe team kept their distance from the larger international bureaucracy not leastout of concern about the Secretariat’s ability to organize resistance. Yet the

Brahimi team was in close touch with the Secretariat’s leadership and several ofits members were also part of the international bureaucracy, therefore it seems

plausible to subsume these activities under behavioural patterns of theSecretariat. The activities grouped in the pattern named overacting correspond

very well with the previously identified ideal-type behaviour of internationalbureaucracies. However, given the workload involved, and also the degree of

scepticism towards the UN Secretariat at that time, it is distinct from regularduties.

Pattern III: Stretching the mandate

Even before it had received the blessing of heads of states and governments at

the Millennium Summit, the Secretary-General took the report to contain amandate sufficient for immediate follow-up action. He decided to press aheadwith the implementation of those recommendations that fell into his purview. In

addition, he urged ‘all Member States to join me in considering, approving andsupporting the implementation of those recommendations’ (United Nations

2000a, p. i). It was not at all mandatory that the report of an independentcommission, requested by the Secretary-General, would be discussed by the UN’s

legislative bodies, or that it would even trigger implementation reports. The firstimplementation report was submitted to the General Assembly not even a month

after the report’s issuance, followed a week later by the budget plans (United

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 269

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

Nations 2000b, 2000c). The implementation report (29 pages) and budget plans

(roughly 100 pages) provided detailed information on the financial and opera-

tional implications of the panel’s recommendations. Political and financial

approval was sought for emergency funding and projects that should be

implemented in the subsequent four months. Because the actual reform report

and the implementation reports were submitted in such a short interval, the

regular policy process of the General Assembly was bypassed or at least

shortened. The reports were submitted to the General Assembly’s finance bodies

(ACABQ, Fifth Committee) before the political bodies (C-34 and Fourth

Committee) had finished their debate. The C-34 convened an extraordinary

session to discuss the report and implementation plans. For the UN, this swift

action was ‘lightning speed’ (NGO Committee on Disarmament 2001).

The Secretariat dedicated a lot of energy to the implementation process.

Brahimi remained in New York and promoted the report’s implementation,

briefing the Security Council, the General Assembly’s responsible bodies and

various regional groups such as the NAM, G77, African Group, Arab League and

the Latin American Group (Brahimi 2001, p. 38). Deputy Secretary-General Louise

Frechette was designated to follow up on the report’s recommendations and to

oversee the preparation of a detailed implementation plan. Salman Ahmed

switched to the implementation side and became a key person in putting

together the input of the 17 thematic interagency working groups that had been

created to discuss the report’s implications and to align the different players

within the UN System. The Secretariat accentuated the Brahimi Report’s

recommendations in two directions. On the one hand, it provided further

explanation or re-formulated recommendations that were met with opposition

when the report was published (e.g. on doctrine, on the UN’s preparations for

transitional administration, on UN ‘intelligence’). On the other hand, it took up

and expanded on aspects that had been neglected by the initial report (e.g.

creation of a gender unit in DPKO, HIV/Aids). Moreover, the Secretariat set its

priorities by accordingly allocating resources to the implementation of different

recommendations. As Durch observed, ‘Far more staff hours were put into the

implementation reports*substantive and financial*that followed just 60 days

after the release of the Brahimi Report than were put into the original report,

but the original report gave them a touchstone, and a political cover’ (Durch

2004, p. 4).

In sum, the Secretariat’s leadership interpreted the Brahimi Report*which it

had itself initiated and helped to produce*as a sufficient mandate for

implementing the reform proposals. Interpreting the panel’s report according

to what it deemed important and promising, it sought to make use of the window

of opportunity it had helped to create. This put the Secretariat in a position

where it could yield its rational legal authority and produce implementation

reports for decision-making bodies. Because of staff overlap with the Brahimi

panel, the Secretariat could fine-tune the implementation reports to increase

the likelihood that the reform proposals would be implemented. In addition, the

Secretariat counted on key member states’ approval of reforms at the Millennium

270 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

Summit and changed the normal order of proceedings by handing in its

implementation reports simultaneously to the political and the financial bodies.

This mandate stretching8 was not fully successful. Developing countries were

not as supportive of the Brahimi reforms as industrialized states. Some

developing countries felt deprived of their prerogative to debate peacekeeping

questions in the C-34 and publicly questioned the right of the Secretary-General

to do so (Brahimi 2001). In the end, the financial bodies did not begin serious

negotiations before the political bodies had concluded their debate. It should

take two implementation rounds for the Secretariat to gain much of the

requested resources (Durch et al. 2003).

III Conclusions

From a constructivist perspective, authority is key to explaining influence of

international organizations on world politics. Authority is not a fixed quality any

actor may possess. Instead it is produced in social interactions. The main concern

of this article was to explore how international organizations re(generate)

authority*and possibly influence. For this purpose, I used the concept of

authority and authority-generating behaviour as analytical tools for examining

how the UN regained authority in the area of peacekeeping after a serious loss of

authority at the end of the 1990s.The case study demonstrates that international bureaucracies may undertake

actions that are outside of their routine behaviour in order to regain lost authority.

Three behavioural patterns were identified that were enacted by the Secretariat

in order to get member states’ backing for urgent peacekeeping reforms, namely

adding authority, overacting, and mandate stretching. At the same time, the

analysis shows that these activities are still related to what was identified as ideal-

type behaviour of international bureaucracies, considered to (re)produce moral,

expert, delegated, and rational� legal authority. Adding authority from heads of

state and government as well as from a panel of independent experts was the

pattern most distinct from routine interactions. It is probably more common a

procedure for an international bureaucracy to commission external studies for

capacity or other reasons. To do so with the explicit intention of generating public

attention cannot be repeated too often or on a regular basis unless risking the

strategy’s uniqueness. Likewise, while large UN summits take place periodically

and many other international organizations hold similar high-level meetings,

borrowing authority from heads of state and government can still be considered an

exceptional strategy. However, the pattern of adding authority builds on existing

moral and rational� legal authority. The international bureaucracy could claim to

act in the interest of states faced with important policy choices.

Borrowing authority provided the foundation for the other two patterns of

behaviour which correspond more directly with the ideal-type behaviour, despite

interesting differences. The activities grouped under the term overacting, while

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 271

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

in essence very akin to ideal-type behaviour, could arguably not be performed as

part of routine tasks. Not only did they require more intensive interactions

between Secretariat actors and peacekeeping stakeholders which might not be

easily reconciled with the regular workload. More importantly, the activities

were similarly based on creating a sense of urgency and uniqueness. The third

pattern, mandate stretching, is more in line with routine action. In all likelihood,

it is a strategy that many international bureaucracies attempt. In the Brahimi

case, it is characterized by the international bureaucracy taking advantage of a

created window of opportunity by means of its routine tasks such as supporting

intergovernmental decision-making and implementing decisions. In order not to

lose the momentum, the international bureaucracy took liberty in generously

interpreting its mandate for reform.The case study moreover provides evidence that international bureaucracies

indeed may succeed in (re)generating authority of an international organization.

While the Brahimi process surely did not solve all UN peacekeeping problems, it led

to a strengthening of all four discussed forms of the UN’s authority. Even without a

comparative assessment of the authority in which the UN was held in the field of

peacekeeping by the main stakeholders prior to and after the publication of the

Brahimi Report, there are signs for significant gains. For instance, Western states

re-engaged and found agreement with developing countries that DPKO should be

significantly strengthened. That states this time followed the Secretariat’s

recommendations for the increase of resources and personnel for peacekeeping

tasks is an indicator that the UN was held in higher rational� legal and expert

authority. Another indicator would be the Secretariat’s stronger position vis-a-vis

the Security Council. DPKO reportedly was able to insist more successfully on its

peacekeeping expertise when faced with politically motivated or budget-

conscious objections to its recommendations. Last but not least, the UN gained

delegated authority, as the number of complex peace operations rose again.

This evidence of successful manipulation is even more interesting when we take

into account that the international bureaucracy in question, the UN Secretariat,

does not score high in terms of competences, size, resources, or independence,

when compared with actors such as the World Bank or EU Commission. Moreover, in

the policy field of security, member states are considered to guard their

sovereignty closely and are more hesitant to delegate authority to international

organizations. If there is evidence that even under these limiting conditions an

international bureaucracy can effectively intervene in the process of authority

(re)generation*including the (re)generation of delegated authority*the con-

ception of the strictly hierarchical relation between principals and agents, as

assumed by principal�agent scholars, is challenged.It would be tempting to attribute the authority gains and the renewed

popularity of peacekeeping solely to successful activities by the international

bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the growing evidence of agency and sometimes

significant influence of international bureaucracies, it is nevertheless important

to take into account favourable conditions that helped the international

bureaucracy’s activities to succeed, or consider rival explanations. This is also

272 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

necessary because, for instance, the pattern of borrowing authority from expertpanels can be observed on various other occasions, but with much more limitedsuccess (Luck 2000).

It seems immediately plausible that a changed constellation of interestsamong member states in 2000 was a factor that contributed to the overall

success. (Western) states realized after Kosovo and East Timor that they stillneeded the UN. Hence, the relatively moderate sums for peacekeeping reform

were well spent. Similarly, troop-contributing countries were concerned aboutthe safety and security of their personnel. This made it possible to forge

consensus. In addition, the Secretariat’s activities might have benefited from anexternal shock. In spring 1999*when the Brahimi Report was written*morethan 200 ill-equipped UN peacekeepers were taken hostage in Sierra Leone and

were only liberated two months later in a forceful military intervention by theUnited Kingdom (Olonisakin 2008, pp. 53�70). Likewise, bureaucratic leadership

seems to have been an important factor for the overall success that stands outfrom other attempts of the UN to regain authority in other policy fields such as

development, or economic and financial questions.Further research is required not only to better understand the Secretariat’s

role in UN peacekeeping but also to get a better grasp of the role of internationalbureaucracies in the processes of authority (re)generation and influence on world

politics. More systematic knowledge on international bureaucracies and enablingor constraining factors on their agency is important not only from an academicperspective. Faced with an ever increasing number of political, economic or

environmental problems that need to be tackled at the global level, there is ademand for a well-functioning global governance architecture. How international

bureaucracies may help or hinder in this regard is a question that warrantsfurther investigation.

Acknowledgements

For comments on earlier versions of this article, the author is grateful to

Michael Bauer, the editors, and various colleagues from the Intercultural andInternational Studies (InIIS) and CRC 597 ‘Transformations of the State’,

University Bremen, as well as to interlocutors in New York and Washington forkindly sharing their insights. Financial assistance from the German Research

Foundation gratefully acknowledged.

Notes on Contributor

Silke Weinlich is a political scientist and has been working at the German DevelopmentInstitute/Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) as a researcher since 2009. She

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 273

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

previously worked at the Institute for Intercultural and International Studies and at theCollaborative Research Center ‘Transformations of the State’ in Bremen. Her researchinterests include the United Nations in the areas of development, peacebuilding andpeacekeeping as well as international organisations and their bureaucracies. (silke.weinlich@die.gdi.de)

Notes

1 The actual beneficiaries, the population of countries where UN peace operations aredeployed, are notably absent from this list of peacekeeping stakeholders. The reputationand authority that UN peace operations enjoy among local populations remain a minorfactor in UN peacekeeping decision-making (see Pouligny 2006).2 A similar strategy was successfully used at the World Summit in 2005. In spite ofincreased North�South tensions, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human RightsCouncil could be established (Brown 2008, p. 5).3 In addition to Brahimi, the members of the panel were Brian Atwood (United States),former head of the United States Agency for International Development; Colin Granderson(Trinidad and Tobago), former head of the Organization of American States (OAS)/UNInternational Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH); Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), formerSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General to Cyprus; Richard Monk (United King-dom), former Police Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF); KlausNaumann (Germany), former Chief of the German defence staff and former Chairman ofthe Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Hisako Shimura(Japan), President of Tsuda College in Japan, former official in the United NationsDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations; Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), Ambas-sador at large, former Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to theUnited Nations; Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), former Force Commander of the UnitedNations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III); and Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzer-land), former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).4 The mandate was to ‘undertake a thorough review of United Nations peace andsecurity activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practicalrecommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in thefuture’ (see United Nations 2000a, p. 1.)5 According to this perception, the principles and legal foundations of ‘peacekeepingoperations’ were established and clear (consent, minimal use of force, impartiality),whereas ‘peace operations’ opened the door to more intrusive policies authorized by aSecurity Council that is dominated by the West.6 For an assessment of the Brahimi Report’s recommendation, see e.g. Gray (2001) andBratt and Gionet (2001).7 Field Visits to East Timor and Sierra Leone had also been scheduled, but the lack oftime and a hostage crisis in Sierra Leone prevented them.8 Bauer (2002) also uses this term; according to his understanding, it describes how theEU Commission takes a risk and defies the Council’s explicit or implicit wishes.

References

Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D., 1998. Why states act through formal internationalorganizations. Journal of conflict resolution, 42 (1), 3�32.

Barnett, M., 2002. Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press.

274 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M., 1999. The politics, power and pathologies of internationalorganizations. International organization, 53 (4), 699�732.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M., 2004. Rules for the world: international organizations inglobal politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M., 2005. The power of liberal international organizations. In:M. Barnett and R. Duvall, eds. Power in global governance. Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press, 161�184.

Bauer, M.W., 2002. Limitations to agency control in EU policy-making*the Commissionand the poverty programmes. Journal of common market studies, 40 (3), 381�400.

Bauer, S., 2006. Does bureaucracy really matter? The authority of intergovernmentaltreaty secretariats in global environmental politics. Global environmental politics, 6(1), 23�49.

Bauer, S. and Weinlich, S., 2011. International bureaucracies: organizing world politics. In:B. Reinalda, ed. The Ashgate research companion to non-state actors. Aldershot:Ashgate, 252�262.

Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P., 2004. Conclusion: what future for peace operations?Brahimi and beyond. International peacekeeping, 11 (1), 183�212.

Berman, E.G., 2002. French, UK, and US policies to support peacekeeping in Africa:Current status and future prospects. NUPI Paper No. 622. Oslo: Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs.

Biermann, F. and Siebenhuner, B., eds, 2009. Managers of global change. The influence ofinternational environmental bureaucracies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Boulden, J., 2006. Double standards, distance and disengagement: collective legitimiza-tion in the post-cold war security council. Security dialogue, 37 (3), 409�423.

Brahimi, L., 2001. Overview of the Brahimi Report. In: N. Azimi and C.L. Lin, eds. Thereform process of the United Nations peace operations. Debriefing and lessons. TheHague: Kluwer Law, 33�92.

Bratt, D. and Gionet, E., 2001. Evaluating the Brahimi Report. University of Calgary,Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Strategic Datalink No. 96.

Brown, M.M., 2008. The John W. Holmes lecture: Can the UN be reformed? Globalgovernance, 14 (1), 1�12.

Daniel, D.C.F. and Caraher, L.C., 2006. Characteristics of troop contributors to peaceoperations and implications for global capacity. International peacekeeping, 13 (3),297�315.

Durch, W., 2001. Implementation of the Brahimi Report. Hopes unfulfilled? In: W. Kuhne,ed. The Brahimi Report. Overcoming the North�South divide. Berlin: German Institutefor International and Security Affairs, 153�156.

Durch, W.J., 2004. Building a better peace operation: lessons from the Brahimi Report.Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center.

Durch, W.J., 2006a. Are we learning yet? The long road to applying best practices. In:W.J. Durch, ed. 21st century peace operations. Washington, DC: United States Institutefor Peace Press, 573�608.

Durch, W.J., 2006b. Restoring and maintaining peace: what we know so far. In: W.J. Durch,ed. Twenty-first century peace operations. Washington, DC: United States Institute ofPeace Press, 1�48.

Durch, W.J., et al., 2003. The Brahimi Report and the future of UN peace operations.Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center.

Dziedzic, M.J., 2006. Kosovo. In: W.J. Durch, ed. Twenty-first century peace operations.Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 319�387.

Goulding, M., 1997. Practical measures to enhance the United Nations effectiveness inthe field of peace and security. Unpublished Manuscript.

Gray, C., 2001. Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: is there a crisis of credibility forthe UN? Journal of conflict and security law, 6 (2), 267�288.

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 275

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

Griffin, M., 1999. Retrenchment, reform, and regionalization: trends in UN peace supportoperations. International peacekeeping, 6 (1), 1�31.

Guehenno, J.M., 2002. The United Nations post-Brahimi: an interview with the UN UnderSecretary-General for Peace Operations. Journal of international affairs, 55 (2), 489�500.

Hafner-Burton, E.M., Von Stein, J. and Gartzke, E., 2008. International organizationscount. Journal of conflict resolution, 52 (2), 175�188.

Haftel, Y.Z. and Thompson, A., 2006. The independence of international organizations:concept and applications. Journal of conflict resolution, 50 (2), 253�275.

Hawkins, D.G., et al., eds, 2006. Delegation and agency in international organizations,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holt, V.K. and Mackinnon, M.G., 2008. The origins and evolution of US policy towardspeace operations. International peacekeeping, 15 (1), 18�34.

Hulme, D., 2007. The making of the Millennium Development Goals: human developmentmeets results-based management in an imperfect world. Brooks World PovertyInstitute Working Paper No. 16. Manchester: The University of Manchester.

International Peace Academy, 2002. Challenges in peacekeeping. Past, present andfuture. Seminar Report, New York: IPA/UN DPKO Best Practices Unit.

Liese, A. and Weinlich, S., 2006. Die Rolle von Verwaltungsstaben internationalerOrganisationen. Lucken, Tucken und Konturen eines (neuen) Forschungsgebiets. In:J. Bogumil, W. Jann and F. Nullmeier, eds. Politik und Verwaltung. PVS-Sonderheft 37.Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 491�526.

Luck, E.C., 2000. Blue ribbon power: independent commissions and UN reform.International Studies Perspectives, 1 (1), 89�104.

Malone, D., 2001. Overview of the Brahimi Report. In: N. Azimi and C.L. Lin, eds. Thereform process of the United Nations peace operations. Debriefing and lessons. TheHague: Kluwer Law, 47�92.

Malone, D.M., 2003. Ingredients of success or failure in UN reform efforts. UnpublishedManuscript.

Malone, D. and Hagman, L., 2002. The north�south divide at the United Nations: fading atlast? Security dialogue, 33 (4), 399�414.

Mcclure, R.L. and Orlov, M., 1999. Is the UN peacekeeping role in eclipse? Parameters. USArmy War College quarterly, XXIX, 96�105.

NGO Committee on Disarmament, 2001. Implementation of the Brahimi Report. Transcriptof Panel Discussion, 12 April, New York.

Olonisakin, F., 2008. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. The story of UNAMSIL. Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner.

Pollack, M., 2007. Principal�agent analysis and international delegation: red herrings,theoretical clarification, and empirical disputes. Bruges Political Research PapersNo.2. Bruges: College of Europe.

Pouligny, B., 2006. Peace operations seen from below. UN missions and local people.Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Ruggie, J.G., 2003. The United Nations and globalization: patterns and limits ofinstitutional adaption. Global governance, 9 (3), 301�321.

Tardy, T., 2004. The Brahimi Report: four years on. Proceedings of a Workshop held at theGeneva Centre for Security Policy. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Traub, J., 2006. The best intentions. Kofi Annan and the UN in the era of American power.London: Bloomsbury.

United Nations, 1992. An agenda for peace. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant tothe statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January1992. UN Document Number A/47/277; S/24111, 17 June.

United Nations, 1999a. Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the UnitedNations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. UN Document Number S/1999/1257, 16December.

276 WEINLICH

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013

United Nations, 1999b. Report on the fall of Srebrenica. UN Document Number A/54/549,15 November.

United Nations, 2000a. Report of the panel on United Nations peace operations. UNDocument Number A/55/305; S/2000/809, 21 August.

United Nations, 2000b. Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of thereport of the Panel on United Nations peace operations. UN Document Number A/55/502, 20 October.

United Nations, 2000c. Resource requirements for implementation of the report of thepanel on United Nations peace operations. Report of the Secretary-General. UNDocument Number A/55/507, 27 October.

Vaubel, R., 2006. Principal�agent problems in international organisations. Review ofinternational organizations, 1 (2), 125�138.

Verbeek, B., 1998. International organizations: the ugly duckling of international relationstheory? In: B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek, eds. Autonomous policy making by internationalorganizations. London: Routledge, 11�26.

(RE)GENERATING PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY 277

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

egin

a] a

t 09:

41 3

1 M

ay 2

013